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Operations Research

2,207 missions · 1,083 completed

The discipline of applying mathematical analysis to complex decision problems in operations: allocating scarce resources, scheduling, routing, inventory, and the design of service and production systems. Drawing on mathematical programming, stochastic modeling, queueing, simulation, and game-theoretic reasoning, it seeks policies that perform provably well in systems shaped by constraints, congestion, and uncertainty.

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Dynamic ProgrammingOptimizationProbability·Captain: mikedeng1

Coordinating Inventory Control and Pricing Strategies with Random Demand and Fixed Ordering Cost: The Finite Horizon Case 1: Additive Demand: k-Concave Profit-to-Go, Optimal (s, S, p) PolicyResearch Paper

Motivation

A retailer that sets both its replenishment quantities and its prices over a finite selling season faces a coupled decision: the price shapes the demand that the inventory must serve, and the inventory position shapes which price is worth charging. With a fixed cost per order, the classical inventory answer is the (s, S) policy of Scarf (1960): when the stock falls below a reorder point sss, order up to the level SSS. Thomas (1974) asked what happens when the price is also a decision, and conjectured that an (s, S, p) policy — an (s, S) ordering rule together with a price that depends on the stock level — is optimal "under fairly general conditions". He also gave a counterexample when prices are restricted to a discrete set.

Chen and Simchi-Levi (Operations Research 52(6), 2004) settled the conjecture for the finite horizon. When demand is additive in a random shock, wt=Dt(pt)+βtw_t = D_t(p_t) + \beta_twt​=Dt​(pt​)+βt​, the conjecture holds (§3, Theorem 3.1). When the shock is not additive, it fails, and a weaker policy class is optimal (§4, the second mission of this series). This mission formalizes the additive case.

Timeline:

  • Scarf (1960): (s, S) policies are optimal for the fixed-cost inventory problem, through k-convexity.
  • Thomas (1974): conjectures (s, S, p) optimality with a continuous price range.
  • Federgruen and Heching (1999): joint pricing and inventory without a fixed cost; base-stock list-price policies are optimal.
  • Polatoglu and Sahin (2000): the lost-sales variant; sufficient conditions for (s, S, p) optimality.
  • Chen and Simchi-Levi (2004): (s, S, p) optimality for additive demand with backlogging, and its failure in general.

Setting

There are TTT periods t=1,…,Tt = 1, \dots, Tt=1,…,T. In period ttt the firm starts with inventory xxx, orders up to a level y≥xy \ge xy≥x at cost k δ(y−x)+ct(y−x)k\,\delta(y - x) + c_t(y - x)kδ(y−x)+ct​(y−x), where k≥0k \ge 0k≥0 is a fixed cost, ctc_tct​ a unit cost and δ(u)=1\delta(u) = 1δ(u)=1 if u>0u > 0u>0 and 000 otherwise, and sets a price. Demand is wt=αtDt(pt)+βtw_t = \alpha_t D_t(p_t) + \beta_twt​=αt​Dt​(pt​)+βt​ for a random pair ϵt=(αt,βt)\epsilon_t = (\alpha_t, \beta_t)ϵt​=(αt​,βt​) with Eαt=1\mathbb E\alpha_t = 1Eαt​=1, Eβt=0\mathbb E\beta_t = 0Eβt​=0; in the additive case αt=1\alpha_t = 1αt​=1. Unmet demand is backlogged, and an end-of-period inventory xxx costs ht(x)h_t(x)ht​(x), a convex function.

Since price and expected demand determine each other, the decision is an expected demand d∈[d‾t,dˉt]d \in [\underline d_t, \bar d_t]d∈[d​t​,dˉt​], with price Pt(d)=Dt−1(d)P_t(d) = D_t^{-1}(d)Pt​(d)=Dt−1​(d) and expected revenue Rt(d)=d Pt(d)R_t(d) = d\,P_t(d)Rt​(d)=dPt​(d), assumed concave. With Gt(y,d)=E ht(y−αtd−βt)G_t(y, d) = \mathbb E\,h_t(y - \alpha_t d - \beta_t)Gt​(y,d)=Eht​(y−αt​d−βt​), the profit-to-go functions satisfy vT+1≡0v_{T+1} \equiv 0vT+1​≡0 and, for t=T,…,1t = T, \dots, 1t=T,…,1,

vt(x)=ctx+max⁡y≥x[−k δ(y−x)+gt(y,dt(y))],(2)v_t(x) = c_t x + \max_{y \ge x}\Big[-k\,\delta(y - x) + g_t\big(y, d_t(y)\big)\Big], \qquad (2)vt​(x)=ct​x+y≥xmax​[−kδ(y−x)+gt​(y,dt​(y))],(2) gt(y,d)=Rt(d)−cty+E{−ht(y−αtd−βt)+vt+1(y−αtd−βt)},(3)g_t(y, d) = R_t(d) - c_t y + \mathbb E\big\{-h_t(y - \alpha_t d - \beta_t) + v_{t+1}(y - \alpha_t d - \beta_t)\big\}, \qquad (3)gt​(y,d)=Rt​(d)−ct​y+E{−ht​(y−αt​d−βt​)+vt+1​(y−αt​d−βt​)},(3)

where dt(y)d_t(y)dt​(y) maximizes gt(y,⋅)g_t(y, \cdot)gt​(y,⋅) over [d‾t,dˉt][\underline d_t, \bar d_t][d​t​,dˉt​]. A function fff is k-convex if k+f(z+y)≥f(y)+zb(f(y)−f(y−b))k + f(z + y) \ge f(y) + \frac{z}{b}\big(f(y) - f(y - b)\big)k+f(z+y)≥f(y)+bz​(f(y)−f(y−b)) for all z≥0z \ge 0z≥0, b>0b > 0b>0, yyy (Definition 2.1), and k-concave if −f-f−f is k-convex. Assumptions 3–5 of the paper give GtG_tGt​ the stated one-sided growth limits and polynomial growth O(∣y∣ρ)O(|y|^\rho)O(∣y∣ρ), and give demand a finite ρ\rhoρ-th moment.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 3.1(c)–(d)

For additive demand and every period ttt: gt(y,⋅)g_t(y, \cdot)gt​(y,⋅) attains its maximum at some dt(y)d_t(y)dt​(y), the functions y↦gt(y,dt(y))y \mapsto g_t(y, d_t(y))y↦gt​(y,dt​(y)) and x↦vt(x)x \mapsto v_t(x)x↦vt​(x) are k-concave, and there exist st≤Sts_t \le S_tst​≤St​ such that

y∗(x)={St,x<st,x,x≥st,y^*(x) = \begin{cases} S_t, & x < s_t,\\ x, & x \ge s_t,\end{cases}y∗(x)={St​,x,​x<st​,x≥st​,​

maximizes −k δ(y−x)+gt(y,dt(y))-k\,\delta(y - x) + g_t(y, d_t(y))−kδ(y−x)+gt​(y,dt​(y)) over y≥xy \ge xy≥x, vt(x)=ctx−k δ(y∗(x)−x)+gt(y∗(x),dt(y∗(x)))v_t(x) = c_t x - k\,\delta(y^*(x) - x) + g_t(y^*(x), d_t(y^*(x)))vt​(x)=ct​x−kδ(y∗(x)−x)+gt​(y∗(x),dt​(y∗(x))), and a best expected demand exists at y∗(x)y^*(x)y∗(x); the price is Dt−1D_t^{-1}Dt−1​ of it.

Milestones

  1. Definitions 2.1 and 2.2 of k-convexity are equivalent.
  2. Lemma 1(d): a continuous coercive k-convex function has the (s, S) shape (already proved on the platform).
  3. Lemma 2: a maximizer dt(y)d_t(y)dt​(y) can be chosen with y−dt(y)y - d_t(y)y−dt​(y) nondecreasing.
  4. Theorem 3.1(a): gt(y,d)=O(∣y∣ρ)g_t(y, d) = O(|y|^\rho)gt​(y,d)=O(∣y∣ρ) and vt(x)=O(∣x∣ρ)v_t(x) = O(|x|^\rho)vt​(x)=O(∣x∣ρ).
  5. Theorem 3.1(b): gtg_tgt​ is continuous, gt(y,d)→−∞g_t(y, d) \to -\inftygt​(y,d)→−∞ as ∣y∣→∞|y| \to \infty∣y∣→∞, and dt(y)d_t(y)dt​(y) exists.
  6. Inequality (7): gt(y,dt(y))g_t(y, d_t(y))gt​(y,dt​(y)) is k-concave when the continuation value is.
  7. The display of vtv_tvt​: its (s, S) form and the transfer of k-concavity from gt(y,dt(y))g_t(y, d_t(y))gt​(y,dt​(y)) to vtv_tvt​.

Significance

The theorem identifies the structure of an optimal policy for a basic model of coordinated pricing and replenishment: two numbers per period determine the ordering decision, and the price is a function of the post-order stock. It confirms Thomas's conjecture in the additive case and tells a computation or an approximation scheme which policy class it may restrict to; §5 of the paper extends it to a nonincreasing fixed cost, the infinite horizon and Markovian demand.

The result is proved in the paper; to our knowledge it has no machine-checked proof. A formalization adds checked versions of the k-convexity toolkit (the equivalence of the two standard definitions; the (s, S) structure lemma), a checked monotone-selection argument for a parametric maximization, and a checked finite-horizon induction in which an expectation, a maximization over a continuous action and a fixed cost interact. The proof of part (a) is omitted in the paper ("similar to that of Theorem 1 in Federgruen and Heching (1999)"), so formalizing it supplies a missing argument.

Difficulty

The obvious argument fails at the expectation. A k-concave function composed with a shift y↦y−d−βy \mapsto y - d - \betay↦y−d−β is k-concave for a fixed ddd, but here the demand decision depends on yyy, and k-concavity, unlike concavity, is not preserved under an arbitrary reparametrization: Definition 2.2 is asymmetric in its two points. The inequality needed for the continuation value requires the post-demand levels y−dt(y)−βty - d_t(y) - \beta_ty−dt​(y)−βt​ to be ordered like the inventory levels yyy. That is the content of Lemma 2, and it uses additivity; for multiplicative demand the ordering fails, and so does the theorem (§4).

The second difficulty is analytic: each step of the induction needs a continuous continuation value of polynomial growth, so that the expectation in (3) is finite and continuous, the maximum over ddd is attained, and gtg_tgt​ is coercive.

Formalization scope

The model is a structure of real data indexed by t∈Nt \in \mathbb Nt∈N, with periods 1,…,T1, \dots, T1,…,T; the law of (αt,βt)(\alpha_t, \beta_t)(αt​,βt​) is a probability measure on R2\mathbb R^2R2 and expectations are Bochner integrals. The formalization works in expected-demand space d∈[d‾t,dˉt]d \in [\underline d_t, \bar d_t]d∈[d​t​,dˉt​], equivalent to price space because DtD_tDt​ is a continuous strictly decreasing bijection. Additivity is "αt=1\alpha_t = 1αt​=1 almost surely". The profit-to-go is defined by recursion on the number of periods to go, with vT+1=0v_{T+1} = 0vT+1​=0. Maxima are written as real suprema; every target that uses them asserts that they are attained, so the convention that an unbounded supremum is 000 never enters. k-convexity is the platform's BertsekasKConvex (Definition 2.1); k-concavity of fff is k-convexity of −f-f−f.

Conventions and restrictions relative to the printed page:

  • O(∣y∣ρ)O(|y|^\rho)O(∣y∣ρ) is an explicit bound C(1+∣y∣ρ)C(1 + |y|^\rho)C(1+∣y∣ρ) with ρ∈N\rho \in \mathbb Nρ∈N, uniform in ddd.
  • Assumption 5, printed E{Dt(p,ϵt)}ρ<∞E\{D_t(p, \epsilon_t)\}^\rho < \inftyE{Dt​(p,ϵt​)}ρ<∞, is read as E∣αtd+βt∣ρ<∞\mathbb E|\alpha_t d + \beta_t|^\rho < \inftyE∣αt​d+βt​∣ρ<∞.
  • Integrability of ht(y−αtd−βt)h_t(y - \alpha_t d - \beta_t)ht​(y−αt​d−βt​) is part of Assumption 4, and Theorem 3.1(a) also asserts that the expectation of vt+1v_{t+1}vt+1​ in (3) is finite.
  • Added hypotheses: cT+1=0c_{T+1} = 0cT+1​=0 (the paper uses cT+1c_{T+1}cT+1​ without defining it), ct≥0c_t \ge 0ct​≥0 (used in the proof of part (b); without it gtg_tgt​ need not tend to −∞-\infty−∞), and k≥0k \ge 0k≥0.
  • Independence across periods is not stated; the dynamic program uses only each period's marginal law.
  • The paper writes st<Sts_t < S_tst​<St​ in the proof; for k=0k = 0k=0 equality is possible, so the targets use st≤Sts_t \le S_tst​≤St​.

A trivializing formalization is ruled out: the targets assert attainment of every maximum they mention and the identity between vt(x)v_t(x)vt​(x) and the maximized objective, so a supremum that defaults to 000, or an integral of a non-integrable function, cannot make them hold vacuously; and the assumptions are satisfiable (a one-period instance with h(x)=∣x∣h(x) = |x|h(x)=∣x∣ meets all of them).

A complete development needs: continuity of parametric integrals under polynomial domination; attainment of maxima over compact intervals; Topkis-style monotone selection for functions with increasing differences; the (s, S) structure lemma for k-convex functions (proved on the platform); and the closure of k-concavity under the operations above. The k-convexity results and the monotone-selection lemma are reusable for the general-demand mission of this series and for other fixed-cost inventory models. Contributions to any milestone are welcome, including proofs that rely on platform results by Topkis (Supermodularity.Monotonicity.argmax_increasing_of_increasing_differences).

Selected references

  • X. Chen, D. Simchi-Levi, Coordinating Inventory Control and Pricing Strategies with Random Demand and Fixed Ordering Cost: The Finite Horizon Case, Operations Research 52(6), 887–896, 2004. https://doi.org/10.1287/opre.1040.0127
  • H. Scarf, The Optimality of (S, s) Policies in the Dynamic Inventory Problem, in Mathematical Methods in the Social Sciences, Stanford University Press, 1960.
  • L. J. Thomas, Price and Production Decisions with Random Demand, Operations Research 22, 513–518, 1974.
  • E. L. Porteus, On the Optimality of Generalized (s, S) Policies, Management Science 17, 411–426, 1971.
  • A. Federgruen, A. Heching, Combined Pricing and Inventory Control Under Uncertainty, Operations Research 47(3), 454–475, 1999. https://doi.org/10.1287/opre.47.3.454
  • H. Polatoglu, I. Sahin, Optimal Procurement Policies under Price-Dependent Demand, International Journal of Production Economics 65, 141–171, 2000.
  • D. M. Topkis, Supermodularity and Complementarity, Princeton University Press, 1998.
  • D. P. Bertsekas, Dynamic Programming and Optimal Control, Vol. I, Athena Scientific, 1995.
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Convex OptimizationOptimization·Captain: mikedeng1

Convex Optimization: Algorithms and Complexity I: The Center of Gravity Method Satisfies f(x_t) − min f ≤ 2B(1 − 1/e)^{t/n}Textbook

Motivation

Black-box convex optimization asks how many queries to an oracle are needed to minimize a convex function to accuracy ε\varepsilonε. In fixed dimension nnn the answer is of order nlog⁡(1/ε)n\log(1/\varepsilon)nlog(1/ε), and the first algorithm to attain it is the center of gravity method, discovered independently by Levin (1965) and Newman (1965). It is the opening example of cutting plane methods: algorithms that keep a set known to contain a minimizer and shrink it with one half-space per oracle call. The ellipsoid method and Vaidya's method, which underlie the polynomial-time solvability of linear programming and convex feasibility problems, follow the same template with cheaper sets. This mission is the first of a series formalizing S. Bubeck's monograph Convex Optimization: Algorithms and Complexity (2015), and covers its §2.1.

Timeline:

  • 1960: B. Grünbaum proves that every half-space whose boundary passes through the centroid of a convex body in Rn\mathbb R^nRn contains at least a fraction (n/(n+1))n≥1/e(n/(n+1))^n \ge 1/e(n/(n+1))n≥1/e of its volume.
  • 1965: A. Levin and D. J. Newman independently introduce the center of gravity method and prove its linear rate.
  • 1983: A. Nemirovski and D. Yudin show that Ω(nlog⁡(1/ε))\Omega(n\log(1/\varepsilon))Ω(nlog(1/ε)) oracle calls are necessary for small ε\varepsilonε, so the method's oracle complexity is optimal.

Setting

Let X⊂Rn\mathcal X\subset\mathbb R^nX⊂Rn be a convex body: a compact convex set with non-empty interior. Let f:X→[−B,B]f:\mathcal X\to[-B,B]f:X→[−B,B] be continuous and convex, and let x∗∈Xx^*\in\mathcal Xx∗∈X be a minimizer of fff on X\mathcal XX. A vector www is a subgradient of fff at x∈Xx\in\mathcal Xx∈X if f(x)−f(y)≤w⊤(x−y)f(x)-f(y)\le w^\top(x-y)f(x)−f(y)≤w⊤(x−y) for every y∈Xy\in\mathcal Xy∈X. The first order oracle returns, at a query point, some subgradient there; the zeroth order oracle returns the value of fff.

For a set S\mathcal SS of finite positive volume, its center of gravity is

c(S)=1vol(S)∫x∈Sx dx.c(\mathcal S)=\frac{1}{\mathrm{vol}(\mathcal S)}\int_{x\in\mathcal S}x\,dx .c(S)=vol(S)1​∫x∈S​xdx.

The center of gravity method sets S1=X\mathcal S_1=\mathcal XS1​=X and, for t≥1t\ge1t≥1, computes ct=c(St)c_t=c(\mathcal S_t)ct​=c(St​), queries the first order oracle at ctc_tct​ to obtain a subgradient wtw_twt​, and sets

St+1=St∩{x∈Rn:(x−ct)⊤wt≤0}.\mathcal S_{t+1}=\mathcal S_t\cap\{x\in\mathbb R^n:(x-c_t)^\top w_t\le0\}.St+1​=St​∩{x∈Rn:(x−ct​)⊤wt​≤0}.

After ttt steps it outputs xt∈argmin⁡1≤r≤tf(cr)x_t\in\operatorname{argmin}_{1\le r\le t}f(c_r)xt​∈argmin1≤r≤t​f(cr​), found with ttt calls to the zeroth order oracle.

The Lean development names these objects IsConvexBody, IsSubgradientOn, centroid and IsCenterOfGravityRun in the namespace ConvexOptAlg.CenterGravity.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 2.1 (p. 245)

For every run of the method and every t≥1t\ge1t≥1,

f(xt)−min⁡x∈Xf(x)≤2B(1−1e)t/n.f(x_t)-\min_{x\in\mathcal X}f(x)\le 2B\Big(1-\frac1e\Big)^{t/n}.f(xt​)−x∈Xmin​f(x)≤2B(1−e1​)t/n.

Milestones (proof of Theorem 2.1, pp. 246–247)

  1. Lemma 2.2 (Grünbaum). If K\mathcal KK is centered, ∫Kx dx=0\int_{\mathcal K}x\,dx=0∫K​xdx=0, then for every w≠0w\ne0w=0,
Vol(K∩{x:x⊤w≥0})≥1e Vol(K).\mathrm{Vol}\big(\mathcal K\cap\{x:x^\top w\ge0\}\big)\ge\tfrac1e\,\mathrm{Vol}(\mathcal K).Vol(K∩{x:x⊤w≥0})≥e1​Vol(K).
  1. (2.2). St∖St+1⊂{x∈X:(x−ct)⊤wt>0}⊂{x∈X:f(x)>f(ct)}\mathcal S_t\setminus\mathcal S_{t+1}\subset\{x\in\mathcal X:(x-c_t)^\top w_t>0\}\subset\{x\in\mathcal X:f(x)>f(c_t)\}St​∖St+1​⊂{x∈X:(x−ct​)⊤wt​>0}⊂{x∈X:f(x)>f(ct​)}, hence x∗∈Stx^*\in\mathcal S_tx∗∈St​ for every ttt.
  2. Volume decay. If ws≠0w_s\ne0ws​=0 for s≤ts\le ts≤t, then vol(St+1)≤(1−1/e)t vol(X)\mathrm{vol}(\mathcal S_{t+1})\le(1-1/e)^t\,\mathrm{vol}(\mathcal X)vol(St+1​)≤(1−1/e)tvol(X).
  3. Shrunk copies. For ε∈[0,1]\varepsilon\in[0,1]ε∈[0,1] and Xε={(1−ε)x∗+εx:x∈X}\mathcal X_\varepsilon=\{(1-\varepsilon)x^*+\varepsilon x: x\in\mathcal X\}Xε​={(1−ε)x∗+εx:x∈X}, vol(Xε)=εn vol(X)\mathrm{vol}(\mathcal X_\varepsilon)=\varepsilon^n\,\mathrm{vol}(\mathcal X)vol(Xε​)=εnvol(X).
  4. Values on shrunk copies. Every xε∈Xεx_\varepsilon\in\mathcal X_\varepsilonxε​∈Xε​ satisfies f(xε)≤f(x∗)+2εBf(x_\varepsilon)\le f(x^*)+2\varepsilon Bf(xε​)≤f(x∗)+2εB.

Significance

Theorem 2.1 is a linear rate whose number of queries to reach accuracy ε\varepsilonε, O(nlog⁡(2B/ε))O(n\log(2B/\varepsilon))O(nlog(2B/ε)), depends on the dimension only linearly and on the accuracy only logarithmically, and matches the Nemirovski–Yudin lower bound. It is the reference point against which the ellipsoid method (O(n2log⁡(1/ε))O(n^2\log(1/\varepsilon))O(n2log(1/ε)) queries) and Vaidya's method are measured, and the randomized center of gravity method of §6.7 of the book rests on the same analysis. Grünbaum's inequality is a basic fact of convex geometry with uses well beyond optimization, for instance in the analysis of query complexity and of approximate centroid computations by random walks.

On the formal side, the theorem has been proved since 1965 and the lemma since 1960; neither is known to have a machine-checked proof. A complete development adds to Mathlib-based libraries the center of gravity of a set, the volume of homothetic images in the form used here, Grünbaum's inequality, and a reusable predicate for cutting plane runs. The later missions of this series (the ellipsoid method in particular) reuse the shrunk-copy argument of milestones 4 and 5.

Difficulty

The steps (2.2), the shrunk-copy volume and the value bound are short. The volume decay and the final comparison are bookkeeping once one knows that each cut keeps the method's sets convex bodies with positive volume. The difficulty is Lemma 2.2. A half-space through the centroid need not split the volume evenly: for a cone the smaller side tends to 1/e1/e1/e of the volume as n→∞n\to\inftyn→∞, so no symmetry argument works, and the bound must hold uniformly in the dimension. The classical proofs rely on tools of convex geometry, such as volume comparisons between a body and a symmetrized body, that are not available in Lean in the needed form. A second source of work is that the method's sets are defined through centroids: it has to be shown that they remain convex bodies of positive volume, so that each centroid is the genuine center of gravity, and this fact is not available before the volume estimates are.

Formalization scope

Rn\mathbb R^nRn is EuclideanSpace ℝ (Fin n) with Lebesgue measure volume; volumes are kept in [0,∞][0,\infty][0,∞] in every statement. The function is a total map f : EuclideanSpace ℝ (Fin n) → ℝ with ∣f∣≤B|f|\le B∣f∣≤B, continuity and convexity required on X\mathcal XX only; its values off X\mathcal XX are irrelevant. Subgradients are relative to X\mathcal XX (Definition 1.2). A run is a predicate on sequences indexed from 111; the oracle's choice of subgradient is free, and every theorem holds for all runs. The minimizer x∗x^*x∗ is a hypothesis, as in the book's standing notation; it exists here by compactness. The output xtx_txt​ is any argmin, so the goal bounds the minimum min⁡1≤r≤tf(cr)\min_{1\le r\le t}f(c_r)min1≤r≤t​f(cr​).

Added hypotheses, all disclosed in the statements: n≥1n\ge1n≥1 in the goal, because the exponent t/nt/nt/n is undefined for n=0n=0n=0; and in Lemma 2.2, that the centered set is a convex body, because in Lean the integral of a non-integrable function is 000, which would make every unbounded convex set "centered". The milestone on volume decay assumes ws≠0w_s\ne0ws​=0, which is the book's own reduction.

The center of gravity is defined with the real volume vol(S)\mathrm{vol}(\mathcal S)vol(S) and is meaningless when that volume is 000 or infinite. The run predicate does not assume the volumes are positive; that every set of a run is a convex body of positive volume is part of what has to be proved, and a formalization in which runs could degenerate to sets of zero volume, or in which the centroid is an arbitrary point, is not the book's method.

Contributions welcome: proofs of any item; a general Grünbaum inequality for convex sets of finite positive volume; lemmas on centroids (membership in the closed convex hull, translation behaviour) that later missions can reuse.

Selected references

  • S. Bubeck, Convex Optimization: Algorithms and Complexity, Foundations and Trends in Machine Learning 8(3–4):231–358, 2015. arXiv:1405.4980v2, §2.1. https://arxiv.org/abs/1405.4980
  • B. Grünbaum, Partitions of mass-distributions and of convex bodies by hyperplanes, Pacific Journal of Mathematics 10(4):1257–1261, 1960. https://doi.org/10.2140/pjm.1960.10.1257
  • A. Yu. Levin, On an algorithm for the minimization of convex functions, Soviet Mathematics Doklady 6:286–290, 1965.
  • D. J. Newman, Location of the maximum on unimodal surfaces, Journal of the ACM 12(3):395–398, 1965. https://doi.org/10.1145/321281.321291
  • A. Nemirovski and D. Yudin, Problem Complexity and Method Efficiency in Optimization, Wiley, 1983.
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Convex OptimizationProbabilityStatistics·Captain: mikedeng1

Data-Driven Robust Optimization VI: The Moment Set U^CS Has Support Function μ̂ᵀv + Γ₁‖v‖ + √(1/ε − 1)‖Cv‖, an Upper Bound on the Worst-Case Value at RiskResearch Paper

Motivation

In robust optimization, a constraint is checked against every parameter value in an uncertainty set. This turns uncertainty into a deterministic optimization problem, but the set must be chosen carefully: a large set can make decisions unnecessarily conservative, while a small one can miss likely outcomes. Bertsimas, Gupta and Kallus use data to calibrate sets through statistical confidence regions. Their question is whether feasibility for every parameter in the set protects a decision against a fresh uncertain outcome with a specified probability. This mission treats the part of their construction based on estimated first and second moments. Bertsimas, Gupta and Kallus, §8.1.

The moment region originates in a concentration result attributed in the paper to Shawe-Taylor and Cristianini. That result bounds the distance between sample and population means and covariances when the uncertain vector is supported in a Euclidean ball. Bertsimas, Gupta and Kallus also discuss replacing those analytic thresholds with bootstrap thresholds; they describe the resulting coverage as approximate. The present target concerns the mathematical relation between a fixed moment region and its uncertainty set, leaving the statistical calibration of the thresholds to its cited source. Shawe-Taylor and Cristianini, 2003; Bertsimas, Gupta and Kallus, pp. 24–25.

Setting

Let the uncertain vector u~\tilde uu~ take values in Rd\mathbb R^dRd. A probability law PPP belongs to the moment confidence region PCS\mathcal P^{CS}PCS when it is supported in the Euclidean ball of radius RRR, its mean mPm_PmP​ is within Γ1\Gamma_1Γ1​ of an estimate μ^\hat\muμ^​, and its covariance SPS_PSP​ is within Γ2\Gamma_2Γ2​ of an estimate Σ^\hat\SigmaΣ^ in Frobenius norm. The covariance is SP=EP[u~u~⊤]−mPmP⊤S_P=\mathbb E_P[\tilde u\tilde u^\top]-m_Pm_P^\topSP​=EP​[u~u~⊤]−mP​mP⊤​. The thresholds Γ1,Γ2\Gamma_1,\Gamma_2Γ1​,Γ2​ are nonnegative and can be chosen by either calibration procedure discussed in the paper. Bertsimas, Gupta and Kallus, Theorem 9 and (33).

For a vector vvv, Value at Risk VaR⁡εP(v)\operatorname{VaR}^{P}_{\varepsilon}(v)VaRεP​(v) is the smallest threshold ttt for which P(u~⊤v≤t)≥1−εP(\tilde u^\top v\le t)\ge1-\varepsilonP(u~⊤v≤t)≥1−ε. The support function of a set U\mathcal UU is δ∗(v∣U)=sup⁡u∈Uu⊤v\delta^*(v\mid\mathcal U)=\sup_{u\in\mathcal U}u^\top vδ∗(v∣U)=supu∈U​u⊤v. The authors construct the set

UεCS={μ^+y+C⊤w:∥y∥2≤Γ1, ∥w∥2≤1/ε−1},C⊤C=Σ^+Γ2I.\mathcal U^{CS}_{\varepsilon} =\{\hat\mu+y+C^\top w:\|y\|_2\le\Gamma_1,\ \|w\|_2\le\sqrt{1/\varepsilon-1}\}, \qquad C^\top C=\hat\Sigma+\Gamma_2 I.UεCS​={μ^​+y+C⊤w:∥y∥2​≤Γ1​, ∥w∥2​≤1/ε−1​},C⊤C=Σ^+Γ2​I.

Here 0<ε<10<\varepsilon<10<ε<1 is the allowed violation probability, III is the identity matrix, and CCC is a matrix factor of the adjusted covariance. The estimates and CCC stay fixed while ε\varepsilonε varies. Bertsimas, Gupta and Kallus, (34)–(35).

Formalization targets

The first milestone bounds the quantile for every law in the moment region:

VaR⁡εP(v)≤μ^⊤v+Γ1∥v∥2+1−εεv⊤(Σ^+Γ2I)v(P∈PCS).\operatorname{VaR}^{P}_{\varepsilon}(v)\le \hat\mu^\top v+\Gamma_1\|v\|_2+ \sqrt{\frac{1-\varepsilon}{\varepsilon}} \sqrt{v^\top(\hat\Sigma+\Gamma_2I)v} \quad(P\in\mathcal P^{CS}).VaRεP​(v)≤μ^​⊤v+Γ1​∥v∥2​+ε1−ε​​v⊤(Σ^+Γ2​I)v​(P∈PCS).

The second milestone evaluates the two linear maxima over the Euclidean balls in UεCS\mathcal U^{CS}_{\varepsilon}UεCS​ and identifies ∥Cv∥2\|Cv\|_2∥Cv∥2​ with the quadratic form above. The goal, the deterministic part of Theorem 10, says the displayed bound equals δ∗(v∣UεCS)\delta^*(v\mid\mathcal U^{CS}_{\varepsilon})δ∗(v∣UεCS​) for every vvv, while the set is nonempty, convex and compact. This gives the support-function criterion of Theorem 1 for each law in the region. A companion formalizes Theorem 13(a): the resulting support constraint is separately convex in (v,t)(v,t)(v,t) and in ε\varepsilonε for 0<ε<3/40<\varepsilon<3/40<ε<3/4. Bertsimas, Gupta and Kallus, Theorems 10 and 13(a).

Significance

The support formula turns a distributional statement about an entire region of probability laws into a deterministic bound on a linear projection. It gives the robust model an explicit quantity to compare with a constraint threshold. The companion convexity result describes which risk levels allow separate convex optimization in the decision variables and the violation probability. Together they explain why the particular set in (35) is useful beyond the fact that it contains plausible uncertain vectors. Bertsimas, Gupta and Kallus, §§8.1 and 9.

The paper proves the mathematical construction and cites statistical results for the region's coverage. In Lean, the published Value-at-Risk and support-function definitions are already available, while this paper's moment region and set (35) need their own definitions. Formalizing the result therefore establishes a reusable interface between moment bounds, quantiles and set support. The theorem statements in this proposal are open proof targets; compiling them checks their types, not their proofs.

Difficulty

A bound on the mean and covariance does not directly bound a high quantile of every projection. The bound must work simultaneously for every probability law in the moment region, including discrete laws and singular covariances. The factor (1−ε)/ε\sqrt{(1-\varepsilon)/\varepsilon}(1−ε)/ε​ is essential: replacing it by a standard deviation or a Gaussian quantile would change the claim. On the set side, the ordinary norm of a Lean function vector is a sup norm, whereas both balls in (35) are Euclidean. Getting the norm wrong changes the support function. Bertsimas, Gupta and Kallus, (34)–(35).

Formalization scope

Vectors are functions on Fin d, whose coordinates start at zero. enorm and frob explicitly compute the Euclidean and Frobenius norms. The ball-support condition in PCS\mathcal P^{CS}PCS secures finite first and second moments; no density is assumed. The goal fixes R≥0R\ge0R≥0, Γ1,Γ2≥0\Gamma_1,\Gamma_2\ge0Γ1​,Γ2​≥0, 0<ε<10<\varepsilon<10<ε<1, and C⊤C=Σ^+Γ2IC^\top C=\hat\Sigma+\Gamma_2IC⊤C=Σ^+Γ2​I. This factor relation makes the quadratic form nonnegative; a separate positive-semidefinite assumption on Σ^\hat\SigmaΣ^ is unnecessary. The matrix need not be triangular because (35) and its support depend on C⊤CC^\top CC⊤C. The uncertainty set's nonemptiness and compactness appear in the goal so the real support-function supremum cannot take Lean's default value for an empty or unbounded set.

Theorem 10's sampling claim is represented by its deterministic criterion for each P∈PCSP\in\mathcal P^{CS}P∈PCS. The confidence-region coverage of Theorem 9 is cited, and the bootstrap coverage discussed on p. 25 is approximate; neither is asserted as an exact probability theorem here. Equation (34) prints an equality for a supremum over PCS\mathcal P^{CS}PCS, yet that region restricts support to a ball, and the page does not establish attainment under that restriction. This mission uses the upper-bound direction needed for Theorem 10 and does not assert the equality or Remark 16's exact equivalence. The scope includes a sharp quantile bound, the exact support formula and the 3/43/43/4 convexity range; a definition that merely makes the claim true by construction would miss these targets. Bertsimas, Gupta and Kallus, pp. 24–25 and 29.

Selected references

  • D. Bertsimas, V. Gupta and N. Kallus, Data-Driven Robust Optimization, arXiv:1401.0212v2, 2014; revised in Mathematical Programming 167 (2018), 235–292. arXiv preprint.
  • J. Shawe-Taylor and N. Cristianini, Estimating the Moments of a Random Vector with Applications, 2003. University of Southampton ePrint.
  • G. C. Calafiore and L. El Ghaoui, On Distributionally Robust Chance-Constrained Linear Programs, Journal of Optimization Theory and Applications 130 (2006), 1–22. DOI.
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Convex OptimizationProbability·Captain: mikedeng1

Data-Driven Robust Optimization I: An Uncertainty Set Whose Support Function Dominates Value at Risk Implies a Probabilistic Guarantee for Every Concave ConstraintResearch Paper

Motivation

Robust optimization replaces an uncertain constraint f(u~,x)≤0f(\tilde{\mathbf u},\mathbf x)\le 0f(u~,x)≤0, whose parameter u~∈Rd\tilde{\mathbf u}\in\mathbb R^du~∈Rd is random, by the requirement that the constraint hold for every u\mathbf uu in a chosen uncertainty set U\mathcal UU:

f(u,x)≤0∀ u∈U.f(\mathbf u,\mathbf x)\le 0\qquad\forall\,\mathbf u\in\mathcal U .f(u,x)≤0∀u∈U.

