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Corollary 5.2 — at a mixed Nash equilibrium of a harmonic game every player is indifferent among all pure strategies

Proved
HarmonicGames.UniformMixed.corollary_5_2

by mikedeng1 · Oct 7, 2026 · Mathlib 0df444a (Lean v4.33.1)

game-theoryharmonic-gamesmixed-nash-equilibriump2o-batch-pfp2bp2o-gran-per-chapterp2o-plan-paperp2o-v1

Let GGG be a finite game with players M\mathcal MM, nonempty finite strategy sets EmE^mEm and utilities u=(um)mu = (u^m)_mu=(um)m​, and suppose GGG is a harmonic game, u∈H⊕Nu \in \mathcal H \oplus \mathcal Nu∈H⊕N. Let x={xm}m∈∏mΔEmx = \{x^m\}_m \in \prod_m \Delta E^mx={xm}m​∈∏m​ΔEm be a mixed strategy profile. Then xxx is a mixed Nash equilibrium (Definition 5.1.1) if and only if

um(xm,x−m)=um(pm,x−m)for all pm∈Em and m∈M(42),u^m(x^m, x^{-m}) = u^m(p^m, x^{-m}) \qquad \text{for all } p^m \in E^m \text{ and } m \in \mathcal M \qquad (42),um(xm,x−m)=um(pm,x−m)for all pm∈Em and m∈M(42),

where um(xm,x−m)=∑pum(p)∏kxk(pk)u^m(x^m,x^{-m}) = \sum_{p} u^m(p)\prod_k x^k(p^k)um(xm,x−m)=∑p​um(p)∏k​xk(pk) is the mixed extension (34) and um(pm,x−m)u^m(p^m, x^{-m})um(pm,x−m) the payoff (35) of the pure strategy pmp^mpm against x−mx^{-m}x−m.

Unlike general games, where equilibrium indifference holds only on the support of each mixed strategy, in a harmonic game each player is indifferent among all of its pure strategies at any mixed equilibrium.

Formalization Note The mixed extension is AGT.expectedPayoff; the payoff (35) and Definition 5.1.1 (with pure deviations) are from the mission's definition file.

Preamble
import Mathlib
import Definitions.Def_agt_games
import Definitions.Def_HarmonicGames_Decomposition_Games
import Definitions.Def_HarmonicGames_GenericPure_Games
import Definitions.Def_HarmonicGames_UniformMixed_Mixed
Formal statement
namespace HarmonicGames.UniformMixed

/-- **Corollary 5.2** (p. 26): in a harmonic game `u ∈ H ⊕ N`, a mixed strategy profile
`x ∈ ∏_m ΔE^m` is a mixed Nash equilibrium (Definition 5.1.1) if and only if
`u^m(x^m, x^{-m}) = u^m(p^m, x^{-m})` for all `p^m ∈ E^m` and all `m` (42), with `u^m(x)`
the mixed extension (34) and `u^m(p^m, x^{-m})` the payoff (35). -/
theorem corollary_5_2 {ι : Type} [Fintype ι] [DecidableEq ι] (E : ι → Type)
    [∀ m, Fintype (E m)] [∀ m, DecidableEq (E m)] [∀ m, Nonempty (E m)]
    (u : HarmonicGames.Decomposition.Games E) (hu : u ∈ HarmonicGames.GenericPure.harmonicGames E) (x : ∀ m, E m → ℝ) (hx : AGT.IsMixedProfile x) :
    IsMixedNashEquilibrium (HarmonicGames.GenericPure.payoff E u) x ↔
      ∀ (m : ι) (a : E m), AGT.expectedPayoff (HarmonicGames.GenericPure.payoff E u) x m = mixedVsPure (HarmonicGames.GenericPure.payoff E u) x m a := by sorry

end HarmonicGames.UniformMixed
Source
Candogan, Menache, Ozdaglar, Parrilo, Flows and Decompositions of Games: Harmonic and Potential Games, arXiv:1005.2405v2, p. 26, Corollary 5.2, (42)
Human review
  • Endorsed by Shuze Chen · Oct 7, 2026

    Confirmed by the moderator at approval.

  • Endorsed by mikedeng1 · Oct 7, 2026

    Confirmed by the mission captain (proposal self-audit).

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