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Script-path soundness at the commitment level: VerifyTaprootCommitment opens only committed leaves, or names an explicit SHA-256 or tweak collision

Proved
BitcoinTapSoundnessV2.commitment_soundness

by pitimespi · Oct 29, 2026 · Mathlib 0df444a (Lean v4.33.1)

bip341bitcoinbitcoin-mainnetcollisionformal-verificationmerklesoundnesstagged-hashtaproot

For an output key qqq, internal key internal32, parity bit and tree TTT with HonestOutput q internal32 parity T, and any control block of length 33+32k33 + 32k33+32k whose internal-key bytes are internal32 and parity bit is parity, and any leaf (v,s)(v, s)(v,s) with verifyTaprootCommitment control q (tapleafHash v s) = true, writing root for taprootMerkleRoot control (tapleafHash v s), one of:

  1. root = T.hash, and either scriptPathWitness T control v s = none with tapleafHash v s ∈ T.leaves, or it is some (x, y) with Collides x y;
  2. root ≠ T.hash and Collides (taggedPre "TapTweak" (internal32 ++ root)) (taggedPre "TapTweak" (internal32 ++ T.hash));
  3. root ≠ T.hash and, for the point PPP with liftX (beVal internal32) = some P, TweakCollision q parity P (tapTweakHash internal32 root) (tapTweakHash internal32 T.hash): the two 32-byte tweak hashes differ and both carry PPP to qqq.

Every collision is an explicit pair of strings computed from the inputs. This is the BIP341 claim that a spender cannot open a leaf the output's creator did not commit to, stated as a reduction to SHA-256 collision resistance and to the hardness of finding two tweaks for one output key.

Preamble
import Definitions.Def_BitcoinTapSoundnessV2
import Definitions.Def_BitcoinSer
import Definitions.Def_BitcoinTaproot
import Definitions.Def_BitcoinSig
open BitcoinTapSoundnessV2 BitcoinSer BitcoinTaproot
Formal statement
theorem BitcoinTapSoundnessV2.commitment_soundness (q internal32 : BitcoinSer.Bytes) (parity : Bool)
    (T : BitcoinTapSoundnessV2.TapTree) (hT : BitcoinTapSoundnessV2.HonestOutput q internal32 parity T)
    (control : BitcoinSer.Bytes) (k : Nat)
    (hc : control.length = BitcoinTaproot.TAPROOT_CONTROL_BASE_SIZE + BitcoinTaproot.TAPROOT_CONTROL_NODE_SIZE * k)
    (hkey : BitcoinTapSoundnessV2.controlInternalKey control = internal32) (hpar : BitcoinTapSoundnessV2.controlParity control = parity)
    (v : BitcoinSer.Byte) (s : BitcoinSer.Bytes)
    (h : BitcoinTaproot.verifyTaprootCommitment control q (BitcoinTaproot.tapleafHash v s) = true) :
    (BitcoinTaproot.taprootMerkleRoot control (BitcoinTaproot.tapleafHash v s) = T.hash ∧
      ((BitcoinTapSoundnessV2.scriptPathWitness T control v s = none ∧ BitcoinTaproot.tapleafHash v s ∈ T.leaves) ∨
        (∃ x y, BitcoinTapSoundnessV2.scriptPathWitness T control v s = some (x, y) ∧ BitcoinTapSoundnessV2.Collides x y))) ∨
    (BitcoinTaproot.taprootMerkleRoot control (BitcoinTaproot.tapleafHash v s) ≠ T.hash ∧
      BitcoinTapSoundnessV2.Collides
        (BitcoinTapSoundnessV2.taggedPre "TapTweak" (internal32 ++ BitcoinTaproot.taprootMerkleRoot control (BitcoinTaproot.tapleafHash v s)))
        (BitcoinTapSoundnessV2.taggedPre "TapTweak" (internal32 ++ T.hash))) ∨
    (BitcoinTaproot.taprootMerkleRoot control (BitcoinTaproot.tapleafHash v s) ≠ T.hash ∧
      ∃ P, BitcoinSig.liftX (BitcoinSig.beVal internal32) = some P ∧
        BitcoinTapSoundnessV2.TweakCollision q parity P
          (BitcoinTaproot.tapTweakHash internal32 (BitcoinTaproot.taprootMerkleRoot control (BitcoinTaproot.tapleafHash v s)))
          (BitcoinTaproot.tapTweakHash internal32 T.hash)) := by sorry
Source
Bitcoin Core a773e1e33b349dc819b5a0edc1c7a4839dc73b48: VerifyTaprootCommitment, ComputeTaprootMerkleRoot, ComputeTapleafHash, ComputeTapbranchHash (src/script/interpreter.cpp: https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/blob/a773e1e33b349dc819b5a0edc1c7a4839dc73b48/src/script/interpreter.cpp); XOnlyPubKey::CheckTapTweak, ComputeTapTweakHash (src/pubkey.cpp); secp256k1_xonly_pubkey_tweak_add_check; BIP341
Read-back

