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Proposition 4, p. 1004 — under A4 and A5 the retailer's optimal effort under returns alone is strictly increasing in the return credit b

Proved
ChannelRebate.ReturnsEffort.proposition4_returns_increase_effort

by mikedeng1 · Oct 7, 2026 · Mathlib 0df444a (Lean v4.33.1)

comparative-staticsp2o-batch-pfp2ap2o-gran-per-chapterp2o-plan-paperp2o-v1returns-policysales-effortsupply-chain-contracts

Let 0<c<w<p0<c<w<p0<c<w<p and s<cs<cs<c (Assumption A1). Let demand be eξe\xieξ, where e≥0e\ge 0e≥0 is the retailer's sales effort and ξ\xiξ has a density φ\varphiφ with φ(ξ)>0\varphi(\xi)>0φ(ξ)>0 for all ξ≥0\xi\ge0ξ≥0 (Assumption A4). Let the effort cost VVV be strictly convex and strictly increasing on [0,∞)[0,\infty)[0,∞) with V(0)=0V(0)=0V(0)=0 (Assumption A5), and differentiable on (0,∞)(0,\infty)(0,∞). Under a return credit bbb the retailer chooses Q≥0Q\ge0Q≥0 and e≥0e\ge 0e≥0 to maximize

R‾b(Q,e)=−wQ+p Emin⁡(Q,eξ)+b E(Q−eξ)+−V(e).\underline{R}_b(Q,e)=-wQ+p\,E\min(Q,e\xi)+b\,E(Q-e\xi)^+-V(e).R​b​(Q,e)=−wQ+pEmin(Q,eξ)+bE(Q−eξ)+−V(e).

Let s≤b2<b1<ws\le b_2<b_1<ws≤b2​<b1​<w, let (Q1,e1)(Q_1,e_1)(Q1​,e1​) be an optimal pair under b1b_1b1​ and (Q2,e2)(Q_2,e_2)(Q2​,e2​) an optimal pair under b2b_2b2​, and suppose e2>0e_2>0e2​>0. Then

e2<e1.e_2<e_1 .e2​<e1​.

That is, the retailer's optimal effort under returns alone is strictly increasing in the return credit, the paper's ∂e‾/∂b>0\partial\underline{e}/\partial b>0∂e​/∂b>0. This reverses the conventional view that returns weaken a retailer's incentive for sales effort: for a fixed order quantity a larger credit lowers the marginal value of effort, but once the order quantity is re-optimized together with the effort, a larger credit raises effort.

Formalization Note The paper states ∂e‾/∂b>0\partial\underline{e}/\partial b>0∂e​/∂b>0 and its proof establishes strict monotonicity, which is what is formalized; a derivative would need e‾(b)\underline{e}(b)e​(b) to be differentiable, which A5 does not provide. Differentiability of VVV on (0,∞)(0,\infty)(0,∞) is added because the paper uses V′V'V′ in Λ\LambdaΛ and in the first-order condition. Effort at the smaller credit is assumed positive, following the paper's restriction to strictly positive effort (p. 1000). Optimal pairs are maximizers over Q≥0Q\ge0Q≥0, e≥0e\ge0e≥0; their existence is a hypothesis, as on p. 999.

Preamble
import Mathlib
import Definitions.Def_ChannelRebate_ReturnsEffort_Setting
Formal statement
namespace ChannelRebate.ReturnsEffort

/-- Taylor (2002), Proposition 4, p. 1004 (proof p. 1006): under A4 and A5, the retailer's
optimal effort under returns alone is strictly increasing in the return credit. If
`s ≤ b₂ < b₁ < w` and `(Q₁, e₁)`, `(Q₂, e₂)` are optimal order–effort pairs under the credits
`b₁`, `b₂` with `e₂ > 0`, then `e₂ < e₁`. -/
theorem proposition4_returns_increase_effort (p c s w : ℝ) (hc : 0 < c) (hcw : c < w)
    (hwp : w < p) (hsc : s < c) (D : Demand) (V : EffortCost) (V' : ℝ → ℝ)
    (hV' : ∀ e > 0, HasDerivAt V.V (V' e) e) (b₁ b₂ : ℝ) (hs : s ≤ b₂) (h12 : b₂ < b₁)
    (hw : b₁ < w) (Q₁ e₁ Q₂ e₂ : ℝ) (h₁ : IsOptimalPair (returnsProfit p w b₁ D V) Q₁ e₁)
    (h₂ : IsOptimalPair (returnsProfit p w b₂ D V) Q₂ e₂) (he₂ : 0 < e₂) :
    e₂ < e₁ := by sorry

end ChannelRebate.ReturnsEffort
Source
Taylor, Supply Chain Coordination Under Channel Rebates with Sales Effort Effects, Management Science 48(8) (2002), p. 1004, Proposition 4 (context §4.4.2, p. 1003); proof: Appendix, p. 1006
Human review
  • Endorsed by Shuze Chen · Oct 7, 2026

    Confirmed by the moderator at approval.

  • Endorsed by mikedeng1 · Oct 7, 2026

    Confirmed by the mission captain (proposal self-audit).

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