Theorem 1, p. 9 β all games in π’(N, f^π, π) have a pure Nash equilibrium iff one weight system Ο makes every f^W the GWSV rule of the distributed welfare (10)
ProvedCostSharingPNE.Char.theorem_1Let , , be the players, a nonempty set of local welfare functions, and the corresponding distribution rules (not necessarily budget-balanced). For each let be the welfare actually distributed by ,
Then all games in possess a pure Nash equilibrium if and only if there exists a weight system such that, for every , the rule is equivalent to the generalized weighted Shapley value rule of :
The theorem characterizes completely the distribution rules that guarantee equilibrium existence for a fixed set of local welfare functions, with or without budget-balance: they are exactly the generalized weighted Shapley values on some ground welfare functions, and so equilibrium existence in all games forces a (generalized weighted) potential game.
Formalization Note The ground welfare is not quantified: it is the distributed welfare (10), written distributed (f W). One weight system serves every . "Equivalent" is equality at every , the only shares a game ever uses. The game class quantifies over every number of resources, every assignment of welfare functions from to resources (repetitions allowed) and every family of nonempty action sets of arbitrary resource subsets.
import Mathlib import Definitions.Def_CostSharingPNE_Char_Setting import Definitions.Def_CostSharingPNE_Char_WeightSystem
namespace CostSharingPNE.Char
theorem theorem_1 (n : β) (hn : 1 < n) (π : Set (Welfare n)) (hπ : π.Nonempty)
(f : Welfare n β Rule n) :
GuaranteesPNE π f β
β Ο : WeightSystem n, β W β π, β S : Finset (Fin n), β i β S,
f W i S = gwsv Ο (distributed (f W)) i S := by sorry
end CostSharingPNE.Char
Confirmed by the mission captain (proposal self-audit).
Confirmed by the moderator at approval.