What the Lean code literally says, in plain math · claude-fable-5-1 (independent sub-agent, blind: Lean code + auditor instructions only)

Read-back: BitcoinTapSoundnessV2.commitment_soundness

Binders and hypotheses. The theorem quantifies universally over:

  • byte strings qqq and internal32\mathit{internal32}internal32 (finite lists of 8-bit bytes; no length hypothesis is stated for either);
  • a Boolean parity\mathit{parity}parity;
  • a tree TTT of type TapTree\mathrm{TapTree}TapTree (built from leaf(v′,s′)\mathrm{leaf}(v', s')leaf(v′,s′) with v′v'v′ a byte and s′s's′ a byte string, and branch(l,r)\mathrm{branch}(l, r)branch(l,r));
  • a hypothesis hT\mathit{hT}hT: HonestOutput(q,internal32,parity,T)\mathrm{HonestOutput}(q, \mathit{internal32}, \mathit{parity}, T)HonestOutput(q,internal32,parity,T), i.e. checkTapTweak(q,internal32,hash(T),parity)=true\mathrm{checkTapTweak}(q, \mathit{internal32}, \mathrm{hash}(T), \mathit{parity}) = \mathrm{true}checkTapTweak(q,internal32,hash(T),parity)=true;
  • a byte string control\mathit{control}control and a natural number kkk (including k=0k = 0k=0);
  • a hypothesis hc\mathit{hc}hc: ∣control∣=33+32k|\mathit{control}| = 33 + 32k∣control∣=33+32k;
  • a hypothesis hkey\mathit{hkey}hkey: take32(drop1(control))=internal32\mathrm{take}_{32}(\mathrm{drop}_1(\mathit{control})) = \mathit{internal32}take32​(drop1​(control))=internal32 (bytes 1 through 32 of control\mathit{control}control equal internal32\mathit{internal32}internal32; together with hc\mathit{hc}hc this forces ∣internal32∣=32|\mathit{internal32}| = 32∣internal32∣=32);
  • a hypothesis hpar\mathit{hpar}hpar: [control[0] mod 2=1]=parity\big[\mathit{control}[0] \bmod 2 = 1\big] = \mathit{parity}[control[0]mod2=1]=parity (the first byte of control\mathit{control}control is odd iff parity\mathit{parity}parity; the default byte 000 is used if control\mathit{control}control is empty, which hc\mathit{hc}hc excludes);
  • a byte vvv and a byte string sss (no constraint on vvv's value or on ∣s∣|s|∣s∣);
  • a hypothesis hhh: verifyTaprootCommitment(control,q,tapleafHash(v,s))=true\mathrm{verifyTaprootCommitment}(\mathit{control}, q, \mathrm{tapleafHash}(v, s)) = \mathrm{true}verifyTaprootCommitment(control,q,tapleafHash(v,s))=true.

Write L=tapleafHash(v,s)L = \mathrm{tapleafHash}(v, s)L=tapleafHash(v,s) and R=taprootMerkleRoot(control,L)R = \mathrm{taprootMerkleRoot}(\mathit{control}, L)R=taprootMerkleRoot(control,L).

