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Economics

523 missions · 401 completed

Missions

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Algorithmic Game TheoryComputational ComplexityOperations Research·Captain: iris

Cardinal-Utility Matching Markets: The Quest for Envy-Freeness, Pareto-Optimality, and Efficient Computability: Finding an Envy-Free and Pareto-Optimal Lottery Is PPAD-HardResearch Paper

Allocating indivisible goods without money (school seats, dormitory rooms, course slots, organ-transplant priority) is a central problem of market design. When agents report cardinal utilities rather than rankings, the classical answer is the mechanism of Hylland and Zeckhauser (1979): give every agent one unit of fake money, find market-clearing prices for…

31 thms5 active usersReviewed
Algorithmic Game TheoryComplexity TheoryOperations Research·Captain: iris

Exploring the Tractability Frontier of Hylland–Zeckhauser ModelsResearch Paper

The Hylland–Zeckhauser (HZ) mechanism allocates indivisible goods without money, for instance dormitory rooms to students: each of NNN buyers receives one unit of artificial money and buys probability shares of NNN goods, each available in one copy, and equilibrium prices clear the market. The resulting doubly stochastic allocation is a lottery over assignments…

47 thms4 active usersReviewed
Algorithmic Game TheoryComputational ComplexityOperations Research·Captain: iris

The Complexity of Pacing for Second-Price Auctions: Finding an Approximate Pacing Equilibrium Is PPAD-HardResearch Paper

Online advertising platforms sell billions of impressions through auctions, and most advertisers face a budget for a whole campaign rather than for a single auction. Ad platforms handle this with budget pacing: each advertiser's bids are scaled down by a multiplier so that spending tracks the budget. When every advertiser paces at once, the multipliers…

26 thms4 active usersReviewed
Algorithmic Game TheoryOperations Research·Captain: iris

Constrained Trading Networks: Under an Integral Polymatroid Constraint on Trades, the Efficient-Allocation Relaxation with Separable M♮-Concave/Linear Valuations Has an Integral OptimumResearch Paper

In a trading network agents sit at the vertices of a directed multigraph and every arc is a bilateral trade: its source sells, its sink buys, and an outcome records how many copies of each trade are executed. When valuations satisfy a gross-substitutes condition (M♯^\sharp♯-concavity), competitive equilibria exist and efficient outcomes can be computed by a…

26 thms4 active usersReviewed
Dynamic ProgrammingMarkov ChainOperations Research·Captain: iris

General Equilibrium in a Heterogeneous-Agent Incomplete-Market Economy with Many Consumption Goods and a Risk-Free Bond: A Competitive Stationary Equilibrium ExistsResearch Paper

Heterogeneous-agent incomplete-market models are the workhorse of quantitative macroeconomics: a continuum of agents faces uninsurable income risk and self-insures by saving in a risk-free bond, and the cross-sectional wealth distribution is an equilibrium object. In the one-good model of Huggett (1993) and Aiyagari (1994) only the interest rate is…

40 thms4 active usersReviewed
Actuarial ScienceOperations ResearchProbability·Captain: iris

An Unexpected Stochastic Dominance: Pareto Distributions, Dependence, and Diversification: A Weighted Average of Negatively Associated Super-Pareto Losses Stochastically Dominates a Single LossResearch Paper

Diversification is the default advice of risk management: spreading a unit of exposure over several independent losses reduces risk. For losses with finite mean this is true in a strong sense: if X1,…,XnX_1,\dots,X_nX1​,…,Xn​ are identically distributed with finite mean, the weighted average ∑iθiXi\sum_i\theta_iX_i∑i​θi​Xi​ can never be larger than a single X1X_1X1​ in first-order stochastic…

20 thms4 active usersReviewed
Optimal TransportProbability·Captain: iris

Decision Making Under Model Uncertainty: Fréchet–Wasserstein Mean Preferences: the multiplier utility has a quantile minimizer and a 1/θ expansion around barycentric expected utilityResearch Paper

A decision maker often receives several probability models for one uncertain payoff, one from each expert or data source, and cannot say which is right. The standard responses are the multiplier preferences of Hansen and Sargent (2001) and the variational preferences of Maccheroni, Marinacci and Rustichini (2006): evaluate the payoff under the worst model,…

21 thms4 active usersReviewed
CombinatoricsLinear Optimization·Captain: mikedeng1

Every Choice Function Is Pro-Con Rationalizable: Disjoint Sets of Pro- and Con-Orderings Under Which Each Choice Set's Chosen Alternative Is the One with More Pros Than ConsResearch Paper

Revealed-preference theory asks which observed choices can be explained by a decision procedure. The classical answer, maximization of a single preference, explains only choice functions that satisfy consistency conditions such as the weak axiom, and observed choices, including the menu effects in Luce and Raiffa's dinner example, often violate them. A…

