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YukonModule.VCVio.CryptoFoundations.SigmaProtocol.part0

Definition
Yukon_7273a9c19f6473b89f551716

by yukon · Sep 30, 2026 · Mathlib 0df444a (Lean v4.33.1)

better-codes

Source module VCVio.CryptoFoundations.SigmaProtocol.

Definition code
/-
Copyright (c) 2024 Devon Tuma. All rights reserved.
Released under Apache 2.0 license as described in the file LICENSE.
Authors: Devon Tuma
-/

module
public import Definitions.Def_Yukon_19e49f429e40ab4a8ab6f6e7

public import Definitions.Def_Yukon_97cb7c7d84a051f4f06c406f

public import Definitions.Def_Yukon_f6ffada621076861526b623c



public import Mathlib.Data.Fintype.Vector
public import Mathlib.Data.Fintype.Pi
public import Mathlib.Data.Fintype.Perm
public import Mathlib.Data.FinEnum
public import Init.Data.UInt.Lemmas
public import Mathlib.Logic.Embedding.Basic
public import Mathlib.Data.List.Sym
public import Init
public import Mathlib.Probability.Distributions.Uniform
public import Mathlib.Data.Finset.Card
public import Mathlib.Data.Vector.Defs
public import Mathlib.CategoryTheory.Monad.Types
public import Mathlib.Order.CompleteLattice.Basic
public import Mathlib.Probability.ProbabilityMassFunction.Monad
public import Batteries.Control.AlternativeMonad
public import Mathlib.Topology.Algebra.InfiniteSum.ENNReal
public import Batteries.Control.OptionT
public import Mathlib.Data.PFunctor.Multivariate.Basic
public import Mathlib.Data.PFunctor.Univariate.Basic
public import Mathlib.Tactic.Common
public import Mathlib.Init
public import Lean.Message
public import Batteries.Tactic.Lint.Basic
public import Batteries.Tactic.Lint
public import Mathlib.Algebra.Polynomial.Eval.Defs
public import Mathlib.Algebra.MvPolynomial.Eval
meta import Definitions.Def_Yukon_f6ffada621076861526b623c
meta import Definitions.Def_Yukon_97cb7c7d84a051f4f06c406f
meta import Definitions.Def_Yukon_19e49f429e40ab4a8ab6f6e7
set_option backward.isDefEq.respectTransparency.types false
/-!
# Sigma Protocol

This file defines a structure type for Σ-protocols, along with standard
security properties: completeness, special soundness, and honest-verifier
zero-knowledge (HVZK).

## Type Parameters

- `Stmt`: statement (public key)
- `Wit`: witness (secret key)
- `Commit`: public commitment
- `PrvState`: private prover state (retained between commit and respond)
- `Chal`: verifier challenge (drawn uniformly)
- `Resp`: prover response
- `rel`: the relation proven by the protocol

## Coercion to `IdenSchemeWithAbort`

Every `SigmaProtocol` can be viewed as a non-aborting `IdenSchemeWithAbort` via
`SigmaProtocol.toIdenSchemeWithAbort`, which wraps `respond` with `some`.
-/

@[expose] public section

universe u v

open OracleSpec OracleComp

/-- A sigma protocol for statements in `Stmt` and witnesses in `Wit`,
where `rel : Stmt → Wit → Bool` is the proposition proven by the Σ-protocol.
Commitments are split into a public part `Commit` (revealed to the verifier) and a
private part `PrvState` (retained by the prover). Verifier challenges are drawn uniformly
from `Chal`. Prover responses are in `Resp`.