Conclusion. At least one of the following three alternatives holds (inclusive disjunction):

(A) R=hash(T)R = \mathrm{hash}(T)R=hash(T), and moreover either

  • scriptPathWitness(T,control,v,s)=none\mathrm{scriptPathWitness}(T, \mathit{control}, v, s) = \mathrm{none}scriptPathWitness(T,control,v,s)=none and L∈leaves(T)L \in \mathrm{leaves}(T)L∈leaves(T); or
  • there exist byte strings x,yx, yx,y with scriptPathWitness(T,control,v,s)=some(x,y)\mathrm{scriptPathWitness}(T, \mathit{control}, v, s) = \mathrm{some}(x, y)scriptPathWitness(T,control,v,s)=some(x,y) and Collides(x,y)\mathrm{Collides}(x, y)Collides(x,y).

(B) R≠hash(T)R \neq \mathrm{hash}(T)R=hash(T), and

Collides(taggedPre("TapTweak",internal32∥R),  taggedPre("TapTweak",internal32∥hash(T))).\mathrm{Collides}\big(\mathrm{taggedPre}(\text{"TapTweak"}, \mathit{internal32} \| R),\; \mathrm{taggedPre}(\text{"TapTweak"}, \mathit{internal32} \| \mathrm{hash}(T))\big).Collides(taggedPre("TapTweak",internal32∥R),taggedPre("TapTweak",internal32∥hash(T))).

(C) R≠hash(T)R \neq \mathrm{hash}(T)R=hash(T), and there exists a pair of natural numbers PPP such that liftX(beVal(internal32))=some(P)\mathrm{liftX}(\mathrm{beVal}(\mathit{internal32})) = \mathrm{some}(P)liftX(beVal(internal32))=some(P) and

TweakCollision(q,parity,P,  tapTweakHash(internal32,R),  tapTweakHash(internal32,hash(T))).\mathrm{TweakCollision}\big(q, \mathit{parity}, P,\; \mathrm{tapTweakHash}(\mathit{internal32}, R),\; \mathrm{tapTweakHash}(\mathit{internal32}, \mathrm{hash}(T))\big).TweakCollision(q,parity,P,tapTweakHash(internal32,R),tapTweakHash(internal32,hash(T))).

Unfoldings. SHA256\mathrm{SHA256}SHA256 is the bundle's executable SHA-256 (MD padding, 64-byte-chunk compression from the standard IV, eight big-endian words out), total on byte strings. ascii(t)\mathrm{ascii}(t)ascii(t) is the UTF-8 byte list of ttt. tagged(t,m)=SHA256(SHA256(ascii(t))∥SHA256(ascii(t))∥m)\mathrm{tagged}(t, m) = \mathrm{SHA256}(\mathrm{SHA256}(\mathrm{ascii}(t)) \| \mathrm{SHA256}(\mathrm{ascii}(t)) \| m)tagged(t,m)=SHA256(SHA256(ascii(t))∥SHA256(ascii(t))∥m); taggedPre(t,m)=SHA256(ascii(t))∥SHA256(ascii(t))∥m\mathrm{taggedPre}(t, m) = \mathrm{SHA256}(\mathrm{ascii}(t)) \| \mathrm{SHA256}(\mathrm{ascii}(t)) \| mtaggedPre(t,m)=SHA256(ascii(t))∥SHA256(ascii(t))∥m. Collides(x,y)\mathrm{Collides}(x, y)Collides(x,y) means x≠y∧SHA256(x)=SHA256(y)x \neq y \wedge \mathrm{SHA256}(x) = \mathrm{SHA256}(y)x=y∧SHA256(x)=SHA256(y).

