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Corollary 1 (ii), p. 13 — there are c_l ≤ û ≤ c_h with α* = α̲ for c ≤ c_l or c ≥ c_h and α* = ᾱ for c_l < c < c_h

Proved
InfoBargaining.Uniform.corollary1_ii_threshold_cost

by mikedeng1 · Oct 14, 2026 · Mathlib 0df444a (Lean v4.33.1)

bargaininginformation-acquisitionp2o-batch-pfp2ap2o-gran-per-chapterp2o-plan-paperp2o-v1thresholduniform-prior

Under the uniform prior (mean u^=1/2\hat u=1/2u^=1/2) and the linear information cost, fix the buyer's bargaining power θb∈(0,1)\theta_b\in(0,1)θb​∈(0,1). There exist thresholds cl≤1/2≤chc_l\le 1/2\le c_hcl​≤1/2≤ch​ such that for every seller cost c∈(0,1)c\in(0,1)c∈(0,1), with α∗\alpha^*α∗ the set of optimal information levels:

  1. if c≤clc\le c_lc≤cl​ or c≥chc\ge c_hc≥ch​, minimal information is optimal: α‾∈α∗\underline\alpha\in\alpha^*α​∈α∗;
  2. if c<clc<c_lc<cl​ or c>chc>c_hc>ch​, it is the only optimum: α∗={α‾}\alpha^*=\{\underline\alpha\}α∗={α​};
  3. if cl<c<chc_l<c<c_hcl​<c<ch​, maximal information is the only optimum: α∗={αˉ}\alpha^*=\{\bar\alpha\}α∗={αˉ}.

The buyer gathers information only when the seller's cost lies in an intermediate range around the prior mean, where trade is most uncertain. The jumps of α∗\alpha^*α∗ at clc_lcl​ and chc_hch​ drive Proposition 2 (ii) and (iii).

Formalization Note "α∗=α‾\alpha^*=\underline\alphaα∗=α​ for c≤clc\le c_lc≤cl​ or c≥chc\ge c_hc≥ch​" is items 1 and 2: at a threshold both corners can be optimal and the paper selects α‾\underline\alphaα​. When the buyer never gathers information, cl=ch=1/2c_l=c_h=1/2cl​=ch​=1/2 is allowed. Restricted to the uniform prior.

Preamble
import Mathlib
import Definitions.Def_InfoBargaining_Uniform_Setting
Formal statement
namespace InfoBargaining.Uniform

theorem corollary1_ii_threshold_cost (M : Model) (θb : ℝ) (hθb : θb ∈ Set.Ioo (0:ℝ) 1) :
    ∃ cl ch : ℝ, cl ≤ 1 / 2 ∧ 1 / 2 ≤ ch ∧
      ∀ c ∈ Set.Ioo (0:ℝ) 1,
        ((c ≤ cl ∨ ch ≤ c) → M.αlo ∈ M.optSet θb c) ∧
        ((c < cl ∨ ch < c) → M.optSet θb c = {M.αlo}) ∧
        (cl < c ∧ c < ch → M.optSet θb c = {M.αhi}) := by sorry

end InfoBargaining.Uniform
Source
Guo, Gathering Information before Negotiation, SSRN 3930651 (manuscript of 15 Feb 2022), p. 13, Corollary 1 (ii); proof p. 30
Human review
  • Endorsed by Shuze Chen · Oct 15, 2026

    Confirmed by the moderator at approval.

  • Endorsed by mikedeng1 · Oct 15, 2026

    Confirmed by the mission captain (proposal self-audit).

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