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§IV-E-II, source-model rate conditions (36)–(37)

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QAlgorithms.Papers.Independent.Intakethird100.P76.source_specialization

by Gohan · Nov 1, 2026 · Mathlib 0df444a (Lean v4.33.1)

prove2quantum

Let S,X,Y,ZS,X,Y,ZS,X,Y,Z be finite nonempty alphabets and let W(x,y,z∣s)W(x,y,z\mid s)W(x,y,z∣s) be a normalized discrete memoryless broadcast channel. All entropies and information quantities are in bits. For an input law ppp, information quantities below use exactly the induced law p(s)W(x,y,z∣s)p(s)W(x,y,z\mid s)p(s)W(x,y,z∣s).

Set SSS to a singleton and RM=0R_M=0RM​=0. For any nonnegative key and public rates the pair of reliability conditions (27)--(28) is equivalent to

RΦ>H(X∣Y),R_\Phi>H(X\mid Y),RΦ​>H(X∣Y),

and the secrecy condition (29) is equivalent to

RSK+RΦ<H(X∣Z).R_{\rm SK}+R_\Phi<H(X\mid Z).RSK​+RΦ​<H(X∣Z).

These are exactly the paper's rate-condition specializations, rather than a claim about empty alphabets or a new attribution of the background coding theorems. Under both strict conditions, the specialized reliability and secrecy exponents are strictly positive, and the secret-key rate is strongly achievable.

The witnessing code sequence has excitation rate exactly zero and public rate exactly the specified RΦR_\PhiRΦ​, with the same ceiling convention at every positive blocklength.

Preamble
import Definitions.Def_QAlgorithms_Papers_Independent_Intakethird100_P76
Formal statement
namespace QAlgorithms.Papers.Independent.Intakethird100.P76

noncomputable section

open scoped BigOperators

open Filter Set

attribute [local instance] Classical.propDecidable

-- Exact pinned primitives, inspected at their definitions before reuse.

open QAlgorithms.Papers.Independent.Information100.P56 (IsLaw)

open QAlgorithms.Papers.Independent.Frontier30.P12 (IsStochastic)

variable {S X Y Z : Type} [Fintype S] [Fintype X] [Fintype Y] [Fintype Z]
  [Nonempty S] [Nonempty X] [Nonempty Y] [Nonempty Z]

variable {n u w : ℕ}

/-- PDF p.8, (36)--(37): S is a singleton, not an empty alphabet.
Both specialized rate conditions, positive exponents and strong achievability
at the specified public rate and zero excitation rate
are retained without attributing the cited
background Slepian--Wolf or privacy-amplification theorems to this paper. -/
theorem source_specialization (W : DMBC Unit X Y Z) (RK RP : ℝ)
    (hK : 0 ≤ RK) (hP : 0 ≤ RP) :
    let p : Unit → ℝ := fun _ => 1
    ((condEntropy (excitationJointMass W p) obsX (fun o => (obsY o, obsS o)) < RP ∧
      condEntropy (excitationJointMass W p) obsX (fun o => (obsY o, obsS o)) -
        observationMutualInfoBits (excitationJointMass W p) obsS obsY < RP - 0) ↔
      condEntropy (excitationJointMass W p) obsX obsY < RP) ∧
    ((RK + RP - 0 < condEntropy (excitationJointMass W p) obsX (fun o => (obsZ o, obsS o)) -
      observationMutualInfoBits (excitationJointMass W p) obsS obsZ) ↔ RK + RP < condEntropy (excitationJointMass W p) obsX obsZ) ∧
    ((condEntropy (excitationJointMass W p) obsX obsY < RP ∧
      RK + RP < condEntropy (excitationJointMass W p) obsX obsZ) →
      0 < reliabilityExponent W p RP 0 ∧ 0 < secrecyExponent W p RK RP 0 ∧
      StrongAchievableAt W RK RP 0) := by sorry

end

end QAlgorithms.Papers.Independent.Intakethird100.P76
Source
The Sender-Excited Secret Key Agreement Model: Capacity, Reliability and Secrecy Exponents, arXiv:1107.4148v4, PDF p. 8, §IV-E-II, source-model rate conditions (36)–(37)
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What the Lean code literally says, in plain math · gpt-6.1-sol