writeCompactSize(n)\mathrm{writeCompactSize}(n)writeCompactSize(n): one byte nnn if n<253n < 253n<253; else byte 253253253 + 2 little-endian bytes if n≤0xffffn \le \mathtt{0xffff}n≤0xffff; else byte 254254254 + 4 LE bytes if n≤0xffffffffn \le \mathtt{0xffffffff}n≤0xffffffff; else byte 255255255 + 8 LE bytes. leafMsg(v,s)=[v]∥writeCompactSize(∣s∣)∥s\mathrm{leafMsg}(v, s) = [v] \| \mathrm{writeCompactSize}(|s|) \| sleafMsg(v,s)=[v]∥writeCompactSize(∣s∣)∥s and tapleafHash(v,s)=tagged("TapLeaf",leafMsg(v,s))\mathrm{tapleafHash}(v, s) = \mathrm{tagged}(\text{"TapLeaf"}, \mathrm{leafMsg}(v, s))tapleafHash(v,s)=tagged("TapLeaf",leafMsg(v,s)).

lexLt\mathrm{lexLt}lexLt is Boolean strict lexicographic order on byte strings (empty <<< non-empty; compare first bytes, recurse on equal). branchMsg(a,b)=a∥b\mathrm{branchMsg}(a, b) = a \| bbranchMsg(a,b)=a∥b if lexLt(a,b)\mathrm{lexLt}(a, b)lexLt(a,b) else b∥ab \| ab∥a; tapbranchHash(a,b)=tagged("TapBranch",branchMsg(a,b))\mathrm{tapbranchHash}(a, b) = \mathrm{tagged}(\text{"TapBranch"}, \mathrm{branchMsg}(a, b))tapbranchHash(a,b)=tagged("TapBranch",branchMsg(a,b)).

hash(leaf(v′,s′))=tapleafHash(v′,s′)\mathrm{hash}(\mathrm{leaf}(v', s')) = \mathrm{tapleafHash}(v', s')hash(leaf(v′,s′))=tapleafHash(v′,s′); hash(branch(l,r))=tapbranchHash(hash(l),hash(r))\mathrm{hash}(\mathrm{branch}(l, r)) = \mathrm{tapbranchHash}(\mathrm{hash}(l), \mathrm{hash}(r))hash(branch(l,r))=tapbranchHash(hash(l),hash(r)). leaves(leaf(v′,s′))=[tapleafHash(v′,s′)]\mathrm{leaves}(\mathrm{leaf}(v', s')) = [\mathrm{tapleafHash}(v', s')]leaves(leaf(v′,s′))=[tapleafHash(v′,s′)]; leaves(branch(l,r))=leaves(l)∥leaves(r)\mathrm{leaves}(\mathrm{branch}(l, r)) = \mathrm{leaves}(l) \| \mathrm{leaves}(r)leaves(branch(l,r))=leaves(l)∥leaves(r); L∈leaves(T)L \in \mathrm{leaves}(T)L∈leaves(T) is list membership of the hash LLL (not of the pair (v,s)(v, s)(v,s)).

controlNodes(control)\mathrm{controlNodes}(\mathit{control})controlNodes(control): with m=⌊(∣control∣−˙33)/32⌋m = \lfloor(|\mathit{control}| \dot- 33)/32\rfloorm=⌊(∣control∣−˙​33)/32⌋ (−˙\dot-−˙​ truncated subtraction), the list of mmm consecutive 32-byte chunks of control\mathit{control}control after its first 33 bytes. Under hc\mathit{hc}hc, m=km = km=k and the chunks are exactly the kkk trailing 32-byte blocks, n1,…,nkn_1, \dots, n_kn1​,…,nk​. taprootMerkleRoot(control,L)\mathrm{taprootMerkleRoot}(\mathit{control}, L)taprootMerkleRoot(control,L) is the left fold h0=Lh_0 = Lh0​=L, hi=tapbranchHash(hi−1,ni)h_i = \mathrm{tapbranchHash}(h_{i-1}, n_i)hi​=tapbranchHash(hi−1​,ni​), result hkh_khk​; for k=0k = 0k=0, R=LR = LR=L.

