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Kuhn's theorem for finite AJ games

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AJGames.kuhn

by martelus trismortuus · Nov 18, 2026 · Mathlib 0df444a (Lean v4.33.1)

game-semanticsonline-algorithms

Let AAA be a game with finitely many moves whose positions have bounded length.

  1. For every behaviour strategy β\betaβ there is a probability distribution μ\muμ on deterministic strategies such that, for every script rrr and every play ppp,
Pr⁡β[play-out against r ends at p]=∑σμ(σ) Pr⁡σ[play-out against r ends at p].\Pr_\beta[\text{play-out against } r \text{ ends at } p]=\sum_\sigma\mu(\sigma)\,\Pr_\sigma[\text{play-out against } r\text{ ends at } p].βPr​[play-out against r ends at p]=σ∑​μ(σ)σPr​[play-out against r ends at p].
  1. Conversely, every such distribution μ\muμ has a behaviour strategy β\betaβ with the same play-out distributions.

AJ plays record the whole history, so Player has perfect recall.

Preamble
import Mathlib
import Definitions.Def_AJGames_Behaviour
Formal statement
namespace AJGames

open scoped ENNReal

universe u

/-- **Kuhn's theorem for finite AJ games.** In a game with finitely many moves and plays of bounded
length, every behaviour strategy has a mixed strategy (a probability distribution on deterministic
strategies) with the same play-out distribution against every Opponent script, and every mixed
strategy has an equivalent behaviour strategy. -/
theorem kuhn {A : Game.{u}} [Finite A.M] (hfin : ∃ N : ℕ, ∀ s ∈ A.pos, s.length ≤ N) :
    (∀ β : BehStrategy A, ∃ μ : PMF (Strategy A), ∀ rs p : List A.M,
      playOut β [] rs p = ∑' σ, μ σ * playOut (ofStrategy σ) [] rs p) ∧
    (∀ μ : PMF (Strategy A), ∃ β : BehStrategy A, ∀ rs p : List A.M,
      playOut β [] rs p = ∑' σ, μ σ * playOut (ofStrategy σ) [] rs p) := by sorry

end AJGames
Source
H. W. Kuhn, Extensive games and the problem of information, Contributions to the Theory of Games II, Annals of Mathematics Studies 28 (1953) 193-216, Theorem 4 (behaviour and mixed strategies are equivalent under perfect recall), for the finite AJ games of S. Abramsky, R. Jagadeesan, Games and full completeness for multiplicative linear logic, J. Symbolic Logic 59(2) (1994) 543-574, https://arxiv.org/abs/1311.6057
Read-back

What the Lean code literally says, in plain math · claude-opus-5-5

Read-back of kuhn (behavioural and mixed strategies give the same outcome distributions).

Setting. A game AAA consists of a type of moves MAM_AMA​, a labelling λA:MA→{P,O}\lambda_A : M_A \to \{P, O\}λA​:MA​→{P,O}, and a set PosA\mathrm{Pos}_APosA​ of finite sequences of moves (the positions) such that: the empty sequence ε\varepsilonε is a position; every prefix of a position is a position; and in every position consecutive moves carry different labels (λA\lambda_AλA​ alternates). Nothing requires a position to start with an OOO-move, and positions may be of any finite length.

A (deterministic) strategy σ\sigmaσ on AAA is a set of sequences (its carrier) such that: ε∈σ\varepsilon \in \sigmaε∈σ; σ⊆PosA\sigma \subseteq \mathrm{Pos}_Aσ⊆PosA​; σ\sigmaσ is prefix-closed; every nonempty sequence in σ\sigmaσ begins with an OOO-labelled move; determinism: if sa∈σs a \in \sigmasa∈σ and sb∈σs b \in \sigmasb∈σ with a,ba, ba,b both PPP-labelled then a=ba = ba=b; receptivity: if s∈σs \in \sigmas∈σ, aaa is OOO-labelled and sa∈PosAs a \in \mathrm{Pos}_Asa∈PosA​, then sa∈σs a \in \sigmasa∈σ. A strategy is not required to answer every OOO-move (it may stop). Two strategies are equal iff their carriers are equal.

