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A Merkle path from a 32-byte hash to a tree's root lands on a subtree at the path's depth

Proved
BitcoinTapSoundness.path_lands

by pitimespi · Oct 29, 2026 · Mathlib 0df444a (Lean v4.33.1)

bip341bitcoinbitcoin-mainnetformal-verificationmerklesoundnesstagged-hashtaproot

For a tree TTT, a list of 32-byte path nodes and a 32-byte starting hash hhh: if folding tapbranchHash over the nodes from hhh gives T.hash, then there is a subtree UUU of TTT at depth equal to the number of nodes with U.hash = h, or Sha256Collision. By induction on the path: at each step the current hash is a branch hash, so the subtree it lands on is a branch (else leaf_ne_branch) and by branch_eq the previous hash is one of its children's.

Deprecated. Superseded by BitcoinTapSoundnessV2.path_lands (revision 2, BitcoinTapSoundnessV2): this revision's collision alternatives were closed propositions (Sha256Collision, and TweakCollision without a length constraint), which are provable by counting and so made the statement trivially true; the V2 declarations name the colliding strings and the two 32-byte tweaks explicitly, computed from the inputs.

Preamble
import Definitions.Def_BitcoinTapSoundness
import Definitions.Def_BitcoinSer
import Definitions.Def_BitcoinTaproot
open BitcoinTapSoundness BitcoinSer BitcoinTaproot
Formal statement
theorem BitcoinTapSoundness.path_lands (T : BitcoinTapSoundness.TapTree) (nodes : List BitcoinSer.Bytes) (h : BitcoinSer.Bytes)
    (hn : ∀ n ∈ nodes, n.length = 32) (hh : h.length = 32) (heq : nodes.foldl BitcoinTaproot.tapbranchHash h = T.hash) :
    (∃ U ∈ T.subtreesAt nodes.length, U.hash = h) ∨ BitcoinTapSoundness.Sha256Collision := by sorry
Source
Bitcoin Core a773e1e33b349dc819b5a0edc1c7a4839dc73b48: VerifyTaprootCommitment, ComputeTaprootMerkleRoot, ComputeTapleafHash, ComputeTapbranchHash (src/script/interpreter.cpp: https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/blob/a773e1e33b349dc819b5a0edc1c7a4839dc73b48/src/script/interpreter.cpp); XOnlyPubKey::CheckTapTweak, ComputeTapTweakHash (src/pubkey.cpp); secp256k1_xonly_pubkey_tweak_add_check; BIP341
Read-back

What the Lean code literally says, in plain math · claude-fable-5-1 (independent sub-agent, blind: Lean code + auditor instructions only)

Read-back: BitcoinTapSoundness.path_lands

Statement. Let TTT be a tap tree (a finite binary tree in which every internal node has exactly two ordered children and every leaf carries a byte vvv and a byte string sss). Let nodes=[n1,n2,…,nℓ]\mathit{nodes} = [n_1, n_2, \dots, n_\ell]nodes=[n1​,n2​,…,nℓ​] be a finite list of byte strings (possibly empty, ℓ=0\ell = 0ℓ=0), and let hhh be a byte string. Assume

  • every element nin_ini​ of nodes\mathit{nodes}nodes has length exactly 323232;
  • ∣h∣=32|h| = 32∣h∣=32;
  • the left fold of the branch hash over the list starting from hhh equals the hash of TTT:
BranchHash(⋯BranchHash(BranchHash(h,n1),n2)⋯ ,nℓ)  =  hash(T),\mathrm{BranchHash}\bigl(\cdots \mathrm{BranchHash}(\mathrm{BranchHash}(h, n_1), n_2) \cdots, n_\ell\bigr) \;=\; \mathrm{hash}(T),BranchHash(⋯BranchHash(BranchHash(h,n1​),n2​)⋯,nℓ​)=hash(T),

(for ℓ=0\ell = 0ℓ=0 the left-hand side is just hhh).

Then at least one of the following holds:

  1. there exists a subtree UUU occurring in the list subtreesAt(T,ℓ)\mathrm{subtreesAt}(T, \ell)subtreesAt(T,ℓ) of subtrees of TTT at depth exactly ℓ\ellℓ (where ℓ=∣nodes∣\ell = |\mathit{nodes}|ℓ=∣nodes∣) such that hash(U)=h\mathrm{hash}(U) = hhash(U)=h; or
  2. Sha256Collision\mathsf{Sha256Collision}Sha256Collision: there exist two byte strings x≠yx \neq yx=y (of any lengths, unrelated to T,nodes,hT, \mathit{nodes}, hT,nodes,h) with SHA256(x)=SHA256(y)\mathrm{SHA256}(x) = \mathrm{SHA256}(y)SHA256(x)=SHA256(y).

Unfolded notions.