tapTweakHash(i,r)=tagged("TapTweak",i∥r)\mathrm{tapTweakHash}(i, r) = \mathrm{tagged}(\text{"TapTweak"}, i \| r)tapTweakHash(i,r)=tagged("TapTweak",i∥r). beVal(b)\mathrm{beVal}(b)beVal(b) is the big-endian natural-number value of bbb. With p=2256−232−977p = 2^{256} - 2^{32} - 977p=2256−232−977: liftX(x)\mathrm{liftX}(x)liftX(x) is none\mathrm{none}none if x≥px \ge px≥p; else with y=(x3+7)(p+1)/4 mod py = (x^3+7)^{(p+1)/4} \bmod py=(x3+7)(p+1)/4modp, it is some(x,y′)\mathrm{some}(x, y')some(x,y′) with y′y'y′ the even one of yyy and (p−y) mod p(p - y) \bmod p(p−y)modp if y2≡x3+7(modp)y^2 \equiv x^3 + 7 \pmod py2≡x3+7(modp), and none\mathrm{none}none otherwise.

xonlyTweakAddCheck(out,par,P,tw)\mathrm{xonlyTweakAddCheck}(\mathit{out}, \mathit{par}, P, \mathit{tw})xonlyTweakAddCheck(out,par,P,tw): let t=beVal(tw)t = \mathrm{beVal}(\mathit{tw})t=beVal(tw); false if t≥nt \ge nt≥n (nnn the secp256k1 order constant); else Q=padd(some(P),pmul(t,G))Q = \mathrm{padd}(\mathrm{some}(P), \mathrm{pmul}(t, G))Q=padd(some(P),pmul(t,G)) with GGG the base-point constant, pmul\mathrm{pmul}pmul double-and-add with 257 fuel from infinity (so pmul(0,G)\mathrm{pmul}(0, G)pmul(0,G) is infinity), and padd\mathrm{padd}padd affine addition mod ppp with infinity as identity, infinity on x1≡x2x_1 \equiv x_2x1​≡x2​ with y1+y2≡0y_1 + y_2 \equiv 0y1​+y2​≡0, doubling formula otherwise on equal xxx, chord formula on distinct xxx, field inverses by Fermat exponentiation (0↦00 \mapsto 00↦0); false if QQQ is infinity; else with Q=(qx,qy)Q = (q_x, q_y)Q=(qx​,qy​) the value is [be32(qx)=out]∧[(qy mod 2=1)=par][\mathrm{be32}(q_x) = \mathit{out}] \wedge [(q_y \bmod 2 = 1) = \mathit{par}][be32(qx​)=out]∧[(qy​mod2=1)=par], be32\mathrm{be32}be32 being 32-byte big-endian encoding mod 22562^{256}2256.

checkTapTweak(q,i,r,par)\mathrm{checkTapTweak}(q, i, r, \mathit{par})checkTapTweak(q,i,r,par): false if liftX(beVal(i))=none\mathrm{liftX}(\mathrm{beVal}(i)) = \mathrm{none}liftX(beVal(i))=none; else, with some(P)\mathrm{some}(P)some(P), xonlyTweakAddCheck(q,par,P,tapTweakHash(i,r))\mathrm{xonlyTweakAddCheck}(q, \mathit{par}, P, \mathrm{tapTweakHash}(i, r))xonlyTweakAddCheck(q,par,P,tapTweakHash(i,r)). verifyTaprootCommitment(c,prog,ℓ)=checkTapTweak(prog,take32(drop1(c)),taprootMerkleRoot(c,ℓ),[c[0] mod 2=1])\mathrm{verifyTaprootCommitment}(c, \mathit{prog}, \ell) = \mathrm{checkTapTweak}\big(\mathit{prog}, \mathrm{take}_{32}(\mathrm{drop}_1(c)), \mathrm{taprootMerkleRoot}(c, \ell), [c[0] \bmod 2 = 1]\big)verifyTaprootCommitment(c,prog,ℓ)=checkTapTweak(prog,take32​(drop1​(c)),taprootMerkleRoot(c,ℓ),[c[0]mod2=1]) (default byte 000 for c[0]c[0]c[0] when ccc is empty). So, given hkey\mathit{hkey}hkey and hpar\mathit{hpar}hpar, hypothesis hhh unfolds to checkTapTweak(q,internal32,R,parity)=true\mathrm{checkTapTweak}(q, \mathit{internal32}, R, \mathit{parity}) = \mathrm{true}checkTapTweak(q,internal32,R,parity)=true, and hT\mathit{hT}hT to checkTapTweak(q,internal32,hash(T),parity)=true\mathrm{checkTapTweak}(q, \mathit{internal32}, \mathrm{hash}(T), \mathit{parity}) = \mathrm{true}checkTapTweak(q,internal32,hash(T),parity)=true; both therefore require liftX(beVal(internal32))\mathrm{liftX}(\mathrm{beVal}(\mathit{internal32}))liftX(beVal(internal32)) to be some(P)\mathrm{some}(P)some(P) for the same PPP, beVal\mathrm{beVal}beVal of each tweak hash to be <n< n<n, and the resulting point to be non-infinite with abscissa encoding qqq and the stated parity.

