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Proposition 2.3, proof — (2.2) holds iff it holds conditionally on each possible suggestion

Proved
Aumann1987.TwoPerson.devCond_iff_condPayoff

by mikedeng1 · Oct 4, 2026 · Mathlib 0df444a (Lean v4.33.1)

correlated-equilibriumgame-theoryp2o-batch-pfp1ap2o-gran-per-chapterp2o-plan-paperp2o-v1

Let (pjk)(p_{jk})(pjk​) be a distribution on S1×S2S^1\times S^2S1×S2 and let h1,h2h^1,h^2h1,h2 be the payoffs. A suggestion jjj to player 1 is possible if ∑kpjk>0\sum_k p_{jk}>0∑k​pjk​>0, and then H1(q∣j)=∑khqk1pjk/∑kpjkH^1(q\mid j)=\sum_k h^1_{qk}p_{jk}/\sum_k p_{jk}H1(q∣j)=∑k​hqk1​pjk​/∑k​pjk​ is player 1's conditional expected payoff from playing qqq; likewise H2(r∣k)=∑jhjr2pjk/∑jpjkH^2(r\mid k)=\sum_j h^2_{jr}p_{jk}/\sum_j p_{jk}H2(r∣k)=∑j​hjr2​pjk​/∑j​pjk​ for a possible suggestion kkk to player 2 (∑jpjk>0\sum_j p_{jk}>0∑j​pjk​>0). Then:

  1. player 1's equilibrium condition (2.2) written on ppp (no φ:S1→S1\varphi:S^1\to S^1φ:S1→S1 increases ∑j∑kpjkhφ(j)k1\sum_j\sum_k p_{jk}h^1_{\varphi(j)k}∑j​∑k​pjk​hφ(j)k1​ above ∑j∑kpjkhjk1\sum_j\sum_k p_{jk}h^1_{jk}∑j​∑k​pjk​hjk1​) holds if and only if
H1(q∣j)≤H1(j∣j)for every possible j∈S1 and every q∈S1;H^1(q\mid j)\le H^1(j\mid j)\quad\text{for every possible }j\in S^1\text{ and every }q\in S^1;H1(q∣j)≤H1(j∣j)for every possible j∈S1 and every q∈S1;
  1. player 2's condition holds if and only if H2(r∣k)≤H2(k∣k)H^2(r\mid k)\le H^2(k\mid k)H2(r∣k)≤H2(k∣k) for every possible k∈S2k\in S^2k∈S2 and every r∈S2r\in S^2r∈S2.

This is the first step of the proof of Proposition 2.3: the equilibrium condition is equivalent to obedience being optimal after each suggestion that occurs with positive probability.

Preamble
import Mathlib
import Definitions.Def_Aumann1987_TwoPerson_Model

open Finset
Formal statement
namespace Aumann1987.TwoPerson

/-- **Conditioning on possible suggestions** (Aumann 1987, Proposition 2.3, proof, p. 6, PDF p. 7:
"For (2.2) it is necessary and sufficient that for each i, the expectation still obeys the
inequality when conditioned on each possible value of fⁱ"). For a distribution `p`:
player 1's condition (2.2) on `p` holds iff for every possible suggestion `j` (`∑_k p_{jk} > 0`)
and every action `q`, `H¹(q|j) ≤ H¹(j|j)`; and player 2's holds iff for every possible
suggestion `k` (`∑_j p_{jk} > 0`) and every `r`, `H²(r|k) ≤ H²(k|k)`.

Formalization Note: impossible suggestions are excluded by the hypothesis `0 < ∑ …`, as in the
paper, so the convention `x / 0 = 0` in `condPayoff₁`, `condPayoff₂` is never used. -/
theorem devCond_iff_condPayoff {S₁ S₂ : Type*} [Fintype S₁] [Fintype S₂]
    (h₁ h₂ : S₁ → S₂ → ℝ) (p : S₁ → S₂ → ℝ) (hp : IsDistribution p) :
    (DevCond₁ h₁ p ↔
      ∀ j : S₁, 0 < ∑ k, p j k → ∀ q : S₁, condPayoff₁ h₁ p q j ≤ condPayoff₁ h₁ p j j) ∧
    (DevCond₂ h₂ p ↔
      ∀ k : S₂, 0 < ∑ j, p j k → ∀ r : S₂, condPayoff₂ h₂ p r k ≤ condPayoff₂ h₂ p k k) := by sorry

end Aumann1987.TwoPerson
Source
Aumann, Correlated Equilibrium as an Expression of Bayesian Rationality, Econometrica 55 (1987), DOI 10.2307/1911154, p. 6 (PDF p. 7), Proposition 2.3, proof (conditioning on each possible suggestion)
Human review
  • Endorsed by Shuze Chen · Oct 4, 2026

    Confirmed by the moderator at approval.

  • Endorsed by mikedeng1 · Oct 4, 2026

    Confirmed by the mission captain (proposal self-audit).

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