Write LastO(s)\mathrm{Last}_O(s)LastO​(s) for "sss is nonempty and its last move is OOO-labelled" (the Lean name is PlayerToMove). A behavioural strategy β\betaβ assigns to every finite sequence sss (not only positions) a probability distribution β(s)\beta(s)β(s) on MA∪{⊥}M_A \cup \{\bot\}MA​∪{⊥}, where ⊥\bot⊥ means "make no move/stop", subject to: if β(s)(a)>0\beta(s)(a) > 0β(s)(a)>0 for a move aaa, then LastO(s)\mathrm{Last}_O(s)LastO​(s), λA(a)=P\lambda_A(a) = PλA​(a)=P, and (if s∈PosAs \in \mathrm{Pos}_As∈PosA​) sa∈PosAs a \in \mathrm{Pos}_Asa∈PosA​. Consequently, whenever sss is empty or ends in a PPP-move, β(s)\beta(s)β(s) is the point mass at ⊥\bot⊥. The distribution β(s)\beta(s)β(s) may depend on the whole history sss.

From a strategy σ\sigmaσ one gets a behavioural strategy σ^\hat\sigmaσ^: σ^(s)\hat\sigma(s)σ^(s) is the point mass at bbb if there is a PPP-labelled bbb with sb∈σs b \in \sigmasb∈σ (some such bbb chosen by choice; by determinism it is unique), and the point mass at ⊥\bot⊥ otherwise.

Play against a script. For a behavioural strategy β\betaβ, a current sequence sss and an opponent script r=(r1,…,rk)r = (r_1, \dots, r_k)r=(r1​,…,rk​) (a fixed finite list of moves, chosen in advance and not reacting to β\betaβ's moves), the outcome distribution Outβ(s,r)\mathrm{Out}_\beta(s, r)Outβ​(s,r) on finite sequences is defined recursively:

  • if rrr is empty, the outcome is sss with probability 111;
  • if r=r1::r′r = r_1 :: r'r=r1​::r′ and r1r_1r1​ is OOO-labelled and sr1∈PosAs r_1 \in \mathrm{Pos}_Asr1​∈PosA​: draw o∼β(sr1)o \sim \beta(s r_1)o∼β(sr1​); if o=⊥o = \boto=⊥ the outcome is sr1s r_1sr1​ (the rest of the script is discarded); if o=ao = ao=a, continue with Outβ(sr1a,r′)\mathrm{Out}_\beta(s r_1 a, r')Outβ​(sr1​a,r′);
  • otherwise (the next script move is PPP-labelled or illegal) the outcome is sss and the rest of the script is discarded.

The theorem uses only Outβ(ε,r)\mathrm{Out}_\beta(\varepsilon, r)Outβ​(ε,r), i.e. play from the empty sequence.

Statement. Let AAA be a game whose move type MAM_AMA​ is finite, and suppose there is N∈NN \in \mathbb{N}N∈N with ∣s∣≤N|s| \le N∣s∣≤N for every s∈PosAs \in \mathrm{Pos}_As∈PosA​. Then both of the following hold:

  1. For every behavioural strategy β\betaβ on AAA there exists a probability distribution μ\muμ on the set of strategies on AAA such that for every script rrr and every finite sequence ppp,
Pr⁡[Outβ(ε,r)=p]  =  ∑σμ(σ) Pr⁡[Outσ^(ε,r)=p].\Pr[\mathrm{Out}_\beta(\varepsilon, r) = p] \;=\; \sum_{\sigma} \mu(\sigma)\, \Pr[\mathrm{Out}_{\hat\sigma}(\varepsilon, r) = p].Pr[Outβ​(ε,r)=p]=σ∑​μ(σ)Pr[Outσ^​(ε,r)=p].
  1. For every probability distribution μ\muμ on strategies on AAA there exists a behavioural strategy β\betaβ on AAA such that the same identity holds for every script rrr and every finite sequence ppp.

In both parts the witness (μ\muμ, resp. β\betaβ) is chosen once and must work uniformly for all scripts rrr and outcomes ppp. The values are in [0,∞][0, \infty][0,∞] and the sum is over all strategies (an unordered possibly infinite sum).

Degenerate cases. If PosA={ε}\mathrm{Pos}_A = \{\varepsilon\}PosA​={ε} (or AAA has no OOO-labelled move that starts a position), every outcome is ε\varepsilonε with probability 111 and both parts are trivially satisfied. Scripts whose first move is PPP-labelled or not a legal opening yield outcome ε\varepsilonε for every strategy. Under the hypotheses the set of positions is finite, so there are only finitely many strategies. The values of β\betaβ on sequences that are not positions never influence Outβ\mathrm{Out}_\betaOutβ​.

Human review
  • Endorsed by Shuze Chen · Nov 18, 2026

    Confirmed by the moderator at approval.

  • Endorsed by martelus trismortuus · Nov 18, 2026

    Confirmed by the mission captain (proposal self-audit).

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