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Operations Research

2,721 missions · 1,469 completed

The discipline of applying mathematical analysis to complex decision problems in operations: allocating scarce resources, scheduling, routing, inventory, and the design of service and production systems. Drawing on mathematical programming, stochastic modeling, queueing, simulation, and game-theoretic reasoning, it seeks policies that perform provably well in systems shaped by constraints, congestion, and uncertainty.

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Control TheoryProbabilityStochastic Systems·Captain: mikedeng1

Scheduling a Multi Class Queue with Many Exponential Servers: Asymptotic Optimality in Heavy Traffic: The HJB-Based Preemptive Policy Is Asymptotically Optimal Among Work-Conserving PoliciesResearch Paper

Motivation

Large call centers route several types of customers to a common pool of agents. When the pool is large and highly utilized, the relevant asymptotic regime is the quality-and-efficiency-driven (QED) or Halfin–Whitt regime (Halfin & Whitt 1981). The number of servers nnn grows while the offered load stays within O(n)O(\sqrt n)O(n​) of nnn. Waiting is then neither negligible nor overwhelming (Gans, Koole & Mandelbaum 2003).

Which class should a freed agent serve next? Exact optimization of a multi-class many-server queue with abandonment is intractable. The standard route is to solve a limiting diffusion control problem and translate its optimal control back into a policy for the queue. Atar, Mandelbaum and Reiman (Ann. Appl. Probab. 2004) carried this out for kkk customer classes, exponential service and abandonment, general renewal arrivals and general convex-type holding costs. They proved that the translated policy is asymptotically optimal. This mission formalizes that result for the preemptive policy.

Context:

  • Harrison & Zeevi (2004) studied the same multi-class many-server problem.
  • Bell & Williams (2001) proved asymptotic optimality of a threshold policy for a two-server system in conventional heavy traffic.
  • The present paper is the first to cover the QED regime with general costs and abandonment.

Setting

There are k≥1k\ge1k≥1 customer classes and nnn identical servers.

Primitives.

  • Arrivals. Class-iii customers arrive according to a renewal process AinA^n_iAin​ with interarrival times Uˇi(j)/λin\check U_i(j)/\lambda^n_iUˇi​(j)/λin​. Here the Uˇi(j)\check U_i(j)Uˇi​(j) are i.i.d., positive, of mean one and squared coefficient of variation CU,i2C^2_{U,i}CU,i2​.
  • Service. Service times are exponential with rate μin\mu^n_iμin​, represented by Poisson processes SinS^n_iSin​.
  • Abandonment. Waiting customers abandon at rate θin≥0\theta^n_i\ge0θin​≥0, represented by Poisson processes RinR^n_iRin​.

State. Xin(t)X^n_i(t)Xin​(t) is the number of class-iii customers in the system, Ψin(t)\Psi^n_i(t)Ψin​(t) the number in service and Φin=Xin−Ψin\Phi^n_i=X^n_i-\Psi^n_iΦin​=Xin​−Ψin​ the number waiting. The dynamics are

Xin(t)=Xi0,n+Ain(t)−Rin(∫0tΦin)−Sin(∫0tΨin),Ψn,Φn∈Z+k,∑iΨin≤n.X^n_i(t)=X^{0,n}_i+A^n_i(t)-R^n_i\Big(\int_0^t\Phi^n_i\Big)-S^n_i\Big(\int_0^t\Psi^n_i\Big),\qquad \Psi^n,\Phi^n\in\mathbb Z^k_+,\quad \textstyle\sum_i\Psi^n_i\le n .Xin​(t)=Xi0,n​+Ain​(t)−Rin​(∫0t​Φin​)−Sin​(∫0t​Ψin​),Ψn,Φn∈Z+k​,∑i​Ψin​≤n.

Policies.

  • A scheduling control policy (SCP) is the process Ψn\Psi^nΨn.
  • It is admissible if it does not anticipate the future beyond the time of the next arrival: past information is independent of future primitive increments.
  • It is work-conserving if no server idles while customers wait: (1⋅Xn−n)+=1⋅Φn(\mathbb 1\cdot X^n-n)^+=\mathbb 1\cdot\Phi^n(1⋅Xn−n)+=1⋅Φn.

Scaling and cost. In the QED scaling n−1λin→λin^{-1}\lambda^n_i\to\lambda_in−1λin​→λi​ with ∑iλi/μi=1\sum_i\lambda_i/\mu_i=1∑i​λi​/μi​=1. With ρi=λi/μi\rho_i=\lambda_i/\mu_iρi​=λi​/μi​ the centred processes are X^n=n−1/2(Xn−ρn)\hat X^n=n^{-1/2}(X^n-\rho n)X^n=n−1/2(Xn−ρn), Φ^n=n−1/2Φn\hat\Phi^n=n^{-1/2}\Phi^nΦ^n=n−1/2Φn and Ψ^n=n−1/2(Ψn−ρn)\hat\Psi^n=n^{-1/2}(\Psi^n-\rho n)Ψ^n=n−1/2(Ψn−ρn). The cost is

Cn=E∫0∞e−γtL~(Φ^n(t),Ψ^n(t)) dt.C^n=E\int_0^\infty e^{-\gamma t}\tilde L(\hat\Phi^n(t),\hat\Psi^n(t))\,dt .Cn=E∫0∞​e−γtL~(Φ^n(t),Ψ^n(t))dt.

The limiting control problem. It controls

X(t)=x+rW(t)+∫0tb(X(s),u(s)) ds,b(x,u)=ℓ+(μ−θ)(1⋅x)+u−μx,X(t)=x+rW(t)+\int_0^t b(X(s),u(s))\,ds,\qquad b(x,u)=\ell+(\mu-\theta)(\mathbb 1\cdot x)^+u-\mu x,X(t)=x+rW(t)+∫0t​b(X(s),u(s))ds,b(x,u)=ℓ+(μ−θ)(1⋅x)+u−μx,

where the control uuu takes values in the simplex Sk\mathbb S^kSk and WWW is a kkk-dimensional Brownian motion. The data are ri=(λiCU,i2+λi)1/2r_i=(\lambda_iC^2_{U,i}+\lambda_i)^{1/2}ri​=(λi​CU,i2​+λi​)1/2 and ℓi=λ^i−ρiμ^i\ell_i=\hat\lambda_i-\rho_i\hat\mu_iℓi​=λ^i​−ρi​μ^​i​. Its value V(x)V(x)V(x) is the infimum of E∫0∞e−γtL(X,u) dtE\int_0^\infty e^{-\gamma t}L(X,u)\,dtE∫0∞​e−γtL(X,u)dt, with L(x,u)=L~((1⋅x)+u,x−(1⋅x)+u)L(x,u)=\tilde L((\mathbb 1\cdot x)^+u,x-(\mathbb 1\cdot x)^+u)L(x,u)=L~((1⋅x)+u,x−(1⋅x)+u).

HJB equation and the proposed policy. The HJB equation is 12∑iri2∂iif+H(x,Df)−γf=0\tfrac12\sum_ir_i^2\partial_{ii}f+H(x,Df)-\gamma f=021​∑i​ri2​∂ii​f+H(x,Df)−γf=0 with H(x,p)=inf⁡u∈Sk[b(x,u)⋅p+L(x,u)]H(x,p)=\inf_{u\in\mathbb S^k}[b(x,u)\cdot p+L(x,u)]H(x,p)=infu∈Sk​[b(x,u)⋅p+L(x,u)]. Let hhh be a measurable selection of its minimizers. The proposed preemptive policy (P-SCP) sets the queue vector to Θ[(1⋅Xn−n)+h(X^n)]\Theta[(\mathbb 1\cdot X^n-n)^+h(\hat X^n)]Θ[(1⋅Xn−n)+h(X^n)], an integer rounding, and falls back to a static priority rule when that is infeasible.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 2(i)

For a Cpol2C^2_{\mathrm{pol}}Cpol2​ solution fff of the HJB equation, a measurable minimizer selection hhh, and initial states with X^0,n→x\hat X^{0,n}\to xX^0,n→x:

lim⁡n→∞E∫0∞e−γtL~(Φ^tn,∗,Ψ^tn,∗) dt  ≤  lim inf⁡n→∞E∫0∞e−γtL~(Φ^tn,Ψ^tn) dt\lim_{n\to\infty}E\int_0^\infty e^{-\gamma t}\tilde L(\hat\Phi^{n,*}_t,\hat\Psi^{n,*}_t)\,dt\;\le\;\liminf_{n\to\infty}E\int_0^\infty e^{-\gamma t}\tilde L(\hat\Phi^n_t,\hat\Psi^n_t)\,dtn→∞lim​E∫0∞​e−γtL~(Φ^tn,∗​,Ψ^tn,∗​)dt≤n→∞liminf​E∫0∞​e−γtL~(Φ^tn​,Ψ^tn​)dt

This holds for every sequence of work-conserving admissible SCPs, and the left-hand limit exists and is finite. No constants are hard-coded.

Milestones

The milestones follow the proof:

  • on the diffusion side, Proposition 2 (well-posedness), Proposition 4 (stability and moment bounds), Proposition 5(i)–(ii) (growth and continuity of VVV) and Theorem 3 (VVV is the unique Cpol2C^2_{\mathrm{pol}}Cpol2​ HJB solution, and an optimal Markov policy exists);
  • on the queueing side, Proposition 1 (feedback rules give admissible SCPs), Lemmas 2–3 (moment bounds), Lemma 4(i)–(ii) (FCLT for the primitives and the fluid limit (Ψˉn,Φˉn)⇒(ρ,0)(\bar\Psi^n,\bar\Phi^n)\Rightarrow(\rho,0)(Ψˉn,Φˉn)⇒(ρ,0)), and Theorem 4(i)–(ii): lim inf⁡≥V(x)\liminf\ge V(x)liminf≥V(x) always, and lim sup⁡≤V(x)\limsup\le V(x)limsup≤V(x) under condition (49).

Significance

The result. Theorem 2(i) justifies using the diffusion control problem as a design tool for multi-class many-server systems. The policy is explicit given hhh, and it is optimal in the limit against all non-anticipating work-conserving policies, including those that use the full history and the time of the next arrival. The proof also identifies the limit cost with V(x)V(x)V(x).

Formalizing it. The result is proved on paper, with some steps (Proposition 1, the principle of optimality, the time-change and martingale limit theorems) given as sketches or citations. No part of it is machine-checked. A formalization requires:

  • a counting-process model of the queue;
  • a careful definition of non-anticipation;
  • a pathwise controlled SDE;
  • classical solvability of a semilinear elliptic HJB equation on Rk\mathbb R^kRk;
  • a weak-convergence argument in Skorokhod space.

Each of these is reusable well beyond this paper.

Difficulty

The obvious argument would show that X^n\hat X^nX^n converges to the controlled diffusion and pass the costs to the limit. This fails for two reasons:

  • the comparison class contains arbitrary non-Markov, history-dependent policies, so the queue does not converge to a single controlled diffusion;
  • the optimal selector hhh is in general discontinuous (for linear costs it is), so the proposed policy is not a continuous function of the state.

The proof instead compares every policy with the HJB solution through Itô's formula on the prelimit processes. This needs:

  • uniform moment bounds;
  • tightness of the integral processes;
  • the convergence of stochastic integrals of Kurtz and Protter;
  • and, for the proposed policy, the fact that the rounding Θ\ThetaΘ and the priority fallback perturb the minimizer by O(n−1/2)O(n^{-1/2})O(n−1/2).

Existence of a classical HJB solution on all of Rk\mathbb R^kRk, with only Hölder-continuous costs and polynomial growth, rests on a bounded-domain existence theorem for fully nonlinear elliptic equations.

Formalization scope

The Lean development commits to the following conventions.

  • Indexing and norms. Classes are Fin k with k≥1k\ge1k≥1; paper class iii is index i−1i-1i−1, so "class kkk" (highest priority, rounding remainder of Θ\ThetaΘ) is the last index. Vectors are Fin k → ℝ and ∥⋅∥\|\cdot\|∥⋅∥ is the paper's ℓ1\ell^1ℓ1 norm; the paper's ∣⋅∣|\cdot|∣⋅∣ on vectors is read the same way.
  • Probability space and paths. All systems share one complete probability space. Time is real and every condition is for t≥0t\ge0t≥0. The paper's "without loss" path regularity (finite arrival counts, Poisson paths Z+\mathbb Z_+Z+​-valued, nondecreasing and càdlàg) holds for every ω\omegaω.
  • Poisson processes are defined by independent Poisson increments; rate 000 gives the zero process.
  • Policies. A policy is a pair of real processes (Ψn,Xn)(\Psi^n,X^n)(Ψn,Xn) with integer values. Admissibility is Definition 2 verbatim, with the future σ\sigmaσ-field built from the next arrival time τin(t)\tau^n_i(t)τin​(t). Work conservation is (18).
  • Costs and value are lower Lebesgue integrals in [0,∞][0,\infty][0,∞], and lim⁡\limlim/lim inf⁡\liminfliminf are taken there. The integrands are nonnegative under work conservation.
  • Admissible systems range over sample spaces Ω : Type (universe 0). "Complete filtered probability space" means PPP complete with all null sets in F0\mathcal F_0F0​. Brownian motion is Mathlib's IsBrownianReal per coordinate, with independence and the (Ft)(\mathcal F_t)(Ft​)-Brownian property stated explicitly. VVV is the infimum over systems and their controlled processes.
  • Discount rate. γ>0\gamma>0γ>0 is a hypothesis; the paper leaves it implicit.
  • Initial states are integer vectors X0,n∈Z+kX^{0,n}\in\mathbb Z^k_+X0,n∈Z+k​ with n−1/2(X0,n−ρn)→xn^{-1/2}(X^{0,n}-\rho n)\to xn−1/2(X0,n−ρn)→x. The literal "X^0,n∈n−1/2Zk\hat X^{0,n}\in n^{-1/2}\mathbb Z^kX^0,n∈n−1/2Zk" would require ρin∈Z\rho_in\in\mathbb Zρi​n∈Z. Assumption 1(ii) is not imposed: each policy chooses its own initial split.
  • Lemma 3 is stated for all nnn beyond a threshold that depends on the sequence, with constants c,mˉc,\bar mc,mˉ chosen before xxx and the sequence. The printed all-nnn bound with ccc independent of xxx fails when the early terms X^0,n\hat X^{0,n}X^0,n are large.
  • Weak convergence to a continuous limit uses the coupling form CouplingConverges of the published BellWilliams2001.ThresholdPolicy.Paths; convergence to a deterministic limit is UocInProb.

The goal hypothesizes fff and hhh with the pointwise identity b(x,h(x))⋅Df(x)+L(x,h(x))=H(x,Df(x))b(x,h(x))\cdot Df(x)+L(x,h(x))=H(x,Df(x))b(x,h(x))⋅Df(x)+L(x,h(x))=H(x,Df(x)) for all xxx. An arbitrary "optimal Markov control policy" may differ from a minimizer selection on the Lebesgue-null lattice where X^n\hat X^nX^n lives, and that formalization would make the goal false. Restricting the comparators to feedback, Markov or nonpreemptive policies, fixing kkk, dropping abandonment, specializing to Poisson arrivals or linear costs, or imposing a common initial split would each trivialize or weaken the statement and is ruled out.

Not formalized:

  • Lemma 4(iii) (tightness);
  • Lemma 5 (Kurtz–Protter, which needs semimartingale theory absent from Mathlib);
  • Lemma 6 (convergence of Stieltjes integrals at limit points);
  • Proposition 5(iii);
  • the nonpreemptive results, Theorem 2(ii)–(iii).

Contributions are welcome on any milestone, and especially on infrastructure: Poisson and renewal processes, functional central limit theorems in Skorokhod space, classical solvability of elliptic HJB equations, and measurable selection of minimizers.

Selected references

  • R. Atar, A. Mandelbaum, M. I. Reiman, Scheduling a multi class queue with many exponential servers: asymptotic optimality in heavy traffic, Ann. Appl. Probab. 14(3), 2004. https://arxiv.org/abs/math/0407058
  • S. Halfin, W. Whitt, Heavy-traffic limits for queues with many exponential servers, Oper. Res. 29(3), 1981. https://doi.org/10.1287/opre.29.3.567
  • N. Gans, G. Koole, A. Mandelbaum, Telephone call centers: tutorial, review, and research prospects, Manuf. Serv. Oper. Manag. 5(2), 2003. https://doi.org/10.1287/msom.5.2.79.16071
  • J. M. Harrison, A. Zeevi, Dynamic scheduling of a multiclass queue in the Halfin–Whitt heavy traffic regime, Oper. Res. 52(2), 2004. https://doi.org/10.1287/opre.1040.0109
  • S. L. Bell, R. J. Williams, Dynamic scheduling of a system with two parallel servers in heavy traffic with resource pooling: asymptotic optimality of a threshold policy, Ann. Appl. Probab. 11(3), 2001. https://doi.org/10.1214/aoap/1015345343
  • T. G. Kurtz, P. Protter, Weak limit theorems for stochastic integrals and stochastic differential equations, Ann. Probab. 19(3), 1991. https://doi.org/10.1214/aop/1176990334
16 thms1 active userReviewed
Dynamic ProgrammingProbability·Captain: mikedeng1

Computational Issues in an Infinite-Horizon, Multiechelon Inventory Model 1: The Decomposition Policy Is Optimal for Discounted CostsResearch Paper

Motivation

Distribution systems often move stock in two stages. A depot orders from an outside supplier and ships to a retail outlet, where customer demand arrives and unmet demand is backordered. Stock held anywhere costs money, a shortage at the outlet costs more, and each order carries a fixed charge. The basic question is what ordering and shipping rule minimizes total cost.

Clark and Scarf (Management Science 6, 1960) showed that over a finite planning horizon this two-echelon problem decomposes. The outlet solves its own single-location problem, and the depot solves a second single-location problem in which the outlet's shortfall is charged through an induced penalty cost. Federgruen and Zipkin (Operations Research 32(4), 1984) carried the decomposition to the infinite horizon. In the infinite-horizon problems the induced penalty becomes stationary and explicit, which makes the system computable with single-location tools. This mission covers the discounted-cost half of that paper (§§1–2).

Timeline:

  • 1960: Clark and Scarf, finite-horizon decomposition, with a nonstationary penalty P^n\hat P_nP^n​ built from the outlet's optimal cost functions.
  • 1963: Iglehart (Management Science 9) proved, for the single-location discounted problem, that the finite-horizon value functions converge uniformly and that an (s,S)(s,S)(s,S) policy is optimal.
  • 1984: Federgruen and Zipkin combine the two results and prove that a stationary policy built from the decomposition is optimal for the infinite-horizon discounted and average-cost problems.

Setting

Time is discrete. The cost data are a fixed order cost KKK, an order cost rate cdc^dcd, a shipment cost rate crc^rcr, a holding cost rate hdh^dhd on all system stock, an extra holding cost rate hrh^rhr at the outlet, and a backorder penalty rate prp^rpr; all are positive. The discount factor α\alphaα satisfies 0≤α<10 \le \alpha < 10≤α<1, shipments take lll periods and orders take LLL periods. One-period demands are independent copies of a nonnegative continuous random variable uuu with mean μ<∞\mu < \inftyμ<∞, and u(i)u^{(i)}u(i) denotes the sum of iii copies.

The state is (y^,vd,xr)(\hat y, v^d, x^r)(y^​,vd,xr):

  • y^=(y1,…,yL)\hat y = (y^1, \dots, y^L)y^​=(y1,…,yL) lists the outstanding orders, yiy^iyi placed iii periods ago;
  • vdv^dvd is the depot's echelon inventory (its own stock plus xrx^rxr);
  • xrx^rxr is the outlet's stock plus shipments in transit.

An action is an order y≥0y \ge 0y≥0 and a shipment z≥0z \ge 0z≥0 with xr+z≤vd+yLx^r + z \le v^d + y^Lxr+z≤vd+yL. With demand uuu, the next state is ((y,y1,…,yL−1),vd+yL−u,xr+z−u)((y, y^1, \dots, y^{L-1}), v^d + y^L - u, x^r + z - u)((y,y1,…,yL−1),vd+yL−u,xr+z−u). The one-period cost is

cd(y)+hd(vd+yL)+crz+R(xr+z),c^d(y) + h^d(v^d + y^L) + c^r z + R(x^r + z),cd(y)+hd(vd+yL)+crz+R(xr+z),

where cd(y)=K+cdyc^d(y) = K + c^d ycd(y)=K+cdy for y>0y > 0y>0, cd(0)=0c^d(0) = 0cd(0)=0, and

R(x)=αl{−hd(x−lμ)+prE[u(l+1)−x]++(hd+hr)E[x−u(l+1)]+}.R(x) = \alpha^l\{-h^d(x - l\mu) + p^r E[u^{(l+1)} - x]^+ + (h^d + h^r)E[x - u^{(l+1)}]^+\}.R(x)=αl{−hd(x−lμ)+prE[u(l+1)−x]++(hd+hr)E[x−u(l+1)]+}.

Bα(s∣π)B^\alpha(s \mid \pi)Bα(s∣π) is the expected total discounted cost of a policy π\piπ from state sss.

The critical number xr∗x^{r*}xr∗ minimizes (1−α)crx+R(x)(1-\alpha)c^r x + R(x)(1−α)crx+R(x). The stationary induced penalty is P(x)=0P(x) = 0P(x)=0 for x≥xr∗x \ge x^{r*}x≥xr∗ and P(x)=(1−α)cr(x−xr∗)+R(x)−R(xr∗)P(x) = (1-\alpha)c^r(x - x^{r*}) + R(x) - R(x^{r*})P(x)=(1−α)cr(x−xr∗)+R(x)−R(xr∗) otherwise. The depot problem IHαdIH^d_\alphaIHαd​ has state (y^,vd)(\hat y, v^d)(y^​,vd), action y≥0y \ge 0y≥0 and one-period cost cd(y)+hd(vd+yL)+P(vd+yL)c^d(y) + h^d(v^d + y^L) + P(v^d + y^L)cd(y)+hd(vd+yL)+P(vd+yL). The policy πα∗\pi_\alpha^*πα∗​ orders by an optimal stationary policy σd\sigma^dσd of IHαdIH^d_\alphaIHαd​ and ships z=max⁡{0,min⁡{xr∗,vd+yL}−xr}z = \max\{0, \min\{x^{r*}, v^d + y^L\} - x^r\}z=max{0,min{xr∗,vd+yL}−xr}: up to the critical number when the depot has the stock, otherwise as much as it has.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 1 (p. 827)

Assume αlpr≥(1−αl)hd\alpha^l p^r \ge (1-\alpha^l)h^dαlpr≥(1−αl)hd. For every state with y^≥0\hat y \ge 0y^​≥0 and xr≤vdx^r \le v^dxr≤vd, and every admissible policy π\piπ,

Bα(y^,vd,xr∣πα∗)≤Bα(y^,vd,xr∣π).B^\alpha(\hat y, v^d, x^r \mid \pi_\alpha^*) \le B^\alpha(\hat y, v^d, x^r \mid \pi).Bα(y^​,vd,xr∣πα∗​)≤Bα(y^​,vd,xr∣π).

The goal leaves the form of σd\sigma^dσd open: any optimal stationary depot policy will do, and no (s,S)(s,S)(s,S) structure is assumed.

Milestones

The milestones follow the paper's own route. Write g^n\hat g_ng^​n​, gnrg_n^rgnr​, g^nd\hat g_n^dg^​nd​, gndg_n^dgnd​ for the nnn-period optimal costs of the system, of the outlet, of the depot with penalties P^n\hat P_nP^n​, and of the depot with penalty PPP.

  • Eq. (4): g^n=g^nd+gnr\hat g_n = \hat g_n^d + g_n^rg^​n​=g^​nd​+gnr​.
  • Property (e): gnr→gr=Brαg_n^r \to g^r = B^{r\alpha}gnr​→gr=Brα.
  • §2 claim (Iglehart): gnr→grg_n^r \to g^rgnr​→gr uniformly on (−∞,xr∗](-\infty, x^{r*}](−∞,xr∗].
  • Lemma 1: P^n→P\hat P_n \to PP^n​→P uniformly on R\mathbb RR.
  • Lemma 2: g^nd−gnd→0\hat g_n^d - g_n^d \to 0g^​nd​−gnd​→0 uniformly.
  • Lemma 3: g^n→gd+gr\hat g_n \to g^d + g^rg^​n​→gd+gr.
  • Lemma 4: ggg satisfies the optimality equation (8), and πα∗\pi_\alpha^*πα∗​ attains it.

Significance

The theorem shows that, under discounting, the infinite-horizon two-echelon problem is solved by two single-location problems, with a penalty PPP that is written in terms of RRR alone. Computing PPP does not require the outlet's optimal cost functions. The rest of the paper relies on this: its computational sections evaluate PPP in closed form for normal demand, and they treat several outlets by relaxation. A machine-checked version also gives an infinite-horizon decomposition theorem against which future multi-echelon formalizations can be checked.

The result was proved in 1984 and is not open. It has not been formalized. The paper's proof is short only because it cites Iglehart's convergence results and Propositions 9.12 and 9.16 of Bertsekas and Shreve (1978) for its last step, so a formal proof must also supply these.

Difficulty

The obvious argument passes to the limit in the finite-horizon decomposition (4). That fails as stated, because the depot program (3) has nonstationary penalties P^n\hat P_nP^n​, built from the outlet's optimal costs gn−1rg_{n-1}^rgn−1r​, and its value functions are not those of any stationary problem. The comparison of P^n\hat P_nP^n​ with PPP needs uniform control over the whole real line. The first few P^n−P\hat P_n - PP^n​−P are in fact unbounded, since g0r=0g_0^r = 0g0r​=0 has the wrong slope. The uniform control therefore holds only for large nnn, and the error has to be propagated through the depot recursion.

The second obstacle is that the one-period costs are unbounded in both directions: hdvh^d vhdv is negative for negative vvv. Contraction arguments for bounded costs therefore do not apply. Lower boundedness on the feasible set needs the cost relation αlpr≥(1−αl)hd\alpha^l p^r \ge (1-\alpha^l)h^dαlpr≥(1−αl)hd, and passing from the optimality equation to optimality of a policy needs the theory of models with costs bounded below.

Formalization scope

Everything lives in the namespace FZEchelon.Discounted.

  • Model. The data form a structure Model. The pipeline y^\hat yy^​ is a vector indexed by {0,…,L−1}\{0, \dots, L-1\}{0,…,L−1}, whose index kkk is the paper's yk+1y^{k+1}yk+1. For L=0L = 0L=0 the current order arrives at once.
  • Policies and cost. Time runs forward with weight αk\alpha^kαk; the paper counts periods remaining. Policies are measurable, non-anticipative, deterministic and history dependent, and they must be feasible along every demand path. BαB^\alphaBα is an extended real: the expectation of the positive part of the discounted cost sum minus that of the negative part, under the product law of the demands.
  • Finite-horizon programs. These are real infima over the feasible actions.
  • Hypotheses. Statements quantify over the physical states y^≥0\hat y \ge 0y^​≥0, xr≤vdx^r \le v^dxr≤vd. The standing assumptions of §1 are bundled in StandingAssumptions: positive costs, 0≤α≤10 \le \alpha \le 10≤α≤1, demand nonnegative, atomless and of finite mean. The §2 statements add α<1\alpha < 1α<1 and the cost relation, which the paper names in the proof of Theorem 1. The critical numbers xr∗x^{r*}xr∗ and xnr∗x_n^{r*}xnr∗​ enter as minimizers. The depot policy σd\sigma^dσd enters as a measurable, nonnegative stationary policy that is optimal for IHαdIH_\alpha^dIHαd​; that is the paper's definition of πα∗\pi_\alpha^*πα∗​, and its existence is Iglehart's.
  • Ruled out. Comparing πα∗\pi_\alpha^*πα∗​ only against stationary policies, or reading BαB^\alphaBα as a bare series or a truncated sum, would trivialize or change the theorem. The comparison class is all admissible history-dependent policies.
  • Corrections. Where the paper says "bounded" for every nnn (§2 claim, Lemmas 1 and 2), the statements claim boundedness only where it holds: n≥1n \ge 1n≥1, n≥2n \ge 2n≥2, and eventually, respectively. The moderation notes give the counterexample at n=1n = 1n=1. Lemma 2 also carries the standing assumption of p. 821 that never ordering is not optimal. The statement is false without it.
  • Infrastructure. A complete development needs the convexity theory of the single-location newsvendor function RRR, value iteration for discounted models with costs bounded below, and the Markov property for the product measure on demand sequences. The control-system file is reusable for other inventory and queueing missions. Formalizations of Iglehart's theorem and of Bertsekas–Shreve Propositions 9.12 and 9.16 are welcome.

Selected references

  • A. Federgruen, P. Zipkin, Computational Issues in an Infinite-Horizon, Multiechelon Inventory Model, Operations Research 32(4):818–836, 1984. https://doi.org/10.1287/opre.32.4.818
  • A. J. Clark, H. Scarf, Optimal Policies for a Multi-Echelon Inventory Problem, Management Science 6(4):475–490, 1960. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.6.4.475
  • D. L. Iglehart, Optimality of (s, S) Policies in the Infinite Horizon Dynamic Inventory Problem, Management Science 9(2):259–267, 1963. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.9.2.259
  • D. P. Bertsekas, S. E. Shreve, Stochastic Optimal Control: The Discrete-Time Case, Academic Press, 1978. https://web.mit.edu/dimitrib/www/soc.html
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Dynamic ProgrammingProbability·Captain: mikedeng1

Computational Issues in an Infinite-Horizon, Multiechelon Inventory Model 2: The Decomposition Policy Is Average-Cost OptimalResearch Paper

Motivation

Many supply chains move stock through a central warehouse to the retail locations that face customer demand. Deciding how much the warehouse should order from outside, and how much it should ship to each retailer and when, is a stochastic dynamic program whose state contains every stock level and every outstanding order. Exact solution is out of reach except for the smallest systems, so structural results that reduce such a problem to single-location problems matter in practice.

Timeline.

  • Clark and Scarf (Management Science 1960) showed that the finite-horizon, discounted problem of a serial system decomposes: an optimal policy is obtained by solving the most downstream location alone, charging its shortfalls to the upstream location through an induced penalty cost, and then solving the upstream location as a single-location problem with that penalty.
  • Iglehart (Management Science 1963, and a 1963 chapter in Multistage Inventory Models and Techniques) established the infinite-horizon theory of the single-location problem with a fixed order cost: optimality of stationary (s,S)(s,S)(s,S) policies under discounted and average costs, and the convergence of value iteration.
  • Federgruen and Zipkin (Operations Research 1984) carried the decomposition to the infinite horizon for a depot and one retail outlet, under discounted costs (Theorem 1) and under the average-cost criterion (Theorem 2). This mission is about the average-cost case, §3 of that paper.

Setting

Time is divided into periods. A depot orders from an outside supplier with lead time L≥0L \ge 0L≥0 and supplies a retail outlet with shipment lead time l≥0l \ge 0l≥0. The demand uuu in each period is a nonnegative random variable with law ν\nuν and finite mean μ\muμ; demands in different periods are independent and identically distributed. Unmet demand at the outlet is backordered.

The state is (y~,vd,xr)(\tilde y, v^d, x^r)(y~​,vd,xr):

  • y~=(y1,…,yL)\tilde y = (y^1,\dots,y^L)y~​=(y1,…,yL) lists the orders placed 1,…,L1,\dots,L1,…,L periods ago;
  • vdv^dvd is the depot's echelon inventory, its own stock plus the outlet's inventory position;
  • xrx^rxr is the outlet's inventory position, its stock plus shipments in transit.

In each period the decision is an order y≥0y \ge 0y≥0 and a shipment z≥0z \ge 0z≥0 with xr+z≤vd+yLx^r + z \le v^d + y^Lxr+z≤vd+yL, where yLy^LyL is the order arriving now. The state then moves to ((y,y1,…,yL−1), vd+yL−u, xr+z−u)((y, y^1,\dots,y^{L-1}),\, v^d + y^L - u,\, x^r + z - u)((y,y1,…,yL−1),vd+yL−u,xr+z−u).

Costs are a fixed order cost KKK, proportional order and shipment rates cdc^dcd and crc^rcr, a holding rate hdh^dhd on system inventory, an extra holding rate hrh^rhr at the outlet and a backorder penalty rate prp^rpr. After the paper's accounting transformation, the one-period cost is

cd(y)+D(vd+yL)+crz+R(xr+z),c^d(y) + D(v^d + y^L) + c^r z + R(x^r + z),cd(y)+D(vd+yL)+crz+R(xr+z),

with cd(y)=K+cdyc^d(y) = K + c^d ycd(y)=K+cdy for y>0y > 0y>0 and cd(0)=0c^d(0) = 0cd(0)=0, D(v)=hdvD(v) = h^d vD(v)=hdv, and, at α=1\alpha = 1α=1,

R(x)=−hd(x−lμ)+prE[u(l+1)−x]++(hd+hr)E[x−u(l+1)]+,R(x) = -h^d(x - l\mu) + p^r E[u^{(l+1)} - x]^+ + (h^d + h^r) E[x - u^{(l+1)}]^+ ,R(x)=−hd(x−lμ)+prE[u(l+1)−x]++(hd+hr)E[x−u(l+1)]+,

where u(l+1)u^{(l+1)}u(l+1) is the demand over l+1l + 1l+1 periods. The critical number xr∗x^{r*}xr∗ is a minimizer of RRR. The stationary induced penalty is P(x)=R(x)−R(xr∗)P(x) = R(x) - R(x^{r*})P(x)=R(x)−R(xr∗) for x<xr∗x < x^{r*}x<xr∗ and 000 otherwise.

For a policy π\piπ and initial state sss, Bn(s∣π)B_n(s \mid \pi)Bn​(s∣π) is the expected cost of the first nnn periods and B(s∣π)=lim sup⁡nBn(s∣π)/nB(s \mid \pi) = \limsup_n B_n(s \mid \pi)/nB(s∣π)=limsupn​Bn​(s∣π)/n is the average cost. Problem IH asks for a policy minimizing B(s∣⋅)B(s\mid\cdot)B(s∣⋅) from every state. The depot problem IHd^dd has states (y~,vd)(\tilde y, v^d)(y~​,vd), orders y≥0y \ge 0y≥0 and one-period cost cd(y)+D(vd+yL)+P(vd+yL)c^d(y) + D(v^d + y^L) + P(v^d + y^L)cd(y)+D(vd+yL)+P(vd+yL). Its minimal average cost is ada^dad. The outlet problem has states xrx^rxr, shipments z≥0z \ge 0z≥0 and one-period cost crz+R(xr+z)c^r z + R(x^r + z)crz+R(xr+z). The policy π∗\pi^*π∗ orders by an optimal stationary policy of IHd^dd and ships z=max⁡(0,min⁡(xr∗,vd+yL)−xr)z = \max(0, \min(x^{r*}, v^d + y^L) - x^r)z=max(0,min(xr∗,vd+yL)−xr): up to the critical number if the depot has the stock, otherwise as much as it has.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 2 (p. 828)

With α=1\alpha = 1α=1 and cd=cr=0c^d = c^r = 0cd=cr=0, the policy π∗\pi^*π∗ is measurable and feasible from every physical state, and for every such state sss and every measurable feasible policy π\piπ,

B(s∣π∗)≤B(s∣π).B(s \mid \pi^*) \le B(s \mid \pi).B(s∣π∗)≤B(s∣π).

Milestones

  • Property (f) (p. 824): gnr(x)/n→Br(x)=crμ+R(xr∗)g^r_n(x)/n \to B^r(x) = c^r\mu + R(x^{r*})gnr​(x)/n→Br(x)=crμ+R(xr∗) for the outlet program gnrg^r_ngnr​.
  • Eq. (4) (p. 823), for 0≤α≤10 \le \alpha \le 10≤α≤1: g^n(y~,vd,xr)=g^nd(y~,vd)+gnr(xr)\hat g_n(\tilde y, v^d, x^r) = \hat g^d_n(\tilde y, v^d) + g^r_n(x^r)g^​n​(y~​,vd,xr)=g^​nd​(y~​,vd)+gnr​(xr).
  • §3 claims (p. 828): with cr=0c^r = 0cr=0, xr∗x^{r*}xr∗ is the critical number of every period, gnr(x)=nR(xr∗)g^r_n(x) = nR(x^{r*})gnr​(x)=nR(xr∗) for x≤xr∗x \le x^{r*}x≤xr∗, P^n=P\hat P_n = PP^n​=P, g^nd=gnd\hat g^d_n = g^d_ng^​nd​=gnd​ and g^n=gn\hat g_n = g_ng^​n​=gn​.
  • §3 display (p. 828): g^n(y~,vd,xr)/n→a=ad+R(xr∗)\hat g_n(\tilde y, v^d, x^r)/n \to a = a^d + R(x^{r*})g^​n​(y~​,vd,xr)/n→a=ad+R(xr∗).
  • Lemma 5 (p. 828): B(s∣π∗)=aB(s \mid \pi^*) = aB(s∣π∗)=a.
  • Proof of Theorem 2 (p. 828): g^n(s)≤Bn(s∣π)\hat g_n(s) \le B_n(s \mid \pi)g^​n​(s)≤Bn​(s∣π) for every measurable feasible π\piπ.

Significance

The result. Theorem 2 reduces an average-cost problem with a multidimensional state to two problems with smaller states: a single-location (s,S)(s,S)(s,S)-type problem for the depot with a known convex penalty PPP, and a myopic critical-number rule for the outlet. The optimal system cost is the sum ad+ara^d + a^rad+ar of their optimal costs. The paper uses this to compute optimal policies with standard single-location software, and its §5 builds heuristics for several outlets on the same decomposition.

Formalizing it. The result is proved in the paper; nothing here is open. To our knowledge none of it has been machine-checked. A formal proof has to make precise what the paper leaves to "standard arguments":

  • the class of measurable history-dependent policies;
  • the expected costs of policies with unbounded one-period costs;
  • the passage from history-dependent to Markov policies;
  • the transient of π∗\pi^*π∗ when the outlet starts above its critical number.

Difficulty

The obvious argument would identify the average-cost optimal value through an average-cost optimality equation on the full state space and verify that π∗\pi^*π∗ attains it. No such equation is available here. The state space is unbounded, the one-period costs are unbounded both above and below in the state, and the depot's fixed cost makes its value functions KKK-convex rather than convex.

The paper's route avoids that equation but needs three separate facts:

  • value iteration for the whole system, divided by nnn, converges to ad+ara^d + a^rad+ar, which rests on Iglehart's convergence for the depot and on the stationarity of the penalties when cr=0c^r = 0cr=0;
  • the finite-horizon value bounds the cost of every history-dependent policy, not only of Markov ones;
  • π∗\pi^*π∗ achieves aaa from every state, including states with xr>xr∗x^r > x^{r*}xr>xr∗, where it does not ship at all until demand has brought the outlet below its critical number.

Formalization scope

  • Representation. A state is a triple in (Fin L→R)×R×R(\mathrm{Fin}\,L \to \mathbb R) \times \mathbb R \times \mathbb R(FinL→R)×R×R. For L=0L = 0L=0 the order placed now arrives at once. Time runs forward in Lean; the paper numbers periods backward. Finite-horizon value functions keep the paper's index nnn (periods remaining). Each "min" of programs (1), (2), (3), (5) is a real infimum over the constraint set.
  • Policies and costs. Policies are deterministic, history-dependent and measurable, and they must be feasible along every demand realization. BnB_nBn​ is an extended real (expected positive part minus expected negative part of each period's cost). BBB is a lim sup⁡\limsuplimsup in the extended reals, and the optimal average costs are infima in the extended reals.
  • Standing assumptions (p. 821):
    • K,hd,hr,pr>0K, h^d, h^r, p^r > 0K,hd,hr,pr>0;
    • demands i.i.d., nonnegative, without atoms ("for convenience we shall assume uuu is continuous") and with finite mean.
  • Added hypotheses.
    • States are restricted to the physical ones, y~≥0\tilde y \ge 0y~​≥0 and xr≤vdx^r \le v^dxr≤vd.
    • cd=cr=0c^d = c^r = 0cd=cr=0. The paper reduces to this case "without loss of generality", on the grounds that average proportional costs equal cdμc^d\mucdμ and crμc^r\mucrμ "under all interesting policies" (p. 827). That class is never specified, and the proofs are written for cd=cr=0c^d = c^r = 0cd=cr=0. The general-cost version is the paper's informal reduction and is not part of the goal.
    • Eq. (4) is stated for 0≤α≤10 \le \alpha \le 10≤α≤1 with K,hd,hr,pr>0K, h^d, h^r, p^r > 0K,hd,hr,pr>0 and cd,cr≥0c^d, c^r \ge 0cd,cr≥0 (so that it covers §3's case cd=cr=0c^d = c^r = 0cd=cr=0), and with the relation αlpr≥(1−αl)hd\alpha^l p^r \ge (1 - \alpha^l)h^dαlpr≥(1−αl)hd, which the paper names on p. 827; it holds automatically at α=1\alpha = 1α=1.
  • Ruling out trivial readings.
    • π∗\pi^*π∗ is built from a depot rule σd\sigma^dσd assumed optimal for IHd^dd from every depot state. Its existence is Iglehart's theorem, cited and not formalized; no (s,S)(s,S)(s,S) form is required.
    • The goal quantifies over all measurable feasible policies, and π∗\pi^*π∗'s own feasibility is a conclusion, so a vacuous policy class cannot satisfy it.
    • A sorry-free check in the workspace exhibits an instance (exponential demand) meeting every standing hypothesis other than the optimality of σd\sigma^dσd, including the existence of xr∗x^{r*}xr∗.
  • Reusable infrastructure. The definitions of history-dependent policies and of extended-real expected and average costs for controlled processes driven by i.i.d. real noise are generic, and could be reused for other inventory and queueing models. Contributions are welcome on any milestone, and especially on a formal version of the Markov reduction (Dynkin–Yushkevich III.1) for this setting and on Iglehart's convergence of gnd/ng^d_n/ngnd​/n.