The resulting problem is deterministic and, for many shapes of U\mathcal UU, tractable (Ben-Tal, El Ghaoui and Nemirovski, Robust Optimization, 2009). The modelling question it leaves open is how to choose U\mathcal UU. A set that is too large makes every solution conservative; a set that is too small gives no protection. The practitioner's real requirement is usually probabilistic: a robust feasible x\mathbf xx should violate the uncertain constraint with probability at most ϵ\epsilonϵ.

Bertsimas, Gupta and Kallus (Data-Driven Robust Optimization, arXiv:1401.0212v2, 2014; Math. Program. 167, 2018) build uncertainty sets directly from data so that this requirement holds with high confidence. Their whole construction rests on one characterization, Theorem 1 of the paper, of when a set carries such a guarantee. This mission formalizes that characterization and the two results (Theorems 2 and 3) that turn it into a data-driven recipe.

Earlier work used the "if" direction of the characterization for bi-affine constraints when designing sets for specific distributional assumptions (Ben-Tal et al., 2009; Chen, Sim and Sun, Oper. Res. 55, 2007). The extension to every constraint concave in u\mathbf uu is due to Bertsimas, Gupta and Kallus.

Setting

Let P\mathbb PP be a probability measure on Rd\mathbb R^dRd, the law of u~\tilde{\mathbf u}u~, and fix a level 0<ϵ<10<\epsilon<10<ϵ<1. Throughout, f(u,x)f(\mathbf u,\mathbf x)f(u,x) is concave in u\mathbf uu for every value of the decision variable x∈Rk\mathbf x\in\mathbb R^kx∈Rk.

The support function of a set U⊆Rd\mathcal U\subseteq\mathbb R^dU⊆Rd is

δ∗(v∣U)=sup⁡u∈UvTu,v∈Rd.\delta^*(\mathbf v\mid\mathcal U)=\sup_{\mathbf u\in\mathcal U}\mathbf v^T\mathbf u,\qquad\mathbf v\in\mathbb R^d .δ∗(v∣U)=u∈Usup​vTu,v∈Rd.

The Value at Risk of the linear loss u~Tv\tilde{\mathbf u}^T\mathbf vu~Tv at level ϵ\epsilonϵ is

VaRϵP(v)=inf⁡{t: P(u~Tv≤t)≥1−ϵ}.\mathrm{VaR}^{\mathbb P}_\epsilon(\mathbf v)=\inf\{t:\ \mathbb P(\tilde{\mathbf u}^T\mathbf v\le t)\ge 1-\epsilon\}.VaRϵP​(v)=inf{t: P(u~Tv≤t)≥1−ϵ}.

A set U\mathcal UU implies a probabilistic guarantee at level ϵ\epsilonϵ for P\mathbb PP (property (P2) of the paper) if for every kkk, every f(u,x)f(\mathbf u,\mathbf x)f(u,x) concave in u\mathbf uu for each x∈Rk\mathbf x\in\mathbb R^kx∈Rk, and every x∗∈Rk\mathbf x^*\in\mathbb R^kx∗∈Rk,

f(u,x∗)≤0  ∀u∈U⟹P(f(u~,x∗)≤0)≥1−ϵ.(2)f(\mathbf u,\mathbf x^*)\le0\ \ \forall\mathbf u\in\mathcal U\quad\Longrightarrow\quad\mathbb P\big(f(\tilde{\mathbf u},\mathbf x^*)\le0\big)\ge1-\epsilon. \tag{2}f(u,x∗)≤0  ∀u∈U⟹P(f(u~,x∗)≤0)≥1−ϵ.(2)

A function is bi-affine if it has the form f(u,x)=uTFx+fuTu+fxTx+f0f(\mathbf u,\mathbf x)=\mathbf u^TF\mathbf x+\mathbf f_u^T\mathbf u+\mathbf f_x^T\mathbf x+f_0f(u,x)=uTFx+fuT​u+fxT​x+f0​.

In the data-driven setting, P∗\mathbb P^*P∗ is unknown and a sample S=(u^1,…,u^N)\mathcal S=(\hat{\mathbf u}^1,\dots,\hat{\mathbf u}^N)S=(u^1,…,u^N) is drawn i.i.d. from it. The paper's schema fixes 0<α<10<\alpha<10<α<1, takes the confidence region P(S)\mathcal P(\mathcal S)P(S) of a hypothesis test at level α\alphaα, and builds a closed convex set U(S)\mathcal U(\mathcal S)U(S) whose support function bounds VaRϵP(v)\mathrm{VaR}^{\mathbb P}_\epsilon(\mathbf v)VaRϵP​(v) for every P∈P(S)\mathbb P\in\mathcal P(\mathcal S)P∈P(S) and every v\mathbf vv.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 1

(a) If U\mathcal UU is nonempty, convex and compact and

δ∗(v∣U)≥VaRϵP(v)∀ v∈Rd,\delta^*(\mathbf v\mid\mathcal U)\ge\mathrm{VaR}^{\mathbb P}_\epsilon(\mathbf v)\qquad\forall\,\mathbf v\in\mathbb R^d,δ∗(v∣U)≥VaRϵP​(v)∀v∈Rd,

then U\mathcal UU implies a probabilistic guarantee at level ϵ\epsilonϵ for P\mathbb PP.

(b) If U\mathcal UU is nonempty and δ∗(v∣U)<VaRϵP(v)\delta^*(\mathbf v\mid\mathcal U)<\mathrm{VaR}^{\mathbb P}_\epsilon(\mathbf v)δ∗(v∣U)<VaRϵP​(v) for some v\mathbf vv at which δ∗(v∣U)\delta^*(\mathbf v\mid\mathcal U)δ∗(v∣U) is finite, then some bi-affine fff violates (2).

Milestones toward the goal

The proof in the electronic companion (EC.1.1) is a short chain, and its steps are the milestones: the attainment property of VaR, P(u~Tv>VaRϵP(v))≤ϵ\mathbb P(\tilde{\mathbf u}^T\mathbf v>\mathrm{VaR}^{\mathbb P}_\epsilon(\mathbf v))\le\epsilonP(u~Tv>VaRϵP​(v))≤ϵ (already proved on the platform); a strict separating hyperplane between U\mathcal UU and the superlevel set {f(⋅,x∗)≥t}\{f(\cdot,\mathbf x^*)\ge t\}{f(⋅,x∗)≥t}; the bound P(f(u~,x∗)≥t)≤ϵ\mathbb P(f(\tilde{\mathbf u},\mathbf x^*)\ge t)\le\epsilonP(f(u~,x∗)≥t)≤ϵ for t>0t>0t>0; its limit P(f(u~,x∗)>0)≤ϵ\mathbb P(f(\tilde{\mathbf u},\mathbf x^*)>0)\le\epsilonP(f(u~,x∗)>0)≤ϵ; and, for part (b), the witness f(u,x)=vTu−xf(\mathbf u,x)=\mathbf v^T\mathbf u-xf(u,x)=vTu−x at x∗=δ∗(v∣U)x^*=\delta^*(\mathbf v\mid\mathcal U)x∗=δ∗(v∣U).

Companions: Theorems 2 and 3

Theorem 2: with probability at least 1−α1-\alpha1−α over the sample, U(S)\mathcal U(\mathcal S)U(S) implies a probabilistic guarantee at level ϵ\epsilonϵ for P∗\mathbb P^*P∗. Theorem 3: if the region does not depend on ϵ\epsilonϵ, then with probability at least 1−α1-\alpha1−α the whole family {U(S,ϵ):0<ϵ<1}\{\mathcal U(\mathcal S,\epsilon):0<\epsilon<1\}{U(S,ϵ):0<ϵ<1} implies the guarantee simultaneously (a), and every x\mathbf xx satisfying the level-optimized constraints (9) satisfies the joint chance constraint

P∗(max⁡j=1,…,mfj(u~,x)≤0)≥1−ϵˉ(7)\mathbb P^*\Big(\max_{j=1,\dots,m}f_j(\tilde{\mathbf u},\mathbf x)\le0\Big)\ge1-\bar\epsilon \tag{7}P∗(j=1,…,mmax​fj​(u~,x)≤0)≥1−ϵˉ(7)

(b).

Significance

Theorem 1(a) is what certifies every uncertainty set in the paper: the χ2\chi^2χ2 and GGG sets for discrete distributions, the Kolmogorov–Smirnov and forward–backward sets for independent marginals, the marginal-sample box and the moment sets. Each construction reduces to proving one inequality between a support function and a Value at Risk, which is a statement about a single linear functional, and Theorem 1(a) lifts it to every concave constraint at once. Part (b) shows the condition cannot be dropped even for bi-affine constraints. Theorems 2 and 3 separate the statistical input (coverage of a confidence region) from the convex-analytic input (the support-function bound), and Theorem 3(b) is what allows the levels ϵj\epsilon_jϵj​ of a system of constraints to be optimized after seeing the data.

The results are proved in the paper. None of them has a machine-checked proof; the only formalized ingredient is the attainment property of VaR, which is on the platform as a proved theorem. The formalization provides a checked bridge from support-function bounds to probabilistic guarantees that the other missions of this series (II–VI) use to state their own results in the criterion form VaR≤δ∗\mathrm{VaR}\le\delta^*VaR≤δ∗.

Difficulty

The informal argument is short; the difficulty is in the infinite-dimensional bookkeeping that the page leaves implicit. The superlevel set {f(⋅,x∗)≥t}\{f(\cdot,\mathbf x^*)\ge t\}{f(⋅,x∗)≥t} need not be bounded, so the strict separation must use compactness of U\mathcal UU alone. Closedness of this set and measurability of {f(u~,x∗)≤0}\{f(\tilde{\mathbf u},\mathbf x^*)\le0\}{f(u~,x∗)≤0} depend on concave functions on Rd\mathbb R^dRd being continuous. The passage t↓0t\downarrow0t↓0 is continuity of a measure along an increasing union. The attainment of the infimum in the definition of VaR requires right-continuity of distribution functions. A naive attempt to separate U\mathcal UU from the zero superlevel set {f≥0}\{f\ge0\}{f≥0} directly fails, because the two sets may touch.

Formalization scope

Rd\mathbb R^dRd is Fin d → ℝ; u~\tilde{\mathbf u}u~ is the identity map; vTu\mathbf v^T\mathbf uvTu is the dot product u ⬝ᵥ v. The Value at Risk is the published MultistageStochastic.valueAtRisk at level 1−ϵ1-\epsilon1−ϵ, and the support function is the published RobustMDP.Shared.supportFunction. Both are real-valued sInf/sSup, which return 000 on empty or unbounded sets, so every statement assumes 0<ϵ<10<\epsilon<10<ϵ<1, a probability measure, and an uncertainty set that is nonempty and compact (Theorem 1(a), Theorems 2–3) or nonempty with {vTu:u∈U}\{\mathbf v^T\mathbf u:\mathbf u\in\mathcal U\}{vTu:u∈U} bounded above in the direction considered (Theorem 1(b)). In Theorem 1(b) and its witness this is the paper's own requirement that δ∗(v∣U)\delta^*(\mathbf v\mid\mathcal U)δ∗(v∣U) be finite, which its strict inequality with a real VaR forces and its proof uses by treating δ∗(v∣U)\delta^*(\mathbf v\mid\mathcal U)δ∗(v∣U) as a real number. Part (b) is printed with U∗\mathcal U^*U∗, a slip for U\mathcal UU; the proof's separation step prints both inequalities in the same direction, a slip corrected in the strict separation milestone.

Property (P2) quantifies over the dimension kkk of the decision variable, every function concave in u\mathbf uu for each x\mathbf xx, and every x∗\mathbf x^*x∗. Restricting it to affine fff or to k=0k=0k=0 would trivialize part (a) and falsify part (b), and is ruled out by the definition.

In Theorems 2 and 3 the sample is Fin N → (Fin d → ℝ) with the product law Measure.pi; the confidence region and the uncertainty set are arbitrary maps of the sample, and the coverage PS∗(P∗∈P(S))≥1−α\mathbb P^*_{\mathcal S}(\mathbb P^*\in\mathcal P(\mathcal S))\ge1-\alphaPS∗​(P∗∈P(S))≥1−α is a hypothesis, never the conclusion's event. Step 2 of the schema is stated with g=δ∗(⋅∣U(S))g=\delta^*(\cdot\mid\mathcal U(\mathcal S))g=δ∗(⋅∣U(S)) directly. The sets are assumed nonempty and compact (Step 3 says closed and convex; a finite support function that bounds VaR forces nonemptiness and boundedness). Theorem 3(b) reads the levels ϵj\epsilon_jϵj​ in (0,1)(0,1)(0,1), where the family is defined. Probabilities of events in the sample space are outer measures, so no measurability hypotheses are needed.

A complete development needs strict separation of a compact convex set from a closed convex set (Mathlib's geometric_hahn_banach_compact_closed), continuity of concave functions on finite-dimensional spaces, and the attainment property of VaR. Contributions are welcome on all milestones; the separation and limit steps are reusable for any chance-constraint argument based on support functions.

Selected references

  • D. Bertsimas, V. Gupta, N. Kallus, Data-Driven Robust Optimization, arXiv:1401.0212v2, 2014; Mathematical Programming 167:235–292, 2018. https://arxiv.org/abs/1401.0212
  • A. Ben-Tal, L. El Ghaoui, A. Nemirovski, Robust Optimization, Princeton University Press, 2009. https://doi.org/10.1515/9781400831050
  • X. Chen, M. Sim, P. Sun, A Robust Optimization Perspective on Stochastic Programming, Operations Research 55(6):1058–1071, 2007. https://doi.org/10.1287/opre.1070.0441
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Linear OptimizationOptimization·Captain: mikedeng1

On the Power and Limitations of Affine Policies in Two-Stage Adaptive Optimization I: An Affine Policy Is Optimal When the Uncertainty Set Is a SimplexResearch Paper

Motivation

Two-stage adaptive optimization models decisions taken in two rounds: a first-stage decision xxx is fixed before an uncertain parameter is revealed, and a second-stage decision y(b)y(b)y(b) is chosen after the parameter bbb is observed, so that the second stage may depend on bbb arbitrarily. The objective is the worst case over an uncertainty set U\mathcal UU of possible parameters. Such models arise in robust network design, capacity planning and two-stage covering problems, and they generalize the two-stage robust combinatorial problems (set cover, facility location) studied by Dhamdhere, Goyal, Ravi and Singh.

Optimizing over all functions y(⋅)y(\cdot)y(⋅) is intractable in general: Bertsimas and Goyal note that the optimal second stage is piecewise linear in bbb with possibly exponentially many pieces (Bemporad, Borrelli and Morari, 2003). A standard remedy, introduced for robust linear programs by Ben-Tal, Goryashko, Guslitzer and Nemirovski (2004), restricts the second stage to affine policies (linear decision rules) y(b)=Pb+qy(b)=Pb+qy(b)=Pb+q; the best affine policy is computable by a single convex program and performs well empirically. The question is when this restriction loses nothing.

Timeline of the relevant results:

  • 2004. Ben-Tal, Goryashko, Guslitzer and Nemirovski introduce affinely adjustable robust counterparts and show that the best affine policy is tractable for many uncertainty sets (doi:10.1007/s10107-003-0454-y).
  • 2010. Bertsimas, Iancu and Parrilo prove that affine policies are optimal for a class of multistage robust problems with one-dimensional uncertainty per stage and box uncertainty sets (doi:10.1287/moor.1100.0444).
  • 2012. Bertsimas and Goyal, the source of this mission, prove that an affine policy is optimal for model (1) whenever U\mathcal UU is a simplex (Theorem 1), and show that this exactness breaks down for slightly larger sets (doi:10.1007/s10107-011-0444-4).

Setting

Let A∈Rm×n1A\in\mathbb R^{m\times n_1}A∈Rm×n1​, B∈Rm×n2B\in\mathbb R^{m\times n_2}B∈Rm×n2​, c∈R+n1c\in\mathbb R^{n_1}_+c∈R+n1​​ and d∈R+n2d\in\mathbb R^{n_2}_+d∈R+n2​​. The problem ΠAdapt(U)\Pi_{Adapt}(\mathcal U)ΠAdapt​(U) of model (1) is

zAdapt(U)=min⁡ cTx+max⁡b∈UdTy(b)s.t.Ax+By(b)≥b,  x≥0,  y(b)≥0∀b∈U,z_{Adapt}(\mathcal U)=\min\ c^Tx+\max_{b\in\mathcal U}d^Ty(b)\quad\text{s.t.}\quad Ax+By(b)\ge b,\ \ x\ge 0,\ \ y(b)\ge 0\quad\forall b\in\mathcal U,zAdapt​(U)=min cTx+b∈Umax​dTy(b)s.t.Ax+By(b)≥b,  x≥0,  y(b)≥0∀b∈U,

where inequalities between vectors are componentwise. A pair (x,y)(x,y)(x,y) satisfying the constraints is feasible; its worst-case cost is cTx+max⁡b∈UdTy(b)c^Tx+\max_{b\in\mathcal U}d^Ty(b)cTx+maxb∈U​dTy(b). A feasible pair is optimal when its worst-case cost equals zAdapt(U)z_{Adapt}(\mathcal U)zAdapt​(U), and an affine policy is a second stage of the form y(b)=Pb+qy(b)=Pb+qy(b)=Pb+q with P∈Rn2×mP\in\mathbb R^{n_2\times m}P∈Rn2​×m, q∈Rn2q\in\mathbb R^{n_2}q∈Rn2​, still required to be nonnegative on U\mathcal UU. The value zAff(U)z_{Aff}(\mathcal U)zAff​(U) is the same minimum restricted to affine policies.

A simplex in Rm\mathbb R^mRm is the convex hull

U=conv⁡(b1,…,bm+1)\mathcal U=\operatorname{conv}(b^1,\dots,b^{m+1})U=conv(b1,…,bm+1)

of m+1m+1m+1 affinely independent points, that is, points for which b1−bm+1,…,bm−bm+1b^1-b^{m+1},\dots,b^m-b^{m+1}b1−bm+1,…,bm−bm+1 are linearly independent. The proof works with the m×mm\times mm×m matrix Q=[(b1−bm+1)⋯(bm−bm+1)]Q=[(b^1-b^{m+1})\cdots(b^m-b^{m+1})]Q=[(b1−bm+1)⋯(bm−bm+1)], the matrix Y=[(y∗(b1)−y∗(bm+1))⋯(y∗(bm)−y∗(bm+1))]Y=[(y^*(b^1)-y^*(b^{m+1}))\cdots(y^*(b^m)-y^*(b^{m+1}))]Y=[(y∗(b1)−y∗(bm+1))⋯(y∗(bm)−y∗(bm+1))] of display (2), and the affine rule y~(b)=YQ−1(b−bm+1)+y∗(bm+1)\tilde y(b)=YQ^{-1}(b-b^{m+1})+y^*(b^{m+1})y~​(b)=YQ−1(b−bm+1)+y∗(bm+1). In Lean these are Qmat v, Ymat v g and interpolant v g, with vertices v : Fin (m+1) → Fin m → ℝ.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 1

If U=conv⁡(b1,…,bm+1)\mathcal U=\operatorname{conv}(b^1,\dots,b^{m+1})U=conv(b1,…,bm+1) with affinely independent bj∈R+mb^j\in\mathbb R^m_+bj∈R+m​ and ΠAdapt(U)\Pi_{Adapt}(\mathcal U)ΠAdapt​(U) is feasible, then there exist x^\hat xx^, P∈Rn2×mP\in\mathbb R^{n_2\times m}P∈Rn2​×m and q∈Rn2q\in\mathbb R^{n_2}q∈Rn2​ such that

(x^, y^),y^(b)=Pb+q  (b∈U),(\hat x,\ \hat y),\qquad \hat y(b)=Pb+q\ \ (b\in\mathcal U),(x^, y^​),y^​(b)=Pb+q  (b∈U),

is an optimal solution of ΠAdapt(U)\Pi_{Adapt}(\mathcal U)ΠAdapt​(U), optimal among all (not only affine) two-stage solutions. In particular zAff(U)=zAdapt(U)z_{Aff}(\mathcal U)=z_{Adapt}(\mathcal U)zAff​(U)=zAdapt​(U).

Milestones

The proof of Theorem 1 has no numbered lemma; the milestones are its displayed steps, in attack order:

  1. QQQ is invertible (PDF p. 6).
  2. For b=∑jαjbjb=\sum_j\alpha_jb^jb=∑j​αj​bj with ∑jαj=1\sum_j\alpha_j=1∑j​αj​=1: Q−1(b−bm+1)=(α1,…,αm)TQ^{-1}(b-b^{m+1})=(\alpha_1,\dots,\alpha_m)^TQ−1(b−bm+1)=(α1​,…,αm​)T (PDF p. 6).
  3. y~(∑jαjbj)=∑jαj y∗(bj)\tilde y\big(\sum_j\alpha_jb^j\big)=\sum_j\alpha_j\,y^*(b^j)y~​(∑j​αj​bj)=∑j​αj​y∗(bj) (PDF pp. 6–7).
  4. Displays (3)–(5): for any feasible (x∗,y∗)(x^*,y^*)(x∗,y∗), the pair (x∗,y~)(x^*,\tilde y)(x∗,y~​) is feasible and every bound on the worst-case cost of (x∗,y∗)(x^*,y^*)(x∗,y∗) also bounds that of (x∗,y~)(x^*,\tilde y)(x∗,y~​) (PDF p. 7).

Significance

The result. Theorem 1 identifies a class of uncertainty sets on which the tractable affine restriction is exact, for every constraint matrix AAA and BBB and every nonnegative cost. It is the positive anchor of the paper: Sections 3 and 4 show that with m+3m+3m+3 extreme points the best affine policy can already be worse by a factor 2−δ2-\delta2−δ, and that on sets with exponentially many extreme points the gap can be Ω(m1/2−δ)\Omega(m^{1/2-\delta})Ω(m1/2−δ); Section 6 uses a dominating simplex, on which affine policies are exact, to build an O(m)O(\sqrt m)O(m​)-approximation for general U\mathcal UU. The theorem also says that on a simplex the whole adaptive problem reduces to m+1m+1m+1 scenario copies of a linear program.

Formalizing it. The result is proved on paper; no machine-checked version is known on Prove2Me. This mission produces the model (1) in Lean, the barycentric-coordinate identity for a simplex in matrix form, and a statement of optimality that asserts attainment of the minimum in (1), which the paper's proof takes for granted.

Difficulty

Two steps are not routine to formalize. First, the paper starts from "an optimal solution x∗,y∗(b)x^*,y^*(b)x∗,y∗(b)", that is, it assumes the minimum in (1) is attained. Over arbitrary functions y(⋅)y(\cdot)y(⋅) this is not automatic; on a simplex it follows because the problem reduces to a finite linear program on the vertices, whose optimum is attained, but Mathlib has no theory of linear-programming attainment, so this reduction has to be built. Second, the affine-independence step needs the passage from affine independence of m+1m+1m+1 points to invertibility of the m×mm\times mm×m matrix QQQ, and the identity Q−1(b−bm+1)=αQ^{-1}(b-b^{m+1})=\alphaQ−1(b−bm+1)=α requires the barycentric coordinates and the inverse matrix to be matched index by index. The naive idea of comparing zAffz_{Aff}zAff​ and zAdaptz_{Adapt}zAdapt​ as real infima does not prove the goal: equality of the two infima says nothing about the existence of an optimal solution.

Formalization scope

Vectors in Rm\mathbb R^mRm are Fin m → ℝ, with the componentwise order; matrices are Matrix (Fin m) (Fin n) ℝ. The paper's indices start at 111, Lean's at 000: bjb^jbj is v (j-1) and bm+1b^{m+1}bm+1 is v (Fin.last m). The simplex is convexHull ℝ (Set.range v); it is compact, convex and, by affine independence, full-dimensional, so these standing assumptions of (1) are not stated separately. Nonnegativity of U\mathcal UU is the hypothesis that all m+1m+1m+1 vertices are nonnegative (the page writes j=1,…,mj=1,\dots,mj=1,…,m, a slip for m+1m+1m+1). Feasibility of (1) is a hypothesis, as the paper assumes. Optimality (IsOptimalAdapt) means: feasible, and every worst-case cost bound achieved by any feasible two-stage solution is achieved by this one. The values zAdaptz_{Adapt}zAdapt​ and zAffz_{Aff}zAff​ are infima of the sets of achievable bounds; they are provided for reference and the goal does not depend on them.

The goal must not be replaced by zAff(U)≤zAdapt(U)z_{Aff}(\mathcal U)\le z_{Adapt}(\mathcal U)zAff​(U)≤zAdapt​(U), by optimality among affine policies only, or by a version that assumes an optimal solution exists: each of these drops the content "there is an optimal solution and it is affine". The goal does not mention QQQ, YYY or the interpolant.

A complete development needs: linear-programming attainment for a finite system of linear inequalities with a cost bounded below (reusable well beyond this mission), the linear-algebra lemmas relating affine independence to an invertible edge matrix (reusable for barycentric coordinates in general), and the convex-hull representation of points of a simplex. Contributions of any of these as separate lemmas are welcome.

Selected references

  • D. Bertsimas, V. Goyal, On the power and limitations of affine policies in two-stage adaptive optimization, Math. Program. Ser. A, 2012. doi:10.1007/s10107-011-0444-4
  • A. Ben-Tal, A. Goryashko, E. Guslitzer, A. Nemirovski, Adjustable robust solutions of uncertain linear programs, Math. Program. 99(2), 351–376, 2004. doi:10.1007/s10107-003-0454-y
  • D. Bertsimas, D. A. Iancu, P. A. Parrilo, Optimality of affine policies in multistage robust optimization, Math. Oper. Res. 35(2), 363–394, 2010. doi:10.1287/moor.1100.0444
  • A. Bemporad, F. Borrelli, M. Morari, Min–max control of constrained uncertain discrete-time linear systems, IEEE Trans. Autom. Control 48(9), 1600–1606, 2003. doi:10.1109/TAC.2003.816984
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Markov ChainProbabilityStochastic Systems·Captain: mikedeng1

Reversibility and Stochastic Networks VII: Clustering Processes — Poisson Product-Form Equilibrium of the Open Clustering ProcessTextbook

Motivation

Many systems consist of units that form themselves into clusters: individuals at a gathering forming conversational groups, monomers forming polymers, particles coagulating and fragmenting. Chapter 8 of F. P. Kelly, Reversibility and Stochastic Networks (Wiley, 1979) treats such clustering processes as Markov processes whose state counts the clusters of each type, and shows that when the process is reversible its equilibrium distribution has an explicit product form. The chapter opens with a model of social grouping (§8.1), develops a general basic model (§8.2) and later applies it to polymerization (§8.4).

The basic model sits in the same family as the migration processes and queueing networks of the earlier chapters: the method is to guess reversibility, solve the detailed balance equations, and normalize. Its specific feature is that the transitions are unions and break-ups of clusters, with rates quadratic in the cluster counts, rather than movements of single individuals.

Setting

There is a countable collection of cluster types rrr. A state is a vector m=(mr)m = (m_r)m=(mr​) of non-negative integers, mrm_rmr​ being the number of rrr-clusters present, with only finitely many mrm_rmr​ non-zero. For cluster types r,s,ur, s, ur,s,u let ere_rer​ be the rrr-th unit vector and

Rursm=m−er−es+eu,Rrsum=m+er+es−eu,R^{rs}_u m = m - e_r - e_s + e_u, \qquad R^u_{rs} m = m + e_r + e_s - e_u,Rurs​m=m−er​−es​+eu​,Rrsu​m=m+er​+es​−eu​,

the union of an rrr-cluster with an sss-cluster into a uuu-cluster, and the break-up of a uuu-cluster into an rrr-cluster and an sss-cluster. Given non-negative parameters λrsu=λsru\lambda_{rsu} = \lambda_{sru}λrsu​=λsru​ and μrsu=μsru\mu_{rsu} = \mu_{sru}μrsu​=μsru​, the clustering process has transition rates

q(m,Rursm)=λrsumrms (r≠s),q(m,Rurrm)=λrrumr(mr−1),q(m,Rrsum)=μrsumu.(8.3)q(m, R^{rs}_u m) = \lambda_{rsu} m_r m_s \ (r \ne s), \qquad q(m, R^{rr}_u m) = \lambda_{rru} m_r(m_r - 1), \qquad q(m, R^u_{rs} m) = \mu_{rsu} m_u. \qquad (8.3)q(m,Rurs​m)=λrsu​mr​ms​ (r=s),q(m,Rurr​m)=λrru​mr​(mr​−1),q(m,Rrsu​m)=μrsu​mu​.(8.3)

A closed clustering process lives on a finite irreducible state space S\mathcal SS. The open clustering process additionally lets one-clusters enter at rate ν\nuν and leave at rate μm1\mu m_1μm1​,

q(m,m+e1)=ν,q(m,m−e1)=μm1,(8.7)q(m, m + e_1) = \nu, \qquad q(m, m - e_1) = \mu m_1, \qquad (8.7)q(m,m+e1​)=ν,q(m,m−e1​)=μm1​,(8.7)

and its state space is the countable set of all mmm with ∑rmr\sum_r m_r∑r​mr​ finite, every state being reachable from every other.

An equilibrium distribution is a collection of positive numbers π(m)\pi(m)π(m) summing to one that satisfies the equilibrium equations π(m)∑m′q(m,m′)=∑m′π(m′)q(m′,m)\pi(m)\sum_{m'} q(m, m') = \sum_{m'} \pi(m') q(m', m)π(m)∑m′​q(m,m′)=∑m′​π(m′)q(m′,m); the process is reversible in equilibrium exactly when π\piπ satisfies the detailed balance conditions π(m)q(m,m′)=π(m′)q(m′,m)\pi(m) q(m, m') = \pi(m') q(m', m)π(m)q(m,m′)=π(m′)q(m′,m).

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 8.2 (p. 164)

If there are positive numbers crc_rcr​ with

ν=c1μ,λrsucrcs=cuμrsu,(8.8)∑rcr<∞,(8.9)\nu = c_1 \mu, \qquad \lambda_{rsu} c_r c_s = c_u \mu_{rsu}, \qquad (8.8) \qquad \sum_r c_r < \infty, \qquad (8.9)ν=c1​μ,λrsu​cr​cs​=cu​μrsu​,(8.8)r∑​cr​<∞,(8.9)

then the open clustering process has equilibrium distribution

π(m)=∏re−crcrmrmr!,(8.10)\pi(m) = \prod_{r} e^{-c_r} \frac{c_r^{m_r}}{m_r!}, \qquad (8.10)π(m)=r∏​e−cr​mr​!crmr​​​,(8.10)

it is reversible, and the counts m1,m2,…m_1, m_2, \dotsm1​,m2​,… are independent, mrm_rmr​ being Poisson with mean crc_rcr​.

Milestones

  • Eq. (8.6): under (8.4), crcsλrsu=cuμrsuc_r c_s \lambda_{rsu} = c_u \mu_{rsu}cr​cs​λrsu​=cu​μrsu​, the weights ∏rcrmr/mr!\prod_r c_r^{m_r}/m_r!∏r​crmr​​/mr​! satisfy the detailed balance conditions for the rates (8.3) on the whole state space.
  • Theorem 8.1 (p. 163): under (8.4) the closed clustering process is reversible with equilibrium distribution π(m)=B∏rcrmr/mr!\pi(m) = B\prod_r c_r^{m_r}/m_r!π(m)=B∏r​crmr​​/mr​! on S\mathcal SS.
  • Eq. (8.2) (p. 161): the social grouping model with MMM individuals has equilibrium π(m)=B∏i1mi!(βα i!)mi\pi(m) = B \prod_{i} \frac{1}{m_i!}\bigl(\frac{\beta}{\alpha\, i!}\bigr)^{m_i}π(m)=B∏i​mi​!1​(αi!β​)mi​ on {m:∑iimi=M}\{m : \sum_i i m_i = M\}{m:∑i​imi​=M}.
  • Eq. (8.9) (p. 164): the product-form weights are summable over the finitely supported states if and only if ∑rcr<∞\sum_r c_r < \infty∑r​cr​<∞, and then (8.10) sums to one.

Significance

Theorem 8.2 gives the equilibrium of a whole class of coagulation–fragmentation dynamics in closed form: the cluster counts are independent Poisson variables, and the equation system (8.8) is the only thing to solve. Quantities such as the expected number of clusters of each type, or the proportion of units in clusters of a given size, are then read off directly. Theorem 8.1 gives the corresponding result for a closed system, where the normalizing constant couples the types; opening the system removes that coupling. The results are the base of the polymerization models of §8.4 and of the later literature on reversible coagulation–fragmentation processes.

The results are proved in the book, with short proofs that state the detailed balance computation is "readily verified". To our knowledge they have no machine-checked proof. The work this mission asks for is the formal verification of that computation for the aggregated rate function, including unions in which two clusters of the same type meet, and the normalization of an infinite product over a countable set of types, which the book takes for granted.

Difficulty

The book calls the detailed balance computation readily verified; the bookkeeping is where a formal check can fail. Two different unions, or a break-up and the entry of a one-cluster, can lead from the same state to the same state when a cluster type is reproduced by the transition, so the rate between two states is a sum over transitions, and the identity has to be checked for the sums, not for single transitions. The same-type case r=sr = sr=s carries the falling factorial mr(mr−1)m_r(m_r - 1)mr​(mr​−1) rather than mr2m_r^2mr2​.

The normalization is the second difficulty. The state space of the open process is countably infinite, the product (8.10) runs over infinitely many types, and the interchange ∑m∏r=∏r∑n\sum_m \prod_r = \prod_r \sum_{n}∑m​∏r​=∏r​∑n​ that makes it sum to one requires (8.9). Without (8.9) the weights are not summable; this is the content of the book's remark that (8.9) is necessary.

Formalization scope

Cluster types are an arbitrary countable type R carrying a linear order, used only to count each unordered pair of types once. States are finitely supported vectors R →₀ ℕ. The rate q(m,m′)q(m, m')q(m,m′) is the sum of the rates (8.3) of all unions and break-ups taking mmm to m′m'm′, plus, for the open process, the rates (8.7); a transition is present only when the clusters it consumes exist, and q(m,m)=0q(m, m) = 0q(m,m)=0 holds because every transition changes the number of clusters. The one-cluster type is a distinguished element one. The closed state space is a finite non-empty set closed under positive-rate transitions and irreducible. The open process carries the book's assumptions that every state is reachable from every other and that the total rate out of each state is finite.

