Motivation
Zero-sum stochastic games model two opponents who interact over a finite set of states, each state being a matrix game whose outcome also decides the next state. Since Shapley (1953), every such game with discount factor λ∈(0,1] has a value vλk at each initial state k, characterised as the fixed point of a contraction. The value is the basic quantity of the theory, both for the discounted game and for its limits as λ→0, and computing it, or describing what kind of number it is, is a long-standing question in game theory and operations research.
A short history of the algebraic side of the question:
- 1950: Shapley and Snow describe the extreme optimal strategies of a matrix game through square sub-matrices and their cofactors.
- 1953: Shapley proves existence of vλ as the unique fixed point of the Shapley operator.
- 1976: Bewley and Kohlberg use Tarski–Seidenberg to show that λ↦vλ is semi-algebraic and admits a Puiseux expansion near 0; the degree of the algebraic equation is not controlled.
- 2018: Attia and Oliu-Barton (A solution for stochastic games, arXiv e-print, reference [2] of the paper) characterise vλk as the unique zero of w↦val((−1)n(Δk−wΔ0)), with n+1 auxiliary matrices built from a Kronecker determinant.
- 2021: the present paper (arXiv:1810.08798v2, Mathematics of Operations Research 46(3)) refines this with Shapley–Snow kernels and the theory of multiparameter eigenvalue problems, and obtains an explicit univariate polynomial with vλk as a root, of degree bounded by a rank.
Setting
A stochastic game has states K={1,…,n}, finite nonempty action sets Ik, Jk at state k, a payoff g(k,i,j)∈R, transition probabilities q(ℓ∣k,i,j)≥0 with ∑ℓq(ℓ∣k,i,j)=1, and a discount factor λ∈(0,1].
A real matrix A is a matrix game: the row player picks a mixed strategy x, the column player a mixed strategy y, and the row player receives txAy. Its value val(A) is the number that each player can guarantee. For z∈Rn, the local game Gk(λ,z) has entries λg(k,i,j)+(1−λ)∑ℓq(ℓ∣k,i,j)zℓ, and the discounted value vλ∈Rn is the unique solution of val(Gk(λ,vλ))=vλk for all k.
The data array D(λ) is the n×(n+1) array of matrices M0k=λGk, Mkk=(1−λ)Qkk−U and Mℓk=(1−λ)Qℓk for ℓ=k, where Gk=(g(k,i,j)), Qℓk=(q(ℓ∣k,i,j)) and U is a matrix of ones. The Kronecker determinant of an n×n array of matrices replaces products of scalars by Kronecker products; entrywise, its entry at rows (i1,…,in) and columns (j1,…,jn) is det(Akℓikjk)k,ℓ. The auxiliary matrices are Δℓ=(−1)ℓdet⊗D(ℓ)(λ), where D(ℓ) deletes column ℓ, for 0≤ℓ≤n.
A Shapley–Snow kernel of a matrix game G is a square sub-matrix G˙ with S(co(G˙))=0 whose cofactor strategies co(G˙)1/S(co(G˙)) and tco(G˙)1/S(co(G˙)), completed by zeros, are optimal in G; co is the cofactor matrix and S the sum of entries. Choosing a kernel I˙k×J˙k of every local game Gk(λ,vλ) and restricting each Mℓk to it gives the reduced array D˙(λ), with square auxiliary matrices Δ˙0,…,Δ˙n.
Formalization targets
Goal: Theorem 3.4.2
For every state k and every choice of kernels:
(i) vλk is the unique w∈R with val(Δ˙k−wΔ˙0)=0;(ii) rank(Δ˙k−vλkΔ˙0)<w∈Rmaxrank(Δ˙k−wΔ˙0);
(iii) some nonzero polynomial Pk of degree at most rank(Δ˙0), the determinant of a square sub-matrix of Δk−wΔ0, vanishes at vλk; (iv) if all entries of D(λ) are rational, then
[Q(vλk):Q]≤rank(Δ˙0).
Milestones
In attack order: Shapley's fixed-point theorem (§2.1); the sign of Δ0 (Lemma 2.2.3) and unique solvability of val(A−wB)=0 (Remark 2.2.4); the Shapley–Snow theorem (Theorem 2.3.1) and existence of kernels (§3.1); the cofactor lemmas B1–B3 and Proposition 2.3.4 on the kernel of G˙−vU˙; the rank-drop criterion (Lemma C1), the tensor kernel vector (Lemma C2) and Proposition 2.4.4; Proposition 3.2.1 placing vλ in the reduced solution sets; Proposition 3.4.1, the characterising polynomial.
Significance
The result. Theorem 3.4.2 turns the computation of a discounted value into univariate root finding: vλk is a root of one of finitely many explicit polynomials, read off from D(λ), of degree bounded by rank(Δ˙0)≤∏kmin(∣Ik∣,∣Jk∣). Part (iv) gives an explicit bound on the algebraic degree of the value of a rational game, a quantity that the semi-algebraic approach leaves uncontrolled. The same polynomials yield, in §4 of the paper, the convergence of vλ as λ→0 and a bound on its rate. These are not part of this mission.