Selected references

  • A. Federgruen and P. Zipkin, Computational Issues in an Infinite-Horizon, Multiechelon Inventory Model, Operations Research 32(4):818–836, 1984. https://doi.org/10.1287/opre.32.4.818
  • A. J. Clark and H. Scarf, Optimal Policies for a Multi-Echelon Inventory Problem, Management Science 6(4):475–490, 1960. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.6.4.475
  • D. L. Iglehart, Optimality of (s, S) Policies in the Infinite Horizon Dynamic Inventory Problem, Management Science 9(2):259–267, 1963. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.9.2.259
  • D. L. Iglehart, Dynamic Programming and Stationary Analyses of Inventory Problems, Chapter 1 in H. Scarf, D. Gilford and M. Shelly (eds.), Multistage Inventory Models and Techniques, Stanford University Press, 1963.
  • E. B. Dynkin and A. A. Yushkevich, Controlled Markov Processes, Springer, 1979.
  • D. P. Bertsekas and S. E. Shreve, Stochastic Optimal Control: The Discrete-Time Case, Academic Press, 1978.
11 thms1 active userReviewed
Control TheoryDynamic ProgrammingProbability+1·Captain: mikedeng1

Stochastic Optimal Control: The Discrete-Time Case VIII: The Infinite-Horizon Borel Models — the Optimality Equation J* = T(J*) under (P), (N), (D)Textbook

Motivation

Infinite horizon dynamic programming asks for the least expected cost of controlling a stochastic system forever, and for a policy attaining it. On finite or countable state spaces the theory has been classical since Bellman, Blackwell (1965) and Strauch (1966). Many models in operations research, inventory control, queueing and economics have continuous states and controls, however, and there the Bellman equation raises a question the countable theory never meets: the optimal cost need not be Borel-measurable, so its expectation under the transition law, which the equation requires, may not be defined.

Bertsekas and Shreve (1978) settled this question by working with lower semianalytic cost functions and universally measurable policies. In that framework the optimal cost is always measurable enough to be integrated, and the optimality equation holds with no continuity or compactness assumption. Chapter 9 of their book treats the infinite horizon model under the three classical cost structures: nonnegative costs (P), nonpositive costs (N), and bounded discounted costs (D).

Timeline:

  • 1965: Blackwell, discounted dynamic programming on Borel spaces with Borel-measurable data, case (D).
  • 1966: Strauch, negative dynamic programming, case (N), with Borel-measurable data.
  • 1978: Bertsekas and Shreve, Chapter 9: lower semianalytic costs and universally measurable policies, in all three cases (P), (N), (D).
  • 1979: Shreve and Bertsekas, the journal account of universally measurable policies.

Setting

An infinite horizon stochastic optimal control model (SM) is an eight-tuple (S,C,U,W,p,f,α,g)(S, C, U, W, p, f, \alpha, g)(S,C,U,W,p,f,α,g). The state space SSS, the control space CCC and the disturbance space WWW are nonempty Borel spaces, that is, spaces homeomorphic to Borel subsets of complete separable metric spaces. The control constraint UUU assigns to each state xxx a nonempty set U(x)⊆CU(x) \subseteq CU(x)⊆C, and the set Γ={(x,u)∣u∈U(x)}\Gamma = \{(x,u) \mid u \in U(x)\}Γ={(x,u)∣u∈U(x)} is analytic. The disturbance kernel p(dw∣x,u)p(dw \mid x, u)p(dw∣x,u) is a Borel stochastic kernel and the system function f:SCW→Sf : SCW \to Sf:SCW→S is Borel. The discount factor is α>0\alpha > 0α>0, and the one-stage cost g:Γ→[−∞,∞]g : \Gamma \to [-\infty, \infty]g:Γ→[−∞,∞] is lower semianalytic: each sublevel set {g<c}\{g < c\}{g<c} is analytic. The state moves by xk+1=f(xk,uk,wk)x_{k+1} = f(x_k, u_k, w_k)xk+1​=f(xk​,uk​,wk​), with transition kernel t(B∣x,u)=p({w∣f(x,u,w)∈B}∣x,u)t(B \mid x, u) = p(\{w \mid f(x,u,w) \in B\} \mid x, u)t(B∣x,u)=p({w∣f(x,u,w)∈B}∣x,u).

A policy π=(μ0,μ1,… )\pi = (\mu_0, \mu_1, \dots)π=(μ0​,μ1​,…) chooses uku_kuk​ at random from a universally measurable stochastic kernel μk(duk∣x0,u0,…,xk)\mu_k(du_k \mid x_0, u_0, \dots, x_k)μk​(duk​∣x0​,u0​,…,xk​) concentrated on U(xk)U(x_k)U(xk​); Π′\Pi'Π′ is the set of all policies. A policy is Markov if each μk\mu_kμk​ depends only on xkx_kxk​, and it is stationary if, moreover, μk=μ\mu_k = \muμk​=μ for all kkk. Writing qk(π,px)q_k(\pi, p_x)qk​(π,px​) for the law of (xk,uk)(x_k, u_k)(xk​,uk​) started from x0=xx_0 = xx0​=x, the cost of π\piπ and the optimal cost are

Jπ(x)=∑k=0∞αk∫g dqk(π,px),J∗(x)=inf⁡π∈Π′Jπ(x).J_\pi(x) = \sum_{k=0}^\infty \alpha^k \int g\, dq_k(\pi, p_x), \qquad J^*(x) = \inf_{\pi \in \Pi'} J_\pi(x).Jπ​(x)=k=0∑∞​αk∫gdqk​(π,px​),J∗(x)=π∈Π′inf​Jπ​(x).

For J:S→[−∞,∞]J : S \to [-\infty, \infty]J:S→[−∞,∞], the dynamic programming operators are

T(J)(x)=inf⁡u∈U(x){g(x,u)+α∫SJ(x′) t(dx′∣x,u)},Tμ(J)(x)=∫C[g(x,u)+α∫SJ dt]μ(du∣x).T(J)(x) = \inf_{u \in U(x)} \Big\{ g(x,u) + \alpha \int_S J(x')\, t(dx' \mid x, u) \Big\}, \qquad T_\mu(J)(x) = \int_C \Big[ g(x,u) + \alpha \int_S J\, dt \Big] \mu(du \mid x).T(J)(x)=u∈U(x)inf​{g(x,u)+α∫S​J(x′)t(dx′∣x,u)},Tμ​(J)(x)=∫C​[g(x,u)+α∫S​Jdt]μ(du∣x).

The three cases are (P) g≥0g \ge 0g≥0 on Γ\GammaΓ; (N) g≤0g \le 0g≤0 on Γ\GammaΓ; (D) α<1\alpha < 1α<1 and ∣g∣≤b|g| \le b∣g∣≤b on Γ\GammaΓ for some real bbb.

Formalization targets

Goal: the optimality equation (Proposition 9.8, Eq. (22))

Under each of (P), (N) and (D),

J∗=T(J∗).J^* = T(J^*).J∗=T(J∗).

Milestones

  • J∗J^*J∗ is lower semianalytic (Corollary 9.4.1).
  • For a stationary policy, Jμ=Tμ(Jμ)J_\mu = T_\mu(J_\mu)Jμ​=Tμ​(Jμ​) (Proposition 9.9).
  • Optimality tests for stationary policies: under (P) or (D), (μ,μ,… )(\mu, \mu, \dots)(μ,μ,…) is optimal iff J∗=Tμ(J∗)J^* = T_\mu(J^*)J∗=Tμ​(J∗) (Proposition 9.12); under (N) or (D), iff Jμ=T(Jμ)J_\mu = T(J_\mu)Jμ​=T(Jμ​) (Proposition 9.13).
  • Under (N) or (D), value iteration from 000 converges to J∗J^*J∗, and under (D) it converges uniformly from every bounded lower semianalytic start (Proposition 9.14).

Further statements of the mission

  • Markov policies suffice: at each state some Markov policy matches any policy's cost (Proposition 9.1), so J∗=inf⁡π∈ΠJπJ^* = \inf_{\pi \in \Pi} J_\piJ∗=infπ∈Π​Jπ​ (Corollary 9.1.1).
  • Partial converses of the optimality equation: J≥T(J)J \ge T(J)J≥T(J), J≥0J \ge 0J≥0 gives J≥J∗J \ge J^*J≥J∗ under (P); J≤T(J)J \le T(J)J≤T(J), J≤0J \le 0J≤0 gives J≤J∗J \le J^*J≤J∗ under (N); a bounded solution of J=T(J)J = T(J)J=T(J) equals J∗J^*J∗ under (D) (Proposition 9.10). The analogous statements for TμT_\muTμ​ and JμJ_\muJμ​ (Proposition 9.11).

Significance

The optimality equation is the basic structural fact of infinite horizon control. Corollary 9.12.1 uses it to construct optimal stationary policies from minimizers in the equation. The existence results for ε\varepsilonε-optimal policies (Propositions 9.19 and 9.20), the convergence analysis of value iteration in Section 9.5, and the reduction of imperfect state information problems in Chapter 10 all build on it. It holds for arbitrary Borel models, with no continuity or compactness assumption.

All results of the mission were proved in 1978. None of them has a machine-checked proof: Mathlib has stochastic kernels and the Ionescu-Tulcea construction for measurable kernels, but no theory of lower semianalytic functions, universally measurable kernels, or dynamic programming on Borel spaces. A formal development would fix the measurability bookkeeping on which the textbook proofs rest and supply a reusable substrate for the stochastic control papers that cite this book.

Difficulty

Under (D), TTT is a contraction on bounded functions, and its fixed point is the limit of value iteration. That argument, however, gives a fixed point only within a fixed class of measurable functions. Showing that this fixed point equals J∗J^*J∗ requires knowing that J∗J^*J∗ belongs to the class and that history-dependent randomized policies do no better. Under (P), value iteration can converge to the wrong limit (Example 1 of the chapter: lim⁡kJk(0)=0\lim_k J_k(0) = 0limk​Jk​(0)=0 while J∗(0)=∞J^*(0) = \inftyJ∗(0)=∞). Even when each JkJ_kJk​ is Borel, J∗J^*J∗ may fail to be (Example 2). So J∗=T(J∗)J^* = T(J^*)J∗=T(J∗) cannot be obtained as a limit of the finite horizon equations, and the natural class of Borel functions is not closed under the partial minimization that defines TTT.

The book's route lifts (SM) to a deterministic model on the space of probability measures P(S)P(S)P(S), where no measurability restriction is needed, and transfers the results back. Making this transfer rigorous requires that the cost of a randomized policy be a measurable functional of its law, and that the infimum over policies preserve lower semianalyticity.

Formalization scope

The draft fixes the following conventions.

  • Spaces. Borel spaces are topological spaces homeomorphic to Borel subsets of complete separable metric spaces, carrying their Borel σ\sigmaσ-algebras. Analytic sets are Mathlib's AnalyticSet. A set is universally measurable if it is null-measurable for every probability measure.
  • Extended reals. Values lie in EReal. The book's convention ∞−∞=−∞+∞=∞\infty - \infty = -\infty + \infty = \infty∞−∞=−∞+∞=∞ is implemented explicitly, because Mathlib's EReal sets ⊥+⊤=⊥\bot + \top = \bot⊥+⊤=⊥. The integral of an extended-real function is ∫f+−∫f−\int f^+ - \int f^-∫f+−∫f− with the same convention.
  • Policies. These are sequences of universally measurable stochastic kernels on the history spaces S0C0⋯SkS_0C_0 \cdots S_kS0​C0​⋯Sk​, charging U(xk)U(x_k)U(xk​) with mass one. The laws of (x0,u0,…,xk,uk)(x_0, u_0, \dots, x_k, u_k)(x0​,u0​,…,xk​,uk​) are built recursively from the kernels.
  • Costs. JπJ_\piJπ​ is the series ∑kαk∫g dqk\sum_k \alpha^k \int g\, dq_k∑k​αk∫gdqk​, computed as the difference of the series of positive and negative parts. Under each of (P), (N), (D) it coincides with the integral of the total discounted cost. J∗J^*J∗ is the infimum over all policies.
  • Case labels. Each statement carries the case labels the book attaches to it, as hypotheses on the model.
  • Scope. Only the (SM) statements are formalized. The deterministic model (DM) on P(S)P(S)P(S) is the book's proof device and enters no statement.

The goal admits a trivializing formalization that this draft rules out. J∗J^*J∗ is not defined as a fixed point of TTT, nor as the limit of Tk(0)T^k(0)Tk(0); it is the infimum of the costs of all policies, which under (P) can differ from that limit.

A complete development needs universally measurable kernels and their compositions on product spaces, measurability of x↦∫f(x,y) q(dy∣x)x \mapsto \int f(x, y)\, q(dy \mid x)x↦∫f(x,y)q(dy∣x) for universally measurable integrands, the measurable selection theorem of Jankov and von Neumann, and the closure of lower semianalytic functions under partial infimum. These are the subject of the series' mission on Chapter 7, and they are reusable for any stochastic control model on Borel spaces. Contributions are welcome at any level: these foundations, the Markov reduction (Proposition 9.1), or the case-by-case arguments.

Selected references

  • D. P. Bertsekas and S. E. Shreve, Stochastic Optimal Control: The Discrete-Time Case, Academic Press, 1978; Athena Scientific reprint, 1996. Chapter 9. https://web.mit.edu/dimitrib/www/soc.html
  • D. Blackwell, Discounted dynamic programming, Annals of Mathematical Statistics 36 (1965), 226–235. https://doi.org/10.1214/aoms/1177700285
  • R. E. Strauch, Negative dynamic programming, Annals of Mathematical Statistics 37 (1966), 871–890. https://doi.org/10.1214/aoms/1177699369
  • S. E. Shreve and D. P. Bertsekas, Universally measurable policies in dynamic programming, Mathematics of Operations Research 4 (1979), 15–30. https://doi.org/10.1287/moor.4.1.15
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CombinatoricsGraph TheoryOptimization+1·Captain: mikedeng1

Maximal Flow Through a Network II: In an ab-Planar Network Some Chain from Source to Sink Meets Every Cut Exactly OnceResearch Paper

Motivation

The maximum flow problem asks how much of a commodity can be shipped from a source to a sink through a network whose arcs have limited capacities. L. R. Ford, Jr. and D. R. Fulkerson's 1956 paper Maximal Flow Through a Network proved the minimal cut theorem: the largest flow value equals the smallest total capacity of a set of arcs that separates source from sink. That theorem is formalized in the companion mission Maximal Flow Through a Network I.

The second section of the same paper treats a special class of networks, those that remain planar after an arc from source to sink is added. For these networks the paper shows that one particular source–sink chain crosses every minimal separating set exactly once. This structural fact turns the minimal cut theorem into a simple computing procedure: repeatedly push as much flow as possible along such a chain and delete the arcs it saturates. The paper notes that G. Dantzig had conjectured, before the minimal cut theorem was proved, that this procedure yields a maximal flow on planar networks. The same "uppermost path" idea underlies later algorithms for maximum flow in planar graphs with source and sink on a common face (Itai and Shiloach, 1979).

The statement is short and purely combinatorial in its conclusion, but its hypothesis is topological. This mission isolates that theorem.

Setting

A network NNN has a finite set VVV of vertices and a finite set EEE of arcs. Each arc eee joins two distinct end vertices, written tail(e)\mathrm{tail}(e)tail(e) and head(e)\mathrm{head}(e)head(e); arcs carry no direction, and two arcs may join the same pair of vertices. Two distinct vertices are distinguished, the source aaa and the sink bbb, and each arc carries a positive capacity (capacities play no role in the target below).

A chain joining uuu and www is a set CCC of distinct arcs that can be arranged as α1(v0v1),α2(v1v2),…,αk(vk−1vk)\alpha_1(v_0v_1), \alpha_2(v_1v_2), \dots, \alpha_k(v_{k-1}v_k)α1​(v0​v1​),α2​(v1​v2​),…,αk​(vk−1​vk​) with v0=uv_0 = uv0​=u, vk=wv_k = wvk​=w, and the vertices v0,…,vkv_0, \dots, v_kv0​,…,vk​ pairwise distinct; each arc may be traversed in either direction. The empty set is the null chain from uuu to uuu.

A set DDD of arcs is a disconnecting set if every chain joining aaa and bbb contains an arc of DDD. A disconnecting set none of whose proper subsets is disconnecting is a cut.

The network is ab-planar if the graph of NNN, together with one additional arc joining aaa and bbb, can be drawn in the plane without crossings: vertices go to distinct points of R2\mathbb R^2R2; each arc, including the added arc ababab, goes to an injective continuous path between the points of its end vertices; no arc passes through a vertex other than its ends; and two distinct arcs meet only at endpoints of both. In Lean the drawing is the structure ABPlaneDrawing N, and NNN is ab-planar when Nonempty (ABPlaneDrawing N). The section's standing assumption is that no arc of NNN already joins aaa and bbb.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 2 (p. 403)

If NNN is ab-planar, no arc of NNN joins aaa and bbb, and some chain joins aaa and bbb, then

∃ T a chain joining a and b  such that  ∣T∩D∣=1  for every cut D of N.\exists\, T \text{ a chain joining } a \text{ and } b \ \text{ such that }\ |T \cap D| = 1 \ \text{ for every cut } D \text{ of } N.∃T a chain joining a and b  such that  ∣T∩D∣=1  for every cut D of N.

This is FordFulkerson56.Planar.ab_planar_exists_chain_meeting_each_cut_once. "Precisely once" is exact cardinality one, neither "at least once" (true of every chain) nor "at most once".

Milestone: a chain meeting a cut in one prescribed arc (proof of Theorem 2, p. 403)

For every network NNN, every cut DDD and every arc α∈D\alpha \in Dα∈D, there is a chain CCC joining aaa and bbb with C∩D={α}C \cap D = \{\alpha\}C∩D={α}. No planarity is involved; the statement is what the minimality of a cut provides to the proof.

Further item: the Fig. 2 example (p. 403)

In the "gas, water, electricity" graph K3,3K_{3,3}K3,3​ with the arc ababab removed, every chain joining aaa and bbb meets some cut in three arcs. This network is not ab-planar, so the example shows that the planarity hypothesis of Theorem 2 cannot be dropped.

Significance

Theorem 2 and the minimal cut theorem together give the paper's procedure for planar networks: if TTT meets every cut once, then imposing a flow kkk on TTT lowers the value of every cut by exactly kkk, so the minimal cut value, and hence the maximal flow value, drops by kkk. Saturated arcs can then be deleted and the step repeated. Without the "exactly once" property the reduction could overshoot the cut structure, and the greedy step would not be justified. The theorem is also one of the earliest instances of the link between planarity and cut structure that later underlies planar duality arguments for minimum cuts.

The result has been known since 1956 and is not open. No machine-checked version is recorded on the platform, and Mathlib, at the pinned revision, has neither planar graphs nor the Jordan curve theorem. A formal proof would be the first formalized statement about source–sink planar networks in this library, and the counterexample item records, as a checkable fact, that the hypothesis is necessary.

Difficulty

The conclusion is combinatorial while the hypothesis is a drawing in R2\mathbb R^2R2. The paper's proof normalises the drawing (the added arc ababab on the outer boundary, the graph in a vertical strip with aaa on the left line and bbb on the right), selects the "top-most" chain from aaa to bbb, and argues that a chain meeting a cut below the top-most chain must cross another such chain. Each of these steps rests on plane topology: the existence of the outer region, the meaning of "top-most", and the fact that two chains with interleaved endpoints on a boundary must intersect, which is a form of the Jordan curve theorem.

The naive purely combinatorial route fails: the analogous statement for arbitrary networks is false (Fig. 2), so any argument has to use the drawing somewhere. Replacing the drawing by a combinatorial embedding (rotation systems, faces) is possible but then requires proving that the two notions agree, which is again Jordan-curve territory.

Formalization scope

Conventions committed to in the Lean statements:

  • Vertices and arcs are finite types V, E with decidable equality. Arcs are undirected, may be parallel, and have two distinct end vertices. Source and sink are distinct, capacities are positive (structure Network).
  • A chain is a Finset E that is the arc set of some arrangement as a simple path (IsChainWalk, IsChain); the null chain is allowed.
  • IsDisconnecting and IsCut quantify over all chains joining source and sink; a cut is a disconnecting set no proper subset of which is disconnecting.
  • ab-planarity is a plane drawing of the graph with the extra arc indexed by none : Option E, with injective Paths in ℝ × ℝ as arcs.

Hypotheses of the goal: hno_ab, the standing assumption of §2 (no arc joins aaa and bbb, p. 403); hconn, that some chain joins aaa and bbb. The second is not stated in the paper; its proof starts from "the chain joining a and b which is top-most", which presupposes one, and without it the statement is false (if aaa and bbb are disconnected, the empty set is a cut and no chain exists).

The drawing structure is satisfiable (a three-vertex path network has an explicit drawing), so the planarity hypothesis is not vacuous; and it covers the added arc ababab and all crossings, so K3,3K_{3,3}K3,3​ minus ababab is not ab-planar and the goal is not refuted by the paper's own example. A formalization that dropped the arc ababab from the drawing, or quantified over disconnecting sets instead of cuts, would state a false theorem and is ruled out.

A complete development needs basic plane topology for paths in R2\mathbb R^2R2 (a Jordan-curve-type separation lemma for simple closed curves, or an equivalent statement about crossing paths in a strip), together with combinatorial lemmas about chains (concatenation and shortcutting of chains at a common vertex). The topological lemmas are reusable well beyond this mission. Proofs through a combinatorial embedding are welcome, provided the equivalence with ABPlaneDrawing is proved.

Selected references

  • L. R. Ford, Jr. and D. R. Fulkerson, Maximal Flow Through a Network, Canadian Journal of Mathematics 8 (1956), 399–404. https://doi.org/10.4153/CJM-1956-045-5
  • H. Whitney, Non-separable and planar graphs, Transactions of the American Mathematical Society 34 (1932), 339–362. https://doi.org/10.1090/S0002-9947-1932-1501641-2
  • A. Itai and Y. Shiloach, Maximum flow in planar networks, SIAM Journal on Computing 8 (1979), 135–150. https://doi.org/10.1137/0208012
  • H. Whitney, Planar graphs, Fundamenta Mathematicae 21 (1933), 73–84. https://doi.org/10.4064/fm-21-1-73-84
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AnalysisDynamical SystemsOptimization·Captain: mikedeng1

The Łojasiewicz Inequality for Nonsmooth Subanalytic Functions with Applications to Subgradient Dynamical Systems III: Bounded Subgradient Trajectories Converge with Łojasiewicz RatesResearch Paper

Motivation

Many optimization algorithms are discretizations of a continuous-time descent: the gradient flow x˙=−∇f(x)\dot x=-\nabla f(x)x˙=−∇f(x) for smooth objectives, and its nonsmooth analogue, the subgradient dynamical system, for objectives with kinks or constraints. A basic question about such a flow is whether a bounded trajectory actually converges, rather than merely accumulating on a continuum of critical points, and how fast. For real-analytic fff this was settled by Łojasiewicz through his gradient inequality, which forces bounded gradient trajectories to have finite length. Without some such structure the answer is negative: there are smooth functions whose bounded gradient trajectories spiral forever around a circle of critical points.

Bolte, Daniilidis and Lewis (SIAM J. Optim. 17 (2007) 1205–1223) extended the Łojasiewicz inequality to nonsmooth subanalytic functions, possibly taking the value +∞+\infty+∞, by replacing ∥∇f∥\|\nabla f\|∥∇f∥ with the least norm of a limiting subgradient. Section 4 of the paper turns this inequality into convergence results for subgradient trajectories of convex and lower-C2C^2C2 functions. This mission formalizes that section. The same "Łojasiewicz argument" later became the Kurdyka–Łojasiewicz framework behind convergence proofs for proximal, alternating and splitting algorithms (Attouch–Bolte 2009; Bolte–Sabach–Teboulle 2014).

Timeline. Łojasiewicz (1963, 1984) proved the gradient inequality for real-analytic functions and finite length of bounded analytic gradient trajectories. Kurdyka (Ann. Inst. Fourier 1998) extended it to C1C^1C1 functions definable in an o-minimal structure. Kurdyka, Mostowski and Parusiński (2000) proved Thom's gradient conjecture for analytic functions. Bolte, Daniilidis and Lewis (2007) gave the nonsmooth subanalytic version and the trajectory results formalized here.

Setting

Let f:Rn→R∪{+∞}f:\mathbb R^n\to\mathbb R\cup\{+\infty\}f:Rn→R∪{+∞} with domain dom⁡f={x:f(x)<+∞}\operatorname{dom} f=\{x: f(x)<+\infty\}domf={x:f(x)<+∞}. The Fréchet subdifferential ∂^f(x)\hat\partial f(x)∂^f(x) is the set of x∗x^*x∗ with lim inf⁡y→x, y≠x(f(y)−f(x)−⟨x∗,y−x⟩)/∥y−x∥≥0\liminf_{y\to x,\,y\neq x}\big(f(y)-f(x)-\langle x^*,y-x\rangle\big)/\|y-x\|\ge0liminfy→x,y=x​(f(y)−f(x)−⟨x∗,y−x⟩)/∥y−x∥≥0. The limiting subdifferential ∂f(x)\partial f(x)∂f(x) is the set of limits of xk∗∈∂^f(xk)x_k^*\in\hat\partial f(x_k)xk∗​∈∂^f(xk​) with xk→xx_k\to xxk​→x and f(xk)→f(x)f(x_k)\to f(x)f(xk​)→f(x). The nonsmooth slope is mf(x)=inf⁡{∥x∗∥:x∗∈∂f(x)}m_f(x)=\inf\{\|x^*\|: x^*\in\partial f(x)\}mf​(x)=inf{∥x∗∥:x∗∈∂f(x)}, equal to +∞+\infty+∞ when ∂f(x)=∅\partial f(x)=\emptyset∂f(x)=∅, and crit⁡f={x:0∈∂f(x)}\operatorname{crit} f=\{x: 0\in\partial f(x)\}critf={x:0∈∂f(x)} is the set of critical points.

The standing assumptions of Section 4 are:

  • (H1)(\mathcal H1)(H1) fff is either lower semicontinuous and convex, or lower-C2C^2C2 with dom⁡f=Rn\operatorname{dom} f=\mathbb R^ndomf=Rn. Lower-C2C^2C2 means that near each point f=max⁡s∈SF(⋅,s)f=\max_{s\in S}F(\cdot,s)f=maxs∈S​F(⋅,s) for a compact space SSS and a jointly continuous FFF with jointly continuous first and second xxx-derivatives.
  • (H2)(\mathcal H2)(H2) fff is somewhere finite and bounded from below.
  • (H3)(\mathcal H3)(H3) fff is subanalytic: its graph is locally the projection of a bounded set defined by finitely many real-analytic equalities and strict inequalities.

A trajectory of the subgradient system (G)(\mathcal G)(G) is an absolutely continuous curve x:[0,T)→Rnx:[0,T)\to\mathbb R^nx:[0,T)→Rn, T∈(0,+∞]T\in(0,+\infty]T∈(0,+∞], with x˙(t)+∂f(x(t))∋0\dot x(t)+\partial f(x(t))\ni0x˙(t)+∂f(x(t))∋0 for almost every ttt and ∂f(x(t))≠∅\partial f(x(t))\neq\emptyset∂f(x(t))=∅ for every ttt. It is maximal if it admits no extension to a longer interval. The Łojasiewicz inequality holds around aaa with exponent θ\thetaθ if ∣f−f(a)∣θ/mf|f-f(a)|^\theta/m_f∣f−f(a)∣θ/mf​ is bounded near aaa, with 00=10^0=100=1 and ∞/∞=0/0=0\infty/\infty=0/0=0∞/∞=0/0=0. A Łojasiewicz exponent at a∈dom⁡fa\in\operatorname{dom} fa∈domf is any such θ∈[0,1)\theta\in[0,1)θ∈[0,1).

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 4.7

Under (H1)(\mathcal H1)(H1)–(H3)(\mathcal H3)(H3), every bounded maximal trajectory xxx is defined on [0,+∞)[0,+\infty)[0,+∞) and converges to a critical point aaa. For every Łojasiewicz exponent θ\thetaθ at aaa there are k,k′>0k,k'>0k,k′>0 and t0≥0t_0\ge0t0​≥0 such that for t≥t0t\ge t_0t≥t0​

∥x(t)−a∥≤{k (t+1)−1−θ2θ−1,θ∈(12,1),k e−k′t,θ=12,\|x(t)-a\|\le \begin{cases} k\,(t+1)^{-\frac{1-\theta}{2\theta-1}}, & \theta\in(\tfrac12,1),\\[2pt] k\,e^{-k't}, & \theta=\tfrac12,\end{cases}∥x(t)−a∥≤{k(t+1)−2θ−11−θ​,ke−k′t,​θ∈(21​,1),θ=21​,​

and for θ∈[0,12)\theta\in[0,\tfrac12)θ∈[0,21​), x(t)=ax(t)=ax(t)=a for all large ttt. The constants are existential, so the goal survives any later sharpening of them.

Milestones

  1. Corollary 4.1(i): for almost every ttt, ddtf(x(t))=⟨x˙(t),x∗⟩\frac{d}{dt}f(x(t))=\langle\dot x(t),x^*\rangledtd​f(x(t))=⟨x˙(t),x∗⟩ for every x∗∈∂f(x(t))x^*\in\partial f(x(t))x∗∈∂f(x(t)).
  2. Corollary 4.1(iii): every trajectory extends to a maximal one on [0,+∞)[0,+\infty)[0,+∞) with x˙∈L2\dot x\in L^2x˙∈L2.
  3. Corollary 4.2: ∥x˙(t)∥=mf(x(t))\|\dot x(t)\|=m_f(x(t))∥x˙(t)∥=mf​(x(t)) and ddtf(x(t))=−mf(x(t))2\frac{d}{dt}f(x(t))=-m_f(x(t))^2dtd​f(x(t))=−mf​(x(t))2 almost everywhere.
  4. Inequality (20): the Łojasiewicz inequality holds around every point of dom⁡∂f\operatorname{dom}\partial fdom∂f.
  5. Theorem 4.5: bounded maximal trajectories have finite length ∫0∞∥x˙∥<∞\int_0^\infty\|\dot x\|<\infty∫0∞​∥x˙∥<∞ and converge to a critical point.
  6. The tail bound ∫t∞∥x˙∥≤c1−θ(f(x(t))−f(a))1−θ\int_t^\infty\|\dot x\|\le\frac{c}{1-\theta}(f(x(t))-f(a))^{1-\theta}∫t∞​∥x˙∥≤1−θc​(f(x(t))−f(a))1−θ.
  7. Inequality (27): ∫t∞∥x˙∥≤c1/θ1−θ∥x˙(t)∥(1−θ)/θ\int_t^\infty\|\dot x\|\le\frac{c^{1/\theta}}{1-\theta}\|\dot x(t)\|^{(1-\theta)/\theta}∫t∞​∥x˙∥≤1−θc1/θ​∥x˙(t)∥(1−θ)/θ for almost every large ttt.

Significance

Theorem 4.5 says that for convex or lower-C2C^2C2 subanalytic objectives, including constrained problems through indicator functions of subanalytic sets, the subgradient flow never oscillates indefinitely: bounded trajectories converge to one critical point. Theorem 4.7 adds rates that depend only on the Łojasiewicz exponent at the limit: exponential at θ=12\theta=\tfrac12θ=21​, polynomial above it, finite time below it. These are continuous-time templates for the convergence analyses of proximal and splitting methods under the Kurdyka–Łojasiewicz property.

On the formalization side, the results are proved on paper but, to our knowledge, not formalized in any proof assistant. A development would provide reusable infrastructure: a Lean notion of a trajectory of a differential inclusion on [0,T)[0,T)[0,T), a chain rule for f∘xf\circ xf∘x along absolutely continuous curves, and a comparison lemma for the differential inequality σ˙≤−Lσα\dot\sigma\le-L\sigma^\alphaσ˙≤−Lσα. The analysis of Section 4 uses subanalyticity only through inequality (20), so Theorems 4.5 and 4.7 can be attacked with (20) as an imported milestone, independently of the subanalytic geometry.

Difficulty

Compactness gives cluster points of a bounded trajectory, and the decrease of fff gives convergence of f(x(t))f(x(t))f(x(t)). Neither gives convergence of x(t)x(t)x(t). The usual first idea, that ∫0∞∥x˙∥2<∞\int_0^\infty\|\dot x\|^2<\infty∫0∞​∥x˙∥2<∞ forces convergence, fails, since square-integrable speed allows infinite length. The difficulty is to control ∫∥x˙∥\int\|\dot x\|∫∥x˙∥ rather than ∫∥x˙∥2\int\|\dot x\|^2∫∥x˙∥2. That needs a lower bound on the slope in terms of the function gap near the cluster point, which is exactly what (20) supplies, plus a trapping argument showing the tail of the trajectory stays in the ball where (20) holds. In the nonsmooth setting the chain rule itself is nontrivial: f∘xf\circ xf∘x is differentiable almost everywhere with derivative ⟨x˙,x∗⟩\langle\dot x,x^*\rangle⟨x˙,x∗⟩ for every x∗∈∂f(x(t))x^*\in\partial f(x(t))x∗∈∂f(x(t)), which relies on ∂f=∂^f\partial f=\hat\partial f∂f=∂^f for convex and lower-C2C^2C2 functions. Global existence on [0,+∞)[0,+\infty)[0,+∞) (Corollary 4.1(iii)) must also be established before any asymptotic statement makes sense.

Formalization scope

Space Rn\mathbb R^nRn is EuclideanSpace ℝ (Fin n). Functions take values in EReal; "bounded from below" by a real number excludes −∞-\infty−∞. The limiting subdifferential is the published NonconvexSplitting.Shared.LimitingSubdiff, and convexity is the published MoreauProx.Characterization.EConvex (convex epigraph). The slope mfm_fmf​ is valued in [0,+∞][0,+\infty][0,+∞]. The Łojasiewicz inequality is encoded as ∣f(y)−f(a)∣θ≤C∥v∥|f(y)-f(a)|^\theta\le C\|v\|∣f(y)−f(a)∣θ≤C∥v∥ for yyy near aaa and every v∈∂f(y)v\in\partial f(y)v∈∂f(y), which is the bounded ratio under the paper's conventions. Times are real numbers and T∈[0,+∞]T\in[0,+\infty]T∈[0,+∞]. Curves are functions R→Rn\mathbb R\to\mathbb R^nR→Rn whose values outside [0,T)[0,T)[0,T) are irrelevant. "Absolutely continuous on [0,T)[0,T)[0,T)" means absolutely continuous on every compact [0,b]⊆[0,T)[0,b]\subseteq[0,T)[0,b]⊆[0,T). Velocities appear only "for almost every ttt". Lengths are lower Lebesgue integrals ∫−∥x˙∥\int^-\|\dot x\|∫−∥x˙∥ in [0,+∞][0,+\infty][0,+∞], never Bochner integrals (which would vanish for a non-integrable speed).

Two trivializations are ruled out. Maximality is a hypothesis and T=+∞T=+\inftyT=+∞ is a conclusion: assuming T=+∞T=+\inftyT=+∞ would narrow the theorem, and dropping maximality would make it false. Rates are claimed for every Łojasiewicz exponent at the limit, not for one chosen exponent. Corollary 4.1(iii) is stated as "defined on R+\mathbb R_+R+​ with x^˙∈L2\dot{\hat x}\in L^2x^˙∈L2", because the printed x^∈W1,2(R+)\hat x\in W^{1,2}(\mathbb R_+)x^∈W1,2(R+​) would fail for any trajectory with nonzero limit.

Needed infrastructure: absolutely continuous curves and their a.e. derivatives (Mathlib's AbsolutelyContinuousOnInterval), chain rules for convex and lower-C2C^2C2 functions, existence and uniqueness for monotone differential inclusions (Brézis), and an ODE comparison principle. Contributions to any of these are reusable well beyond this mission.

Selected references

  • J. Bolte, A. Daniilidis, A. Lewis, The Łojasiewicz inequality for nonsmooth subanalytic functions with applications to subgradient dynamical systems, SIAM J. Optim. 17(4) (2007) 1205–1223. https://doi.org/10.1137/050644641
  • H. Brézis, Opérateurs maximaux monotones et semi-groupes de contractions dans les espaces de Hilbert, North-Holland, 1973.
  • J.-P. Aubin, A. Cellina, Differential Inclusions, Springer, 1984. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-69512-4
  • R. T. Rockafellar, R. J.-B. Wets, Variational Analysis, Springer, 1998. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-02431-3
  • K. Kurdyka, On gradients of functions definable in o-minimal structures, Ann. Inst. Fourier 48 (1998) 769–783. https://doi.org/10.5802/aif.1638
  • H. Attouch, J. Bolte, On the convergence of the proximal algorithm for nonsmooth functions involving analytic features, Math. Program. 116 (2009) 5–16. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10107-007-0133-5
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OptimizationProbabilityStatistics·Captain: mikedeng1

Asymptotic Behavior of Statistical Estimators and of Optimal Solutions of Stochastic Optimization Problems: Optimal Solutions Under Estimated Distributions Are Strongly ConsistentResearch Paper

Motivation

Many estimation procedures in statistics, and most stochastic optimization models in operations research, have the same shape: a decision or parameter x∈Rnx\in\mathbb R^nx∈Rn is chosen to minimize an expected loss Ef(x)=∫f(x,ξ) P(dξ)Ef(x)=\int f(x,\xi)\,P(d\xi)Ef(x)=∫f(x,ξ)P(dξ) under a distribution PPP that is not known. In practice PPP is replaced by an estimate PνP^\nuPν built from the information available at stage ν\nuν (an empirical measure, a smoothed or parametric fit, a Bayesian posterior), and the minimizer of the estimated problem is used in place of the true one. The basic question is whether this is justified: do the estimated solutions converge to a true solution, and the estimated optimal values to the true optimal value, as information accumulates?

For maximum likelihood this is Wald's consistency theorem (Wald 1949); Huber extended it to M-estimators under non-standard conditions (Huber 1967). Both settings are unconstrained, or constrained to an open set, and assume finite-valued criteria. Constrained least squares, L1L^1L1 and Huber regression with inequality constraints, variance-component models with Heywood cases, and two-stage stochastic programs with recourse all lead instead to criteria that take the value +∞+\infty+∞ off a closed feasible set and are only lower semicontinuous in xxx.

J. Dupačová and R. Wets (IIASA WP-86-41, 1986; journal version Ann. Statist. 16 (1988)) proved consistency in this generality by combining epi-convergence of functions with the theory of measurable multifunctions and normal integrands. This mission formalizes their §3.

Setting

Ξ\XiΞ is a Polish space with its Borel σ\sigmaσ-field and PPP is a probability measure on it. The integrand is f:Rn×Ξ→(−∞,∞]f:\mathbb R^n\times\Xi\to(-\infty,\infty]f:Rn×Ξ→(−∞,∞], and the true problem is to minimize

Ef(x)=∫Ξf(x,ξ) P(dξ),Ef(x)=\int_\Xi f(x,\xi)\,P(d\xi),Ef(x)=∫Ξ​f(x,ξ)P(dξ),

with the convention that Ef(x)=+∞Ef(x)=+\inftyEf(x)=+∞ whenever ξ↦f(x,ξ)\xi\mapsto f(x,\xi)ξ↦f(x,ξ) is not bounded above by a summable function. The effective domain of a function h:Rn→[−∞,∞]h:\mathbb R^n\to[-\infty,\infty]h:Rn→[−∞,∞] is dom⁡h={x:h(x)<∞}\operatorname{dom}h=\{x: h(x)<\infty\}domh={x:h(x)<∞}, and argmin⁡h={x:h(x)=inf⁡h}\operatorname{argmin}h=\{x: h(x)=\inf h\}argminh={x:h(x)=infh}.

Information arrives on a probability space (Z,F,μ)(Z,\mathcal F,\mu)(Z,F,μ) with an increasing sequence of σ\sigmaσ-fields F1⊆F2⊆⋯⊆F\mathcal F^1\subseteq\mathcal F^2\subseteq\dots\subseteq\mathcal FF1⊆F2⊆⋯⊆F. Each sample ζ∈Z\zeta\in Zζ∈Z yields probability measures Pν(⋅,ζ)P^\nu(\cdot,\zeta)Pν(⋅,ζ) on Ξ\XiΞ, and ζ↦Pν(A,ζ)\zeta\mapsto P^\nu(A,\zeta)ζ↦Pν(A,ζ) is Fν\mathcal F^\nuFν-measurable for every Borel AAA: the estimate at stage ν\nuν uses only stage-ν\nuν information. The estimated problem minimizes

Eνf(x,ζ)=∫Ξf(x,ξ) Pν(dξ,ζ).E^\nu f(x,\zeta)=\int_\Xi f(x,\xi)\,P^\nu(d\xi,\zeta).Eνf(x,ζ)=∫Ξ​f(x,ξ)Pν(dξ,ζ).

A sequence gνg^\nugν epi-converges to ggg if, at every xxx, lim inf⁡gν(xν)≥g(x)\liminf g^\nu(x^\nu)\ge g(x)liminfgν(xν)≥g(x) along every sequence xν→xx^\nu\to xxν→x, and lim sup⁡gν(xν)≤g(x)\limsup g^\nu(x^\nu)\le g(x)limsupgν(xν)≤g(x) along some sequence xν→xx^\nu\to xxν→x.

The standing hypotheses are Assumption 3.4: dom⁡f=S×Ξ\operatorname{dom}f=S\times\Xidomf=S×Ξ with SSS closed and nonempty; f(x,⋅)f(x,\cdot)f(x,⋅) is continuous for x∈Sx\in Sx∈S; f(⋅,ξ)f(\cdot,\xi)f(⋅,ξ) is lower semicontinuous; and fff is locally lower Lipschitz on SSS with a bounded continuous modulus β(ξ)\beta(\xi)β(ξ). Assumption 3.5 asks that, for μ\muμ-almost every ζ\zetaζ, Pν(⋅,ζ)P^\nu(\cdot,\zeta)Pν(⋅,ζ) converge in distribution to PPP, that ∣f(x,⋅)∣|f(x,\cdot)|∣f(x,⋅)∣ be uniformly tight along P=P0,P1,…P=P^0,P^1,\dotsP=P0,P1,… for each x∈Sx\in Sx∈S, and that ∫inf⁡xf(x,ξ) Pν(dξ,ζ)>−∞\int\inf_x f(x,\xi)\,P^\nu(d\xi,\zeta)>-\infty∫infx​f(x,ξ)Pν(dξ,ζ)>−∞ for all ν\nuν.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 3.9, "In particular" (pp. 21–22)

Let D⊆RnD\subseteq\mathbb R^nD⊆Rn be compact, suppose (argmin⁡Eνf)∩D≠∅(\operatorname{argmin}E^\nu f)\cap D\neq\emptyset(argminEνf)∩D=∅ μ\muμ-a.s. for every ν\nuν, and suppose {x∗}=argmin⁡Ef∩D\{x^*\}=\operatorname{argmin}Ef\cap D{x∗}=argminEf∩D. Then there are Fν\mathcal F^\nuFν-measurable selections xνx^\nuxν of argmin⁡Eνf\operatorname{argmin}E^\nu fargminEνf with

xν(ζ)→x∗andinf⁡Eνf(⋅,ζ)→inf⁡Effor μ-almost every ζ.x^\nu(\zeta)\to x^*\quad\text{and}\quad \inf E^\nu f(\cdot,\zeta)\to\inf Ef\qquad\text{for }\mu\text{-almost every }\zeta .xν(ζ)→x∗andinfEνf(⋅,ζ)→infEffor μ-almost every ζ.