The statements are at the level of rates: reversibility is detailed balance for a positive, normalized π\piπ, the equivalence with reversibility of the stationary process being Kelly's Theorem 1.3. That π\piπ is the law of a stationary Markov process with these rates is not formalized. Independence and the Poisson laws are stated as the joint law of every finite set of counts. A formalization in which crc_rcr​ may vanish, in which detailed balance is imposed only for a degenerate choice of rates, or in which (8.10) is not normalized does not meet the goal: the crc_rcr​ are positive, the rates are arbitrary non-negative symmetric parameters, and both detailed balance and total mass one are required.

The development uses the published definitions KellyStochasticNetworks_Balance (detailed balance and the equilibrium equations) and the proved implication from detailed balance to the equilibrium equations. Lemmas on summing products over finitely supported vectors, and on infinite products of exponentials, are reusable beyond this mission. Lemma 8.3, a partial converse to Theorem 8.1, is not part of this mission; a faithful statement of it, with the units structure of the clusters, is a welcome addition.

Selected references

  • F. P. Kelly, Reversibility and Stochastic Networks, Wiley, Chichester, 1979, Chapter 8. Reissued by Cambridge University Press, 2011. https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511564246 (author's copy: http://www.statslab.cam.ac.uk/~frank/BOOKS/kelly_book.html)
  • P. Whittle, Systems in Stochastic Equilibrium, Wiley, 1986 (reversible models of association and polymerization). ISBN 978-0-471-90887-0.
  • F. P. Kelly and E. Yudovina, Stochastic Networks, Cambridge University Press, 2014 (detailed balance and the equilibrium equations used here). https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781139565363
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Markov ChainProbabilityStochastic Systems·Captain: mikedeng1

Reversibility and Stochastic Networks II: Migration Processes with Blocking — Reversibility and Product-Form EquilibriumTextbook

Motivation

A migration process is a continuous-time Markov model of a population spread over JJJ sites, called colonies, in which individuals move one at a time: between colonies, out of the system, or into it from outside. The model was introduced by Whittle (1967) and Kingman (1969) and is the framework of Chapter 2 of F. P. Kelly, Reversibility and Stochastic Networks (Wiley, 1979). It covers closed and open networks of queues (Jackson networks), linear population models and the movement of particles between cells. Its central fact is that the equilibrium distribution is a product form: the joint law of the colony sizes factorizes into one term per colony, and for open processes the colony sizes are independent in equilibrium.

In the migration processes of Chapter 2 the rate at which an individual leaves colony jjj depends on the number njn_jnj​ there, but not on the number already present in the colony it joins. Chapter 6 (§6.1) lifts this restriction. The rate of a move into colony kkk is multiplied by a function ψk(nk)\psi_k(n_k)ψk​(nk​) of the receiving colony's occupancy, which can model blocking (a crowded colony slows arrivals) or attraction (as in the models of social grouping of §6.2). The price is that product form survives only under a reversibility condition on the routing parameters. This mission formalizes the two theorems of §6.1 on top of the already-formalized results of Chapter 2.

Timeline. Whittle (1967) and Kingman (1969) introduced migration processes and their product-form equilibria; Kelly (1976) treated networks of queues with general routes; Kelly (1979, Ch. 2) states the closed and open product forms (Theorems 2.3, 2.4) and the time reversal of an open process (Theorem 2.5); Kelly (1979, §6.1) states the reversible versions with receiving-colony dependence (Theorems 6.1, 6.2).

Setting

There are JJJ colonies. The state is n=(n1,…,nJ)∈NJn = (n_1,\dots,n_J) \in \mathbb{N}^Jn=(n1​,…,nJ​)∈NJ, with njn_jnj​ the number of individuals in colony jjj. Three operators change the state by one individual: TjknT_{jk}nTjk​n moves one individual from colony jjj to colony kkk, Tj⋅nT_{j\cdot}nTj⋅​n removes one from colony jjj, and T⋅knT_{\cdot k}nT⋅k​n adds one to colony kkk.

The model is given by non-negative constants λjk\lambda_{jk}λjk​ (with λjj=0\lambda_{jj} = 0λjj​=0), μj\mu_jμj​, νk\nu_kνk​, and functions φj,ψj:N→R\varphi_j,\psi_j : \mathbb{N}\to\mathbb{R}φj​,ψj​:N→R with φj(0)=0\varphi_j(0) = 0φj​(0)=0, φj(n)>0\varphi_j(n) > 0φj​(n)>0 for n>0n > 0n>0, and ψj(n)>0\psi_j(n) > 0ψj​(n)>0 for all n≥0n \ge 0n≥0. A closed reversible migration process with NNN individuals has state space S={n:∑jnj=N}\mathcal{S} = \{n : \sum_j n_j = N\}S={n:∑j​nj​=N} and transition rates

q(n,Tjkn)=λjk φj(nj) ψk(nk).(6.2)q(n, T_{jk}n) = \lambda_{jk}\,\varphi_j(n_j)\,\psi_k(n_k). \qquad (6.2)q(n,Tjk​n)=λjk​φj​(nj​)ψk​(nk​).(6.2)

An open reversible migration process has state space NJ\mathbb{N}^JNJ and, in addition to (6.2), the rates

q(n,Tj⋅n)=μj φj(nj)(6.5),q(n,T⋅kn)=νk ψk(nk)(6.6).q(n, T_{j\cdot}n) = \mu_j\,\varphi_j(n_j) \quad (6.5), \qquad q(n, T_{\cdot k}n) = \nu_k\,\psi_k(n_k) \quad (6.6).q(n,Tj⋅​n)=μj​φj​(nj​)(6.5),q(n,T⋅k​n)=νk​ψk​(nk​)(6.6).

The parameters are required to make the process irreducible: in the closed case an individual can pass between any two colonies along pairs with λab>0\lambda_{ab} > 0λab​>0; in the open case it can reach every colony from outside and leave from every colony. Setting ψj≡1\psi_j \equiv 1ψj​≡1 recovers the migration processes of Chapter 2.

Given positive constants α1,…,αJ\alpha_1,\dots,\alpha_Jα1​,…,αJ​, the candidate equilibrium is

π(n)=B∏j=1J{αjnj∏r=1njψj(r−1)φj(r)},(6.3)\pi(n) = B\prod_{j=1}^{J}\Bigl\{\alpha_j^{n_j}\prod_{r=1}^{n_j}\frac{\psi_j(r-1)}{\varphi_j(r)}\Bigr\}, \qquad (6.3)π(n)=Bj=1∏J​{αjnj​​r=1∏nj​​φj​(r)ψj​(r−1)​},(6.3)

with BBB chosen so that π\piπ sums to one over the state space.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 6.2 (open process)

If positive αj\alpha_jαj​ satisfy

αjλjk=αkλkj(6.4),αjμj=νj(6.7),\alpha_j\lambda_{jk} = \alpha_k\lambda_{kj} \quad (6.4), \qquad \alpha_j\mu_j = \nu_j \quad (6.7),αj​λjk​=αk​λkj​(6.4),αj​μj​=νj​(6.7),

and every colony series gj=∑m≥0αjm∏r=1mψj(r−1)/φj(r)g_j = \sum_{m\ge 0}\alpha_j^m\prod_{r=1}^m \psi_j(r-1)/\varphi_j(r)gj​=∑m≥0​αjm​∏r=1m​ψj​(r−1)/φj​(r) converges, then (6.3) with B=∏jgj−1B = \prod_j g_j^{-1}B=∏j​gj−1​ is in detailed balance with the rates (6.2), (6.5), (6.6), satisfies the equilibrium equations, is positive and sums to one, and under it n1,…,nJn_1,\dots,n_Jn1​,…,nJ​ are independent with marginals πj(m)=gj−1αjm∏r=1mψj(r−1)/φj(r)\pi_j(m) = g_j^{-1}\alpha_j^m\prod_{r=1}^m\psi_j(r-1)/\varphi_j(r)πj​(m)=gj−1​αjm​∏r=1m​ψj​(r−1)/φj​(r).

Milestones

  • Theorem 2.3: the closed migration process (ψ≡1\psi\equiv 1ψ≡1) has equilibrium of the form (2.3).
  • Theorem 2.4: the open migration process has independent colonies with marginals bjαjnj/∏r=1njφj(r)b_j\alpha_j^{n_j}/\prod_{r=1}^{n_j}\varphi_j(r)bj​αjnj​​/∏r=1nj​​φj​(r).
  • Theorem 2.5: the reversal of a stationary open migration process is an open migration process.
  • Theorem 6.1: the closed process with rates (6.2) is reversible under (6.4), with equilibrium (6.3) on S\mathcal{S}S.

Theorems 2.3–2.5 are already proved on the platform and enter as references.

Significance

The result. Theorem 6.2 shows that product form and independence of colony sizes are not tied to routing that ignores the destination's occupancy. Any positive ψk\psi_kψk​ is allowed, provided the routing is reversible in the sense of (6.4) and (6.7). This is what makes the social-grouping models of §6.2 and the clustering models of Chapter 8 tractable, and it identifies (6.4) as the structural condition: Exercise 6.1.1 shows that without it the process cannot be reversible. Through Theorem 1.3 of the book, detailed balance also gives that the stationary process looks the same run backwards in time.

Formalization. The Chapter 2 results (Theorems 2.3–2.5) are formalized and proved on the platform, at the level of transition rates, in the KellyStochasticNetworks series. Theorems 6.1 and 6.2 are not formalized anywhere to our knowledge. The new work is the detailed-balance verification with the receiving-colony factor, the normalization over the finite set S\mathcal{S}S in the closed case, and the summation over the countable space NJ\mathbb{N}^JNJ with the marginal computation that expresses independence in the open case.

Difficulty

The equilibrium equations of a migration process with blocking have no simple solution in general (p. 135); a direct attack on the full balance equations does not close. Detailed balance is a local condition, but the formal statement has to be careful with transitions that do not exist: a move out of an empty colony, a departure that would make a count negative, and the coincidences between operators at the boundary (Tjkn=T⋅knT_{jk}n = T_{\cdot k}nTjk​n=T⋅k​n when nj=0n_j = 0nj​=0). In the open case the bookkeeping is in infinite sums: positivity and normalization need convergence of each colony series, and independence needs the marginal of π\piπ on one colony to be computed as a sum over the remaining J−1J-1J−1 coordinates.

Formalization scope

Colonies are Fin J; states are Fin J → ℕ; rates are real-valued functions of two states, assembled as sums of indicator terms over the possible transitions, reusing the operators Tjk, Tout, Tin and the predicates DetailedBalance, FullBalance of the published definitions KellyStochasticNetworks_Migration and KellyStochasticNetworks_Balance. Transitions out of an empty colony carry the factor φj(0)=0\varphi_j(0) = 0φj​(0)=0 and so vanish. The hypotheses λjj=0\lambda_{jj} = 0λjj​=0, non-negativity of the rates, positivity of φj(n)\varphi_j(n)φj​(n) (n>0n>0n>0), ψj(n)\psi_j(n)ψj​(n) (n≥0n\ge0n≥0) and αj\alpha_jαj​, and the book's irreducibility requirements are binders of each theorem.

The statements are at the level of transition rates: "reversible" is read as detailed balance of the equilibrium distribution, and "equilibrium distribution" as positive, summing to one, and satisfying the equilibrium equations. The stochastic process itself is not constructed. In the closed case the distribution lives on NJ\mathbb{N}^JNJ and vanishes off S\mathcal{S}S, which is equivalent because every transition preserves ∑jnj\sum_j n_j∑j​nj​; J≥1J \ge 1J≥1 is assumed so that S\mathcal{S}S is nonempty. In the open case stationarity is the convergence of each colony series, carried as HasSum hypotheses with sums gjg_jgj​.

The normalizing constant is never free: π≡0\pi \equiv 0π≡0 satisfies detailed balance, so a statement that leaves BBB unconstrained, or omits the factor ψk(nk)\psi_k(n_k)ψk​(nk​) from (6.2), (6.6) and (6.3), is not this theorem. Contributions welcome: proofs of Theorem 6.1 and 6.2, reusable lemmas on detailed balance for indicator-sum rates, and on products of summable families over Fin J → ℕ.

Selected references

  • F. P. Kelly, Reversibility and Stochastic Networks, Wiley, 1979; reprinted Cambridge University Press, 2011. Chapters 2 and 6. http://www.statslab.cam.ac.uk/~frank/BOOKS/kelly_book.html
  • J. F. C. Kingman, Markov population processes, Journal of Applied Probability 6 (1969), 1–18. https://doi.org/10.2307/3212273
  • F. P. Kelly, Networks of queues, Advances in Applied Probability 8 (1976), 416–432. https://doi.org/10.2307/1426136
  • P. Whittle, Nonlinear migration processes, Bulletin of the International Statistical Institute 42 (1967).
  • F. P. Kelly and E. Yudovina, Stochastic Networks, Cambridge University Press, 2014, Chapter 2. http://www.statslab.cam.ac.uk/~frank/STOCHNET/
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Linear OptimizationOptimization·Captain: mikedeng1

Maximization of a Linear Function of Variables Subject to Linear Inequalities: Under Nondegeneracy the Simplex Technique Ends in Infeasibility, Unboundedness, or a Maximum Feasible SolutionResearch Paper

Motivation

Linear programming asks for the best value of a linear objective under linear constraints. In the form studied by George B. Dantzig in 1951, all variables are nonnegative and the constraints are equalities. The simplex technique moves between small sets of columns, seeking a feasible vector first and then improving its objective. Its basic promise is operational: a run should end with a valid answer, whether that answer is a maximum, infeasibility, or an objective that can grow without bound. Dantzig's chapter sets out both phases and the tests that distinguish these outcomes.

The formulation matters to readers of optimization because it separates the algebraic claim about a linear program from a particular rule for selecting the next column. The chapter permits any entering column satisfying the stated improvement test. This mission captures the correctness claim for every sequence of admissible choices under the chapter's nondegeneracy assumption, with one additional general-position condition needed for the Phase I argument.

Setting

Fix integers 1≤m≤n1\le m\le n1≤m≤n. Let P0∈RmP_0\in\mathbb R^mP0​∈Rm be a right-hand side, P1,…,Pn∈RmP_1,\ldots,P_n\in\mathbb R^mP1​,…,Pn​∈Rm be columns, and c1,…,cn∈Rc_1,\ldots,c_n\in\mathbb Rc1​,…,cn​∈R be objective coefficients. A feasible solution is a weight vector λ∈Rn\lambda\in\mathbb R^nλ∈Rn with λj≥0\lambda_j\ge0λj​≥0 and ∑jλjPj=P0\sum_j\lambda_jP_j=P_0∑j​λj​Pj​=P0​. Its objective value is z(λ)=∑jλjcjz(\lambda)=\sum_j\lambda_jc_jz(λ)=∑j​λj​cj​. It is maximum feasible when z(μ)≤z(λ)z(\mu)\le z(\lambda)z(μ)≤z(λ) for every feasible μ\muμ. Unboundedness means that feasible objective values exceed every real threshold.

Dantzig assumes nondegeneracy: every indexed selection of mmm points among P0,P1,…,PnP_0,P_1,\ldots,P_nP0​,P1​,…,Pn​ is linearly independent. A Phase II state uses exactly mmm basic columns BBB, each with a positive weight, and represents P0P_0P0​ with them. Every column has unique coordinates Pj=∑i∈BxijPiP_j=\sum_{i\in B}x_{ij}P_iPj​=∑i∈B​xij​Pi​, and zj=∑i∈Bxijciz_j=\sum_{i\in B}x_{ij}c_izj​=∑i∈B​xij​ci​ is the corresponding objective value. A column with cj>zjc_j>z_jcj​>zj​ can improve the objective. When some xij>0x_{ij}>0xij​>0, the step uses the smallest ratio λi/xij\lambda_i/x_{ij}λi​/xij​ over those positive coordinates and replaces a minimizing basic column.

A Phase I state begins from m−1m-1m−1 basic columns SSS and a fixed reference point GGG. Positive weights wiw_iwi​ and ρ>0\rho>0ρ>0 satisfy G+ρP0=∑i∈SwiPiG+\rho P_0=\sum_{i\in S}w_iP_iG+ρP0​=∑i∈S​wi​Pi​. Write Pj=y0jP0+∑i∈SyijPiP_j=y_{0j}P_0+\sum_{i\in S}y_{ij}P_iPj​=y0j​P0​+∑i∈S​yij​Pi​. A column with y0j>0y_{0j}>0y0j​>0 either gives a new Phase I basis through the positive-ratio test or supplies the nonnegative weights in equation (39), which start Phase II.

Formalization targets

The goal is the correctness of the complete two-phase transition system. There is no infinite admissible run. Every state with no outgoing transition has one of three outcomes:

Phase I:y0j≤0 (∀j),no feasible solution;Phase II:∃j (cj>zj ∧ xij≤0 (∀i∈B)),∀M∈R ∃λ feasible:z(λ)>M;Phase II:cj≤zj (∀j),z(μ)≤z(λ) for every feasible μ.\begin{array}{ll} \text{Phase I:}& y_{0j}\le0\ (\forall j),\quad \text{no feasible solution};\\ \text{Phase II:}& \exists j\ (c_j>z_j\ \land\ x_{ij}\le0\ (\forall i\in B)),\quad \forall M\in\mathbb R\ \exists\lambda\text{ feasible}: z(\lambda)>M;\\ \text{Phase II:}& c_j\le z_j\ (\forall j),\quad z(\mu)\le z(\lambda)\text{ for every feasible }\mu. \end{array}Phase I:Phase II:Phase II:​y0j​≤0 (∀j),no feasible solution;∃j (cj​>zj​ ∧ xij​≤0 (∀i∈B)),∀M∈R ∃λ feasible:z(λ)>M;cj​≤zj​ (∀j),z(μ)≤z(λ) for every feasible μ.​

The five milestones follow the chapter's own statements: Theorem 3's infeasibility certificate, Section 2's termination and hand-off, Theorem 1's improving family and two cases, Section 1's termination alternatives, and Theorem 2's optimality test. The goal includes the hand-off from the first phase to the second; the milestones make each outcome separately auditable.

Significance

The result gives a complete outcome guarantee for the chapter's procedure under its stated nondegeneracy regime. A terminal basis satisfying cj≤zjc_j\le z_jcj​≤zj​ is certified optimal against every feasible solution, not just against nearby bases. The other terminal tests certify properties of the original problem: nonexistence of feasible weights or arbitrarily large feasible objective values. This is the distinction needed to use the procedure as an algorithm for an LP rather than merely a local improvement rule.

The chapter's Theorems A and B assert existence of a basic feasible solution, and existence of a basic optimal one when the objective is bounded above. A proved platform theorem on basic optimal solutions covers these structural results after changing minimization cost qqq to −c-c−c; it is included by reference. Existing simplex results in the platform's minimization convention do not state Dantzig's Phase I reference-point process or his xijx_{ij}xij​ and zjz_jzj​ tests. Formalizing this mission adds that two-phase interface and a machine-checkable statement of its outcomes.

Difficulty

An improving column alone does not say whether another basis exists. In Phase II, the signs of its basis coordinates determine whether the positive weights meet a finite ratio limit or instead continue along an unbounded feasible family. In Phase I, the analogous limit must preserve strictly positive weights on exactly m−1m-1m−1 columns. The printed argument says that a coefficient vanishes at the limit, but does not exclude two coefficients vanishing together. That gap matters because the next state in the paper's recurrence must again have strictly positive basic weights. The mission states a general-position condition on GGG that rules out this simultaneous-vanishing case. It is an explicit addition to the printed assumptions and should be reviewed as such.

Formalization scope

Lean uses Fin n → (Fin m → ℝ) for the columns, Fin m → ℝ for P0P_0P0​ and GGG, Fin n → ℝ for weights and costs, and finite sets for bases. Its zero-based Fin n labels correspond to the paper's 1,…,n1,\ldots,n1,…,n. Each state carries its basis cardinality, independence, coordinate equations, and strictly positive basic weights. This keeps the coordinate functions defined on genuine bases and prevents a zero-weight intermediate state from counting as a valid pivot. The transition relation records every admissible entering column and minimizing leaving index; the pivot-selection heuristics (20) and (21) are outside the claim.

The phrases “upper bound of zzz is infinite” and “process terminates” are read as, respectively, objective values above every real threshold on the original feasible set and absence of an infinite sequence of admissible steps. “A feasible solution has been obtained” is the explicit vector of equation (39), not an unnamed existence assertion. Maximum feasible means feasible plus comparison with every feasible vector, avoiding a real supremum's empty-set default. The dimensions 1≤m≤n1\le m\le n1≤m≤n make both kinds of basis possible and prevent a vacuous nondegeneracy condition. General position asks every family containing GGG, P0P_0P0​, and m−2m-2m−2 distinct PjP_jPj​ to be independent. The paper does not write this condition, so its inclusion is a substantive qualification of the target.

The printed indices in (30), (45), and a sentence following (18) do not match their defining ranges. The Lean statements use all nnn columns for jjj and the current m−1m-1m−1 Phase I columns for iii. The indices in (17) and (45) also carry the entering conditions cj>zjc_j>z_jcj​>zj​ and y0j>0y_{0j}>0y0j​>0, respectively. These corrections preserve the paper's described procedure and prevent a terminal test from becoming trivial through a basic column. Contributions may address the finite-state termination argument, the ratio-test lemmas, coordinate uniqueness, and the translation from terminal signs to the three global LP outcomes. The operation counts and geometric interpretation on the last pages are outside the formalization.

Selected references

  • George B. Dantzig, “Maximization of a Linear Function of Variables Subject to Linear Inequalities,” in T. C. Koopmans (ed.), Activity Analysis of Production and Allocation, Wiley, 1951, Chapter XXI, pp. 339–347. Book catalog search.
  • Hartmann_Psi, “A bounded feasible standard-form LP attains its minimum at a basic feasible solution,” Prove2Me, proved platform theorem. Theorem record.
  • Shuze Chen, “Finite termination of the simplex method under nondegeneracy,” Prove2Me, proved platform theorem in a minimization convention. Theorem record.
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Algorithmic Game TheoryComplexity Theory·Captain: mikedeng1

The Complexity of Computing a Nash Equilibrium 3: Trimming an Approximate Nash Equilibrium Yields a Well-Supported OneResearch Paper

Motivation

The complexity of computing a Nash equilibrium is usually studied for an approximate equilibrium, because an exact equilibrium of a game with three or more players can require irrational probabilities. Two approximation notions are in use, and results proved for one do not automatically transfer to the other. Daskalakis, Goldberg and Papadimitriou (SIAM J. Comput. 39(1), 2009) prove their PPAD-hardness results for the stronger notion, the ε-approximately well-supported Nash equilibrium, and then show in their §4.7 (Lemma 4.28, announced as Lemma 2.1) that any ε-approximate Nash equilibrium can be turned, by an explicit and cheap transformation, into an approximately well-supported one with a polynomially worse accuracy. This is what lets their hardness results hold for both notions. A weaker version of the relation had been pointed out by Chen, Deng and Teng (FOCS 2006, reference [9] of the paper).

This mission formalizes Lemma 4.28 together with the steps of its proof: the best-response inequality (28), Claims 5 and 6, and the Lipschitz estimate of Lemma 4.26 (used in the proof as Lemma 4.29).

Setting

A game in normal form has r≥2r\ge2r≥2 players. Player ppp has a finite set SpS_pSp​ of pure strategies; S=∏pSpS=\prod_p S_pS=∏p​Sp​ is the set of pure strategy profiles and S−pS_{-p}S−p​ the set of profiles of the players other than ppp. For each player ppp and profile s∈Ss\in Ss∈S there is a payoff usp≥0u^p_s\ge0usp​≥0; for j∈Spj\in S_pj∈Sp​ and s∈S−ps\in S_{-p}s∈S−p​ the payoff to ppp at the profile (j,s)(j,s)(j,s) is written ujspu^p_{js}ujsp​. The number max⁡{u}\max\{u\}max{u} is the largest entry uspu^p_susp​ over all players and all profiles.

A mixed profile x={xjp}x=\{x^p_j\}x={xjp​} assigns to each player ppp a probability distribution xpx^pxp on SpS_pSp​; the players randomize independently, and for s∈S−ps\in S_{-p}s∈S−p​ we write xs=∏q≠pxsqqx_s=\prod_{q\ne p}x^q_{s_q}xs​=∏q=p​xsq​q​. The expected payoff of player ppp for playing the pure strategy jjj against the others is

Ujp=∑s∈S−pujsp xs,Umax⁡p=max⁡j∈SpUjp.\mathcal U^p_j=\sum_{s\in S_{-p}}u^p_{js}\,x_s,\qquad \mathcal U^p_{\max}=\max_{j\in S_p}\mathcal U^p_j .Ujp​=s∈S−p​∑​ujsp​xs​,Umaxp​=j∈Sp​max​Ujp​.
  • xxx is an ε-approximate Nash equilibrium if no player can gain more than ϵ\epsilonϵ by deviating to any mixed strategy ypy^pyp:
∑j∈SpUjp xjp ≥ ∑j∈SpUjp yjp−ϵfor all p and all mixed yp.\sum_{j\in S_p}\mathcal U^p_j\,x^p_j\ \ge\ \sum_{j\in S_p}\mathcal U^p_j\,y^p_j-\epsilon\quad\text{for all }p\text{ and all mixed }y^p .j∈Sp​∑​Ujp​xjp​ ≥ j∈Sp​∑​Ujp​yjp​−ϵfor all p and all mixed yp.
  • xxx is an ε-approximately well-supported Nash equilibrium if every strategy played with positive probability is within ϵ\epsilonϵ of the best:
Ujp>Uj′p+ϵ ⟹ xj′p=0for all p and j,j′∈Sp.\mathcal U^p_j>\mathcal U^p_{j'}+\epsilon\ \Longrightarrow\ x^p_{j'}=0\quad\text{for all }p\text{ and }j,j'\in S_p .Ujp​>Uj′p​+ϵ ⟹ xj′p​=0for all p and j,j′∈Sp​.

The trimmed profile x^\hat xx^ of xxx with parameter kkk deletes the strategies whose expected payoff is more than ϵk\epsilon kϵk below Umax⁡p\mathcal U^p_{\max}Umaxp​ and renormalizes:

zp=∑j∈Spxjp X{Ujp<Umax⁡p−ϵk},x^jp={xjp/(1−zp),Ujp≥Umax⁡p−ϵk,0,otherwise.z^p=\sum_{j\in S_p}x^p_j\,\mathcal X_{\{\mathcal U^p_j<\mathcal U^p_{\max}-\epsilon k\}},\qquad \hat x^p_j=\begin{cases}x^p_j/(1-z^p), & \mathcal U^p_j\ge\mathcal U^p_{\max}-\epsilon k,\\ 0, & \text{otherwise.}\end{cases}zp=j∈Sp​∑​xjp​X{Ujp​<Umaxp​−ϵk}​,x^jp​={xjp​/(1−zp),0,​Ujp​≥Umaxp​−ϵk,otherwise.​

In the Lean development these are purePayoff u x p j, maxPurePayoff u x p, maxPayoff u, IsEpsApproxNash u x ε, IsEpsWellSupportedNash u x ε, trimMass u x ε k p and trim u x ε k, all in the namespace DGPNash.WellSupported.

Formalization targets

Goal: Lemma 4.28

For ϵ>0\epsilon>0ϵ>0 and an ϵ\epsilonϵ-approximate Nash equilibrium xxx, the trimmed profile x^\hat xx^ with k=1+1/ϵk=1+1/\sqrt\epsilonk=1+1/ϵ​ is a mixed profile and a

ϵ⋅(ϵ+1+4(r−1)max⁡{u})-approximately well-supported Nash equilibrium.\sqrt\epsilon\cdot\bigl(\sqrt\epsilon+1+4(r-1)\max\{u\}\bigr)\text{-approximately well-supported Nash equilibrium.}ϵ​⋅(ϵ​+1+4(r−1)max{u})-approximately well-supported Nash equilibrium.

The constant is the paper's. The statement is about the specific profile x^\hat xx^ built from xxx, not about the existence of some well-supported equilibrium.

Milestones, in proof order

  • Eq. (28): ∑jUjpxjp≥Umax⁡p−ϵ\sum_j\mathcal U^p_j x^p_j\ge\mathcal U^p_{\max}-\epsilon∑j​Ujp​xjp​≥Umaxp​−ϵ for every player ppp.
  • Claim 5: for every k>0k>0k>0, zp≤1/kz^p\le 1/kzp≤1/k.
  • Claim 6: for every k>1k>1k>1, ∑j∈Sp∣xjp−x^jp∣≤2/(k−1)\sum_{j\in S_p}|x^p_j-\hat x^p_j|\le 2/(k-1)∑j∈Sp​​∣xjp​−x^jp​∣≤2/(k−1).
  • Lemma 4.26 (Lemma 4.29): for mixed profiles x,yx,yx,y,
∣∑s∈S−pujspxs−∑s∈S−pujspys∣≤max⁡s∈S−p{ujsp}∑q≠p∑i∈Sq∣xiq−yiq∣.\Bigl|\sum_{s\in S_{-p}}u^p_{js}x_s-\sum_{s\in S_{-p}}u^p_{js}y_s\Bigr|\le\max_{s\in S_{-p}}\{u^p_{js}\}\sum_{q\ne p}\sum_{i\in S_q}|x^q_i-y^q_i| .​s∈S−p​∑​ujsp​xs​−s∈S−p​∑​ujsp​ys​​≤s∈S−p​max​{ujsp​}q=p∑​i∈Sq​∑​∣xiq​−yiq​∣.

Significance

The result. Lemma 4.28 makes the two approximation notions polynomially equivalent for computation: every well-supported equilibrium is approximate with the same ϵ\epsilonϵ, and conversely an approximate equilibrium yields a well-supported one at accuracy O(ϵ)O(\sqrt\epsilon)O(ϵ​) for fixed rrr and payoff range. Hardness results proved for well-supported equilibria, including the PPAD-completeness of 3-player Nash in the paper and the two-player result of Chen, Deng and Teng, therefore apply to approximate equilibria as well, and algorithms for one notion give algorithms for the other. Lemma 4.26, the Lipschitz dependence of expected payoffs on the opponents' strategies in L1L_1L1​, is a general tool for perturbation and rounding arguments in finite games.

Formalizing it. The result is proved in the paper; as far as we know there is no machine-checked version, and the platform has neither approximation notion. The mission produces both definitions, on top of the published game vocabulary agt_games, and the quantitative chain from an approximate equilibrium to a well-supported one. These definitions are what any later formalization of approximate-equilibrium algorithms or hardness results would need.

Difficulty

The obvious attempt, to show that xxx itself is approximately well-supported, fails: an approximate equilibrium may put small positive probability on a strategy that is far from optimal, which a well-supported equilibrium forbids for any accuracy. Removing those strategies changes the opponents' expected payoffs, so the well-supported condition must be checked for U^\hat{\mathcal U}U^, computed from x^\hat xx^, not for U\mathcal UU. The accuracy of the result therefore depends on how far all r−1r-1r−1 opponents' strategies move, which is why the bound carries the factor (r−1)max⁡{u}(r-1)\max\{u\}(r−1)max{u}. Lemma 4.26 is a statement about product distributions: the change in a multilinear expected payoff is controlled by the sum of the per-player L1L_1L1​ distances, not by their product.

Formalization scope

  • Players form a finite type ι with decidable equality; player p has a finite strategy type S p; payoffs are u : ι → (∀ i, S i) → ℝ with the standing hypothesis ∀ p s, 0 ≤ u p s of §2.1. The number of players is r=r=r= Fintype.card ι, and 2 ≤ Fintype.card ι is assumed in every statement, as in §2.1. Strategy sets may differ between players.
  • Mixed profiles and lotteries are AGT.IsMixedProfile and AGT.IsLottery from agt_games; both equilibrium notions include the requirement that the profile be mixed. Ujp\mathcal U^p_jUjp​ is AGT.expectedPayoff after player ppp alone switches to the pure strategy jjj, and the approximate-Nash condition compares AGT.expectedPayoff before and after player ppp alone switches to a lottery yyy, which is the paper's inequality (27).
  • Umax⁡p\mathcal U^p_{\max}Umaxp​ and max⁡{u}\max\{u\}max{u} are suprema over finite types; they are the maxima, since a mixed profile forces each SpS_pSp​ to be nonempty. In Lemma 4.26 the maximum over s∈S−ps\in S_{-p}s∈S−p​ is the supremum of upu^pup over full profiles whose ppp-th coordinate is jjj.
  • The strict and non-strict inequalities are the paper's: the trim keeps Ujp≥Umax⁡p−ϵk\mathcal U^p_j\ge\mathcal U^p_{\max}-\epsilon kUjp​≥Umaxp​−ϵk, zpz^pzp counts Ujp<Umax⁡p−ϵk\mathcal U^p_j<\mathcal U^p_{\max}-\epsilon kUjp​<Umaxp​−ϵk, and the well-supported condition uses >>>. The goal assumes ϵ>0\epsilon>0ϵ>0, as the paper's 1/ϵ1/\sqrt\epsilon1/ϵ​ requires; Claim 5 is stated for k>0k>0k>0 and Claim 6 for k>1k>1k>1.
  • The clause "can be computed in polynomial time" of Lemma 4.28 is not formalized; the goal states the property of the profile the proof computes. A complexity statement would need the PPAD machinery, which is outside this series.
  • A trivializing formalization is ruled out: by Nash's theorem (on the platform as AGT.nash_existence) a δ-well-supported equilibrium exists for every δ ≥ 0, so the goal is stated for x^\hat xx^, defined from xxx, and not as an existence claim.

Contributions welcome: proofs of the milestones, in particular the decomposition ∑sxsusp=∑jxjp Ujp\sum_s x_s u^p_s=\sum_j x^p_j\,\mathcal U^p_j∑s​xs​usp​=∑j​xjp​Ujp​ of the expected payoff, which Eq. (28) and the goal both need, and Lemma 4.26, which is reusable in any perturbation argument for finite games.