We leave properties like special soundness as separate definitions for better modularity. -/
structure SigmaProtocol
    (Stmt Wit Commit PrvState Chal Resp : Type) (rel : Stmt → Wit → Bool) where
  /-- Generate a commitment to prove knowledge of a valid witness. -/
  commit (stmt : Stmt) (wit : Wit) : ProbComp (Commit × PrvState)
  /-- Given a previous private state, respond to the challenge. -/
  respond (stmt : Stmt) (wit : Wit) (prvState : PrvState) (chal : Chal) : ProbComp Resp
  /-- Deterministic verification: check that the response satisfies the challenge. -/
  verify (stmt : Stmt) (commit : Commit) (chal : Chal) (resp : Resp) : Bool
  /-- Simulate public commitment generation while only knowing the statement. -/
  sim (stmt : Stmt) : ProbComp Commit
  /-- Extract a witness to the statement from two accepting transcripts. -/
  extract (chal₁ : Chal) (resp₁ : Resp) (chal₂ : Chal) (resp₂ : Resp) : ProbComp Wit

namespace SigmaProtocol

variable {Stmt Wit Commit PrvState Chal Resp : Type} {rel : Stmt → Wit → Bool}

section complete

variable [SampleableType Chal] [IsUniformSpec unifSpec]

/-- A Σ-protocol is perfectly complete if the honest prover always convinces the verifier
on valid statement-witness pairs. -/
def PerfectlyComplete (σ : SigmaProtocol Stmt Wit Commit PrvState Chal Resp rel) : Prop :=
  ∀ x w, rel x w = true →
    Pr[= true | do
      let (pc, sc) ← σ.commit x w
      let ω ← $ᵗ Chal
      let π ← σ.respond x w sc ω
      return σ.verify x pc ω π] = 1

end complete

section speciallySound

/-- Special soundness at a particular statement: given two accepting transcripts with the same
commitment but different challenges, the extracted witness is valid. -/
def SpeciallySoundAt (σ : SigmaProtocol Stmt Wit Commit PrvState Chal Resp rel)
    (x : Stmt) : Prop :=
  ∀ pc ω₁ ω₂ p₁ p₂, ω₁ ≠ ω₂ →
    σ.verify x pc ω₁ p₁ = true → σ.verify x pc ω₂ p₂ = true →
    ∀ w ∈ support (σ.extract ω₁ p₁ ω₂ p₂), rel x w = true

/-- A Σ-protocol is specially sound if `SpeciallySoundAt` holds for all statements. -/
def SpeciallySound (σ : SigmaProtocol Stmt Wit Commit PrvState Chal Resp rel) : Prop :=
  ∀ x, SpeciallySoundAt σ x

/-- Special soundness immediately validates any witness returned by the Σ-protocol extractor from
two accepting transcripts with the same statement and commitment and with distinct challenges. -/
theorem extract_sound_of_speciallySoundAt
    (σ : SigmaProtocol Stmt Wit Commit PrvState Chal Resp rel) {x : Stmt}
    (hss : σ.SpeciallySoundAt x)
    {pc : Commit} {ω₁ ω₂ : Chal} {p₁ p₂ : Resp} (hω : ω₁ ≠ ω₂)
    (hv₁ : σ.verify x pc ω₁ p₁ = true) (hv₂ : σ.verify x pc ω₂ p₂ = true)
    {w : Wit} (hw : w ∈ support (σ.extract ω₁ p₁ ω₂ p₂)) :
    rel x w = true :=
  hss pc ω₁ ω₂ p₁ p₂ hω hv₁ hv₂ w hw

end speciallySound

section hvzk

variable [SampleableType Chal] [IsUniformSpec unifSpec]

/-- The honest prover's transcript distribution for a Σ-protocol. -/
def realTranscript (σ : SigmaProtocol Stmt Wit Commit PrvState Chal Resp rel)
    (x : Stmt) (w : Wit) :
    ProbComp (Commit × Chal × Resp) := do
  let (pc, sc) ← σ.commit x w
  let ω ← $ᵗ Chal
  let π ← σ.respond x w sc ω
  return (pc, ω, π)

/-- Honest-verifier zero-knowledge: the real transcript distribution is within total variation
distance `ζ_zk` of the simulated one.

The real transcript is `σ.realTranscript x w`.
The simulated transcript is produced by `simTranscript` given only the statement `x`.