Formalizing it. The theorem is proved in the paper; no part of it is machine-checked. A complete development formalizes the value of a matrix game on arbitrary finite action sets, Shapley's fixed point, the Shapley–Snow description of extreme optimal strategies, Kronecker determinants of arrays of matrices, and the singular multiparameter-eigenvalue lemmas of Muhič–Plestenjak and Atkinson. Each of these is reusable outside stochastic games.
Difficulty
The obvious route is Cramer's rule for the multiparameter system det(M0k+z1M1k+⋯+znMnk)=0: when Δ0 is invertible, the solutions are the eigenvalues of Δk(Δ0)−1. Here Δ0, and still more Δ˙0, is in general singular, and the polynomials det(Δ˙k−wΔ˙0) may vanish identically, so the determinant equation carries no information. The value must instead be located through a rank drop of the pencil. Proving the rank drop requires nonzero left and right kernel vectors with txΔ˙0y=0, which come from the sign of Δ0 (Lemma 2.2.3) and from nonnegative kernel strategies of the Shapley–Snow kernels transported through Kronecker products. Neither ingredient is available off the shelf.
A second obstacle is the paper's degree argument: it quotes the degree of det(A+wB) as equal to rank(B), which is false in general; only the inequality holds and is posed.
Formalization scope
- Model. States are
Fin n with n≥1. The action sets I k, J k are finite, nonempty and may depend on the state, as in §4, p. 20, where the paper extends its results "word for word" to that case. The transition probabilities are nonnegative and sum to one, and 0 < lam ≤ 1.
- Value. The value of a matrix game is the relation
IsMatVal A w: optimal strategies of both players guarantee w. No supremum or infimum over strategy sets is taken. vλ is any v with IsShapleyFixed g q lam v; the milestone shapley_fixed_point gives existence and uniqueness, so the goal is not vacuous.
- Kernels. A kernel is given by embeddings
Fin s ↪ I, Fin s ↪ J. IsSSK requires S(co(G˙))=0 and optimality of the completed cofactor strategies. The paper also requires the pair to be basic, but by Theorem 2.3.1 this is equivalent.
- Linear algebra.
co M is the transposed adjugate. The Kronecker determinant is defined through its entry formula (K5), and rows and columns of Δℓ are indexed by tuples instead of lexicographic integers. Column 0 of the array is the paper's ℓ=0, and the paper's Δk is Delta … k.succ. "maxwrank" means "some real w gives larger rank". The sets SM,SΔ accept complex vectors in Lemma C2, as in §2.4; SR,TM are used over Rn in the game results. Proposition 3.4.1 takes its polynomial from a determinant of a reduced-pencil submatrix, as the proof constructs.
- Conventions. Part (i) is the printed form, without the (−1)n of Result 1 (i); both hold for the square reduced matrices. Part (iv) is
IsAlgebraic ℚ v ∧ (minpoly ℚ v).natDegree ≤ rank.
The goal ranges over Shapley–Snow kernels, not over arbitrary square sub-matrices, and Ek is built from the full Δk−wΔ0 with only its degree cap taken from Δ˙0. A formalization in which kernels are arbitrary square sub-matrices, or in which Ek is built from Δ˙, states a different theorem.
Contributions are welcome at every level. In particular: the value of a matrix game on Fintype index types with existence and uniqueness, Shapley's contraction, the Shapley–Snow theorem, the Kronecker determinant and its column-alternation property (K3), and the bound degdet(A+wB)≤rank(B).
Selected references
- L. Attia, M. Oliu-Barton, Shapley–Snow kernels, multiparameter eigenvalue problems and stochastic games, Mathematics of Operations Research 46(3), 2021; arXiv:1810.08798v2. https://arxiv.org/abs/1810.08798v2
- L. Attia, M. Oliu-Barton, A solution for stochastic games, arXiv e-print, 2018 (reference [2] of the paper).
- L. S. Shapley, Stochastic games, PNAS 39(10), 1953. https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.39.10.1095
- L. S. Shapley, R. N. Snow, Basic solutions of discrete games, Contributions to the Theory of Games I (Annals of Mathematics Studies 24), 1950, pp. 27–35.
- T. Bewley, E. Kohlberg, The asymptotic theory of stochastic games, Mathematics of Operations Research 1(3), 1976. https://doi.org/10.1287/moor.1.3.197
- A. Muhič, B. Plestenjak, On the singular two-parameter eigenvalue problem, Electronic Journal of Linear Algebra 18, 2009, pp. 420–437.
- F. V. Atkinson, Multiparameter Eigenvalue Problems, vol. 1, Academic Press, 1972.
- J. W. Demmel, Applied Numerical Linear Algebra, SIAM, 1997 (cited for the degree of det(A+wB)).