Selected references

  • C. Daskalakis, P. W. Goldberg, C. H. Papadimitriou, The Complexity of Computing a Nash Equilibrium, SIAM Journal on Computing 39(1):195–259, 2009. https://doi.org/10.1137/070699652
  • X. Chen, X. Deng, S.-H. Teng, Computing Nash Equilibria: Approximation and Smoothed Complexity, FOCS 2006. https://arxiv.org/abs/cs/0602043
  • X. Chen, X. Deng, S.-H. Teng, Settling the Complexity of Computing Two-Player Nash Equilibria, Journal of the ACM 56(3), 2009. https://doi.org/10.1145/1516512.1516516
  • J. Nash, Non-Cooperative Games, Annals of Mathematics 54(2):286–295, 1951. https://doi.org/10.2307/1969529
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Algorithmic Game TheoryProbability·Captain: mikedeng1

The Price of Anarchy of Finite Congestion Games V: The Mixed Price of Anarchy of the Average Social Cost Is at Most (3+sqrt 5)/2Research Paper

Motivation

When many self-interested users share resources whose cost grows with use (links of a network, servers, machines), each user picks the option that is cheapest for them given what the others do, and the resulting equilibrium can be worse for the group than a centrally planned allocation. The price of anarchy, introduced by Koutsoupias and Papadimitriou (STACS 1999), measures this loss as the worst ratio between the social cost of an equilibrium and the optimal social cost. Congestion games (Rosenthal 1973) are the standard finite model of such resource sharing: they always have pure Nash equilibria, and they cover atomic routing, load balancing and many network design questions.

Timeline of the linear-latency case:

  • 2002: Roughgarden and Tardos (J. ACM) bound the price of anarchy of nonatomic selfish routing with linear latencies by 4/34/34/3.
  • 2005: Awerbuch, Azar and Epstein (STOC 2005) and, independently, Christodoulou and Koutsoupias (STOC 2005) show that for atomic (finite) congestion games with linear latencies the pure price of anarchy of the total cost is 5/25/25/2. Awerbuch, Azar and Epstein also obtain (3+5)/2≈2.618(3+\sqrt5)/2 \approx 2.618(3+5​)/2≈2.618 for weighted players.
  • 2005: Christodoulou and Koutsoupias observe that their argument for 5/25/25/2 extends to mixed Nash equilibria, at the price of the larger constant (3+5)/2(3+\sqrt5)/2(3+5​)/2 (their Theorem 14, the goal of this mission).

Setting

A congestion game consists of a finite set NNN of players, a finite set EEE of facilities, for each player iii a collection Σi\Sigma_iΣi​ of pure strategies, each a subset of EEE, and for each facility eee a latency function fe:N→Rf_e : \mathbb N \to \mathbb Rfe​:N→R. In a pure profile A=(A1,…,An)A = (A_1, \dots, A_n)A=(A1​,…,An​), Ai∈ΣiA_i \in \Sigma_iAi​∈Σi​, the load ne(A)n_e(A)ne​(A) is the number of players whose set contains eee, and player iii pays

ci(A)=∑e∈Aife(ne(A)).c_i(A) = \sum_{e \in A_i} f_e\bigl(n_e(A)\bigr).ci​(A)=e∈Ai​∑​fe​(ne​(A)).

The social cost of a pure profile is SUM(A)=∑i∈Nci(A)\mathrm{SUM}(A) = \sum_{i\in N} c_i(A)SUM(A)=∑i∈N​ci​(A) (NNN times the average cost). Latencies are linear: fe(k)=aek+bef_e(k) = a_e k + b_efe​(k)=ae​k+be​ with ae,be≥0a_e, b_e \ge 0ae​,be​≥0.

A mixed strategy pip_ipi​ of player iii is a probability distribution on Σi\Sigma_iΣi​. The players randomize independently, so the pure profile sss occurs with probability Pr⁡(s)=∏jpj(sj)\Pr(s) = \prod_j p_j(s_j)Pr(s)=∏j​pj​(sj​). Player iii's expected cost is E[ci]=∑sPr⁡(s) ci(s)\mathbb E[c_i] = \sum_s \Pr(s)\, c_i(s)E[ci​]=∑s​Pr(s)ci​(s), and the expected load of eee is E[ne]=∑sPr⁡(s) ne(s)\mathbb E[n_e] = \sum_s \Pr(s)\, n_e(s)E[ne​]=∑s​Pr(s)ne​(s). A mixed profile is a mixed Nash equilibrium if no player can lower their expected cost by switching unilaterally to another distribution on their strategies. The social cost of a mixed profile is the sum of the expected costs, SUM(p)=∑iE[ci]\mathrm{SUM}(p) = \sum_i \mathbb E[c_i]SUM(p)=∑i​E[ci​].

In Lean: CongestionGame ι E with fields strategies and latency, load, cost, IsProfile, sumCost, IsLinear, expCost, expLoad, mixedSumCost and IsMixedNash, all in the namespace CongestionPoA.Mixed; lotteries and independent randomization come from the platform definition agt_games (AGT.IsLottery, AGT.profileProb, AGT.IsMixedNash).

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 14

For every congestion game with linear latencies, every mixed Nash equilibrium ppp and every pure profile PPP with Pi∈ΣiP_i \in \Sigma_iPi​∈Σi​,

∑i∈NE[ci]  ≤  3+52 SUM(P).\sum_{i\in N} \mathbb E[c_i] \;\le\; \frac{3+\sqrt5}{2}\,\mathrm{SUM}(P).i∈N∑​E[ci​]≤23+5​​SUM(P).

Taking PPP optimal, the mixed price of anarchy of the average social cost is at most (3+5)/2(3+\sqrt5)/2(3+5​)/2.

Milestones

  1. Lemma 3 (corrected). For real x≥0x \ge 0x≥0 and integer y≥0y \ge 0y≥0, y(x+1)≤5−14x2+5+54y2y(x+1) \le \frac{\sqrt5-1}{4}x^2 + \frac{\sqrt5+5}{4}y^2y(x+1)≤45​−1​x2+45​+5​y2.
  2. Deviation inequality (Theorem 1's proof, mixed). At a mixed Nash equilibrium, for every player iii,
E[ci]≤∑e∈Pi(ae(E[ne]+1)+be).\mathbb E[c_i] \le \sum_{e\in P_i}\bigl(a_e(\mathbb E[n_e]+1) + b_e\bigr).E[ci​]≤e∈Pi​∑​(ae​(E[ne​]+1)+be​).
  1. Summing step (Theorem 1's proof, mixed).
∑iE[ci]≤∑e∈Ene(P)(ae(E[ne]+1)+be).\sum_i \mathbb E[c_i] \le \sum_{e\in E} n_e(P)\bigl(a_e(\mathbb E[n_e]+1) + b_e\bigr).i∑​E[ci​]≤e∈E∑​ne​(P)(ae​(E[ne​]+1)+be​).

Significance

The bound says that randomization by the players cannot make linear congestion games much worse than pure play: the loss stays within a constant factor independent of the number of players and facilities. Mixed equilibria matter because they always exist in every finite game and because they model populations of users whose individual choices are not known in advance. The same authors report (PDF p. 2) extending these bounds to correlated equilibria with the same values, which places the mixed bound in a hierarchy of equilibrium notions whose worst cases coincide.

The result is proved in the paper, in one sentence that defers to the proof of Theorem 1. The work here is a complete machine-checked version: the expected-cost layer for congestion games on top of agt_games, the deviation and summing inequalities under product distributions, and the corrected Lemma 3. The paper prints Lemma 3 for all nonnegative reals x,yx, yx,y, where it is false (at x=0x = 0x=0, y=1/10y = 1/10y=1/10 the left side is 0.10.10.1 and the right side about 0.0180.0180.018); the formal statement keeps yyy an integer, which is how the lemma is used. No formalization of congestion-game price-of-anarchy bounds was on the platform when this mission was drafted.

Difficulty

The pure proof compares ne(P)(ne(A)+1)n_e(P)(n_e(A)+1)ne​(P)(ne​(A)+1) with ne(A)2n_e(A)^2ne​(A)2 and ne(P)2n_e(P)^2ne​(P)2 through an integer inequality (Lemma 1). Under a mixed equilibrium the equilibrium side is an expectation, so the cost of a facility is no longer a function of one integer load, and Lemma 1's constant 1/31/31/3 is not available for real arguments: a real-variable version is needed, and the constant degrades from 5/25/25/2 to (3+5)/2(3+\sqrt5)/2(3+5​)/2. A second obstacle is bookkeeping: the deviating player's load changes only on their own deviation, while the other players' randomization stays independent, and the expected cost of a player has to be related to expected facility loads, which uses linearity of the latencies in an essential way. The naive idea of applying Theorem 1 to each pure profile in the support of the equilibrium fails, because those profiles are not themselves Nash equilibria.

Formalization scope

Players and facilities are finite types ι and E; profiles are functions ι → Finset E, with feasibility IsProfile a separate predicate. Latencies are real-valued on natural-number loads, and "linear" means affine with nonnegative coefficients, fe(k)=aek+bef_e(k) = a_e k + b_efe​(k)=ae​k+be​; the paper displays only the identity latency fe(k)=kf_e(k)=kfe​(k)=k and states that its proofs extend. Mixed strategies are real weight functions on the finite strategy type Σi\Sigma_iΣi​; independence is built into AGT.profileProb; Nash deviations range over all lotteries, which is equivalent to pure deviations. agt_games maximizes payoffs, so the game is passed to it with payoff −ci-c_i−ci​. The goal is stated against every feasible pure profile rather than as a ratio, so no division by an optimum that may be 000 occurs. The social cost is the expected sum of the players' costs; the paper's second option, ∑eE[ne2]\sum_e \mathbb E[n_e^2]∑e​E[ne2​], is not part of this mission. A version with correlated distributions on profiles, or one that bounds the cost of an "averaged" profile instead of the expected cost, is a different statement and does not discharge the goal.

A complete development needs elementary finite-sum manipulation of product distributions (marginals of AGT.profileProb, expectations of loads), and a Jensen-type inequality (E[ne])2≤E[ne2](\mathbb E[n_e])^2 \le \mathbb E[n_e^2](E[ne​])2≤E[ne2​] for finite distributions. The expectation lemmas for congestion games are reusable for the other mixed results of the literature (weighted games, polynomial latencies). Proofs of the milestones, of the expectation layer, and alternative arguments are all welcome.

Selected references

  • G. Christodoulou, E. Koutsoupias, The Price of Anarchy of Finite Congestion Games, STOC 2005, pp. 67–73. https://doi.org/10.1145/1060590.1060600
  • B. Awerbuch, Y. Azar, A. Epstein, The Price of Routing Unsplittable Flow, STOC 2005, pp. 57–66. https://doi.org/10.1145/1060590.1060599
  • E. Koutsoupias, C. Papadimitriou, Worst-case Equilibria, STACS 1999, LNCS 1563, pp. 404–413. https://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-49116-3_38
  • R. W. Rosenthal, A Class of Games Possessing Pure-Strategy Nash Equilibria, International Journal of Game Theory 2 (1973), pp. 65–67. https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01737559
  • T. Roughgarden, É. Tardos, How Bad Is Selfish Routing?, Journal of the ACM 49 (2002), pp. 236–259. https://doi.org/10.1145/506147.506153
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Maximal Flow Through a Network I: The Minimal Cut Theorem — the Maximal Flow Value Equals the Minimum Value of a Disconnecting SetResearch Paper

Motivation

The question behind this mission was posed by T. E. Harris to L. R. Ford, Jr. and D. R. Fulkerson at RAND, in the setting of rail transport: given a rail network linking two cities, with a capacity on every link, find the largest steady flow from one city to the other. Ford and Fulkerson's answer, the minimal cut theorem, published in the Canadian Journal of Mathematics in 1956 (DOI 10.4153/CJM-1956-045-5), says that the obvious upper bound, the total capacity of a set of links whose removal separates the two cities, is always achieved by some flow.

The theorem became the starting point of network flow theory, and through it of a large part of combinatorial optimization and operations research: transportation, assignment, scheduling and network reliability problems are routinely reduced to it.

Timeline.

  • 1927: K. Menger proves that the minimum number of vertices separating two vertex sets of a graph equals the maximum number of disjoint paths joining them (Fund. Math. 10), the unit-capacity ancestor of the theorem.
  • 1955: Harris and Ross study the Soviet rail network as a capacity problem in a RAND report; Harris formulates the maximal flow problem (Schrijver's historical account: Math. Program. 91, 2002).
  • 1956: Ford and Fulkerson publish the minimal cut theorem for undirected networks, with a non-constructive proof based on maximal flows (this paper). Independently, Elias, Feinstein and Shannon state and prove the max-flow min-cut theorem for directed networks (IRE Trans. Inf. Theory 2, 1956), and Dantzig and Fulkerson obtain it from linear programming duality.
  • 1956–1962: Ford and Fulkerson's labelling (augmenting path) algorithm, collected in Flows in Networks (Princeton, 1962).
  • 1972: Edmonds and Karp give polynomial bounds for augmenting-path methods (J. ACM 19).

Setting

A network NNN consists of a finite set of vertices VVV, a finite set of arcs EEE, two distinct vertices, the source aaa and the sink bbb, and a positive capacity c(e)>0c(e)>0c(e)>0 on every arc. Each arc eee has two distinct end vertices; arcs are undirected, and several arcs may join the same pair of vertices.

A chain joining uuu and www is a set of distinct arcs that can be arranged as α1(v0v1),α2(v1v2),…,αm(vm−1vm)\alpha_1(v_0v_1),\alpha_2(v_1v_2),\dots,\alpha_m(v_{m-1}v_m)α1​(v0​v1​),α2​(v1​v2​),…,αm​(vm−1​vm​) with v0=uv_0=uv0​=u, vm=wv_m=wvm​=w and the vertices v0,…,vmv_0,\dots,v_mv0​,…,vm​ pairwise distinct; each arc may be traversed in either direction. The null chain (m=0m=0m=0) joins uuu to itself.

A flow fff assigns a number f(C)≥0f(C)\ge 0f(C)≥0 to each chain CCC joining aaa and bbb (and 000 to every other set of arcs) such that the load ℓf(e)=∑C∋ef(C)\ell_f(e)=\sum_{C\ni e}f(C)ℓf​(e)=∑C∋e​f(C) satisfies ℓf(e)≤c(e)\ell_f(e)\le c(e)ℓf​(e)≤c(e) for every arc. Its value is val(f)=∑Cf(C)\mathrm{val}(f)=\sum_C f(C)val(f)=∑C​f(C). An arc is saturated by fff if ℓf(e)=c(e)\ell_f(e)=c(e)ℓf​(e)=c(e). A maximal flow is a flow of largest value.

A set DDD of arcs is a disconnecting set if every chain joining aaa and bbb contains an arc of DDD; its value is v(D)=∑e∈Dc(e)v(D)=\sum_{e\in D}c(e)v(D)=∑e∈D​c(e). A cut is a disconnecting set no proper subset of which is disconnecting.

The proof introduces two further objects: the set SSS of arcs saturated by every maximal flow, and the set L⊆SL\subseteq SL⊆S of left arcs, those arcs of SSS whose left vertex (the end vertex met first by a positive chain flow of a maximal flow, travelling from aaa) can be reached from aaa by a chain with no arc saturated by some maximal flow.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 1 (Minimal cut theorem), p. 400

∃ m∈R:m=max⁡f flowval(f)=min⁡D disconnectingv(D),\exists\, m\in\mathbb R:\quad m=\max_{f\ \text{flow}}\mathrm{val}(f)=\min_{D\ \text{disconnecting}}v(D),∃m∈R:m=f flowmax​val(f)=D disconnectingmin​v(D),

with both the maximum and the minimum attained. The statement mentions only flows and disconnecting sets, not the proof objects SSS and LLL.

Milestones, in the order of the paper's proof

  1. A maximal flow exists, and the set of maximal flows is convex (p. 400).
  2. Lemma 1: SSS is a disconnecting set (p. 400).
  3. Every arc of SSS receives the same orientation from all positive chain flows of all maximal flows: its left vertex is unique (pp. 400–401).
  4. Lemma 2: LLL is a disconnecting set (p. 401).
  5. Lemma 3: no positive chain flow of a maximal flow contains more than one arc of LLL (p. 401).
  6. val(f)≤v(D)\mathrm{val}(f)\le v(D)val(f)≤v(D) for every flow fff and every disconnecting set DDD (p. 402).
  7. LLL is a cut of minimal value, and every maximal flow has value v(L)v(L)v(L) (p. 402).

Two further statements of the paper are included as items without being milestones: the remark that a disconnecting set of minimal value is a cut (p. 400), and the Corollary (p. 402): if a set AAA of arcs meets every cut in exactly one arc, adding kkk to the capacity of each arc of AAA raises the maximal flow value by kkk.

Significance

The minimal cut theorem turns a maximization over flows into a minimization over finite sets of arcs, so an optimal flow comes with a short certificate of optimality. It implies Menger's theorem (unit capacities), and through it König's theorem on bipartite matchings and Hall's marriage theorem. The Corollary is the tool behind the paper's own computing procedure for source–sink planar networks (§2, formalized in a companion mission).

The theorem is classical and proved. What this mission adds is a machine-checked proof of the paper's own formulation: undirected arcs, parallel arcs, flows decomposed along chains (path flows, with no circulations), and the minimum taken over arc sets meeting every chain, together with the proof's intermediate claims. Max-flow min-cut theorems already on the platform (Applied Combinatorics VIII, AppliedComb.Flows.max_flow_min_cut; Introduction to Linear Optimization X, LinearOptimization.max_flow_min_cut) concern directed networks with edge flows obeying conservation and cuts given by vertex sets. They are related results, not this statement, and connecting the two models is itself welcome work.

Difficulty

Weak duality (milestone 6) is immediate; the content is the reverse inequality. The obvious first step, taking a maximal flow and observing that its saturated arcs separate aaa from bbb, does not finish the proof: a positive chain flow may pass through several saturated arcs, so the total capacity of the saturated arcs can exceed the flow value. One has to single out a disconnecting subset that every positive chain flow crosses exactly once, and there is no canonical choice from a single flow. The paper's sets SSS and LLL are defined from all maximal flows at once, and the work consists in showing that these sets are well behaved. The orientation claim in particular needs an exchange argument on two chains that cross at an arc, where the recombined arc sequences may revisit vertices and must be reduced to chains. In a formal development this "a walk contains a chain" step and the averaging of maximal flows over finitely many chains are the main bookkeeping costs.

Formalization scope

  • A network is a structure on a vertex type V and an arc type E, both Fintype with decidable equality, with end-vertex maps tail, head (labels only, no direction), tail e ≠ head e, a source and a sink with source ≠ sink, and capacities cap : E → ℝ with 0 < cap e. These are the paper's standing assumptions; there are no others in §1. In particular, no planarity is assumed and an arc may join aaa and bbb directly.
  • A chain is a Finset E that is the arc set of some arrangement (list of arcs, list of pairwise distinct vertices, each arc joining consecutive vertices in either order).
  • A flow is a function f : Finset E → ℝ, non-negative, zero off the chains joining source and sink, with every arc load at most the capacity. A collection of chain flows that lists a chain twice merges into this form without changing the value or any load.
  • "Maximal" means of maximum value. The goal is stated with IsGreatest and IsLeast on the sets of flow values and of values of disconnecting sets, so no supremum of a real set appears and both extrema must be attained.
  • A trivializing formalization is ruled out: chains must be self-avoiding and must join the source and the sink, the disconnecting condition quantifies over exactly these chains, and the minimum ranges over all disconnecting sets rather than over a family chosen to match a given flow.
  • Needed infrastructure: finite sums over Finset (Finset E), convexity in Finset E → ℝ, compactness of the flow polytope (for existence), and lemmas on lists (extracting a chain from a walk). The walk-to-chain lemma and weak duality are reusable for the companion mission and for any path-flow model.

Selected references

  • L. R. Ford, Jr. and D. R. Fulkerson, Maximal Flow Through a Network, Canadian Journal of Mathematics 8 (1956), 399–404. https://doi.org/10.4153/CJM-1956-045-5
  • P. Elias, A. Feinstein and C. E. Shannon, A note on the maximum flow through a network, IRE Transactions on Information Theory 2 (1956), 117–119. https://doi.org/10.1109/TIT.1956.1056816
  • K. Menger, Zur allgemeinen Kurventheorie, Fundamenta Mathematicae 10 (1927), 96–115. https://doi.org/10.4064/fm-10-1-96-115
  • L. R. Ford, Jr. and D. R. Fulkerson, Flows in Networks, Princeton University Press, 1962.
  • J. Edmonds and R. M. Karp, Theoretical improvements in algorithmic efficiency for network flow problems, Journal of the ACM 19 (1972), 248–264. https://doi.org/10.1145/321694.321699
  • A. Schrijver, On the history of the transportation and maximum flow problems, Mathematical Programming 91 (2002), 437–445. https://doi.org/10.1007/s101070100259
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CombinatoricsGraph TheoryLinear Optimization+1·Captain: mikedeng1

Maximum Matching and a Polyhedron With 0,1-Vertices: The Vertices of the Matching Polyhedron Are Exactly the Matching VectorsResearch Paper

Motivation

A matching in a graph is a set of edges no two of which share a node. Given a real weight on every edge, the maximum-weight matching problem asks for a matching of largest total weight. It is one of the basic problems of combinatorial optimization: assignment, pairing and scheduling problems reduce to it, and it is the standard example of a combinatorial problem that is solvable in polynomial time although it is not obviously a linear program.

For bipartite graphs the problem is a linear program in disguise: the polytope cut out by nonnegativity and the node-degree inequalities has only 0–1 vertices (the Birkhoff–von Neumann theorem in the square case; Mathlib has it as extremePoints_doublyStochastic). For general graphs this fails already on a triangle, where the vector with every coordinate 1/21/21/2 satisfies all degree inequalities but is not a combination of matchings. Edmonds' 1965 paper (DOI 10.6028/jres.069b.013) adds one family of inequalities, one for each odd set of nodes, and proves that the resulting polyhedron has exactly the matching vectors as its vertices. The companion paper Paths, trees, and flowers gives the cardinality algorithm on which the weighted algorithm of §7 is built.

Timeline:

  • 1931: König and Egerváry prove the min–max theorems for bipartite matching; 1946: Birkhoff shows that the doubly stochastic matrices are the convex hull of the permutation matrices (the bipartite perfect-matching polytope).
  • 1947: Tutte characterizes graphs with a perfect matching.
  • 1965: Edmonds, Paths, trees, and flowers: the blossom algorithm for maximum-cardinality matching.
  • 1965: Edmonds, this paper: Theorem (P) (the matching polyhedron) and Theorem (M) (blossom-shrinking optimality certificates), with a weighted matching algorithm.

Setting

Let GGG be a finite graph with node set VVV and edge set EEE; each edge meets two different nodes, its ends. Real variables xex_exe​ correspond to the edges e∈Ee\in Ee∈E. The polyhedron C⊆REC\subseteq\mathbb R^EC⊆RE is the set of vectors xxx satisfying

  1. xe≥0x_e\ge 0xe​≥0 for every edge eee;
  2. ∑e meets vxe≤1\sum_{e \text{ meets } v} x_e\le 1∑e meets v​xe​≤1 for every node vvv;
  3. ∑e has both ends in Sxe≤r\sum_{e \text{ has both ends in } S} x_e\le r∑e has both ends in S​xe​≤r for every set SSS of 2r+12r+12r+1 nodes, rrr a strictly positive integer.

The matching vectors PPP are the vectors with every component 000 or 111 that satisfy (2); they are the incidence vectors of matchings. For edge weights c∈REc\in\mathbb R^Ec∈RE, the linear form (4) is W(c,x)=∑ecexeW(c,x)=\sum_e c_e x_eW(c,x)=∑e​ce​xe​.

The dual program has a variable yvy_vyv​ for each node and zSz_SzS​ for each odd set SSS (∣S∣=2rS+1|S|=2r_S+1∣S∣=2rS​+1, rS≥1r_S\ge1rS​≥1). Its objective is (5) U(y,z)=∑vyv+∑SrSzSU(y,z)=\sum_v y_v+\sum_S r_S z_SU(y,z)=∑v​yv​+∑S​rS​zS​, subject to (6) y,z≥0y,z\ge0y,z≥0 and (7) yv1+yv2+∑S∋v1,v2zS≥cey_{v_1}+y_{v_2}+\sum_{S\ni v_1,v_2}z_S\ge c_eyv1​​+yv2​​+∑S∋v1​,v2​​zS​≥ce​ for every edge eee with ends v1,v2v_1,v_2v1​,v2​. For a matching MMM, conditions (8)–(10) are the complementary slackness conditions: yv=0y_v=0yv​=0 at nodes not covered by MMM, equality in (7) on MMM, and every odd set with zS>0z_S>0zS​>0 contains exactly rSr_SrS​ edges of MMM.

A blossom sequence {Gi}i=0n\{G_i\}_{i=0}^n{Gi​}i=0n​ (Theorem (M)) starts from G0=GG_0=GG0​=G with matching M0=MM_0=MM0​=M and repeatedly shrinks an odd circuit BiB_iBi​ (a blossom, 2ai+12a_i+12ai​+1 edges of which aia_iai​ are matched) to a single node, carrying node weights w(vi)w(v^i)w(vi) and edge weights w(ei)w(e^i)w(ei) that obey conditions (a)–(k) of p. 127.

In the Lean development these are Graph, IsMatching, incidence, matchingPolyhedron (CCC), matchingVectors (PPP), W, U, DualFeasible ((6)–(7)), CompSlack ((8)–(10)) and BlossomSequence, all in the namespace EdmondsMatching65.Polyhedron.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem (P)

ext⁡(C)=P.\operatorname{ext}(C)=P.ext(C)=P.

The vertices (extreme points) of CCC are exactly the matching vectors of GGG. Hence the maximum weight of a matching equals max⁡{W(c,x):x∈C}\max\{W(c,x):x\in C\}max{W(c,x):x∈C} for every ccc.

Milestones

  1. P⊆ext⁡(C)P\subseteq\operatorname{ext}(C)P⊆ext(C) (§2, p. 126).
  2. If for every ccc some 0–1 point of CCC maximizes W(c,⋅)W(c,\cdot)W(c,⋅) over CCC, then ext⁡(C)=P\operatorname{ext}(C)=Pext(C)=P (§2, p. 126).
  3. Weak duality: W(c,x)≤U(y,z)W(c,x)\le U(y,z)W(c,x)≤U(y,z) for x∈Cx\in Cx∈C and ⟨y,z⟩\langle y,z\rangle⟨y,z⟩ satisfying (6)–(7) (§3, p. 126).
  4. If MMM is a matching and ⟨y,z⟩\langle y,z\rangle⟨y,z⟩ satisfies (6)–(10), then W(c,χM)=U(y,z)W(c,\chi^M)=U(y,z)W(c,χM)=U(y,z) (§3, p. 127).
  5. A blossom sequence for MMM yields ⟨y,z⟩\langle y,z\rangle⟨y,z⟩ satisfying (6)–(10) (§5, pp. 127–128).
  6. For every ccc some maximum matching has a blossom sequence (§6, p. 128).
  7. Theorem (M): a matching is maximum if and only if a blossom sequence for it exists (§4, p. 127).
  8. For every ccc there are a matching MMM and ⟨y,z⟩\langle y,z\rangle⟨y,z⟩ satisfying (6)–(10) (§3, p. 127).

Significance

The result. Theorem (P) turns maximum-weight matching in general graphs into a linear program over an explicitly described polyhedron, and Theorem (M) with the §5 translation gives a short certificate of optimality for every maximum matching. Together they established the template of polyhedral combinatorics: describe the convex hull of the combinatorial objects by inequalities, and prove the description through linear programming duality and an algorithm. The matching polytope underlies the analysis of the weighted blossom algorithm, separation over odd-set inequalities (Padberg–Rao), and many later integrality results; Edmonds' own §8 states the extension to degree-constrained subgraphs.

Formalizing it. The theorem has been proved since 1965 and appears in every text on combinatorial optimization; this mission asks for a machine-checked proof of the polytope statement for general finite graphs, including parallel edges, together with the duality certificate and the blossom-sequence characterization. The prove2me platform has a proved form of Edmonds' perfect matching polytope theorem on complete graphs in convex-decomposition form (MetricTSP.pm_polytope_decomposition), a different polytope with a different conclusion; nothing states Theorem (P) or Theorem (M).

Difficulty

The inclusion P⊆ext⁡(C)P\subseteq\operatorname{ext}(C)P⊆ext(C) and weak duality are routine. The difficulty is the reverse inclusion: showing that no fractional point of CCC is a vertex. The bipartite argument (a fractional point has a cycle of fractional edges along which it can be perturbed both ways) breaks on odd cycles: perturbing along an odd circuit violates a degree inequality, and the odd-set inequalities that cut off the half-integral points are exponentially many and overlap. The paper's route needs, for every weight vector, an optimal matching together with a dual solution satisfying (6)–(10), and the existence of that certificate is the substance of the weighted matching algorithm: the blossom sequence of Theorem (M) must be constructed, and the translation (11)–(16) from node and edge weights of the contracted graphs to ⟨y,z⟩\langle y,z\rangle⟨y,z⟩ must be verified through the whole shrinking history.

Formalization scope

  • The graph is a finite node type V, a finite edge type E and an end map ends : E → Sym2 V with no loops. Parallel edges are allowed: the contracted graphs of Theorem (M) have them, and Theorem (P) holds for multigraphs; simple graphs are the case of an injective end map.
  • Vectors are E → ℝ, one coordinate per edge. Vertices are Mathlib's Set.extremePoints ℝ. Odd sets carry an explicit r : ℕ with 1 ≤ r and |S| = 2r + 1; even sets and singletons carry no inequality.
  • Edge weights are arbitrary reals; matchings need not be perfect and may be empty. No connectivity, no parity of |V|.
  • The dual variable z is a function on all node sets of which only odd sets are read.
  • A contracted graph Gᵢ is a partition of V into blocks; an edge of G is an edge of Gᵢ when its ends lie in different blocks. Each Mᵢ must be a matching of Gᵢ, and all of (a)–(k) appear as fields of BlossomSequence; a sequence missing any of them would make milestone 6 trivial or milestone 5 false.
  • A trivializing formalization is ruled out: coordinates indexed by node pairs (Sym2 V → ℝ) leave non-edge coordinates free and give a polyhedron with no extreme points, and the goal is stated as equality of extreme points, not as a convex-hull identity or as the existence of a dual certificate.
  • Needed infrastructure: extreme points of polyhedra as unique maximizers of linear forms, finite LP weak duality over these index sets, and the weighted blossom algorithm (or another proof of milestone 8). The polyhedral lemmas are reusable for other integrality results; contributions on any milestone are welcome.

Selected references

  • J. Edmonds, Maximum Matching and a Polyhedron With 0,1-Vertices, J. Res. Nat. Bur. Standards Sect. B 69B (1965), 125–130. https://doi.org/10.6028/jres.069b.013
  • J. Edmonds, Paths, Trees, and Flowers, Canad. J. Math. 17 (1965), 449–467. https://doi.org/10.4153/CJM-1965-045-4
  • W. T. Tutte, The Factorization of Linear Graphs, J. London Math. Soc. 22 (1947), 107–111. https://doi.org/10.1112/jlms/s1-22.2.107
  • M. W. Padberg, M. R. Rao, Odd Minimum Cut-Sets and b-Matchings, Math. Oper. Res. 7 (1982), 67–80. https://doi.org/10.1287/moor.7.1.67
  • A. Schrijver, Combinatorial Optimization: Polyhedra and Efficiency, Springer, 2003, Chapter 25.
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Dynamic ProgrammingLinear OptimizationMarkov Chain·Captain: mikedeng1

On Sequential Decisions and Markov Chains 2: Under Irreducibility, an Optimal Solution of a Linear Program over State-Action Frequencies Yields an Optimal Stationary ProcedureResearch Paper

Linear programming for Markov decision problems

A Markov decision problem asks how to control a system that moves at random between finitely many states, where each decision changes the probabilities of the next move and incurs a cost. Cyrus Derman's 1962 paper On Sequential Decisions and Markov Chains (Management Science 9(1):16–24) treats two criteria: the long-run average cost per period, and the total cost of driving the system into an absorbing state. Its Theorem 2 shows that, once attention is restricted to stationary procedures, each problem can be solved as a linear program over the state-action frequencies of the procedure. This mission formalizes that theorem, its supporting displays (3)–(10) and its Lemma on linear-fractional programs.

The linear programming formulation is now the standard computational and theoretical tool for constrained Markov decision processes, and its variables, the occupation measures, are the objects of most later work on that topic. Derman's paper is among the first to state it for the average-cost criterion. Manne (Linear Programming and Sequential Decisions, Management Science, 1960) gave an earlier average-cost formulation for an inventory model. The reduction of a ratio of linear functions to a linear program in Derman's Lemma is the transformation published in the same year by Charnes and Cooper (Programming with Linear Fractional Functionals, Naval Research Logistics Quarterly, 1962).

Setting

There are finitely many states 0,…,L0, \dots, L0,…,L and decisions d1,…,dKd_1, \dots, d_Kd1​,…,dK​, all available in every state. Making decision dkd_kdk​ in state iii sends the system to state jjj with probability qij(k)≥0q_{ij}(k) \ge 0qij​(k)≥0, where ∑jqij(k)=1\sum_j q_{ij}(k) = 1∑j​qij​(k)=1, and costs wikw_{ik}wik​.

A procedure of class C′C'C′ is stationary randomized: in state iii it makes decision dkd_kdk​ with probability DikD_{ik}Dik​, where Dik≥0D_{ik} \ge 0Dik​≥0 and ∑kDik=1\sum_k D_{ik} = 1∑k​Dik​=1, independently of the past and of the time. Under such a procedure the states form a Markov chain with transition probabilities pij=∑kqij(k)Dikp_{ij} = \sum_k q_{ij}(k) D_{ik}pij​=∑k​qij​(k)Dik​. Write WtW_tWt​ for the expected cost at time ttt when X0=iX_0 = iX0​=i.

  • Problem 1 (average cost): minimize QR(i)=lim sup⁡T→∞1T∑t=0TWtQ_R(i) = \limsup_{T\to\infty} \frac{1}{T}\sum_{t=0}^{T} W_tQR​(i)=limsupT→∞​T1​∑t=0T​Wt​. Here wik>0w_{ik} > 0wik​>0, and Assumption A says that under every procedure of C′C'C′ all states belong to one class.
  • Problem 2 (total cost): the state LLL is absorbing under every decision and wLk=0w_{Lk} = 0wLk​=0. Minimize SR(i)=∑t=0∞WtS_R(i) = \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} W_tSR​(i)=∑t=0∞​Wt​, the expected cost of reaching LLL. Assumption B says that under every procedure of C′C'C′, LLL is reached from every state with probability one.

The state-action frequencies of a procedure D∈C′D \in C'D∈C′ with stationary distribution π\piπ are xjk=πjDjkx_{jk} = \pi_j D_{jk}xjk​=πj​Djk​. They satisfy the linear constraints

(10)xjk≥0,∑kxjk−∑i∑kxik qij(k)=0  (j),∑j∑kxjk=1.\text{(10)}\qquad x_{jk} \ge 0,\qquad \sum_k x_{jk} - \sum_{i}\sum_k x_{ik}\, q_{ij}(k) = 0 \ \ (j),\qquad \sum_j\sum_k x_{jk} = 1 .(10)xjk​≥0,k∑​xjk​−i∑​k∑​xik​qij​(k)=0  (j),j∑​k∑​xjk​=1.

