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Theorem 1, p. 9 β€” all games in 𝒒(N, f^π•Ž, π•Ž) have a pure Nash equilibrium iff one weight system Ο‰ makes every f^W the GWSV rule of the distributed welfare (10)

Proved
CostSharingPNE.Char.theorem_1

by mikedeng1 Β· Oct 8, 2026 Β· Mathlib 0df444a (Lean v4.33.1)

characterizationcost-sharingnash-equilibriump2o-batch-pfp2ap2o-gran-per-chapterp2o-plan-paperp2o-v1potential-gameshapley-value

Let N={1,…,n}N=\{1,\dots,n\}N={1,…,n}, n>1n>1n>1, be the players, W\mathbb WW a nonempty set of local welfare functions, and fW={fW}W∈Wf^{\mathbb W}=\{f^W\}_{W\in\mathbb W}fW={fW}W∈W​ the corresponding distribution rules (not necessarily budget-balanced). For each W∈WW\in\mathbb WW∈W let Wβ€²=gSV(W)W'=g_{SV}(W)Wβ€²=gSV​(W) be the welfare actually distributed by fWf^WfW,

(βˆ€SβŠ†N)Wβ€²(S)=βˆ‘i∈SfW(i,S).(10)(\forall S\subseteq N)\qquad W'(S)=\sum_{i\in S} f^W(i,S). \tag{10}(βˆ€SβŠ†N)Wβ€²(S)=i∈Sβˆ‘β€‹fW(i,S).(10)

Then all games in G(N,fW,W)\mathcal G(N,f^{\mathbb W},\mathbb W)G(N,fW,W) possess a pure Nash equilibrium if and only if there exists a weight system Ο‰\omegaΟ‰ such that, for every W∈WW\in\mathbb WW∈W, the rule fWf^WfW is equivalent to the generalized weighted Shapley value rule of Wβ€²W'Wβ€²:

fW(i,S)=fGWSVWβ€²[Ο‰](i,S)forΒ allΒ SβŠ†NΒ andΒ i∈S.f^W(i,S)=f^{W'}_{GWSV}[\omega](i,S)\qquad\text{for all } S\subseteq N \text{ and } i\in S .fW(i,S)=fGWSVW′​[Ο‰](i,S)forΒ allΒ SβŠ†NΒ andΒ i∈S.

The theorem characterizes completely the distribution rules that guarantee equilibrium existence for a fixed set of local welfare functions, with or without budget-balance: they are exactly the generalized weighted Shapley values on some ground welfare functions, and so equilibrium existence in all games forces a (generalized weighted) potential game.

Formalization Note The ground welfare is not quantified: it is the distributed welfare (10), written distributed (f W). One weight system serves every W∈WW\in\mathbb WW∈W. "Equivalent" is equality at every i∈Si\in Si∈S, the only shares a game ever uses. The game class quantifies over every number m>1m>1m>1 of resources, every assignment of welfare functions from W\mathbb WW to resources (repetitions allowed) and every family of nonempty action sets of arbitrary resource subsets.

Preamble
import Mathlib
import Definitions.Def_CostSharingPNE_Char_Setting
import Definitions.Def_CostSharingPNE_Char_WeightSystem
Formal statement
namespace CostSharingPNE.Char

theorem theorem_1 (n : β„•) (hn : 1 < n) (π•Ž : Set (Welfare n)) (hπ•Ž : π•Ž.Nonempty)
    (f : Welfare n β†’ Rule n) :
    GuaranteesPNE π•Ž f ↔
      βˆƒ Ο‰ : WeightSystem n, βˆ€ W ∈ π•Ž, βˆ€ S : Finset (Fin n), βˆ€ i ∈ S,
        f W i S = gwsv Ο‰ (distributed (f W)) i S := by sorry

end CostSharingPNE.Char
Source
Gopalakrishnan, Marden, Wierman, arXiv:1402.3610v1, Theorem 1 and (10), p. 9
Human review
  • Endorsed by Shuze Chen Β· Oct 9, 2026

    Confirmed by the moderator at approval.

  • Endorsed by mikedeng1 Β· Oct 9, 2026

    Confirmed by the mission captain (proposal self-audit).

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