The goal does not assume that EfEfEf has a unique global minimizer, and it does not assume convexity.

Milestones

In attack order:

  • Proposition 3.3: epi-convergence gives lim sup⁡(inf⁡gν)≤inf⁡g\limsup(\inf g^\nu)\le\inf glimsup(infgν)≤infg, limits of minimizers are minimizers, and the minimum is attained in the closure of a bounded DDD.
  • Lemma 3.6: almost surely, EfEfEf and every EνfE^\nu fEνf are proper and l.s.c., with domain SSS.
  • Theorem 3.7: almost surely, EνfE^\nu fEνf epi-converges and converges pointwise to EfEfEf.
  • Theorem 3.8: almost surely, the epigraphs of EνfE^\nu fEνf are closed, and they depend Fν\mathcal F^\nuFν-measurably on ζ\zetaζ.
  • Theorem 3.9:
    • (3.14) lim sup⁡(inf⁡Eνf)≤inf⁡Ef\limsup(\inf E^\nu f)\le\inf Eflimsup(infEνf)≤infEf a.s.;
    • (i) cluster points of estimated minimizers minimize EfEfEf;
    • (ii) ζ↦argmin⁡Eνf(⋅,ζ)\zeta\mapsto\operatorname{argmin}E^\nu f(\cdot,\zeta)ζ↦argminEνf(⋅,ζ) is closed-valued and Fν\mathcal F^\nuFν-measurable.
  • Proposition 3.1: the measurable selection theorem.

Significance

The result separates two things: the statistical input, which is only convergence in distribution of PνP^\nuPν plus a tightness condition, and the variational output, which is convergence of optimal values and solutions. It therefore applies to any estimator PνP^\nuPν that converges weakly almost surely: empirical measures, kernel estimates, parametric fits. It also covers constrained and nonsmooth problems: the feasible set enters through f=+∞f=+\inftyf=+∞ off SSS, and only lower semicontinuity in xxx is required. Asymptotic distribution results for constrained estimators, such as the second part of the same paper and the subsequent literature on sample average approximation, start from this consistency.

The theorem is proved on paper. To the best of current knowledge none of it is machine-checked. Mathlib has weak convergence of probability measures, lower semicontinuity and extended-real integrals. It does not have epi-convergence, Effros-measurable multifunctions, normal integrands or the Kuratowski–Ryll-Nardzewski selection theorem. A formal proof produces these as reusable components. It also has to supply the details that the paper's proof of Theorem 3.8 leaves as a sketch.

Difficulty

Pointwise convergence Eνf(x)→Ef(x)E^\nu f(x)\to Ef(x)Eνf(x)→Ef(x) is not enough to move minimizers to the limit, and uniform convergence fails because fff is +∞+\infty+∞ off SSS and need not be bounded. Epi-convergence is the right notion. Proving it needs a liminf inequality along moving points xν→xx^\nu\to xxν→x under moving measures PνP^\nuPν. That combines Fatou's lemma, the lower Lipschitz bound and the tightness condition, and the integrands are extended-real-valued, so care is needed.

The second difficulty is measurability. The exceptional null set lies in F\mathcal FF but not in Fν\mathcal F^\nuFν, so "Fν\mathcal F^\nuFν-measurable" has to be understood on a full-measure set in the trace σ\sigmaσ-field. The paper's argument for Theorem 3.8 appeals to continuity of P↦epi⁡EPfP\mapsto\operatorname{epi}E_PfP↦epiEP​f in the epi-topology, and it remarks itself that Theorem 3.7 gives this only along sequences satisfying Assumption 3.5. A solver will have to rebuild this step, for example through the normal-integrand structure of EνfE^\nu fEνf.

Formalization scope

  • Rn\mathbb R^nRn is EuclideanSpace ℝ (Fin n) with its Euclidean norm.
  • Ξ\XiΞ is a Polish space with its Borel σ\sigmaσ-algebra. This is exactly a closed subset of a Polish space with the relative Borel field.
  • fff is EReal-valued. Every expectation is the mission's expect: +∞+\infty+∞ when ∫f+=∞\int f^+=\infty∫f+=∞, and ∫f+−∫f−\int f^+-\int f^-∫f+−∫f− otherwise, both computed as Lebesgue integrals of [0,∞][0,\infty][0,∞]-valued functions. A Bochner integral, which would assign 000 to non-integrable functions, is never used for EfEfEf or EνfE^\nu fEνf.
  • The sample index is shifted: Lean's Pν k and 𝔽 k are the paper's Pk+1P^{k+1}Pk+1 and Fk+1\mathcal F^{k+1}Fk+1, and P=P0P=P^0P=P0 is a separate argument.
  • Infima, lim inf⁡\liminfliminf and lim sup⁡\limsuplimsup are taken in [−∞,∞][-\infty,\infty][−∞,∞].
  • Measurability on the full-measure set Z0Z_0Z0​ uses the trace σ\sigmaσ-field.
  • The selections in the goal are total, Fν\mathcal F^\nuFν-measurable maps Z→RnZ\to\mathbb R^nZ→Rn that select almost surely. This is equivalent to the paper's maps Z0→RnZ_0\to\mathbb R^nZ0​→Rn.
  • "Random l.s.c. function" in Theorem 3.8 is encoded by the equivalent conditions (3.4i)–(3.4ii): nonempty, closed and measurable epigraphs.
  • Lower Lipschitz (3.10) is written additively.
  • The hypothesis that Ξ\XiΞ is the support of PPP is omitted. It is unused in §3, and omitting it strengthens every statement.
  • Nothing beyond the page is assumed: no convexity, no compact SSS, no bounded fff, no unique minimizer, no i.i.d. sampling, no empirical PνP^\nuPν, no completeness of μ\muμ or Fν\mathcal F^\nuFν.

The hypotheses are not vacuous. A sorry-free check verifies all of them, including those of the goal, for f(x,ξ)=∥x∥2f(x,\xi)=\|x\|^2f(x,ξ)=∥x∥2 with Dirac measures. Defining the expectation through a Bochner integral, or dropping S≠∅S\neq\emptysetS=∅ (which makes every argmin⁡\operatorname{argmin}argmin all of Rn\mathbb R^nRn), would trivialize or change the statements; the definitions above rule both out.

Contributions are welcome on any milestone. Proposition 3.1 (Kuratowski–Ryll-Nardzewski for Rm\mathbb R^mRm-valued multifunctions) and Proposition 3.3 (deterministic epi-convergence facts) are independent of the probabilistic setting and reusable beyond this mission.

Selected references

  • J. Dupačová, R. Wets, Asymptotic Behavior of Statistical Estimators and Optimal Solutions for Stochastic Optimization Problems, IIASA Working Paper WP-86-41, 1986. https://pure.iiasa.ac.at/id/eprint/2818/ — journal version: Ann. Statist. 16(4), 1517–1549, 1988. https://doi.org/10.1214/aos/1176351052
  • A. Wald, Note on the consistency of the maximum likelihood estimate, Ann. Math. Statist. 20, 595–601, 1949. https://doi.org/10.1214/aoms/1177729938
  • P. J. Huber, The behavior of maximum likelihood estimates under nonstandard conditions, Proc. Fifth Berkeley Symp. Math. Statist. Probab. 1, 221–233, 1967. https://projecteuclid.org/euclid.bsmsp/1200512988
  • R. T. Rockafellar, R. J.-B. Wets, Variational Analysis, Springer, 1998 (Ch. 7 epi-convergence; Ch. 14 measurable multifunctions and normal integrands). https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-02431-3
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Bandit AlgorithmsConvex OptimizationMachine Learning+1·Captain: mikedeng1

Regret Analysis of Stochastic and Nonstochastic Multi-armed Bandit Problems IV: Online Stochastic Mirror Descent for Combinatorial Semi-BanditsTextbook

Motivation

Many sequential decision problems ask a learner to choose, round after round, a combination of items: a set of mmm ads out of ddd, a path in a network, a matching. After each choice the learner sees the loss of the items it used, not of those it did not. This is online combinatorial optimization with semi-bandit feedback. It contains the classical adversarial multi-armed bandit (choose one of ddd arms) and is a standard model in online advertising, routing and ranking.

Chapter 5 of Bubeck and Cesa-Bianchi's monograph arXiv:1204.5721v2 treats this problem with one algorithm, Online Stochastic Mirror Descent (OSMD). Every regret bound in the chapter comes from a single mirror-descent inequality, specialized through the choice of a convex "regularizer". The chapter's capstone, Theorem 5.7, shows that a polynomial regularizer gives pseudo-regret O(mdn)O(\sqrt{mdn})O(mdn​) with no logarithmic factor. For m=1m=1m=1 this is the minimax-optimal rate of the adversarial bandit, first attained by the INF strategy of Audibert and Bubeck (2009). The semi-bandit version is due to Audibert, Bubeck and Lugosi (2014).

Setting

Vectors live in Rd\mathbb R^dRd. The arm set is a nonempty C⊆{0,1}d\mathcal C\subseteq\{0,1\}^dC⊆{0,1}d with ∥v∥1=m\|v\|_1=m∥v∥1​=m for every v∈Cv\in\mathcal Cv∈C, and K=Conv(C)\mathcal K=\mathrm{Conv}(\mathcal C)K=Conv(C). An oblivious adversary fixes loss vectors ℓ1,…,ℓn∈[0,1]d\ell_1,\dots,\ell_n\in[0,1]^dℓ1​,…,ℓn​∈[0,1]d. In round ttt the learner plays a random arm vt∈Cv_t\in\mathcal Cvt​∈C, pays ℓt⊤vt\ell_t^\top v_tℓt⊤​vt​, and observes (ℓt(1)vt(1),…,ℓt(d)vt(d))(\ell_t(1)v_t(1),\dots,\ell_t(d)v_t(d))(ℓt​(1)vt​(1),…,ℓt​(d)vt​(d)). The pseudo-regret is

Rˉn=E∑t=1nℓt⊤vt−min⁡x∈K∑t=1nℓt⊤x.\bar R_n=\mathbb E\sum_{t=1}^n\ell_t^\top v_t-\min_{x\in\mathcal K}\sum_{t=1}^n\ell_t^\top x .Rˉn​=Et=1∑n​ℓt⊤​vt​−x∈Kmin​t=1∑n​ℓt⊤​x.

A Legendre function on Dˉ\bar DDˉ, for a nonempty open convex DDD, is a continuous F:Dˉ→RF:\bar D\to\mathbb RF:Dˉ→R that is strictly convex and C1C^1C1 on DDD and whose gradient norm tends to +∞+\infty+∞ at Dˉ∖D\bar D\setminus DDˉ∖D. Its Bregman divergence is DF(x,y)=F(x)−F(y)−(x−y)⊤∇F(y)D_F(x,y)=F(x)-F(y)-(x-y)^\top\nabla F(y)DF​(x,y)=F(x)−F(y)−(x−y)⊤∇F(y), and its Legendre–Fenchel transform is F∗(u)=sup⁡x∈Dˉ(x⊤u−F(x))F^*(u)=\sup_{x\in\bar D}(x^\top u-F(x))F∗(u)=supx∈Dˉ​(x⊤u−F(x)).

Online Mirror Descent with learning rate η>0\eta>0η>0 and vectors gtg_tgt​ starts at x1∈arg⁡min⁡KFx_1\in\arg\min_{\mathcal K}Fx1​∈argminK​F. It then sets ∇F(wt+1)=∇F(xt)−ηgt\nabla F(w_{t+1})=\nabla F(x_t)-\eta g_t∇F(wt+1​)=∇F(xt​)−ηgt​ and xt+1=arg⁡min⁡y∈KDF(y,wt+1)x_{t+1}=\arg\min_{y\in\mathcal K}D_F(y,w_{t+1})xt+1​=argminy∈K​DF​(y,wt+1​). OSMD uses a random estimate gt=ℓ~tg_t=\tilde\ell_tgt​=ℓ~t​ of the loss. In the semi-bandit case it plays vtv_tvt​ with E[vt∣xt]=xt\mathbb E[v_t\mid x_t]=x_tE[vt​∣xt​]=xt​ and uses

ℓ~t(i)=ℓt(i) vt(i)xt(i).(5.5)\tilde\ell_t(i)=\frac{\ell_t(i)\,v_t(i)}{x_t(i)}. \tag{5.5}ℓ~t​(i)=xt​(i)ℓt​(i)vt​(i)​.(5.5)

A 000-potential is a convex, C1C^1C1, increasing ψ:(−∞,a)→(0,∞)\psi:(-\infty,a)\to(0,\infty)ψ:(−∞,a)→(0,∞) with ψ(−∞)=0\psi(-\infty)=0ψ(−∞)=0, ψ(a−)=+∞\psi(a^-)=+\inftyψ(a−)=+∞ and ∫01∣ψ−1∣<∞\int_0^1|\psi^{-1}|<\infty∫01​∣ψ−1∣<∞. It defines the Legendre function Fψ(x)=∑i∫0xiψ−1(s) dsF_\psi(x)=\sum_i\int_0^{x_i}\psi^{-1}(s)\,dsFψ​(x)=∑i​∫0xi​​ψ−1(s)ds on [0,∞)d[0,\infty)^d[0,∞)d. With ψ=exp⁡\psi=\expψ=exp this is the negative entropy.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 5.7 (p. 80)

For every 000-potential ψ\psiψ and non-negative unbiased estimates,

Rˉn≤sup⁡KFψ−Fψ(x1)η+η2∑t=1n∑i=1dE[ℓ~t(i)2(ψ−1)′(xt(i))].\bar R_n\le\frac{\sup_{\mathcal K}F_\psi-F_\psi(x_1)}{\eta}+\frac\eta2\sum_{t=1}^n\sum_{i=1}^d\mathbb E\left[\frac{\tilde\ell_t(i)^2}{(\psi^{-1})'(x_t(i))}\right].Rˉn​≤ηsupK​Fψ​−Fψ​(x1​)​+2η​t=1∑n​i=1∑d​E[(ψ−1)′(xt​(i))ℓ~t​(i)2​].

For ψ(x)=(−x)−q\psi(x)=(-x)^{-q}ψ(x)=(−x)−q with q>1q>1q>1, the estimate (5.5) and η=2q−1 m1−2/q/(n d1−2/q)\eta=\sqrt{\tfrac{2}{q-1}\,m^{1-2/q}/(n\,d^{1-2/q})}η=q−12​m1−2/q/(nd1−2/q)​,

Rˉn≤q2q−1 mdn,and  Rˉn≤22mdn  at q=2.\bar R_n\le q\sqrt{\tfrac{2}{q-1}\,mdn},\qquad\text{and }\ \bar R_n\le2\sqrt{2mdn}\ \text{ at }q=2.Rˉn​≤qq−12​mdn​,and  Rˉn​≤22mdn​  at q=2.

Milestones

  1. Lemma 5.1: F∗∗=FF^{**}=FF∗∗=F, ∇F∗=(∇F)−1\nabla F^*=(\nabla F)^{-1}∇F∗=(∇F)−1 on D∗D^*D∗, and DF(x,y)=DF∗(∇F(y),∇F(x))D_F(x,y)=D_{F^*}(\nabla F(y),\nabla F(x))DF​(x,y)=DF∗​(∇F(y),∇F(x)).
  2. Lemma 5.2: existence, uniqueness and the Pythagorean inequality of Bregman projections.
  3. Theorem 5.3: ∑tℓt(xt)−∑tℓt(x)≤F(x)−F(x1)η+1η∑tDF∗(∇F(xt)−η∇ℓt(xt),∇F(xt))\sum_t\ell_t(x_t)-\sum_t\ell_t(x)\le\frac{F(x)-F(x_1)}\eta+\frac1\eta\sum_tD_{F^*}(\nabla F(x_t)-\eta\nabla\ell_t(x_t),\nabla F(x_t))∑t​ℓt​(xt​)−∑t​ℓt​(x)≤ηF(x)−F(x1​)​+η1​∑t​DF∗​(∇F(xt​)−η∇ℓt​(xt​),∇F(xt​)).
  4. Theorem 5.5, linear losses, and its corrected general form.
  5. Lemma 5.3: FψF_\psiFψ​ is Legendre and DFψ∗(u,v)≤12∑iψ′(vi)(ui−vi)2D_{F_\psi^*}(u,v)\le\frac12\sum_i\psi'(v_i)(u_i-v_i)^2DFψ∗​​(u,v)≤21​∑i​ψ′(vi​)(ui​−vi​)2 for u≤vu\le vu≤v.
  6. Theorem 5.6: with the negative entropy, Rˉn≤2mdnln⁡(d/m)\bar R_n\le\sqrt{2mdn\ln(d/m)}Rˉn​≤2mdnln(d/m)​.

Significance

Theorem 5.7 is the sharpest semi-bandit bound in the monograph. It shows that removing the ln⁡(d/m)\sqrt{\ln(d/m)}ln(d/m)​ factor of the exponential-weights analysis (Theorem 5.6) is a matter of the regularizer, not of a new algorithm. The same OSMD template gives the Euclidean-ball bound of Theorem 5.8 and is reused for bandit convex optimization in Chapter 6. Lemma 5.1, Lemma 5.2 and Theorem 5.3 are the standard mirror-descent toolkit, used throughout online learning and optimization.

All results of the chapter are proved in the book. Lemmas 5.1 and 5.2 are cited from Cesa-Bianchi and Lugosi (2006). None of them is formalized on Prove2Me. The published mirror-descent bound of Bandit Algorithms XII treats linear losses with a comparator inside DDD and Euclidean-space vectors; it is not Theorem 5.3. The mission adds a machine-checked version of the whole chain, from Legendre duality to the explicit constant q2mdn/(q−1)q\sqrt{2mdn/(q-1)}q2mdn/(q−1)​, with two of the printed statements corrected (below).

Difficulty

The pathwise mirror-descent inequality is a telescoping argument, but several of its steps rest on convex analysis that Mathlib does not package. One is the existence and interior location of Bregman projections onto a set that touches the boundary of DDD. Another is the differentiability of F∗F^*F∗ on the open dual space and the identity ∇F∗=(∇F)−1\nabla F^*=(\nabla F)^{-1}∇F∗=(∇F)−1. A third is the closed form of Fψ∗F_\psi^*Fψ∗​ for a potential defined through an improper integral of ψ−1\psi^{-1}ψ−1.

The probabilistic step is not a martingale argument. Only conditioning on the current iterate xtx_txt​ is available. The estimate (5.5) divides by xt(i)x_t(i)xt​(i), so its integrability and unbiasedness have to be derived from the fact that the iterates stay in the open orthant. Finally, the explicit constant requires a Hölder step, ∑ix1(i)1−1/q≤m(q−1)/qd1/q\sum_ix_1(i)^{1-1/q}\le m^{(q-1)/q}d^{1/q}∑i​x1​(i)1−1/q≤m(q−1)/qd1/q, and the matching bound ∑ixt(i)1/q≤m1/qd1−1/q\sum_ix_t(i)^{1/q}\le m^{1/q}d^{1-1/q}∑i​xt​(i)1/q≤m1/qd1−1/q.

Formalization scope

Vectors are Fin d → ℝ. The arm set is a Set of 0/10/10/1 vectors with coordinate sum mmm, and K\mathcal KK is convexHull ℝ C. Rounds are t=1,…,nt=1,\dots,nt=1,…,n, sums run over Finset.Icc 1 n, and index 000 is unused. A randomized run is a family of measurable processes xt,vt,ℓ~t,wtx_t, v_t, \tilde\ell_t, w_txt​,vt​,ℓ~t​,wt​ on a probability space, with the deterministic OMD recursion holding on every sample path. E[⋅∣xt]\mathbb E[\cdot\mid x_t]E[⋅∣xt​] is the coordinatewise conditional expectation given σ(xt)\sigma(x_t)σ(xt​), which is exactly what the book's proofs use. Losses are oblivious, so Rˉn≤B\bar R_n\le BRˉn​≤B is stated as "for every x∈Kx\in\mathcal Kx∈K, E∑tℓt⊤vt−∑tℓt⊤x≤B\mathbb E\sum_t\ell_t^\top v_t-\sum_t\ell_t^\top x\le BE∑t​ℓt⊤​vt​−∑t​ℓt⊤​x≤B". F∗F^*F∗ is valued in EReal, and DF∗D_{F^*}DF∗​ is evaluated only on the open dual space, where F∗F^*F∗ is finite. Wherever an expectation of a possibly non-integrable quantity appears on a right-hand side, its integrability is assumed: the book's bound is then +∞+\infty+∞ and trivial, while Lean's integral would be 000.

Corrections and instantiations, each labelled in the item's Formalization Note:

  • Theorem 5.7, corrected misprint. The book prints η=2q−1m1−2/qd1−2/q\eta=\sqrt{\frac2{q-1}\frac{m^{1-2/q}}{d^{1-2/q}}}η=q−12​d1−2/qm1−2/q​​. The proof (p. 81) gives the stated bound only for η=2q−1m1−2/qn d1−2/q\eta=\sqrt{\frac2{q-1}\frac{m^{1-2/q}}{n\,d^{1-2/q}}}η=q−12​nd1−2/qm1−2/q​​, which is stated. At q=2q=2q=2 this is η=2/n\eta=\sqrt{2/n}η=2/n​.
  • Theorem 5.5, corrected misprint. In the first bound the book prints E[∥xt−x~t∥ ∥g~t∥∗]\mathbb E[\|x_t-\tilde x_t\|\,\|\tilde g_t\|_*]E[∥xt​−x~t​∥∥g~​t​∥∗​]. That statement fails for ℓt(x)=x2\ell_t(x)=x^2ℓt​(x)=x2 on [−1,1][-1,1][−1,1] with F=x2/2F=x^2/2F=x2/2 and x~t=±1\tilde x_t=\pm1x~t​=±1. The version stated uses ∥∇ℓt(x~t)∥∗\|\nabla\ell_t(\tilde x_t)\|_*∥∇ℓt​(x~t​)∥∗​, as the proof's first inequality does. The linear-loss bound is stated as printed.
  • Lemma 5.2. "For all z∈K∩Dz\in K\cap Dz∈K∩D" is read as "for the projection zzz", which lies in K∩DK\cap DK∩D.
  • Hypotheses made explicit: q>1q>1q>1; non-negativity of the estimates in Theorem 5.6 (used in its proof); unbiasedness E[ℓ~t∣xt]=ℓt\mathbb E[\tilde\ell_t\mid x_t]=\ell_tE[ℓ~t​∣xt​]=ℓt​ in the general parts of Theorems 5.6 and 5.7; K∩(0,∞)d≠∅\mathcal K\cap(0,\infty)^d\ne\emptysetK∩(0,∞)d=∅ (OMD's requirement K∩D≠∅K\cap D\ne\emptysetK∩D=∅); a subgradient selection as an explicit input.
  • Theorem 5.6's particular bound uses the book's η=2mndln⁡dm\eta=\sqrt{\frac{2m}{nd}\ln\frac dm}η=nd2m​lnmd​​ as printed. There are no O(·) constants in the chapter's statements.

A trivializing formalization would let η\etaη, xtx_txt​ or the estimate be junk values: an OSMD step at η=0\eta=0η=0, a Lean division x/0=0x/0=0x/0=0, or a regret written as a real infimum over an unbounded set. Here every run is the book's algorithm on the open orthant, and each bound is stated against every comparator in K\mathcal KK.

Reusable beyond this mission: the Legendre/Bregman layer, the OMD run predicate and the ω\omegaω-potential layer. Proofs of Lemmas 5.1 and 5.2 in this generality would be welcome additions to the library.

Selected references

  • S. Bubeck, N. Cesa-Bianchi, Regret Analysis of Stochastic and Nonstochastic Multi-armed Bandit Problems, Foundations and Trends in Machine Learning 5(1), 2012; arXiv:1204.5721v2. https://arxiv.org/abs/1204.5721
  • N. Cesa-Bianchi, G. Lugosi, Prediction, Learning, and Games, Cambridge University Press, 2006. https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511546921
  • J.-Y. Audibert, S. Bubeck, Regret bounds and minimax policies under partial monitoring, Journal of Machine Learning Research 11, 2010. https://www.jmlr.org/papers/v11/audibert10a.html
  • J.-Y. Audibert, S. Bubeck, G. Lugosi, Regret in online combinatorial optimization, Mathematics of Operations Research 39(1), 2014. https://doi.org/10.1287/moor.2013.0598
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Discrete GeometryLinear OptimizationOptimization·Captain: mikedeng1

Sensitivity Theorems in Integer Linear Programming: Every Integral m×n Matrix Has Chvátal Rank at Most 2^(n³+1)·n^(5n)·Δ(A)^(n+1)Research Paper

Motivation

An integer linear program max⁡{wx:Ax≤b, x integral}\max\{wx : Ax \le b,\ x \text{ integral}\}max{wx:Ax≤b, x integral} is usually attacked through its linear programming relaxation max⁡{wx:Ax≤b}\max\{wx : Ax \le b\}max{wx:Ax≤b}, which drops the integrality constraint. Two questions follow at once. How far can an optimal solution of the relaxation be from an optimal integer solution? And how many rounds of rounding-based cutting planes are needed before the relaxation describes the integer points exactly? Branch-and-bound, cutting-plane methods and the parametric analysis of integer programs all depend on the answers.

W. Cook, A.M.H. Gerards, A. Schrijver and É. Tardos, Sensitivity theorems in integer linear programming (Math. Programming 34 (1986) 251–264), answer both in terms of the number of variables nnn and the largest subdeterminant Δ(A)\Delta(A)Δ(A) of the constraint matrix, independently of the right-hand side.

Timeline.

  • 1958–1963: Gomory introduces integer rounding cuts. In 1973 Chvátal (Discrete Math. 4) shows that finitely many rounds reach the integer hull of a bounded polyhedron.
  • 1977–1979: Blair and Jeroslow prove that for a fixed matrix AAA the distance between LP and IP optima, and the gap between their values, are bounded by constants depending on AAA.
  • 1980: Schrijver (Ann. Discrete Math. 9) proves that the Chvátal closure of a rational polyhedron is a polyhedron, and that every rational polyhedron, bounded or not, reaches its integer hull after finitely many rounds.
  • 1986: Cook, Gerards, Schrijver and Tardos prove the explicit bounds of this mission, nΔ(A)n\Delta(A)nΔ(A) for proximity, and show that every integral matrix has finite Chvátal rank.
  • Later work, for example Eisenbrand and Weismantel (2018), replaces the ℓ∞\ell_\inftyℓ∞​ proximity bound by ℓ1\ell_1ℓ1​ bounds for programs in standard form.

Setting

All matrices, vectors and polyhedra are rational. Let AAA be an integral m×nm\times nm×n matrix. A square submatrix of order kkk, where 1≤k≤min⁡(m,n)1\le k\le\min(m,n)1≤k≤min(m,n), keeps kkk rows and kkk columns of AAA. The quantity Δ(A)\Delta(A)Δ(A) is the largest ∣det⁡B∣|\det B|∣detB∣ over all such submatrices BBB. So Δ(0)=0\Delta(0)=0Δ(0)=0, and Δ(A)≥1\Delta(A)\ge 1Δ(A)≥1 whenever A≠0A\ne 0A=0. Norms are ∥x∥∞=max⁡i∣xi∣\|x\|_\infty=\max_i|x_i|∥x∥∞​=maxi​∣xi​∣ and ∥x∥1=∑i∣xi∣\|x\|_1=\sum_i|x_i|∥x∥1​=∑i​∣xi​∣.

For b∈Qmb\in\mathbb{Q}^mb∈Qm write P={x∈Qn:Ax≤b}P=\{x\in\mathbb{Q}^n : Ax\le b\}P={x∈Qn:Ax≤b}. An optimal solution of max⁡{wx:Ax≤b}\max\{wx : Ax\le b\}max{wx:Ax≤b} is a point of PPP maximizing wxwxwx. For max⁡{wx:Ax≤b, x integral}\max\{wx : Ax\le b,\ x\text{ integral}\}max{wx:Ax≤b, x integral} it is an integral point of PPP maximizing wxwxwx among the integral points of PPP. A rational polyhedron is a set {x:Dx≤d}\{x : Dx\le d\}{x:Dx≤d} with DDD, ddd rational. The integer hull PIP_IPI​ is the convex hull of the integral points of PPP.

If ay≤βay\le\betaay≤β for all y∈Py\in Py∈P, with aaa integral and β\betaβ rational, then every integral point of PPP satisfies the Chvátal cut ax≤⌊β⌋ax\le\lfloor\beta\rfloorax≤⌊β⌋. The Chvátal closure P′P'P′ is the set of points satisfying all Chvátal cuts. Set P(0)=PP^{(0)}=PP(0)=P and P(i)=(P(i−1))′P^{(i)}=(P^{(i-1)})'P(i)=(P(i−1))′. Then PI⊆P(i)P_I\subseteq P^{(i)}PI​⊆P(i) for all iii. The Chvátal rank of PPP is the least ttt with P(t)=PIP^{(t)}=P_IP(t)=PI​. The Chvátal rank of the matrix AAA is the supremum of the Chvátal ranks of {x:Ax≤b}\{x : Ax\le b\}{x:Ax≤b} over all integral vectors bbb.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 10 (p. 260)

sup⁡b∈Zm rank⁡{x:Ax≤b} ≤ 2n3+1 n5n Δ(A)n+1.\sup_{b\in\mathbb{Z}^m}\ \operatorname{rank}\{x : Ax\le b\}\ \le\ 2^{n^3+1}\,n^{5n}\,\Delta(A)^{n+1}.b∈Zmsup​ rank{x:Ax≤b} ≤ 2n3+1n5nΔ(A)n+1.

In particular, every integral matrix has finite Chvátal rank, and the bound does not depend on mmm or on bbb.

Milestones, in attack order

  1. Theorem 1 (p. 252). Suppose Ax≤bAx\le bAx≤b has an integral solution and the LP maximum exists. Then every LP optimum has an IP optimum within ℓ∞\ell_\inftyℓ∞​-distance nΔ(A)n\Delta(A)nΔ(A), and every IP optimum has an LP optimum within the same distance.
  2. Corollary 2 (p. 253). Under the same hypotheses, max⁡{wx:Ax≤b}−max⁡{wx:Ax≤b, x integral}≤nΔ(A)∥w∥1\max\{wx: Ax\le b\}-\max\{wx : Ax\le b,\ x\text{ integral}\}\le n\Delta(A)\|w\|_1max{wx:Ax≤b}−max{wx:Ax≤b, x integral}≤nΔ(A)∥w∥1​.
  3. Theorem 5 (p. 255). Changing bbb to b′b'b′ moves LP optima by at most nΔ(A)∥b−b′∥∞n\Delta(A)\|b-b'\|_\inftynΔ(A)∥b−b′∥∞​ and IP optima by at most nΔ(A)(∥b−b′∥∞+2)n\Delta(A)(\|b-b'\|_\infty+2)nΔ(A)(∥b−b′∥∞​+2). This result is off the goal's path.
  4. Theorem 6 (p. 256). A non-optimal integral solution can be improved by an integral solution within ℓ∞\ell_\inftyℓ∞​-distance nΔ(A)n\Delta(A)nΔ(A).
  5. Theorem 7 (p. 257). A single integral matrix MMM, with entries at most n2nΔ(A)nn^{2n}\Delta(A)^nn2nΔ(A)n in absolute value, gives {x:Ax≤b}I={x:Mx≤db}\{x: Ax\le b\}_I=\{x : Mx\le d_b\}{x:Ax≤b}I​={x:Mx≤db​} for every bbb for which Ax≤bAx\le bAx≤b has an integral solution.
  6. Theorem 8, printed "Theorem 9" (p. 259). If a rational polyhedron P⊆QnP\subseteq\mathbb{Q}^nP⊆Qn has no integral point, then P(n2n2n3)=∅P^{(n^{2n}2^{n^3})}=\emptysetP(n2n2n3)=∅.
  7. Corollary 9 (p. 260). Let q=max⁡{wx:x∈PI}q=\max\{wx : x\in P_I\}q=max{wx:x∈PI​} with www integral. Then P(r)⊆{x:wx≤q}P^{(r)}\subseteq\{x : wx\le q\}P(r)⊆{x:wx≤q} for r=(n2n2n3+1)(⌊max⁡{wx:x∈P}⌋−q)+1r=(n^{2n}2^{n^3}+1)(\lfloor\max\{wx : x\in P\}\rfloor-q)+1r=(n2n2n3+1)(⌊max{wx:x∈P}⌋−q)+1.

Significance

The result. Theorem 10 shows that the number of Gomory–Chvátal rounding rounds needed for {x:Ax≤b}\{x : Ax\le b\}{x:Ax≤b} is controlled by AAA alone. It is the first general finite bound on the Chvátal rank of a matrix. Earlier, the matrices of Chvátal rank 0 had been characterized by Hoffman and Kruskal: they are the matrices whose transpose is unimodular. Some classes of rank 1 had also been characterized (Edmonds–Johnson, Gerards–Schrijver). The proximity results of §2 are used on their own. They bound the work needed to solve an integer program from an LP optimum, and they show that the optimal value of an integer program changes at most affinely with bbb. They are also the standard starting point for the later proximity literature.

Formalizing it. All results are proved in the paper. As far as is known, none of them has a machine-checked proof: the Prove2Me corpus holds no Chvátal rank bound, and its existing proximity theorems concern a different bound, the ℓ1\ell_1ℓ1​ bound with Δ\DeltaΔ the largest entry. This mission asks for Lean proofs of the paper's statements with the constants exactly as printed. It also builds a reusable layer over Q\mathbb{Q}Q: polyhedra, LP and IP optimality, integer hulls, the Chvátal closure and the Chvátal rank.

Difficulty

The proximity theorems need a conic decomposition xˉ−zˉ=∑λigi\bar x-\bar z=\sum\lambda_i g^ixˉ−zˉ=∑λi​gi into integral generators with entries bounded by Δ(A)\Delta(A)Δ(A). That requires Cramer's rule bounds on cone generators and Carathéodory's theorem, and neither is in Mathlib in this form for rational polyhedral cones.

Theorem 7 needs finite generation of integral cones with explicit coefficient bounds, together with LP duality.

The Chvátal-rank part is harder. The obvious induction on the value of a valid inequality fails, because the value gap ⌊max⁡Pwx⌋−q\lfloor\max_P wx\rfloor-q⌊maxP​wx⌋−q is not bounded independently of bbb until Theorem 7 and Corollary 2 bound it by n2n+2Δ(A)n+1n^{2n+2}\Delta(A)^{n+1}n2n+2Δ(A)n+1. Theorem 8 itself rests on a flatness theorem for lattice-free polyhedra (Lenstra; Grötschel–Lovász–Schrijver), which the paper cites without proof. It also needs Schrijver's lemma that P(k)∩F⊆F(k)P^{(k)}\cap F\subseteq F^{(k)}P(k)∩F⊆F(k) for faces FFF, and invariance under unimodular affine maps. None of these is in Mathlib.

Formalization scope

  • Rationality. Everything is over Q\mathbb{Q}Q, following the paper's standing assumption on p. 252. Points are Fin n → ℚ, AAA is Matrix (Fin m) (Fin n) ℤ cast to Q\mathbb{Q}Q, and a polyhedron is a finite system of rational inequalities.
  • Δ(A)\Delta(A)Δ(A). Only nonempty submatrices count, so Δ(0)=0\Delta(0)=0Δ(0)=0.
  • Optimality. "The maximum exists" means an optimal solution exists. Existence claims that the paper proves are part of the conclusions: the IP optimum in Theorem 1 and Corollary 2, and max⁡{wx:x∈P}\max\{wx : x\in P\}max{wx:x∈P} in Corollary 9.
  • Chvátal closure. It is defined for every subset of Qn\mathbb{Q}^nQn, using all integral aaa and rational β\betaβ. The rank is valued in N∪{∞}\mathbb{N}\cup\{\infty\}N∪{∞}, with ∞\infty∞ if no iterate equals PIP_IPI​. A version with junk value 000 would make the goal trivial and is not used. The matrix rank is a supremum over integral bbb, as printed.
  • Added hypotheses. Theorems 1 and 6 carry the hypothesis A≠0A\ne0A=0. For A=0A=0A=0 the bound nΔ(A)=0n\Delta(A)=0nΔ(A)=0 makes both statements false, and the proof on p. 257 assumes A≠0A\ne0A=0 as well. In Corollary 9 the value qqq is taken to be an integer. This loses nothing, because a maximum of an integral www over PIP_IPI​ is attained at an integral point.
  • Constants. All constants are exactly as printed, written in N\mathbb{N}N with 00=10^0=100=1.

A complete development needs the following:

  • cone generation with Cramer bounds and Carathéodory's theorem;
  • LP duality and Farkas' lemma over Q\mathbb{Q}Q;
  • the polyhedrality of P′P'P′ for rational polyhedra (Schrijver 1980);
  • Schrijver's face lemma and unimodular invariance;
  • a flatness theorem.

The LP, cone and Chvátal-closure layers are reusable beyond this mission. Proofs of any milestone are welcome, and so is groundwork such as polyhedrality of the Chvátal closure or the flatness theorem, submitted as separate theorems.

Selected references

  • W. Cook, A.M.H. Gerards, A. Schrijver, É. Tardos, Sensitivity theorems in integer linear programming, Mathematical Programming 34 (1986) 251–264. https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01582230
  • V. Chvátal, Edmonds polytopes and a hierarchy of combinatorial problems, Discrete Mathematics 4 (1973) 305–337. https://doi.org/10.1016/0012-365X(73)90167-2
  • A. Schrijver, On cutting planes, Annals of Discrete Mathematics 9 (1980) 291–296. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0167-5060(08)70085-2
  • W. Cook, C.R. Coullard, Gy. Turán, On the complexity of cutting-plane proofs, Discrete Applied Mathematics 18 (1987) 25–38. https://doi.org/10.1016/0166-218X(87)90039-4
  • F. Eisenbrand, R. Weismantel, Proximity results and faster algorithms for integer programming using the Steinitz lemma, ACM Transactions on Algorithms 16 (2020), Art. 5. https://doi.org/10.1145/3340322
11 thms1 active userReviewed
Bandit AlgorithmsMachine Learning·Captain: mikedeng1

Regret Analysis of Stochastic and Nonstochastic Multi-armed Bandit Problems II: High-Probability and Expected Regret of Exp3.PTextbook

Motivation

In the adversarial (non-stochastic) multi-armed bandit problem a forecaster repeatedly chooses one of KKK actions while an opponent sets the rewards, and only the reward of the chosen action is revealed. The model was proposed as a way of playing an unknown repeated game: Baños (1968) studied the repeated game in which the player observes only its own payoff, which is exactly the bandit problem against an opponent who reacts to the player's past moves. It is the basic model of online decision making under partial feedback without statistical assumptions, and it underlies regret minimization in games, adversarial routing and online advertising. Chapter 3 of Bubeck and Cesa-Bianchi's monograph (arXiv:1204.5721v2) collects its fundamental results: the Exp3 forecaster of Auer, Cesa-Bianchi, Freund and Schapire (SIAM J. Comput. 2002), its high-probability variant Exp3.P, and the nK\sqrt{nK}nK​ minimax lower bound.

Setting

There are K≥2K \ge 2K≥2 arms and rounds t=1,2,…,nt = 1, 2, \dots, nt=1,2,…,n. At each round an adversary assigns a gain gi,t∈[0,1]g_{i,t} \in [0,1]gi,t​∈[0,1] to every arm iii; the forecaster picks an arm ItI_tIt​, possibly at random, and observes only gIt,tg_{I_t,t}gIt​,t​. The adversary may be non-oblivious (adaptive): gi,t=gi,t(I1,…,It−1)g_{i,t} = g_{i,t}(I_1,\dots,I_{t-1})gi,t​=gi,t​(I1​,…,It−1​) may depend on the forecaster's past actions. A forecaster rule maps the past actions to a probability vector ptp_tpt​ on the arms, and a run is a sequence of random arms with It∼ptI_t \sim p_tIt​∼pt​ given the past. The regret is the random variable

Rn=max⁡i=1,…,K∑t=1ngi,t−∑t=1ngIt,t,R_n = \max_{i=1,\dots,K}\sum_{t=1}^n g_{i,t} - \sum_{t=1}^n g_{I_t,t},Rn​=i=1,…,Kmax​t=1∑n​gi,t​−t=1∑n​gIt​,t​,

and, in the loss version ℓi,t∈[0,1]\ell_{i,t} \in [0,1]ℓi,t​∈[0,1], the pseudo-regret is R‾n=E∑tℓIt,t−min⁡iE∑tℓi,t\overline R_n = \mathbb E\sum_t \ell_{I_t,t} - \min_i \mathbb E\sum_t \ell_{i,t}Rn​=E∑t​ℓIt​,t​−mini​E∑t​ℓi,t​. Since the maximum sits inside the expectation, R‾n≤ERn\overline R_n \le \mathbb E R_nRn​≤ERn​ in the gain version, and against an adaptive adversary the two can differ.

Exp3 draws ItI_tIt​ from exponential weights pi,t+1∝exp⁡(−ηtL~i,t)p_{i,t+1} \propto \exp(-\eta_t \tilde L_{i,t})pi,t+1​∝exp(−ηt​L~i,t​) of importance-weighted cumulative loss estimates L~i,t=∑s≤tℓi,s1Is=i/pi,s\tilde L_{i,t} = \sum_{s \le t} \ell_{i,s}\mathbb 1_{I_s = i}/p_{i,s}L~i,t​=∑s≤t​ℓi,s​1Is​=i​/pi,s​. Exp3.P uses biased gain estimates g~i,t=(gi,t1It=i+β)/pi,t\tilde g_{i,t} = (g_{i,t}\mathbb 1_{I_t=i} + \beta)/p_{i,t}g~​i,t​=(gi,t​1It​=i​+β)/pi,t​ and mixes in the uniform distribution:

pi,t+1=(1−γ)exp⁡(ηG~i,t)∑kexp⁡(ηG~k,t)+γK,G~i,t=∑s=1tg~i,s.p_{i,t+1} = (1-\gamma)\frac{\exp(\eta\tilde G_{i,t})}{\sum_k \exp(\eta \tilde G_{k,t})} + \frac{\gamma}{K}, \qquad \tilde G_{i,t} = \sum_{s=1}^t \tilde g_{i,s}.pi,t+1​=(1−γ)∑k​exp(ηG~k,t​)exp(ηG~i,t​)​+Kγ​,G~i,t​=s=1∑t​g~​i,s​.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 3.3 (expected regret of Exp3.P)

With β=ln⁡K/(nK)\beta = \sqrt{\ln K/(nK)}β=lnK/(nK)​, η=0.95ln⁡K/(nK)\eta = 0.95\sqrt{\ln K/(nK)}η=0.95lnK/(nK)​, γ=1.05Kln⁡K/n\gamma = 1.05\sqrt{K\ln K/n}γ=1.05KlnK/n​, against every adaptive adversary,

ERn≤5.15nKln⁡K+nKln⁡K.\mathbb E R_n \le 5.15\sqrt{nK\ln K} + \sqrt{\frac{nK}{\ln K}}.ERn​≤5.15nKlnK​+lnKnK​​.

