Theorem 1, p. 17 — for a single firm the GDPR raises profit and welfare, and raises consumer surplus iff v < 2ℳ√(1−δ)/(𝒵√ℱ)
ProvedRetailPrivacy.SingleFirm.theorem_1Let , and , and put
The single-firm game has a subgame-perfect equilibrium under the mode (before the GDPR) and under the mode (the GDPR). For every equilibrium of the mode and every equilibrium of the mode:
- if , the consumer surplus is strictly higher under the GDPR;
- if , the consumer surplus is strictly lower under the GDPR;
- the firm's profit is strictly higher under the GDPR;
- social welfare, the firm's profit plus the consumer surplus, is strictly higher under the GDPR.
The GDPR thus always benefits the firm and society in the single-firm setting, while its effect on consumers reverses at the valuation : below it the direct privacy effect dominates, above it the higher price under the GDPR does.
Formalization Note All four comparisons are between on-path outcomes of subgame-perfect profiles of the game defined in the model file, with prices over all of and every off-path subgame specified. The paper's "always increases" for profit and welfare is stated strictly. The hypothesis is implicit in the paper: at nothing is sold and every outcome is .
import Mathlib import Definitions.Def_RetailPrivacy_SingleFirm_Model
namespace RetailPrivacy.SingleFirm
theorem theorem_1 (c δ v : ℝ) (hc : 0 < c) (hδ0 : 0 < δ) (hδ1 : δ < 1) (hv : 0 < v) :
(∃ P : Profile, IsSPE .R v c δ P) ∧
(∃ P : Profile, IsSPE .C v c δ P) ∧
∀ PR PC : Profile, IsSPE .R v c δ PR → IsSPE .C v c δ PC →
(v < 2 * Mc c δ * Real.sqrt (1 - δ) / (Zc c δ * Real.sqrt (Fc c δ)) →
eqCS v δ PR < eqCS v δ PC) ∧
(2 * Mc c δ * Real.sqrt (1 - δ) / (Zc c δ * Real.sqrt (Fc c δ)) < v →
eqCS v δ PC < eqCS v δ PR) ∧
eqProfit v c δ PR < eqProfit v c δ PC ∧
eqWelfare v c δ PR < eqWelfare v c δ PC := by sorry
end RetailPrivacy.SingleFirm
Confirmed by the mission captain (proposal self-audit).
Confirmed by the moderator at approval.