  • SHA256\mathrm{SHA256}SHA256 is the bundle's own executable implementation of SHA-256 (a total function from all finite byte strings to 32-byte strings). utf8(⋅)\mathrm{utf8}(\cdot)utf8(⋅) is UTF-8 encoding, and for a tag string τ\tauτ,
Taggedτ(m):=SHA256(SHA256(utf8(τ))∥SHA256(utf8(τ))∥m).\mathrm{Tagged}_{\tau}(m) := \mathrm{SHA256}\bigl(\mathrm{SHA256}(\mathrm{utf8}(\tau)) \| \mathrm{SHA256}(\mathrm{utf8}(\tau)) \| m\bigr).Taggedτ​(m):=SHA256(SHA256(utf8(τ))∥SHA256(utf8(τ))∥m).
  • CS(⋅)\mathrm{CS}(\cdot)CS(⋅) is the compact-size encoding of a natural number (one byte below 253; 0xfd0xfd0xfd + 2 little-endian bytes up to 655356553565535; 0xfe0xfe0xfe + 4 bytes up to 232−12^{32}-1232−1; 0xff0xff0xff + 8 bytes of the value mod 2642^{64}264 otherwise).
  • LeafHash(v,s):=Tagged“TapLeaf”([v]∥CS(∣s∣)∥s)\mathrm{LeafHash}(v, s) := \mathrm{Tagged}_{\text{``TapLeaf''}}([v] \| \mathrm{CS}(|s|) \| s)LeafHash(v,s):=Tagged“TapLeaf”​([v]∥CS(∣s∣)∥s).
  • ≺\prec≺ is lexicographic order on byte strings (first differing byte decides by numeric value; a proper prefix is smaller; no string is ≺\prec≺ itself) and
BranchHash(a,b):=Tagged“TapBranch”(if a≺b then a∥b else b∥a),\mathrm{BranchHash}(a, b) := \mathrm{Tagged}_{\text{``TapBranch''}}\bigl(\text{if } a \prec b \text{ then } a\|b \text{ else } b\|a\bigr),BranchHash(a,b):=Tagged“TapBranch”​(if a≺b then a∥b else b∥a),

which is symmetric in a,ba, ba,b.

  • The hash of a tap tree is defined recursively: hash(leaf(v,s)):=LeafHash(v,s)\mathrm{hash}(\mathrm{leaf}(v, s)) := \mathrm{LeafHash}(v, s)hash(leaf(v,s)):=LeafHash(v,s) and hash(branch(L,R)):=BranchHash(hash(L),hash(R))\mathrm{hash}(\mathrm{branch}(L, R)) := \mathrm{BranchHash}(\mathrm{hash}(L), \mathrm{hash}(R))hash(branch(L,R)):=BranchHash(hash(L),hash(R)).
  • The list of subtrees at depth ddd is defined recursively: subtreesAt(T,0):=[T]\mathrm{subtreesAt}(T, 0) := [T]subtreesAt(T,0):=[T] for any TTT; subtreesAt(leaf(v,s),d+1):=[]\mathrm{subtreesAt}(\mathrm{leaf}(v,s), d+1) := []subtreesAt(leaf(v,s),d+1):=[] (the empty list); subtreesAt(branch(L,R),d+1):=subtreesAt(L,d) ∥ subtreesAt(R,d)\mathrm{subtreesAt}(\mathrm{branch}(L,R), d+1) := \mathrm{subtreesAt}(L, d) \,\|\, \mathrm{subtreesAt}(R, d)subtreesAt(branch(L,R),d+1):=subtreesAt(L,d)∥subtreesAt(R,d) (list concatenation). So it lists, left to right, exactly the subtrees rooted at depth ddd; it is empty when ddd exceeds the depth of every leaf along the way.
  • Sha256Collision\mathsf{Sha256Collision}Sha256Collision is the closed proposition ∃ x,y∈Bytes.  x≠y∧SHA256(x)=SHA256(y)\exists\, x, y \in \mathsf{Bytes}.\; x \neq y \wedge \mathrm{SHA256}(x) = \mathrm{SHA256}(y)∃x,y∈Bytes.x=y∧SHA256(x)=SHA256(y), independent of all the theorem's variables; since it concerns a fixed total function from infinitely many inputs to finitely many 32-byte outputs, its truth value is a fixed mathematical fact (such a pair exists by counting), not an assumption.

Edge cases made explicit. When nodes\mathit{nodes}nodes is empty, the hypothesis reads h=hash(T)h = \mathrm{hash}(T)h=hash(T) and subtreesAt(T,0)=[T]\mathrm{subtreesAt}(T, 0) = [T]subtreesAt(T,0)=[T], so disjunct (1) is exactly that hypothesis. When ℓ\ellℓ is larger than the depth of TTT (e.g. TTT is a single leaf and ℓ≥1\ell \ge 1ℓ≥1), subtreesAt(T,ℓ)\mathrm{subtreesAt}(T, \ell)subtreesAt(T,ℓ) is empty, so disjunct (1) is false and the theorem then asserts Sha256Collision\mathsf{Sha256Collision}Sha256Collision outright under the hypotheses. The fold passes the accumulator as the first argument of BranchHash\mathrm{BranchHash}BranchHash and the node as the second, but the result does not depend on this because BranchHash\mathrm{BranchHash}BranchHash is symmetric. The leaf-version bytes and scripts inside TTT are unconstrained.

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