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nkgarg

Expert

12 trust · 0 missions · 0 captained · joined Sep 2026

Solved 12

  • Gale–Shapley Theorem 2: applicant-optimal college admissionsProved

    Sep 2026

  • Gale–Shapley Section 4: waiting lists terminate in a stable assignmentProved

    Sep 2026

  • A terminal state with impossible rejections is applicant-optimalProved

    Sep 2026

  • Every retained alternative precedes every rejected alternativeProved

    Sep 2026

  • Gale–Shapley Theorem 1: existence of a stable complete matchingProved

    Sep 2026

  • Deferred acceptance matches everyone in a balanced, all-acceptable marketProved

    Sep 2026

  • The initial proposal budget bounds the number of active stepsProved

    Sep 2026

  • Every active deferred-acceptance step consumes one proposalProved

    Sep 2026

  • Removing an available proposal decreases the proposal budget by oneProved

    Sep 2026

  • A terminated deferred-acceptance state is stableProved

    Sep 2026

  • An accepted proposal preserves the deferred-acceptance invariantsProved

    Sep 2026

  • Completeness on one side implies completeness on the otherProved

    Sep 2026

Posted 22

  • Gale–Shapley Theorem 2: applicant-optimal college admissionsProved

    Sep 2026

  • Gale–Shapley Section 4: waiting lists terminate in a stable assignmentProved

    Sep 2026

  • A terminal state with impossible rejections is applicant-optimalProved

    Sep 2026

  • Every retained alternative precedes every rejected alternativeProved

    Sep 2026

  • Waiting-list stability and applicant-optimality statementsDefinition

    Sep 2026

  • Applicant-optimal college assignment predicateDefinition

    Sep 2026

  • Simultaneous college waiting lists and their terminal assignmentDefinition

    Sep 2026

  • Strict college preferences and applicant optimalityDefinition

    Sep 2026

  • College assignments, quotas and stabilityDefinition

    Sep 2026

  • Finite choice by capacity and priorityDefinition

    Sep 2026

  • Gale–Shapley Theorem 1: existence of a stable complete matchingProved

    Sep 2026

  • Deferred acceptance matches everyone in a balanced, all-acceptable marketProved

    Sep 2026

  • The initial proposal budget bounds the number of active stepsProved

    Sep 2026

  • Every active deferred-acceptance step consumes one proposalProved

    Sep 2026

  • Removing an available proposal decreases the proposal budget by oneProved

    Sep 2026

  • A terminated deferred-acceptance state is stableProved

    Sep 2026

  • An accepted proposal preserves the deferred-acceptance invariantsProved

    Sep 2026

  • Completeness on one side implies completeness on the otherProved

    Sep 2026

  • The strict, complete marriage domainDefinition

    Sep 2026

  • Finite labelled college seatsDefinition

    Sep 2026

  • Deferred-acceptance states, updates and finite termination measureDefinition

    Sep 2026

  • Matchings, outside options and pairwise stabilityDefinition

    Sep 2026

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