TweakCollision(q,par,P,t1,t2)\mathrm{TweakCollision}(q, \mathit{par}, P, t_1, t_2)TweakCollision(q,par,P,t1​,t2​) is t1≠t2∧∣t1∣=32∧∣t2∣=32∧xonlyTweakAddCheck(q,par,P,t1)=true∧xonlyTweakAddCheck(q,par,P,t2)=truet_1 \neq t_2 \wedge |t_1| = 32 \wedge |t_2| = 32 \wedge \mathrm{xonlyTweakAddCheck}(q, \mathit{par}, P, t_1) = \mathrm{true} \wedge \mathrm{xonlyTweakAddCheck}(q, \mathit{par}, P, t_2) = \mathrm{true}t1​=t2​∧∣t1​∣=32∧∣t2​∣=32∧xonlyTweakAddCheck(q,par,P,t1​)=true∧xonlyTweakAddCheck(q,par,P,t2​)=true.

walk(T,path,h)\mathrm{walk}(T, \mathit{path}, h)walk(T,path,h) returns either a tree (inl\mathrm{inl}inl) or a pair of byte strings (inr\mathrm{inr}inr): walk(T,[],h)=inl(T)\mathrm{walk}(T, [], h) = \mathrm{inl}(T)walk(T,[],h)=inl(T); for n::restn :: \mathit{rest}n::rest, let W=walk(T,rest,tapbranchHash(h,n))W = \mathrm{walk}(T, \mathit{rest}, \mathrm{tapbranchHash}(h, n))W=walk(T,rest,tapbranchHash(h,n)); if W=inr(c)W = \mathrm{inr}(c)W=inr(c) return inr(c)\mathrm{inr}(c)inr(c); if W=inl(leaf(v′,s′))W = \mathrm{inl}(\mathrm{leaf}(v', s'))W=inl(leaf(v′,s′)) return inr(taggedPre("TapLeaf",leafMsg(v′,s′)),taggedPre("TapBranch",branchMsg(h,n)))\mathrm{inr}(\mathrm{taggedPre}(\text{"TapLeaf"}, \mathrm{leafMsg}(v', s')), \mathrm{taggedPre}(\text{"TapBranch"}, \mathrm{branchMsg}(h, n)))inr(taggedPre("TapLeaf",leafMsg(v′,s′)),taggedPre("TapBranch",branchMsg(h,n))); if W=inl(branch(l,r))W = \mathrm{inl}(\mathrm{branch}(l, r))W=inl(branch(l,r)) return inl(l)\mathrm{inl}(l)inl(l) if h=hash(l)h = \mathrm{hash}(l)h=hash(l), else inl(r)\mathrm{inl}(r)inl(r) if h=hash(r)h = \mathrm{hash}(r)h=hash(r), else inr(taggedPre("TapBranch",branchMsg(hash(l),hash(r))),taggedPre("TapBranch",branchMsg(h,n)))\mathrm{inr}(\mathrm{taggedPre}(\text{"TapBranch"}, \mathrm{branchMsg}(\mathrm{hash}(l), \mathrm{hash}(r))), \mathrm{taggedPre}(\text{"TapBranch"}, \mathrm{branchMsg}(h, n)))inr(taggedPre("TapBranch",branchMsg(hash(l),hash(r))),taggedPre("TapBranch",branchMsg(h,n))). The path is consumed so that the tree is descended from the root while the list is read from its last element; no length or root check is performed inside walk\mathrm{walk}walk.

