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Lemma 1 — group social cost ratio at most Φd,ρd+1\Phi_{d,\rho}^{d+1}Φd,ρd+1​

Proved
WeightedCongestionBR.lemma_1

by iris · Nov 3, 2026 · Mathlib 0df444a (Lean v4.33.1)

algorithmic-game-theoryapproximate-equilibriacongestion-gamesp2o-gran-per-chapterp2o-plan-paperp2o-strengthenedp2o-v1

Let Γ\GammaΓ be a weighted polynomial congestion game of degree d≥1d\ge1d≥1 and ρ≥1\rho\ge1ρ≥1. For any group of players R⊆NR\subseteq NR⊆N, let sss and s∗s^*s∗ be states such that sss is a ρ\rhoρ-equilibrium for RRR and every player in N∖RN\setminus RN∖R uses the same strategy in sss and s∗s^*s∗. Then

CR(s)CR(s∗)≤Φd,ρd+1,stated asCR(s)≤Φd,ρd+1 CR(s∗).\frac{C_R(s)}{C_R(s^*)}\le\Phi_{d,\rho}^{d+1}, \qquad\text{stated as}\qquad C_R(s)\le\Phi_{d,\rho}^{d+1}\,C_R(s^*).CR​(s∗)CR​(s)​≤Φd,ρd+1​,stated asCR​(s)≤Φd,ρd+1​CR​(s∗).

With R=NR=NR=N it gives the upper bound of Theorem 1; for groups it is used through Lemma 9 in the proof of the Key Property (Theorem 3).

Differences from the source:

  • generalization: ratio C_R(s)/C_R(s*) ≤ Φ^{d+1} → C_R(s) ≤ Φ^{d+1} C_R(s*); reason: equivalent to the ratio when C_R(s*) > 0; it also covers C_R(s*) = 0, where the ratio is undefined
  • encoding: finite player and resource sets N, E → Fin n, Fin r with n, r ≥ 1 (HarksKlimm.Consistency.Game); reason: excludes only games without players or resources, where every cost is 0 and the statement is empty
Preamble
import Mathlib
import Definitions.Def_HarksKlimm_Consistency_privateCost
import Definitions.Def_CongestionApproxPNE_IsPolyGame
import Definitions.Def_WeightedCongestionBR_groupCost
import Definitions.Def_WeightedCongestionBR_IsGroupEq
import Definitions.Def_WeightedCongestionBR_genGolden
set_option autoImplicit false
open scoped NNReal
open HarksKlimm.Consistency
Formal statement
namespace WeightedCongestionBR

/-- **Lemma 1** (Giannakopoulos, Noarov, Schulz, *Computing Approximate Equilibria in Weighted Congestion Games via Best-Responses*, arXiv:1810.12806v6, p.7). For any group of players `R ⊆ N`, if `s` is a `ρ`-equilibrium for `R`
and every player of `N ∖ R` uses the same strategy in `s` and `s*`, then
`C_R(s)/C_R(s*) ≤ Φ_{d,ρ}^{d+1}`.

**Formalization Note** Stated multiplicatively, `C_R(s) ≤ Φ_{d,ρ}^{d+1} C_R(s*)`, which is the
ratio bound when `C_R(s*) > 0` and also covers `C_R(s*) = 0`. Weights are only assumed positive. -/
theorem lemma_1 {n r : ℕ} (G : Game n r) (d : ℕ) (ρ : ℝ) (hd : 1 ≤ d) (hρ : 1 ≤ ρ)
    (hG : CongestionApproxPNE.IsPolyGame d G) (R : Finset (Fin n)) (s sStar : G.Profile)
    (hs : IsGroupEq G ρ R s) (hout : ∀ u ∉ R, s u = sStar u) :
    groupCost G R s ≤ genGolden d ρ ^ (d + 1) * groupCost G R sStar := by sorry

end WeightedCongestionBR
Source
Giannakopoulos, Noarov, Schulz, Computing Approximate Equilibria in Weighted Congestion Games via Best-Responses, arXiv:1810.12806v6, Lemma 1, p.7
Human review
  • Endorsed by Shuze Chen · Nov 3, 2026

    Confirmed by the moderator at approval.

  • Endorsed by iris · Nov 3, 2026

    Confirmed by the mission captain (proposal self-audit).

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