For Problem 2, Derman adjoins a state −1-1−1 that restarts the chain uniformly on 0,…,L0, \dots, L0,…,L and is entered from LLL. The expected total cost then becomes a ratio of two linear functions of the frequencies of this augmented chain, (9).

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 2, pinned-down reading

The printed statement, "If Assumption A (B) holds, then problem 1 (2) can be formulated as a linear programming problem", is not a mathematical statement as it stands. The goal is the reading established by its proof (pp. 20–23).

Under Assumption A with w>0w > 0w>0, the program

min⁡ ∑j,kxjkwjksubject to (10)\min \ \sum_{j,k} x_{jk} w_{jk} \quad \text{subject to (10)}min j,k∑​xjk​wjk​subject to (10)

has an optimal solution. For every optimal x∗x^*x∗, every row sum ∑kxjk∗\sum_k x^*_{jk}∑k​xjk∗​ is positive, and Djk∗=xjk∗/∑kxjk∗D^*_{jk} = x^*_{jk}/\sum_k x^*_{jk}Djk∗​=xjk∗​/∑k​xjk∗​ satisfies QD∗(i)≤QD(i)Q_{D^*}(i) \le Q_D(i)QD∗​(i)≤QD​(i) for all D∈C′D \in C'D∈C′ and all iii.

Under Assumption B with the Problem 2 costs, the linear program obtained from (9) by the Lemma's transformation, min⁡∑wjkzjk\min \sum w_{jk} z_{jk}min∑wjk​zjk​ subject to (12), has an optimal solution. For every optimal (z∗,zn+1∗)(z^*, z^*_{n+1})(z∗,zn+1∗​) one has zn+1∗>0z^*_{n+1} > 0zn+1∗​>0, and the procedure decoded from x∗=z∗/zn+1∗x^* = z^*/z^*_{n+1}x∗=z∗/zn+1∗​ satisfies SD∗(i)≤SD(i)S_{D^*}(i) \le S_D(i)SD∗​(i)≤SD​(i) for all D∈C′D \in C'D∈C′ and all iii.

Milestones

In the order the proof uses them: the Cesàro limit and the unique positive stationary distribution of a one-class chain ((3), (5)); the taboo-probability identity (4); the formula (6) for QRQ_RQR​; the cycle formula (7) for the averaged total cost; the remark that minimizing the average of the SR(i)S_R(i)SR​(i) minimizes each one; the correspondence between C′C'C′ and the solutions of (10); and the Lemma reducing a linear-fractional program under conditions (i) and (ii) to the linear program (12).

Significance

The theorem replaces a search over infinitely many randomized procedures by a single finite linear program. It also yields the structural fact that an optimal stationary procedure can be read off from any optimal solution. The variables xjkx_{jk}xjk​ make constraints on long-run frequencies of actions expressible as linear constraints. That is the origin of the theory of constrained Markov decision processes, and of the dual linear programs whose variables are value functions. The Lemma is the classical linear-fractional reduction, used well beyond this setting.

All of these results are proved in the paper and in later textbooks (for example Puterman, Markov Decision Processes, 1994, §8.8 and §9.5). None of them has been formalized: Mathlib has Perron–Frobenius-type facts for irreducible matrices but no linear programming theory, no taboo probabilities and no Markov decision model. The mission produces machine-checked versions of the proof's chain of equalities and of the decoding step, written so that they can be reused for occupation-measure arguments.

Difficulty

Several steps fail in the naive argument. The correspondence between procedures and solutions of (10) needs every row sum ∑kxjk\sum_k x_{jk}∑k​xjk​ to be positive. That uses Assumption A for a procedure obtained by completing the decoded rows arbitrarily, together with the uniqueness and positivity of the stationary distribution. Positivity of the stationary vector of an irreducible but possibly periodic chain, and the Cesàro (not ordinary) convergence of PtP^tPt, have no ready-made form in Mathlib. The total-cost identity (7) needs the regenerative identity (4), whose sums must first be shown to converge, and needs the augmented chain to be irreducible, which follows from Assumption B but is not assumed. Problem 2 needs one more step: a minimizer of the averaged total cost is optimal from every starting state, which uses the finiteness of all SR(i)S_R(i)SR​(i).

Formalization scope

States and decisions are finite Lean types S and Act. Probabilities and costs are real numbers, a procedure of C′C'C′ is a nonnegative real matrix with unit row sums, and the chain is chainMatrix q D. Assumption A is irreducibility (Matrix.IsIrreducible) of every such chain matrix. Assumption B is reachability of LLL from every state; for a finite chain in which LLL is absorbing, this is equivalent to absorption with probability one. QR(i)Q_R(i)QR​(i) is a real limsup of a bounded sequence, with the paper's sum over t=0,…,Tt = 0, \dots, Tt=0,…,T. SR(i)S_R(i)SR​(i) takes values in [0,∞][0, \infty][0,∞]. The paper requires wik>0w_{ik} > 0wik​>0 on p. 17 and wLk=0w_{Lk} = 0wLk​=0 in Problem 2. The formalization uses wik>0w_{ik} > 0wik​>0 for i≠Li \ne Li=L in Problem 2, and keeps the two problems as separate implications. The adjoined state −1-1−1 is none : Option S, with the transition law that produces Derman's p−1,i=1/(L+1)p_{-1,i} = 1/(L+1)p−1,i​=1/(L+1), pL,−1=1p_{L,-1} = 1pL,−1​=1 for every procedure. The published JewellMRP.InfiniteStep definitions of an ergodic matrix and of a stationary vector are reused.

The goal states optimality of the decoded procedure against every competitor in C′C'C′, for every optimal solution of the linear program, with existence of an optimal solution as a separate clause. A statement that only identifies feasible sets, or that only asserts that some optimal procedure exists, does not count as Theorem 2. Optimality over all history-dependent procedures is Theorem 1, a separate mission of this series.

Welcome contributions: the stationary-distribution facts for irreducible finite stochastic matrices (reusable across Markov chain work), a small linear-programming existence lemma (a linear function attains its minimum on a nonempty compact polytope), and the Lemma's transformation, which is self-contained.

Selected references

  • C. Derman, On Sequential Decisions and Markov Chains, Management Science 9(1):16–24, 1962. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.9.1.16
  • A. S. Manne, Linear Programming and Sequential Decisions, Management Science 6(3):259–267, 1960. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.6.3.259
  • A. Charnes and W. W. Cooper, Programming with Linear Fractional Functionals, Naval Research Logistics Quarterly 9(3–4):181–186, 1962. https://doi.org/10.1002/nav.3800090303
  • K. L. Chung, Markov Chains with Stationary Transition Probabilities, Springer, 1960. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-49686-8
  • M. L. Puterman, Markov Decision Processes: Discrete Stochastic Dynamic Programming, Wiley, 1994. https://doi.org/10.1002/9780470316887
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Dynamic ProgrammingMarkov Chain·Captain: mikedeng1

On Sequential Decisions and Markov Chains 1: Deterministic Stationary Procedures Are Optimal for the Long-Run Average Cost and for the Total Cost to AbsorptionResearch Paper

Why restrict to stationary procedures

A Markov decision process with finitely many states and decisions is the basic model of sequential decision making under uncertainty: inventory replacement, machine maintenance, queue control and pursuit problems all fit it. Its computational methods (Howard's policy iteration, 1960; Manne's linear programming formulation, 1960) search only over stationary procedures, which use the same decision every time the system is in the same state. A controller, however, may also remember the whole past and randomize. Whether such procedures can do better is a genuine question: as Derman puts it, "a proof is required before a procedure optimal over C′C'C′ can be considered as the optimal procedure."

Cyrus Derman's 1962 paper On Sequential Decisions and Markov Chains (Management Science 9(1):16–24) answers it for two criteria, the long-run average cost and the total cost until absorption, by showing that a deterministic stationary procedure is optimal against all procedures. This mission formalizes that theorem, Theorem 1, together with the steps of its proof.

Timeline. Karlin (1955) gives the existence of a discount-optimal procedure used here; Howard (1960) and Manne (1960) solve the average-cost problem over stationary procedures; Wagner (1960) shows by linear programming that an optimal average-cost procedure can be taken deterministic and stationary; Derman (1962) proves the reduction for both criteria by the functional equation approach; Blackwell (1962) strengthens the discounted side to procedures optimal for all discount factors close to 111.

Setting

The system is observed at times t=0,1,…t = 0, 1, \dotst=0,1,… in one of finitely many states 0,…,L0, \dots, L0,…,L. After each observation one of KKK decisions d1,…,dKd_1, \dots, d_Kd1​,…,dK​ is made; every decision is available in every state. If the system is in state iii and decision dkd_kdk​ is made, it moves to state jjj with probability qij(k)≥0q_{ij}(k) \ge 0qij​(k)≥0, where ∑jqij(k)=1\sum_j q_{ij}(k) = 1∑j​qij​(k)=1, and a cost wikw_{ik}wik​ is incurred.

A procedure RRR chooses decision dkd_kdk​ at time ttt with probability Dk(X0,Δ0,…,Xt)D_k(X_0, \Delta_0, \dots, X_t)Dk​(X0​,Δ0​,…,Xt​), which may depend on the whole history of states XsX_sXs​ and decisions Δs\Delta_sΔs​. The class of all procedures is CCC. The class C′C'C′ consists of the stationary randomized procedures, for which this probability is a number DikD_{ik}Dik​ depending only on the current state iii. The class C′′C''C′′ consists of the deterministic stationary procedures, those of C′C'C′ with Dik∈{0,1}D_{ik} \in \{0, 1\}Dik​∈{0,1}, that is, maps fff from states to decisions; C′′C''C′′ is finite.

Started from X0=iX_0 = iX0​=i, a procedure RRR incurs the expected cost WtW_tWt​ at time ttt. The criteria are

QR(i)=lim sup⁡T→∞1T∑t=0TWt(Problem 1),SR(i)=∑t=0∞Wt∈[0,∞](Problem 2),Q_R(i) = \limsup_{T \to \infty} \frac1T \sum_{t=0}^{T} W_t \quad\text{(Problem 1)}, \qquad S_R(i) = \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} W_t \in [0, \infty] \quad\text{(Problem 2)},QR​(i)=T→∞limsup​T1​t=0∑T​Wt​(Problem 1),SR​(i)=t=0∑∞​Wt​∈[0,∞](Problem 2),

and, for a discount factor 0<α<10 < \alpha < 10<α<1, the auxiliary discounted cost VR(i,α)=∑t≥0αtWtV_R(i, \alpha) = \sum_{t \ge 0} \alpha^t W_tVR​(i,α)=∑t≥0​αtWt​. Problem 1 assumes wik>0w_{ik} > 0wik​>0. Problem 2 assumes that state LLL is absorbing under every decision and that wLk=0w_{Lk} = 0wLk​=0, so SR(i)S_R(i)SR​(i) is the expected cost of driving the system from iii into LLL.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 1

There are procedures R1,R2∈C′′R_1, R_2 \in C''R1​,R2​∈C′′ such that, for every state iii,

QR1(i)=min⁡R∈CQR(i)(Problem 1),SR2(i)=min⁡R∈CSR(i)  (possibly ∞)(Problem 2).Q_{R_1}(i) = \min_{R \in C} Q_R(i) \quad\text{(Problem 1)}, \qquad S_{R_2}(i) = \min_{R \in C} S_R(i) \ \ (\text{possibly } \infty) \quad\text{(Problem 2)}.QR1​​(i)=R∈Cmin​QR​(i)(Problem 1),SR2​​(i)=R∈Cmin​SR​(i)  (possibly ∞)(Problem 2).

One procedure serves every initial state, and the minimum is over all of CCC.

Milestones, in the order of the proof

  1. The functional equation: Vi=min⁡R∈CVR(i,α)V_i = \min_{R \in C} V_R(i, \alpha)Vi​=minR∈C​VR​(i,α) satisfies Vi=min⁡Di∑kDik (wik+α∑jqij(k)Vj)V_i = \min_{D_i} \sum_k D_{ik}\,(w_{ik} + \alpha \sum_j q_{ij}(k) V_j)Vi​=minDi​​∑k​Dik​(wik​+α∑j​qij​(k)Vj​), the minimum over randomizations DiD_iDi​ being attained.
  2. For each α∈(0,1)\alpha \in (0,1)α∈(0,1) some Rα∈C′′R_\alpha \in C''Rα​∈C′′ minimizes VR(i,α)V_R(i, \alpha)VR​(i,α) over CCC.
  3. One R∗∈C′′R^* \in C''R∗∈C′′ is αv\alpha_vαv​-discount optimal along a sequence αv→1\alpha_v \to 1αv​→1.
  4. lim⁡v(1−αv)VR∗(i,αv)=QR∗(i)\lim_{v} (1 - \alpha_v) V_{R^*}(i, \alpha_v) = Q_{R^*}(i)limv​(1−αv​)VR∗​(i,αv​)=QR∗​(i) for a stationary R∗R^*R∗ (published).
  5. The Abelian inequality QR(i)≥lim sup⁡α→1−(1−α)VR(i,α)Q_R(i) \ge \limsup_{\alpha \to 1^-} (1 - \alpha) V_R(i, \alpha)QR​(i)≥limsupα→1−​(1−α)VR​(i,α) for every R∈CR \in CR∈C (published).
  6. Theorem 1 (1) itself (published, as part of Sennott's Proposition 6.2.3).
  7. SR(i)=lim⁡α→1−VR(i,α)S_R(i) = \lim_{\alpha \to 1^-} V_R(i, \alpha)SR​(i)=limα→1−​VR​(i,α) for every R∈CR \in CR∈C, finite or not.

Significance

Theorem 1 is what makes finite optimization possible for these problems: once C′′C''C′′ is known to contain an optimal procedure, the search runs over finitely many maps, and the linear programs of the paper's §3 (the next mission of this series) and of Manne describe the whole problem rather than a restriction of it. Part (2) is a total-cost result without any assumption that the absorbing state is reached; it holds even when every procedure has infinite cost from some state, which separates it from the stochastic shortest path theory that assumes properness.

Part (1) is available on the platform as part of Sennott's Proposition 6.2.3 (stated there, not yet proved), and it is referenced here rather than restated. Part (2), the functional equation for history-dependent procedures and the Abel-limit identity for the total cost have no statement on the platform; to our knowledge none has a machine-checked proof.

Difficulty

The obvious argument compares an arbitrary procedure with stationary ones state by state, but a history-dependent randomized procedure does not induce a Markov chain, so no transition matrix is available for it. The comparison has to pass through the discounted problem, where an optimal stationary procedure exists for each α\alphaα, and then let α→1\alpha \to 1α→1. Two limit exchanges are needed: for the average cost, an Abelian inequality valid for every procedure plus a Markov chain limit theorem for the stationary one; for the total cost, monotone convergence in [0,∞][0, \infty][0,∞], which must work when the limit is infinite. The discount-optimal procedure depends on α\alphaα, and the finiteness of C′′C''C′′ is what yields a single procedure along a sequence αv→1\alpha_v \to 1αv​→1.

Formalization scope

The model is the published SennottDP.AvgFinite.Model (a Markov decision chain with finite action sets, nonnegative costs in R≥0\mathbb R_{\ge 0}R≥0​ and transition probabilities in [0,∞][0, \infty][0,∞]) with finite nonempty types of states and decisions and every action set equal to the whole decision type. Derman's class CCC is its Policy (history-dependent, randomized); C′′C''C′′ is StationaryPolicy. WtW_tWt​ is expCost, VR(i,α)V_R(i, \alpha)VR​(i,α) is discCost, and QR(i)Q_R(i)QR​(i) is avgCost =lim sup⁡n1n∑t<nWt= \limsup_n \frac1n \sum_{t<n} W_t=limsupn​n1​∑t<n​Wt​, which has the same value as Derman's normalization because WtW_tWt​ is bounded. SR(i)S_R(i)SR​(i) is a new definition, a sum in [0,∞][0, \infty][0,∞]. Every discount factor is restricted to (0,1)(0, 1)(0,1) explicitly. "Minimum over CCC" is stated as an inequality against every policy, with the optimal procedure chosen before the initial state.

Problems 1 and 2 enter as separate implications with their own cost hypotheses; the page's "wik>0w_{ik} > 0wik​>0" is read as wik>0w_{ik} > 0wik​>0 for i≠Li \ne Li=L in Problem 2, since wLk=0w_{Lk} = 0wLk​=0 there. A formalization that compares only against stationary procedures, or that states the total cost as a real series (whose divergent values default to 000), is ruled out: the competitors are all policies and SR(i)S_R(i)SR​(i) lives in [0,∞][0, \infty][0,∞].

A complete development needs the discounted Bellman equation for history-dependent policies, the selection of a deterministic minimizer, and Abelian theorems for nonnegative series. These are reusable across the platform's dynamic programming missions, and proofs of the referenced Sennott propositions are welcome contributions in their own right.

Selected references

  • C. Derman, On Sequential Decisions and Markov Chains, Management Science 9(1):16–24, 1962. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.9.1.16
  • S. Karlin, The Structure of Dynamic Programming Models, Naval Research Logistics Quarterly 2(4):285–294, 1955. https://doi.org/10.1002/nav.3800020408
  • A. S. Manne, Linear Programming and Sequential Decisions, Management Science 6(3):259–267, 1960. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.6.3.259
  • R. A. Howard, Dynamic Programming and Markov Processes, MIT Press, 1960.
  • H. M. Wagner, On the Optimality of Pure Strategies, Management Science 6(3):268–269, 1960. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.6.3.268
  • D. Blackwell, Discrete Dynamic Programming, Annals of Mathematical Statistics 33(2):719–726, 1962. https://doi.org/10.1214/aoms/1177704593
  • L. I. Sennott, Stochastic Dynamic Programming and the Control of Queueing Systems, Wiley, 1999, Propositions 6.1.1, 6.2.2, 6.2.3. https://doi.org/10.1002/9780470317037
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Algorithmic Game TheoryComplexity Theory·Captain: mikedeng1

The Complexity of Computing a Nash Equilibrium 1: Approximate Fixed Points of Nash's Map Are Approximate Nash EquilibriaResearch Paper

Motivation

A finite game describes several decision makers whose payoffs depend on everyone's choices. A Nash equilibrium is a collection of choices at which no single player can improve their expected payoff by changing strategy alone. Equilibrium existence is a classical result, but a computational argument needs to connect an object that can be approximated numerically to a strategically meaningful outcome. Daskalakis, Goldberg and Papadimitriou make that connection using Nash's map on mixed-strategy profiles in their study of equilibrium computation (Daskalakis, Goldberg and Papadimitriou 2009, §3.2). This mission isolates their quantitative connection: a profile close to a fixed point of that particular map is close to a Nash equilibrium, with the paper's explicit error bound.

The result is a known lemma from the published paper, not an open conjecture. It belongs to the paper's route from finite games to approximate equilibrium computation. The present mission treats the analytic statements about the map and finite payoffs; it does not state the paper's PPAD completeness theorem or encode computational reductions.

Setting

A normal-form game has r≥2r\ge2r≥2 players. In the Nash-map section each player has the same nonempty set [n][n][n] of nnn pure strategies. A pure profile sss chooses one strategy for each player, and player ppp receives a nonnegative real payoff uspu^p_susp​. The largest entry among all these payoff tables is Umax⁡U_{\max}Umax​. A mixed profile xxx assigns each player ppp probabilities xjp≥0x^p_j\ge0xjp​≥0 that sum to one over j∈[n]j\in[n]j∈[n]; different players randomize independently. The expected payoff when everyone uses xxx is Up(x)U^p(x)Up(x). If player ppp instead uses the pure strategy jjj while the others keep their mixed strategies, the expected payoff is Ujp(x)U^p_j(x)Ujp​(x).

Write Bjp(x)=max⁡{0,Ujp(x)−Up(x)}B^p_j(x)=\max\{0,U^p_j(x)-U^p(x)\}Bjp​(x)=max{0,Ujp​(x)−Up(x)} for the positive part of this unilateral payoff gain. Nash's map fff assigns to each coordinate of a mixed profile the normalized value

f(x)jp=xjp+Bjp(x)1+∑k∈[n]Bkp(x).f(x)^p_j=\frac{x^p_j+B^p_j(x)}{1+\sum_{k\in[n]}B^p_k(x)}.f(x)jp​=1+∑k∈[n]​Bkp​(x)xjp​+Bjp​(x)​.

The numerator raises the weight of a strategy whose pure payoff exceeds the current expected payoff. The common denominator ensures that the new weights for a player sum to one. These are exactly the quantities and normalization displayed on page 205 of the paper (Daskalakis, Goldberg and Papadimitriou 2009).

An ε\varepsilonε-approximate Nash equilibrium here means a mixed profile at which no player can increase expected payoff by more than ε\varepsilonε through any mixed-strategy deviation. This is the alternative approximation notion identified on page 199 and written as Eq. (27) on page 243. It is weaker than the paper's ε\varepsilonε-approximately well-supported condition; the two notions must remain distinct.

Formalization targets

The goal is Lemma 3.8 (p. 207). For any mixed profile xxx with ∥f(x)−x∥∞≤ε′\|f(x)-x\|_\infty\le\varepsilon'∥f(x)−x∥∞​≤ε′, where ε′≥0\varepsilon'\ge0ε′≥0, its approximate-equilibrium error is bounded by the paper's exact quantity:

εNash=nε′(1+nUmax⁡)(1+ε′(1+nUmax⁡))max⁡{Umax⁡,1}.\varepsilon_{\mathrm{Nash}}= n\sqrt{\varepsilon'(1+nU_{\max})} \left(1+\sqrt{\varepsilon'(1+nU_{\max})}\right) \max\{U_{\max},1\}.εNash​=nε′(1+nUmax​)​(1+ε′(1+nUmax​)​)max{Umax​,1}.

No numerical constant is left free or replaced by an unspecified asymptotic bound. The goal is universal over games and profiles satisfying the stated conditions; it does not merely assert the existence of one favorable profile.

The milestone list also includes Lemma 3.5, bounding the variation of a pure-strategy payoff when opponents change their distributions; Lemma 3.6, an inequality for normalized nonnegative sums; and Lemma 3.4, the explicit Lipschitz bound

∥f(x)−f(x′)∥∞≤[1+2Umax⁡rn(n+1)] δwhen∥x−x′∥∞≤δ.\|f(x)-f(x')\|_\infty\le[1+2U_{\max}rn(n+1)]\,\delta \quad\text{when}\quad \|x-x'\|_\infty\le\delta.∥f(x)−f(x′)∥∞​≤[1+2Umax​rn(n+1)]δwhen∥x−x′∥∞​≤δ.

Equation (3) on page 208 is a further milestone: it bounds each coordinate's share of the total positive gain under approximate fixedness. Lemma 3.4 has a separate role in the paper's grid analysis; it is not claimed as a prerequisite of Lemma 3.8.

Significance

The goal gives a quantitative translation between two kinds of approximation. An error measured in the coordinates of a fixed-point map becomes an upper bound on a player's incentive to deviate. The dependence on nnn, Umax⁡U_{\max}Umax​ and ε′\varepsilon'ε′ matters because the later computational construction chooses its grid scale using an explicit threshold, not simply a convergence claim. Lemma 3.4 provides the separate sensitivity estimate for that map, also with its exact constant (Daskalakis, Goldberg and Papadimitriou 2009, pp. 205–207).

Formalizing these known statements supplies a reusable bridge between finite-game payoffs, mixed profiles and a concrete fixed-point map. The shared finite-game representation already exists in the published agt_games definition bundle. What remains here is a machine-checked proof of each quantitative statement and of the payoff identities needed to relate pure and mixed deviations. The local Lean statements compile as open theorem targets; the mission does not claim that their proofs are already formalized.

Difficulty

A coordinatewise small value of f(x)−xf(x)-xf(x)−x does not by itself bound the largest payoff advantage by the same number. The map normalizes by a sum of all positive advantages, and a strategy with a large advantage might have little probability under xxx. Conversely, controlling a player's current expected payoff requires information about the entire probability vector, including strategies that are worse than the current mix. The explicit square-root dependence in Lemma 3.8 captures this mismatch. A direct substitution of the fixed-point error for the equilibrium error would lose both the dimension and payoff-scale factors in the published bound.

Formalization scope

Lean represents players by Fin r, strategies by Fin n, payoffs by a real function on pure profiles, and mixed strategies by real-valued weight functions satisfying AGT.IsMixedProfile. The paper numbers players and strategies from one; Fin uses zero-based indices without changing the mathematical sets. AGT.expectedPayoff and AGT.profileProb implement the independent product distribution. Pure-strategy expected payoff is the same expectation after replacing just one player's lottery by a point mass. The maximum payoff is computed from the game's actual finite table; the statements require r≥2r\ge2r≥2 and n>0n>0n>0, so this maximum exists. Nonnegative payoff entries, the standing convention from §2.1, are hypotheses.

The formula for fff is defined on all real coordinate arrays, exactly as an algebraic expression. Every theorem about an equilibrium supplies mixed-profile membership. This explicit condition rules out interpreting Lemma 3.8 on arbitrary vectors, for which “approximate Nash equilibrium” has no strategic meaning and the paper's argument does not apply. The infinity norm is written as a bound for every player-strategy pair, avoiding any dependence on a chosen norm instance. All error parameters appearing in the statements are nonnegative, and the denominator of fff is positive on mixed profiles because each Bjp(x)B^p_j(x)Bjp​(x) is nonnegative.

The development needs finite products and sums, real inequalities, the game bundle, and elementary facts about lotteries and unilateral deviations. Results about how expectations vary under a changed product distribution are reusable for other finite-game formalizations. Contributions proving the milestone inequalities, the payoff identities, and the goal's exact bound are welcome.

Selected references

  • C. Daskalakis, P. W. Goldberg and C. H. Papadimitriou, The Complexity of Computing a Nash Equilibrium, SIAM Journal on Computing 39(1):195–259, 2009. DOI: 10.1137/070699652.
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OptimizationStochastic Systems·Captain: mikedeng1

A Characterization of Waiting Time Performance Realizable by Single-Server Queues: The Conservation-Law Polytope Is the Convex Hull of the Preemptive Priority VectorsResearch Paper

Motivation

A single server shared by several classes of jobs must decide, at every moment, which class to serve. Different scheduling rules give different mean response times to the classes, and a system designer often starts from the other end: a target vector of mean response times, one per class, and the question whether any rule can meet it. Coffman and Mitrani answered this question for the multiclass M/M/1 queue in A Characterization of Waiting Time Performance Realizable by Single-Server Queues (Operations Research 28 (1980), 810–821). Their answer is a polytope with an explicit description: the response-time vectors that can be realized are exactly the convex combinations of the vectors of the preemptive priority rules, and these are exactly the vectors satisfying one equation and 2M−22^M-22M−2 inequalities.

The starting point is Kleinrock's conservation law (Kleinrock, Naval Res. Logist. Quart. 12 (1965)): a weighted sum of the response times does not depend on the rule. The characterization is the first instance of what was later called the achievable region method, developed for general multiclass systems by Federgruen and Groenevelt (Oper. Res. 36 (1988)), Shanthikumar and Yao (Oper. Res. 40 (1992)) and Bertsimas and Niño-Mora (Math. Oper. Res. 21 (1996)), and used to derive priority-index policies such as the cμc\mucμ rule and Gittins indices.

Setting

There are M≥1M\ge1M≥1 job classes. Jobs of class iii arrive in a Poisson stream at rate λi>0\lambda_i>0λi​>0 and have exponential service times with parameter μi>0\mu_i>0μi​>0. The traffic intensity of class iii is ρi=λi/μi\rho_i=\lambda_i/\mu_iρi​=λi​/μi​, and the system is stable: ρ=ρ1+⋯+ρM<1\rho=\rho_1+\cdots+\rho_M<1ρ=ρ1​+⋯+ρM​<1. A performance vector W=(W1,…,WM)W=(W_1,\dots,W_M)W=(W1​,…,WM​) lists the mean response times of the classes. Write ai=ρi/μia_i=\rho_i/\mu_iai​=ρi​/μi​, V=∑iλi/μi2V=\sum_i\lambda_i/\mu_i^2V=∑i​λi​/μi2​, and for a set ggg of classes

f(g)=∑i∈gai1−∑i∈gρi,f(∅)=0.f(g)=\frac{\sum_{i\in g}a_i}{1-\sum_{i\in g}\rho_i},\qquad f(\emptyset)=0 .f(g)=1−∑i∈g​ρi​∑i∈g​ai​​,f(∅)=0.
  • The conservation law (1): ∑i=1MρiWi=V/(1−ρ)\sum_{i=1}^M\rho_iW_i=V/(1-\rho)∑i=1M​ρi​Wi​=V/(1−ρ), which equals f({1,…,M})f(\{1,\dots,M\})f({1,…,M}).
  • The inequalities (4): ∑i∈gρiWi≥f(g)\sum_{i\in g}\rho_iW_i\ge f(g)∑i∈g​ρi​Wi​≥f(g) for each proper nonempty set ggg of classes.
  • H∗∗H^{**}H∗∗ is the set of WWW satisfying (1) and (4).
  • A priority order lists the classes as i1,…,iMi_1,\dots,i_Mi1​,…,iM​, i1i_1i1​ highest. The preemptive priority vector P(i1,…,iM)P(i_1,\dots,i_M)P(i1​,…,iM​) is the vector with ∑i∈SkρiWi=f(Sk)\sum_{i\in S_k}\rho_iW_i=f(S_k)∑i∈Sk​​ρi​Wi​=f(Sk​) for the top sets Sk={i1,…,ik}S_k=\{i_1,\dots,i_k\}Sk​={i1​,…,ik​}, k=1,…,Mk=1,\dots,Mk=1,…,M; explicitly Pik=(f(Sk)−f(Sk−1))/ρikP_{i_k}=(f(S_k)-f(S_{k-1}))/\rho_{i_k}Pik​​=(f(Sk​)−f(Sk−1​))/ρik​​. For M=2M=2M=2, P(1,2)1=1/(μ1−λ1)P(1,2)_1=1/(\mu_1-\lambda_1)P(1,2)1​=1/(μ1​−λ1​), the M/M/1 response time of class 1 alone.
  • HHH, (3), is the set of convex combinations ∑k=1MαkPk\sum_{k=1}^M\alpha_kP_k∑k=1M​αk​Pk​ of MMM preemptive priority vectors.

In Lean the data are a structure Params M carrying λ,μ\lambda,\muλ,μ and the three standing assumptions; Params.f, Params.Hss (H∗∗H^{**}H∗∗), Params.prioVec, topSet and Params.H are the objects above.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 2, analytical form

H∗∗=H.H^{**}=H .H∗∗=H.

The paper's Theorem 2 says a vector is achievable by a scheduling strategy iff it lies in HHH; its proof is the chain H⊆H∗⊆H∗∗⊆HH\subseteq H^*\subseteq H^{**}\subseteq HH⊆H∗⊆H∗∗⊆H, where H∗H^*H∗ is the achievable set. The goal is the part of the chain that involves no strategies.

Milestones

  1. The priority vector is the unique solution of the equations (5) for its chain of top sets.
  2. The first inequality of the proof of Lemma 2: (1−ρ(g1))(1−ρ(g2))>(1−ρ(g1∪g2))(1−ρ(g1∩g2))(1-\rho(g_1))(1-\rho(g_2))>(1-\rho(g_1\cup g_2))(1-\rho(g_1\cap g_2))(1−ρ(g1​))(1−ρ(g2​))>(1−ρ(g1​∪g2​))(1−ρ(g1​∩g2​)) for crossing g1,g2g_1,g_2g1​,g2​.
  3. The second inequality of that proof, in the coefficients aia_iai​.
  4. Lemma 1 at the priority vectors: every P(i1,…,iM)P(i_1,\dots,i_M)P(i1​,…,iM​) lies in H∗∗H^{**}H∗∗.
  5. Two sets on which a point of H∗∗H^{**}H∗∗ satisfies (4) with equality are nested.
  6. Lemma 2: every vertex of H∗∗H^{**}H∗∗ is a preemptive priority vector.

A further item states the paper's final remark (§4): every linear cost ∑iciWi\sum_ic_iW_i∑i​ci​Wi​ is minimized over H∗∗H^{**}H∗∗ at some preemptive priority vector.

Significance

The theorem turns a question about all scheduling rules into a finite check: a target vector is realizable iff it satisfies (1) and the inequalities (4), and every realizable vector is realized by randomly mixing at most MMM priority rules. Linear costs over the realizable vectors are minimized by a priority rule, the fact behind the optimality of priority-index rules in multiclass queues. The paper also gives a linear program for finding the mixture.

The result has been proved since 1980. No machine-checked proof of it is known. The Prove2Me library holds the abstract generalized conservation law theorem of Gittins, Glazebrook and Weber (AllocationIndices.achievable_region_theorem, included as a reference item), which assumes the inequalities (4) for every policy and whose polytope also imposes nonnegativity; it does not compute the right-hand sides for the M/M/1 queue, does not prove that the priority vectors satisfy (4), and uses equality on the lowest-priority sets rather than the highest. This mission supplies the concrete polytope, the closed form of the priority vectors and the strict supermodularity of fff.

Difficulty

That the priority vectors lie in H∗∗H^{**}H∗∗ is a family of inequalities between ratios f(Sk)f(S_k)f(Sk​), one for each pair of a priority order and a set ggg, and the order and ggg need not interact in any simple way. The reverse inclusion is a statement about vertices: a vertex is determined by MMM tight constraints, and one has to show that they form a chain. This needs strict inequalities with the right direction for every crossing pair of sets, which is where the positivity of every λi,μi\lambda_i,\mu_iλi​,μi​ is used. If some λi=0\lambda_i=0λi​=0, then WiW_iWi​ appears in no constraint, H∗∗H^{**}H∗∗ is unbounded and the goal is false. Finally, HHH uses only MMM points, not all M!M!M!, so the goal contains a Carathéodory-type bound for the hyperplane of (1).

Formalization scope

Classes are Fin M, numbered from 000. A priority order is π : Equiv.Perm (Fin M) with π r the class of rank r, rank 000 highest. "Vertex" is an element of Set.extremePoints ℝ. The points of (3) are prioVec (σ k) for an arbitrary σ : Fin M → Equiv.Perm (Fin M), so repetitions are allowed. The priority vectors are given by their closed form, not as solutions of a system. The goal assumes M≥1M\ge1M≥1; for M=0M=0M=0 the set HHH is empty.

The paper's notion "achievable by some scheduling strategy" is replaced by its analytical characterization H∗∗H^{**}H∗∗: the strategy class of the paper (Assumptions 1–3, p. 812) is described only in prose and the steady-state means are assumed to exist, so the queueing half of the proof (Theorem 1, Lemma 1 for arbitrary strategies, the conservation law itself) is not stated. The goal is not to be stated on an abstract set satisfying hypotheses that encode Lemma 1 and (1); that form is already proved and drops the content of milestone 4. The conservation law is an equality, never the inequality (4) at the full set.