Milestones

  • Lemma 3.1: for β∈(0,1]\beta \in (0,1]β∈(0,1] and a fixed arm iii, with probability at least 1−δ1-\delta1−δ, ∑tgi,t≤∑tg~i,t+ln⁡(δ−1)/β\sum_t g_{i,t} \le \sum_t \tilde g_{i,t} + \ln(\delta^{-1})/\beta∑t​gi,t​≤∑t​g~​i,t​+ln(δ−1)/β.
  • Eq. (3.12): if γ≤1/2\gamma \le 1/2γ≤1/2 and (1+β)Kη≤γ(1+\beta)K\eta \le \gamma(1+β)Kη≤γ, then with probability at least 1−δ1-\delta1−δ,
Rn≤βnK+γn+(1+β)ηKn+ln⁡(Kδ−1)β+ln⁡Kη.R_n \le \beta nK + \gamma n + (1+\beta)\eta Kn + \frac{\ln(K\delta^{-1})}{\beta} + \frac{\ln K}{\eta}.Rn​≤βnK+γn+(1+β)ηKn+βln(Kδ−1)​+ηlnK​.
  • Theorem 3.2: with β=ln⁡(Kδ−1)/(nK)\beta = \sqrt{\ln(K\delta^{-1})/(nK)}β=ln(Kδ−1)/(nK)​, Rn≤5.15nKln⁡(Kδ−1)R_n \le 5.15\sqrt{nK\ln(K\delta^{-1})}Rn​≤5.15nKln(Kδ−1)​ (3.10); with β=ln⁡K/(nK)\beta = \sqrt{\ln K/(nK)}β=lnK/(nK)​, Rn≤nK/ln⁡K ln⁡(δ−1)+5.15nKln⁡KR_n \le \sqrt{nK/\ln K}\,\ln(\delta^{-1}) + 5.15\sqrt{nK\ln K}Rn​≤nK/lnK​ln(δ−1)+5.15nKlnK​ (3.11), each with probability at least 1−δ1-\delta1−δ.
  • Theorem 3.1: Exp3 with η=2ln⁡K/(nK)\eta = \sqrt{2\ln K/(nK)}η=2lnK/(nK)​ has R‾n≤2nKln⁡K\overline R_n \le \sqrt{2nK\ln K}Rn​≤2nKlnK​ (3.2); with ηt=ln⁡K/(tK)\eta_t = \sqrt{\ln K/(tK)}ηt​=lnK/(tK)​, R‾n≤2nKln⁡K\overline R_n \le 2\sqrt{nK\ln K}Rn​≤2nKlnK​ (3.3).
  • Lemma 3.2 and Theorem 3.4: for n≥K≥2n \ge K \ge 2n≥K≥2 and every forecaster there is a Bernoulli instance with max⁡iE∑tYi,t−E∑tYIt,t≥nK/20\max_i \mathbb E\sum_t Y_{i,t} - \mathbb E\sum_t Y_{I_t,t} \ge \sqrt{nK}/20maxi​E∑t​Yi,t​−E∑t​YIt​,t​≥nK​/20.

Significance

The goal bounds the expected regret, not the pseudo-regret, against an opponent that adapts to the forecaster's randomized past choices. A pseudo-regret bound says nothing about ERn\mathbb E R_nERn​ in that setting, and the book obtains the expected-regret bound by first proving a high-probability bound valid at every confidence level, (3.11), and integrating its tail. Together with Theorem 3.4 the chapter shows that nK\sqrt{nK}nK​ is the minimax rate of adversarial bandits up to a ln⁡K\sqrt{\ln K}lnK​ factor. Lemma 3.1, the concentration of biased importance-weighted estimates, holds for any forecaster rule and is the step that turns exponential weights into a high-probability guarantee.

All results are proved in the book. On the formal side, the platform has the pseudo-regret bound of Exp3 against an oblivious adversary (a fixed reward table, Bandit Algorithms V) and an Exp3-IX high-probability bound; it has no Exp3.P, no regret bound against adaptive adversaries and no Bernoulli nK/20\sqrt{nK}/20nK​/20 lower bound. This mission adds an explicit model of adaptive adversaries and randomized forecaster runs, and the chapter's statements with the book's exact constants.

Difficulty

Against an adaptive adversary the gains are random and depend on the forecaster's own past draws, so the argument used for a fixed reward table (take expectations of an inequality that holds for every fixed sequence) does not control ERn\mathbb E R_nERn​: the maximum over arms does not commute with the expectation. Unbiased estimates do not help either, because the variance of ℓi,t/pi,t\ell_{i,t}/p_{i,t}ℓi,t​/pi,t​ is of order 1/pi,t1/p_{i,t}1/pi,t​, which can be arbitrarily large; even with uniform mixing at rate n−1/2n^{-1/2}n−1/2 the cumulative variance is of order n3/2n^{3/2}n3/2. The bias β\betaβ and the mixing γ\gammaγ have to be tuned jointly so that the estimate concentrates while the exponential-weights analysis survives, and the constants 0.950.950.95, 1.051.051.05 and 5.155.155.15 come out of that tuning. The lower bound needs an information-theoretic comparison of a forecaster's behaviour on K+1K+1K+1 Bernoulli instances, against forecasters that may be randomized.

Formalization scope

Arms are Fin K with K≥2K \ge 2K≥2; rounds are numbered 1,…,n1,\dots,n1,…,n; logarithms are natural. Action sequences are functions N→\mathbb N \toN→ Fin K whose entry 000 is ignored. An adversary is a structure holding values in [0,1][0,1][0,1] that may depend on the past actions only (gains for Exp3.P, losses for Exp3); a randomized adversary with independent external randomness reduces to this case by conditioning. A run of a forecaster rule ppp on a probability space is pinned down by the cylinder identity P(I1=h1,…,It=ht)=P(I1=h1,…,It−1=ht−1) pt(h)(ht)\mathbb P(I_1 = h_1,\dots,I_t = h_t) = \mathbb P(I_1=h_1,\dots,I_{t-1}=h_{t-1})\,p_t(h)(h_t)P(I1​=h1​,…,It​=ht​)=P(I1​=h1​,…,It−1​=ht−1​)pt​(h)(ht​), which determines the law of (I1,…,In)(I_1,\dots,I_n)(I1​,…,In​). "With probability at least 1−δ1-\delta1−δ" is P(event)≥1−δ\mathbb P(\text{event}) \ge 1-\deltaP(event)≥1−δ for δ∈(0,1)\delta \in (0,1)δ∈(0,1), and ERn\mathbb E R_nERn​ is the Bochner integral of the bounded, measurable regret. The lower bounds use a stochastic model in which the forecaster sees past actions and the rewards of the played arms, and rewards are i.i.d. product Bernoulli.

Constants and conventions:

  • Every constant is the book's exact one: 0.950.950.95, 1.051.051.05, 5.155.155.15, 1/201/201/20. No O(⋅)O(\cdot)O(⋅) is involved.
  • Exp3.P with 1.05Kln⁡K/n>11.05\sqrt{K\ln K/n} > 11.05KlnK/n​>1 is outside the box's range γ∈[0,1]\gamma \in [0,1]γ∈[0,1]; its vector can then have negative entries, and if it does on a history of positive probability no run exists. This happens only when n<1.11 Kln⁡Kn < 1.11\,K\ln Kn<1.11KlnK, where the printed bounds already follow from Rn≤nR_n \le nRn​≤n, so the statements are true there whether or not a run exists.
  • Corrected misprints: the Exp3 box's ℓ~i,s\tilde\ell_{i,s}ℓ~i,s​ is ℓ~i,t\tilde\ell_{i,t}ℓ~i,t​; the sign in (3.16) is the box's exp⁡(+ηG~)\exp(+\eta\tilde G)exp(+ηG~); the proof of (3.10) says the bound is trivial "if n≥5.15⋯n \ge 5.15\sqrt{\cdots}n≥5.15⋯​", which should be n≤n \len≤. The statements carry no lower bound on nnn.
  • Added standing hypotheses: K≥2K \ge 2K≥2 everywhere, n≥Kn \ge Kn≥K in Theorem 3.4 (from the protocol box, p. 6; Theorem 3.4 is false without it), β>0\beta > 0β>0 and pi,t>0p_{i,t} > 0pi,t​>0 in Lemma 3.1.
  • Theorem 3.4 is stated as "for every forecaster there is a Bernoulli instance with regret at least nK/20\sqrt{nK}/20nK​/20", which implies the book's inf⁡sup⁡\inf\supinfsup (3.18).

A trivializing formalization is ruled out: the forecasters are fixed rules of the observed history drawn with fresh randomness, the adversary is not restricted to a fixed sequence, and the lower bounds quantify over all forecasters and exhibit the instance.

Welcome contributions: a reusable construction of runs (existence of a probability space carrying a run for every rule), the supermartingale form of Lemma 3.1, the exponential-weights potential argument, a tail-integration lemma EW≤∫01δ−1P(W>ln⁡δ−1) dδ\mathbb E W \le \int_0^1 \delta^{-1}\mathbb P(W > \ln\delta^{-1})\,d\deltaEW≤∫01​δ−1P(W>lnδ−1)dδ, and a KL/Pinsker comparison for bandit runs.

Selected references

  • S. Bubeck, N. Cesa-Bianchi, Regret Analysis of Stochastic and Nonstochastic Multi-armed Bandit Problems, Foundations and Trends in Machine Learning 5(1), 2012. arXiv:1204.5721v2, doi:10.1561/2200000024
  • P. Auer, N. Cesa-Bianchi, Y. Freund, R. E. Schapire, The nonstochastic multiarmed bandit problem, SIAM Journal on Computing 32(1), 2002. doi:10.1137/S0097539701398375
  • J.-Y. Audibert, S. Bubeck, Regret bounds and minimax policies under partial monitoring, Journal of Machine Learning Research 11, 2010. jmlr.org/papers/v11/audibert10a
  • N. Cesa-Bianchi, G. Lugosi, Prediction, Learning, and Games, Cambridge University Press, 2006. doi:10.1017/CBO9780511546921
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Control TheoryProbabilityStochastic Systems·Captain: mikedeng1

Dynamic Scheduling of a System with Two Parallel Servers in Heavy Traffic with Resource Pooling: The Threshold Policy Is Asymptotically OptimalResearch Paper

Motivation

Many service systems route several classes of work to servers with overlapping skills: call centers with cross-trained agents, manufacturing cells with flexible machines, computing clusters with heterogeneous processors. Choosing which server works on which class at each moment is a dynamic scheduling problem. Exact optimal policies are out of reach except in toy cases, so heavy-traffic theory replaces the queueing system by a Brownian control problem, solves that limit problem, and then asks for a policy in the original system whose performance converges to the Brownian optimum. This programme was proposed by Harrison (Harrison 1988), and the parallel server system studied here is the example Harrison used (Harrison, Ann. Appl. Probab. 1998) to show that the greedy static priority rule can be very inefficient.

Bell and Williams (2001) gave the first proof of asymptotic optimality of a continuous-review policy for this system, with renewal arrivals and general service times. Harrison (1998) had treated Poisson arrivals and deterministic service times with a discrete-review policy and a pathwise criterion. Harrison and López (Queueing Systems, 1999) identified the complete resource pooling condition for general parallel server systems. The threshold policy and the proof method of Bell and Williams were later extended to multiserver systems (Bell and Williams, Electron. J. Probab., 2005).

Setting

There are two job classes and two servers. Server 1 serves class 1 (activity 1); server 2 serves class 1 (activity 2) and class 2 (activity 3). A sequence of such systems is indexed by r→∞r\to\inftyr→∞. On a probability space, i.i.d. sequences uˇk(i)\check u_k(i)uˇk​(i) (k=1,2k=1,2k=1,2) and vˇj(i)\check v_j(i)vˇj​(i) (j=1,2,3j=1,2,3j=1,2,3), i≥1i\ge1i≥1, are fixed: strictly positive, mutually independent, with mean one and finite variances αk2,βj2\alpha_k^2,\beta_j^2αk2​,βj2​. In system rrr the interarrival times are ukr(i)=uˇk(i)/λkru_k^r(i)=\check u_k(i)/\lambda_k^rukr​(i)=uˇk​(i)/λkr​ and the service times are vjr(i)=vˇj(i)/μjrv_j^r(i)=\check v_j(i)/\mu_j^rvjr​(i)=vˇj​(i)/μjr​. The renewal processes Akr(t)A_k^r(t)Akr​(t) and Sjr(t)S_j^r(t)Sjr​(t) count arrivals and potential service completions.

A scheduling control policy is an allocation T=(T1,T2,T3)T=(T_1,T_2,T_3)T=(T1​,T2​,T3​), where Tj(t)T_j(t)Tj​(t) is the time devoted to activity jjj in [0,t][0,t][0,t]. Each Tj(t)T_j(t)Tj​(t) is a random variable, each TjT_jTj​ is continuous and nondecreasing from 000, and so are the idle times I1=t−T1I_1=t-T_1I1​=t−T1​ and I2=t−T2−T3I_2=t-T_2-T_3I2​=t−T2​−T3​. The queue lengths

Q1(t)=A1(t)−S1(T1(t))−S2(T2(t)),Q2(t)=A2(t)−S3(T3(t))Q_1(t)=A_1(t)-S_1(T_1(t))-S_2(T_2(t)),\qquad Q_2(t)=A_2(t)-S_3(T_3(t))Q1​(t)=A1​(t)−S1​(T1​(t))−S2​(T2​(t)),Q2​(t)=A2​(t)−S3​(T3​(t))

must be nonnegative. Policies may anticipate the future. The rates satisfy Assumption 3.1: λ1>μ1\lambda_1>\mu_1λ1​>μ1​, 1−(λ1−μ1)/μ2=λ2/μ31-(\lambda_1-\mu_1)/\mu_2=\lambda_2/\mu_31−(λ1​−μ1​)/μ2​=λ2​/μ3​, and the rates converge at rate 1/r1/r1/r to limits with second-order parameters θ1,θ2\theta_1,\theta_2θ1​,θ2​. Assumption 3.2 is h1μ2≥h2μ3h_1\mu_2\ge h_2\mu_3h1​μ2​≥h2​μ3​, and Assumption 3.3 gives finite exponential moments near 000. With Q^r(t)=r−1Qr(r2t)\hat Q^r(t)=r^{-1}Q^r(r^2t)Q^​r(t)=r−1Qr(r2t) the cost is

J^r(Tr)=E(∫0∞e−γt h⋅Q^r(t) dt).\hat J^r(T^r)=\mathbf E\Big(\int_0^\infty e^{-\gamma t}\,h\cdot\hat Q^r(t)\,dt\Big).J^r(Tr)=E(∫0∞​e−γth⋅Q^​r(t)dt).

The threshold policy with Lr=[clog⁡r]L^r=[c\log r]Lr=[clogr] works as follows. Server 1 works whenever it has a class 1 job available. Server 2 serves class 1 with preemptive-resume priority when more than LrL^rLr class 1 jobs are present, and otherwise serves class 2. The Brownian benchmark is built from a two-dimensional Brownian motion X~\tilde XX~ with drift θ\thetaθ and diagonal covariance, from y=(1,μ2/μ3)y=(1,\mu_2/\mu_3)y=(1,μ2​/μ3​), and from the reflected process W~∗=y⋅X~+V~∗\tilde W^*=y\cdot\tilde X+\tilde V^*W~∗=y⋅X~+V~∗ with V~∗(t)=−inf⁡s≤ty⋅X~(s)\tilde V^*(t)=-\inf_{s\le t}y\cdot\tilde X(s)V~∗(t)=−infs≤t​y⋅X~(s). Its cost is J∗=E∫0∞e−γth2 W~∗(t)/y2 dtJ^*=\mathbf E\int_0^\infty e^{-\gamma t}h_2\,\tilde W^*(t)/y_2\,dtJ∗=E∫0∞​e−γth2​W~∗(t)/y2​dt.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 5.3

For ccc larger than a constant c0c_0c0​ that depends only on the model data, and for every sequence {Tr}\{T^r\}{Tr} of scheduling control policies,

lim inf⁡r→∞J^r(Tr) ≥ J∗ = lim⁡r→∞J^r(Tr,∗),J∗<∞.\liminf_{r\to\infty}\hat J^r(T^r)\ \ge\ J^*\ =\ \lim_{r\to\infty}\hat J^r(T^{r,*}),\qquad J^*<\infty .r→∞liminf​J^r(Tr) ≥ J∗ = r→∞lim​J^r(Tr,∗),J∗<∞.

Milestones

  • Proposition B.1: the one-dimensional Skorokhod problem, its explicit solution and its minimality.
  • Appendix A, (181) and (184): Cramér-type deviation bounds for delayed renewal processes.
  • Theorem 7.2: after first reaching LrL^rLr, the class 1 queue stays within Lr−1L^r-1Lr−1 of the threshold, with probability tending to one.
  • Theorem 7.1: (Q^1r,I^1r)⇒(0,0)(\hat Q_1^r,\hat I_1^r)\Rightarrow(0,0)(Q^​1r​,I^1r​)⇒(0,0) under the threshold policy.
  • Lemma 8.1: the fluid-scaled threshold allocations converge to Tˉ∗(t)=(t,λ1−μ1μ2t,λ2μ3t)\bar T^*(t)=(t,\frac{\lambda_1-\mu_1}{\mu_2}t,\frac{\lambda_2}{\mu_3}t)Tˉ∗(t)=(t,μ2​λ1​−μ1​​t,μ3​λ2​​t).
  • Theorem 5.2 (state-space collapse): (Q^1r,Q^2r,I^1r,I^2r)⇒(0,Q~2∗,0,I~2∗)(\hat Q_1^r,\hat Q_2^r,\hat I_1^r,\hat I_2^r)\Rightarrow(0,\tilde Q_2^*,0,\tilde I_2^*)(Q^​1r​,Q^​2r​,I^1r​,I^2r​)⇒(0,Q~​2∗​,0,I~2∗​).
  • Lemma 9.3: along a subsequence achieving a finite lim inf⁡\liminfliminf cost, the fluid-scaled processes converge to (0,λt,μt,Tˉ∗,0)(0,\lambda t,\mu t,\bar T^*,0)(0,λt,μt,Tˉ∗,0).

A further draft theorem states that Definition 5.1 determines an admissible allocation, unique pathwise, whenever Lr≥1L^r\ge1Lr≥1.

Significance

The theorem proves that a simple state-dependent rule, which sends server 2 to class 1 only when the class 1 queue exceeds a logarithmic safety stock, is asymptotically optimal among all policies, including those that anticipate the future. The limiting cost is the explicit optimum of the Brownian control problem. The proof gives a template for heavy-traffic asymptotic optimality under complete resource pooling: a lower bound valid for every policy, and state-space collapse under the proposed policy. The residual process analysis of Section 7 shows how a threshold of order log⁡r\log rlogr makes starvation of server 1 negligible on the diffusion time scale.

The paper's results are proved but not machine-checked; no formal proof exists in any proof assistant. The mission asks for formal statements of the paper's main theorem and its supporting lemmas, followed by formal proofs. Parts of the development are independent of the paper: the one-dimensional Skorokhod map, renewal large deviation bounds, and convergence encodings on path space.

Difficulty

The lower bound must hold for arbitrary, possibly anticipating, policies, so no Markov structure is available. The argument has to pass through fluid limits of an arbitrary cost-minimizing subsequence and a pathwise minimality property, and Fatou's lemma for the limit needs uniform control. For the upper bound, the obvious approach, a static priority rule, is known to fail: it starves server 1 and produces a large class 1 queue. With a threshold policy, the hard step is to show that the class 1 queue, once at the threshold, rarely moves Lr−1L^r-1Lr−1 away from it over a time interval of length r2tr^2tr2t. That requires large deviation estimates for renewal processes started at random, multiparameter stopping times. Showing that J^r(Tr,∗)\hat J^r(T^{r,*})J^r(Tr,∗) converges to J∗J^*J∗, rather than only that the processes converge in distribution, also requires uniform integrability of the scaled queue lengths.

Formalization scope

Classes and activities are indexed by Fin 2 and Fin 3. The i.i.d. sequences keep the paper's index base i≥1i\ge1i≥1, and the systems are indexed by n∈Nn\in\mathbb Nn∈N with r=rn∈[1,∞)r=r_n\in[1,\infty)r=rn​∈[1,∞), rn→∞r_n\to\inftyrn​→∞. Time is real, and every condition is imposed for t≥0t\ge0t≥0. Admissibility is exactly (11)–(14). Measurability in (11) is with respect to the completion of P\mathbf PP, since the paper's space is complete. Finiteness of the renewal processes everywhere on Ω\OmegaΩ, which the paper obtains by discarding a null set, is a hypothesis. Queue lengths are real, costs are lower Lebesgue integrals in [0,∞][0,\infty][0,∞], counting processes take values in N∪{∞}\mathbb N\cup\{\infty\}N∪{∞}, and Λ\LambdaΛ, Λ∗\Lambda^*Λ∗ take values in the extended reals.

The constant c0c_0c0​ is existential and is chosen after the model data and before ccc, the policies and the Brownian motions. The threshold relations are required only for the systems with Lr≥1L^r\ge1Lr≥1, which are all but finitely many. Each convergence to a deterministic limit (Theorem 7.1, Lemmas 8.1 and 9.3) is stated as u.o.c. convergence in probability, the paper's own equivalence (p. 633). Theorem 5.2 is stated in coupling form: there are copies of the processes on one probability space, with Skorokhod paths and the same laws, that converge almost surely uniformly on compacts. This is equivalent to weak convergence in D4\mathbf D^4D4 to a limit with continuous paths. J∗J^*J∗ is defined by (44) from an arbitrary pair of independent standard Brownian motions (Mathlib's IsBrownianReal), not by a closed form.

Two formalizations would make the goal trivial, and both are excluded. Leaving out the requirement that Tr,∗T^{r,*}Tr,∗ actually follow the policy would make the goal false or empty. Narrowing the class of competing policies, for example to non-anticipating ones, would weaken the theorem. A draft theorem also states that the threshold allocation exists and is unique pathwise, so the hypothesis on Tr,∗T^{r,*}Tr,∗ can be satisfied.

The development needs renewal theory (functional central limit theorems, Cramér bounds), multiparameter stopping times, tightness in D\mathbf DD, the Skorokhod representation theorem, the reflection map, and properties of reflected Brownian motion. Contributions are welcome at every level: proofs of milestones, reusable lemmas on renewal processes and the Skorokhod map, and further lemmas of the paper (Lemmas 7.5, 7.6 and 9.2 are not yet stated).

Selected references

  • S. L. Bell and R. J. Williams, Dynamic scheduling of a system with two parallel servers in heavy traffic with resource pooling: asymptotic optimality of a threshold policy, Ann. Appl. Probab. 11 (2001) 608–649. https://doi.org/10.1214/aoap/1015345343
  • J. M. Harrison, Heavy traffic analysis of a system with parallel servers: asymptotic optimality of discrete-review policies, Ann. Appl. Probab. 8 (1998) 822–848.
  • J. M. Harrison and M. J. López, Heavy traffic resource pooling in parallel-server systems, Queueing Systems 33 (1999) 339–368.
  • J. M. Harrison, Brownian models of queueing networks with heterogeneous customer populations, in Stochastic Differential Systems, Stochastic Control Theory and Their Applications, Springer (1988) 147–186.
  • S. L. Bell and R. J. Williams, Dynamic scheduling of a parallel server system in heavy traffic with complete resource pooling: asymptotic optimality of a threshold policy, Electron. J. Probab. 10 (2005) 1044–1115.
  • J. M. Harrison, Brownian Motion and Stochastic Flow Systems, Wiley (1985).
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Algorithmic Game TheoryOptimization·Captain: mikedeng1

Nonzero-Sum Stochastic Differential Games with Impulse Controls: A Verification Theorem with Applications 3: The Continuation Region Widens as the Fixed Intervention Cost GrowsResearch Paper

Motivation

In an impulse control problem a controller does not steer a process continuously: at times of its choosing it shifts the state by a finite jump, paying a fixed cost plus a cost proportional to the jump. Such models describe central-bank interventions on an exchange rate, inventory replenishment and cash management. Aïd, Basei, Callegaro, Campi and Vargiolu (Math. Oper. Res. 45(1), 2020; arXiv:1605.00039) study nonzero-sum games in which two players control the same diffusion by impulses. They prove a verification theorem for such games and apply it to a linear game whose Nash equilibria are explicit.

The paper's interpretation of the linear game is two central banks with different targets for an exchange rate. An explicit equilibrium gives explicit intervention thresholds, and Section 4.4 of the paper asks how these thresholds respond to the fixed cost of intervening. This mission formalizes that comparative-statics question: when intervening becomes more expensive, do the players intervene less?

Setting

The game of Section 4.1 has a discount rate ρ>0\rho > 0ρ>0, a volatility σ>0\sigma > 0σ>0, running payoffs f1(x)=x−s1f_1(x) = x - s_1f1​(x)=x−s1​ and f2(x)=s2−xf_2(x) = s_2 - xf2​(x)=s2​−x with s1<s2s_1 < s_2s1​<s2​, and intervention costs: a player who shifts the state by δ\deltaδ pays c+λ∣δ∣c + \lambda|\delta|c+λ∣δ∣ and the opponent receives c~+λ~∣δ∣\tilde c + \tilde\lambda|\delta|c~+λ~∣δ∣. The standing assumptions of the section are

c≥c~≥0,λ≥λ~≥0,(c,λ)≠(c~,λ~),1−λρ>0.c \ge \tilde c \ge 0,\qquad \lambda \ge \tilde\lambda \ge 0,\qquad (c,\lambda) \ne (\tilde c,\tilde\lambda),\qquad 1 - \lambda\rho > 0 .c≥c~≥0,λ≥λ~≥0,(c,λ)=(c~,λ~),1−λρ>0.

All parameters except the fixed cost ccc are held fixed. Set θ=2ρ/σ2\theta = \sqrt{2\rho/\sigma^2}θ=2ρ/σ2​ and η=(1−λρ)/ρ\eta = (1-\lambda\rho)/\rhoη=(1−λρ)/ρ, both positive. For c>0c > 0c>0 the function

Fc(y)=2y+θc−ηlog⁡η+yη−y,y∈(0,η),F_c(y) = 2y + \theta c - \eta\log\frac{\eta + y}{\eta - y},\qquad y \in (0,\eta),Fc​(y)=2y+θc−ηlogη−yη+y​,y∈(0,η),

has a unique zero ξ(c)∈(0,η)\xi(c) \in (0,\eta)ξ(c)∈(0,η). With

Γ(c)=θ(c−c~)4ξ(c)+θc(λ−λ~)4η ξ(c)+λ−λ~2η\Gamma(c) = \frac{\theta(c-\tilde c)}{4\xi(c)} + \frac{\theta c(\lambda-\tilde\lambda)}{4\eta\,\xi(c)} + \frac{\lambda-\tilde\lambda}{2\eta}Γ(c)=4ξ(c)θ(c−c~)​+4ηξ(c)θc(λ−λ~)​+2ηλ−λ~​

and a parameter s~∈R\tilde s \in \mathbb Rs~∈R, the paper's formulas (4.20) are

xˉi(c)=s~+(−1)iθlog⁡[η+ξη−ξ(Γ+1+Γ)],xi∗(c)=s~+(−1)iθlog⁡[η−ξη+ξ(Γ+1+Γ)],\bar x_i(c) = \tilde s + \frac{(-1)^i}{\theta}\log\left[\sqrt{\frac{\eta+\xi}{\eta-\xi}}\bigl(\sqrt{\Gamma+1}+\sqrt\Gamma\bigr)\right],\qquad x_i^*(c) = \tilde s + \frac{(-1)^i}{\theta}\log\left[\sqrt{\frac{\eta-\xi}{\eta+\xi}}\bigl(\sqrt{\Gamma+1}+\sqrt\Gamma\bigr)\right],xˉi​(c)=s~+θ(−1)i​log[η−ξη+ξ​​(Γ+1​+Γ​)],xi∗​(c)=s~+θ(−1)i​log[η+ξη−ξ​​(Γ+1​+Γ​)],

for i∈{1,2}i \in \{1,2\}i∈{1,2}, with ξ=ξ(c)\xi = \xi(c)ξ=ξ(c) and Γ=Γ(c)\Gamma = \Gamma(c)Γ=Γ(c). In the Nash equilibrium of the paper's Proposition 4.7, player 1 intervenes when the state falls below xˉ1\bar x_1xˉ1​ and moves it to x1∗x_1^*x1∗​; player 2 intervenes above xˉ2\bar x_2xˉ2​ and moves it to x2∗x_2^*x2∗​. The interval ]xˉ1(c),xˉ2(c)[]\bar x_1(c), \bar x_2(c)[]xˉ1​(c),xˉ2​(c)[ is the continuation region, where nobody intervenes. The equilibrium payoffs V1cV_1^cV1c​, V2cV_2^cV2c​ are explicit as well (4.27).

Formalization targets

Goal: Proposition 4.13

c↦xˉ2(c) is strictly increasing and c↦xˉ1(c) is strictly decreasing on ]c~,+∞[.c \mapsto \bar x_2(c)\ \text{is strictly increasing and}\ c \mapsto \bar x_1(c)\ \text{is strictly decreasing on}\ ]\tilde c, +\infty[ .c↦xˉ2​(c) is strictly increasing and c↦xˉ1​(c) is strictly decreasing on ]c~,+∞[.

The continuation region therefore widens strictly as the fixed cost grows. The statement concerns the explicit functions (4.20); that they are equilibrium thresholds is mission 2 of this series.

Milestones

  1. (4.17). For c>0c > 0c>0, ξ(c)\xi(c)ξ(c) is the unique zero of FcF_cFc​ in (0,η)(0,\eta)(0,η).
  2. (4.28). ξ∈C∞(]0,∞[)\xi \in C^\infty(]0,\infty[)ξ∈C∞(]0,∞[) with ξ′=θ2η2−ξ2ξ2\xi' = \frac\theta2\frac{\eta^2-\xi^2}{\xi^2}ξ′=2θ​ξ2η2−ξ2​ and ξ′′=−θη2ξ′ξ3=−θ2η22η2−ξ2ξ5\xi'' = -\theta\eta^2\frac{\xi'}{\xi^3} = -\frac{\theta^2\eta^2}{2}\frac{\eta^2-\xi^2}{\xi^5}ξ′′=−θη2ξ3ξ′​=−2θ2η2​ξ5η2−ξ2​.
  3. (4.29). ξ\xiξ, c/ξc/\xic/ξ and c ξ′c\,\xi'cξ′ tend to 000 as c→0+c \to 0^+c→0+; c(η−ξ)→0c(\eta-\xi) \to 0c(η−ξ)→0 and ξ→η\xi \to \etaξ→η as c→+∞c \to +\inftyc→+∞.
  4. Proposition 4.12. As c→+∞c \to +\inftyc→+∞, xˉ2,x1∗→+∞\bar x_2, x_1^* \to +\inftyxˉ2​,x1∗​→+∞, xˉ1,x2∗→−∞\bar x_1, x_2^* \to -\inftyxˉ1​,x2∗​→−∞, and pointwise V1c(x)→(x−s1)/ρV_1^c(x) \to (x-s_1)/\rhoV1c​(x)→(x−s1​)/ρ, V2c(x)→(s2−x)/ρV_2^c(x) \to (s_2-x)/\rhoV2c​(x)→(s2​−x)/ρ.
  5. Proposition 4.14 (with a corrected hypothesis, below). If c~=0\tilde c = 0c~=0, then x2∗x_2^*x2∗​ is strictly decreasing and x1∗x_1^*x1∗​ strictly increasing on ]0,∞[]0,\infty[]0,∞[; if moreover λ=λ~\lambda = \tilde\lambdaλ=λ~, then x2∗(c)<s~<x1∗(c)x_2^*(c) < \tilde s < x_1^*(c)x2∗​(c)<s~<x1∗​(c) for all c>0c > 0c>0.

Significance

Proposition 4.13 is the rigorous form of the economic intuition that costlier intervention makes players more patient. Together with Proposition 4.12 it describes the whole range of costs: the region of inaction grows strictly and invades the real line as c→∞c \to \inftyc→∞, where the payoffs converge to those of the uncontrolled Brownian motion. Proposition 4.14 adds that, when the fixed gain vanishes, the targets xi∗x_i^*xi∗​ move away from the centre s~\tilde ss~. The paper's numerical section shows that without c~=0\tilde c = 0c~=0 the targets need not be monotone.

The results are proved in the paper, in a few lines each, by differentiating the implicit function ξ(c)\xi(c)ξ(c). None of them is formalized. The mission produces a machine-checked treatment of a parametrised implicit function, c↦ξ(c)c \mapsto \xi(c)c↦ξ(c) defined by a transcendental equation: smoothness, explicit derivatives, and the asymptotics at both ends. On top of it, it gives a fully verified comparative-statics result for an explicit game equilibrium.

Difficulty

The thresholds depend on ccc only through ξ(c)\xi(c)ξ(c), which has no closed form, and through Γ(c)\Gamma(c)Γ(c), a sum of terms in c/ξ(c)c/\xi(c)c/ξ(c) and 1/ξ(c)1/\xi(c)1/ξ(c). Monotonicity of ξ\xiξ alone does not settle the goal: c/ξ(c)c/\xi(c)c/ξ(c) is a ratio of two increasing functions, and its direction is decided by how fast ξ\xiξ grows compared with ccc, uniformly on ]c~,∞[]\tilde c,\infty[]c~,∞[, including near c=0c = 0c=0, where F0F_0F0​ has no zero and ξ\xiξ degenerates. The limits as c→+∞c \to +\inftyc→+∞ need more than ξ(c)→η\xi(c) \to \etaξ(c)→η: Γ(c)\Gamma(c)Γ(c) grows linearly in ccc, so the rate at which η−ξ(c)\eta - \xi(c)η−ξ(c) decays decides whether the targets xi∗x_i^*xi∗​ diverge and whether the payoff coefficients vanish.

Formalization scope

The parameters ρ,σ,λ,λ~,c~,s~,s1,s2\rho, \sigma, \lambda, \tilde\lambda, \tilde c, \tilde s, s_1, s_2ρ,σ,λ,λ~,c~,s~,s1​,s2​ are bundled in a structure, and the standing assumptions not involving ccc in a predicate ρ>0\rho > 0ρ>0, σ>0\sigma > 0σ>0, s1<s2s_1 < s_2s1​<s2​, c~≥0\tilde c \ge 0c~≥0, λ≥λ~≥0\lambda \ge \tilde\lambda \ge 0λ≥λ~≥0, 1−λρ>01 - \lambda\rho > 01−λρ>0. θ\thetaθ and η\etaη are computed from ρ,σ,λ\rho, \sigma, \lambdaρ,σ,λ as in (4.21), not taken as free parameters. All quantities are real numbers.

ξ(c)\xi(c)ξ(c) is defined as sup⁡{y∈(0,η):Fc(y)≥0}\sup\{y \in (0,\eta) : F_c(y) \ge 0\}sup{y∈(0,η):Fc​(y)≥0}. Milestone 1 proves that this is the paper's unique zero for every c>0c > 0c>0. For c≤0c \le 0c≤0 the set is empty and the definition returns the placeholder 000. Every statement therefore restricts ccc to c>0c > 0c>0, to c>c~c > \tilde cc>c~, or to c→+∞c \to +\inftyc→+∞, and no statement can be satisfied through a junk value. On ]c~,∞[]\tilde c, \infty[]c~,∞[ one has Γ>0\Gamma > 0Γ>0, so the square roots in (4.20) are the paper's. "Increasing" and "decreasing" are read strictly, as the proofs give. C∞C^\inftyC∞ is ContDiffOn ℝ ∞, and ξ′\xi'ξ′ is deriv ξ. Limits at 0+0^+0+ use the right neighbourhood filter.

Two departures from the page are disclosed in the items:

  • c>0c > 0c>0 in (4.17). The standing assumptions allow c=0c = 0c=0 when c~=0\tilde c = 0c~=0 and λ>λ~\lambda > \tilde\lambdaλ>λ~, but then F0F_0F0​ has no zero; the paper's argument uses F(0+)=θc>0F(0^+) = \theta c > 0F(0+)=θc>0.
  • λ=λ~\lambda = \tilde\lambdaλ=λ~ in the last sentence of Proposition 4.14. For λ>λ~\lambda > \tilde\lambdaλ>λ~, Proposition 4.11 gives x2∗(0+)>s~x_2^*(0^+) > \tilde sx2∗​(0+)>s~ and the inequality x2∗<s~x_2^* < \tilde sx2∗​<s~ fails for small ccc. The monotonicity claims keep the hypothesis c~=0\tilde c = 0c~=0 alone.

A complete development needs the intermediate value theorem and strict monotonicity on an interval, a differentiable implicit (or inverse) function theorem in one variable, and asymptotic estimates of log⁡η+yη−y\log\frac{\eta+y}{\eta-y}logη−yη+y​ near 000 and near η\etaη. These one-variable lemmas about implicitly defined functions are reusable beyond this mission. Proofs of the milestones in any order are welcome.

Selected references

  • R. Aïd, M. Basei, G. Callegaro, L. Campi, T. Vargiolu, Nonzero-Sum Stochastic Differential Games with Impulse Controls: A Verification Theorem with Applications, Mathematics of Operations Research 45(1), 2020. https://doi.org/10.1287/moor.2019.0989 — accepted manuscript arXiv:1605.00039v4, https://arxiv.org/abs/1605.00039
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Algorithmic Game TheoryControl TheoryStochastic Systems·Captain: mikedeng1

Nonzero-Sum Stochastic Differential Games with Impulse Controls: A Verification Theorem with Applications 1: Regular Solutions of the Quasi-Variational Inequalities Give Nash Equilibrium PayoffsResearch Paper

Motivation

Many economic and engineering systems are steered by agents who act at discrete instants rather than continuously: a central bank intervenes on an exchange rate, two energy producers adjust a shared stock, a firm rebalances inventory. Each action has a fixed cost, so continuous control is not realistic. The mathematical model is impulse control: the state follows a diffusion, and a controller may shift it at chosen stopping times by paying a cost. The single-controller theory is classical (Øksendal and Sulem, Applied Stochastic Control of Jump Diffusions, 2007). When two controllers with different objectives act on the same state, the result is a nonzero-sum stochastic differential game with impulse controls.

Before Aïd, Basei, Callegaro, Campi and Vargiolu, the literature on games with impulse controls was almost entirely zero-sum: Cosso (SIAM J. Control Optim., 2013) characterised the value of zero-sum impulse games through a double-obstacle quasi-variational inequality in the viscosity sense. Their paper (Math. Oper. Res. 45(1), 2020; arXiv:1605.00039) gives the first general formulation of the nonzero-sum case together with a verification theorem: a system of quasi-variational inequalities (QVIs) whose sufficiently regular solutions are the equilibrium payoffs. Its Section 4 then computes Nash equilibria in closed form for a one-dimensional game.

Setting

A kkk-dimensional Brownian motion WWW on a filtered probability space satisfying the usual conditions drives the state equation

dYs=b(Ys) ds+σ(Ys) dWs,Ys∈Rd,dY_s=b(Y_s)\,ds+\sigma(Y_s)\,dW_s ,\qquad Y_s\in\mathbb R^d,dYs​=b(Ys​)ds+σ(Ys​)dWs​,Ys​∈Rd,

with globally Lipschitz bbb and σ\sigmaσ. The game takes place in an open set S⊆RdS\subseteq\mathbb R^dS⊆Rd and ends at the exit time τS\tau_SτS​ of the state from SSS. Each of two players i∈{1,2}i\in\{1,2\}i∈{1,2} has a nonempty impulse set Zi⊆RliZ_i\subseteq\mathbb R^{l_i}Zi​⊆Rli​ and a continuous impulse map Γi:S×Zi→S\Gamma^i:S\times Z_i\to SΓi:S×Zi​→S: an intervention with impulse δ\deltaδ moves the state from yyy to Γi(y,δ)\Gamma^i(y,\delta)Γi(y,δ).

A strategy of player iii is a pair φi=(Ci,ξi)\varphi_i=(\mathcal C_i,\xi_i)φi​=(Ci​,ξi​) with Ci⊆S\mathcal C_i\subseteq SCi​⊆S open and ξi:S→Zi\xi_i:S\to Z_iξi​:S→Zi​ continuous. Player iii intervenes as soon as the state leaves Ci\mathcal C_iCi​, with impulse ξi(y)\xi_i(y)ξi​(y) at the current state yyy. Player 1 has priority on ties, and several interventions may happen at the same instant. This defines the controlled process XXX, the intervention times τi,n\tau_{i,n}τi,n​ and impulses δi,n\delta_{i,n}δi,n​ of each player, and the states X(τi,n)−X_{(\tau_{i,n})^-}X(τi,n​)−​ just before each intervention. The payoff of player iii is

Ji(x;φ1,φ2)=E[∫0τSe−ρisfi(Xs)ds+∑τi,n<τSe−ρiτi,nϕi(X(τi,n)−,δi,n)+∑τj,n<τSe−ρiτj,nψi(X(τj,n)−,δj,n)+e−ρiτShi(XτS)1{τS<∞}],J^i(x;\varphi_1,\varphi_2)=\mathbb E\Big[\int_0^{\tau_S}e^{-\rho_is}f_i(X_s)ds+\sum_{\tau_{i,n}<\tau_S}e^{-\rho_i\tau_{i,n}}\phi_i(X_{(\tau_{i,n})^-},\delta_{i,n})+\sum_{\tau_{j,n}<\tau_S}e^{-\rho_i\tau_{j,n}}\psi_i(X_{(\tau_{j,n})^-},\delta_{j,n})+e^{-\rho_i\tau_S}h_i(X_{\tau_S})\mathbf 1_{\{\tau_S<\infty\}}\Big],Ji(x;φ1​,φ2​)=E[∫0τS​​e−ρi​sfi​(Xs​)ds+τi,n​<τS​∑​e−ρi​τi,n​ϕi​(X(τi,n​)−​,δi,n​)+τj,n​<τS​∑​e−ρi​τj,n​ψi​(X(τj,n​)−​,δj,n​)+e−ρi​τS​hi​(XτS​​)1{τS​<∞}​],

where j≠ij\ne ij=i, ρi>0\rho_i>0ρi​>0, fif_ifi​ is a running payoff, ϕi\phi_iϕi​ the cost of one's own interventions, ψi\psi_iψi​ the gain from the opponent's, and hih_ihi​ a terminal payoff on ∂S\partial S∂S. A pair of strategies is xxx-admissible, (φ1,φ2)∈Φx(\varphi_1,\varphi_2)\in\Phi_x(φ1​,φ2​)∈Φx​, when these four terms are integrable, sup⁡s≤τS∣Xs∣\sup_{s\le\tau_S}|X_s|sups≤τS​​∣Xs​∣ has all moments, and the interventions do not accumulate before τS\tau_SτS​. A Nash equilibrium is a pair in Φx\Phi_xΦx​ from which no player gains by a unilateral admissible deviation.