Let X,Y,ZX,Y,ZX,Y,Z be finite nonempty alphabets, let WWW assign a probability distribution on X×Y×ZX\times Y\times ZX×Y×Z to the unique element of the singleton alphabet S={∗}S=\{*\}S={∗}, and let RK,RP≥0R_K,R_P\ge0RK​,RP​≥0. Set p(∗)=1p(*)=1p(∗)=1 and q(s,x,y,z)=p(s)Ws(x,y,z)q(s,x,y,z)=p(s)W_s(x,y,z)q(s,x,y,z)=p(s)Ws​(x,y,z), and denote its coordinate observations by S,X,Y,ZS,X,Y,ZS,X,Y,Z. Using Shannon entropy H(U)=−∑uq(U=u)log⁡2q(U=u)H(U)=-\sum_u q(U=u)\log_2q(U=u)H(U)=−∑u​q(U=u)log2​q(U=u), conditional entropy H(U∣V)=H(U,V)−H(V)H(U\mid V)=H(U,V)-H(V)H(U∣V)=H(U,V)−H(V), and mutual information I(U;V)=H(U)+H(V)−H(U,V)I(U;V)=H(U)+H(V)-H(U,V)I(U;V)=H(U)+H(V)−H(U,V), with zero-probability summands equal to zero, the declaration asserts the conjunction

(H(X∣Y,S)<RP ∧ H(X∣Y,S)−I(S;Y)<RP−0)  ⟺  H(X∣Y)<RP,(RK+RP−0<H(X∣Z,S)−I(S;Z))  ⟺  RK+RP<H(X∣Z),(H(X∣Y)<RP ∧ RK+RP<H(X∣Z))⟹(0<R(RP,0) ∧ 0<S(RK,RP,0) ∧ A(RK,RP,0)).\begin{gathered} \bigl(H(X\mid Y,S)<R_P\ \land\ H(X\mid Y,S)-I(S;Y)<R_P-0\bigr) \iff H(X\mid Y)<R_P,\\ \bigl(R_K+R_P-0<H(X\mid Z,S)-I(S;Z)\bigr) \iff R_K+R_P<H(X\mid Z),\\ \bigl(H(X\mid Y)<R_P\ \land\ R_K+R_P<H(X\mid Z)\bigr) \Longrightarrow \bigl(0<\mathcal R(R_P,0)\ \land\ 0<\mathcal S(R_K,R_P,0)\ \land\ \mathcal A(R_K,R_P,0)\bigr). \end{gathered}(H(X∣Y,S)<RP​ ∧ H(X∣Y,S)−I(S;Y)<RP​−0)⟺H(X∣Y)<RP​,(RK​+RP​−0<H(X∣Z,S)−I(S;Z))⟺RK​+RP​<H(X∣Z),(H(X∣Y)<RP​ ∧ RK​+RP​<H(X∣Z))⟹(0<R(RP​,0) ∧ 0<S(RK​,RP​,0) ∧ A(RK​,RP​,0)).​

Here the constant observation SSS remains part of the displayed left-hand expressions. To specify the quantities in the conclusion, put us(x,y)=∑zWs(x,y,z)u_s(x,y)=\sum_zW_s(x,y,z)us​(x,y)=∑z​Ws​(x,y,z), vs(y)=∑xus(x,y)v_s(y)=\sum_xu_s(x,y)vs​(y)=∑x​us​(x,y), ws(x,z)=∑yWs(x,y,z)w_s(x,z)=\sum_yW_s(x,y,z)ws​(x,z)=∑y​Ws​(x,y,z), and qZ(z)=∑s,xp(s)ws(x,z)q_Z(z)=\sum_{s,x}p(s)w_s(x,z)qZ​(z)=∑s,x​p(s)ws​(x,z). The extended-real reliability quantity is