Note: the `sim` field of `SigmaProtocol` only produces a public commitment. For HVZK we need
a full transcript simulator `Stmt → ProbComp (Commit × Chal × Resp)`. We parameterize by this
simulator. -/
def HVZK (σ : SigmaProtocol Stmt Wit Commit PrvState Chal Resp rel)
    (simTranscript : Stmt → ProbComp (Commit × Chal × Resp)) (ζ_zk : ℝ) : Prop :=
  ∀ x w, rel x w = true →
    tvDist (σ.realTranscript x w) (simTranscript x) ≤ ζ_zk

/-- Exact honest-verifier zero-knowledge: the real transcript distribution equals the
simulated one. -/
def PerfectHVZK (σ : SigmaProtocol Stmt Wit Commit PrvState Chal Resp rel)
    (simTranscript : Stmt → ProbComp (Commit × Chal × Resp)) : Prop :=
  ∀ x w, rel x w = true →
    𝒟[σ.realTranscript x w] = 𝒟[simTranscript x]

/-- The perfect HVZK property is equivalent to the approximate HVZK property with `ζ_zk = 0`. -/
@[grind =]
lemma perfectHVZK_iff_hvzk_zero
    (σ : SigmaProtocol Stmt Wit Commit PrvState Chal Resp rel)
    (simTranscript : Stmt → ProbComp (Commit × Chal × Resp)) :
    σ.PerfectHVZK simTranscript ↔ σ.HVZK simTranscript 0 := by
  refine ⟨fun h x w hx => ?_, fun h x w hx => ?_⟩
  · exact le_of_eq ((tvDist_eq_zero_iff _ _).2 (h x w hx))
  · exact (tvDist_eq_zero_iff _ _).1 (le_antisymm (h x w hx) (tvDist_nonneg _ _))

open scoped ENNReal in
/-- The simulator's commitment marginal has predictability at most `β`: no single
commitment value is output with probability exceeding `β`. Equivalently, the commitment
has min-entropy at least `-log₂ β`.

This is a companion assumption to `HVZK` that bounds the collision probability of
programmed cache entries in the Fiat-Shamir CMA-to-NMA reduction. For Schnorr,
`β = 1/|G|` because the commitment `g^r` is uniform over the group.

The `_σ : SigmaProtocol …` argument is dummy (the predicate only depends on
`simTranscript` and `β`); it is present to enable field-notation usage like
`σ.simCommitPredictability simTranscript β`. -/
def simCommitPredictability
    (_σ : SigmaProtocol Stmt Wit Commit PrvState Chal Resp rel)
    (simTranscript : Stmt → ProbComp (Commit × Chal × Resp)) (β : ℝ≥0∞) : Prop :=
  ∀ x : Stmt, ∀ c₀ : Commit, probOutput (Prod.fst <$> simTranscript x) c₀ ≤ β

open scoped ENNReal in
/-- Conditional uniformity of the simulator's challenge given its commitment, expressed
in product form: for any statement `x` admitting a witness, any commit value `c₀`, and
any challenge value `ch₀`, the joint marginal `Pr[(commit, chal) = (c₀, ch₀)]` factors as
`Pr[commit = c₀] * (1 / |Chal|)`.

This is a strengthening of `simCommitPredictability` (which only bounds the commit
marginal). Where the latter says "no commit value is too likely", `simChalUniformGivenCommit`
says "the challenge is uniform conditional on any commit value", which is exactly the
hypothesis required by `identical_until_bad_with_flag` when bridging the Fiat-Shamir
programming-oracle and no-programming-oracle worlds: cache misses on programmed points
return the simulator's challenge, and the bridge needs that challenge to be marginally
uniform conditional on the simulator's commit (which is what gets compared against the
random oracle's would-be answer).

The product form `P[(c₀, ch₀)] = P[c₀] * 1/|Chal|` avoids conditional-probability
ambiguities when `P[c₀] = 0` and is the most directly-usable shape inside the `tvDist`
calculation.