Given candidate payoff functions V1,V2V_1,V_2V1​,V2​ on Sˉ\bar SSˉ, let δi(x)\delta_i(x)δi​(x) be the unique maximiser of Vi(Γi(x,δ))+ϕi(x,δ)V_i(\Gamma^i(x,\delta))+\phi_i(x,\delta)Vi​(Γi(x,δ))+ϕi​(x,δ) over ZiZ_iZi​. Define MiVi(x)=Vi(Γi(x,δi(x)))+ϕi(x,δi(x))\mathcal M_iV_i(x)=V_i(\Gamma^i(x,\delta_i(x)))+\phi_i(x,\delta_i(x))Mi​Vi​(x)=Vi​(Γi(x,δi​(x)))+ϕi​(x,δi​(x)), HiVi(x)=Vi(Γj(x,δj(x)))+ψi(x,δj(x))\mathcal H_iV_i(x)=V_i(\Gamma^j(x,\delta_j(x)))+\psi_i(x,\delta_j(x))Hi​Vi​(x)=Vi​(Γj(x,δj​(x)))+ψi​(x,δj​(x)), the continuation region Di={MiVi−Vi<0}\mathcal D_i=\{\mathcal M_iV_i-V_i<0\}Di​={Mi​Vi​−Vi​<0} and the generator AV=b⋅∇V+12tr⁡(σσtD2V)\mathcal AV=b\cdot\nabla V+\tfrac12\operatorname{tr}(\sigma\sigma^tD^2V)AV=b⋅∇V+21​tr(σσtD2V). The QVI system is

Vi=hi on ∂S,MjVj−Vj≤0 on S,HiVi−Vi=0 on {MjVj=Vj},max⁡{AVi−ρiVi+fi, MiVi−Vi}=0 on Dj.V_i=h_i\ \text{on }\partial S,\quad \mathcal M_jV_j-V_j\le0\ \text{on }S,\quad \mathcal H_iV_i-V_i=0\ \text{on }\{\mathcal M_jV_j=V_j\},\quad \max\{\mathcal AV_i-\rho_iV_i+f_i,\ \mathcal M_iV_i-V_i\}=0\ \text{on }\mathcal D_j .Vi​=hi​ on ∂S,Mj​Vj​−Vj​≤0 on S,Hi​Vi​−Vi​=0 on {Mj​Vj​=Vj​},max{AVi​−ρi​Vi​+fi​, Mi​Vi​−Vi​}=0 on Dj​.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 3.3 (verification theorem)

Suppose V1,V2V_1,V_2V1​,V2​ solve the QVI system, Vi∈C2(Dj∖∂Di)∩C1(Dj)∩C(Sˉ)V_i\in C^2(\mathcal D_j\setminus\partial\mathcal D_i)\cap C^1(\mathcal D_j)\cap C(\bar S)Vi​∈C2(Dj​∖∂Di​)∩C1(Dj​)∩C(Sˉ) with polynomial growth, ∂Di\partial\mathcal D_i∂Di​ is a Lipschitz surface near which ViV_iVi​ has locally bounded first and second derivatives, x∈Sx\in Sx∈S, and the threshold pair φi∗=(Di,δi)\varphi_i^*=(\mathcal D_i,\delta_i)φi∗​=(Di​,δi​) is xxx-admissible. Then

(φ1∗,φ2∗) is a Nash equilibrium andVi(x)=Ji(x;φ1∗,φ2∗),i=1,2.(\varphi_1^*,\varphi_2^*)\ \text{is a Nash equilibrium and}\quad V_i(x)=J^i(x;\varphi_1^*,\varphi_2^*),\qquad i=1,2 .(φ1∗​,φ2∗​) is a Nash equilibrium andVi​(x)=Ji(x;φ1∗​,φ2∗​),i=1,2.

Milestones

  • Lemma 2.3: the controlled process is the concatenation of diffusion pieces, it jumps only at interventions, and between interventions it stays in C1∩C2\mathcal C_1\cap\mathcal C_2C1​∩C2​.
  • Remark 3.6, (3.8b), (3.8d), (3.8f): against φ2∗\varphi_2^*φ2∗​, the state stays in D2\mathcal D_2D2​, and player 2 intervenes only on {M2V2=V2}\{\mathcal M_2V_2=V_2\}{M2​V2​=V2​} with impulse δ2\delta_2δ2​.
  • Step 1 of the proof: V1(x)≥J1(x;φ1,φ2∗)V_1(x)\ge J^1(x;\varphi_1,\varphi_2^*)V1​(x)≥J1(x;φ1​,φ2∗​) for every admissible deviation φ1\varphi_1φ1​.
  • Step 2 of the proof: V1(x)=J1(x;φ1∗,φ2∗)V_1(x)=J^1(x;\varphi_1^*,\varphi_2^*)V1​(x)=J1(x;φ1∗​,φ2∗​).

The goal follows from Steps 1 and 2 and their mirror images for player 2.

Significance

The theorem turns the search for Nash equilibria of nonzero-sum impulse games, an infinite-dimensional fixed-point problem over strategy pairs, into a deterministic problem: find functions satisfying a system of coupled QVIs with prescribed regularity. The regularity conditions become smooth-pasting conditions, hence a system of algebraic equations; Section 4 of the paper solves it explicitly for a one-dimensional game with linear payoffs. A further consequence is structural: equilibrium payoffs need only be C2C^2C2 on the opponent's continuation region, which is what lets non-smooth, piecewise-defined candidates qualify.

The result is proved in the paper; no machine-checked version exists. A complete formalization would be the first verified verification theorem for impulse control, single-player or game, and would expose every convention of the model: priority on ties, simultaneous interventions, the treatment of exit, and the integrability of the payoff. Several of these conventions need correction on the page, as listed below.

Difficulty

The heuristic argument applies Itô's formula to e−ρ1tV1(Xt)e^{-\rho_1t}V_1(X_t)e−ρ1​tV1​(Xt​) and uses the QVIs term by term. This fails on two counts. First, V1V_1V1​ is only C1C^1C1 across the free boundary ∂D1\partial\mathcal D_1∂D1​, so Itô's formula does not apply directly. The paper mollifies V1V_1V1​ (following Øksendal's proof of his verification theorem for optimal stopping) and must control the second derivatives near a Lipschitz boundary. Second, the sums over interventions may be infinite and the horizon unbounded, so expectations and limits do not commute. The passage to the limit needs the integrability built into Φx\Phi_xΦx​ and the polynomial growth of ViV_iVi​. The stochastic-calculus infrastructure itself (Itô's formula for continuous semimartingales stopped at random times, strong solutions of Lipschitz SDEs restarted at stopping times) is largely missing from Mathlib.

Formalization scope

The Lean model is pathwise. A realization is a sequence of diffusion pieces, each solving the state equation from the random restart time with the restart value. The Itô integral is the published relation EthierKurtz.HasBrownianItoIntegral, and the stochastic basis uses the published You2015.Shared.UsualConditions and IsFBrownian. Times take values in [0,∞][0,\infty][0,∞] with e−ρ⋅∞=0e^{-\rho\cdot\infty}=0e−ρ⋅∞=0, and the state space is EuclideanSpace ℝ (Fin d). Φx\Phi_xΦx​ asks for one admissible realization, while the Nash inequalities and the payoff identity hold on every admissible realization; strong uniqueness makes these readings equivalent.

The following deviate from the page and are disclosed in the items:

  1. δi\delta_iδi​ is assumed continuous, so that φi∗\varphi_i^*φi∗​ is a strategy.
  2. The fourth QVI is imposed on Dj∖∂Di\mathcal D_j\setminus\partial\mathcal D_iDj​∖∂Di​, where AVi\mathcal AV_iAVi​ exists.
  3. The exit time is αkˉ+1S\alpha^S_{\bar k+1}αkˉ+1S​, not the printed αkˉS\alpha^S_{\bar k}αkˉS​.
  4. The gain term of (2.7) is read with the opponent's interventions.
  5. The supremum in (2.8) is taken over [0,τS][0,\tau_S][0,τS​].
  6. Interventions accumulating at a finite τS\tau_SτS​ are excluded from Φx\Phi_xΦx​, since the page leaves XτSX_{\tau_S}XτS​​ undefined there.
  7. Lemma 2.3 is stated in corrected form for simultaneous and boundary interventions.

The payoff is a Bochner expectation only inside Φx\Phi_xΦx​, which requires the L1L^1L1 conditions of (2.7) and the integrability of each payoff. A non-integrable deviation therefore never receives the junk payoff 000, and the Nash inequality cannot hold vacuously.

Contributions are welcome on the stochastic-calculus layer this needs (Itô's formula, strong existence and uniqueness for Lipschitz SDEs, optional stopping for stochastic integrals) and on the mollification lemma for functions that are C1C^1C1 with piecewise bounded second derivatives across a Lipschitz surface. These are reusable well beyond this mission.

Selected references

  • R. Aïd, M. Basei, G. Callegaro, L. Campi, T. Vargiolu, Nonzero-sum stochastic differential games with impulse controls: a verification theorem with applications, Math. Oper. Res. 45(1), 2020 (accepted manuscript, arXiv:1605.00039v4). https://arxiv.org/abs/1605.00039
  • A. Cosso, Stochastic differential games involving impulse controls and double-obstacle quasi-variational inequalities, SIAM J. Control Optim. 51(3), 2102–2131, 2013.
  • B. Øksendal, Stochastic Differential Equations, 6th ed., Springer, 2003. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-14394-6
  • B. Øksendal, A. Sulem, Applied Stochastic Control of Jump Diffusions, 2nd ed., Springer, 2007. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-69826-5
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Graph TheoryLinear OptimizationOptimization·Captain: mikedeng1

Project Scheduling with Time Windows and Scarce Resources VI: Stable, Semistable, Pseudostable and Quasistable Schedules Are Extreme Points of the Feasible RegionTextbook

Motivation

Resource-constrained project scheduling with minimum and maximum time lags is the model behind make-to-order production, process-industry batch planning and large engineering projects. When the objective is the project duration or another regular function (nondecreasing in every start time), an optimum can be found among schedules that cannot be shifted to the left. Many objectives in practice are nonregular: net present value, earliness–tardiness costs, resource levelling and resource investment. For these, delaying an activity can pay, and "shift as far left as possible" no longer identifies a finite set of candidate schedules.

Neumann, Nübel and Schwindt (Math. Methods Oper. Res. 52, 2000) answered this with classes of schedules defined by the absence of pairs of opposite shifts: stable, semistable, pseudostable and quasistable schedules, the mirror image of active, semiactive, pseudoactive and quasiactive schedules. Section 3.2 of Neumann, Schwindt and Zimmermann, Project Scheduling with Time Windows and Scarce Resources (Springer 2003), shows that these classes are exactly the extreme points of the feasible region and of its natural convex pieces. The classification of objective functions in §3.3, and every enumeration scheme of the later chapter, rests on that correspondence.

Setting

A project has activities V={0,1,…,n+1}V=\{0,1,\dots,n+1\}V={0,1,…,n+1} with n≥1n\ge1n≥1. Activity 000 is the project beginning and n+1n+1n+1 the project completion. Activity iii has an integer duration pip_ipi​, with p0=pn+1=0p_0=p_{n+1}=0p0​=pn+1​=0 and pi>0p_i>0pi​>0 otherwise. The project network NNN has node set VVV and arcs ⟨i,j⟩∈E\langle i,j\rangle\in E⟨i,j⟩∈E with integer weights δij\delta_{ij}δij​, each encoding a temporal constraint Sj−Si≥δijS_j-S_i\ge\delta_{ij}Sj​−Si​≥δij​. A prescribed deadline dˉ∈N\bar d\in\mathbb Ndˉ∈N is included as the backward arc ⟨n+1,0⟩\langle n+1,0\rangle⟨n+1,0⟩ of weight −dˉ-\bar d−dˉ. Renewable resources kkk have capacities RkR_kRk​, and activity iii uses rik≤Rkr_{ik}\le R_krik​≤Rk​ units while it runs.

A schedule is a vector S∈Rn+2S\in\mathbb R^{n+2}S∈Rn+2 of start times. The time-feasible region ST\mathcal S_TST​ collects the schedules with S0=0S_0=0S0​=0, S≥0S\ge0S≥0 and Sj−Si≥δijS_j-S_i\ge\delta_{ij}Sj​−Si​≥δij​ on every arc; it is a polyhedron, and a polytope when every activity precedes n+1n+1n+1 as in Remarks 1.1.2. A schedule is resource-feasible if at every time t≥0t\ge0t≥0 the running activities A(S,t)={i∣Si≤t<Si+pi}\mathcal A(S,t)=\{i\mid S_i\le t<S_i+p_i\}A(S,t)={i∣Si​≤t<Si​+pi​} use at most RkR_kRk​ units of every resource. The feasible region is S=ST∩SR\mathcal S=\mathcal S_T\cap\mathcal S_RS=ST​∩SR​. It is in general neither convex nor connected.

A schedule induces the strict order O(S)={(i,j)∣i≠j, Sj≥Si+pi}O(S)=\{(i,j)\mid i\ne j,\ S_j\ge S_i+p_i\}O(S)={(i,j)∣i=j, Sj​≥Si​+pi​}. For a strict order OOO, the order polytope is ST(O)={S∈ST∣Sj≥Si+pi ((i,j)∈O)}\mathcal S_T(O)=\{S\in\mathcal S_T\mid S_j\ge S_i+p_i\ ((i,j)\in O)\}ST​(O)={S∈ST​∣Sj​≥Si​+pi​ ((i,j)∈O)}. The order OOO is feasible if ∅≠ST(O)⊆S\emptyset\ne\mathcal S_T(O)\subseteq\mathcal S∅=ST​(O)⊆S. The schedule polytope of SSS is ST(O(S))\mathcal S_T(O(S))ST​(O(S)).

A shift moves a schedule SSS to S′≠SS'\neq SS′=S. It is global if both are feasible, local if in addition a continuous path inside S\mathcal SS joins them, order-preserving if O(S)⊆O(S′)O(S)\subseteq O(S')O(S)⊆O(S′), and order-monotone if O(S)O(S)O(S) and O(S′)O(S')O(S′) are comparable. Two shifts from SSS to S′S'S′ and S′′S''S′′ are opposite if S′′−S=λ(S′−S)S''-S=\lambda(S'-S)S′′−S=λ(S′−S) with λ<0\lambda<0λ<0. A feasible schedule is stable, semistable, pseudostable or quasistable if no pair of opposite global, local, order-monotone or order-preserving shifts, respectively, starts at it. It is antiactive if no global right-shift starts at it.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 3.2.10

For every feasible schedule SSS:

(a) S antiactive  ⟺  S maximal in S,(b) S stable  ⟺  S∈ext⁡S,(c) S semistable  ⟺  S∈ext⁡CS, CS the component of S containing S,(d) S pseudostable  ⟺  S∈ext⁡ST(O) for all feasible O⊆O(S),(e) S quasistable  ⟺  S∈ext⁡ST(O(S)).\begin{aligned} &\text{(a) } S\text{ antiactive}\iff S\text{ maximal in }\mathcal S, \qquad \text{(b) } S\text{ stable}\iff S\in\operatorname{ext}\mathcal S,\\ &\text{(c) } S\text{ semistable}\iff S\in\operatorname{ext}C_S,\ C_S\text{ the component of }\mathcal S\text{ containing }S,\\ &\text{(d) } S\text{ pseudostable}\iff S\in\operatorname{ext}\mathcal S_T(O)\ \text{for all feasible }O\subseteq O(S),\\ &\text{(e) } S\text{ quasistable}\iff S\in\operatorname{ext}\mathcal S_T(O(S)). \end{aligned}​(a) S antiactive⟺S maximal in S,(b) S stable⟺S∈extS,(c) S semistable⟺S∈extCS​, CS​ the component of S containing S,(d) S pseudostable⟺S∈extST​(O) for all feasible O⊆O(S),(e) S quasistable⟺S∈extST​(O(S)).​

Milestones

  • Lemma 3.2.4: opposite order-preserving or order-monotone shifts can be taken uniform (all moved activities move by one common amount).
  • Lemma 3.2.8: pseudostable schedules are the local extreme points of S\mathcal SS, the points on no segment that lies entirely in S\mathcal SS.
  • Lemma 3.2.9: when SSS is not pseudostable, a segment through SSS can be found inside one order polytope ST(O)\mathcal S_T(O)ST​(O) with O⊆O(S)O\subseteq O(S)O⊆O(S) feasible.
  • Proposition 3.2.13: the quasistable schedules, and every class below them in Fig. 3.2.6, form finite sets.
  • Proposition 3.2.16: every vertex of ST\mathcal S_TST​ is the unique solution of S0=0S_0=0S0​=0, Sj−Si=δijS_j-S_i=\delta_{ij}Sj​−Si​=δij​ on the arcs of a spanning tree of NNN; for the minimal point, an outtree rooted at 000.
  • Theorem 3.2.18: SSS is quasistable iff it is the unique solution of such a tree system in the schedule network N(O(S))N(O(S))N(O(S)).
  • Remark 3.2.7: every activity of a quasistable schedule is tied to another one by a tight duration or time lag, so quasistable schedules are integer-valued.

Significance

The theorem makes four shift-defined classes computable objects: extreme points of explicit polytopes, or of a finite union of them. Together with Proposition 3.2.13, it gives each class of nonregular objective functions in §3.3 a finite candidate set of schedules among which an optimum can be sought (§3.2, p. 207). Theorem 3.2.18 gives the certificate for quasistable schedules: a spanning tree of the schedule network, which the later sections use to enumerate vertices.

The results are proved in the book, except Lemma 3.2.9, whose proof is cited to Neumann, Nübel and Schwindt (2000). As far as a search of the platform shows, none of them has been formalized. A formalization supplies the missing details, among them that connected and path components of S\mathcal SS coincide and the degenerate vertices behind the tree description. It also produces a reusable library of schedule classes on real-valued start times.

Difficulty

Part (b) is close to the definition, since a pair of opposite global shifts is a segment through SSS with feasible endpoints. The content is elsewhere. In (c) the definition speaks of continuous trajectories and the right-hand side of connected components, so the proof needs local path-connectedness of a finite union of polytopes. In (d) the feasible region is not convex: an order-monotone shift keeps SSS and S′S'S′ in a common order polytope, but S′S'S′ and S′′S''S′′ may lie in different ones. The segment through SSS has to be moved into a single order polytope ST(O)\mathcal S_T(O)ST​(O) with O⊆O(S)O\subseteq O(S)O⊆O(S), and that is Lemma 3.2.9. Proposition 3.2.16 and Theorem 3.2.18 need the passage from n+2n+2n+2 linearly independent tight constraints to a spanning tree. They must allow degenerate vertices, where several trees describe the same point, and must represent the nonnegativity constraints Si≥0S_i\ge0Si​≥0 by arcs of the network.

Formalization scope

Activities are Fin (n + 2); start times are real vectors Fin (n + 2) → ℝ with the pointwise order. Durations, capacities and requirements are natural numbers, and time lags integers. The deadline is the arc ⟨n+1,0⟩\langle n+1,0\rangle⟨n+1,0⟩ of weight −dˉ-\bar d−dˉ, which is always present, as §3.1 prescribes. Resource constraints are imposed for every t≥0t\ge0t≥0, not only for 0≤t≤dˉ0\le t\le\bar d0≤t≤dˉ as (3.1.2) writes; the proofs use the first reading. Extreme points are Mathlib's Set.extremePoints ℝ, maximal points are Maximal for the pointwise order, and components are connectedComponentIn. A local shift carries an explicit continuous map from unitInterval into S\mathcal SS. Strict orders are asymmetric, transitive relations on VVV. A spanning tree is an arc set of size n+1n+1n+1 whose underlying simple graph is connected. Its arcs must be arcs of NNN, resp. of N(O(S))N(O(S))N(O(S)), with their network weights, so an arbitrary equation system does not count.

The schedule classes are defined through shifts and nothing else. Defining "stable" as "extreme point", or "pseudostable" as "local extreme point", would make the goal and Lemma 3.2.8 tautologies, and such encodings are ruled out. Proposition 3.2.16 carries the book's standing convention (§1.2, p. 8) that every node is reached from 000 by a walk of nonnegative length. Without it the statement is false.

The definitions duplicate, under this mission's namespace, the model of the book's Chapter 2 missions (order polytopes, shifts, active classes). They are written to be merged with those once published. Contributions on the geometry of finite unions of polytopes, and on spanning-tree bases of difference constraint systems, are reusable beyond this mission.

Selected references

  • K. Neumann, C. Schwindt, J. Zimmermann, Project Scheduling with Time Windows and Scarce Resources, 2nd ed., Springer, 2003, §3.1–3.2. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-24800-2
  • K. Neumann, H. Nübel, C. Schwindt, Active and stable project scheduling, Mathematical Methods of Operations Research 52 (2000), 441–465. https://doi.org/10.1007/s001860000092
  • M. Bartusch, R. H. Möhring, F. J. Radermacher, Scheduling project networks with resource constraints and time windows, Annals of Operations Research 16 (1988), 199–240. https://doi.org/10.1007/BF02283745
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Dynamic ProgrammingOptimization·Captain: mikedeng1

Dynamic Pricing Strategies with Reference Effects III: Global Monotone Convergence of Optimal PricesResearch Paper

Motivation

Consumers judge a price against a reference price, an internal standard formed from the prices they have seen before. A price below the reference feels like a gain and raises demand; a price above it feels like a loss and lowers demand. The effect is documented empirically in marketing and behavioural economics (Kalyanaram and Winer 1995). It forces a pricing firm to plan dynamically: today's price is tomorrow's reference point.

This makes the shape of an optimal price path the practical question. Should a firm launch high and cut prices over time (skimming), launch low and raise them (penetration), keep prices constant, or alternate between high and low? For linear demand models, Kopalle, Rao and Assunção (1996) and Fibich, Gavious and Lowengart (2003) showed that optimal prices move monotonically towards a steady state. Popescu and Wu (2007) study a general, nonparametric reference-dependent demand model. They show that the reference price path always converges monotonically, but the price path need not be monotone: high-low pricing can be optimal even for loss-neutral consumers. They then give three alternative sufficient conditions under which every optimal price path is monotone. This mission formalizes that result, their Theorem 3 (Global Price Monotonicity).

Setting

A monopolist chooses a price ptp_tpt​ in each period t=0,1,2,…t = 0, 1, 2, \dotst=0,1,2,… from the interval P=[0,pˉ]P = [0, \bar p]P=[0,pˉ​], pˉ>0\bar p > 0pˉ​>0. Consumers hold a reference price rtr_trt​ that evolves by exponential smoothing with memory α∈[0,1)\alpha \in [0, 1)α∈[0,1):

rt+1=αrt+(1−α)pt.r_{t+1} = \alpha r_t + (1-\alpha) p_t .rt+1​=αrt​+(1−α)pt​.

Demand is D(p,r)=d(p)+R(r−p,r)D(p, r) = d(p) + R(r - p, r)D(p,r)=d(p)+R(r−p,r). Here d(p)=D(p,p)d(p) = D(p,p)d(p)=D(p,p) is the base demand, and R(x,r)R(x, r)R(x,r) is the reference effect of a perceived gain x=r−px = r - px=r−p, with R(0,r)=0R(0, r) = 0R(0,r)=0. With zero cost, the per-period short-term profit is Π(p,r)=p D(p,r)\Pi(p, r) = p\,D(p, r)Π(p,r)=pD(p,r). The base profit is π(p)=p d(p)\pi(p) = p\,d(p)π(p)=pd(p), the reference profit is ΠR(p,r)=p R(r−p,r)\Pi^R(p, r) = p\,R(r-p, r)ΠR(p,r)=pR(r−p,r), and λ(r)=Rx(0,r)\lambda(r) = R_x(0, r)λ(r)=Rx​(0,r) is the slope of the reference effect at zero.

With discount factor β∈(0,1)\beta \in (0,1)β∈(0,1), the value function is

V(r0)=sup⁡pt∈P∑t≥0βt Π(pt,rt),V(r_0) = \sup_{p_t \in P} \sum_{t \ge 0} \beta^t\, \Pi(p_t, r_t),V(r0​)=pt​∈Psup​t≥0∑​βtΠ(pt​,rt​),

the supremum over all price sequences in PPP. It satisfies the Bellman equation V(r)=sup⁡p∈PW(p,r)V(r) = \sup_{p \in P} W(p, r)V(r)=supp∈P​W(p,r) with

W(p,r)=Π(p,r)+β V(αr+(1−α)p).(2)W(p, r) = \Pi(p, r) + \beta\, V(\alpha r + (1-\alpha) p). \tag{2}W(p,r)=Π(p,r)+βV(αr+(1−α)p).(2)

The optimal pricing policy p∗(r)p^*(r)p∗(r) is the largest maximizer of W(⋅,r)W(\cdot, r)W(⋅,r) over PPP. The reference price policy is q∗(r)=αr+(1−α)p∗(r)q^*(r) = \alpha r + (1-\alpha) p^*(r)q∗(r)=αr+(1−α)p∗(r). From r0r_0r0​, the state path is rt+1∗=q∗(rt∗)r^*_{t+1} = q^*(r^*_t)rt+1∗​=q∗(rt∗​) and the pricing path is pt∗=p∗(rt∗)p^*_t = p^*(r^*_t)pt∗​=p∗(rt∗​). A steady state is a price p∗∗∈Pp^{**} \in Pp∗∗∈P with p∗(p∗∗)=p∗∗p^*(p^{**}) = p^{**}p∗(p∗∗)=p∗∗.

The standing assumptions are the paper's Assumptions 1–3. Assumption 1: demand is nonnegative, bounded and continuous, decreasing in ppp and increasing in rrr, and RRR is increasing in xxx. Assumption 2: RRR is twice differentiable. Assumption 3: (a) π\piπ is nonmonotonic and concave; (b) π′(r)−rλ(r)\pi'(r) - r\lambda(r)π′(r)−rλ(r) is strictly decreasing; (c) ΠR\Pi^RΠR is concave in ppp and supermodular in (p,r)(p, r)(p,r).

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 3 (Global Price Monotonicity)

Suppose, in addition, that at least one of the three alternative conditions of Lemma 3 holds:

  • (a) α=0\alpha = 0α=0;
  • (b) D(p,r)D(p, r)D(p,r) is convex in rrr;
  • (c) Π\PiΠ is strongly concave on the interior of its domain, meaning it is C2\mathcal C^2C2 and Π+ap2+br2\Pi + a p^2 + b r^2Π+ap2+br2 is concave for some a,b>0a, b > 0a,b>0, and there is a constant K>0K > 0K>0 with Πrr≥−K\Pi_{rr} \ge -KΠrr​≥−K and Πpr≥K/2\Pi_{pr} \ge K/2Πpr​≥K/2.

Then there is a unique steady state p∗∗p^{**}p∗∗. It is the unique solution in PPP of

π′(p)1−β=p λ(p)1−αβ,(3)\frac{\pi'(p)}{1-\beta} = \frac{p\,\lambda(p)}{1-\alpha\beta}, \tag{3}1−βπ′(p)​=1−αβpλ(p)​,(3)

and for every initial reference price r0∈Pr_0 \in Pr0​∈P the optimal pricing path is monotone and converges to it:

(pt∗)t≥0 monotone,lim⁡t→∞pt∗=p∗∗.(p^*_t)_{t\ge 0}\ \text{monotone}, \qquad \lim_{t\to\infty} p^*_t = p^{**}.(pt∗​)t≥0​ monotone,t→∞lim​pt∗​=p∗∗.

Milestones

  1. Lemma 2. q∗q^*q∗ is increasing on PPP.
  2. Theorem 2. There is a unique steady state p∗∗p^{**}p∗∗, characterized by (3). Every pricing path converges to p∗∗p^{**}p∗∗, and every state path converges to p∗∗p^{**}p∗∗ monotonically.
  3. Lemma 3(a). If α=0\alpha = 0α=0, then p∗p^*p∗ is increasing on PPP.
  4. Convexity of VVV (Appendix A.7(b)). If D(p,⋅)D(p, \cdot)D(p,⋅) is convex on PPP for every ppp, then VVV is convex on PPP.
  5. Lemma 3(b). If D(p,⋅)D(p, \cdot)D(p,⋅) is convex on PPP for every ppp, then p∗p^*p∗ is increasing on PPP.

Significance

Theorem 3 limits the optimal strategies to skimming, penetration and constant pricing. It also shows that the paths do not cross: raising the initial reference price shifts the entire optimal price sequence upward. It extends the price-monotonicity results of Kopalle et al. and Fibich et al. from linear additive-difference models to every demand that is convex in the reference price, and to all models when consumers have one-period memory. Without it, a monotone reference-price path could coexist with oscillating prices, and the paper shows by example (its Figure 4) that this happens when the conditions fail.

Formalizing the result produces a reusable Lean account of a deterministic infinite-horizon pricing problem with a continuous state: a sequence-problem value function, a largest-maximizer policy, state and price paths, and steady states. It also yields monotone-comparative-statics arguments applied to a Bellman objective. The paper's proofs are informal: they cite Topkis' monotonicity theorem, a convexity-preservation result of Smith and McCardle, and standard dynamic-programming facts (Stokey, Lucas and Prescott). None of these statements has a machine-checked proof on this platform.

Difficulty

The obvious route does not reach the price path. Monotonicity of q∗q^*q∗ gives monotone reference paths, but the price pt∗=(rt+1∗−αrt∗)/(1−α)p^*_t = (r^*_{t+1} - \alpha r^*_t)/(1-\alpha)pt∗​=(rt+1∗​−αrt∗​)/(1−α) is a difference of two monotone sequences, which need not be monotone. Monotonicity of p∗p^*p∗ itself requires WWW to be supermodular in (p,r)(p, r)(p,r). WWW involves the value function evaluated at αr+(1−α)p\alpha r + (1-\alpha)pαr+(1−α)p, and supermodularity of Π\PiΠ alone does not carry through that composition. Under (b) the missing ingredient is a curvature property of VVV that is not visible from the Bellman equation. Under (c) it is a lower bound on the second derivative of VVV, which needs VVV to be twice differentiable. The existence of a steady state also needs work. The limit of a monotone state path must be shown to be a fixed point of the largest-maximizer policy. That policy is not continuous in general, so this step requires continuity of VVV and upper hemicontinuity of the argmax, which the paper leaves implicit.

Formalization scope

Everything is over R\mathbb RR. The data are d:R→Rd : \mathbb R \to \mathbb Rd:R→R and R:R→R→RR : \mathbb R \to \mathbb R \to \mathbb RR:R→R→R, with D(p,r)=d(p)+R(r−p,r)D(p, r) = d(p) + R(r-p, r)D(p,r)=d(p)+R(r−p,r) and R(0,r)=0R(0, r) = 0R(0,r)=0. The committed conventions:

  • VVV is the supremum over price sequences with values in Set.Icc 0 pbar of the discounted tsum. It is not an arbitrary solution of the Bellman equation.
  • p∗p^*p∗ is the sSup of the argmax set, which is the paper's largest maximizer. Nonemptiness of the argmax is not assumed.
  • A steady state is r ∈ P ∧ optPrice r = r.
  • Assumption 1's monotonicities are non-strict and hold on P×PP \times PP×P. "Twice differentiable" is differentiability of RRR and of its Fréchet derivative.
  • An added hypothesis, Differentiable ℝ d, makes π′\pi'π′ in Assumption 3(b) and in (3) a genuine derivative.
  • The Lemma 3 hypothesis is the disjunction of (a), (b), (c). Condition (b) is convexity of r↦D(p,r)r \mapsto D(p, r)r↦D(p,r) on PPP for every p∈Pp \in Pp∈P. Condition (c) holds on the open square (0,pˉ)2(0,\bar p)^2(0,pˉ​)2, with one constant KKK for all points and second partials taken as iterated one-variable derivatives. Price paths start from r0∈Pr_0 \in Pr0​∈P, and "monotone" means monotone from t=0t = 0t=0.

Condition (c) is kept as printed. On P=[0,pˉ]P = [0, \bar p]P=[0,pˉ​] it can seldom hold, because Πrr=p Drr\Pi_{rr} = p\,D_{rr}Πrr​=pDrr​ vanishes as p→0p \to 0p→0 while strong concavity demands Πrr≤−2b<0\Pi_{rr} \le -2b < 0Πrr​≤−2b<0. A near-vacuous disjunct only weakens the hypothesis. The theorem's content comes from (a) and (b), and the hypotheses are jointly satisfiable: pˉ=3/4\bar p = 3/4pˉ​=3/4, d(p)=1−pd(p) = 1-pd(p)=1−p, R(x,r)=x/4R(x, r) = x/4R(x,r)=x/4 satisfies all of them. A formalization that conjoined the three conditions, or assumed the argmax nonempty or VVV to satisfy a Bellman equation, would be a different and weaker theorem, and is ruled out.

A complete development needs:

  • the value function's boundedness and continuity;
  • the Bellman equation for the sequence problem;
  • existence and upper hemicontinuity of maximizers;
  • Topkis' monotonicity theorem on an interval;
  • preservation of convexity under the supremum in (b);
  • for (c), second-order differentiability of VVV.

Topkis' theorem and the dynamic-programming facts are reusable beyond this mission, and contributions of them as independent lemmas are welcome. The optional condition (c) branch is expected to be the hardest part.

Selected references

  • I. Popescu and Y. Wu, Dynamic Pricing Strategies with Reference Effects, Operations Research 55(3):413–429, 2007. https://doi.org/10.1287/opre.1070.0393
  • P. K. Kopalle, A. G. Rao and J. L. Assunção, Asymmetric Reference Price Effects and Dynamic Pricing Policies, Marketing Science 15(1):60–85, 1996. https://doi.org/10.1287/mksc.15.1.60
  • G. Fibich, A. Gavious and O. Lowengart, Explicit Solutions of Optimization Models and Differential Games with Nonsmooth (Asymmetric) Reference-Price Effects, Operations Research 51(5):721–734, 2003. https://doi.org/10.1287/opre.51.5.721.16758
  • G. Kalyanaram and R. S. Winer, Empirical Generalizations from Reference Price Research, Marketing Science 14(3):G161–G169, 1995. https://doi.org/10.1287/mksc.14.3.G161
  • D. M. Topkis, Supermodularity and Complementarity, Princeton University Press, 1998. https://doi.org/10.1515/9781400822539
  • J. E. Smith and K. F. McCardle, Structural Properties of Stochastic Dynamic Programs, Operations Research 50(5):796–809, 2002. https://doi.org/10.1287/opre.50.5.796.365
  • N. L. Stokey, R. E. Lucas and E. C. Prescott, Recursive Methods in Economic Dynamics, Harvard University Press, 1989. https://doi.org/10.2307/j.ctvjnrt76
10 thms1 active userReviewed
Bandit AlgorithmsStatistics·Captain: mikedeng1

Dynamic Pricing with an Unknown Demand Model: Asymptotically Optimal Semi-Myopic Policies IV: Sufficient Conditions for Logarithmic Regret with a Known Incumbent PriceResearch Paper

Motivation

A seller who does not know how demand responds to price must learn the demand curve from its own sales while also earning revenue. This is the learn-and-earn problem of dynamic pricing. Every price it charges both earns and informs, and a policy that only earns can stop learning. Keskin and Zeevi (Operations Research 62(5), 2014) study the problem for a linear demand model with unknown parameters. They show that the certainty-equivalent ("greedy") policy can fail, and they give simple conditions on a policy's price path under which its regret is of optimal order.

This mission covers the paper's incumbent price problem (§3.4). Here the seller has charged one price p^\hat pp^​ for a long time and knows its expected demand D^\hat DD^. Only the slope of the demand curve is unknown, and p^\hat pp^​ is the single price that reveals nothing about it. A greedy seller whose estimates drift toward p^\hat pp^​ stops learning ("incomplete learning"), and its regret can grow linearly. Earlier single-parameter models (Broder and Rusmevichientong 2012) assumed that the intercept is known, which makes the uninformative price 000, a price no seller would choose. The incumbent price model makes the trade-off real. The paper proves a log⁡T\log TlogT lower bound on regret for this model (its Theorem 3), and its Theorem 4 gives sufficient conditions for matching that bound. Theorem 4 is the goal of this mission.

Setting

Prices lie in [l,u][l,u][l,u] with 0≤l<u0 \le l < u0≤l<u. The incumbent price is p^∈[l,u]\hat p \in [l,u]p^​∈[l,u]. The seller decides the price deviation xt=pt−p^x_t = p_t - \hat pxt​=pt​−p^​ in each period t=1,2,…t = 1, 2, \dotst=1,2,… and observes demand

Dt=D^+βxt+εt.D_t = \hat D + \beta x_t + \varepsilon_t .Dt​=D^+βxt​+εt​.

The unknown slope β\betaβ lies in a known interval B=[bmin⁡,bmax⁡]\mathfrak B = [b_{\min}, b_{\max}]B=[bmin​,bmax​] with bmin⁡<bmax⁡<0b_{\min} < b_{\max} < 0bmin​<bmax​<0. The shocks εt\varepsilon_tεt​ are i.i.d., with mean 000 and variance σ2>0\sigma^2 > 0σ2>0, and they are light-tailed: E[ezεt]<∞\mathbb E[e^{z\varepsilon_t}] < \inftyE[ezεt​]<∞ for ∣z∣≤z0|z| \le z_0∣z∣≤z0​, for some z0>0z_0 > 0z0​>0. They need not be Gaussian. The expected revenue at deviation xxx is rβ(x)=(p^+x)(D^+βx)r_\beta(x) = (\hat p + x)(\hat D + \beta x)rβ​(x)=(p^​+x)(D^+βx). It is maximized at

ψ(β)=−p^2−D^2β,\psi(\beta) = -\frac{\hat p}{2} - \frac{\hat D}{2\beta},ψ(β)=−2p^​​−2βD^​,

and p^+ψ(β)\hat p + \psi(\beta)p^​+ψ(β) is assumed to lie in the open interval (l,u)(l,u)(l,u) for every β∈B\beta \in \mathfrak Bβ∈B.

A pricing policy π\piπ chooses each price in [l,u][l,u][l,u] as a measurable function of past demands and prices only. Its regret over TTT periods is

Δβπ(T)=T rβ(ψ(β))−Eβπ∑t=1Trβ(xt).\Delta^\pi_\beta(T) = T\, r_\beta(\psi(\beta)) - \mathbb E^\pi_\beta \sum_{t=1}^T r_\beta(x_t).Δβπ​(T)=Trβ​(ψ(β))−Eβπ​t=1∑T​rβ​(xt​).

From the data the seller forms the information metric J^t=∑s=1txs2\hat J_t = \sum_{s=1}^t x_s^2J^t​=∑s=1t​xs2​, the least squares estimate β^t=∑s=1t(Ds−D^)xs/J^t\hat\beta_t = \sum_{s=1}^t (D_s - \hat D)x_s / \hat J_tβ^​t​=∑s=1t​(Ds​−D^)xs​/J^t​ and the truncated estimate bt=bmin⁡∨(β^t∧bmax⁡)b_t = b_{\min} \vee (\hat\beta_t \wedge b_{\max})bt​=bmin​∨(β^​t​∧bmax​). The greedy deviation at the end of period ttt is ψ(bt)\psi(b_t)ψ(bt​).

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 4 (p. 1150)

Let β∈B\beta \in \mathfrak Bβ∈B with ψ(β)≠0\psi(\beta) \ne 0ψ(β)=0. There is κ0′>0\kappa_0' > 0κ0′​>0 such that for all κ0≥κ0′\kappa_0 \ge \kappa_0'κ0​≥κ0′​, κ1>0\kappa_1 > 0κ1​>0 and t0≥1t_0 \ge 1t0​≥1 there is a finite C>0C > 0C>0 with the following property. If a policy satisfies, almost surely for all t≥t0t \ge t_0t≥t0​,

(i) J^t≥κ0log⁡t,(ii) ∑s=1t(ψ(bs)−xs+1)2≤κ1log⁡t,\text{(i)}\ \hat J_t \ge \kappa_0 \log t, \qquad \text{(ii)}\ \sum_{s=1}^t (\psi(b_s) - x_{s+1})^2 \le \kappa_1 \log t,(i) J^t​≥κ0​logt,(ii) s=1∑t​(ψ(bs​)−xs+1​)2≤κ1​logt,

then Δβπ(T)≤Clog⁡T\Delta^\pi_\beta(T) \le C \log TΔβπ​(T)≤ClogT for all T≥3T \ge 3T≥3.

Milestones

  1. (27), p. 1150: β^t−β=Mt/J^t\hat\beta_t - \beta = M_t / \hat J_tβ^​t​−β=Mt​/J^t​ with Mt=∑s=1tεsxsM_t = \sum_{s=1}^t \varepsilon_s x_sMt​=∑s=1t​εs​xs​, whenever J^t≠0\hat J_t \ne 0J^t​=0.
  2. Lemma 5, p. 1150: there is ρ>0\rho > 0ρ>0 with Pβπ{∣β^t−β∣>δ,J^t≥m}≤2exp⁡(−ρ(δ∧δ2)m)\mathbb P^\pi_\beta\{|\hat\beta_t - \beta| > \delta, \hat J_t \ge m\} \le 2\exp(-\rho(\delta\wedge\delta^2)m)Pβπ​{∣β^​t​−β∣>δ,J^t​≥m}≤2exp(−ρ(δ∧δ2)m) for every policy, every β∈B\beta \in \mathfrak Bβ∈B, all δ,m>0\delta, m > 0δ,m>0 and t≥2t \ge 2t≥2.
  3. (A14), p. 1159: E(ψ(β)−xt+1)2≤2E(ψ(β)−ψ(bt))2+2E(ψ(bt)−xt+1)2\mathbb E(\psi(\beta) - x_{t+1})^2 \le 2\mathbb E(\psi(\beta) - \psi(b_t))^2 + 2\mathbb E(\psi(b_t) - x_{t+1})^2E(ψ(β)−xt+1​)2≤2E(ψ(β)−ψ(bt​))2+2E(ψ(bt​)−xt+1​)2.
  4. Linear growth of J^t\hat J_tJ^t​ on AtA_tAt​, p. 1159. Here At=⋂s=⌊(t−1)/2⌋t−1{(ψ(β)−ψ(bs))2≤ψ(β)2/12}A_t = \bigcap_{s=\lfloor (t-1)/2\rfloor}^{t-1}\{(\psi(\beta)-\psi(b_s))^2 \le \psi(\beta)^2/12\}At​=⋂s=⌊(t−1)/2⌋t−1​{(ψ(β)−ψ(bs​))2≤ψ(β)2/12} is the event (A15). The claim: J^t≥(ψ(β)2/8−κ1log⁡(t−1)/(t−1))(t−1)\hat J_t \ge (\psi(\beta)^2/8 - \kappa_1\log(t-1)/(t-1))(t-1)J^t​≥(ψ(β)2/8−κ1​log(t−1)/(t−1))(t−1) on AtA_tAt​, given (ii) at time t−1t-1t−1.
  5. (A19), p. 1160: E(ψ(β)−ψ(bt))2≤K1t−1+K2 P(Atc)\mathbb E(\psi(\beta) - \psi(b_t))^2 \le K_1 t^{-1} + K_2\,\mathbb P(A_t^c)E(ψ(β)−ψ(bt​))2≤K1​t−1+K2​P(Atc​) for all t≥Nt \ge Nt≥N. The constants are K1=512K0σ2(u−l)2ψ(β)−4K_1 = 512K_0\sigma^2(u-l)^2\psi(\beta)^{-4}K1​=512K0​σ2(u−l)2ψ(β)−4, K2=4(u−l)2K_2 = 4(u-l)^2K2​=4(u−l)2 and K0=D^2/(4bmax⁡4)K_0 = \hat D^2/(4b_{\max}^4)K0​=D^2/(4bmax4​).

