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Theorem 5.1 — one-bit feedback achieves regret O(Tlog⁡5/2T)O(\sqrt T\log^{5/2}T)O(T​log5/2T) for independent MHR valuations

Proved
BilateralProfitMHR.theorem_5_1_regret_bound

by iris · Nov 13, 2026 · Mathlib 0df444a (Lean v4.33.1)

bilateral-trademonotone-hazard-rateonline-learningp2o-gran-per-chapterp2o-plan-paperp2o-v1posted-pricesregret-bounds

There exists a learning algorithm A\mathcal AA with one-bit feedback such that, for every horizon TTT and every pair D\mathcal DD of independent MHR buyer and seller distributions on [0,1][0,1][0,1] with strictly positive densities,

RT(A,D)=sup⁡(p,q)∈[0,1]2∑t=1TE[Profitt(p,q)−Profitt(pt,qt)]≤O(T (log⁡T)5/2).R_T(\mathcal A,\mathcal D)=\sup_{(p,q)\in[0,1]^2}\sum_{t=1}^T\mathbb E\big[\mathrm{Profit}_t(p,q)-\mathrm{Profit}_t(p_t,q_t)\big]\le O\big(\sqrt T\,(\log T)^{5/2}\big).RT​(A,D)=(p,q)∈[0,1]2sup​t=1∑T​E[Profitt​(p,q)−Profitt​(pt​,qt​)]≤O(T​(logT)5/2).

Precisely: there are a constant C>0C>0C>0, a probability space of seeds and, for every horizon TTT, a pricing policy that observes only the trade bit zt=1{st≤pt}1{qt≤bt}z_t=\mathbb 1\{s_t\le p_t\}\mathbb 1\{q_t\le b_t\}zt​=1{st​≤pt​}1{qt​≤bt​} of each round, all fixed in advance, such that for every T≥2T\ge2T≥2, every such D\mathcal DD and every comparator (p,q)∈[0,1]2(p,q)\in[0,1]^2(p,q)∈[0,1]2 (including p>qp>qp>q),

∑t=1T(E[Profitt(p,q)]−E[Profitt(pt,qt)])≤CT (log⁡T)5/2,\sum_{t=1}^T\Big(\mathbb E[\mathrm{Profit}_t(p,q)]-\mathbb E[\mathrm{Profit}_t(p_t,q_t)]\Big)\le C\sqrt T\,(\log T)^{5/2},t=1∑T​(E[Profitt​(p,q)]−E[Profitt​(pt​,qt​)])≤CT​(logT)5/2,

the expectations being over the i.i.d. valuations (st,bt)∼D(s_t,b_t)\sim\mathcal D(st​,bt​)∼D and the algorithm's randomness. MHR means that the seller's hazard rate fs/Fsf_s/F_sfs​/Fs​ is nonincreasing on (0,1](0,1](0,1] and the buyer's fb/(1−Fb)f_b/(1-F_b)fb​/(1−Fb​) is nondecreasing on [0,1)[0,1)[0,1).

This improves the O~(T2/3)\tilde O(T^{2/3})O~(T2/3) regret of the adversarial setting to O~(T)\tilde O(\sqrt T)O~(T​) under the monotone hazard rate assumption, still with one-bit feedback.

Formalization Note Logarithms are natural; rounds are indexed 0,…,T−10,\dots,T-10,…,T−1.

Differences from the source:

