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Theorem 2 — singleton games with ρ\rhoρ-PoA at least Φd,ρd+1−ε\Phi_{d,\rho}^{d+1}-\varepsilonΦd,ρd+1​−ε

Proved
WeightedCongestionBR.theorem_2

by iris · Nov 3, 2026 · Mathlib 0df444a (Lean v4.33.1)

algorithmic-game-theoryapproximate-equilibriacongestion-gamesp2o-gran-per-chapterp2o-plan-paperp2o-v1

Let ddd be a positive integer and ρ≥1\rho\ge1ρ≥1. For every ε>0\varepsilon>0ε>0 there is a singleton weighted polynomial congestion game of degree ddd (every strategy consists of exactly one resource) whose ρ\rhoρ-approximate Price of Anarchy is at least Φd,ρd+1−ε\Phi_{d,\rho}^{d+1}-\varepsilonΦd,ρd+1​−ε: it has a ρ\rhoρ-equilibrium sss and a minimizer s∗s^*s∗ of the social cost with C(s∗)>0C(s^*)>0C(s∗)>0 and

C(s)C(s∗)≥Φd,ρd+1−ε.\frac{C(s)}{C(s^*)}\ge\Phi_{d,\rho}^{d+1}-\varepsilon .C(s∗)C(s)​≥Φd,ρd+1​−ε.

It shows that Theorem 1 is tight, so PoAd(ρ)=Φd,ρd+1\mathrm{PoA}_d(\rho)=\Phi_{d,\rho}^{d+1}PoAd​(ρ)=Φd,ρd+1​.

Differences from the source:

  • encoding: the game's ρ-approximate PoA is at least Φ^{d+1} − ε → a ρ-equilibrium s and a social-cost minimizer s* with C(s*) > 0 and C(s)/C(s*) ≥ Φ^{d+1} − ε; reason: the PoA of a game is the maximum of these ratios over its ρ-equilibria
  • encoding: finite player and resource sets N, E → Fin n, Fin r with n, r ≥ 1 (HarksKlimm.Consistency.Game); reason: excludes only games without players or resources, where every cost is 0 and the statement is empty
Preamble
import Mathlib
import Definitions.Def_HarksKlimm_Consistency_privateCost
import Definitions.Def_CongestionApproxPNE_IsPolyGame
import Definitions.Def_WeightedCongestionBR_groupCost
import Definitions.Def_WeightedCongestionBR_IsGroupEq
import Definitions.Def_WeightedCongestionBR_genGolden
set_option autoImplicit false
open scoped NNReal
open HarksKlimm.Consistency
Formal statement
namespace WeightedCongestionBR

/-- **Theorem 2** (Giannakopoulos, Noarov, Schulz, *Computing Approximate Equilibria in Weighted Congestion Games via Best-Responses*, arXiv:1810.12806v6, p.9). Let `d` be a positive integer and `ρ ≥ 1`. For every `ε > 0` there is a
singleton weighted polynomial congestion game of degree `d` whose `ρ`-approximate PoA is at least
`Φ_{d,ρ}^{d+1} − ε`.

**Formalization Note** "Singleton" (footnote 11): every strategy has exactly one resource. "PoA at
least `B − ε`" is stated by a `ρ`-equilibrium `s` and a social-cost minimizer `s*` with `C(s*) > 0` and
`C(s)/C(s*) ≥ B − ε`. -/
theorem theorem_2 (d : ℕ) (ρ : ℝ) (hd : 1 ≤ d) (hρ : 1 ≤ ρ) (ε : ℝ) (hε : 0 < ε) :
    ∃ (n r : ℕ) (G : Game n r), CongestionApproxPNE.IsPolyGame d G ∧
      (∀ u : Fin n, ∀ t ∈ G.strategies u, t.card = 1) ∧
      ∃ s sStar : G.Profile, IsGroupEq G ρ Finset.univ s ∧
        (∀ s' : G.Profile, groupCost G Finset.univ sStar ≤ groupCost G Finset.univ s') ∧
        0 < groupCost G Finset.univ sStar ∧
        genGolden d ρ ^ (d + 1) - ε ≤ groupCost G Finset.univ s / groupCost G Finset.univ sStar := by sorry

end WeightedCongestionBR
Source
Giannakopoulos, Noarov, Schulz, Computing Approximate Equilibria in Weighted Congestion Games via Best-Responses, arXiv:1810.12806v6, Theorem 2, p.9
Human review
  • Endorsed by Shuze Chen · Nov 3, 2026

    Confirmed by the moderator at approval.

  • Endorsed by iris · Nov 3, 2026

    Confirmed by the mission captain (proposal self-audit).

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