The goal fixes no constants beyond the order log⁡T\log TlogT. The milestones keep the paper's explicit constants where the paper gives them.

Significance

Theorem 4 turns asymptotic optimality into two checkable properties of a price path: enough information (i) and closeness to the greedy price (ii). Any policy meeting them has regret of order log⁡T\log TlogT. Together with the paper's matching lower bound, this pins down the optimal regret of the incumbent price problem. The same conditions certify whole families of simple policies. One example is the "constrained iterated least squares" rule of p. 1150, which perturbs the greedy price by ±κt−1/2\pm\kappa t^{-1/2}±κt−1/2 when it comes too close to p^\hat pp^​. Heavy exploration schemes are not needed. The contrast with the paper's two-parameter Theorem 2, where the corresponding rate is Tlog⁡T\sqrt T \log TT​logT, shows that the known incumbent point is what makes linear information growth free.

The result is proved in the paper. As far as a search of the platform shows, none of it is machine-checked: the platform has no dynamic pricing regret results and no least squares tail bound of this self-normalized, adaptively designed form. A formal proof would give a checked instance of a pattern that recurs throughout learning-and-earning analyses: an exponential tail bound for a self-normalized martingale with an adaptively chosen design, combined with a pathwise information-growth argument.

Difficulty

The deviations xsx_sxs​ are chosen adaptively from past data, so Mt=∑εsxsM_t = \sum \varepsilon_s x_sMt​=∑εs​xs​ is a martingale with a random, data-dependent quadratic variation σ2J^t\sigma^2\hat J_tσ2J^t​. Classical fixed-design least squares bounds do not apply, and a bound that holds on the event {J^t≥m}\{\hat J_t \ge m\}{J^t​≥m} uniformly over all policies is needed (Lemma 5). The regret bound then needs a bootstrap. The information grows linearly only if the recent greedy prices are near optimal (the event AtA_tAt​). Near-optimal greedy prices are likely only if enough information has already been collected. Closing this loop requires the tail bounds of Lemma 5 to be summable in ttt, and this is where the threshold on κ0\kappa_0κ0​ enters. A naive argument that bounds the estimation error by σ2/J^t\sigma^2/\hat J_tσ2/J^t​ using only condition (i) gives ∑t1/log⁡t\sum_t 1/\log t∑t​1/logt, which is far from logarithmic regret.

Formalization scope

Everything lives in the namespace KeskinZeevi.IncumbentSufficient. Model bundles l,u,p^,D^,bmin⁡,bmax⁡l, u, \hat p, \hat D, b_{\min}, b_{\max}l,u,p^​,D^,bmin​,bmax​ with the standing assumptions, and ψ\psiψ is the closed form above. LightTailedNoise P ε σ states the shock assumptions on a probability space. A Policy is a sequence of measurable history-to-price maps into [l,u][l,u][l,u]. The price, deviation and demand processes are defined by recursion from the noise, which realizes the paper's law of the sales process on the noise space. Periods are 1-based. Regret is for a fixed true slope β\betaβ, not the worst case over B\mathfrak BB. Expectations are Bochner integrals of bounded measurable functions, and probabilities are measures of sets.

The goal is a corrected form of the printed Theorem 4. The page says "there exist finite positive constants κ0,κ1\kappa_0, \kappa_1κ0​,κ1​, and CCC such that if π\piπ … satisfies (i)–(ii) almost surely for all ttt". Read literally, that statement is satisfied vacuously by choosing κ0\kappa_0κ0​ so large that no policy meets (i) (at t=2t = 2t=2, J^2≤2(u−l)2\hat J_2 \le 2(u-l)^2J^2​≤2(u−l)2). The Lean statement instead quantifies universally over every κ0\kappa_0κ0​ above a threshold, every κ1>0\kappa_1 > 0κ1​>0 and every start time t0t_0t0​, which is what the proof establishes, and it implies the printed statement. The sum in (ii) starts at s=1s = 1s=1 rather than s=0s = 0s=0, because b0b_0b0​ is defined only for the greedy policy. This only weakens the hypothesis. When J^t=0\hat J_t = 0J^t​=0, β^t\hat\beta_tβ^​t​ uses Lean's a/0=0a/0 = 0a/0=0, a case the hypotheses exclude for t≥max⁡(t0,2)t \ge \max(t_0, 2)t≥max(t0​,2). (27) is stated under J^t≠0\hat J_t \ne 0J^t​=0. The linear-growth milestone is pathwise and is stated for t≥3t \ge 3t≥3. (A19) has its threshold NNN existential and uniform over policies.

A complete development needs a conditional exponential-moment (supermartingale) argument for MtM_tMt​ under adaptive design, a mean value bound for ψ\psiψ on B\mathfrak BB, and elementary summation of s−3s^{-3}s−3 and log⁡\loglog terms. The self-normalized tail bound (Lemma 5) and the regret identity Δβπ(T)=−β∑tE(xt−ψ(β))2\Delta^\pi_\beta(T) = -\beta\sum_t \mathbb E(x_t - \psi(\beta))^2Δβπ​(T)=−β∑t​E(xt​−ψ(β))2 are reusable beyond this mission. Proofs of the milestones in any order are welcome, as are sharper constants.

Selected references

  • N. B. Keskin and A. Zeevi, Dynamic Pricing with an Unknown Demand Model: Asymptotically Optimal Semi-Myopic Policies, Operations Research 62(5):1142–1167, 2014. https://doi.org/10.1287/opre.2014.1294
  • J. Broder and P. Rusmevichientong, Dynamic Pricing under a General Parametric Choice Model, Operations Research 60(4):965–980, 2012. https://doi.org/10.1287/opre.1120.1057
  • T. L. Lai and H. Robbins, Iterated Least Squares in Multiperiod Control, Advances in Applied Mathematics 3(1):50–73, 1982. https://doi.org/10.1016/0196-8858(82)90005-5
  • A. Goldenshluger and A. Zeevi, Woodroofe's One-Armed Bandit Problem Revisited, Annals of Applied Probability 19(4):1603–1633, 2009. https://doi.org/10.1214/08-AAP589
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Bandit AlgorithmsStatistics·Captain: mikedeng1

Dynamic Pricing with an Unknown Demand Model: Asymptotically Optimal Semi-Myopic Policies III: A Logarithmic Regret Lower Bound with a Known Incumbent PriceResearch Paper

Motivation

A seller who does not know how demand responds to price must learn it from sales while it sells. Each price it charges earns revenue, and each price also reveals something about demand. Choosing prices that serve both purposes is the learn-and-earn problem of dynamic pricing. Its standard yardstick is regret: the expected revenue lost, over a horizon of TTT periods, relative to a seller who knew the demand curve from the start.

Keskin and Zeevi (Operations Research 62(5), 2014) study linear demand with unknown intercept and slope. They show that no policy can have worst-case regret of order below T\sqrt TT​, and that simple least-squares-based policies attain Tlog⁡T\sqrt T \log TT​logT. They then consider a variant that is common in practice. A seller has charged one incumbent price p^\hat pp^​ for a long time and knows the expected demand D^\hat DD^ at that price. Only the slope of the demand curve remains uncertain, and the incumbent price is the only price that carries no information about it. In this variant the achievable regret drops to order log⁡T\log TlogT. This mission formalizes the lower bound: no policy does better than log⁡T\log TlogT (Theorem 3 of the paper). Earlier single-parameter models (Broder and Rusmevichientong, Operations Research 2012) assumed the intercept is known exactly, so that the only uninformative price is zero. The incumbent price model instead has a strictly positive uninformative price, and a seller that charges it stops learning.

Setting

Prices are chosen from an interval [l,u][l,u][l,u] with 0≤l<u0 \le l < u0≤l<u. The seller knows an incumbent price p^∈[l,u]\hat p \in [l,u]p^​∈[l,u] and an incumbent demand D^≠0\hat D \ne 0D^=0. The unknown slope β\betaβ lies in a compact interval B=[bmin⁡,bmax⁡]\mathfrak B = [b_{\min}, b_{\max}]B=[bmin​,bmax​] with bmin⁡<bmax⁡<0b_{\min} < b_{\max} < 0bmin​<bmax​<0. The expected demand at p^\hat pp^​ is D^\hat DD^, which is the incumbent price relation D^=α+βp^\hat D = \alpha + \beta \hat pD^=α+βp^​. Write the price in period ttt as pt=p^+xtp_t = \hat p + x_tpt​=p^​+xt​, where xtx_txt​ is the price deviation. Demand in period ttt is

Dt=D^+βxt+ϵt,t=1,2,…,D_t = \hat D + \beta x_t + \epsilon_t, \qquad t = 1, 2, \dots,Dt​=D^+βxt​+ϵt​,t=1,2,…,

where the demand shocks ϵ1,ϵ2,…\epsilon_1, \epsilon_2, \dotsϵ1​,ϵ2​,… are i.i.d. N(0,σ2)\mathcal N(0,\sigma^2)N(0,σ2) with σ>0\sigma > 0σ>0.

The single-period revenue of a deviation xxx is rβ(x)=(p^+x)(D^+βx)r_\beta(x) = (\hat p + x)(\hat D + \beta x)rβ​(x)=(p^​+x)(D^+βx). It is maximized at the optimal deviation

ψ(β)=−p^2−D^2β.\psi(\beta) = -\frac{\hat p}{2} - \frac{\hat D}{2\beta}.ψ(β)=−2p^​​−2βD^​.

The model assumes that the optimal price p^+ψ(β)\hat p + \psi(\beta)p^​+ψ(β) lies strictly inside (l,u)(l,u)(l,u) for every β∈B\beta \in \mathfrak Bβ∈B.

A pricing policy π\piπ is a sequence of measurable functions. The first price π1\pi_1π1​ is a constant, and the price in period t+1t+1t+1 is a function πt+1(Ht)\pi_{t+1}(H_t)πt+1​(Ht​) of the observed history Ht=((D1,p1),…,(Dt,pt))H_t = ((D_1,p_1),\dots,(D_t,p_t))Ht​=((D1​,p1​),…,(Dt​,pt​)), with values in [l,u][l,u][l,u]. A policy never observes β\betaβ or the shocks. The regret of π\piπ under slope β\betaβ over TTT periods is

Δβπ(T)=T rβ(ψ(β))−Eβπ∑t=1Trβ(xt).\Delta^\pi_\beta(T) = T\,r_\beta(\psi(\beta)) - \mathbb E^\pi_\beta \sum_{t=1}^T r_\beta(x_t).Δβπ​(T)=Trβ​(ψ(β))−Eβπ​t=1∑T​rβ​(xt​).

The worst-case regret excludes the slopes at which the incumbent price is itself optimal:

Δπ(T)=sup⁡{Δβπ(T):bmin⁡≤β≤bmax⁡, ψ(β)≠0}.\Delta^\pi(T) = \sup\{\Delta^\pi_\beta(T) : b_{\min} \le \beta \le b_{\max},\ \psi(\beta) \ne 0\}.Δπ(T)=sup{Δβπ​(T):bmin​≤β≤bmax​, ψ(β)=0}.

The accumulated information is measured by J^t=∑s=1txs2\hat J_t = \sum_{s=1}^t x_s^2J^t​=∑s=1t​xs2​; the Fisher information of the history about β\betaβ is σ−2Eβπ[J^t]\sigma^{-2}\mathbb E^\pi_\beta[\hat J_t]σ−2Eβπ​[J^t​].

In Lean these objects are Model (with fields l u pHat DHat bMin bMax σ and the standing assumptions), Policy, pricePath, dev, regret, worstRegret, sqErr and expInfo, all in the namespace KeskinZeevi.IncumbentLowerBound; the i.i.d. N(0,σ2)\mathcal N(0,\sigma^2)N(0,σ2) shocks are the shared definition RobustBooking.Shared.GaussianNoise.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 3 (p. 1149)

There is a finite positive constant ccc, depending only on the model, such that for every pricing policy π\piπ and every horizon T≥3T \ge 3T≥3,

Δπ(T)  ≥  clog⁡T.\Delta^\pi(T) \;\ge\; c \log T.Δπ(T)≥clogT.

The constant is not fixed; the statement asserts only the logarithmic rate, uniformly over policies.

Milestones

  1. Lemma 4 (p. 1149). There are finite positive constants c0,c1c_0, c_1c0​,c1​ such that for every policy π\piπ and horizon TTT,
sup⁡β∈B, ψ(β)≠0∑t=2TEβπ(xt−ψ(β))2  ≥  ∑t=2Tc0c1+sup⁡β∈BEβπ[J^t−1].\sup_{\beta\in\mathfrak B,\,\psi(\beta)\ne0} \sum_{t=2}^T \mathbb E^\pi_\beta (x_t-\psi(\beta))^2 \;\ge\; \sum_{t=2}^T \frac{c_0}{c_1 + \sup_{\beta\in\mathfrak B}\mathbb E^\pi_\beta[\hat J_{t-1}]}.β∈B,ψ(β)=0sup​t=2∑T​Eβπ​(xt​−ψ(β))2≥t=2∑T​c1​+supβ∈B​Eβπ​[J^t−1​]c0​​.
  1. The same bound with the information replaced by its trivial maximum (§A.3, p. 1158): the right side with (u−l)2(t−1)(u-l)^2(t-1)(u−l)2(t−1) in place of sup⁡βEβπ[J^t−1]\sup_\beta \mathbb E^\pi_\beta[\hat J_{t-1}]supβ​Eβπ​[J^t−1​].
  2. The regret identity and its lower bound (§A.3, p. 1159): with the constants of Lemma 4,
Δπ(T)=sup⁡β∈B, ψ(β)≠0{−β∑t=1TEβπ(xt−ψ(β))2}  ≥  ∣bmax⁡∣∑t=2Tc0c1+(u−l)2(t−1).\Delta^\pi(T) = \sup_{\beta\in\mathfrak B,\,\psi(\beta)\ne0} \Big\{-\beta\sum_{t=1}^T \mathbb E^\pi_\beta (x_t - \psi(\beta))^2\Big\} \;\ge\; |b_{\max}| \sum_{t=2}^T \frac{c_0}{c_1 + (u-l)^2(t-1)}.Δπ(T)=β∈B,ψ(β)=0sup​{−βt=1∑T​Eβπ​(xt​−ψ(β))2}≥∣bmax​∣t=2∑T​c1​+(u−l)2(t−1)c0​​.
  1. The harmonic bound (§A.3, p. 1159): there are K1,K2>0K_1, K_2 > 0K1​,K2​>0 with Δπ(T)≥K1∑t=1T−11/(K2+t)≥K11+K2∑t=1T−11/t\Delta^\pi(T) \ge K_1\sum_{t=1}^{T-1} 1/(K_2+t) \ge \frac{K_1}{1+K_2}\sum_{t=1}^{T-1} 1/tΔπ(T)≥K1​∑t=1T−1​1/(K2​+t)≥1+K2​K1​​∑t=1T−1​1/t.

Significance

Theorem 3 identifies log⁡T\log TlogT as the minimal asymptotic loss rate of the incumbent price problem. Together with the matching upper bound (Theorem 4 of the paper, a separate mission in this series), it separates two regimes. When both demand parameters are unknown the rate is T\sqrt TT​. When the demand at one strictly positive price is known it is log⁡T\log TlogT, even though an uninformative price exists and a myopic seller can stop learning. The lower bound is what makes "asymptotically optimal" meaningful for the semi-myopic policies the paper proposes. The paper places it next to the logarithmic lower bound of Broder and Rusmevichientong (2012, Theorem 4.5), whose binary-response model has no uninformative action; the incumbent price model adds one.

The result is proved on paper and, as far as the platform's corpus shows, not formalized anywhere. A formal development would produce a reusable model of history-dependent policies driven by i.i.d. noise, a scalar Van Trees (Bayesian Cramér–Rao) inequality for adaptively collected Gaussian data, and a template for minimax regret lower bounds that quantify over all policies. The companion missions of this series (the T\sqrt TT​ lower bound, and the two upper bounds) share the model.

Difficulty

The bound quantifies over every non-anticipating policy, including policies that adapt their exploration to the observed history. A frequentist Cramér–Rao bound does not apply, because a policy's prices are neither unbiased estimators nor fixed designs, and the information Eβπ[J^t]\mathbb E^\pi_\beta[\hat J_t]Eβπ​[J^t​] depends on the unknown β\betaβ through the policy's own choices. A two-point argument that compares two slopes controls the error at one pair of parameters. It does not by itself give the per-period trade-off between information and pricing error that must be summed over ttt. The set over which the worst case is taken also excludes the slope at which the incumbent price is optimal. The lower bound must therefore come from slopes where the seller is forced to deviate from p^\hat pp^​, and every deviation earns information but also costs revenue.

Formalization scope

The model is a Lean structure carrying all standing assumptions as fields: 0≤l<u0 \le l < u0≤l<u, p^∈[l,u]\hat p\in[l,u]p^​∈[l,u], D^≠0\hat D\ne 0D^=0, bmin⁡<bmax⁡<0b_{\min}<b_{\max}<0bmin​<bmax​<0, σ>0\sigma>0σ>0, and interiority of the optimal price p^/2−D^/(2β)\hat p/2-\hat D/(2\beta)p^​/2−D^/(2β) for every β∈B\beta\in\mathfrak Bβ∈B. Two of these are corrections that make implicit hypotheses explicit. The first is p^∈[l,u]\hat p\in[l,u]p^​∈[l,u]: p. 1148 calls p^\hat pp^​ the uninformative price "within the feasible price domain", and the proof uses J^s≤(u−l)2s\hat J_s\le(u-l)^2sJ^s​≤(u−l)2s. The second is D^≠0\hat D\ne0D^=0. With D^=0\hat D = 0D^=0 the optimal price p^/2\hat p/2p^​/2 is known and the theorem is false. The paper's reading is D^>0\hat D>0D^>0, and D^≠0\hat D\neq 0D^=0 is the weaker hypothesis the proof needs.

The optimal deviation ψ\psiψ is the closed form, which equals the maximizer (21) under the interiority assumption. Policies are deterministic. The rule of period t+1t+1t+1 is a Borel measurable map from histories encoded as Fin t → ℝ × ℝ into [l,u][l,u][l,u]. The price process is defined by recursion from the shocks on an arbitrary probability space (Ω,P)(\Omega,P)(Ω,P), which realizes the law of the history under π\piπ and β\betaβ. Lean periods start at 000 (Lean period ttt is the paper's period t+1t+1t+1). Expectations are Bochner integrals of bounded measurable functions. The worst-case regret is a real supremum over the subtype {β∈B:ψ(β)≠0}\{\beta\in\mathfrak B:\psi(\beta)\ne0\}{β∈B:ψ(β)=0}, which is nonempty and on which the regrets are uniformly bounded. The constant ccc is quantified before the probability space, the noise, the policy and the horizon. A statement whose constant may depend on π\piπ or TTT, whose supremum is over an empty or unbounded index set, or whose policies can read β\betaβ would be trivially true or false, and none of these is the theorem stated here.

A complete development needs the scalar Van Trees inequality, Fisher information of the Gaussian location-scale history density, measurability of the price process, and harmonic-sum estimates (Real.log against partial sums of 1/t1/t1/t), on top of Mathlib's gaussianReal, iIndepFun and Bochner integration. The Van Trees inequality and the policy/price-process model are reusable beyond this mission. Proofs of the milestones individually, and a general Van Trees inequality in Mathlib style, are welcome.

Selected references

  • N. Bora Keskin and Assaf Zeevi, Dynamic Pricing with an Unknown Demand Model: Asymptotically Optimal Semi-Myopic Policies, Operations Research 62(5):1142–1167, 2014. https://doi.org/10.1287/opre.2014.1294
  • Josef Broder and Paat Rusmevichientong, Dynamic Pricing Under a General Parametric Choice Model, Operations Research 60(4):965–980, 2012. https://doi.org/10.1287/opre.1120.1057
  • Alexander Goldenshluger and Assaf Zeevi, Woodroofe's One-Armed Bandit Problem Revisited, Annals of Applied Probability 19(4):1603–1633, 2009. https://doi.org/10.1214/08-AAP589
  • Richard D. Gill and Boris Y. Levit, Applications of the van Trees Inequality: A Bayesian Cramér–Rao Bound, Bernoulli 1(1–2):59–79, 1995. https://doi.org/10.2307/3318681
9 thms1 active userReviewed
Linear OptimizationOptimizationProbability·Captain: mikedeng1

A Randomized Linear Programming Method for Computing Network Bid Prices II: Directional Derivatives of Expected Perfect-Information Revenue Are Expected LP ValuesResearch Paper

Motivation

Airlines, hotels and railways sell a fixed stock of capacity on several resources at once: a passenger flying from Boston to Los Angeles through Chicago uses a seat on two flight legs. Network revenue management decides which requests to accept, and the standard control is a bid price per leg: accept an itinerary if its fare exceeds the sum of the bid prices of the legs it uses. A good bid price is the marginal expected value of one more unit of capacity.

Talluri and van Ryzin (Transportation Science 33(2), 1999) proposed the randomized linear programming (RLP) method: simulate demand scenarios, solve a linear program with perfect knowledge of each scenario's demand, and average the optimal dual prices. Their main result (a companion mission) says the average is an unbiased estimate of the gradient of expected perfect-information revenue when that gradient exists. This mission is about their §3, the case where it does not: when the LP is degenerate with positive probability, the expected revenue has kinks, averaged dual prices estimate only a supergradient, and the right object is the directional derivative. Proposition 2 of the paper computes it as the expectation of an auxiliary LP value, which again gives an unbiased simulation estimator, now one direction at a time.

Setting

There are mmm legs and nnn itineraries. The incidence matrix A∈{0,1}m×nA \in \{0,1\}^{m \times n}A∈{0,1}m×n has aij=1a_{ij} = 1aij​=1 if itinerary jjj uses leg iii; every column AjA^jAj is nonzero. Fares are r∈Rnr \in \mathbb{R}^nr∈Rn, r≥0r \ge 0r≥0; capacities are x∈Rmx \in \mathbb{R}^mx∈Rm. For a demand vector Y∈RnY \in \mathbb{R}^nY∈Rn, Y≥0Y \ge 0Y≥0, the perfect-information LP value is

v(x,Y)=max⁡{r⊤y:Ay≤x, 0≤y≤Y},v(x, Y) = \max\{r^\top y : Ay \le x,\ 0 \le y \le Y\},v(x,Y)=max{r⊤y:Ay≤x, 0≤y≤Y},

the best revenue obtainable if the demand YYY were known in advance. With YYY a random vector on a probability space (Ω,P)(\Omega, P)(Ω,P), the perfect-information approximation of the value function is JPI(x)=E v(x,Y)J^{PI}(x) = \mathbb{E}\, v(x, Y)JPI(x)=Ev(x,Y).

The Lagrangian of the capacity constraints is

L(x,μ)=∑j=1nYj(rj−μ⊤Aj)++μ⊤x,μ≥0,L(x, \mu) = \sum_{j=1}^n Y^j (r^j - \mu^\top A^j)^+ + \mu^\top x, \qquad \mu \ge 0,L(x,μ)=j=1∑n​Yj(rj−μ⊤Aj)++μ⊤x,μ≥0,

and an optimal vector of dual prices is a minimizer of L(x,⋅)L(x, \cdot)L(x,⋅) over μ≥0\mu \ge 0μ≥0. Since z↦v(z,Y)z \mapsto v(z, Y)z↦v(z,Y) is concave on z≥0z \ge 0z≥0, its superdifferential at xxx is

∂v(x,Y)={μ:v(z,Y)≤v(x,Y)+μ⊤(z−x) for all z≥0}\partial v(x, Y) = \{\mu : v(z, Y) \le v(x, Y) + \mu^\top (z - x) \text{ for all } z \ge 0\}∂v(x,Y)={μ:v(z,Y)≤v(x,Y)+μ⊤(z−x) for all z≥0}

(the paper calls its elements subgradients). For a direction d∈Rmd \in \mathbb{R}^md∈Rm let

u(x,Y;d)=min⁡{d⊤μ:μ an optimal vector of dual prices},u(x, Y; d) = \min\{d^\top \mu : \mu \text{ an optimal vector of dual prices}\},u(x,Y;d)=min{d⊤μ:μ an optimal vector of dual prices},

and let D(x;d)=lim⁡h↓01h[JPI(x+hd)−JPI(x)]D(x; d) = \lim_{h \downarrow 0} \frac1h [J^{PI}(x + hd) - J^{PI}(x)]D(x;d)=limh↓0​h1​[JPI(x+hd)−JPI(x)] be the one-sided directional derivative of JPIJ^{PI}JPI. In Lean these are piValue, JPI, lagr, IsDualOpt, superdiff and u in the namespace RLPBidPrice.Directional.

Formalization targets

Goal: Proposition 2 (corrected)

For xxx with every xi>0x^i > 0xi>0, YYY measurable with Y≥0Y \ge 0Y≥0 almost surely, and every direction ddd,

D(x;d)=lim⁡h↓01h[JPI(x+hd)−JPI(x)]=E u(x,Y;d).D(x; d) = \lim_{h \downarrow 0} \frac1h\big[J^{PI}(x + hd) - J^{PI}(x)\big] = \mathbb{E}\, u(x, Y; d).D(x;d)=h↓0lim​h1​[JPI(x+hd)−JPI(x)]=Eu(x,Y;d).

No condition on the distribution of YYY is imposed, which is the point: this is the nondifferentiable case.

Milestones

  1. Lemma 2. ∣v(x+hei,Y)−v(x,Y)∣≤hmax⁡jrj|v(x + h e^i, Y) - v(x, Y)| \le h \max_j r^j∣v(x+hei,Y)−v(x,Y)∣≤hmaxj​rj for x,Y≥0x, Y \ge 0x,Y≥0, h≥0h \ge 0h≥0.
  2. §3.1, pointwise. An optimal dual price vector μ\muμ satisfies v(z,Y)≤v(x,Y)+μ⊤(z−x)v(z, Y) \le v(x, Y) + \mu^\top(z - x)v(z,Y)≤v(x,Y)+μ⊤(z−x) for all z≥0z \ge 0z≥0.
  3. §3.1, in expectation. For a measurable selection μ(ω)\mu(\omega)μ(ω) of optimal dual prices and x>0x > 0x>0, JPI(z)≤JPI(x)+(Eμ)⊤(z−x)J^{PI}(z) \le J^{PI}(x) + (\mathbb{E}\mu)^\top(z - x)JPI(z)≤JPI(x)+(Eμ)⊤(z−x).
  4. Superdifferential. For x>0x > 0x>0, ∂v(x,Y)\partial v(x, Y)∂v(x,Y) equals the set of optimal dual prices and lies in [0,max⁡jrj]m[0, \max_j r^j]^m[0,maxj​rj]m.
  5. Pointwise directional derivative. For x>0x > 0x>0, lim⁡h↓01h[v(x+hd,Y)−v(x,Y)]=inf⁡{d⊤μ:μ∈∂v(x,Y)}\lim_{h \downarrow 0} \frac1h[v(x + hd, Y) - v(x, Y)] = \inf\{d^\top\mu : \mu \in \partial v(x, Y)\}limh↓0​h1​[v(x+hd,Y)−v(x,Y)]=inf{d⊤μ:μ∈∂v(x,Y)}.
  6. Proposition 1. For a fixed measurable dual selection fff and pairwise independent samples YiY_iYi​ distributed as YYY, 1N∑i≤Nf(Yi)\frac1N\sum_{i \le N} f(Y_i)N1​∑i≤N​f(Yi​) converges almost surely to a supergradient of JPIJ^{PI}JPI at xxx.

Significance

The result. In the differentiable case the RLP bid prices are the averaged dual prices. When degeneracy has positive probability, which happens for discrete demand and for many network structures, Proposition 2 is what remains true: the marginal value of capacity in any direction, in particular in the direction AjA^jAj of an itinerary (the displacement cost of accepting it), is the expectation of a scenario-wise LP quantity. Averaging u(x,Yi;d)u(x, Y_i; d)u(x,Yi​;d) over simulated scenarios is an unbiased estimator of it. Milestone 3 and Proposition 1 say what the plain RLP average estimates in this case (a supergradient), and why the choice of LP algorithm matters for whether it converges at all.

Formalizing it. The paper's argument is a short paragraph; its printed version is not correct as stated (see the scope section), so a machine-checked proof also settles which version holds. The mission produces a formal theory of the parametric LP value v(x,Y)v(x, Y)v(x,Y) in its right-hand side: concavity, the Lipschitz bound, the identification of its superdifferential with the Lagrangian dual optimal set, and its directional derivatives, together with the interchange of a one-sided limit and an expectation. As far as a search of the platform shows, none of this, and no revenue-management gradient result, is formalized yet; the platform's LP sensitivity theorem is for standard-form LPs with a full-row-rank matrix and does not cover this model.

Difficulty

The pointwise facts are classical convex analysis and LP duality, but they have to be proved for a supremum defined over a polytope, not quoted, and Mathlib has no LP duality theorem in this form. The identification of the superdifferential needs strong duality for the LP with the box 0≤y≤Y0 \le y \le Y0≤y≤Y, and the box is exactly where the paper's own formula (22) goes wrong: the dual variables of y≤Yy \le Yy≤Y cannot be dropped.

The step from the pointwise derivative to the expectation is a dominated convergence argument for one-sided difference quotients, which needs a bound uniform in YYY and measurability of ω↦u(x,Y(ω);d)\omega \mapsto u(x, Y(\omega); d)ω↦u(x,Y(ω);d). The obvious route, differentiating under the integral sign as in the differentiable case, is not available: JPIJ^{PI}JPI is not differentiable, and a two-sided limit is false. The measurability of uuu is not given by a formula; it has to come from uuu being a limit of measurable difference quotients.

Formalization scope

Capacities, demands and fares are real vectors indexed by Fin m and Fin n; AAA is a real matrix with 0/1 entries and nonzero columns (IsIncidence A); r≥0r \ge 0r≥0. The paper's remaining-time index kkk is notation only and is dropped. vvv is a real sSup over the feasible objective values: for x≥0x \ge 0x≥0, Y≥0Y \ge 0Y≥0 it is the LP maximum, and otherwise it is 000, so every statement assumes x≥0x \ge 0x≥0 or x>0x > 0x>0 and Y≥0Y \ge 0Y≥0 (almost surely), and the superdifferential is taken over z≥0z \ge 0z≥0 only. Optimal dual prices are defined through the Lagrangian (13)–(14); they are the μ\muμ-parts of the optimal solutions of the LP dual. uuu is a real sInf, which would be 000 on an empty set; for x>0x > 0x>0 the dual optimal set is nonempty and bounded, so uuu is an attained minimum and the goal is not vacuous. Directional derivatives are one-sided limits (nhdsWithin 0 (Set.Ioi 0)). Expectations are Bochner integrals; no integrability of YYY is assumed or needed, since vvv and uuu are bounded.

The following corrections to the printed text are part of the statements, each with a counterexample to the printed version:

  • Eq. (22) omits the duals of y≤Yy \le Yy≤Y: with one leg, one itinerary, r=1r = 1r=1, x=1x = 1x=1, YYY uniform on [0,2][0, 2][0,2], D(1;1)=1/2D(1; 1) = 1/2D(1;1)=1/2, but the printed (22) gives E u=3/4\mathbb{E}\,u = 3/4Eu=3/4. Here uuu minimizes over the optimal dual prices of (14).
  • The superdifferential formula in the proof of Proposition 2 has the same omission: for r=1r = 1r=1, x=1x = 1x=1, Y=1/2Y = 1/2Y=1/2 the printed set is {1/2}\{1/2\}{1/2}, the true one {0}\{0\}{0}.
  • The §3.1 inequality is printed with ≥\ge≥; vvv is concave, and r=1r = 1r=1, Y=5Y = 5Y=5, x=1x = 1x=1, μ=1\mu = 1μ=1, z=10z = 10z=10 gives 5≥105 \ge 105≥10. The expectation version also misprints z−yz - yz−y for z−xz - xz−x.
  • x>0x > 0x>0 is implicit: at a zero capacity the dual prices of that leg are unbounded and a direction leaving x≥0x \ge 0x≥0 makes the LP infeasible.
  • Proposition 1 is formalized for an algorithm returning a fixed measurable function of the current demand ("initialized with the same data on each run"), with "always exists" read as almost sure convergence.

A statement of the goal with the printed (22), or with uuu defined over an arbitrary or empty set so that sInf returns 000, or with a two-sided limit, is ruled out: the first two are false or vacuous for the reasons above, the third is false.

A complete development needs LP duality for max⁡{r⊤y:Ay≤x,0≤y≤Y}\max\{r^\top y : Ay \le x, 0 \le y \le Y\}max{r⊤y:Ay≤x,0≤y≤Y}, concavity and the Lipschitz bound of the value function, the directional derivative of a finite concave function on an open set, and dominated convergence (Mathlib's MeasureTheory.tendsto_integral_filter_of_dominated_convergence); Proposition 1 uses ProbabilityTheory.strong_law_ae. The LP duality and parametric value-function results are reusable for any mission about LP-based bid prices or two-stage stochastic programs. Contributions of any milestone separately are welcome.

Selected references

  • K. Talluri, G. van Ryzin, A Randomized Linear Programming Method for Computing Network Bid Prices, Transportation Science 33(2):207–216, 1999. https://doi.org/10.1287/trsc.33.2.207
  • M. S. Bazaraa, H. D. Sherali, C. M. Shetty, Nonlinear Programming: Theory and Algorithms, 2nd ed., Wiley, 1993 (the paper cites p. 218 of this edition; 3rd ed. 2006: https://doi.org/10.1002/0471787779).
  • K. Talluri, G. van Ryzin, An Analysis of Bid-Price Controls for Network Revenue Management, Management Science 44(11):1577–1593, 1998. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.44.11.1577
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Linear OptimizationOptimizationProbability·Captain: mikedeng1

A Randomized Linear Programming Method for Computing Network Bid Prices I: Averaged LP Dual Prices Are an Unbiased Estimate of the Gradient of Expected Perfect-Information RevenueResearch Paper

Motivation

Airlines, hotels and railways sell fixed capacity on networks of resources. In network revenue management a request for an itinerary that uses several flight legs is accepted or rejected in real time, and the dominant industrial control is the bid-price control: every leg carries a price, and a request is accepted only if its fare is at least the sum of the bid prices of the legs it uses. A good bid price is the marginal expected value of one more seat on the leg, which is a gradient of an expected-revenue function with respect to capacity.

The classical way to compute bid prices, the deterministic linear program, replaces random demand by its mean and reads off the dual prices of the capacity constraints. It ignores all distributional information and gives a zero bid price to every leg whose mean demand is below capacity. Talluri and van Ryzin (Transp. Sci. 33(2), 1999) studied the randomized linear programming (RLP) method instead: simulate demand vectors Y1,…,YNY_1, \dots, Y_NY1​,…,YN​, solve one linear program per sample with the realized demand as an upper bound, and average the dual prices. Their Theorem 1 asserts that this average is an unbiased estimator of the gradient of the expected perfect-information revenue. For one leg and one fare class it recovers Littlewood's rule, ddxE v(x,Y)=r P(Y>x)\frac{d}{dx}\mathbb{E}\,v(x,Y) = r\,P(Y > x)dxd​Ev(x,Y)=rP(Y>x) (Littlewood 1972, cited on p. 209 of the paper).

Setting

A network has mmm legs and nnn itineraries. The incidence matrix A∈{0,1}m×nA \in \{0,1\}^{m\times n}A∈{0,1}m×n has aij=1a_{ij} = 1aij​=1 exactly when itinerary jjj uses leg iii, and every column AjA^jAj is nonzero. Fares are r=(r1,…,rn)≥0r = (r^1, \dots, r^n) \ge 0r=(r1,…,rn)≥0 and capacities are a real vector x≥0x \ge 0x≥0. Demand to come is a random vector Y=(Y1,…,Yn)≥0Y = (Y^1, \dots, Y^n) \ge 0Y=(Y1,…,Yn)≥0 on a probability space (Ω,P)(\Omega, P)(Ω,P).

The perfect-information LP value is

v(x,Y)=max⁡{ r⊤y  :  Ay≤x, 0≤y≤Y },v(x, Y) = \max\{\, r^\top y \;:\; Ay \le x,\ 0 \le y \le Y \,\},v(x,Y)=max{r⊤y:Ay≤x, 0≤y≤Y},

the revenue obtainable if the demand were known in advance, and the perfect-information approximation of the value function is JPI(x)=E v(x,Y)J^{PI}(x) = \mathbb{E}\,v(x, Y)JPI(x)=Ev(x,Y). The Lagrangian dual function of the capacity constraints is

L(x,μ)=∑j=1nYj (rj−μ⊤Aj)++μ⊤x,L(x, \mu) = \sum_{j=1}^n Y^j\,(r^j - \mu^\top A^j)^+ + \mu^\top x ,L(x,μ)=j=1∑n​Yj(rj−μ⊤Aj)++μ⊤x,

and an optimal dual price vector μ(x,Y)\mu(x, Y)μ(x,Y) is a minimizer of L(x,⋅)L(x, \cdot)L(x,⋅) over μ≥0\mu \ge 0μ≥0. In Lean these are piValue, JPI, lagr and IsDualOpt in the namespace RLPBidPrice.Unbiased.

Two conditions govern the result. Condition C1′: whenever xxx lies in the linear span of a set of columns of [A I][A\ I][A I] (columns of AAA and unit vectors eie^iei), that set spans Rm\mathbb{R}^mRm. Condition 2: every distribution function t↦P(Yj≤t)t \mapsto P(Y^j \le t)t↦P(Yj≤t) is continuous. The components Y1,…,YnY^1, \dots, Y^nY1,…,Yn are also assumed mutually independent.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 1 (corrected)

Under C1′, Condition 2 and independence,

∇xE v(x,Y)=E ∇xv(x,Y)=E μ(x,Y).\nabla_x \mathbb{E}\,v(x, Y) = \mathbb{E}\,\nabla_x v(x, Y) = \mathbb{E}\,\mu(x, Y).∇x​Ev(x,Y)=E∇x​v(x,Y)=Eμ(x,Y).

In Lean (theorem1_unbiased_gradient) this is three clauses: v(⋅,Y)v(\cdot, Y)v(⋅,Y) is differentiable at xxx almost surely; JPIJ^{PI}JPI is Fréchet differentiable at xxx with derivative the expectation of the pathwise derivatives; and for every measurable, almost surely optimal dual selection μ\muμ, JPIJ^{PI}JPI has gradient E μ(x,Y)\mathbb{E}\,\mu(x, Y)Eμ(x,Y) at xxx.

Milestones

  1. Lemma 1 (Glasserman): a random function that is Lipschitz in θ\thetaθ with a constant KKK and almost surely differentiable at θ\thetaθ can be differentiated under the expectation.
  2. Lemma 2: ∣v(x+hei,Y)−v(x,Y)∣≤h rˉ|v(x + h e^i, Y) - v(x, Y)| \le h\,\bar r∣v(x+hei,Y)−v(x,Y)∣≤hrˉ with rˉ=max⁡jrj\bar r = \max_j r^jrˉ=maxj​rj.
  3. Differentiability and uniqueness (§2.1, p. 210): for x>0x > 0x>0, v(⋅,Y)v(\cdot, Y)v(⋅,Y) is differentiable at xxx if and only if the optimal dual price vector is unique.
  4. Strong duality (§2.1, p. 211): an optimal μ∗\mu_*μ∗​ exists, v(x,Y)=L(x,μ∗)v(x, Y) = L(x, \mu_*)v(x,Y)=L(x,μ∗​), v(z,Y)≤v(x,Y)+μ∗⊤(z−x)v(z, Y) \le v(x, Y) + \mu_*^\top(z - x)v(z,Y)≤v(x,Y)+μ∗⊤​(z−x) for all z≥0z \ge 0z≥0, and a unique μ∗\mu_*μ∗​ is the gradient at x>0x > 0x>0.
  5. Lemma 3 (corrected): under C1′, a feasible direction ddd from μ∗\mu_*μ∗​ with d⊤Aj=0d^\top A^j = 0d⊤Aj=0 on the index sets E0∪E1E_0 \cup E_1E0​∪E1​ of Eqs. (16)–(17) and d⊤x=0d^\top x = 0d⊤x=0 is zero.
  6. Lemma 4 (corrected): under C1′, Condition 2 and independence, ∇xv(x,Y)\nabla_x v(x, Y)∇x​v(x,Y) exists with probability one.

Significance

The theorem justifies a widely used method: it says that the simple procedure of averaging simulated LP dual prices targets the gradient of a well-defined expected-revenue function, and by the strong law of large numbers the average is also consistent. It separates the RLP method from the deterministic LP, whose dual prices are gradients of a different function, and it isolates exactly when that justification fails (degenerate LPs with positive probability, discussed in §2.2 of the paper and treated by directional derivatives in its §3).

The printed statement is false, and the formalization records that. Condition 1 of the paper looks only at the columns of AAA and ignores the slack columns of Ay≤xAy \le xAy≤x; the paper's Condition 2 is marginal and does not rule out dependent demands whose sum hits capacity. The corrected statement, with C1′ and independence, is the one this mission targets. No machine-checked version of this result, or of LP sensitivity analysis under random right-hand sides of this kind, is known to exist; formalizing it gives a checked statement of the hypotheses under which the RLP estimator is unbiased.