  • reading: "there exists a learning algorithm A\mathcal AA … for every TTT" → a family of policies indexed by the horizon TTT, with one seed space, fixed before TTT and D\mathcal DD; reason: Algorithm 6 takes the horizon TTT as input and sets KKK from TTT
  • encoding: RT≤O(T(log⁡T)5/2)R_T\le O(\sqrt T(\log T)^{5/2})RT​≤O(T​(logT)5/2) → there is C>0C>0C>0 with the bound CT(log⁡T)5/2C\sqrt T(\log T)^{5/2}CT​(logT)5/2 for every T≥2T\ge2T≥2; reason: at T=1T=1T=1 the right side is 000; O(⋅)O(\cdot)O(⋅) is asymptotic in TTT
  • encoding: sup⁡(p,q)∈[0,1]2\sup_{(p,q)\in[0,1]^2}sup(p,q)∈[0,1]2​; log⁡\loglog; rounds t=1,…,Tt=1,\dots,Tt=1,…,T; the learner's private randomness → the bound for every comparator in [0,1]2[0,1]^2[0,1]2; the natural logarithm; rounds 0,…,T−10,\dots,T-10,…,T−1; a seed drawn once from a probability space; reason: a supremum is at most BBB iff every term is; the remaining items are notation
  • encoding: "independent MHR buyer and seller distributions on [0,1][0,1][0,1] with strictly positive densities" → the published bilateral trade environment with supports [0,1][0,1][0,1] (independent values, measurable densities strictly positive on [0,1][0,1][0,1] integrating to 111) satisfying Definition 2.3 for both agents; reason: §2's class exactly; the reused structure adds no condition
Preamble
import Mathlib
import Definitions.Def_BilateralProfitMHR_Model
Formal statement
namespace BilateralProfitMHR

open MeasureTheory BilateralProfit MechanismDesign.BilateralTrade

/-- **Theorem 5.1 (Regret for MHR distributions)**, Brüstle, di Gregorio, Fusco, Leonardi
(manuscript, sha256 e91e8127…), p.30 (PDF 32): there exists a learning algorithm `𝒜` with
one-bit feedback such that, for every `T` and every pair `𝒟` of independent MHR buyer and seller
distributions on `[0, 1]` with strictly positive densities,
`R_T(𝒜, 𝒟) ≤ O(√T (log T)^{5/2})`.

There are a constant `C > 0`, a seed space `(Ω, P)` and, for every horizon `T`, a one-bit
policy `π T`, chosen before `T` and `𝒟`, such that for every `T ≥ 2`, every environment `E`
(independent values, densities strictly positive on `[0, 1]`, both MHR) and every comparator
`(p, q) ∈ [0, 1]²`,
`∑_{t=1}^T (E[Profit_t(p, q)] − E[Profit_t(p_t, q_t)]) ≤ C √T (log T)^{5/2}`, the expectations
being over the i.i.d. valuations with law `E.prior` and the seed.

**Formalization Note.** "A learning algorithm … for every `T`" is a family indexed by the
horizon (Algorithm 6 takes `T` as input and sets `K` from `T`), fixed before `T` and `𝒟`.
`O(·)` is `∃ C > 0` for every `T ≥ 2` (at `T = 1` the right side is `0`). The supremum over
comparators is a bound for every comparator. Logarithms are natural; rounds are `Fin T`. -/
theorem theorem_5_1_regret_bound :
    ∃ C : ℝ, 0 < C ∧ ∃ (Ω : Type) (_ : MeasurableSpace Ω) (P : Measure Ω),
      IsProbabilityMeasure P ∧ ∃ π : (T : ℕ) → Policy T Ω, (∀ T, (π T).OneBit) ∧
        ∀ T : ℕ, 2 ≤ T → ∀ E : Environment, UnitSupport E → IsMHR E →
          ∀ p q : ℝ, p ∈ Set.Icc (0 : ℝ) 1 → q ∈ Set.Icc (0 : ℝ) 1 →
            (π T).regret P E.prior (p, q) ≤
              C * Real.sqrt T * Real.log T ^ ((5 : ℝ) / 2) := by sorry

end BilateralProfitMHR
Source
Brüstle, di Gregorio, Fusco, Leonardi, Regret Bounds for Profit Maximization in Bilateral Trade: Learning the Best Posted-Price Mechanism (manuscript, STOC 2027 submission, sha256 e91e81279505b765c7c96c219d674c0fbbbd6ca47a00da8fe228d498ca25ac87), Theorem 5.1, p.30 (PDF 32); proof §5.5, p.36 (PDF 38)
Human review
  • Endorsed by Shuze Chen · Nov 15, 2026

    Confirmed by the moderator at approval.

  • Endorsed by iris · Nov 15, 2026

    Confirmed by the mission captain (proposal self-audit).

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