The `rel pk sk = true` hypothesis is needed because typical Schnorr-style simulators only
satisfy this when `pk` admits a witness (the proof uses a witness-indexed bijection on the
response variable); for statements outside the relation's image, the simulator's joint may
have any structure. -/
def simChalUniformGivenCommit [Fintype Chal]
    (_σ : SigmaProtocol Stmt Wit Commit PrvState Chal Resp rel)
    (simTranscript : Stmt → ProbComp (Commit × Chal × Resp)) : Prop :=
  ∀ (pk : Stmt) (sk : Wit), rel pk sk = true →
    ∀ (c₀ : Commit) (ch₀ : Chal),
      Pr[fun t : Commit × Chal × Resp => t.1 = c₀ ∧ t.2.1 = ch₀ | simTranscript pk] =
        Pr[fun t : Commit × Chal × Resp => t.1 = c₀ | simTranscript pk] *
          (Fintype.card Chal : ℝ≥0∞)⁻¹

end hvzk

section uniqueResponses

/-- A Σ-protocol has unique responses if for any statement, commitment, and challenge,
there is at most one valid response. This property is required by the Fischlin transform
and holds for most common Σ-protocols (Schnorr, Guillou-Quisquater, etc.). -/
def UniqueResponses (σ : SigmaProtocol Stmt Wit Commit PrvState Chal Resp rel) : Prop :=
  ∀ x pc ω p₁ p₂,
    σ.verify x pc ω p₁ = true → σ.verify x pc ω p₂ = true → p₁ = p₂

end uniqueResponses

section toIdenSchemeWithAbort

/-- Every `SigmaProtocol` can be viewed as a non-aborting `IdenSchemeWithAbort` by wrapping
the response in `some`. The `sim` and `extract` fields are not part of
`IdenSchemeWithAbort` and are dropped. -/
def toIdenSchemeWithAbort (σ : SigmaProtocol Stmt Wit Commit PrvState Chal Resp rel) :
    IdenSchemeWithAbort Stmt Wit Commit PrvState Chal Resp rel where
  commit := σ.commit
  respond := fun stmt wit prvState chal => some <$> σ.respond stmt wit prvState chal
  verify := σ.verify

instance  _root_.SigmaProtocol.instCoeIdenSchemeWithAbort : Coe (SigmaProtocol Stmt Wit Commit PrvState Chal Resp rel)
    (IdenSchemeWithAbort Stmt Wit Commit PrvState Chal Resp rel) :=
  ⟨toIdenSchemeWithAbort⟩

end toIdenSchemeWithAbort

end SigmaProtocol


Source
https://github.com/Verified-zkEVM/VCV-io/blob/446baa72bb7d4296d6f6b7015fd6c15ca9c678b7/VCVio/CryptoFoundations/SigmaProtocol.lean yukon-proof-operation:1d1a4ad995ff7cafa7c29dc8f4ebeec5af1272cb473c650ba7dc4b4da2bf74b4 [yukon-proof-receipt:eyJlbnZpcm9ubWVudCI6eyJtYXRobGliUmV2IjoiMGRmNDQ0YTM2MGVhYTYwYWI4YzExZGNhNTFhODZhZjY5Mjk1NTQ3NCIsInRvb2xjaGFpbiI6ImxlYW5wcm92ZXIvbGVhbjQ6djQuMzMuMSJ9LCJoYXNoIjoiMDZiNDQ4MmZlMjk2YTFhMjMzYTY2M2MxMmM3NTBhZjZiNDcyMWIzNzJiZDNiNzdkNjE0ZWVkNDBiNjQ4ZDRhZiIsImtpbmQiOiJkZWZpbml0aW9uIiwibWFya2VyIjoieXVrb24tcHJvb2Ytb3BlcmF0aW9uOjFkMWE0YWQ5OTVmZjdjYWZhN2MyOWRjOGY0ZWJlZWM1YWYxMjcyY2I0NzNjNjUwYmE3ZGM0YjRkYTJiZjc0YjQiLCJ0YWciOiJiZXR0ZXItY29kZXMiLCJ0YXJnZXQiOiJZdWtvbl83MjczYTljMTlmNjQ3M2I4OWY1NTE3MTYiLCJ2IjoyfQ]

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