A complete development needs finite-set sums, the extreme points of a polyhedron and a Carathéodory argument in an affine hyperplane; the inequalities of milestones 2 and 3 and the vertex-chain argument are reusable for any strictly supermodular set function. Proofs of any milestone, and alternative proofs of the goal through polymatroid theory, are welcome.

Selected references

  • E. G. Coffman, Jr. and I. Mitrani, A Characterization of Waiting Time Performance Realizable by Single-Server Queues, Operations Research 28(3, Part II), 810–821, 1980. https://doi.org/10.1287/opre.28.3.810
  • L. Kleinrock, A Conservation Law for a Wide Class of Queueing Disciplines, Naval Research Logistics Quarterly 12, 181–192, 1965. https://doi.org/10.1002/nav.3800120206
  • A. Federgruen and H. Groenevelt, Characterization and Optimization of Achievable Performance in General Queueing Systems, Operations Research 36(5), 733–741, 1988. https://doi.org/10.1287/opre.36.5.733
  • J. G. Shanthikumar and D. D. Yao, Multiclass Queueing Systems: Polymatroidal Structure and Optimal Scheduling Control, Operations Research 40(3-supplement-2), S293–S299, 1992. https://doi.org/10.1287/opre.40.3.S293
  • D. Bertsimas and J. Niño-Mora, Conservation Laws, Extended Polymatroids and Multiarmed Bandit Problems; A Polyhedral Approach to Indexable Systems, Mathematics of Operations Research 21(2), 257–306, 1996. https://doi.org/10.1287/moor.21.2.257
  • J. Gittins, K. Glazebrook and R. Weber, Multi-armed Bandit Allocation Indices, 2nd ed., Wiley, 2011. https://doi.org/10.1002/9780470980033
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OptimizationProbability·Captain: mikedeng1

Air Travel Demand and Airline Seat Inventory Management II: The EMSR Protection Level for Two Nested Fare ClassesTextbook

Why airlines protect seats

An airline sells the seats of one flight in several fare classes at different prices, all drawn from one shared cabin. Discount fares are bought early, under advance-purchase restrictions, while most high-fare requests arrive close to departure. Accepting every early low-fare request fills the aircraft with cheap passengers and turns away late high-fare passengers; refusing too many leaves seats empty. Seat inventory control decides how many seats to keep away from the low fare. Peter Belobaba's 1987 MIT thesis (Flight Transportation Laboratory Report R87-7) introduced the expected marginal seat revenue (EMSR) model for this decision, and EMSR-type rules remain the basis of the booking-limit logic in airline revenue management systems.

Timeline. Littlewood (1972, AGIFORS Symposium Proceedings; reprinted 2005) proposed accepting a low-fare request as long as its fare is at least the high fare times the probability of selling all remaining seats to high-fare passengers. Analysts at Trans World Airlines (1973) and Richter at Lufthansa (1982) gave equivalent formulations for the dynamic case. Belobaba (1987, Ch. 5) restated the two-class rule as a static protection level for nested inventories and extended it heuristically to many classes. Brumelle and McGill (Operations Research 41, 1993) and Curry (Transportation Science 24, 1990) later proved optimality of nested protection levels for any number of classes under low-to-high arrivals, and showed that Belobaba's multi-class EMSR levels are not optimal for three or more classes. This mission concerns only the two-class result, which is correct.

Setting

A single flight leg has capacity C∈NC \in \mathbb NC∈N. Class 1 has fare f1f_1f1​, class 2 has fare f2f_2f2​, with 0≤f2≤f10 \le f_2 \le f_10≤f2​≤f1​. The numbers of requests for the two classes are random variables r1,r2r_1, r_2r1​,r2​ with values in N\mathbb NN, defined on a probability space (Ω,μ)(\Omega, \mu)(Ω,μ) and independent. There are no cancellations, no no-shows, and a refused request is lost.

The inventory is nested: a class-1 request is accepted as long as any seat is unsold. A protection level S∈{0,…,C}S \in \{0, \dots, C\}S∈{0,…,C} is the number of seats reserved for class 1; it sets the class-2 booking limit BL2=C−SBL_2 = C - SBL2​=C−S. All class-2 requests arrive before any class-1 request. Class 2 therefore books min⁡(r2,C−S)\min(r_2, C - S)min(r2​,C−S) seats and class 1 books min⁡(r1,C−min⁡(r2,C−S))\min(r_1, C - \min(r_2, C-S))min(r1​,C−min(r2​,C−S)), and the realised revenue is

RS=f2min⁡(r2,C−S)+f1min⁡(r1, C−min⁡(r2,C−S)).R_S = f_2 \min(r_2, C - S) + f_1 \min\bigl(r_1,\, C - \min(r_2, C - S)\bigr).RS​=f2​min(r2​,C−S)+f1​min(r1​,C−min(r2​,C−S)).

The expected revenue is Rˉ(S)=E[RS]\bar R(S) = \mathbb E[R_S]Rˉ(S)=E[RS​].

The tail probability of class 1 is Pˉ1(S)=P[r1≥S]\bar P_1(S) = P[r_1 \ge S]Pˉ1​(S)=P[r1​≥S], the probability of receiving SSS or more class-1 requests, and the expected marginal seat revenue of the SSS-th class-1 seat is

EMSR1(S)=f1⋅Pˉ1(S).\mathrm{EMSR}_1(S) = f_1 \cdot \bar P_1(S).EMSR1​(S)=f1​⋅Pˉ1​(S).

For a single class with SSS seats the expected revenue is f1 E[min⁡(r1,S)]f_1\,\mathbb E[\min(r_1, S)]f1​E[min(r1​,S)], and EMSR1(S)\mathrm{EMSR}_1(S)EMSR1​(S) is its increment from S−1S-1S−1 to SSS seats. The EMSR protection level S21S_2^1S21​ is the largest integer S∈{0,…,C}S \in \{0, \dots, C\}S∈{0,…,C} with

EMSR1(S)≥f2.\mathrm{EMSR}_1(S) \ge f_2 .EMSR1​(S)≥f2​.

In Lean these objects are nestedRevenue, expectedNestedRevenue, tailProb, classRevenue, emsr and emsrProtectionLevel in SeatInventory.Nested.

Formalization targets

Goal: Eqs. (5.15)–(5.16), optimality of the EMSR protection level

Rˉ(S)≤Rˉ(S21)for all S∈{0,…,C}.\bar R(S) \le \bar R(S_2^1) \qquad \text{for all } S \in \{0, \dots, C\}.Rˉ(S)≤Rˉ(S21​)for all S∈{0,…,C}.

The goal fixes no distribution: it holds for every pair of independent N\mathbb NN-valued demands, and S21S_2^1S21​ depends only on f2/f1f_2/f_1f2​/f1​ and the law of r1r_1r1​.

Milestones

  1. Eq. (5.11). f1E[min⁡(r1,S)]−f1E[min⁡(r1,S−1)]=f1P[r1≥S]f_1\mathbb E[\min(r_1,S)] - f_1\mathbb E[\min(r_1,S-1)] = f_1 P[r_1 \ge S]f1​E[min(r1​,S)]−f1​E[min(r1​,S−1)]=f1​P[r1​≥S] for S≥1S \ge 1S≥1.
  2. Eqs. (6.1)–(6.2). Pˉ1\bar P_1Pˉ1​ and, for f1≥0f_1 \ge 0f1​≥0, EMSR1\mathrm{EMSR}_1EMSR1​ are non-increasing in SSS.
  3. Eq. (4.8), Littlewood's rule, already on the platform as RevenueManagement.littlewood_marginal_value (Talluri and van Ryzin's Eq. (2.1), proved).
  4. Sect. 5.2, p. 112. Rˉ(S)≤Rˉ(S21)\bar R(S) \le \bar R(S_2^1)Rˉ(S)≤Rˉ(S21​) for S21≤S≤CS_2^1 \le S \le CS21​≤S≤C: a smaller booking limit for class 2 cannot raise expected revenue.
  5. Sect. 5.2, p. 114. With the same class-2 limit C−SC - SC−S, the expected nested revenue is at least the expected revenue of two distinct inventories with SSS and C−SC - SC−S seats, strictly if f1>0f_1 > 0f1​>0 and P[r2<C−S, r1>S]>0P[r_2 < C - S,\ r_1 > S] > 0P[r2​<C−S, r1​>S]>0.

Significance

The two-class result says that, for a static booking limit set once before sales open and low-fare demand arriving first, the airline needs only the high-fare demand distribution and the fare ratio to set the optimal limit; the low-fare forecast is irrelevant. This is the rule that the thesis then applies class by class in multi-class nested systems, and it is the base case against which the later exact multi-class theory (Brumelle–McGill, Curry) is checked. Milestone 5 makes precise why nested inventories dominate the distinct-inventory allocation of the thesis's Sect. 5.1 with the same class-2 limit.

The result is classical and proved, in the sense that the optimality of a two-class threshold policy follows from Littlewood's argument and from the dynamic-programming treatment in Talluri and van Ryzin's The Theory and Practice of Revenue Management (2004, Ch. 2). On Prove2Me, Littlewood's marginal rule and the dynamic-programming optimality of nested protection levels (RevenueManagement.static_optimal_controls) are formalized, but in Bellman form: there the protection level is defined through the value function of a dynamic program. What is not formalized is the statement in Belobaba's form, where the protection level is the explicit threshold of f1P[r1≥S]f_1 P[r_1 \ge S]f1​P[r1​≥S] against f2f_2f2​ and the objective is the explicit expected revenue of a booking limit. Connecting the two forms, and the comparison with distinct inventories, is the work of this mission.

Difficulty

The expected revenue couples the two demands through the capacity left by class 2, so Rˉ\bar RRˉ is not a sum of single-class revenues and is not separately concave in an obvious way. The step that requires care is the increment Rˉ(S)−Rˉ(S−1)\bar R(S) - \bar R(S-1)Rˉ(S)−Rˉ(S−1): it is not EMSR1(S)−f2\mathrm{EMSR}_1(S) - f_2EMSR1​(S)−f2​, as the thesis's sentence after the milestone on p. 112 suggests, because the extra protected seat matters only on the event that class 2 would have reached its limit. Independence of r1r_1r1​ and r2r_2r2​ is what makes that event's probability factor out; without independence the threshold rule is not optimal. The discrete reading matters too: with P[r1>S]P[r_1 > S]P[r1​>S] in place of P[r1≥S]P[r_1 \ge S]P[r1​≥S] the rule is off by one seat and the claim fails.

Formalization scope

Conventions the Lean statements commit to:

  • Demands are N\mathbb NN-valued measurable random variables r₁ r₂ : Ω → ℕ on a probability space μ; the goal and milestone 4 assume IndepFun r₁ r₂ μ. The thesis writes continuous densities (Eqs. (5.1)–(5.5)) but requires integer seat counts; the discrete model is used throughout.
  • Pˉ1(S)=P[r1≥S]\bar P_1(S) = P[r_1 \ge S]Pˉ1​(S)=P[r1​≥S], as in Eq. (6.2) and the prose of Eq. (5.11), not P[r1>S]P[r_1 > S]P[r1​>S] as in Eq. (5.2).
  • The EMSR protection level is the largest S∈{0,…,C}S \in \{0,\dots,C\}S∈{0,…,C} with f1P[r1≥S]≥f2f_1 P[r_1 \ge S] \ge f_2f1​P[r1​≥S]≥f2​ (Eq. (5.15)); Eq. (5.16)'s equality is the continuous idealisation and is not stated.
  • Booking order: all class-2 requests precede all class-1 requests (pp. 108, 112). This order is built into the revenue formula, not assumed separately.
  • Fares satisfy 0≤f2≤f10 \le f_2 \le f_10≤f2​≤f1​; the thesis has f1>f2f_1 > f_2f1​>f2​, and the statements also cover equality.
  • Expectations are Bochner integrals of bounded revenues, probabilities are μ.real; seat counts use truncated subtraction only where S≤CS \le CS≤C.

A trivializing formalization is ruled out: S21S_2^1S21​ is defined by the threshold of (5.15), never as an argmax of expected revenue, and the expected revenue is computed from the realised revenue of the booking process, not postulated as a sum of marginal terms.

The multi-class EMSR levels of Eqs. (5.19)–(5.29) and the dynamic revision of Eqs. (5.31)–(5.32) are out of scope. Proofs need the discrete expectation identity E[min⁡(r,S)]−E[min⁡(r,S−1)]=P[r≥S]\mathbb E[\min(r,S)] - \mathbb E[\min(r,S-1)] = P[r \ge S]E[min(r,S)]−E[min(r,S−1)]=P[r≥S] and expectation of products of independent bounded functions, both in Mathlib's reach and reusable for other single-leg revenue models. Proofs of any milestone, and a proof of the goal from milestones 1, 2 and 4 plus the matching lower-half argument, are welcome.

Selected references

  • P. P. Belobaba, Air Travel Demand and Airline Seat Inventory Management, PhD thesis, MIT, Flight Transportation Laboratory Report R87-7, 1987 (no DOI).
  • K. Littlewood, Forecasting and control of passenger bookings, AGIFORS Symposium Proceedings 12, 1972; reprinted in Journal of Revenue and Pricing Management 4, 2005. https://doi.org/10.1057/palgrave.rpm.5170134
  • S. L. Brumelle and J. I. McGill, Airline seat allocation with multiple nested fare classes, Operations Research 41, 1993. https://doi.org/10.1287/opre.41.1.127
  • R. E. Curry, Optimal airline seat allocation with fare classes nested by origins and destinations, Transportation Science 24, 1990. https://doi.org/10.1287/trsc.24.3.193
  • K. T. Talluri and G. J. van Ryzin, The Theory and Practice of Revenue Management, Springer, 2004. https://doi.org/10.1007/b139000
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Linear OptimizationOptimizationProbability·Captain: mikedeng1

Air Travel Demand and Airline Seat Inventory Management I: Marginal Seat Allocation Among Distinct Fare ClassesTextbook

Why airlines allocate seats by fare class

An airline sells the seats of one flight leg at several prices. Low fares fill seats that would otherwise fly empty; high fares are bought by passengers who book late and cannot be predicted exactly. Seat inventory control decides how many seats each fare class may sell. Peter Belobaba's 1987 MIT dissertation (MIT Flight Transportation Laboratory Report R87-7) gave the probabilistic treatment of this problem that became the expected marginal seat revenue (EMSR) method, which was in use across the airline industry for decades.

This mission formalizes the first, simplest model of the thesis: distinct (non-nested) fare-class inventories on a single leg, where a seat assigned to a class may be sold only in that class or not at all. The thesis surveys this model in Sect. 4.2 (pp. 84–94), where an integer-programming formulation from McDonnell-Douglas and its solution by ranking marginal values are described (p. 90), and develops it probabilistically in Sect. 5.1 (pp. 102–107).

Setting

A leg has capacity nnn seats (the thesis also writes CCC). There are finitely many fare classes iii. Class iii has an average fare fi≥0f_i \ge 0fi​≥0 and receives a random number of requests ri∈{0,1,2,… }r_i \in \{0,1,2,\dots\}ri​∈{0,1,2,…}, with law pip_ipi​. The seats are split into allocations Si∈NS_i \in \mathbb{N}Si​∈N, one per class.

With SSS seats, a class books requests until its seats run out, so its bookings and spill (refused requests) are

b=min⁡(r,S),l=(r−S)+(Eq. (5.3)).b = \min(r, S), \qquad l = (r - S)^+ \qquad \text{(Eq. (5.3))}.b=min(r,S),l=(r−S)+(Eq. (5.3)).

The expected revenue of class iii is Rˉi(Si)=fi⋅bˉi(Si)\bar R_i(S_i) = f_i \cdot \bar b_i(S_i)Rˉi​(Si​)=fi​⋅bˉi​(Si​) with bˉi(Si)=E[min⁡(ri,Si)]\bar b_i(S_i) = E[\min(r_i,S_i)]bˉi​(Si​)=E[min(ri​,Si​)], and the leg's expected revenue is Rˉ=∑iRˉi(Si)\bar R = \sum_i \bar R_i(S_i)Rˉ=∑i​Rˉi​(Si​) (Eq. (5.9)). Write

Pˉi(S)=P[ri≥S],EMSRi(S)=fi⋅Pˉi(S)(Eqs. (5.11), (6.1), (6.2)),\bar P_i(S) = P[r_i \ge S], \qquad \mathrm{EMSR}_i(S) = f_i \cdot \bar P_i(S) \qquad \text{(Eqs. (5.11), (6.1), (6.2))},Pˉi​(S)=P[ri​≥S],EMSRi​(S)=fi​⋅Pˉi​(S)(Eqs. (5.11), (6.1), (6.2)),

the expected marginal seat revenue of the SSS-th seat of class iii. The value of the kkk-th seat of class iii in the integer program of p. 90 is mi(k)=EMSRi(k)m_i(k) = \mathrm{EMSR}_i(k)mi​(k)=EMSRi​(k), k=1,…,nk = 1, \dots, nk=1,…,n.

Formalization targets

Goal: the nnn largest marginal values give the optimal booking limits (p. 90)

Let TTT be any set of nnn pairs (i,k)(i,k)(i,k), 1≤k≤n1 \le k \le n1≤k≤n, such that every mi(k)m_i(k)mi​(k) with (i,k)∈T(i,k) \in T(i,k)∈T is at least every mj(l)m_j(l)mj​(l) with (j,l)∉T(j,l) \notin T(j,l)∈/T, and let SiT=#{k:(i,k)∈T}S^T_i = \#\{k : (i,k) \in T\}SiT​=#{k:(i,k)∈T}. Then ∑iSiT=n\sum_i S^T_i = n∑i​SiT​=n and

∑ifi E[min⁡(ri,Si)]  ≤  ∑ifi E[min⁡(ri,SiT)]for every S with ∑iSi≤n.\sum_i f_i\, E[\min(r_i, S_i)] \;\le\; \sum_i f_i\, E[\min(r_i, S^T_i)] \qquad \text{for every } S \text{ with } \textstyle\sum_i S_i \le n .i∑​fi​E[min(ri​,Si​)]≤i∑​fi​E[min(ri​,SiT​)]for every S with ∑i​Si​≤n.

The goal fixes no distribution, number of classes or fare ordering, and it holds for every tie-breaking among equal marginal values.

Milestones

  1. Eq. (5.6): bˉi(S)+lˉi(S)=rˉi\bar b_i(S) + \bar l_i(S) = \bar r_ibˉi​(S)+lˉi​(S)=rˉi​ for requests of finite mean.
  2. Eq. (5.11): Rˉi(S)−Rˉi(S−1)=fi⋅P[ri≥S]\bar R_i(S) - \bar R_i(S-1) = f_i \cdot P[r_i \ge S]Rˉi​(S)−Rˉi​(S−1)=fi​⋅P[ri​≥S] for S≥1S \ge 1S≥1.
  3. Eqs. (6.1)–(6.2): Pˉi\bar P_iPˉi​ and EMSRi\mathrm{EMSR}_iEMSRi​ are non-increasing in SSS.
  4. Eq. (4.5): the 0–1 vector equal to 111 on a set of nnn largest mi(k)m_i(k)mi​(k) is an optimal solution of the linear program max⁡∑i,kXikmi(k)\max \sum_{i,k} X_{ik} m_i(k)max∑i,k​Xik​mi​(k) subject to ∑Xik≤n\sum X_{ik} \le n∑Xik​≤n, 0≤Xik≤10 \le X_{ik} \le 10≤Xik​≤1.
  5. Eq. (5.13), discrete form: an allocation of exactly CCC seats maximises Rˉ\bar RRˉ among such allocations if and only if some λ\lambdaλ satisfies EMSRi(Si)≥λ\mathrm{EMSR}_i(S_i) \ge \lambdaEMSRi​(Si​)≥λ whenever Si≥1S_i \ge 1Si​≥1 and EMSRi(Si+1)≤λ\mathrm{EMSR}_i(S_i + 1) \le \lambdaEMSRi​(Si​+1)≤λ, for all iii.

Significance

The goal is the reason distinct-inventory allocation is computationally easy: a revenue-maximising allocation is obtained by sorting n×(number of classes)n \times (\text{number of classes})n×(number of classes) numbers, with no search over allocations. The same marginal-value principle underlies the EMSR rules for nested classes in the rest of the thesis, and the identity (5.11) is the link between an expected-revenue function and its marginal seat values used throughout revenue management. Milestone 5 is the integer form of the Lagrangian condition of Eq. (5.13); the thesis states it only for a continuous relaxation, and its equality form is generally unattainable with integer seats.

These results are classical and their proofs are elementary; to our knowledge none of them has been machine-checked. The mission produces a reusable formal model of a single-leg, distinct-inventory allocation problem with integer demand (bookings, spill, revenue and marginal values of a PMF ℕ), and checked statements of the marginal-allocation principle for it.

Difficulty

The thesis argues with continuous densities and derivatives, setting ∂Rˉ/∂Si\partial \bar R / \partial S_i∂Rˉ/∂Si​ equal across classes. That argument does not transfer to integer seats: the derivative of a step-shaped expected-revenue function does not exist, equality of marginal values across classes generally fails at every integer allocation, and the tail probability must be P[r≥S]P[r \ge S]P[r≥S] rather than the P[r>S]P[r > S]P[r>S] of Eq. (5.2) for the marginal identity to hold. The integer statements need their own exchange argument. A second subtlety is ties: "the nnn largest values" is not unique, and the goal must hold for every admissible choice, including choices in which a class's selected seat numbers are not an initial segment {1,…,Si}\{1, \dots, S_i\}{1,…,Si​}.

Formalization scope

All declarations live in the namespace SeatInventory.Distinct. Conventions:

  • Integer demand. The law of class iii's requests is d i : PMF ℕ; expectations are series over N\mathbb{N}N. The thesis's continuous densities are replaced by this discrete model, which the thesis itself requires for seat allocations (p. 103).
  • Tail convention. Pˉ(S)=P[r≥S]\bar P(S) = P[r \ge S]Pˉ(S)=P[r≥S], as in Eq. (6.2) and the prose of Eq. (5.11) ("the probability of selling SiS_iSi​ or more seats"), not the P[r>S]P[r > S]P[r>S] of Eq. (5.2).
  • Seat numbers start at 1, and the pairs (i,k)(i,k)(i,k) range over k∈{1,…,n}k \in \{1, \dots, n\}k∈{1,…,n}, as the 600 variables of a 150-seat, four-class problem on p. 90 indicate.
  • Nonnegative fares fi≥0f_i \ge 0fi​≥0 are assumed in every statement that needs them; with a negative fare the capacity constraint ∑Si≤n\sum S_i \le n∑Si​≤n would not bind and the claims fail.
  • Finite mean of the requests is assumed explicitly for Eq. (5.6); the thesis assumes it silently. Expected bookings are bounded and need no assumption.
  • Capacity. The goal and the LP compare against allocations with ∑iSi≤n\sum_i S_i \le n∑i​Si​≤n (the LP's constraint); milestone 5 compares allocations of exactly CCC seats (Eq. (5.8)).
  • No independence assumption. Expected revenue of distinct inventories depends only on each class's marginal law, so the statements take one law per class.
  • "Decreasing" is non-increasing. The thesis's justification in Sect. 6.1.1 gives only monotonicity; strict decrease fails for bounded demand.
  • LP integrality. "The solution will be integer" is stated as: the indicator of every set of nnn largest values is optimal. With ties the LP also has fractional optima.

The expected revenue in the goal is computed from the booking rule min⁡(ri,Si)\min(r_i, S_i)min(ri​,Si​); it is not defined as a sum of marginal values, and the optimal allocation is not defined as an argmax of Rˉ\bar RRˉ. Either shortcut would make the goal a tautology and is ruled out.

Needed infrastructure: tail sums of a PMF ℕ, telescoping of E[min⁡(r,S)]E[\min(r, S)]E[min(r,S)], and a finite exchange argument for sums of the nnn largest values of a function on a finite set; the last two are reusable for any separable concave resource-allocation problem. Contributions of proofs of any milestone, and of a verified sorting routine that produces a set of nnn largest values, are welcome.

Selected references

  • P. P. Belobaba, Air Travel Demand and Airline Seat Inventory Management, PhD thesis, MIT Flight Transportation Laboratory Report R87-7, 1987 (no DOI).
  • P. P. Belobaba, Airline yield management: an overview of seat inventory control, Transportation Science 21(2), 63–73, 1987. https://doi.org/10.1287/trsc.21.2.63
  • P. P. Belobaba, Application of a probabilistic decision model to airline seat inventory control, Operations Research 37(2), 183–197, 1989. https://doi.org/10.1287/opre.37.2.183
  • K. Littlewood, Forecasting and control of passenger bookings, AGIFORS Symposium Proceedings 12, 1972; reprinted in Journal of Revenue and Pricing Management 4(2), 111–123, 2005. https://doi.org/10.1057/palgrave.rpm.5170134
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Linear OptimizationOptimization·Captain: mikedeng1

Linear Programming: Foundations and Extensions I: Degeneracy and Termination of the Simplex Method under Bland's RuleTextbook

Motivation

The simplex method is the standard algorithm for linear programming, and its correctness rests on one question: does it stop? Each pivot of the method moves from one dictionary to another without decreasing the objective value, but a pivot can leave the objective unchanged. When that happens repeatedly, the method can return to a dictionary it has already visited and loop forever. This behaviour, cycling, is not hypothetical: Vanderbei's Chapter 3 exhibits a problem with four decision variables and three constraints on which the "largest coefficient" entering rule with a natural tie-breaking rule cycles through six dictionaries (Vanderbei 2014, pp. 26–27).

The chapter answers the question with two pivoting rules under which the simplex method provably terminates, and then draws the consequence that makes linear programming a finite theory: the fundamental theorem of linear programming. This mission formalizes the chapter's four numbered theorems in Vanderbei's own setting of standard-form problems with slack variables.

Timeline. Hoffman (1953) and Beale (1955) gave the first examples of cycling. The perturbation and lexicographic methods go back to Charnes (1952) and to Dantzig, Orden and Wolfe (1955). Bland (1977) introduced the smallest-index rule and proved that the simplex method terminates under it (Bland 1977).

Setting

A linear program in standard form has mmm constraints and nnn decision variables:

maximize ∑j=1ncjxjsubject to∑j=1naijxj≤bi (i=1,…,m),xj≥0 (j=1,…,n).\text{maximize } \sum_{j=1}^n c_j x_j \quad\text{subject to}\quad \sum_{j=1}^n a_{ij}x_j \le b_i\ (i=1,\dots,m),\qquad x_j \ge 0\ (j=1,\dots,n).maximize j=1∑n​cj​xj​subject toj=1∑n​aij​xj​≤bi​ (i=1,…,m),xj​≥0 (j=1,…,n).

A solution xxx is feasible if it satisfies every constraint, and optimal if in addition it maximizes the objective among feasible solutions. The problem is infeasible if no feasible solution exists, and unbounded if it has feasible solutions with arbitrarily large objective values.

The slack variables wi=bi−∑jaijxjw_i = b_i - \sum_j a_{ij}x_jwi​=bi​−∑j​aij​xj​ are appended to the list of variables as xn+i=wix_{n+i} = w_ixn+i​=wi​, so that the constraints become the linear system [A I] x=b[A\ I]\,x = b[A I]x=b with x≥0x \ge 0x≥0 in Rn+m\mathbb{R}^{n+m}Rn+m. A dictionary is given by a set B\mathcal BB of mmm basic indices whose columns of [A I][A\ I][A I] are linearly independent; the remaining indices N\mathcal NN are nonbasic. Solving for the basic variables gives

ζ=ζˉ+∑j∈Ncˉjxj,xi=bˉi−∑j∈Naˉijxj(i∈B).\zeta = \bar\zeta + \sum_{j\in\mathcal N}\bar c_j x_j,\qquad x_i = \bar b_i - \sum_{j\in\mathcal N}\bar a_{ij}x_j\quad (i\in\mathcal B).ζ=ζˉ​+j∈N∑​cˉj​xj​,xi​=bˉi​−j∈N∑​aˉij​xj​(i∈B).

The basic solution of the dictionary sets the nonbasic variables to zero. The dictionary is feasible if bˉi≥0\bar b_i \ge 0bˉi​≥0 for every i∈Bi\in\mathcal Bi∈B, and degenerate if bˉi=0\bar b_i = 0bˉi​=0 for some i∈Bi\in\mathcal Bi∈B.

The simplex method (Phase II) starts at a feasible dictionary and repeats a pivot: an entering variable xkx_kxk​ is chosen among the nonbasic variables with cˉk>0\bar c_k > 0cˉk​>0, and a leaving variable xlx_lxl​ among the basic variables with aˉlk>0\bar a_{lk} > 0aˉlk​>0 that minimize the ratio bˉl/aˉlk\bar b_l/\bar a_{lk}bˉl​/aˉlk​; then xkx_kxk​ becomes basic and xlx_lxl​ nonbasic. The method stops when no cˉj\bar c_jcˉj​ is positive (the dictionary is optimal) or when the entering column has no positive aˉik\bar a_{ik}aˉik​ (the problem is unbounded). A pivoting rule resolves the remaining choices. Bland's rule chooses both the entering and the leaving variable as the candidate with the smallest index. The lexicographic rule perturbs the right-hand sides by symbols 0<ϵm≪⋯≪ϵ1≪0<\epsilon_m\ll\dots\ll\epsilon_1\ll0<ϵm​≪⋯≪ϵ1​≪ all data and chooses the leaving variable by the perturbed ratio test.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 3.3 (termination under Bland's rule, p. 31)

From every feasible dictionary D0D_0D0​, there is no infinite sequence of pivots

D0→D1→D2→⋯D_0\to D_1\to D_2\to\cdotsD0​→D1​→D2​→⋯

in which both the entering and the leaving variable follow Bland's rule; and a finite sequence of such pivots reaches a dictionary DTD_TDT​ at which the method stops, optimal or exhibiting unboundedness.

Milestones

  • Theorem 3.1 (p. 27): if the simplex method fails to terminate, it must cycle, i.e. an infinite run visits some dictionary twice.
  • Theorem 3.2 (p. 30): the simplex method always terminates when the leaving variable is selected by the lexicographic rule.
  • Theorem 3.4 (p. 33), the fundamental theorem: (1) with no optimal solution the problem is infeasible or unbounded; (2) if a feasible solution exists, a basic feasible solution exists; (3) if an optimal solution exists, a basic optimal solution exists.

Significance

The result. Termination under Bland's rule is what turns the simplex method from a heuristic into an algorithm. Combined with Phase I, it yields the fundamental theorem of linear programming, which reduces the search for an optimum to finitely many basic solutions and underlies the duality theory of the following chapters. Bland's rule also needs no perturbation or extra bookkeeping, and it is the anticycling rule used in many correctness proofs of simplex-type and combinatorial pivoting algorithms, including oriented-matroid programming.

Formalizing it. All four theorems are classical and proved. The Prove2Me library has the lexicographic rule and a nondegenerate termination theorem in the tableau setting of Bertsimas and Tsitsiklis (equality form Ax=bAx=bAx=b, x≥0x\ge 0x≥0, full row rank), and the existence of basic feasible and optimal solutions in that form. It has no statement of Bland's theorem, and none of Vanderbei's dictionary formulation over [A I][A\ I][A I]. This mission produces a machine-checkable model of dictionaries and pivoting rules in that formulation, and targets Bland's theorem, whose proof is a genuine combinatorial argument rather than a monotonicity argument.

Difficulty

The natural argument for termination is monotonicity: each pivot increases the objective, so no dictionary repeats. It fails exactly at degenerate pivots, where the step length bˉl/aˉlk\bar b_l/\bar a_{lk}bˉl​/aˉlk​ is zero and the objective and the basic solution do not change. Bland's rule gives no potential function that strictly increases along degenerate pivots, so the proof has to reason about a hypothetical cycle as a whole: which variables enter and leave the basis within it, and how two dictionaries of the cycle, in which the same variable leaves and later enters, constrain each other's coefficients. Relating the coefficients of two different dictionaries of the same problem is the step that has no counterpart in the model's definitions and has to be developed.

For Theorem 3.2, the symbols ϵi\epsilon_iϵi​ cannot be replaced by a fixed small real number: the method treats them as formal quantities on separate scales, and the statement is about that symbolic rule.

Formalization scope

Vectors are Fin n → ℝ, Fin m → ℝ, and the constraint matrix is Matrix (Fin m) (Fin n) ℝ. The n+mn+mn+m variables are indexed by Fin (n + m) with the decision variables first and the slacks after them, which is the order x1,…,xn,xn+1=w1,…,xn+m=wmx_1,\dots,x_n,x_{n+1}=w_1,\dots,x_{n+m}=w_mx1​,…,xn​,xn+1​=w1​,…,xn+m​=wm​ that Bland's rule compares. A dictionary is a structure holding its basic set, a proof that it has mmm elements and a proof that its columns of [A I][A\ I][A I] are linearly independent; the coefficients bˉ,aˉ,cˉ,ζˉ\bar b,\bar a,\bar c,\bar\zetabˉ,aˉ,cˉ,ζˉ​ are computed as coordinates in the basis of basic columns. A dictionary is therefore determined by its basic set, as the proof of Theorem 3.1 uses. "Basic solution" is defined through such a dictionary, not as a support condition.

Termination is stated as the nonexistence of an infinite run from a feasible dictionary, for Theorems 3.2 and 3.3. The goal adds that a finite Bland run reaches a stopping dictionary, so that it cannot hold because pivots fail to exist. The lexicographic rule is encoded by lexicographic comparison of the coefficient vectors (bˉi,ri1,…,rim)/aˉik(\bar b_i, r_{i1},\dots,r_{im})/\bar a_{ik}(bˉi​,ri1​,…,rim​)/aˉik​ of the perturbed ratios; the symbol ϵp\epsilon_pϵp​ is attached in the starting dictionary to its ppp-th basic variable in increasing index order, which for the initial dictionary is the ppp-th constraint. Unboundedness in Theorem 3.4 is "for every MMM a feasible solution with objective >M>M>M", as defined on p. 7. The statements carry no explicit constants.

A formalization that stated Theorem 3.3 for arbitrary pivot sequences with pairwise distinct bases would be Theorem 3.1's counting argument, not Bland's theorem; the goal is stated for pivots that follow Bland's rule and only those.

A complete development needs: the pivot update of a dictionary and the invariance of the solution set under it, feasibility preservation by the ratio test, the relation between the objective rows of two dictionaries, and finiteness of the set of bases. These are reusable for any later formalization of simplex-type algorithms. Proofs of the milestones, alternative proofs of Theorem 3.3, and Phase I (to connect Theorem 3.4 with the algorithm) are welcome.