16 thms4 active usersReviewed
ProbabilityStochastic Systems·Captain: mikedeng1

Incomplete Information, Debt Issuance, and the Term Structure of Credit Spreads: Once Debt Capacity Is Exhausted, Creditors Face a Jump-to-Default Intensity Given in Closed Form by Equation (32)Research Paper

Creditors can observe a firm's liabilities while learning its asset value only after a delay. In the model of Benzoni, Garlappi, and Goldstein, this gap matters when the firm has exhausted its ability to issue more debt: creditors know that the firm has stayed above its default boundary, but do not know how close it is to that boundary now. Even though…

9 thms4 active usersReviewed
Algorithmic Game TheoryMechanism DesignOperations Research+1·Captain: Shuze Chen

On the Power and Limitations of Multiple Intermediaries for Single-Item AuctionsResearch Paper

A seller may be unable to receive buyers' bids directly. Intermediaries can control access to its auction and charge bidders for the right to participate. Competition between those intermediaries might reduce exclusion, but it need not transfer their revenue back to the seller. These are different questions: whether the item reaches the buyer who values it…

16 thms3 active usersReviewed
Machine LearningOperations Research·Captain: iris

Maximizing Unobserved Welfare: Logarithmic Regret from PurchasesResearch Paper

A seller who produces goods and posts prices to a stream of buyers usually wants revenue. A planner who runs a public market, such as a food bank, a cooperative or a platform with a welfare mandate, wants something else: the total utility of the buyers minus the cost of production. The difficulty is that utility is never observed. The seller sees only what…

25 thms3 active usersReviewed
Mechanism DesignOperations ResearchProbability·Captain: iris

The Value of Observing the Buyers’ Arrival Time in Dynamic Pricing: Observing the Buyer’s Arrival Raises the Seller’s Optimal Revenue by a Factor of at Most 4.911Research Paper

A retailer who sells a seasonal good over time faces customers who know that prices may fall and who time their purchases strategically. A large operations literature studies how a seller should set a price path against such forward-looking buyers (for example Besanko and Winston, 1990; Aviv and Pazgal, 2008; Cachon and Swinney, 2009). A basic informational…

12 thms3 active usersReviewed
Algorithmic Game TheoryOperations Research·Captain: iris

Transparency and Control in Platforms for Networked Markets: Open-Access Cournot Competition Has Price of Anarchy at Most (3/2)(1−1/(3n+6))(3/2)(1 - 1/(3n+6))(3/2)(1−1/(3n+6)), Tight When All Markets Share One Willingness to PayResearch Paper

Online marketplaces such as eBay, Etsy, Amazon and Alibaba, ride-sharing services and electricity markets are platforms: they stand between many producers and many geographically or logically separate markets, and they decide which producer may serve which market. A basic design question is how much welfare is lost when the platform simply lets everyone…

26 thms3 active usersReviewed
Control TheoryOperations ResearchProbability·Captain: iris

Mean-Variance Portfolio Selection with Dynamic Targets for Expected Terminal Wealth: Closed-Form Equilibrium Strategies for the Three Targets, Each Unique in Its ClassResearch Paper

Mean-variance analysis is the standard model of portfolio choice: an investor fixes a target for expected wealth and minimizes the variance of wealth. In continuous time the problem is time-inconsistent: the strategy that is optimal at time 0 is no longer optimal for the same investor at a later date, because variance is not additive across time. Dynamic…

43 thms3 active usersReviewed
Algorithmic Game TheoryConvex OptimizationOperations Research·Captain: iris

Persuasion in Networks: Public Signals and Cores: Algorithm 1 applied to an optimal solution of the convex program (OPT) yields an optimal double-interval public signaling mechanismResearch Paper

An information designer who knows a payoff-relevant state, and who cannot pay or coerce anyone, can still shape behavior by committing in advance to what is disclosed. This is Bayesian persuasion (Kamenica and Gentzkow, 2011). Candogan studies the case of many receivers in a social network, who act on a common public signal and whose actions are strategic…

20 thms3 active usersReviewed
Algorithmic Game TheoryConvex Optimization·Captain: iris

The Edgeworth Conjecture with Small Coalitions and Approximate Equilibria in Large Economies: every κ-core allocation of a replica economy is an ε-Walrasian allocationResearch Paper

Edgeworth (1881) conjectured that as an exchange economy grows, the outcomes that no group of traders can improve upon by trading among themselves shrink to the competitive (Walrasian) outcomes. Debreu and Scarf (DS63) proved this for replica economies: an allocation that lies in the core of the nnn-fold replica En\mathcal E^nEn for every nnn is a Walrasian…

7 thms3 active usersReviewed
Operations ResearchProbability·Captain: iris

An Equilibrium Model for the Cross-Section of Liquidity Premia: an explicit Radner equilibrium with quadratic transaction costs for any number of agents and assets, via global Riccati solutionsResearch Paper

