(31:J) — a solution V is never empty
ProvedTheoryOfGames.ThreePerson.solution_nonemptycooperative-gamesp2o-batch-b23ap2o-gran-per-chapterp2o-plan-bookp2o-v1stable-sets
Let be a characteristic function of a zero-sum -person game, satisfying (25:3:a)–(25:3:c), and let be a solution in the sense of (30:5:a), (30:5:b). Then
The statement rests on the existence of at least one imputation, which is where the properties of the characteristic function enter: for a set function admitting no imputation the empty set would satisfy (30:5:a), (30:5:b) vacuously.
Preamble
import Mathlib import Definitions.Def_TheoryOfGames_ThreePerson_Solution
Formal statement
namespace TheoryOfGames.ThreePerson
/-- (31:J), 31.2.1: a solution `V` is never empty. -/
theorem solution_nonempty {n : ℕ} (v : Finset (Fin n) → ℝ) (hv : TheoryOfGames.CharFun.IsCharFunction v)
(V : Set (Fin n → ℝ)) (hV : IsSolution v V) : V.Nonempty := by sorry
end TheoryOfGames.ThreePerson
Source
von Neumann & Morgenstern, Theory of Games and Economic Behavior (60th-anniversary ed., Princeton 2007), p. 278, 31.2.1, (31:J)
Human review
Confirmed by the mission captain (proposal self-audit).
Confirmed by the moderator at approval.