Selected references

  • R. J. Vanderbei, Linear Programming: Foundations and Extensions, 4th ed., International Series in Operations Research & Management Science 196, Springer, 2014, Chapter 3. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4614-7630-6
  • R. G. Bland, New finite pivoting rules for the simplex method, Mathematics of Operations Research 2(2):103–107, 1977. https://doi.org/10.1287/moor.2.2.103
  • G. B. Dantzig, A. Orden, P. Wolfe, The generalized simplex method for minimizing a linear form under linear inequality restraints, Pacific Journal of Mathematics 5(2):183–195, 1955. https://doi.org/10.2140/pjm.1955.5.183
  • E. M. L. Beale, Cycling in the dual simplex algorithm, Naval Research Logistics Quarterly 2(4):269–275, 1955. https://doi.org/10.1002/nav.3800020406
  • D. Bertsimas, J. N. Tsitsiklis, Introduction to Linear Optimization, Athena Scientific, 1997, §3.4 (lexicographic rule and Bland's rule in tableau form).
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Convex OptimizationNumerical AnalysisOptimization·Captain: mikedeng1

Minimization Methods for Non-Differentiable Functions VII: Geometric Convergence of Subgradient Methods with Space Dilation along the GradientTextbook

Motivation

The subgradient method for a nonsmooth convex function converges, but slowly: when the level sets of the objective are elongated, the subgradient is nearly orthogonal to the direction towards the minimum, and the method zigzags. For smooth functions the remedy is a change of metric (Newton and quasi-Newton methods); for nonsmooth functions no Hessian exists to supply one. N. Z. Shor's answer was to learn a metric from the subgradients themselves: after each step, stretch the space along the latest (transformed) subgradient, so that components of future subgradients parallel to it are damped. These subgradient methods with space dilation along the gradient (SDG methods) are the ancestors of Shor's r-algorithm and of the ellipsoid method, which the book (p. 49) describes as a special case of the same family and which Khachiyan later used to show that linear programming is solvable in polynomial time.

Section 3.4 of Shor's monograph (Springer 1985, translated by K. C. Kiwiel and A. Ruszczyński, doi:10.1007/978-3-642-82118-9) proves that, under a two-sided condition on the objective, a suitable SDG method decreases function values at the speed of a geometric progression whose ratio is invariant under nonsingular linear changes of variables. This mission formalizes that chain of results.

Setting

Let EnE_nEn​ be the nnn-dimensional Euclidean space with inner product (x,y)(x,y)(x,y). For a unit vector ξ\xiξ and a coefficient α≥0\alpha \ge 0α≥0, the operator of space dilation along ξ\xiξ is

Rα(ξ) x=x+(α−1)(x,ξ) ξ,R_\alpha(\xi)\,x = x + (\alpha - 1)(x,\xi)\,\xi ,Rα​(ξ)x=x+(α−1)(x,ξ)ξ,

which multiplies the component of xxx along ξ\xiξ by α\alphaα and leaves the orthogonal complement fixed.

Let f:En→Rf : E_n \to \mathbb{R}f:En​→R and let g:En→Eng : E_n \to E_ng:En​→En​ be a generalized gradient: a subgradient of fff when fff is convex, an almost-gradient when fff is almost differentiable. The SDG method starts from x0x_0x0​ and a nonsingular operator B0=A0−1B_0 = A_0^{-1}B0​=A0−1​. At step k=0,1,…k = 0, 1, \dotsk=0,1,…: if g(xk)=0g(x_k) = 0g(xk​)=0 it stops; otherwise it forms the transformed gradient g~k=Bk∗g(xk)\tilde g_k = B_k^* g(x_k)g~​k​=Bk∗​g(xk​), the direction ξk+1=g~k/∥g~k∥\xi_{k+1} = \tilde g_k/\|\tilde g_k\|ξk+1​=g~​k​/∥g~​k​∥, and

xk+1=xk−hk+1Bkξk+1,Bk+1=BkR1/αk+1(ξk+1),Ak+1=Rαk+1(ξk+1)Ak,x_{k+1} = x_k - h_{k+1} B_k \xi_{k+1}, \qquad B_{k+1} = B_k R_{1/\alpha_{k+1}}(\xi_{k+1}), \qquad A_{k+1} = R_{\alpha_{k+1}}(\xi_{k+1}) A_k ,xk+1​=xk​−hk+1​Bk​ξk+1​,Bk+1​=Bk​R1/αk+1​​(ξk+1​),Ak+1​=Rαk+1​​(ξk+1​)Ak​,

with a stepsize hk+1h_{k+1}hk+1​ and a dilation coefficient αk+1\alpha_{k+1}αk+1​. So AkA_kAk​ is the accumulated space transformation, Bk=Ak−1B_k = A_k^{-1}Bk​=Ak−1​, and each step is a subgradient step for φk(y)=f(Bky)\varphi_k(y) = f(B_k y)φk​(y)=f(Bk​y) in the variables y=Akxy = A_k xy=Ak​x.

The quantitative results assume, for a point x∗x^*x∗ and the ball Sd={x:∥x−x∗∥≤d}S_d = \{x : \|x - x^*\| \le d\}Sd​={x:∥x−x∗∥≤d}, the two-sided condition

N [f(x)−f(x∗)]≤(g(x), x−x∗)≤M [f(x)−f(x∗)],x∈Sd,M>N>0.(3.18)N\,[f(x) - f(x^*)] \le (g(x),\, x - x^*) \le M\,[f(x) - f(x^*)], \qquad x \in S_d, \quad M > N > 0. \qquad (3.18)N[f(x)−f(x∗)]≤(g(x),x−x∗)≤M[f(x)−f(x∗)],x∈Sd​,M>N>0.(3.18)

For a convex function the lower inequality holds with N=1N = 1N=1; the upper one bounds how far fff is from a positively homogeneous function around x∗x^*x∗.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 3.4

Under (3.18), with B0=IB_0 = IB0​=I, x0∈Sdx_0 \in S_dx0​∈Sd​, stepsizes hk+1=2MNM+Nf(xk)−f(x∗)∥g~k∥h_{k+1} = \frac{2MN}{M+N}\frac{f(x_k)-f(x^*)}{\|\tilde g_k\|}hk+1​=M+N2MN​∥g~​k​∥f(xk​)−f(x∗)​, a constant coefficient 1<α≤M+NM−N1 < \alpha \le \frac{M+N}{M-N}1<α≤M−NM+N​, and GGG a bound for ∥g∥\|g\|∥g∥ on SdS_dSd​: there are c>0c > 0c>0 and indices k1<k2<⋯k_1 < k_2 < \cdotsk1​<k2​<⋯ with

f(xkp)−f(x∗)≤c α−kp/n,f(x_{k_p}) - f(x^*) \le c\,\alpha^{-k_p/n},f(xkp​​)−f(x∗)≤cα−kp​/n,

and for every k≥1k \ge 1k≥1

min⁡0≤i≤k−1 [f(xi)−f(x∗)]≤Gk(α2−1) dNα2k/n−1.\min_{0 \le i \le k-1}\,[f(x_i) - f(x^*)] \le \frac{G\sqrt{k(\alpha^2-1)}\,d}{N\sqrt{\alpha^{2k/n}-1}} .0≤i≤k−1min​[f(xi​)−f(x∗)]≤Nα2k/n−1​Gk(α2−1)​d​.

Milestones

  1. Eq. (3.4): ∥Rα(ξ)x∥=∥x∥2+(α2−1)(x,ξ)2\|R_\alpha(\xi)x\| = \sqrt{\|x\|^2 + (\alpha^2-1)(x,\xi)^2}∥Rα​(ξ)x∥=∥x∥2+(α2−1)(x,ξ)2​.
  2. Theorem 3.1: if ∥g(xk)∥≤d\|g(x_k)\| \le d∥g(xk​)∥≤d and 1+δ≤αk≤α∗1+\delta \le \alpha_k \le \alpha^*1+δ≤αk​≤α∗, then ∥g~kp∥<c (∏j≤kpαj)−1/n\|\tilde g_{k_p}\| < c\,(\prod_{j\le k_p}\alpha_j)^{-1/n}∥g~​kp​​∥<c(∏j≤kp​​αj​)−1/n along a subsequence.
  3. Theorem 3.2: for constant α>1\alpha > 1α>1 and B0=IB_0 = IB0​=I, min⁡0≤r≤k−1∥g~r∥≤dk(α2−1)/α2k/n−1\min_{0\le r\le k-1}\|\tilde g_r\| \le d\sqrt{k(\alpha^2-1)}/\sqrt{\alpha^{2k/n}-1}min0≤r≤k−1​∥g~​r​∥≤dk(α2−1)​/α2k/n−1​.
  4. Theorem 3.3: under (3.18) and the rules above, ∥Ak(xk−x∗)∥≤d\|A_k(x_k - x^*)\| \le d∥Ak​(xk​−x∗)∥≤d for all kkk.

Significance

The result shows that one fixed rule, depending only on MMM, NNN and nnn, yields linear convergence of function values for every objective satisfying (3.18), at a ratio α−1/n\alpha^{-1/n}α−1/n that does not deteriorate when the problem is badly scaled: the method, and hence its rate, is invariant under nonsingular linear changes of variables. This is the property the ellipsoid method inherits (Section 3.8 of the book), and the same space-dilation machinery drives the r-algorithm (Section 3.7), still used for large nonsmooth problems such as Lagrangian duals of integer programs.

The theorems are proved in the book; none of them, and no space-dilation method, has a machine-checked proof to our knowledge, and the platform has no statement about variable-metric subgradient methods. The mission provides a reusable formal model of the SDG iteration, the eigenvalue-growth arguments behind Theorems 3.1–3.2, and the one-step invariant of Theorem 3.3. The formalization also corrects two points of the printed text (see Formalization scope).

Difficulty

Theorem 3.3 is a one-step computation, but Theorems 3.1 and 3.2 are not: they relate the size of the transformed gradients to the growth of the singular values of AkA_kAk​, whose determinant is ∏jαj\prod_j \alpha_j∏j​αj​. A bound on ∥g~k∥\|\tilde g_k\|∥g~​k​∥ at a single step says nothing, since the dilations can concentrate in few directions; the argument has to control the largest singular value of AkA_kAk​ over many steps against the geometric-mean lower bound (det⁡Ak)1/n(\det A_k)^{1/n}(detAk​)1/n. The dimension nnn enters the rate exactly through this comparison. Theorem 3.4 then needs the invariant of Theorem 3.3 to keep every iterate inside SdS_dSd​, where (3.18) and the bound GGG are available.

Formalization scope

  • EnE_nEn​ is EuclideanSpace ℝ (Fin n) with n≥1n \ge 1n≥1 in the rate statements. Operators are continuous linear maps; B0B_0B0​ is a continuous linear equivalence and A0A_0A0​ its inverse. The state (xk,Bk,Ak)(x_k, B_k, A_k)(xk​,Bk​,Ak​) is produced by a defined recursion sdg, not assumed; g~k\tilde g_kg~​k​ is gTilde.
  • The stepsize rule receives the index, the current point and g~k\tilde g_kg~​k​; the dilation coefficient at step kkk is α (k+1). When g(xk)=0g(x_k) = 0g(xk​)=0 the state is repeated, which encodes the book's stop; no division by zero is used.
  • The book states Theorems 3.1–3.4 for almost differentiable fff with ggg an almost-gradient; the proofs use only the bounds on ∥g∥\|g\|∥g∥ and (3.18), so the Lean statements quantify over every map ggg with those properties. GGG is any bound for ∥g∥\|g\|∥g∥ on SdS_dSd​ in place of the maximum.
  • Theorems 3.2–3.4 take B0=IB_0 = IB0​=I, as their proofs do; Theorem 3.1 allows any nonsingular B0B_0B0​.
  • Two corrections to the printed statements, both following the proofs: Theorem 3.4's record bound carries the factor 1/N1/N1/N that the proof derives, and the record minima in Theorems 3.2 and 3.4 range over the indices 0,…,k−10, \dots, k-10,…,k−1 that the proof controls, rather than 1,…,k1, \dots, k1,…,k.
  • Constants ccc and subsequences are existential and chosen after the data of the run, before the index ppp. A statement placing ccc after ppp, or dropping (3.18) on SdS_dSd​, would be trivially true or false and is ruled out.

Useful infrastructure, reusable for the r-algorithm and ellipsoid chapters: identities for Rα(ξ)R_\alpha(\xi)Rα​(ξ), determinants and singular values of products of rank-one dilations, and the invariance of the SDG iteration under a linear change of variables. Proofs of any milestone, and alternative arguments for Theorem 3.1, are welcome.

Selected references

  • N. Z. Shor, Minimization Methods for Non-Differentiable Functions, Springer Series in Computational Mathematics 3, Springer, 1985, §§3.2–3.4, pp. 49–62 (translated by K. C. Kiwiel and A. Ruszczyński). https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-82118-9
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Dynamic ProgrammingProbabilityStochastic Systems·Captain: mikedeng1

Stochastic Dynamic Programming and the Control of Queueing Systems III: Approximating Sequences for the Discounted Cost CriterionTextbook

Motivation

Optimal control of queueing systems leads to Markov decision problems whose state space is countably infinite (buffer contents, numbers of customers) and whose costs are unbounded (holding costs grow with the queue). Such a problem cannot be solved on a computer as it stands. The standard remedy is to truncate: solve a finite problem on the states {0,1,…,N}\{0,1,\dots,N\}{0,1,…,N} and hope that its value and its optimal policy approximate those of the original problem as NNN grows. Linn Sennott's approximating sequence method (ASM) makes this hope precise. For the expected discounted cost criterion, Sections 4.6–4.7 of Sennott's book (Stochastic Dynamic Programming and the Control of Queueing Systems, Wiley, 1999) identify a single condition, Assumption DC(α\alphaα), that is necessary and sufficient for convergence of the truncated values, and give checkable sufficient conditions for it.

The method matters because naive truncation can fail. The book's Example 4.6.1 has a chain whose value at state 000 is finite, yet a natural truncation produces values VαN(0)≥αN2/((1−α)[N(1−α)+α])→∞V^N_\alpha(0)\ge \alpha N^2/((1-\alpha)[N(1-\alpha)+\alpha])\to\inftyVαN​(0)≥αN2/((1−α)[N(1−α)+α])→∞. How the probability that would leave the truncated set is redistributed decides whether the computation is meaningful.

Earlier truncation schemes (Fox 1971; White 1980, 1982; Hernández-Lerma 1986; Cavazos-Cadena 1986; Whitt 1978–79; see the bibliographic notes on p. 81 of the book and Puterman 1994) require bounded rewards or pass directly to an algorithm. The ASM instead produces a sequence of finite Markov decision chains that can be studied in their own right; the material of Sections 4.6–4.7 is presented in the book as new.

Setting

A Markov decision chain (MDC) Δ\DeltaΔ has a countable state space SSS; for each state iii a finite nonempty action set AiA_iAi​; nonnegative finite costs C(i,a)C(i,a)C(i,a); and transition probabilities Pij(a)P_{ij}(a)Pij​(a) with ∑jPij(a)=1\sum_j P_{ij}(a)=1∑j​Pij​(a)=1. A policy θ\thetaθ chooses the action at time ttt at random from a distribution θ(⋅∣ht)\theta(\cdot\mid h_t)θ(⋅∣ht​) on AitA_{i_t}Ait​​ that may depend on the entire history ht=(i0,a0,…,it−1,at−1,it)h_t=(i_0,a_0,\dots,i_{t-1},a_{t-1},i_t)ht​=(i0​,a0​,…,it−1​,at−1​,it​). A stationary policy fff always chooses f(i)∈Aif(i)\in A_if(i)∈Ai​ in state iii. Fix a discount factor α∈(0,1)\alpha\in(0,1)α∈(0,1). The discounted cost of θ\thetaθ and the discounted value function are

Vθ,α(i)=∑t≥0αtEθ[C(Xt,At)∣X0=i],Vα(i)=inf⁡θVθ,α(i),V_{\theta,\alpha}(i)=\sum_{t\ge0}\alpha^tE_\theta[C(X_t,A_t)\mid X_0=i],\qquad V_\alpha(i)=\inf_\theta V_{\theta,\alpha}(i),Vθ,α​(i)=t≥0∑​αtEθ​[C(Xt​,At​)∣X0​=i],Vα​(i)=θinf​Vθ,α​(i),

both in [0,∞][0,\infty][0,∞], the infimum over all policies. A policy is discount optimal if Vθ,α=VαV_{\theta,\alpha}=V_\alphaVθ,α​=Vα​.

An approximating sequence (ΔN)N≥N0(\Delta_N)_{N\ge N_0}(ΔN​)N≥N0​​ consists of finite nonempty sets SNS_NSN​ increasing to SSS and, for i∈SNi\in S_Ni∈SN​ and a∈Aia\in A_ia∈Ai​, probability distributions Pij(a;N)P_{ij}(a;N)Pij​(a;N) on SNS_NSN​ with Pij(a;N)→Pij(a)P_{ij}(a;N)\to P_{ij}(a)Pij​(a;N)→Pij​(a) as N→∞N\to\inftyN→∞. The finite MDC ΔN\Delta_NΔN​ has state space SNS_NSN​ and the same actions and costs; VαNV^N_\alphaVαN​ is its value function and fαNf^N_\alphafαN​ a stationary policy attaining the minimum in its discount optimality equation

VαN(i)=min⁡a∈Ai{C(i,a)+α∑j∈SNPij(a;N)VαN(j)},i∈SN.V^N_\alpha(i)=\min_{a\in A_i}\Big\{C(i,a)+\alpha\sum_{j\in S_N}P_{ij}(a;N)V^N_\alpha(j)\Big\},\qquad i\in S_N.VαN​(i)=a∈Ai​min​{C(i,a)+αj∈SN​∑​Pij​(a;N)VαN​(j)},i∈SN​.

An augmentation type approximating sequence (ATAS) keeps the original probabilities inside SNS_NSN​ and redistributes the excess probability Pir(a)P_{ir}(a)Pir​(a), r∉SNr\notin S_Nr∈/SN​, according to augmentation distributions qj(i,a,r,N)q_j(i,a,r,N)qj​(i,a,r,N) on SNS_NSN​: Pij(a;N)=Pij(a)+∑r∉SNPir(a)qj(i,a,r,N)P_{ij}(a;N)=P_{ij}(a)+\sum_{r\notin S_N}P_{ir}(a)q_j(i,a,r,N)Pij​(a;N)=Pij​(a)+∑r∈/SN​​Pir​(a)qj​(i,a,r,N).

Assumption DC(α\alphaα): for every i∈Si\in Si∈S, Wα(i):=lim sup⁡NVαN(i)<∞W_\alpha(i):=\limsup_{N}V^N_\alpha(i)<\inftyWα​(i):=limsupN​VαN​(i)<∞ and Wα(i)≤Vα(i)W_\alpha(i)\le V_\alpha(i)Wα​(i)≤Vα​(i).

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 4.6.3

The following are equivalent:

(i) lim⁡N→∞VαN(i)=Vα(i)<∞  (i∈S);(ii) Assumption DC(α).\text{(i)}\ \lim_{N\to\infty}V^N_\alpha(i)=V_\alpha(i)<\infty\ \ (i\in S);\qquad \text{(ii)}\ \text{Assumption DC}(\alpha).(i) N→∞lim​VαN​(i)=Vα​(i)<∞  (i∈S);(ii) Assumption DC(α).

Under either, every limit point of (fαN)N≥N0(f^N_\alpha)_{N\ge N_0}(fαN​)N≥N0​​ (a stationary fff with fNr(i)=f(i)f^{N_r}(i)=f(i)fNr​(i)=f(i) eventually along a subsequence, for each iii) is discount optimal for Δ\DeltaΔ.

Milestones

  • Lemma 4.6.2: lim inf⁡NVαN≥Vα\liminf_N V^N_\alpha\ge V_\alphaliminfN​VαN​≥Vα​ for every approximating sequence.
  • Proposition 4.7.1: bounded costs imply DC(α\alphaα).
  • Lemma 4.7.2: taboo probabilities of avoiding S−SNS-S_NS−SN​ converge to the ttt-step transition probabilities.
  • Lemma 4.7.3: for the first passage time Ti(N)T_i(N)Ti​(N) out of SNS_NSN​ under a stationary policy, E[αTi(N)]→0E[\alpha^{T_i(N)}]\to0E[αTi​(N)]→0.
  • Proposition 4.7.4: if Vα<∞V_\alpha<\inftyVα​<∞ and the ATAS sends excess probability to a finite set, DC(α\alphaα) holds.
  • Corollary 4.7.5: the case of a single distinguished state zzz, with the relative form of the optimality equation for ΔN\Delta_NΔN​.
  • Proposition 4.7.6: if Vα<∞V_\alpha<\inftyVα​<∞ and the augmentation distributions satisfy ∑j∈SNqj(i,a,r,N)vα,n(j)≤vα,n(r)\sum_{j\in S_N}q_j(i,a,r,N)v_{\alpha,n}(j)\le v_{\alpha,n}(r)∑j∈SN​​qj​(i,a,r,N)vα,n​(j)≤vα,n​(r) for all n≥0n\ge0n≥0, then VαN≤VαV^N_\alpha\le V_\alphaVαN​≤Vα​ on SNS_NSN​.

Significance

Theorem 4.6.3 turns the question "does truncation work?" into the verification of one inequality between a lim sup and the true value, and it delivers both the value and an optimal stationary policy from finite computations. Propositions 4.7.4–4.7.6 give conditions that hold in the queueing models of the book with unbounded holding costs, and Corollary 4.7.5 supplies the computational form used for the inventory model of Chapter 5. The discounted theory is also the stepping stone to the average cost ASM of Chapter 8, which is built on discounted approximations.

All results are proved in the book. None of them is formalized: the platform has no statement about approximating sequences or state truncation of countable-state MDPs, and Mathlib has no Markov decision processes. The mission produces machine-checked versions of the convergence theorem and its sufficient conditions, for general history-dependent randomized policies and [0,∞][0,\infty][0,∞]-valued costs.

Difficulty

The value functions are infima over uncountably many history-dependent policies and may be infinite, so no contraction argument applies: costs are unbounded and VαV_\alphaVα​ is only the minimal nonnegative solution of its optimality equation. Passing to the limit in NNN inside ∑j∈SNPij(a;N)VαN(j)\sum_{j\in S_N}P_{ij}(a;N)V^N_\alpha(j)∑j∈SN​​Pij​(a;N)VαN​(j) is an interchange of limit and infinite sum under a moving probability measure, with no dominating function in general; Example 4.6.1 shows that the interchange genuinely fails. The upper bound of Proposition 4.7.4 requires comparing ΔN\Delta_NΔN​ with Δ\DeltaΔ along a coupled first passage out of SNS_NSN​, which needs the taboo-probability estimates of Lemmas 4.7.2–4.7.3. The obvious idea of bounding VαNV^N_\alphaVαN​ by sup⁡C/(1−α)\sup C/(1-\alpha)supC/(1−α) works only for bounded costs (Proposition 4.7.1).

Formalization scope

The state type S is countable ([Countable S]); actions live in a type Act, with a finite nonempty Finset of admissible actions per state. Costs are ℝ≥0, transition probabilities and all value functions are ℝ≥0∞, so infima over policies are lattice infima and +∞+\infty+∞ is a legitimate value. A general policy is a function of the history, encoded as the list of past state–action pairs (most recent first) and the current state; the expected cost at time ttt is the [0,∞][0,\infty][0,∞]-valued sum over histories. VαV_\alphaVα​ is the infimum over all such policies; a stationary policy enters as the policy putting mass one on f(i)f(i)f(i). The discount factor is α : ℝ≥0 with 0<α<10<\alpha<10<α<1 (the chapter's standing assumption). ΔN\Delta_NΔN​ is an MDC on the subtype SNS_NSN​; VαN(i)V^N_\alpha(i)VαN​(i) is extended by 000 when N<N0N<N_0N<N0​ or i∉SNi\notin S_Ni∈/SN​, a convention that affects finitely many NNN for each fixed iii and hence no limit in NNN. Limits, lim sups and lim infs are along Filter.atTop in ℝ≥0∞. Taboo probabilities and the first passage quantity E[αT]=∑n≥1αnP(T=n)E[\alpha^{T}]=\sum_{n\ge1}\alpha^nP(T=n)E[αT]=∑n≥1​αnP(T=n) (so α∞=0\alpha^\infty=0α∞=0) are defined combinatorially from the transition probabilities.

A trivializing formalization is ruled out: VαV_\alphaVα​ is not an infimum over stationary policies only (which would make optimality of limit points close to definitional), DC(α\alphaα) keeps both of its conditions, and statement (i) of the goal includes finiteness of VαV_\alphaVα​.

A complete development needs the minimality of VαV_\alphaVα​ among nonnegative solutions of the discount optimality equation (Theorem 4.1.4, chunk II of this series), Fatou-type lemmas for sums against converging distributions (Appendix A, chunk XI), and compactness of stationary policies (Proposition B.5). Contributions of these as reusable lemmas about countable-state MDCs are welcome.

Selected references

  • L. I. Sennott, Stochastic Dynamic Programming and the Control of Queueing Systems, Wiley, 1999, Sections 4.6–4.7, pp. 73–81. https://doi.org/10.1002/9780470317037
  • M. L. Puterman, Markov Decision Processes: Discrete Stochastic Dynamic Programming, Wiley, 1994. https://doi.org/10.1002/9780470316887
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Algorithmic Game TheoryCombinatorics·Captain: mikedeng1

Theory of Games and Economic Behavior IX: Solutions for Acyclic RelationsTextbook

Motivation

The solution concept of von Neumann and Morgenstern's Theory of Games and Economic Behavior (1944) is defined from two ingredients: a set of imputations and a domination relation between them. A solution is a set of imputations that is internally stable (no member dominates another) and externally stable (every non-member is dominated by some member). In §65 of the book the authors observe that this definition never uses what imputations and domination actually are. They abstract it to an arbitrary set DDD and an arbitrary relation S\mathcal SS on DDD, and ask which properties of S\mathcal SS guarantee that exactly one solution exists.

The abstract notion is what graph theory now calls a kernel of a directed graph: draw an arc x→yx \to yx→y whenever xSyx\mathcal S yxSy; a solution is a set of vertices that is independent and absorbs every vertex outside it. Kernels appear in combinatorial game theory (the losing positions of a finite impartial game form a kernel of its move graph) and in the theory of preference and choice.

Timeline.

  • 1944 (1st ed.; 3rd ed. 1953, reprinted 2007): von Neumann and Morgenstern define solutions for an arbitrary relation (§65), show that a finite set with an acyclic relation has exactly one solution (65:X), and that acyclicity is necessary for every subset to have a unique solution (65:Z).
  • 1953: M. Richardson, Solutions of irreflexive relations, extends existence (not uniqueness) to finite relations without cycles of odd length.

Setting

Let DDD be an arbitrary set and S\mathcal SS an arbitrary relation on DDD; xSyx\mathcal S yxSy is read "xxx dominates yyy". A solution (in DDD for S\mathcal SS) is a set V⊆DV \subseteq DV⊆D with

(65:1)V={ y∈D:xSy holds for no x∈V }.\text{(65:1)}\qquad V = \{\, y \in D : x\mathcal S y \text{ holds for no } x \in V \,\}.(65:1)V={y∈D:xSy holds for no x∈V}.

For E⊆DE \subseteq DE⊆D, an element xxx is a maximum of EEE if x∈Ex \in Ex∈E and no y∈Ey \in Ey∈E has ySxy\mathcal S xySx; the set of maxima is EmE^mEm.

For m≥1m \ge 1m≥1, condition (Am)(A_m)(Am​) says: never x1Sx0,x2Sx1,…,xmSxm−1x_1\mathcal S x_0, x_2\mathcal S x_1, \dots, x_m\mathcal S x_{m-1}x1​Sx0​,x2​Sx1​,…,xm​Sxm−1​ with x0=xmx_0 = x_mx0​=xm​ and all xi∈Dx_i \in Dxi​∈D. The relation is acyclic if it satisfies every (Am)(A_m)(Am​), m=1,2,…m = 1, 2, \dotsm=1,2,…; in particular never xSxx\mathcal S xxSx. It is strictly acyclic if there is no infinite sequence x0,x1,x2,…x_0, x_1, x_2, \dotsx0​,x1​,x2​,… in DDD with xi+1Sxix_{i+1}\mathcal S x_ixi+1​Sxi​ for every iii. Property (65:K) says that every non-empty E⊆DE \subseteq DE⊆D has Em≠⊖E^m \ne \ominusEm=⊖. A partial ordering (65:B) is a transitive relation for which at most one of x=yx = yx=y, xSyx\mathcal S yxSy, ySxy\mathcal S xySx holds.

For the main theorem the book constructs a candidate solution by induction (65.7.1): A1=DA_1 = DA1​=D; Bi=AimB_i = A_i^mBi​=Aim​; CiC_iCi​ is the set of elements of AiA_iAi​ dominated by some element of BiB_iBi​; Ai+1=Ai−Bi−CiA_{i+1} = A_i - B_i - C_iAi+1​=Ai​−Bi​−Ci​. With i0i_0i0​ the first index for which Ai0=⊖A_{i_0} = \ominusAi0​​=⊖,

(65:2)V0=B1∪⋯∪Bi0−1.\text{(65:2)}\qquad V_0 = B_1 \cup \cdots \cup B_{i_0 - 1}.(65:2)V0​=B1​∪⋯∪Bi0​−1​.

In Lean the elements live in a type α, D V : Set α, and S : α → α → Prop with S x y meaning xSyx\mathcal S yxSy; the predicates are IsSolution D S V, maxima E S, IsAcyclic, IsStrictlyAcyclic, HasMaximaProperty, IsPartialOrdering, ConditionG, and the construction stageA, stageB, stageC, V0.

Formalization targets

Goal: (65:X)

If DDD is finite and S\mathcal SS is acyclic on DDD, then

∃! V: V is a solution in D for S,andV is a solution  ⟺  V=V0.\exists!\, V:\ V \text{ is a solution in } D \text{ for } \mathcal S, \qquad\text{and}\qquad V \text{ is a solution} \iff V = V_0 .∃!V: V is a solution in D for S,andV is a solution⟺V=V0​.

Milestones, in attack order

  1. (65:I) For a partial ordering, a finite DDD satisfies (65:G): every non-maximal yyy is dominated by some maximum.
  2. (65:H) For a partial ordering of an arbitrary DDD: VVV is a solution   ⟺  \iff⟺ (65:G) holds and V=DmV = D^mV=Dm.
  3. (65:O:c) Strict acyclicity implies acyclicity; for finite DDD the two are equivalent.
  4. (65:P) (65:K)   ⟺  \iff⟺ strict acyclicity, for arbitrary DDD.
  5. (65:S) For finite DDD and acyclic S\mathcal SS, some AiA_iAi​ is empty.
  6. (65:V) For finite DDD and acyclic S\mathcal SS, every solution equals V0V_0V0​.
  7. (65:W) For finite DDD and acyclic S\mathcal SS, V0V_0V0​ is a solution.
  8. (65:Z) If every E⊆DE \subseteq DE⊆D has a unique solution in EEE for S\mathcal SS, then S\mathcal SS is acyclic on DDD.

Significance

The result itself. (65:X) is the most general of the book's three existence-and-uniqueness theorems for solutions (complete ordering, partial ordering, acyclic relation; 65.8.1). For games proper it has no direct application: the set of imputations of an essential game has no maxima, so (65:K) fails (65.9.1). Its role is to isolate a sufficient condition for a unique solution. With (65:Z), and applied to every subset of DDD, it characterizes the finite relations for which every subset has exactly one solution: exactly the acyclic ones (65.8.2). In graph language it is the statement that a finite directed acyclic graph has exactly one kernel. In combinatorial game theory this is the partition of the positions of a finite impartial game into P- and N-positions. The complete- and partial-ordering results (65:E)–(65:I) are the special cases the book treats first.

Formalizing it. The results are classical and fully proved in the book; to the best of our knowledge none of them is on the Prove2Me platform, and Mathlib has well-foundedness (WellFounded, RelEmbedding of ℕ) but no kernel or von Neumann–Morgenstern solution notion for an abstract relation. The mission produces machine-checked proofs of the book's §65 chain: the equivalence of (65:K) with strict acyclicity for arbitrary sets, the finite equivalence of acyclicity and strict acyclicity, the explicit construction of V0V_0V0​, and the characterization of 65.8.2.

Difficulty

Most of the individual steps are short. The work is in making the book's finite induction precise. The sets AiA_iAi​ are defined recursively and V0V_0V0​ refers to the first empty stage i0i_0i0​. The uniqueness proof (65:V) is a minimal-counterexample argument over the stage index, which moves between "smallest kkk with y∉Aky \notin A_ky∈/Ak​" and the disjoint decomposition (65:U) of DDD into the BiB_iBi​ and CiC_iCi​. A tempting shortcut, taking an arbitrary well-founded rank function instead of the book's construction, proves existence and uniqueness but not that the solution is the V0V_0V0​ of (65:2), which is part of the goal. For (65:P) and (65:O:c) the difficulty is the passage between finite cycles and infinite chains. Going from a chain in a finite set to a repetition needs a pigeonhole argument, and going from a set without maxima to a chain needs dependent choice.

Formalization scope

  • Representation. An ambient type α; D, E, V are Set α; the relation is S : α → α → Prop and is only ever consulted on elements of the set under consideration, so it is the book's relation on DDD (or its restriction to EEE). Finite and infinite sequences are functions ℕ → α.
  • Solutions. IsSolution D S V is the set equation (65:1) literally; it forces V⊆DV \subseteq DV⊆D. Uniqueness in the goal is ∃! over all V : Set α, not over a subtype; there is no degenerate reading in which the solution is fixed by construction.
  • Acyclicity. IsAcyclic D S requires (Am)(A_m)(Am​) for every m≥1m \ge 1m≥1, all cycle elements in DDD. The case m=0m = 0m=0 is excluded, as in the book (it would be unsatisfiable). This is equivalent to the absence of a Relation.TransGen loop inside DDD, but the book's form is stated.
  • Construction. Stages are indexed from 000: stageA D S k is the book's Ak+1A_{k+1}Ak+1​. V0 D S is the union of all BiB_iBi​, which equals B1∪⋯∪Bi0−1B_1 \cup \cdots \cup B_{i_0 - 1}B1​∪⋯∪Bi0​−1​ because every later BiB_iBi​ is empty.
  • Standing hypotheses instantiated. (65:S), (65:V), (65:W) and the goal (65:X) carry the hypotheses of 65.7.1, "DDD finite and S\mathcal SS acyclic" (for finite DDD equivalently strictly acyclic, i.e. (65:K)), as D.Finite and IsAcyclic D S. (65:H) and (65:I) carry the partial-ordering hypothesis (65:B:a), (65:B:b) of 65.5.1, and (65:I) also finiteness of DDD. (65:O:c), (65:P) and (65:Z) are for arbitrary DDD and S\mathcal SS, as 65.6.2 and 65.8.2 state. The empty DDD is allowed everywhere; there the unique solution is ⊖\ominus⊖.
  • Not stated. The infinite case of (65:X) and of (65:Y), which the book leaves open (65.7.1, 65.8.3, question (65:9)); the complete-ordering results (65:E), (65:F), which silently assume D≠⊖D \neq \ominusD=⊖; the counting statement (65:8).
  • Needed infrastructure. Finite-set induction and pigeonhole on Set.Finite, dependent choice for (65:P). The definitions are reusable for any later work on kernels of digraphs and on abstract stable sets. Proofs of any milestone, and alternative proofs of the goal, are welcome.