Assets that are expensive to trade earn higher expected returns than comparable liquid assets. Partial-equilibrium models explain such liquidity premia by taking prices as given and asking how a single investor trades around costs. An explanation of the cross-section of premia needs prices that are themselves set in equilibrium by agents who all pay costs.…

26 thms3 active usersReviewed
Operations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

Curtailing Bank Loan and Loan Insurance Under Risk Regulations in Supply Chain Finance: In the Insurance-Cooperation Region a Lower Initial Loan Limit and a Higher Fixed Bank Fee Benefit the SupplierResearch Paper

Small retailers often cannot pay for their orders out of their own capital and borrow from banks to do so. Banks in turn are regulated: risk-control rules such as value-at-risk caps limit how much they may lend against an uncertain revenue, and they charge fixed fees to process a loan. Loan insurance, offered by insurers or guaranteed by governments,…

14 thms3 active usersReviewed
Functional AnalysisProbability·Captain: mikedeng1

Lipschitz Bernoulli Utility Functions: A Preorder on Finite-Mean Lotteries Is Lipschitz and Affine if and only if It Has a Lipschitz Expected Multi-Utility RepresentationResearch Paper

Expected utility theory describes a decision maker who ranks risky prospects (probability distributions over outcomes) by the expected value of a Bernoulli utility function on the outcomes. The classical von Neumann–Morgenstern theorem, extended by Grandmont to separable metric outcome spaces, says that a complete preference over lotteries has a continuous…

11 thms3 active usersReviewed
Convex OptimizationOptimization·Captain: mikedeng1

Discrete Choice Prox-Functions on the Simplex: The Convex Conjugate of an Additive Random Utility Surplus Function Is a Prox-Function on the SimplexResearch Paper

Prox-functions determine how subgradient and mirror-type optimization methods turn a direction of improvement into the next feasible point. On a probability simplex, that step should respect the geometry of probability vectors and be computable from the current direction. The entropic prox-function gives the softmax rule, familiar from the logit model of…

10 thms3 active usersReviewed
Algorithmic Game TheoryOperations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

Multidimensional Targeting and Consumer Response: With a Small Ad Cost and a Click Cost Just Below the md-Equilibrium Threshold, Single-Dimensional Targeting Is Strictly More ProfitableResearch Paper

Firms that advertise online choose whom to target from the customer data they hold, and the industry's working assumption is that more granular data can only help: a firm that knows more about each consumer can at worst ignore the extra information. Despotakis and Yu (SSRN 3900394; Management Science, 2022, doi:10.1287/mnsc.2022.4604) show that this fails…

11 thms3 active usersReviewed
Operations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

Data Tracking under Competition: In the Interior-Equilibrium Regime m < m_L, Data Tracking Raises Aggregate Consumer Surplus for Both Myopic and Forward-Looking ConsumersResearch Paper

Firms increasingly record what they learn about a customer in one transaction and use it to price the next one. Regulators treat this data tracking as a privacy problem; the consumer-protection question is whether consumers, as a group, lose from it. In a monopoly the answer is typically yes: the seller who learns a consumer's valuation extracts it.…

20 thms3 active usersReviewed
Operations ResearchProbability·Captain: mikedeng1

Systemic Portfolio Diversification: With Two Heterogeneous Banks and Two Assets, Equilibrium Portfolios Raise the Probability That Some Bank Liquidates and Lower the Probability That Both DoResearch Paper

When a leveraged financial institution suffers a loss, a leverage constraint can force it to sell assets. If several institutions hold the same assets, their simultaneous sales depress prices and impose losses on everyone holding those assets. These fire-sale spillovers were a central amplification channel in the 2007–2009 financial crisis (Greenwood,…

10 thms3 active usersReviewed
Operations ResearchProbability·Captain: mikedeng1

How Endogenization of the Reference Point Affects Loss Aversion: A Study of Portfolio Selection: The Partially Endogenous PPE Is the Exogenous-Reference Optimum with a Lower Degree of Loss AversionResearch Paper

Loss aversion, the tendency to weigh a loss more heavily than a gain of the same size, is the central ingredient of reference-dependent preferences. Measured degrees of loss aversion vary widely across experiments and markets. One explanation is that the reference point is not fixed. People form it partly from their own expectations about what they will…

12 thms3 active usersReviewed
AnalysisOperations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

Intertemporal Choice with Continuity Constraints: On a Finite Horizon, Eight Axioms Characterize Preferences over Continuous Trajectories Admitting a Discounted Utility Integral RepresentationResearch Paper

Intertemporal choice compares outcomes received at different times. A familiar model assigns each instantaneous outcome a utility and aggregates those utilities with a time weight. That model is useful in economics and operations research, but its meaning depends on what choices are feasible and how a preference over one stretch of time relates to a…

18 thms3 active usersReviewed
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