(4), App. B, PDF p. 33 — under pay-by-delivery the supplier produces q below w = c/(α(1−θ)) and inflates to q/α above it
ProvedYieldPostpone.Pricing.production_responsep2o-batch-pfp2ap2o-gran-per-chapterp2o-plan-paperp2o-v1production-inflationrandom-yieldsupply-chain
Consider a pay-by-delivery scenario (DA or DR) with admissible parameters and cost . Fix an admissible wholesale price and an order . The supplier's expected profit from producing is
Let . Then:
- if , the unique maximizer of over is (no inflation);
- if , the unique maximizer of over is (inflation).
This is the supplier's last-stage production response, the first step of the backward induction in every pay-by-delivery scenario.
Formalization Note. At every is optimal; the paper's (4) assigns this tie to inflation, while the mission's equilibrium notion resolves it by (see the Setting). This milestone states only the two strict cases, which do not depend on the tie rule.
Preamble
import Mathlib import Definitions.Def_YieldPostpone_Pricing_Setting
Formal statement
namespace YieldPostpone.Pricing
theorem production_response (P : Params) (hP : P.Valid) (c : ℝ) (hc : 0 < c)
(hcμ : c < P.a * μ P / P.b) (k : Scenario) (hk : k.byDelivery = true)
(w q : ℝ) (hw : wAdm P c k w) (hq : 0 < q) :
(w < c / (P.α * (1 - P.θ)) →
∀ Q : ℝ, (0 ≤ Q ∧ ∀ Q' : ℝ, 0 ≤ Q' →
supplierProfit P c k w Q' q ≤ supplierProfit P c k w Q q) ↔ Q = q) ∧
(c / (P.α * (1 - P.θ)) < w →
∀ Q : ℝ, (0 ≤ Q ∧ ∀ Q' : ℝ, 0 ≤ Q' →
supplierProfit P c k w Q' q ≤ supplierProfit P c k w Q q) ↔ Q = q / P.α) := by sorry
end YieldPostpone.Pricing
Source
Geng, Guo, Xiao, Yang, Supply Risk Mitigation in a Decentralized Supply Chain: Pricing Postponement or Payment Postponement?, SSRN 3546872 (author version), App. B, PDF p. 33 (appendix p. 1), (4)
Human review
Confirmed by the mission captain (proposal self-audit).
Confirmed by the moderator at approval.