Selected references

  • J. von Neumann and O. Morgenstern, Theory of Games and Economic Behavior, 60th-anniversary edition, Princeton University Press, 2007 (reprint of the 3rd ed., 1953), §65, pp. 587–602. https://doi.org/10.1515/9781400829460
  • M. Richardson, Solutions of irreflexive relations, Annals of Mathematics 58 (1953), 573–590. https://doi.org/10.2307/1969755
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Algorithmic Game Theory·Captain: mikedeng1

Theory of Games and Economic Behavior VIII: Characteristic Functions of General n-Person GamesTextbook

Motivation

The theory of Theory of Games and Economic Behavior (von Neumann and Morgenstern, 1944; 3rd ed. 1953) rests on one object: the characteristic function v(S)v(S)v(S), the amount a coalition SSS of players can secure for itself whatever the other players do. For zero-sum nnn-person games, Chapter VI defines v(S)v(S)v(S) and proves (25.3.1 and 26.1.1) that the set functions arising this way are exactly those with v(∅)=0v(\emptyset)=0v(∅)=0, v(−S)=−v(S)v(-S)=-v(S)v(−S)=−v(S) and superadditivity. Economic applications, however, are rarely zero-sum: exchange and production create value. Chapter XI extends the theory to general (non-zero-sum) games by adding a fictitious player who absorbs the total gain, and §57 answers the question that decides the scope of this extension: which set functions are characteristic functions of general games?

The answer, that these are exactly the superadditive set functions vanishing on the empty set, is the reason why the cooperative game theory that followed could take "a superadditive vvv with v(∅)=0v(\emptyset)=0v(∅)=0" as its primitive object, usually without any underlying strategic game.

Setting

A general nnn-person game Γ\GammaΓ in normalized form has players I={1,…,n}I=\{1,\dots,n\}I={1,…,n}. Player kkk chooses τk∈{1,…,βk}\tau_k\in\{1,\dots,\beta_k\}τk​∈{1,…,βk​} with βk≥1\beta_k\ge 1βk​≥1, without knowing the choices of the others, and receives the real amount Hk(τ1,…,τn)\mathcal H_k(\tau_1,\dots,\tau_n)Hk​(τ1​,…,τn​). No condition is imposed on ∑kHk\sum_k\mathcal H_k∑k​Hk​. The game is zero-sum if ∑k=1nHk≡0\sum_{k=1}^n\mathcal H_k\equiv 0∑k=1n​Hk​≡0.

The zero-sum extension Γ‾\overline\GammaΓ (56.2.2) adds a fictitious player n+1n+1n+1, who has no move and receives

Hn+1(τ1,…,τn)=−∑k=1nHk(τ1,…,τn).\mathcal H_{n+1}(\tau_1,\dots,\tau_n)=-\sum_{k=1}^n\mathcal H_k(\tau_1,\dots,\tau_n).Hn+1​(τ1​,…,τn​)=−k=1∑n​Hk​(τ1​,…,τn​).

Write I‾={1,…,n,n+1}\overline I=\{1,\dots,n,n+1\}I={1,…,n,n+1}. For S⊆I‾S\subseteq\overline IS⊆I, the coalition SSS and its complement ⊥S=I‾−S\bot S=\overline I-S⊥S=I−S play a zero-sum two-person game. The pure strategies of SSS are the tuples of choices of its real members. A mixed strategy ξ\xiξ of SSS is a single probability distribution over these tuples, so the members of a coalition randomize jointly, and likewise η\etaη for ⊥S\bot S⊥S. The payoff to SSS is ∑k∈SHk\sum_{k\in S}\mathcal H_k∑k∈S​Hk​. Then

v(S)=max⁡ξmin⁡ηK(ξ,η),v(S)=\max_\xi\min_\eta K(\xi,\eta),v(S)=ξmax​ηmin​K(ξ,η),

where KKK is the expected payoff to SSS. The function vvv on all S⊆I‾S\subseteq\overline IS⊆I is the extended characteristic function; its restriction to S⊆IS\subseteq IS⊆I is the restricted characteristic function (57.1). For a zero-sum game the restricted function is the characteristic function of Chapter VI.

Formalization targets

Goal: 57.3.4

For every nnn and every set function vvv on the subsets of III,

v is the restricted characteristic function of some general game  ⟺  v(∅)=0 and v(S∪T)≥v(S)+v(T) for S∩T=∅,v \text{ is the restricted characteristic function of some general game} \iff v(\emptyset)=0 \text{ and } v(S\cup T)\ge v(S)+v(T) \text{ for } S\cap T=\emptyset,v is the restricted characteristic function of some general game⟺v(∅)=0 and v(S∪T)≥v(S)+v(T) for S∩T=∅,

and for every set function vvv on the subsets of I‾\overline II,

v is the extended characteristic function of some general game  ⟺  v(∅)=0, v(⊥S)=−v(S), v superadditive.v \text{ is the extended characteristic function of some general game} \iff v(\emptyset)=0,\ v(\bot S)=-v(S),\ v \text{ superadditive}.v is the extended characteristic function of some general game⟺v(∅)=0, v(⊥S)=−v(S), v superadditive.

In each direction a single game realizes vvv on every set simultaneously; v(I)v(I)v(I) is not constrained.

Milestones

  1. (57:1:a)–(57:1:c): necessity of the extended conditions.
  2. (57:2:a), (57:2:c), (57:2:b): necessity of the restricted conditions, including v(−S)≤v(I)−v(S)v(-S)\le v(I)-v(S)v(−S)≤v(I)−v(S).
  3. 57.3.1: sufficiency of (57:2:a), (57:2:c).
  4. 57.3.3: sufficiency of (57:1:a)–(57:1:c).
  5. (57:G): for such vvv, v(−S)=−v(S)v(-S)=-v(S)v(−S)=−v(S) for all SSS holds iff v(S)+v(−S)=v(I)v(S)+v(-S)=v(I)v(S)+v(−S)=v(I) for all SSS and v(I)=0v(I)=0v(I)=0.
  6. (57:B): in a zero-sum game every one-element set of players is removable, meaning that some zero-sum game with the same characteristic function has payoffs that do not depend on that player's choice.
  7. (57:C): the set of all players is removable iff the game is inessential, i.e. v(S)=∑k∈Sαkv(S)=\sum_{k\in S}\alpha_kv(S)=∑k∈S​αk​.

Significance

The characterization fixes the domain of Chapter XI: every statement about solutions of general games is, by 57.3.4, a statement about superadditive set functions with v(∅)=0v(\emptyset)=0v(∅)=0, and conversely every such function is attained by a strategic game. That converse justifies studying cooperative games abstractly. (57:G) separates the zero-sum and constant-sum subclasses inside this domain. (57:B) and (57:C) quantify how much of a player's strategic role survives when his moves are removed, which is the book's justification for the fictitious player.

Status: all results are proved in the book (1944). To our knowledge none of them is machine-checked; the Prove2Me catalog has superadditive and convex cooperative games, but none tied to a strategic game, and no characteristic function built from a minimax value. The work here is formalizing the known proofs.

Difficulty

Necessity reduces to the zero-sum theory applied to Γ‾\overline\GammaΓ, but still requires the minimax theorem for the coalition's two-person game and a careful treatment of joint mixing when two disjoint coalitions merge. Sufficiency requires building one finite game whose coalition values equal an arbitrary superadditive vvv exactly, for all 2n2^n2n coalitions at once. The obvious attempt, choosing payoffs coalition by coalition, fails because the payoffs are shared: a construction that gives SSS the right value can change the value of every set that overlaps SSS. The difficulty is to obtain the upper bound v(S)≤v0(S)v(S)\le v_0(S)v(S)≤v0​(S) for every SSS simultaneously. For the extended function there is a further difficulty. The fictitious player has no move, so the values on sets containing n+1n+1n+1 are forced by the others, and they must be reconciled with (57:1:b).

For (57:B), the target game must reproduce an arbitrary zero-sum characteristic function while one prescribed player's choice has no effect on any payoff.

Formalization scope

Players are Fin n (book indices 1,…,n1,\dots,n1,…,n become 0,…,n−10,\dots,n-10,…,n−1); sets of players are Finset (Fin n). The extended domain I‾\overline II is Fin (n + 1) with the fictitious player Fin.last n, and ⊥S\bot S⊥S is the complement in Fin (n + 1). A game (GeneralGame n) has βk≥1\beta_k\ge1βk​≥1 strategies Fin (β k) per player and real payoffs; zero-sum is the predicate IsZeroSum. The fictitious player's single strategy is left out of the coalition's strategy tuples, which does not change the two-person game. Max and Min are ⨆/⨅ over Mathlib's stdSimplex on the coalition's strategy tuples (one joint distribution per coalition). Both simplices are nonempty and the payoff is bounded, so these are attained values and no junk value from an empty or unbounded supremum occurs.

Standing hypotheses and their instantiation:

  • finite strategy sets with βk≥1\beta_k\ge1βk​≥1 (11.2.3, 56.2.2): a field of GeneralGame;
  • "always assuming (57:2:a), (57:2:c)" for (57:G) (p. 537): an explicit hypothesis;
  • "zero-sum nnn-person game" in (57:A)–(57:C) (p. 533): the hypothesis Γ.IsZeroSum and the requirement that the replacement game Γ′\Gamma'Γ′ is zero-sum;
  • "no influence upon the course of the game" (57:A): all payoffs are independent of that player's variable, as in the proof of (57:C) on p. 534;
  • "inessential" (57:C): the additive form (57:13), which p. 534 calls "precisely the definition of inessentiality".

No normalization is imposed: v(I)v(I)v(I) is arbitrary and nothing is reduced. Every statement is made for all n≥0n\ge0n≥0; the book's n≥1n\ge1n≥1 is not needed, so this is a strengthening.

A trivializing formalization is ruled out: the characteristic function is defined from the game through the coalition's minimax value, so it is never a free parameter, and the existence claims must produce one game for all coalitions at once.

Needed infrastructure: finite zero-sum two-person games with joint mixed strategies over dependent product types; the minimax theorem ((17:6), on the platform as AGT.zero_sum_minimax for matrices); and product decompositions of coalition strategy tuples. The coalition-value API is reusable for any mission built on characteristic functions (Chapters VI, IX–XI). Contributions of this API as separate lemmas are welcome.

Not stated: (57:E*), (57:F*) (given without proof on p. 535), the open question (57:D), and (57:H), because the notion of a "dummy" it uses (from 46.9 and 56.3) is not defined on these pages.

Selected references

  • J. von Neumann, O. Morgenstern, Theory of Games and Economic Behavior, 60th-anniversary edition, Princeton University Press, 2007 (reprint of the 3rd ed., 1953), §§56–57, pp. 504–537. https://doi.org/10.1515/9781400829460
  • J. von Neumann, "Zur Theorie der Gesellschaftsspiele", Mathematische Annalen 100 (1928), 295–320. https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01448847
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Algorithmic Game TheoryCombinatorics·Captain: mikedeng1

Theory of Games and Economic Behavior VII: Simple Games, Weighted Majorities and the Main Simple SolutionTextbook

Motivation

Many collective decisions are taken by coalitions that either carry the vote or do not: committees, legislatures, shareholder meetings, councils with weighted votes. In such a situation the only aim of a participant is to be part of a coalition that wins, and nothing is left to bargain about except the division of the prize inside the winning coalition. Chapter X of von Neumann and Morgenstern's Theory of Games and Economic Behavior (1944; 3rd ed. 1953) isolates exactly this class of zero-sum nnn-person games, the simple games, and studies their numerical description by weighted majorities and their finite main simple solutions.

The chapter is the origin of a large later literature: simple games and weighted voting games are the standard model of voting bodies in political science and social choice (for instance the Shapley–Shubik power index, 1954). The characterization of which simple games admit homogeneous weights, and the solutions they carry, starts here.

Setting

A zero-sum nnn-person game with players I={1,…,n}I = \{1, \dots, n\}I={1,…,n} is represented by its characteristic function vvv, a real function on the subsets of III with v(⊖)=0v(\ominus) = 0v(⊖)=0, v(−S)=−v(S)v(-S) = -v(S)v(−S)=−v(S) (−S-S−S the complement) and v(S∪T)≧v(S)+v(T)v(S \cup T) \geqq v(S) + v(T)v(S∪T)≧v(S)+v(T) for disjoint S,TS, TS,T. An imputation is a vector α⃗\vec\alphaα with αi≧v((i))\alpha_i \geqq v((i))αi​≧v((i)) and ∑iαi=0\sum_i \alpha_i = 0∑i​αi​=0; α⃗\vec\alphaα dominates β⃗\vec\betaβ​ if some nonempty SSS has ∑i∈Sαi≦v(S)\sum_{i\in S}\alpha_i \leqq v(S)∑i∈S​αi​≦v(S) and αi>βi\alpha_i > \beta_iαi​>βi​ for i∈Si \in Si∈S; a solution is a set VVV of imputations none of which dominates another and which dominates every imputation outside it (30.1.1). The game is inessential when its reduced form vanishes identically, essential otherwise.

A coalition SSS is flat if v(S)=∑k∈Sv((k))v(S) = \sum_{k\in S} v((k))v(S)=∑k∈S​v((k)). The losing coalitions LΓL_\GammaLΓ​ are the flat sets, and the winning coalitions WΓW_\GammaWΓ​ are the sets whose complement is flat. The game is simple if it is essential and every coalition is winning or losing. WmW^mWm denotes the minimal winning coalitions, those of which no proper subset wins.

Weights w1,…,wnw_1, \dots, w_nw1​,…,wn​ define the winning system W={S:∑i∈Swi>12∑iwi}W = \{S : \sum_{i\in S} w_i > \tfrac12 \sum_i w_i\}W={S:∑i∈S​wi​>21​∑i​wi​}, and under the conditions (50:B) (non-negative weights, no player with half the total weight, no ties) this is the weighted majority game [w1,…,wn][w_1,\dots,w_n][w1​,…,wn​]. The weights are homogeneous if the advantage aS=∑i∈Swi−∑i∈−Swia_S = \sum_{i\in S} w_i - \sum_{i\in -S} w_iaS​=∑i∈S​wi​−∑i∈−S​wi​ is the same for all SSS in WmW^mWm.

In §50 the game is taken in reduced form with γ=1\gamma = 1γ=1, so v((i))=−1v((i)) = -1v((i))=−1. For numbers xi≧0x_i \geqq 0xi​≧0 and a coalition SSS let α⃗S\vec\alpha^SαS give −1-1−1 to the players outside SSS and −1+xi-1 + x_i−1+xi​ to player iii in SSS. When the xix_ixi​ satisfy ∑i∈Sxi=n\sum_{i \in S} x_i = n∑i∈S​xi​=n for every S∈WmS \in W^mS∈Wm, the set VVV of all α⃗S\vec\alpha^SαS, S∈WmS \in W^mS∈Wm, is a main simple solution.

Formalization targets

Goal: (50:K), p. 444

Every homogeneous weighted majority game possesses a main simple solution,\text{Every homogeneous weighted majority game possesses a main simple solution,}Every homogeneous weighted majority game possesses a main simple solution,

namely the set of α⃗S\vec\alpha^SαS, S∈WmS \in W^mS∈Wm, with xi=nbwix_i = \frac{n}{b} w_ixi​=bn​wi​, b=12(∑iwi+a)b = \frac12(\sum_i w_i + a)b=21​(∑i​wi​+a), aaa the common advantage. Conversely, if xi≧0x_i \geqq 0xi​≧0 solve ∑i∈Sxi=n\sum_{i\in S} x_i = n∑i∈S​xi​=n on WmW^mWm, then wi=xiw_i = x_iwi​=xi​ are homogeneous weights for the game if and only if

∑i=1nxi<2n.\sum_{i=1}^n x_i < 2n .i=1∑n​xi​<2n.

Milestones

  1. (49:C) LΓL_\GammaLΓ​ contains the empty set and all one-element sets.
  2. (49:A) WΓ,LΓW_\Gamma, L_\GammaWΓ​,LΓ​ are mapped onto each other by complementation, WΓW_\GammaWΓ​ is closed under supersets, and LΓL_\GammaLΓ​ is closed under subsets.
  3. (49:B) WΓ∩LΓ=⊖W_\Gamma \cap L_\Gamma = \ominusWΓ​∩LΓ​=⊖ if and only if the game is essential. If the game is inessential, every set is both winning and losing.
  4. (49:F) The pairs W,LW, LW,L of simple games are exactly those satisfying (48:A:a)–(48:A:d) and (49:C).
  5. (50:A) The essential three-person game is simple: it is the direct majority game.
  6. (50:B) Non-negative weights define a winning system with (49:W*) if and only if (50:B:a), (50:B:b) hold.
  7. (50:D) aS>0a_S > 0aS​>0 on WWW, aS<0a_S < 0aS​<0 on LLL, and aS=0a_S = 0aS​=0 never occurs.
  8. (50:G) An imputation β⃗\vec\betaβ​ is undominated by V={α⃗S:S∈U}V = \{\vec\alpha^S : S \in U\}V={αS:S∈U} if and only if R(β⃗)∈U+R(\vec\beta) \in U^+R(β​)∈U+.
  9. (50:J) The exact criterion (50:8*), (50:9*) for VVV to be a solution.

Significance

The result links two descriptions of a simple game. One is numerical: a vector of weights, normalized by homogeneity. The other is game-theoretic: a finite solution in which each minimal winning coalition forms and divides a fixed total among its members. When the weights are homogeneous they are, up to scale, the shares in the main simple solution. When a main simple solution exists, its shares are homogeneous weights exactly under the inequality (50:20). The criterion (50:J) behind it is the chapter's general tool for deciding which systems of "profitable" minimal winning coalitions yield a finite solution. It is used again in the enumeration of simple games in §§51–55.

All of the results are proved in the book. As far as a search of the Prove2Me library shows (queries on simple game, weighted majority, winning coalition and stable set, 2026-09-28), none of them has been machine-checked. The only stable-set statements on the platform concern feasible payoff vectors of convex games, which is a different domain. The mission therefore asks for a formal proof of the known results, including the case analysis of §50.5–50.6, and in doing so it produces a reusable Lean theory of simple games and their winning systems.

Difficulty

The characterizations of §49 are set-theoretic, but they depend on superadditivity to show that subsets of flat sets are flat, and on the strategic-equivalence description of essentiality. The substantial part is (50:J). Deciding whether VVV is a solution means classifying every imputation β⃗\vec\betaβ​ by the set R(β⃗)R(\vec\beta)R(β​) where it meets the shares −1+xi-1 + x_i−1+xi​.

The natural first attempt is to check only the minimal winning coalitions. It fails, because domination can be exercised through any winning coalition. The book's argument has to exclude sets of U+U^+U+ with ∑i∈Txi<n\sum_{i\in T} x_i < n∑i∈T​xi​<n by producing infinitely many undominated imputations against a finite VVV. It also has to handle indifferent players with xi=0x_i = 0xi​=0, whose presence makes R(β⃗)R(\vec\beta)R(β​) larger than the coalition that generated β⃗\vec\betaβ​. For the converse half of the goal, the obstacle is the strict inequality a>0a > 0a>0: the equations (50:17) are linear and say nothing about it.

Formalization scope

Players are Fin n (the book's player iii is index i−1i - 1i−1), coalitions are Finset (Fin n), and characteristic functions are Finset (Fin n) → ℝ. Imputations are vectors Fin n → ℝ, and systems of coalitions are Set (Finset (Fin n)). A game is identified with its characteristic function (by 26.1 every vvv satisfying (25:3:a)–(25:3:c) arises from a game). The theory is the "old" one of 30.1.1 (49.1.1), with no excess. The definitions of imputation, domination and solution are the same as in mission V of this series and are restated here, because a draft cannot import another draft.

The standing hypotheses, stated in each theorem where the book has them in force:

  • (25:3:a)–(25:3:c) on vvv in every theorem;
  • simplicity (essential + (49:1:b)) in (50:G), (50:J), (50:K);
  • the reduced form with γ=1\gamma = 1γ=1, as v((i))=−1v((i)) = -1v((i))=−1 for all iii (50.4.1), in (50:G), (50:J), (50:K);
  • U⊆WmU \subseteq W^mU⊆Wm, (50:7) xi≧0x_i \geqq 0xi​≧0 and (50:8) ∑i∈Sxi=n\sum_{i\in S} x_i = n∑i∈S​xi​=n for S∈US \in US∈U (50.5.1) in (50:G), (50:J);
  • (50:B) on the weights in (50:D) and in the first half of (50:K);
  • non-negative weights in (50:B). The book states (50:B) for arbitrary real weights, but its "only if" direction is false without wi≧0w_i \geqq 0wi​≧0: [10,10,10,−110][10, 10, 10, -\tfrac1{10}][10,10,10,−101​] is a counterexample. The corrected statement is recorded in the item.

The numbers xix_ixi​ are given for every player. Players in no minimal winning coalition, for whom the book defines no xix_ixi​, do not affect any α⃗S\vec\alpha^SαS. In the converse of (50:K) the derived weights are wi=xiw_i = x_iwi​=xi​ for every player.

The goal is not the bare solvability of (50:17). A statement that only asserted "xxx exists with (50:7), (50:17)" would reduce to linear algebra. The goal asserts that the set of α⃗S\vec\alpha^SαS is a solution in the sense of 30.1.1, with domination requiring a nonempty effective set, and it adds the converse equivalence with (50:20). The set VVV is built from WmW^mWm only, never from all of WWW.

Welcome contributions: proofs of the §49 milestones, which form a small reusable library on winning and losing systems; a proof of (50:G) and (50:J); and lemmas connecting WΓW_\GammaWΓ​ of a simple reduced game with the explicit formula (49:2), v(S)=n−∣S∣v(S) = n - |S|v(S)=n−∣S∣ on WWW and −∣S∣-|S|−∣S∣ on LLL.

Selected references

  • J. von Neumann, O. Morgenstern, Theory of Games and Economic Behavior, 60th-anniversary ed., Princeton University Press, 2007 (reprint of the 3rd ed., 1953), Chapter X, §§48–50, pp. 420–444. https://doi.org/10.1515/9781400829460
  • L. S. Shapley, M. Shubik, "A method for evaluating the distribution of power in a committee system", American Political Science Review 48 (1954) 787–792. https://doi.org/10.2307/1951053
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Algorithmic Game Theory·Captain: mikedeng1

Theory of Games and Economic Behavior IV: The Characteristic Function of a Zero-Sum n-Person GameTextbook

Motivation

Chapter VI of von Neumann and Morgenstern's Theory of Games and Economic Behavior (1944; 3rd ed. 1953) opens the general theory of zero-sum games with more than two players. The authors propose to describe everything that can be said about coalitions, compensations between partners and fights between coalitions through one numerical object, the characteristic function v(S)v(S)v(S): the amount a group of players SSS can secure for itself against all the others (25.2.1). The whole later theory of the book (imputations, domination, solutions, simple games, decomposition) is built on this set function, and the same object, under the name "coalitional game" or "TU game", is the starting point of cooperative game theory as a field (cores, Shapley value, nucleolus).

§§25–27 settle two foundational questions about it. First, which set functions arise as characteristic functions of actual games? Second, which characteristic functions describe the same strategic situation, and how is a canonical representative chosen? The answers (a complete characterization by three conditions, and the reduced form under strategic equivalence) are what later chapters, and much of the cooperative literature, use when they take "a characteristic function" as a primitive without reference to any game.

Setting

A zero-sum nnn-person game in normalized form Γ\GammaΓ (11.2.3, 25.1.3) has players k=1,…,nk = 1, \dots, nk=1,…,n. Player kkk chooses a pure strategy τk∈{1,…,βk}\tau_k \in \{1, \dots, \beta_k\}τk​∈{1,…,βk​}, βk≧1\beta_k \geqq 1βk​≧1, uninformed about the others' choices, and then receives the real amount Hk(τ1,…,τn)\mathcal H_k(\tau_1, \dots, \tau_n)Hk​(τ1​,…,τn​), subject to (25:1)

∑k=1nHk(τ1,…,τn)≡0.\sum_{k=1}^n \mathcal H_k(\tau_1, \dots, \tau_n) \equiv 0 .k=1∑n​Hk​(τ1​,…,τn​)≡0.

Let I={1,…,n}I = \{1, \dots, n\}I={1,…,n} and, for S⊆IS \subseteq IS⊆I, −S=I∖S-S = I \setminus S−S=I∖S. The book defines v(S)v(S)v(S) in 25.1.3 through a fictitious two-person game: all players of SSS form one composite player 1′1'1′, all players of −S-S−S another, 2′2'2′. The pure strategies of 1′1'1′ are the aggregates τS\tau^SτS (one choice τk\tau_kτk​ for each k∈Sk \in Sk∈S), those of 2′2'2′ are the aggregates τ−S\tau^{-S}τ−S, and 1′1'1′ receives (25:2)

H‾(τS,τ−S)=∑k∈SHk(τ1,…,τn).\overline{\mathcal H}(\tau^S, \tau^{-S}) = \sum_{k \in S} \mathcal H_k(\tau_1, \dots, \tau_n).H(τS,τ−S)=k∈S∑​Hk​(τ1​,…,τn​).

A mixed strategy of 1′1'1′ is a probability vector ξ\xiξ on the set of all aggregates τS\tau^SτS, and one of 2′2'2′ is a probability vector η\etaη on the aggregates τ−S\tau^{-S}τ−S. With K(ξ,η)=∑τS,τ−SH‾(τS,τ−S) ξτSητ−SK(\xi, \eta) = \sum_{\tau^S, \tau^{-S}} \overline{\mathcal H}(\tau^S, \tau^{-S})\, \xi_{\tau^S} \eta_{\tau^{-S}}K(ξ,η)=∑τS,τ−S​H(τS,τ−S)ξτS​ητ−S​,

v(S)=Max⁡ξMin⁡ηK(ξ,η)=Min⁡ηMax⁡ξK(ξ,η).v(S) = \operatorname{Max}_\xi \operatorname{Min}_\eta K(\xi, \eta) = \operatorname{Min}_\eta \operatorname{Max}_\xi K(\xi, \eta).v(S)=Maxξ​Minη​K(ξ,η)=Minη​Maxξ​K(ξ,η).

The coalition therefore randomizes jointly: ξ\xiξ is one distribution over its members' strategy tuples, not a product of independent mixtures. The empty set and III are coalitions too (footnote 2, p. 241).

The three conditions of 25.3.1 on a set function vvv are

(25:3:a) v(⊖)=0,(25:3:b) v(−S)=−v(S),(25:3:c) v(S∪T)≧v(S)+v(T)  if S∩T=⊖.\text{(25:3:a)}\ v(\ominus) = 0, \qquad \text{(25:3:b)}\ v(-S) = -v(S), \qquad \text{(25:3:c)}\ v(S \cup T) \geqq v(S) + v(T) \ \text{ if } S \cap T = \ominus .(25:3:a) v(⊖)=0,(25:3:b) v(−S)=−v(S),(25:3:c) v(S∪T)≧v(S)+v(T)  if S∩T=⊖.

From 26.2 on, every set function satisfying them is called a characteristic function.

Two such functions are strategically equivalent (27.1) if v′(S)=v(S)+∑k∈Sαk0v'(S) = v(S) + \sum_{k \in S} \alpha^0_kv′(S)=v(S)+∑k∈S​αk0​ for numbers αk0\alpha^0_kαk0​ with ∑kαk0=0\sum_k \alpha^0_k = 0∑k​αk0​=0 ((27:1), (27:2)). A function is reduced if all one-element coalitions have the same value, (27:3); with that common value written −γ-\gamma−γ, (27:5). A game is inessential if the reduced form of its characteristic function is ≡0\equiv 0≡0, and essential otherwise (27.3).

Formalization targets

Goal: the characterization of characteristic functions (26.2)

v satisfies (25:3:a)–(25:3:c)  ⟺  ∃ Γ zero-sum n-person game with vΓ=v.v \text{ satisfies (25:3:a)–(25:3:c)} \iff \exists\, \Gamma \text{ zero-sum } n\text{-person game with } v_\Gamma = v .v satisfies (25:3:a)–(25:3:c)⟺∃Γ zero-sum n-person game with vΓ​=v.

The "only if" half is 25.3.1; the "if" half is 26.1.1, which requires a single game Γ\GammaΓ realizing vvv on every coalition simultaneously.

Milestones

  1. 25.3.1: every vΓv_\GammavΓ​ satisfies (25:3:a)–(25:3:c).
  2. (25:A): the three conditions are equivalent to v(S1)+⋯+v(Sp)≦0v(S_1) + \dots + v(S_p) \leqq 0v(S1​)+⋯+v(Sp​)≦0 on decompositions of III for p=1,2,3p = 1, 2, 3p=1,2,3, with equality for p=1,2p = 1, 2p=1,2.
  3. 26.1.1: every vvv satisfying (25:3:a)–(25:3:c) is vΓv_\GammavΓ​ for some game Γ\GammaΓ.
  4. (27:A): every characteristic function is strategically equivalent to exactly one reduced characteristic function, given by (27:2), (27:4).
  5. (27:7): for reduced vˉ\bar vvˉ and every ppp-element SSS, −pγ≦vˉ(S)≦(n−p)γ-p\gamma \leqq \bar v(S) \leqq (n-p)\gamma−pγ≦vˉ(S)≦(n−p)γ, with equality in the stated boundary cases.
  6. (27:B): inessential iff ∑jv((j))=0\sum_j v((j)) = 0∑j​v((j))=0; essential iff ∑jv((j))<0\sum_j v((j)) < 0∑j​v((j))<0.
  7. (27:C) and (27:D): inessential iff vvv is additive, v(S)≡∑k∈Sαk0v(S) \equiv \sum_{k \in S} \alpha^0_kv(S)≡∑k∈S​αk0​, equivalently iff (25:3:c) always holds with equality.

Significance

The characterization makes the three conditions (25:3:a)–(25:3:c) the complete axiomatics of zero-sum characteristic functions. Every later result in the book that is stated "for a characteristic function" (the solutions of the three-person game in §32, the simple games of Chapter X, the decomposition theory of Chapter IX) is thereby a result about zero-sum games, and conversely no further constraint on vvv is hidden in the game model. The reduced form of §27 cuts the parameter space of characteristic functions by nnn and turns essentiality into a sign condition, which is used throughout the rest of the book.

These results are proved in the book. As far as a search of the Prove2Me catalog shows (queries on characteristic function, coalition, strategic equivalence, inessential, superadditive), none of them is formalized there; the existing cooperative-game definitions on the platform use other normalizations (v(∅)=0v(\emptyset) = 0v(∅)=0 only, no complementarity condition) and are not this object. The mission produces a machine-checked link between the non-cooperative model of an nnn-person game and the cooperative set function, including the book's explicit game construction behind 26.1.1.

Difficulty

The "only if" direction requires comparing values of different two-person games: (25:3:c) asks that the coalition S∪TS \cup TS∪T can guarantee as much as SSS and TTT separately, which rests on the coalition mixing jointly, and (25:3:b) needs the minimax theorem, since v(−S)v(-S)v(−S) is a Max-Min for the opposite side. The "if" direction is an existence claim: from an abstract vvv one must produce one finite game whose characteristic function matches vvv on all 2n2^n2n coalitions at once. Producing, for each SSS separately, a game with the right value vΓ(S)v_\Gamma(S)vΓ​(S) is easy and proves nothing. The §27 results are finite linear algebra over set functions, but the uniqueness in (27:A) and the boundary equalities in (27:7) depend on using all three conditions.

Formalization scope

Players are Fin n (the book's 1,…,n1, \dots, n1,…,n are 0,…,n−10, \dots, n-10,…,n−1), coalitions are Finset (Fin n), −S-S−S is the complement Sᶜ, and set functions are Finset (Fin n) → ℝ. A game is a structure ZeroSumGame n with strategy sets Fin (β k), a field β k > 0 (finitely many and at least one pure strategy per player), real payoffs H τ k, and the zero-sum condition (25:1) as a field. An aggregate τS\tau^SτS is a dependent function on the members of SSS; mixed strategies are elements of Mathlib's stdSimplex, and the coalition's ξ\xiξ is a single distribution on aggregates, as in 25.1.3. The Max and Min in v(S)v(S)v(S) are written as ⨆/⨅ over the simplices; these are nonempty and the bilinear form is bounded on them, so no junk value arises. No lower bound on nnn is imposed: the book's statements remain true for n=0n = 0n=0 and n=1n = 1n=1, so dropping the implicit n≧1n \geqq 1n≧1 is a harmless strengthening.

Standing hypotheses instantiated in the statements: finiteness of the strategy sets and (25:1) (25.1.3) are part of ZeroSumGame; the §27 results carry (25:3:a)–(25:3:c) as a hypothesis, the book's standing assumption from 26.2 on ("characteristic function"); (27:7) carries reducedness (27:3) and the definition (27:5) of γ\gammaγ; strategic equivalence includes (27:1). The reduced form is the explicit function of (27:2), (27:4), with 1n\frac1nn1​ as a real division that only matters for n≧1n \geqq 1n≧1.

A trivializing reading of the goal, "for every SSS there is a game with vΓ(S)=v(S)v_\Gamma(S) = v(S)vΓ​(S)=v(S)", is excluded: the statement asks for one game Γ\GammaΓ with vΓ=vv_\Gamma = vvΓ​=v as functions. The coalition value is not the value under independent mixtures of the members, which is smaller in general and for which (25:3:c) can fail.

A complete development needs the minimax theorem for finite matrix games (the platform's AGT.zero_sum_minimax covers it for matrices indexed by Fin (m+1), and can be transported to the aggregate types), bookkeeping for splitting and joining strategy profiles along SSS and −S-S−S, and the construction of 26.1 with its zero-sum check. The profile-splitting lemmas and the value facts for coalition games are reusable for the book's Chapter XI (general games) and for any work on coalitional values of strategic games. Contributions welcome: the §27 milestones, which are self-contained, and the two directions of the goal.

Selected references

  • J. von Neumann and O. Morgenstern, Theory of Games and Economic Behavior, 60th-anniversary edition, Princeton University Press, 2007 (reprint of the 3rd edition, 1953), §§25–27, pp. 238–254. https://doi.org/10.1515/9781400829460
  • J. von Neumann, "Zur Theorie der Gesellschaftsspiele", Mathematische Annalen 100 (1928), 295–320 (the minimax theorem used for v(S)v(S)v(S)). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01448847
  • M. Maschler, E. Solan and S. Zamir, Game Theory, Cambridge University Press, 2013, Ch. 16 (coalitional games with transferable utility). https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511794216
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