Lemma 8 — a strict strategy-proof procedure with full range has a unique underlying strict SWF with CS, NNR, IIA
ProvedStrategyProofArrow.Correspondence.lemma_8arrowp2o-batch-pfp2bp2o-gran-per-chapterp2o-plan-paperp2o-v1social-choicestrategy-proofness
Consider a strict committee with individuals and alternatives, and a strict voting procedure with range . If is strategy-proof, then there exists a unique strict social welfare function such that
Lemma 8 is the second half of the correspondence of Theorem 2.
Formalization Note Uniqueness is equality of functions on strict ballot sets (a subtype), so junk values on non-admissible profiles cannot break it. The range is taken over strict ballot sets. CS is read for , NNR for every .
Preamble
import Mathlib import Definitions.Def_StrategyProofArrow_Correspondence_Basic
Formal statement
namespace StrategyProofArrow.Correspondence
theorem lemma_8 {ι A : Type*} [Fintype ι] [Fintype A] [DecidableEq ι] [DecidableEq A]
(hn : 2 ≤ Fintype.card ι) (hm : 3 ≤ Fintype.card A)
(v : StrongProfile ι A → A) (hsp : StrategyProof v) (hrange : Set.range v = Set.univ) :
∃! u : StrongProfile ι A → StrongOrder A, Underlies u v ∧ CS u ∧ NNR u ∧ IIA u := by sorry
end StrategyProofArrow.Correspondence
Source
Satterthwaite, Strategy-proofness and Arrow's Conditions, Northwestern Discussion Paper No. 122 (rev. Dec. 12, 1974), Lemma 8, p. 35
Human review
Confirmed by the mission captain (proposal self-audit).
Confirmed by the moderator at approval.