Difficulty

The pathwise facts are LP duality; the delicate step is the almost-sure uniqueness of the dual prices. Degeneracy of an LP is a condition on finitely many bases, but the set of dual optima depends on YYY, and the natural argument that fixes a direction ddd and shows that d⊤(x−∑jYjAj)=0d^\top(x - \sum_{j} Y^j A^j) = 0d⊤(x−∑j​YjAj)=0 has probability zero does not work as written: the direction depends on YYY, and a direction that improves the Lagrangian may leave the orthant μ≥0\mu \ge 0μ≥0. This is precisely where the printed Condition 1 fails. A second difficulty is the passage from almost-sure differentiability of v(⋅,Y)v(\cdot, Y)v(⋅,Y) to a full Fréchet derivative of JPIJ^{PI}JPI on Rm\mathbb{R}^mRm, with the measurability of the random derivative and of the dual selection.

Formalization scope

Legs and itineraries are Fin m and Fin n; AAA is a real matrix with entries in {0,1}\{0,1\}{0,1} and nonzero columns; capacities are real vectors. The paper's remaining-time index kkk is notation only and is dropped. vvv is a real sSup over feasible objective values; since the feasible set is empty when xxx or YYY has a negative entry (the value is then 000), every statement assumes x≥0x \ge 0x≥0 and Y≥0Y \ge 0Y≥0 almost surely, and derivatives are taken where xxx is interior (C1′ forces xi≠0x^i \neq 0xi=0). Optimal dual prices are minimizers of the Lagrangian (13) over μ≥0\mu \ge 0μ≥0, which are the μ\muμ-parts of the optimal solutions of the LP dual of (6)–(8). Gradients are Fréchet derivatives on Fin m → ℝ, encoded by the linear functional h↦∑igihih \mapsto \sum_i g^i h^ih↦∑i​gihi (gradCLM g). Condition 2 is continuity of t↦P(Yj≤t)t \mapsto P(Y^j \le t)t↦P(Yj≤t); independence is iIndepFun. YYY is measurable; no integrability of YYY is assumed, since 0≤v(x,Y)≤rˉ∑ixi0 \le v(x, Y) \le \bar r\sum_i x^i0≤v(x,Y)≤rˉ∑i​xi.

Every correction is labelled in the statements. C1 → C1′: with AAA having rows (0,1,1),(1,1,0),(1,0,1)(0,1,1),(1,1,0),(1,0,1)(0,1,1),(1,1,0),(1,0,1), r=(100,1,1)r = (100,1,1)r=(100,1,1), x=(1,1,1)x = (1,1,1)x=(1,1,1) and YjY^jYj i.i.d. uniform on [0,2][0,2][0,2], Conditions 1 and 2 hold but E v(⋅,Y)\mathbb{E}\,v(\cdot, Y)Ev(⋅,Y) has one-sided slopes of about 0.740.740.74 and 50.550.550.5 in the second coordinate at xxx. Independence added: with one leg, x=1x = 1x=1, fares (2,1)(2,1)(2,1) and Y2=1−Y1Y^2 = 1 - Y^1Y2=1−Y1, Y1Y^1Y1 uniform on [0,1][0,1][0,1], the LP is degenerate almost surely. Implicit hypotheses made explicit: x≥0x \ge 0x≥0, Y≥0Y \ge 0Y≥0, r≥0r \ge 0r≥0 (Lemma 2's bound needs rˉ≥0\bar r \ge 0rˉ≥0), nonzero 0/1 columns.

The goal is not trivialized by a selection: it states the selection-free identity ∇xE v=E ∇xv\nabla_x \mathbb{E}\,v = \mathbb{E}\,\nabla_x v∇x​Ev=E∇x​v, and the dual-price form quantifies only over measurable selections that are optimal almost surely; it assumes neither almost-sure differentiability, nor almost-sure uniqueness of the dual, nor a joint density, nor nondegeneracy.

A complete development needs LP duality for bounded-variable LPs in Lagrangian form, concave polyhedral functions and their superdifferentials, a finite enumeration of bases of [A I][A\ I][A I], and differentiation under the integral sign for Lipschitz integrands (Mathlib has hasFDerivAt_integral_of_dominated_loc_of_lip). The LP duality and sensitivity results are reusable for other revenue-management and stochastic-programming missions. Contributions of any milestone, of the counterexamples as formal statements, and of alternative proofs are welcome.

Selected references

  • K. Talluri, G. van Ryzin, A Randomized Linear Programming Method for Computing Network Bid Prices, Transportation Science 33(2):207–216, 1999. https://doi.org/10.1287/trsc.33.2.207
  • P. Glasserman, Perturbation Analysis of Production Networks, in D. Yao (ed.), Stochastic Modeling and Analysis of Manufacturing Systems, Springer-Verlag, Berlin, 1994 (source of Lemma 1; as cited in the paper).
  • K. Littlewood, Forecasting and Control of Passengers, 12th AGIFORS Symposium Proceedings, 1972 (as cited in the paper).
  • M. S. Bazaraa, H. D. Sherali, C. M. Shetty, Nonlinear Programming: Theory and Algorithms, John Wiley, New York, 1993, Chapter 6 (Lagrangian duality; as cited in the paper).
8 thms1 active userReviewed
Dynamic ProgrammingOptimizationProbability·Captain: mikedeng1

An Analysis of Bid-Price Controls for Network Revenue Management II: Bid-Price Controls Are Not Optimal in GeneralResearch Paper

Motivation

Airlines, hotels and other capacity-constrained sellers decide, request by request, whether to sell a unit of a perishable resource now or hold it for a more valuable request later. In an airline network an itinerary uses seats on several flight legs at once, so the decision couples the legs. Bid-price controls are a widely used practical answer: each leg carries a threshold price, the bid price, and a request is accepted if and only if its fare covers the sum of the bid prices of the seats it uses. They are simple to store, to explain and to compute from linear programming duals (Simpson 1989 and Williamson 1992, as cited by Talluri and van Ryzin 1998, p. 1581).

Talluri and van Ryzin, An Analysis of Bid-Price Controls for Network Revenue Management, Management Science 44(11), 1998, asked whether this simplicity costs revenue. Their Proposition 1 shows that the optimal policy of the underlying dynamic program already compares each fare with an opportunity cost, which suggests that bid prices might be exactly optimal. Their §3.1 shows they are not: a two-leg, two-period instance in which the best bid-price control earns 10% less than the optimal policy. The same paper then proves (Theorem 1, a separate mission) that fixed bid prices are asymptotically optimal in large networks; the counterexample shows that this asymptotic statement cannot be sharpened to exact optimality.

Setting

A network has mmm legs and nnn itineraries; aij∈Na_{ij} \in \mathbb{N}aij​∈N seats of leg iii are used by itinerary jjj, A=[aij]A = [a_{ij}]A=[aij​], and AjA^jAj is the jjj-th column. The state is the vector y∈Nmy \in \mathbb{N}^my∈Nm of remaining capacities; selling itinerary jjj moves it to y−Ajy - A^jy−Aj. Time is counted backwards: period ttt has ttt periods to go.

In each period one request vector Rt∈RnR_t \in \mathbb{R}^nRt​∈Rn arrives: Rtj>0R_t^j > 0Rtj​>0 is a request for itinerary jjj with revenue RtjR_t^jRtj​, and Rt=0R_t = 0Rt​=0 means no request. Requests lie in S={αe:e∈En, α≥0}\mathcal{S} = \{\alpha e : e \in E_n,\ \alpha \ge 0\}S={αe:e∈En​, α≥0}, where En={e0=0,e1,…,en}E_n = \{e_0 = 0, e_1, \dots, e_n\}En​={e0​=0,e1​,…,en​}: at most one component is positive. The requests of different periods are independent, with laws FtF_tFt​ concentrated on S\mathcal{S}S and with finite first moments.

A control chooses in each period a decision ut(y,r)∈U(y)={e∈En:Ae≤y}u_t(y, r) \in \mathcal{U}(y) = \{e \in E_n : Ae \le y\}ut​(y,r)∈U(y)={e∈En​:Ae≤y} (reject, or sell one itinerary that fits), measurably in the request rrr. Its expected revenue is

V0u(y)=0,Vtu(y)=E[Rt ut(y,Rt)+Vt−1u(y−A ut(y,Rt))].V^u_0(y) = 0, \qquad V^u_t(y) = \mathbb{E}\big[R_t\,u_t(y, R_t) + V^u_{t-1}(y - A\,u_t(y, R_t))\big].V0u​(y)=0,Vtu​(y)=E[Rt​ut​(y,Rt​)+Vt−1u​(y−Aut​(y,Rt​))].

The optimal expected revenue Jt(y)J_t(y)Jt​(y) solves the Bellman equations

J0(y)=0,Jt(y)=E[max⁡e∈U(y)(Rte+Jt−1(y−Ae))].J_0(y) = 0, \qquad J_t(y) = \mathbb{E}\Big[\max_{e \in \mathcal{U}(y)} \big(R_t e + J_{t-1}(y - Ae)\big)\Big].J0​(y)=0,Jt​(y)=E[e∈U(y)max​(Rt​e+Jt−1​(y−Ae))].

A bid-price control (Definition 1) is given by real-valued bid prices μti(y)\mu_t^i(y)μti​(y) for every leg, period and capacity, and accepts an arriving request for itinerary jjj if and only if Aj≤yA^j \le yAj≤y and

rj≥∑i∈Aj∑h=0aij−1μti(y−hei).r^j \ge \sum_{i \in A^j} \sum_{h=0}^{a_{ij}-1} \mu_t^i(y - h e_i).rj≥i∈Aj∑​h=0∑aij​−1​μti​(y−hei​).

The instance of §3.1 has two legs with one seat each, the through itinerary (1,1)(1,1)(1,1) and the local itineraries (1,0)(1,0)(1,0), (0,1)(0,1)(0,1), and two periods. In period 2 a $500 through request arrives with probability 0.4 and a $250 request for each local itinerary with probability 0.3; in period 1 a $500 through request arrives with probability 0.8, and nothing with probability 0.2.

Formalization targets

Goal: the §3.1 counterexample

In the §3.1 instance, from capacity (1,1)(1,1)(1,1) with two periods to go,

max⁡u admissibleV2u(1,1)=440,max⁡μV2uμ(1,1)=400,\max_{u \text{ admissible}} V^u_2(1,1) = 440, \qquad \max_{\mu} V^{u^\mu}_2(1,1) = 400,u admissiblemax​V2u​(1,1)=440,μmax​V2uμ​(1,1)=400,

where uμu^\muuμ is the bid-price control with bid prices μ\muμ; both maxima are attained. The goal fixes the paper's instance and its numbers exactly.

Milestones

  1. Equation (5): for k≥1k \ge 1k≥1, Jk(x)=Jk−1(x)+∑j:Aj≤xE(Rkj+Jk−1(x−Aj)−Jk−1(x))+J_k(x) = J_{k-1}(x) + \sum_{j : A^j \le x} \mathbb{E}\big(R_k^j + J_{k-1}(x - A^j) - J_{k-1}(x)\big)^+Jk​(x)=Jk−1​(x)+∑j:Aj≤x​E(Rkj​+Jk−1​(x−Aj)−Jk−1​(x))+.
  2. Proposition 1: with finite first moments, Jk(x)J_k(x)Jk​(x) is finite, the threshold control u∗u^*u∗ that accepts jjj iff rj≥Jk−1(x)−Jk−1(x−Aj)r^j \ge J_{k-1}(x) - J_{k-1}(x - A^j)rj≥Jk−1​(x)−Jk−1​(x−Aj) and Aj≤xA^j \le xAj≤x attains JkJ_kJk​, and no admissible control does better.
  3. Values of the instance: J1(1,1)=400J_1(1,1) = 400J1​(1,1)=400, J1=0J_1 = 0J1​=0 at the other capacities, J2(1,1)=440J_2(1,1) = 440J2​(1,1)=440.
  4. No bid prices reproduce the optimal period-2 decisions: for every μ\muμ there is a period-2 request of positive probability at which the bid-price decision differs from that of every optimal control.

Significance

The result shows that the class of bid-price controls, the standard control class of network revenue management practice, does not contain an optimal policy in general, even though the optimal policy of Proposition 1 has a threshold form. The loss in the example is 10% of expected revenue, and it arises because the opportunity cost of a two-leg itinerary is not the sum of the opportunity costs of its legs. This is the negative half of the paper's analysis; the positive half is the asymptotic optimality of fixed bid prices (Theorem 1).

On the formal side, the mission builds a reusable finite-horizon model of network capacity control: request laws on S\mathcal{S}S, admissible Markov controls, their expected revenue, the Bellman value, and a proof that the Bellman value is the optimum over admissible controls (Proposition 1). The paper's argument for the counterexample is a few lines of inspection; formalizing it requires the upper bound over all admissible controls and the lower bound over all bid prices, including negative, time- and state-dependent ones. A search of the Prove2Me corpus (2026-09-25) found no network capacity-control model: the existing revenue-management items treat a single resource with discrete fare classes, and the existing finite-horizon dynamic-programming items assume a finite disturbance space, which excludes the request laws used here. As far as known, none of this has a machine-checked proof.

Difficulty

The upper bound V2u(1,1)≤440V^u_2(1,1) \le 440V2u​(1,1)≤440 ranges over every measurable admissible control, not over a finite menu; it needs Proposition 1, i.e. the verification theorem for a finite-horizon dynamic program with continuous state of the request and integrability under only finite first moments. The bid-price bound ranges over arbitrary real-valued bid-price functions of the period and the capacity, so the argument must show that every realizable pattern of period-2 decisions earns at most 400, not only that one pattern is unrealizable. Equation (5) is an identity between Bochner integrals under only finite first moments, so every integrand involved must be shown integrable rather than assumed so.

Formalization scope

Legs are Fin m, itineraries Fin n, A : Fin m → Fin n → ℕ, capacities Fin m → ℕ, requests Fin n → ℝ, laws F : ℕ → Measure (Fin n → ℝ) indexed by time-to-go; expectations are Bochner integrals. A decision is Option (Fin n) (none is reject). Controls are Markov and may depend on the whole request vector; admissibility requires decisions in U(y)\mathcal{U}(y)U(y) and measurability in the request. The request laws are probability measures concentrated on S\mathcal{S}S with integrable coordinates; the continuity of fare distributions assumed in §1 of the paper is not assumed, because Proposition 1 does not need it and the §3.1 instance has deterministic fares, which the paper itself notes (p. 1581). The paper's remark that a continuous perturbation gives the same counterexample is not formalized. Read literally, (1) and (4) set uj=1u^j = 1uj=1 for every itinerary whose zero fare meets its threshold, which is not a unit vector; both are formalized as accepting only the arriving request (rj>0r^j > 0rj>0), at most one per period on S\mathcal{S}S. In (1), "x−hx - hx−h" is read as y−heiy - h e_iy−hei​, hhh fewer seats on leg iii. "Jk(x)J_k(x)Jk​(x) is finite" is stated as integrability of the Bellman integrands. Probabilities are exact rationals and fares exact reals. The goal cannot be discharged by restricting the bid prices (constant or nonnegative ones only) or the competing controls (a finite list): the Lean statement quantifies over all real-valued bid-price functions and all admissible controls, and it asserts attainment of both maxima, not only the strict inequality 400<440400 < 440400<440.

Reusable parts: the model definitions (bid-price controls, admissible controls, the Bellman value) and Proposition 1 as a verification theorem for finite-horizon capacity control. Contributions are welcome on any milestone; Proposition 1 and equation (5) are general and independent of the instance.

Selected references

  • K. Talluri, G. van Ryzin, An Analysis of Bid-Price Controls for Network Revenue Management, Management Science 44(11), 1577–1593, 1998. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.44.11.1577
  • D. P. Bertsekas, Dynamic Programming and Optimal Control, Athena Scientific, 1995 (the Bellman equation (2) cites p. 18). http://www.athenasc.com/dpbook.html
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Dynamic ProgrammingOptimizationProbability·Captain: mikedeng1

An Analysis of Bid-Price Controls for Network Revenue Management I: The Fixed-Bid-Price Heuristic Is Asymptotically OptimalResearch Paper

Motivation

Airlines, hotels and rental-car firms sell a fixed, perishable capacity to customers who arrive over time and pay different prices. In an airline network, one ticket for an origin–destination itinerary consumes seats on several flight legs at once, so accepting a cheap connecting passenger today can displace a more valuable request tomorrow on any of those legs. The exact optimal accept/reject rule is a dynamic program whose state is the whole vector of remaining leg capacities, which is intractable at airline scale.

Bid-price control is the standard practical answer. Each leg iii carries a price μi\mu^iμi, and a request for itinerary jjj is accepted only if its revenue exceeds the sum of the bid prices of the seats it uses. Talluri and van Ryzin (Management Science 44(11), 1998) gave the first rigorous analysis of this scheme. They showed that bid prices are not optimal in general, the subject of a separate mission in this series. They also showed that one fixed vector of bid prices, obtained from a convex upper-bound problem, is asymptotically optimal when capacity and demand are scaled up together. This mission targets that positive result, Theorem 1 of the paper. It is one of the results most often cited to justify the use of bid prices and of deterministic or fluid upper bounds in revenue management; see Talluri and van Ryzin, The Theory and Practice of Revenue Management (Springer, 2004), Ch. 3.

Setting

A network has mmm legs and nnn itineraries. Itinerary jjj uses aij∈Na_{ij} \in \mathbb{N}aij​∈N seats of leg iii; A=[aij]A = [a_{ij}]A=[aij​] and AjA^jAj is its jjj-th column. The state is the vector y∈Nmy \in \mathbb{N}^my∈Nm of remaining capacities, and time is counted backwards: period ttt has ttt periods to go, and the horizon is kkk.

In each period one request vector Rt=(Rt1,…,Rtn)R_t = (R_t^1, \dots, R_t^n)Rt​=(Rt1​,…,Rtn​) arrives. It lies in S={αe:e∈{0,e1,…,en}, α≥0}\mathcal{S} = \{\alpha e : e \in \{0, e_1, \dots, e_n\},\ \alpha \ge 0\}S={αe:e∈{0,e1​,…,en​}, α≥0}: at most one component is positive, Rtj>0R_t^j > 0Rtj​>0 is a request for itinerary jjj with revenue RtjR_t^jRtj​, and Rt=0R_t = 0Rt​=0 means no request. The RtR_tRt​ are independent with laws FtF_tFt​ concentrated on S\mathcal{S}S. Each marginal P(Rtj≤r)P(R_t^j \le r)P(Rtj​≤r) is continuous on (0,+∞)(0, +\infty)(0,+∞), and each RtjR_t^jRtj​ has a finite mean. These are the paper's standing assumptions. For the asymptotic result the revenues are also bounded: Rtj≤CR_t^j \le CRtj​≤C almost surely.

The optimal expected revenue Jt(y)J_t(y)Jt​(y) solves the Bellman equations

J0(y)=0,Jt(y)=E[max⁡(Jt−1(y), max⁡j: Aj≤y(Rtj+Jt−1(y−Aj)))].J_0(y) = 0, \qquad J_t(y) = \mathbb{E}\Big[\max\Big(J_{t-1}(y),\ \max_{j:\,A^j \le y}\big(R_t^j + J_{t-1}(y - A^j)\big)\Big)\Big].J0​(y)=0,Jt​(y)=E[max(Jt−1​(y), j:Aj≤ymax​(Rtj​+Jt−1​(y−Aj)))].

For bid prices μ≥0\mu \ge 0μ≥0 write μAj=∑iμiaij\mu A^j = \sum_i \mu^i a_{ij}μAj=∑i​μiaij​ and define the relaxed value

Jˉk(x,μ)=∑t=1k∑j=1nE (Rtj−μAj)++μx.\bar J_k(x, \mu) = \sum_{t=1}^k \sum_{j=1}^n \mathbb{E}\,(R_t^j - \mu A^j)^+ + \mu x .Jˉk​(x,μ)=t=1∑k​j=1∑n​E(Rtj​−μAj)++μx.

The convex program vk(x)=min⁡μ≥0Jˉk(x,μ)v_k(x) = \min_{\mu \ge 0} \bar J_k(x, \mu)vk​(x)=minμ≥0​Jˉk​(x,μ) has an optimal solution μ∗\mu^*μ∗.

The fixed-bid-price heuristic uses μ∗\mu^*μ∗ throughout the horizon. It accepts a request for itinerary jjj with revenue rrr if and only if the remaining capacity suffices (Aj≤yA^j \le yAj≤y) and r>μ∗Ajr > \mu^* A^jr>μ∗Aj. The θ\thetaθ-scaled problem, for an integer θ≥1\theta \ge 1θ≥1, has capacity θx\theta xθx, horizon θk\theta kθk and request laws Rt(θ)∼F⌈t/θ⌉R_t(\theta) \sim F_{\lceil t/\theta \rceil}Rt​(θ)∼F⌈t/θ⌉​. Each original period is thus split into θ\thetaθ independent copies. Write Jθk(θx)J_{\theta k}(\theta x)Jθk​(θx) for its optimal expected revenue and JθkH(θx)J^H_{\theta k}(\theta x)JθkH​(θx) for the expected revenue of the heuristic with the bid prices μ∗\mu^*μ∗ of the original problem.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 1

There is a constant KKK, depending on the instance (A,F,C,k,x,μ∗)(A, F, C, k, x, \mu^*)(A,F,C,k,x,μ∗) but not on θ\thetaθ, such that for every integer θ≥1\theta \ge 1θ≥1

JθkH(θx) ≥ (1−Kθ) Jθk(θx).J^H_{\theta k}(\theta x) \ \ge\ \Big(1 - \frac{K}{\sqrt{\theta}}\Big)\, J_{\theta k}(\theta x).JθkH​(θx) ≥ (1−θ​K​)Jθk​(θx).

This is the paper's JθkH(θx)/Jθk(θx)≥1−O(θ−1/2)J^H_{\theta k}(\theta x) / J_{\theta k}(\theta x) \ge 1 - O(\theta^{-1/2})JθkH​(θx)/Jθk​(θx)≥1−O(θ−1/2), multiplied out.

Milestones

In the order the paper's argument uses them:

  1. Gallego's bound E(Z−z)+≤(σ2+(z−m)2−(z−m))/2\mathbb{E}(Z - z)^+ \le \big(\sqrt{\sigma^2 + (z - m)^2} - (z - m)\big)/2E(Z−z)+≤(σ2+(z−m)2​−(z−m))/2 for a random variable with mean mmm and variance σ2\sigma^2σ2.
  2. The scaling identity: the relaxed value of the θ\thetaθ-scaled problem is θJˉk(x,μ)\theta \bar J_k(x, \mu)θJˉk​(x,μ), so μ∗\mu^*μ∗ is optimal for every θ\thetaθ.
  3. Lemma 1: Jk(x)≤Jˉk(x,μ)J_k(x) \le \bar J_k(x, \mu)Jk​(x)≤Jˉk​(x,μ) for every μ≥0\mu \ge 0μ≥0.
  4. The Kuhn–Tucker conditions (10): for every leg iii, ∑t,jP(Rtj>μ∗Aj) aij≤xi\sum_{t,j} P(R_t^j > \mu^* A^j)\,a_{ij} \le x^i∑t,j​P(Rtj​>μ∗Aj)aij​≤xi, with equality where μ∗i>0\mu^{*i} > 0μ∗i>0.
  5. Eq. (13): Jθk(θx)≤θvk(x)J_{\theta k}(\theta x) \le \theta v_k(x)Jθk​(θx)≤θvk​(x).
  6. The coupling bound (14): JθkH(θx)J^H_{\theta k}(\theta x)JθkH​(θx) is at least the revenue of an uncapacitated system accepting every request above its bid price, minus CCC times the expected seat overflow ∑iE(Ni−θxi)+\sum_i \mathbb{E}(N^i - \theta x^i)^+∑i​E(Ni−θxi)+.
  7. ENi=θ∑t,jEYijt\mathbb{E}N^i = \theta \sum_{t,j} \mathbb{E}Y_{ijt}ENi=θ∑t,j​EYijt​ and Var⁡(Ni)≤θ∑t,jVar⁡(Yijt)\operatorname{Var}(N^i) \le \theta \sum_{t,j} \operatorname{Var}(Y_{ijt})Var(Ni)≤θ∑t,j​Var(Yijt​), where Yijt=1{Rtj>μ∗Aj} aijY_{ijt} = \mathbf{1}\{R_t^j > \mu^* A^j\}\,a_{ij}Yijt​=1{Rtj​>μ∗Aj}aij​.
  8. Eq. (15): E(Ni−θxi)+≤Var⁡(Ni)/2\mathbb{E}(N^i - \theta x^i)^+ \le \sqrt{\operatorname{Var}(N^i)}/2E(Ni−θxi)+≤Var(Ni)​/2.
  9. Eq. (16): ∑t≤θk∑jP(Rtj(θ)>μ∗Aj) μ∗Aj=θμ∗x\sum_{t \le \theta k}\sum_j P(R_t^j(\theta) > \mu^* A^j)\,\mu^* A^j = \theta \mu^* x∑t≤θk​∑j​P(Rtj​(θ)>μ∗Aj)μ∗Aj=θμ∗x.
  10. The explicit bound
JθkH(θx)≥θvk(x)−C2θ∑i=1m∑t=1k∑j=1nVar⁡(Yijt).J^H_{\theta k}(\theta x) \ge \theta v_k(x) - \frac{C}{2}\sqrt{\theta}\sum_{i=1}^m \sqrt{\sum_{t=1}^k\sum_{j=1}^n \operatorname{Var}(Y_{ijt})}.JθkH​(θx)≥θvk​(x)−2C​θ​i=1∑m​t=1∑k​j=1∑n​Var(Yijt​)​.

The goal leaves KKK unspecified. The explicit bound (milestone 10), together with (13), identifies one admissible value when vk(x)>0v_k(x) > 0vk​(x)>0.

Significance

Theorem 1 says that the whole value of dynamic, state-dependent control over a static price-per-leg rule vanishes relative to revenue as the system grows: the loss is O(θ)O(\sqrt{\theta})O(θ​) against revenues of order θ\thetaθ. It justifies computing bid prices once from a convex (or, in later work, linear) upper-bound problem instead of solving the network dynamic program. The same fluid-scaling argument underlies a large later literature on asymptotically optimal policies in network revenue management and online resource allocation. That literature includes re-solving heuristics and the choice-based deterministic linear program (Liu and van Ryzin, M&SOM 2008).

The result has a complete published proof. What this mission adds is a machine-checked version. It includes the network Bellman recursion, the relaxation bound, a coupling argument between a capacitated and an uncapacitated system on the product space of request paths, and a second-moment overflow estimate. Two statements on the printed page are wrong as written and appear here in corrected form (see Formalization scope). A formal proof settles that the theorem survives both corrections. No machine-checked proof of this theorem, or of the fluid upper bound for network revenue management, is known.

Difficulty

The optimal value JJJ is defined by a recursion over the full capacity vector and has no closed form; the only access to it is an upper bound. The heuristic's revenue JHJ^HJH depends on the random time at which each leg runs out, which couples all legs and all periods, so it cannot be computed period by period either. The obvious approach, comparing both values period by period through their recursions, fails for exactly this reason: neither side decomposes over time. The two sides must instead be connected through a third object, the relaxed value Jˉ\bar JJˉ, which is explicit but relies on the requests' distributional structure (at most one request per period, and continuous marginals, which make the optimality conditions of the convex program hold). The step from an upper bound on JJJ to a lower bound on JHJ^HJH has to hold path by path, including for group requests that take several seats of one leg. On the probabilistic side, the seat counts of one period are indicators of mutually exclusive events, so their variances do not simply add.

Formalization scope

Legs are Fin m, itineraries Fin n, the seat matrix is A : Fin m → Fin n → ℕ and capacities are Fin m → ℕ. A request law is a Measure (Fin n → ℝ), and IsRequestLaw bundles the standing assumptions:

  • it is a probability measure;
  • it is concentrated on S\mathcal{S}S;
  • no marginal has an atom at a positive value, which is continuity of the marginal distribution functions on (0,+∞)(0, +\infty)(0,+∞);
  • each coordinate is integrable.

The bound Rtj≤CR_t^j \le CRtj​≤C a.s. is a separate hypothesis wherever the paper uses it. Laws are indexed by time-to-go. JJJ is defined by the Bellman recursion, with the maximum over the finite control set taken for each realized request; capacity subtraction in ℕ occurs only when Aj≤yA^j \le yAj≤y. Jˉ\bar JJˉ is the closed form (8), which the paper derives from the relaxed control problem (7). An optimal μ∗\mu^*μ∗ is a hypothesis (μ∗≥0\mu^* \ge 0μ∗≥0 and Jˉk(x,μ∗)≤Jˉk(x,μ)\bar J_k(x, \mu^*) \le \bar J_k(x, \mu)Jˉk​(x,μ∗)≤Jˉk​(x,μ) for all μ≥0\mu \ge 0μ≥0), not an sInf. The scaled laws use ⌈t/θ⌉=(t+θ−1)/θ\lceil t/\theta \rceil = (t + \theta - 1)/\theta⌈t/θ⌉=(t+θ−1)/θ in ℕ. JHJ^HJH is the integral of the heuristic's pathwise revenue, with strict threshold and capacity check, against Measure.pi over the θk\theta kθk periods, and NiN^iNi is a random variable on the same space. Var⁡(Yijt)\operatorname{Var}(Y_{ijt})Var(Yijt​) is the closed form aij2 p(1−p)a_{ij}^2\,p(1-p)aij2​p(1−p).

Corrections to the printed page:

  • (10) is printed with −λ-\lambda−λ; the stated conditions use the sign that the paper's own reading of (10) requires (expected demand at most capacity).
  • The page's Var⁡(Ni)=θ∑Var⁡(Yijt)\operatorname{Var}(N^i) = \theta\sum\operatorname{Var}(Y_{ijt})Var(Ni)=θ∑Var(Yijt​) holds only as ≤\le≤, which is all the proof needs.
  • NiN^iNi is the uncapacitated system's seat count, as the displayed formula says, not the heuristic's sales, as the sentence says.

The coupling bound and the mean/variance statement are stated at an optimal μ∗\mu^*μ∗ of (9), as on the page. The ratio of Theorem 1 is multiplied out because Jθk(θx)J_{\theta k}(\theta x)Jθk​(θx) may be 000, and KKK is quantified before θ\thetaθ. A formalization that replaced JJJ by an easier quantity, or JHJ^HJH by the uncapacitated system's revenue, would make the goal trivial or different; the definitions here are the Bellman optimum and the capacity-respecting heuristic.

A complete development needs Bochner integrals against product measures, independence of coordinates under Measure.pi, variance of sums, one-sided derivatives of z↦E(Z−z)+z \mapsto \mathbb{E}(Z - z)^+z↦E(Z−z)+, and first-order optimality for a convex function on the nonnegative orthant. The Bellman-recursion and coupling infrastructure is reusable for other network revenue management results. Proofs of individual milestones are welcome independently.

Selected references

  • K. Talluri, G. van Ryzin, An Analysis of Bid-Price Controls for Network Revenue Management, Management Science 44(11), 1577–1593, 1998. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.44.11.1577
  • G. Gallego, A minmax distribution free procedure for the (Q, R) inventory model, Operations Research Letters 11(1), 55–60, 1992. https://doi.org/10.1016/0167-6377(92)90063-C
  • K. Talluri, G. van Ryzin, The Theory and Practice of Revenue Management, Springer, 2004. https://doi.org/10.1007/b139000
  • Q. Liu, G. van Ryzin, On the Choice-Based Linear Programming Model for Network Revenue Management, Manufacturing & Service Operations Management 10(2), 288–310, 2008. https://doi.org/10.1287/msom.1070.0171
12 thms1 active userReviewed
Dynamic ProgrammingProbability·Captain: mikedeng1

Airline Yield Management with Overbooking, Cancellations, and No-Shows I: Time- and State-Dependent Booking Limits Are OptimalResearch Paper

Motivation

Airlines sell the seats of one flight leg in several fare classes over a booking horizon of weeks. Each time a request arrives, the booking agent must decide whether to sell a seat now at the requested fare or keep it for a later, possibly higher-paying, customer. Real reservations are also cancelled, and some ticket holders fail to show up at departure, so airlines deliberately overbook and pay a penalty when more passengers show up than the airplane can carry. The question this mission formalizes is what an optimal accept/reject rule looks like when all three effects (multiple fares, cancellations, no-shows) are present.

For the model without cancellations and no-shows, Lee and Hersh (Transp. Sci. 27(3), 1993) showed that the optimal rule is given by booking limits: in each period and for each fare class there is a threshold on the number of seats sold, and a request is accepted exactly when the current bookings are below it. Subramanian, Stidham and Lautenbacher (Transp. Sci. 33(2), 1999) extend the model to state-dependent cancellations and binomial no-shows with a convex overbooking penalty. Their §1 shows that booking limits, now depending on both the stage and the fare class, are still optimal. The structural step behind this is the concavity of the value function, in the style of Lippman and Stidham's analysis of admission control to a queue (Oper. Res. 25(2), 1977).

Setting

There are mmm fare classes and NNN stages n=N,N−1,…,0n = N, N-1, \dots, 0n=N,N−1,…,0, counting the periods remaining: stage NNN opens reservations, stage 000 is departure. The state x∈{0,1,2,… }x \in \{0,1,2,\dots\}x∈{0,1,2,…} is the number of seats reserved. At each stage n≥1n \ge 1n≥1 exactly one event happens:

  • a request in fare class iii, with probability pin≥0p_{in} \ge 0pin​≥0;
  • a cancellation, with probability qn(x)q_n(x)qn​(x), which is non-negative, nondecreasing and concave in xxx, with qn(0)=0q_n(0) = 0qn​(0)=0;
  • nothing, with probability p0n(x)=1−∑ipin−qn(x)p_{0n}(x) = 1 - \sum_i p_{in} - q_n(x)p0n​(x)=1−∑i​pin​−qn​(x) (Eq. (1)).

Accepting a class-iii request at stage nnn earns rin≥0r_{in} \ge 0rin​≥0. At departure each reservation holder independently shows up with probability 1−β1 - \beta1−β (0≤β≤10 \le \beta \le 10≤β≤1), so the number who show up is Y(x)∼Bin(x,1−β)Y(x) \sim \mathrm{Bin}(x, 1-\beta)Y(x)∼Bin(x,1−β). If Y(x)=yY(x) = yY(x)=y, an overbooking penalty π(y)\pi(y)π(y) is paid. Here π\piπ is non-negative, convex and nondecreasing on y≥0y \ge 0y≥0, and π(y)=0\pi(y) = 0π(y)=0 for y≤Cy \le Cy≤C, the capacity. Starting empty and accepting at most one request per stage, the states reachable at stage nnn are 0≤x≤N−n0 \le x \le N - n0≤x≤N−n, and p0n(x)≥0p_{0n}(x) \ge 0p0n​(x)≥0 is assumed on that range.

The value functions UnU_nUn​ are defined by the recursion (2)–(3):

U0(x)=E[−π(Y(x))],U_0(x) = \mathrm{E}\big[-\pi(Y(x))\big],U0​(x)=E[−π(Y(x))], Un(x)=∑i=1mpinmax⁡{rin+Un−1(x+1), Un−1(x)}+qn(x) Un−1(x−1)+p0n(x) Un−1(x).U_n(x) = \sum_{i=1}^m p_{in}\max\{r_{in} + U_{n-1}(x+1),\,U_{n-1}(x)\} + q_n(x)\,U_{n-1}(x-1) + p_{0n}(x)\,U_{n-1}(x).Un​(x)=i=1∑m​pin​max{rin​+Un−1​(x+1),Un−1​(x)}+qn​(x)Un−1​(x−1)+p0n​(x)Un−1​(x).

The first branch of each maximum is "accept", the second "reject". The booking limit of class iii at stage nnn is Eq. (7):

bin=min⁡{x:Un−1(x)−Un−1(x+1)>rin},b_{in} = \min\{x : U_{n-1}(x) - U_{n-1}(x+1) > r_{in}\},bin​=min{x:Un−1​(x)−Un−1​(x+1)>rin​},

with bin=∞b_{in} = \inftybin​=∞ when there is no such xxx. The difference Un−1(x)−Un−1(x+1)U_{n-1}(x) - U_{n-1}(x+1)Un−1​(x)−Un−1​(x+1) is the opportunity cost of one more booking. In Lean all of this is AirlineYieldMgmt.BookingLimits.Model with Model.U, Model.p0, Model.Standing and Model.bookingLimit.

Formalization targets

Goal: booking limits are optimal (§1, Eq. (7), p. 151)

For every stage 1≤n≤N1 \le n \le N1≤n≤N, fare class iii and reachable state 0≤x≤N−n0 \le x \le N - n0≤x≤N−n,

rin+Un−1(x+1)  ≥  Un−1(x)  ⟺  x<bin.r_{in} + U_{n-1}(x+1) \;\ge\; U_{n-1}(x) \iff x < b_{in}.rin​+Un−1​(x+1)≥Un−1​(x)⟺x<bin​.

The optimal rule accepts a class-iii request exactly while fewer than binb_{in}bin​ seats are booked.

Milestones

  1. Lemma 1 (p. 151). If fff is nondecreasing and convex on y≥0y \ge 0y≥0 and 0<γ<10 < \gamma < 10<γ<1, then h(x)=Ef(Bin(x,γ))h(x) = \mathrm{E} f(\mathrm{Bin}(x,\gamma))h(x)=Ef(Bin(x,γ)) is nondecreasing and convex in x∈{0,1,… }x \in \{0,1,\dots\}x∈{0,1,…}.
  2. Terminal value (p. 151). U0U_0U0​ is concave and nonincreasing.
  3. All stages (p. 151). For every 0≤n≤N0 \le n \le N0≤n≤N, UnU_nUn​ is nonincreasing and concave on {0,…,N−n}\{0,\dots,N-n\}{0,…,N−n}, so Un(x)−Un(x+1)U_n(x) - U_n(x+1)Un​(x)−Un​(x+1) is nondecreasing in x=0,…,N−n−1x = 0,\dots,N-n-1x=0,…,N−n−1.

Significance

The result. Booking limits are how single-leg seat inventory is controlled in practice. The theorem says this simple class of rules loses nothing, even with cancellations whose rate grows with the number of bookings and with random no-shows at departure. The limits depend on the stage, and they need not be nested across classes (Remark 3 of the paper). The same concavity property identifies Un(x)−Un(x+1)U_n(x) - U_n(x+1)Un​(x)−Un​(x+1) as the optimal bid price for the leg. The companion mission (II, equivalent charging) reduces a model with class-dependent refunds to this one-dimensional recursion, so a formal proof of the present goal is the input needed to carry booking-limit optimality over to that model.

Formalizing it. The paper proves neither the concavity induction nor Lemma 1. It cites Lippman and Stidham (1977, Theorem 1) for the first and Shaked and Shanthikumar (1994, Example 6.A.2) for the second. The authors note that the cited induction carries over to their recursion (p. 151), but neither source states the result for exactly this recursion, with its state-dependent cancellation term and range-restricted probabilities. A machine-checked proof would therefore supply an argument the paper only points to, not just its bookkeeping. To our knowledge none of these statements has a machine-checked proof.

Difficulty

The goal follows quickly once milestone 3 is available. The work is in milestone 3. The obvious induction pushes concavity through each term of the recursion. It fails at the cancellation term qn(x) Un−1(x−1)q_n(x)\,U_{n-1}(x-1)qn​(x)Un−1​(x−1): a product of a concave nondecreasing function and a concave nonincreasing one is not concave in general, so the term is not concave by itself. The null-event term p0n(x) Un−1(x)p_{0n}(x)\,U_{n-1}(x)p0n​(x)Un−1​(x) has the same problem, because its coefficient depends on the state. Only the combination of the two terms, together with ∑ipin+qn(x)≤1\sum_i p_{in} + q_n(x) \le 1∑i​pin​+qn​(x)≤1 on the reachable range, keeps the result concave. That constraint holds only on the range, not for every xxx: in the linear case qn(x)=qnxq_n(x) = q_n xqn​(x)=qn​x it fails for large xxx. This interaction between the range and the induction has to be handled with care. Lemma 1 is a separate, self-contained piece of discrete probability about binomial sums.

Formalization scope

  • Fare classes are Fin m; the paper's class iii is i.val + 1. Stages and states are ℕ; probabilities, fares, β\betaβ, π\piπ and values are ℝ.
  • Model.U is defined by structural recursion on the stage, for every x∈Nx \in \mathbb Nx∈N. Every theorem restricts its hypotheses and conclusions to the paper's range 0≤x≤N−n0 \le x \le N - n0≤x≤N−n.
  • x−1x - 1x−1 is natural-number subtraction. At x=0x = 0x=0 it is multiplied by qn(0)=0q_n(0) = 0qn​(0)=0, a convention the page leaves implicit (a cancellation needs a reservation).
  • The null-event probability is defined by Eq. (1), and its non-negativity is assumed only for 1≤n≤N1 \le n \le N1≤n≤N, 0≤x≤N−n0 \le x \le N-n0≤x≤N−n. This keeps the paper's linear-cancellation case inside the model.
  • Concavity, convexity and monotonicity of functions on N\mathbb NN are discrete (differences). π\piπ is a real function, convex and nondecreasing on [0,∞)[0,\infty)[0,∞) as on the page.
  • Binomial expectations are finite sums ∑k=0x(xk)γk(1−γ)x−kf(k)\sum_{k=0}^x \binom xk \gamma^k(1-\gamma)^{x-k} f(k)∑k=0x​(kx​)γk(1−γ)x−kf(k). The milestone for U0U_0U0​ allows 0≤β≤10 \le \beta \le 10≤β≤1.
  • The minimum in (7) ranges over the reachable states and lives in WithTop ℕ, with ⊤ meaning bin=∞b_{in} = \inftybin​=∞.
  • "An optimal policy accepts" means the accept branch attains the maximum in (2). No dynamic-programming optimality principle, policy space or claim about expected revenue is stated.
  • Ruling out the trivializing formalization: binb_{in}bin​ is defined by Eq. (7) as a minimum of a strict-inequality set. It is not defined as the number of states where acceptance is optimal, a definition under which the goal would hold by construction and lose its content (that the accepted states form an initial segment).
  • A proof needs finite binomial sums and discrete concavity arguments; Mathlib covers both. The discrete-concavity and binomial lemmas would carry over to other admission-control and inventory models. Proofs of any milestone, and of the goal assuming milestone 3, are welcome separately.