scriptPathWitness(T,control,v,s)\mathrm{scriptPathWitness}(T, \mathit{control}, v, s)scriptPathWitness(T,control,v,s): from W=walk(T,controlNodes(control),L)W = \mathrm{walk}(T, \mathrm{controlNodes}(\mathit{control}), L)W=walk(T,controlNodes(control),L): inr(c)↦some(c)\mathrm{inr}(c) \mapsto \mathrm{some}(c)inr(c)↦some(c); inl(leaf(⋅,⋅))↦none\mathrm{inl}(\mathrm{leaf}(\cdot, \cdot)) \mapsto \mathrm{none}inl(leaf(⋅,⋅))↦none (the leaf's contents are not compared with v,sv, sv,s); inl(branch(l,r))↦some(taggedPre("TapLeaf",leafMsg(v,s)),taggedPre("TapBranch",branchMsg(hash(l),hash(r))))\mathrm{inl}(\mathrm{branch}(l, r)) \mapsto \mathrm{some}(\mathrm{taggedPre}(\text{"TapLeaf"}, \mathrm{leafMsg}(v, s)), \mathrm{taggedPre}(\text{"TapBranch"}, \mathrm{branchMsg}(\mathrm{hash}(l), \mathrm{hash}(r))))inl(branch(l,r))↦some(taggedPre("TapLeaf",leafMsg(v,s)),taggedPre("TapBranch",branchMsg(hash(l),hash(r)))).

Edge cases and what is silently included. kkk appears only in hc\mathit{hc}hc; k=0k = 0k=0 (a 33-byte control block, empty path, R=LR = LR=L) is allowed, and so is any kkk, with no upper bound such as 128. vvv is an arbitrary byte: nothing restricts the leaf version or ties vvv to the first byte of control\mathit{control}control. Neither qqq nor sss carries a length hypothesis; ∣internal32∣=32|\mathit{internal32}| = 32∣internal32∣=32 follows from hkey\mathit{hkey}hkey and hc\mathit{hc}hc but is not stated directly. The three alternatives are not asserted to be exclusive. In (A), both sub-alternatives may be true simultaneously in principle; the first sub-alternative asserts membership of the hash LLL in leaves(T)\mathrm{leaves}(T)leaves(T), which is a list of hashes and may contain repeats. In (B) and (C) the colliding objects are explicit expressions in internal32\mathit{internal32}internal32, RRR, hash(T)\mathrm{hash}(T)hash(T), qqq and parity\mathit{parity}parity: (B) names two (64+64)(64 + 64)(64+64)-byte strings and asserts they differ and have the same SHA-256; (C) names two 32-byte tweak hashes and asserts they differ, both have length 32, and both pass xonlyTweakAddCheck\mathrm{xonlyTweakAddCheck}xonlyTweakAddCheck against qqq, parity\mathit{parity}parity and the lifted point PPP of internal32\mathit{internal32}internal32. Alternative (A) does not itself assert any collision when its first sub-alternative is used. The hypotheses hT\mathit{hT}hT and hhh are both Boolean equalities to true\mathrm{true}true; if either computation yields false for every choice of inputs in some situation (e.g. liftX\mathrm{liftX}liftX failing on internal32\mathit{internal32}internal32), the theorem is vacuous there.

Human review
  • Endorsed by Shuze Chen · Nov 20, 2026

    Confirmed by the moderator at approval.

  • Endorsed by pitimespi · Nov 20, 2026

    Confirmed by the mission captain (proposal self-audit).

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