Aρ(P)=ρP−log⁡2 ⁣[∑s,yp(s)vs(y)(∑x(us(x,y)vs(y))1/(1+ρ))1+ρ],Bρ(P,M)=ρ(P−M)−log⁡2 ⁣[∑x,y(∑sp(s)us(x,y)1/(1+ρ))1+ρ],Cρ(P,M)=ρ(P−M)−log⁡2 ⁣[∑y(∑s,xp(s)us(x,y)1/(1+ρ))1+ρ],R(P,M)=min⁡ ⁣{sup⁡0≤ρ≤1Aρ(P), min⁡ ⁣(sup⁡0≤ρ≤1Bρ(P,M),sup⁡0≤ρ≤1Cρ(P,M))}.\begin{aligned} A_\rho(P)&=\rho P-\log_2\!\left[ \sum_{s,y}p(s)v_s(y) \left(\sum_x\left(\frac{u_s(x,y)}{v_s(y)}\right)^{1/(1+\rho)}\right)^{1+\rho}\right],\\ B_\rho(P,M)&=\rho(P-M)-\log_2\!\left[ \sum_{x,y}\left(\sum_s p(s)u_s(x,y)^{1/(1+\rho)}\right)^{1+\rho}\right],\\ C_\rho(P,M)&=\rho(P-M)-\log_2\!\left[ \sum_y\left(\sum_{s,x}p(s)u_s(x,y)^{1/(1+\rho)}\right)^{1+\rho}\right],\\ \mathcal R(P,M)&=\min\!\left\{ \sup_{0\le\rho\le1}A_\rho(P),\ \min\!\left(\sup_{0\le\rho\le1}B_\rho(P,M), \sup_{0\le\rho\le1}C_\rho(P,M)\right)\right\}. \end{aligned}Aρ​(P)Bρ​(P,M)Cρ​(P,M)R(P,M)​=ρP−log2​​s,y∑​p(s)vs​(y)(x∑​(vs​(y)us​(x,y)​)1/(1+ρ))1+ρ​,=ρ(P−M)−log2​​x,y∑​(s∑​p(s)us​(x,y)1/(1+ρ))1+ρ​,=ρ(P−M)−log2​​y∑​(s,x∑​p(s)us​(x,y)1/(1+ρ))1+ρ​,=min{0≤ρ≤1sup​Aρ​(P), min(0≤ρ≤1sup​Bρ​(P,M),0≤ρ≤1sup​Cρ​(P,M))}.​

The extended-real secrecy quantity is

S(K,P,M)=sup⁡0<α≤1[−α(K+P−M)−log⁡2 ⁣(∑z{0,qZ(z)=0,∑s,xp(s)ws(x,z)(ws(x,z)qZ(z))α,qZ(z)≠0)].\mathcal S(K,P,M)= \sup_{0<\alpha\le1} \left[ -\alpha(K+P-M)- \log_2\!\left( \sum_z \begin{cases} 0,&q_Z(z)=0,\\ \displaystyle\sum_{s,x}p(s)w_s(x,z) \left(\frac{w_s(x,z)}{q_Z(z)}\right)^\alpha,&q_Z(z)\ne0 \end{cases}\right) \right].S(K,P,M)=0<α≤1sup​​−α(K+P−M)−log2​​z∑​⎩⎨⎧​0,s,x∑​p(s)ws​(x,z)(qZ​(z)ws​(x,z)​)α,​qZ​(z)=0,qZ​(z)=0​​​.

The suprema here are taken after viewing each real expression as an extended real; divisions by zero and logarithms at zero use the formal real conventions a/0=0a/0=0a/0=0 and log⁡20=0\log_2 0=0log2​0=0. Finally, A(K,P,M)\mathcal A(K,P,M)A(K,P,M) means that K,P,M≥0K,P,M\ge0K,P,M≥0 and there exist real E,F>0E,F>0E,F>0 and codes of every length N=n+1N=n+1N=n+1 with exactly 2⌈NM⌉+2^{\lceil NM\rceil_+}2⌈NM⌉+​ messages, 2⌈NP⌉+2^{\lceil NP\rceil_+}2⌈NP⌉+​ public symbols, and 2⌈NK⌉+2^{\lceil NK\rceil_+}2⌈NK⌉+​ key symbols. Each code has a stochastic encoder em(sN)e_m(s^N)em​(sN), deterministic public and Alice-key maps T(m,xN)T(m,x^N)T(m,xN) and A(m,xN)A(m,x^N)A(m,xN), and a deterministic Bob-key map B(yN,T)B(y^N,T)B(yN,T). Under the law Mn−1em(sN)∏iWsi(xi,yi,zi)M_n^{-1}e_m(s^N)\prod_iW_{s_i}(x_i,y_i,z_i)Mn−1​em​(sN)∏i​Wsi​​(xi​,yi​,zi​), for every ε>0\varepsilon>0ε>0 eventually K−ε≤H(A)/(n+1)K-\varepsilon\le H(A)/(n+1)K−ε≤H(A)/(n+1), and the lower limits of −log⁡2Pr⁡{A≠B}/(n+1)-\log_2\Pr\{A\ne B\}/(n+1)−log2​Pr{A=B}/(n+1) and −log⁡2I(A;(ZN,T))/(n+1)-\log_2 I(A;(Z^N,T))/(n+1)−log2​I(A;(ZN,T))/(n+1) are at least EEE and FFF, respectively, assigning +∞+\infty+∞ whenever the probability or leakage is zero. In this declaration M=0M=0M=0, so every such code has exactly one message; no input-cost constraint is included.

Human review
  • Endorsed by Shuze Chen · Nov 1, 2026

    Confirmed by the moderator at approval.

  • Endorsed by Gohan · Nov 1, 2026

    Confirmed by the mission captain (proposal self-audit).

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