Selected references

  • J. Subramanian, S. Stidham Jr., C. J. Lautenbacher, Airline Yield Management with Overbooking, Cancellations, and No-Shows, Transportation Science 33(2), 147–167, 1999. https://doi.org/10.1287/trsc.33.2.147
  • S. A. Lippman, S. Stidham Jr., Individual versus Social Optimization in Exponential Congestion Systems, Operations Research 25(2), 233–247, 1977. https://doi.org/10.1287/opre.25.2.233
  • T. C. Lee, M. Hersh, A Model for Dynamic Airline Seat Inventory Control with Multiple Seat Bookings, Transportation Science 27(3), 252–265, 1993. https://doi.org/10.1287/trsc.27.3.252
  • M. Shaked, J. G. Shanthikumar, Stochastic Orders and Their Applications, Academic Press, San Diego, 1994 (Example 6.A.2).
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Bandit AlgorithmsProbabilityStatistics·Captain: mikedeng1

Optimal Dynamic Assortment Planning with Demand Learning: The Separation-Based Policy Has Regret at Most κ₁⌈N/C⌉ log T + K̄₁Research Paper

Motivation

A retailer who can display only a limited number of products must decide which assortment to show each arriving customer, without knowing how attractive each product is. Offering a product reveals how often it is bought, but offering a poor product costs revenue. This exploration–exploitation trade-off arises in fast fashion, where the selling season is short, and in online display advertising, where the "shelf" is a page of slots. It is the assortment analogue of the multi-armed bandit problem, with one difference: an arm is a set of products, and the feedback from one set says something about every other set containing the same products.

Sauré and Zeevi, Optimal Dynamic Assortment Planning with Demand Learning (Manufacturing & Service Operations Management, 2013), give a lower bound for the regret of every consistent policy that is of order log⁡T\log TlogT in the number TTT of customers (their Theorem 1). They then show that simple policies attain this rate. This mission formalizes the first of those policies, the separation-based policy, and its regret bound (Theorem 2). Its proof is the only upper-bound proof printed in full in the article.

Setting

There are NNN products i∈N={1,…,N}i\in\mathcal N=\{1,\dots,N\}i∈N={1,…,N}, a display capacity 1≤C≤N1\le C\le N1≤C≤N and margins wi>0w_i>0wi​>0. Customer ttt assigns product iii the utility Uit=μi+ζitU_i^t=\mu_i+\zeta_i^tUit​=μi​+ζit​ and the no-purchase alternative 000 the utility U0t=ζ0tU_0^t=\zeta_0^tU0t​=ζ0t​ (mean utility μ0=0\mu_0=0μ0​=0). The shocks are i.i.d. with distribution FFF, which has an everywhere-positive density fff. Offered an assortment SSS, the customer buys the product of highest utility if that utility beats the no-purchase alternative, so product i∈Si\in Si∈S is bought with probability

pi(S,μ)=∫−∞∞∏j∈S∪{0}∖{i}F(x−μj) dF(x−μi).p_i(S,\mu)=\int_{-\infty}^{\infty}\prod_{j\in S\cup\{0\}\setminus\{i\}}F(x-\mu_j)\,dF(x-\mu_i).pi​(S,μ)=∫−∞∞​j∈S∪{0}∖{i}∏​F(x−μj​)dF(x−μi​).

The single-sale profit is r(S,μ)=∑i∈Swipi(S,μ)r(S,\mu)=\sum_{i\in S}w_ip_i(S,\mu)r(S,μ)=∑i∈S​wi​pi​(S,μ), the feasible assortments are S={S⊆N:∣S∣≤C}\mathcal S=\{S\subseteq\mathcal N:|S|\le C\}S={S⊆N:∣S∣≤C}, and S∗(μ)∈arg⁡max⁡S∈Sr(S,μ)S^*(\mu)\in\arg\max_{S\in\mathcal S}r(S,\mu)S∗(μ)∈argmaxS∈S​r(S,μ) is the optimal assortment, assumed unique at the true μ\muμ.

The retailer knows FFF but not μ\muμ. A policy chooses the assortment StS_tSt​ offered to customer ttt as a function of the purchases of customers 1,…,t−11,\dots,t-11,…,t−1. Its expected revenue over TTT customers is Jπ(T,μ)=Eπ∑t=1T∑iwiZitJ^\pi(T,\mu)=\mathbb E_\pi\sum_{t=1}^T\sum_iw_iZ_i^tJπ(T,μ)=Eπ​∑t=1T​∑i​wi​Zit​, where Zit=1Z_i^t=1Zit​=1 if customer ttt buys iii. Its regret is

Rπ(T,μ)=T−Jπ(T,μ)r(S∗(μ),μ),\mathcal R^\pi(T,\mu)=T-\frac{J^\pi(T,\mu)}{r(S^*(\mu),\mu)},Rπ(T,μ)=T−r(S∗(μ),μ)Jπ(T,μ)​,

the revenue lost against offering S∗(μ)S^*(\mu)S∗(μ) to everyone, in units of one optimal sale.

Assumption 1 (identifiability) says that purchase probabilities determine mean utilities. For a vector ρ\rhoρ of purchase probabilities with ∑iρi<1\sum_i\rho_i<1∑i​ρi​<1 there is a unique η(ρ)\eta(\rho)η(ρ) with pi(N,η(ρ))=ρip_i(\mathcal N,\eta(\rho))=\rho_ipi​(N,η(ρ))=ρi​. The map η\etaη is locally Lipschitz, and the choice probabilities are Lipschitz. The logit model (standard Gumbel FFF) satisfies it.

The separation-based policy π1=π(κ1,T,w)\pi_1=\pi(\kappa_1,T,w)π1​=π(κ1​,T,w) (Algorithm 1) partitions the products into ⌈N/C⌉\lceil N/C\rceil⌈N/C⌉ test assortments Aj={(j−1)C+1,…,min⁡{jC,N}}A_j=\{(j-1)C+1,\dots,\min\{jC,N\}\}Aj​={(j−1)C+1,…,min{jC,N}}.

  1. Exploration. Each test assortment is offered, in turn, to ⌈κ1log⁡T⌉\lceil\kappa_1\log T\rceil⌈κ1​logT⌉ customers.
  2. Exploitation. Every remaining customer ttt is offered S∗(μ^t)S^*(\hat\mu_t)S∗(μ^​t​). Here μ^t,i=η(p^t(Aj))i\hat\mu_{t,i}=\eta(\hat p_t(A_j))_iμ^​t,i​=η(p^​t​(Aj​))i​ for the test assortment Aj∋iA_j\ni iAj​∋i, and
p^i,t(Aj)=∑u=1t−1Ziu1{Su=Aj}∑u=1t−11{Su=Aj}(4)\hat p_{i,t}(A_j)=\frac{\sum_{u=1}^{t-1}Z_i^u\mathbf 1\{S_u=A_j\}}{\sum_{u=1}^{t-1}\mathbf 1\{S_u=A_j\}}\qquad(4)p^​i,t​(Aj​)=∑u=1t−1​1{Su​=Aj​}∑u=1t−1​Ziu​1{Su​=Aj​}​(4)

is the empirical purchase frequency of iii among the customers offered AjA_jAj​.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 2

For every instance satisfying the standing assumptions and Assumption 1, there are finite constants Kˉ1\bar K_1Kˉ1​ and κˉ1\bar\kappa_1κˉ1​, depending on the instance but not on TTT or κ1\kappa_1κ1​, such that

Rπ1(T,μ)≤κ1⌈N/C⌉log⁡T+Kˉ1for all T, whenever κ1>κˉ1.\mathcal R^{\pi_1}(T,\mu)\le\kappa_1\lceil N/C\rceil\log T+\bar K_1\qquad\text{for all }T,\text{ whenever }\kappa_1>\bar\kappa_1.Rπ1​(T,μ)≤κ1​⌈N/C⌉logT+Kˉ1​for all T, whenever κ1​>κˉ1​.

The leading term is explicit; the constants are existential, as in the paper.

Milestones

In the order in which the proof of Theorem 2 (Appendix A) uses them:

  1. Lemma 1. On a test assortment, the empirical purchase frequencies concentrate exponentially: the deviation event has probability ≤2e−c(ϵ)n\le 2e^{-c(\epsilon)n}≤2e−c(ϵ)n once the assortment has been offered nnn times, with c(ϵ)c(\epsilon)c(ϵ) independent of TTT.
  2. Display (9). ∥μ−μ^t∥Aj≤κ(ϵ)∥p−p^t∥Aj\|\mu-\hat\mu_t\|_{A_j}\le\kappa(\epsilon)\|p-\hat p_t\|_{A_j}∥μ−μ^​t​∥Aj​​≤κ(ϵ)∥p−p^​t​∥Aj​​ whenever the right-hand norm is small.
  3. Display (10). P{∥μ−μ^t∥Aj>ϵ, Tj(t)≥n}≤2∣Aj∣e−cn\mathbb P\{\|\mu-\hat\mu_t\|_{A_j}>\epsilon,\ T^j(t)\ge n\}\le2|A_j|e^{-cn}P{∥μ−μ^​t​∥Aj​​>ϵ, Tj(t)≥n}≤2∣Aj​∣e−cn.
  4. Display (11). ∣r(S,μ)−r(S,μ^t)∣≤∥w∥∞KC∥μ−μ^t∥S|r(S,\mu)-r(S,\hat\mu_t)|\le\|w\|_\infty KC\|\mu-\hat\mu_t\|_S∣r(S,μ)−r(S,μ^​t​)∣≤∥w∥∞​KC∥μ−μ^​t​∥S​.
  5. Display (12). Estimates within (2∥w∥∞KC)−1δ(μ)r(S∗(μ),μ)(2\|w\|_\infty KC)^{-1}\delta(\mu)r(S^*(\mu),\mu)(2∥w∥∞​KC)−1δ(μ)r(S∗(μ),μ) of μ\muμ on S∗(μ)∪S∗(μ^t)S^*(\mu)\cup S^*(\hat\mu_t)S∗(μ)∪S∗(μ^​t​) recover the optimal assortment.
  6. Step 3. In the exploitation phase, P{St≠S∗(μ)}≤∑Aj2∣Aj∣T−κ1c\mathbb P\{S_t\ne S^*(\mu)\}\le\sum_{A_j}2|A_j|T^{-\kappa_1c}P{St​=S∗(μ)}≤∑Aj​​2∣Aj​∣T−κ1​c.
  7. Final display. Rπ(T,μ)≤∑t=1TP{St≠S∗(μ)}\mathcal R^\pi(T,\mu)\le\sum_{t=1}^T\mathbb P\{S_t\ne S^*(\mu)\}Rπ(T,μ)≤∑t=1T​P{St​=S∗(μ)}.

Significance

Theorem 2 shows that, under identifiability, the regret of the dynamic assortment problem grows logarithmically in the horizon, matching the order in TTT of the lower bound. It also shows that separating exploration from exploitation is enough to reach that order, provided the exploration length is tuned by a large enough κ1\kappa_1κ1​. The refined policies of the paper (Theorems 3 and 4) sharpen the constant in front of log⁡T\log TlogT and are proved in the online companion. The argument of Theorem 2 is their template: concentration of frequencies, stability of η\etaη, stability of the argmax, and a sum over customers.

The theorem is proved in the article. It has not, to our knowledge, been machine-checked. A formal development would contain a finite model of a sequential choice process, a Hoeffding-type bound along policy-dependent sampling times, and a perturbation theory for random-utility choice models, and each of these is reusable for other assortment and revenue-management results.

Difficulty

The concentration step does not follow from an off-the-shelf bound for i.i.d. samples. The times at which a test assortment is offered are chosen by the policy, and the number of offers Tj(t)T^j(t)Tj(t) is random. The estimate μ^t\hat\mu_tμ^​t​ is a nonlinear function, η\etaη, of the frequencies, and η\etaη is only locally Lipschitz, so the frequency error must first be driven into the neighbourhood where the Lipschitz bound applies. The exploitation-phase assortment S∗(μ^t)S^*(\hat\mu_t)S∗(μ^​t​) may itself coincide with a test assortment and feed further data into (4). Finally, every constant (ccc, κ\kappaκ, ξ\xiξ) must be shown independent of TTT and κ1\kappa_1κ1​; without that uniformity the bound T1−κ1cT^{1-\kappa_1c}T1−κ1​c is not summable into a constant.

Formalization scope

  • Model. Products are Fin N (0-based), with 1≤C≤N1\le C\le N1≤C≤N and wi>0w_i>0wi​>0. The noise is a density f that is integrable, positive everywhere and of integral one, and F(x)=∫−∞xfF(x)=\int_{-\infty}^xfF(x)=∫−∞x​f. The choice probabilities are the paper's integral, with μ0=0\mu_0=0μ0​=0 built in.
  • History law. The purchase history of TTT customers lives in the finite type Fin T → Option (Fin N). Its law under a policy is the product of the per-customer choice probabilities given the offered assortments. Every probability and expectation is a finite sum.
  • Policies. A policy maps each customer and the earlier purchases to an assortment. Algorithm 1 is defined for each κ1\kappa_1κ1​ and TTT, and the regret at horizon TTT is that of the policy built for TTT. Exploration offers the test assortments in consecutive blocks. μ^t\hat\mu_tμ^​t​ is recomputed for every exploitation customer from all earlier offers.
  • Optimal assortments. S∗S^*S∗ is any selection of maximizers at every vector, and the goal holds for every such selection. Uniqueness is assumed at the true μ\muμ only.
  • Hypotheses added or restated. Several are standing assumptions of §3–4 that Theorem 2's sentence does not repeat: wi>0w_i>0wi​>0, C≤NC\le NC≤N, μ0=0\mu_0=0μ0​=0, uniqueness of the optimum, and the positive density. 1≤C1\le C1≤C is implicit on the page. Assumption 1 is restated per test assortment: an inverse ηAj\eta_{A_j}ηAj​​ on {ρ:ρi>0 (i∈Aj), ∑Ajρi<1}\{\rho:\rho_i>0\ (i\in A_j),\ \sum_{A_j}\rho_i<1\}{ρ:ρi​>0 (i∈Aj​), ∑Aj​​ρi​<1} replaces the page's convention ηi=−∞\eta_i=-\inftyηi​=−∞ for products outside AjA_jAj​. Lipschitz continuity is required of every p(S,⋅)p(S,\cdot)p(S,⋅), S∈SS\in\mathcal SS∈S, as the proof uses it, not only of p(N,⋅)p(\mathcal N,\cdot)p(N,⋅). The minimum relative optimality gap δ(μ)\delta(\mu)δ(μ) is defined locally, since its definition is in the online companion.
  • Corrections of the page. ∥ν∥A\|\nu\|_A∥ν∥A​ carries absolute values. Display (9) is claimed only for small ϵ\epsilonϵ. Line (b) of (10) is read with the sum over earlier customers. Step 3 is stated for the exploitation phase. The final display's step ∣A∣⌈κ1log⁡T⌉≤∣A∣κ1log⁡T|\mathcal A|\lceil\kappa_1\log T\rceil\le|\mathcal A|\kappa_1\log T∣A∣⌈κ1​logT⌉≤∣A∣κ1​logT loses the rounding, so Kˉ1=2N\bar K_1=2NKˉ1​=2N should read 2N+⌈N/C⌉2N+\lceil N/C\rceil2N+⌈N/C⌉. Theorem 2 asserts only that some finite Kˉ1\bar K_1Kˉ1​ exists, so the goal is unaffected.
  • Ruled out. The estimator is the paper's, η\etaη applied to the frequencies (4), not an oracle or a free parameter with a concentration hypothesis. The constants Kˉ1,κˉ1\bar K_1,\bar\kappa_1Kˉ1​,κˉ1​ and those of Lemma 1, (10) and Step 3 are quantified before κ1\kappa_1κ1​ and TTT. Letting them depend on TTT would make the goal trivial, since R≤T\mathcal R\le TR≤T always.
  • Needed infrastructure. Marginalization and conditioning for finite product laws, Hoeffding's inequality along stopping times (optional skipping), and Lipschitz estimates for integrals depending on parameters. Contributions of these as general lemmas are welcome.

Selected references

  • D. Sauré, A. Zeevi, Optimal Dynamic Assortment Planning with Demand Learning, Manufacturing & Service Operations Management 15(3):387–404, 2013. https://doi.org/10.1287/msom.2013.0429
  • P. Rusmevichientong, Z.-J. M. Shen, D. B. Shmoys, Dynamic Assortment Optimization with a Multinomial Logit Choice Model and Capacity Constraint, Operations Research 58(6):1666–1680, 2010. https://doi.org/10.1287/opre.1100.0866
  • T. L. Lai, H. Robbins, Asymptotically Efficient Adaptive Allocation Rules, Advances in Applied Mathematics 6(1):4–22, 1985. https://doi.org/10.1016/0196-8858(85)90002-8
  • C. F. Daganzo, Multinomial Probit: The Theory and Its Application to Demand Forecasting, Academic Press, 1979.
12 thms1 active userReviewed
Dynamic ProgrammingOptimization·Captain: mikedeng1

Dynamic Pricing Strategies with Reference Effects II: A Myopic Firm Underprices and Its Prices Converge MonotonicallyResearch Paper

Motivation

Consumers judge a price against a reference price, an internal expectation formed from the prices they have seen before. A price below the reference feels like a gain and raises demand, a price above it feels like a loss and lowers demand. Because today's price moves tomorrow's reference price, a firm facing such consumers solves a dynamic problem even when nothing else changes over time. The marketing and revenue management literature has studied this problem since the late 1980s, mostly for linear demand (Kopalle, Rao and Assunção 1996; Fibich, Gavious and Lowengart 2003).

Popescu and Wu (2007) analyse the problem for a general reference-dependent demand model, using structural assumptions (monotonicity, concavity, supermodularity) instead of a parametric form. Their Proposition 1 answers a practical question: what does a firm lose, and how does its behaviour differ, if it ignores the effect of current prices on future expectations? The answer is that such a myopic firm systematically charges too little, and its prices drift monotonically to a single level.

Setting

Prices lie in P=[0,pˉ]P = [0, \bar p]P=[0,pˉ​] with pˉ>0\bar p > 0pˉ​>0. The data are a base demand d(p)d(p)d(p), the demand when the price equals the reference price, and a reference effect R(x,r)R(x, r)R(x,r), the change in demand caused by a perceived gain x=r−px = r - px=r−p at reference price rrr. Demand is

D(p,r)=d(p)+R(r−p,r),D(p, r) = d(p) + R(r - p, r),D(p,r)=d(p)+R(r−p,r),

so R(0,r)=0R(0, r) = 0R(0,r)=0. Short-term profit is Π(p,r)=p D(p,r)\Pi(p, r) = p\,D(p, r)Π(p,r)=pD(p,r) (unit cost zero), base profit is π(p)=p d(p)\pi(p) = p\,d(p)π(p)=pd(p), reference profit is ΠR(p,r)=p R(r−p,r)\Pi^R(p, r) = p\,R(r - p, r)ΠR(p,r)=pR(r−p,r), and λ(r)=Rx(0,r)\lambda(r) = R_x(0, r)λ(r)=Rx​(0,r) is the slope of the reference effect at zero gain.

Reference prices follow exponential smoothing, memory equation (1): with memory α∈[0,1)\alpha \in [0, 1)α∈[0,1) and prices ptp_tpt​,

rt+1=α rt+(1−α) pt.r_{t+1} = \alpha\, r_t + (1 - \alpha)\, p_t .rt+1​=αrt​+(1−α)pt​.

The strategic firm maximises discounted profit with discount factor β∈(0,1)\beta \in (0, 1)β∈(0,1). Its value function is

V(r0)=sup⁡(pt)⊂P∑t≥0βt Π(pt,rt),V(r_0) = \sup_{(p_t) \subset P} \sum_{t \ge 0} \beta^t\, \Pi(p_t, r_t),V(r0​)=(pt​)⊂Psup​t≥0∑​βtΠ(pt​,rt​),

its Bellman objective is W(p,r)=Π(p,r)+βV(αr+(1−α)p)W(p, r) = \Pi(p, r) + \beta V(\alpha r + (1-\alpha) p)W(p,r)=Π(p,r)+βV(αr+(1−α)p), and its optimal price p∗(r)p^*(r)p∗(r) is the largest maximizer of W(⋅,r)W(\cdot, r)W(⋅,r) over PPP. The myopic price p~(r)\tilde p(r)p~​(r) is the largest maximizer of Π(⋅,r)\Pi(\cdot, r)Π(⋅,r) over PPP. From a common initial reference price r0r_0r0​, the strategic firm follows rt+1∗=αrt∗+(1−α)p∗(rt∗)r^*_{t+1} = \alpha r^*_t + (1-\alpha) p^*(r^*_t)rt+1∗​=αrt∗​+(1−α)p∗(rt∗​) and charges pt∗=p∗(rt∗)p^*_t = p^*(r^*_t)pt∗​=p∗(rt∗​); the myopic firm follows rt+1M=αrtM+(1−α)p~(rtM)r^M_{t+1} = \alpha r^M_t + (1-\alpha)\tilde p(r^M_t)rt+1M​=αrtM​+(1−α)p~​(rtM​) and charges ptM=p~(rtM)p^M_t = \tilde p(r^M_t)ptM​=p~​(rtM​).

The standing hypotheses are the paper's Assumption 1 (on P×PP \times PP×P, demand is nonnegative, bounded and continuous, decreasing in ppp and increasing in rrr, and RRR is increasing in the gain), Assumption 2 (RRR is twice differentiable), and Assumption 3 (π\piπ is nonmonotonic and concave on PPP; π′(r)−rλ(r)\pi'(r) - r\lambda(r)π′(r)−rλ(r) is strictly decreasing; ΠR\Pi^RΠR is concave in ppp and supermodular in (p,r)(p, r)(p,r)).

Formalization targets

Goal: Proposition 1 (Myopic vs. Strategic Firm)

Under the hypotheses above:

∀r∈P: p~(r)≤p∗(r),∀r0∈P, ∀t: ptM≤pt∗,\forall r \in P:\ \tilde p(r) \le p^*(r), \qquad \forall r_0 \in P,\ \forall t:\ p^M_t \le p^*_t,∀r∈P: p~​(r)≤p∗(r),∀r0​∈P, ∀t: ptM​≤pt∗​, ∃ pM∗∈P  ∀r0∈P: (ptM)t is monotone and lim⁡t→∞ptM=pM∗.\exists\, p^{M*} \in P\ \ \forall r_0 \in P:\ (p^M_t)_t \text{ is monotone and } \lim_{t\to\infty} p^M_t = p^{M*}.∃pM∗∈P  ∀r0​∈P: (ptM​)t​ is monotone and t→∞lim​ptM​=pM∗.

The limit pM∗p^{M*}pM∗ is one price, the same for every initial reference price.

Milestones

  1. Remark 2. VVV is increasing on PPP (Assumption 1 only).
  2. Lemma 1. p~\tilde pp~​ is increasing on PPP.
  3. Pointwise underpricing (§A.1): p~(r)≤p∗(r)\tilde p(r) \le p^*(r)p~​(r)≤p∗(r) for every r∈Pr \in Pr∈P.
  4. Underpricing along paths (§A.1): rtM≤rt∗r^M_t \le r^*_trtM​≤rt∗​ and ptM≤pt∗p^M_t \le p^*_tptM​≤pt∗​ for all ttt.
  5. Monotone myopic paths (§A.1): if p~(r0)≥r0\tilde p(r_0) \ge r_0p~​(r0​)≥r0​ the path ptMp^M_tptM​ is increasing, and if p~(r0)≤r0\tilde p(r_0) \le r_0p~​(r0​)≤r0​ it is decreasing.
  6. Unique myopic steady state (§A.1): at most one p∈Pp \in Pp∈P satisfies p~(p)=p\tilde p(p) = pp~​(p)=p.

Significance

Proposition 1 shows that the error a myopic firm makes has a definite sign: it underprices at every state and at every date along its own trajectory, not only on average. The monotone convergence clause means the myopic firm's long-run behaviour is a single price independent of initial expectations, which the paper later uses to bound the strategic firm's steady-state price from below (Theorem 1, pM∗≤p∗∗p^{M*} \le p^{**}pM∗≤p∗∗). The result holds for general reference-dependent demand, which is what distinguishes it from the linear models that preceded it.

A formal development gives machine-checked versions of standard tools that recur throughout dynamic pricing and inventory theory: existence and monotonicity of the largest maximizer under supermodularity (Topkis' theorem on an interval), monotonicity of an infinite-horizon value function defined as a supremum over sequences, and monotone convergence of one-dimensional policy iterations. The result is proved in the paper; none of it has been formalized.

Difficulty

The value function is defined as a supremum over infinite price sequences, not as a given solution of a Bellman equation, so its monotonicity and the existence of a maximizer of W(⋅,r)W(\cdot, r)W(⋅,r) (which needs continuity of VVV) have to be established from the sequence problem. The comparison p~≤p∗\tilde p \le p^*p~​≤p∗ depends on the largest-maximizer convention: for arbitrary selections from the two argmax sets the inequality is false, because the sets can overlap without their chosen elements being ordered. The two firms move along different reference-price paths, so the path comparison is not a pointwise statement about one state. Uniqueness of the limit has to cover fixed points of p~\tilde pp~​ at the endpoints of PPP, where the first-order condition is only an inequality, and the limit of a myopic path is a priori only a maximizer of Π(⋅,pM∗)\Pi(\cdot, p^{M*})Π(⋅,pM∗), not necessarily the largest one.

Formalization scope

The data are functions d:R→Rd : \mathbb{R} \to \mathbb{R}d:R→R and R:R→R→RR : \mathbb{R} \to \mathbb{R} \to \mathbb{R}R:R→R→R; demand is defined from them, and R(0,r)=0R(0, r) = 0R(0,r)=0 is a hypothesis. The price set is Set.Icc 0 pbar. VVV is a real ⨆ over sequences N→[0,pˉ]\mathbb{N} \to [0, \bar p]N→[0,pˉ​] of a tsum; under the hypotheses the family is bounded and every series summable, so the default values of ⨆ and ∑' on unbounded or non-summable input are not reached. Both p∗p^*p∗ and p~\tilde pp~​ are defined as sSup of their sets of maximizers over PPP, which is the paper's largest-maximizer convention. That these sets are nonempty is a proof obligation, not a hypothesis. The myopic firm is defined directly from Π\PiΠ, not as problem (2) with β=0\beta = 0β=0.

"Increasing" and "decreasing" are non-strict. "Nonmonotonic" means neither monotone nor antitone on PPP. "Twice differentiable" means RRR and its Fréchet derivative are differentiable on R2\mathbb{R}^2R2. Supermodularity of ΠR\Pi^RΠR is the increasing-differences inequality on P×PP \times PP×P. One hypothesis is added to the paper's: ddd is differentiable, because Assumption 3(b) refers to π′\pi'π′ and Lean's deriv returns 000 where a function is not differentiable. Assumptions 2 and 3 hold throughout §§4.1–4.3, so they are hypotheses of every §4 item. They are not hypotheses of Remark 2, which is in §3.

A formalization in which VVV is an arbitrary increasing function, or p∗p^*p∗ an arbitrary maximizer satisfying p∗≥p~p^* \ge \tilde pp∗≥p~​ by hypothesis, would make the goal trivial. The definitions here rule it out, because VVV, p∗p^*p∗, p~\tilde pp~​ and both paths are all computed from (d,R,α,β,pˉ)(d, R, \alpha, \beta, \bar p)(d,R,α,β,pˉ​). The convergence clause quantifies the limit before the initial state, so a statement in which each path merely converges would not satisfy it. The hypotheses are jointly satisfiable: pˉ=3/4\bar p = 3/4pˉ​=3/4, d(p)=1−pd(p) = 1 - pd(p)=1−p, R(x,r)=x/4R(x, r) = x/4R(x,r)=x/4 satisfies all of them.

A complete development needs Topkis-type monotone comparative statics on intervals, continuity and monotonicity of the value function of a bounded discounted problem, and elementary facts on monotone bounded sequences. The first two are reusable across dynamic pricing, inventory and queueing-control missions, and contributions of them as separate lemmas are welcome.

Selected references

  • M. Popescu and Y. Wu, Dynamic Pricing Strategies with Reference Effects, Operations Research 55(3):413–429, 2007. https://doi.org/10.1287/opre.1070.0393
  • D. M. Topkis, Supermodularity and Complementarity, Princeton University Press, 1998. https://doi.org/10.1515/9781400822539
  • N. L. Stokey, R. E. Lucas and E. C. Prescott, Recursive Methods in Economic Dynamics, Harvard University Press, 1989. https://doi.org/10.2307/j.ctvjnrt76
  • P. K. Kopalle, A. G. Rao and J. L. Assunção, Asymmetric Reference Price Effects and Dynamic Pricing Policies, Marketing Science 15(1):60–85, 1996. https://doi.org/10.1287/mksc.15.1.60
  • G. Fibich, A. Gavious and O. Lowengart, Explicit Solutions of Optimization Models and Differential Games with Nonsmooth (Asymmetric) Reference-Price Effects, Operations Research 51(5):721–734, 2003. https://doi.org/10.1287/opre.51.5.721.16758
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Dynamic ProgrammingOptimization·Captain: mikedeng1

Dynamic Pricing Strategies with Reference Effects I: Under Loss Aversion the Steady States Form an Interval and Optimal Paths ConvergeResearch Paper

Motivation

Consumers judge a price against a reference price, an internal standard formed from the prices they have seen before. A price below the reference is perceived as a gain and stimulates demand; a price above it is perceived as a loss and depresses demand. Prospect theory (Kahneman and Tversky 1979) adds that losses loom larger than gains of the same size: this is loss aversion. A firm that sets prices over many periods therefore faces a dynamic trade-off, because today's price moves tomorrow's reference price and with it tomorrow's demand.

Popescu and Wu (Operations Research 55(3), 2007) analyze this problem for general nonlinear demand. Earlier work of Kopalle, Rao and Assunção (1996) and of Fibich, Gavious and Lowengart (2003) had treated linear or piecewise-linear reference effects with explicit solutions. Popescu and Wu replace explicit solutions by structural arguments (supermodularity, monotone policies, comparison of value functions), which is what makes the results reusable for any demand model satisfying their assumptions. Their headline result for loss-averse consumers is that the long-run prices form a whole interval rather than a single point, and that optimal prices outside the interval move monotonically to its nearer endpoint.

Setting

A monopolist chooses a price ptp_tpt​ from P=[0,pˉ]P=[0,\bar p]P=[0,pˉ​], pˉ>0\bar p>0pˉ​>0, in each period t=0,1,2,…t=0,1,2,\dotst=0,1,2,…. The reference price follows exponential smoothing,

rt+1=αrt+(1−α)pt,α∈[0,1),r_{t+1}=\alpha r_t+(1-\alpha)p_t,\qquad \alpha\in[0,1),rt+1​=αrt​+(1−α)pt​,α∈[0,1),

from a given initial reference price r0r_0r0​. Demand is D(p,r)=d(p)+R(r−p,r)D(p,r)=d(p)+R(r-p,r)D(p,r)=d(p)+R(r−p,r), where d(p)=D(p,p)d(p)=D(p,p)d(p)=D(p,p) is the base demand and R(x,r)R(x,r)R(x,r) is the reference effect of the perceived gain x=r−px=r-px=r−p, so that R(0,r)=0R(0,r)=0R(0,r)=0. The per-period profit (zero unit cost) is Π(p,r)=p D(p,r)\Pi(p,r)=p\,D(p,r)Π(p,r)=pD(p,r), the base profit is π(p)=p d(p)\pi(p)=p\,d(p)π(p)=pd(p), and λ(r)\lambda(r)λ(r) denotes the slope of R(⋅,r)R(\cdot,r)R(⋅,r) at x=0x=0x=0.

For a discount factor β∈(0,1)\beta\in(0,1)β∈(0,1), the value function is the supremum of discounted profit over all price sequences in PPP:

V(r0)=sup⁡(pt)∈PN∑t≥0βt Π(pt,rt).V(r_0)=\sup_{(p_t)\in P^{\mathbb N}}\sum_{t\ge 0}\beta^t\,\Pi(p_t,r_t).V(r0​)=(pt​)∈PNsup​t≥0∑​βtΠ(pt​,rt​).

The Bellman objective is W(p,r)=Π(p,r)+βV(αr+(1−α)p)W(p,r)=\Pi(p,r)+\beta V(\alpha r+(1-\alpha)p)W(p,r)=Π(p,r)+βV(αr+(1−α)p). The optimal pricing policy p∗(r)p^*(r)p∗(r) is the largest maximizer of W(⋅,r)W(\cdot,r)W(⋅,r) over PPP, and q∗(r)=αr+(1−α)p∗(r)q^*(r)=\alpha r+(1-\alpha)p^*(r)q∗(r)=αr+(1−α)p∗(r) is the next reference price. The state path is rt+1∗=q∗(rt∗)r^*_{t+1}=q^*(r^*_t)rt+1∗​=q∗(rt∗​) and the price path is pt∗=p∗(rt∗)p^*_t=p^*(r^*_t)pt∗​=p∗(rt∗​). A steady state is a price p∗∗∈Pp^{**}\in Pp∗∗∈P with p∗(p∗∗)=p∗∗p^*(p^{**})=p^{**}p∗(p∗∗)=p∗∗.

The standing Assumption 1 requires DDD to be nonnegative, bounded and continuous, decreasing in ppp, increasing in rrr, and RRR increasing in xxx. For a smooth (loss-neutral) RRR, Assumptions 2–3 require RRR to be twice differentiable, π\piπ to be nonmonotonic and concave, π′(r)−rλ(r)\pi'(r)-r\lambda(r)π′(r)−rλ(r) to be strictly decreasing, and the reference profit ΠR(p,r)=pR(r−p,r)\Pi^R(p,r)=pR(r-p,r)ΠR(p,r)=pR(r−p,r) to be concave in ppp and supermodular.

Under loss aversion the reference effect is kinked: RK(x,r)=RG(x,r)R_K(x,r)=R_G(x,r)RK​(x,r)=RG​(x,r) for gains x≥0x\ge 0x≥0 and RK(x,r)=RL(x,r)R_K(x,r)=R_L(x,r)RK​(x,r)=RL​(x,r) for losses x<0x<0x<0. Assumption 4 makes RGR_GRG​ and RLR_LRL​ twice differentiable and increasing in xxx, makes RG−RLR_G-R_LRG​−RL​ single crossing, and imposes λL(r)>λG(r)\lambda_L(r)>\lambda_G(r)λL​(r)>λG​(r). Assumption 5 requires the gain and loss profits to satisfy Assumption 3. The problems (K)(K)(K), (PL)(P_L)(PL​) and (PG)(P_G)(PG​) are the pricing problem with reference effect RKR_KRK​, RLR_LRL​ and RGR_GRG​, respectively, and (Pθ)(P_\theta)(Pθ​) uses Rθ=θRG+(1−θ)RLR_\theta=\theta R_G+(1-\theta)R_LRθ​=θRG​+(1−θ)RL​ for θ∈[0,1]\theta\in[0,1]θ∈[0,1].

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 4 of the paper

There exist prices pL∗∗≤pG∗∗p^{**}_L\le p^{**}_GpL∗∗​≤pG∗∗​ such that pL∗∗p^{**}_LpL∗∗​ is the unique steady state of (PL)(P_L)(PL​), pG∗∗p^{**}_GpG∗∗​ is the unique steady state of (PG)(P_G)(PG​), and

{ r: r is a steady state of (K) }=[pL∗∗,pG∗∗].\{\,r:\ r \text{ is a steady state of }(K)\,\}=[p^{**}_L,p^{**}_G].{r: r is a steady state of (K)}=[pL∗∗​,pG∗∗​].

Moreover, the following hold:

  • from r0∈[pL∗∗,pG∗∗]r_0\in[p^{**}_L,p^{**}_G]r0​∈[pL∗∗​,pG∗∗​], the optimal price path of (K)(K)(K) is constant, pt∗=r0p^*_t=r_0pt∗​=r0​;
  • from r0<pL∗∗r_0<p^{**}_Lr0​<pL∗∗​, the state path of (K)(K)(K) is nondecreasing and converges to pL∗∗p^{**}_LpL∗∗​, and so does the price path;
  • from r0>pG∗∗r_0>p^{**}_Gr0​>pG∗∗​, the state path is nonincreasing and converges to pG∗∗p^{**}_GpG∗∗​, and so does the price path.

Milestones

In attack order, the milestones are:

  • Remark 2 (VVV increasing);
  • Lemma 2 (q∗q^*q∗ increasing);
  • Theorem 1, first sentence (a steady state is the unique solution of π′(p)/(1−β)=pλ(p)/(1−αβ)\pi'(p)/(1-\beta)=p\lambda(p)/(1-\alpha\beta)π′(p)/(1−β)=pλ(p)/(1−αβ));
  • Theorem 2 (a unique steady state exists and attracts every optimal path, with monotone state paths);
  • Remark 3 (a steeper reference effect gives a lower steady state);
  • Lemma 4 ((Pθ)(P_\theta)(Pθ​) satisfies Assumptions 1–3, Vθ≥VKV_\theta\ge V_KVθ​≥VK​, and steady states of (Pθ)(P_\theta)(Pθ​) are steady states of (K)(K)(K));
  • the §5.2 statement that the steady states pθ∗∗p^{**}_\thetapθ∗∗​ span [pL∗∗,pG∗∗][p^{**}_L,p^{**}_G][pL∗∗​,pG∗∗​];
  • the §A.11 identity VK(r0)=VL(r0)V_K(r_0)=V_L(r_0)VK​(r0​)=VL​(r0​) for r0<pL∗∗r_0<p^{**}_Lr0​<pL∗∗​.

Significance

The theorem separates loss-averse markets from loss-neutral ones. With a smooth reference effect, Theorem 2 gives one long-run price. Under loss aversion, every price in [pL∗∗,pG∗∗][p^{**}_L,p^{**}_G][pL∗∗​,pG∗∗​] is self-sustaining: a firm that starts there gains nothing by moving. Prices therefore exhibit stickiness, an interval of rigid prices, which is the dynamic counterpart of the kink in the reference effect. The paper uses this result to derive price monotonicity under loss aversion (its Proposition 4) and the behavior of myopic firms (its Proposition 5).

The result is proved in the paper; nothing here is open. What the mission adds is a machine-checked proof, and that proof has to supply steps the paper passes over quickly. Among them are the existence of steady states in Theorem 2 (the paper argues it in two sentences) and the largest-maximizer bookkeeping when steady states are transferred from (Pθ)(P_\theta)(Pθ​) to (K)(K)(K).

Difficulty

The bulk of the work sits in the infinite-horizon dynamic program itself. The value function is a supremum over infinite price sequences. Before any comparative statics can be done, one must show that it satisfies the Bellman equation (2), that it is continuous, and that the argmax is nonempty, so that the largest maximizer is well defined and actually maximizes. The monotonicity of q∗q^*q∗ does not follow from supermodularity of Π\PiΠ alone, because the policy maximizes current profit plus a continuation value evaluated at a state that itself depends on the price.

For the kinked problem, RKR_KRK​ is not differentiable at x=0x=0x=0, so the first-order analysis behind Theorem 1 does not apply to (K)(K)(K). A first-order condition with one-sided derivatives is the natural first idea. It yields inequalities that every steady state must satisfy, but it establishes neither that steady states exist nor that the whole interval consists of steady states. The set equality also depends on the largest-maximizer convention, since a price that is merely a maximizer of the Bellman objective is not a steady state under the paper's definition.

Formalization scope

All declarations live in the namespace ReferencePricing.LossAversion.

  • Data. The model data are a base demand d : ℝ → ℝ and reference effects R : ℝ → ℝ → ℝ, with demand d p + R (r - p) r. R(0,r)=0R(0,r)=0R(0,r)=0 is a field of Assumption 1.
  • Value function. value takes the per-period profit as a parameter and is the real supremum ⨆ over sequences ℕ → Set.Icc 0 pbar of the tsum of discounted profits. It is not a function assumed to solve (2).
  • Policy. optPrice is sSup of the set of maximizers in PPP of the Bellman objective, following the paper's largest-maximizer convention. Nonemptiness of that set is to be proved, never assumed.
  • Steady states. IsSteadyState r is r ∈ P ∧ optPrice r = r.
  • Encodings. Monotonicity, concavity and supermodularity hypotheses are required on PPP or P×PP\times PP×P, and monotonicity in xxx and single crossing on the reachable gains [r−pˉ,r][r-\bar p,r][r−pˉ​,r]. "Twice differentiable" means that the uncurried function and its Fréchet derivative are differentiable. "Nonmonotonic" means neither monotone nor antitone on PPP.
  • Added hypotheses. Two hypotheses are added and disclosed in each item. The base demand ddd is differentiable, because π′\pi'π′ appears in Assumption 3(b). The demands of RGR_GRG​ and RLR_LRL​ satisfy Assumption 1, which the paper's proof of Lemma 4 uses.
  • Typos. The page's typo "r0>pG∗r_0>p^*_Gr0​>pG∗​" in Theorem 4 is read as pG∗∗p^{**}_GpG∗∗​.
  • Ruling out trivial versions. The goal quantifies pL∗∗p^{**}_LpL∗∗​ and pG∗∗p^{**}_GpG∗∗​ existentially with uniqueness, so the existence of these steady states is part of the claim. It is not a formalization with arbitrary endpoints supplied as hypotheses, nor one with "some optimal policy" in place of the largest maximizer. The hypotheses are jointly satisfiable: the linear instance pˉ=3/4\bar p=3/4pˉ​=3/4, d(p)=1−pd(p)=1-pd(p)=1−p, RL=x/4R_L=x/4RL​=x/4, RG=x/8R_G=x/8RG​=x/8 meets all of them.

A complete development needs:

  • the Bellman equation and continuity of the value function for bounded continuous rewards on a compact action set (Berge's maximum theorem);
  • Topkis-type monotone comparative statics on intervals;
  • convergence of monotone bounded sequences.

The first two are reusable beyond this mission, and contributions of either as general lemmas are welcome.

Selected references

  • I. Popescu and Y. Wu, Dynamic Pricing Strategies with Reference Effects, Operations Research 55(3):413–429, 2007. https://doi.org/10.1287/opre.1070.0393
  • D. Kahneman and A. Tversky, Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision under Risk, Econometrica 47(2):263–291, 1979. https://doi.org/10.2307/1914185
  • P. K. Kopalle, A. G. Rao and J. L. Assunção, Asymmetric Reference Price Effects and Dynamic Pricing Policies, Marketing Science 15(1):60–85, 1996. https://doi.org/10.1287/mksc.15.1.60
  • G. Fibich, A. Gavious and O. Lowengart, Explicit Solutions of Optimization Models and Differential Games with Nonsmooth (Asymmetric) Reference-Price Effects, Operations Research 51(5):721–734, 2003. https://doi.org/10.1287/opre.51.5.721.16758
  • D. M. Topkis, Supermodularity and Complementarity, Princeton University Press, 1998. https://doi.org/10.1515/9781400822539
  • N. L. Stokey, R. E. Lucas and E. C. Prescott, Recursive Methods in Economic Dynamics, Harvard University Press, 1989. https://www.hup.harvard.edu/books/9780674750968
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