A Supply Chain Theory of Factoring and Reverse Factoring 1: The Supplier's Equilibrium Choice Among Recourse, Non-Recourse and Reverse FactoringResearch Paper
Motivation
Small and medium-sized suppliers that sell to large retailers typically ship first and are paid weeks or months later. Until the invoice is paid, the supplier's cash is trapped in accounts receivable, while production has to be financed up front. Factoring (selling or pledging the receivable to a financial intermediary for immediate cash) and reverse factoring (a buyer-initiated program in which the retailer approves the invoice and the supplier is paid early by the retailer's bank) are the standard remedies, and reverse factoring programs of large buyers are often coupled with an extension of payment terms. Which of these instruments a supplier should use, and how the answer depends on the credit ratings of the two firms, is the question addressed by Kouvelis and Xu, "A Supply Chain Theory of Factoring and Reverse Factoring", Management Science 67(10):6071–6088, 2021 (doi:10.1287/mnsc.2020.3788). The paper embeds each financing scheme in the pull wholesale-price game of Cachon (2004) and compares the resulting equilibria.
Setting
A retailer (the Stackelberg leader) offers a wholesale price to a capital-constrained supplier (the follower), who then chooses a production quantity and carries the inventory; the retail price is fixed, and is the unit production cost. Demand has density , complementary distribution function , finite mean, on (), and a strictly increasing failure rate (strict IFR). Expected sales are , and .
Each firm has a credit rating . The default probability is strictly decreasing in the rating, and the interest-rate premium is decreasing. Production takes a lead time , payment follows after a term , and the supplier faces a Poisson liquidity shock of rate during production (the retailer, rate ). Under a scheme (recourse, non-recourse, reverse factoring, the last with a payment extension ), the supplier's expected profit is
with coefficients , , , and effective unit cost . The retailer's profit is under factoring and carries the extra factor under reverse factoring.
Formalization targets
Goal: Proposition 5
For a given , let be the unique supplier rating with , the one with , and the feasibility thresholds (). With all three schemes available,
Milestones
- Proposition 2 (p. 6078): recourse factoring is feasible iff , and then the unique equilibrium solves , .
- Proposition 3 (p. 6079): the same for non-recourse factoring with .
- §5.2 (p. 6082, Proposition EC.2): the same for reverse factoring with .
- §4.4 (p. 6080, Lemma EC.2): between feasible schemes, the supplier's equilibrium profits are ordered as the .
- Proposition 4 (p. 6080): the choice between and alone.
A follow-on item states Corollary 1(i) (p. 6081): when the retailer's rating is at least the supplier's, non-recourse factoring strictly dominates recourse factoring whenever the latter is feasible.
Significance
Proposition 5 is the paper's main prediction: non-recourse factoring is the choice of medium-rated suppliers, recourse factoring of highly rated ones, and reverse factoring with a fixed payment extension is chosen only by low-to-medium-rated suppliers and only if the retailer's rating is not too high relative to the extension. The paper uses it to explain the documented reluctance of suppliers to join reverse-factoring programs that come with extended payment terms (Wuttke, Rosenzweig and Heese 2019; Corsten 2010, a teaching case), and it is the starting point of the paper's Proposition 6 on the retailer's optimal payment extension, which is the subject of the second mission of this series.
The results are proved in the paper's Online Appendix B. To the best of available knowledge none of them, and no model of supply chain finance, has a machine-checked proof. A formal development would also supply a reusable treatment of the pull wholesale-price game under a strictly IFR demand with an arbitrary effective unit cost, of which Propositions 2, 3 and EC.2 are three instances.
Difficulty
The case analysis of Proposition 5 is short once the milestones are available; the substance lies in them. Proposition 2 requires solving a bilevel problem: the follower's best response has to be identified for every wholesale price, including prices at which the supplier produces nothing, and the leader's objective has to be shown to have a single maximizer. The natural route through the first-order condition needs the IFR property to exclude multiple stationary points, and it has to cope with a support end that may be finite (where vanishes and , lose meaning) or infinite. Lemma EC.2 requires the equilibrium supplier profit as an explicit function of the effective cost and a monotonicity argument for it; comparing the directly, without the equilibrium, does not prove it. The proofs themselves are not in the main text.
Formalization scope
Demand is a probability measure μ on ℝ with a density f, the support end Z : EReal, and the complementary distribution function Fbar μ x = μ((x, ∞)). The model data, the coefficients coef, the effective costs cF, cN, cR, the two profit functions, best responses, equilibria, feasibility and adoption are definitions; all theorems are for arbitrary data satisfying Params.Valid and DemandModel. Readings fixed by the formalization:
- "Feasible": some wholesale price with a supplier best response gives the retailer strictly positive profit. It is not defined as , which is what Propositions 2 and 3 prove.
- "Adopted" / "should be adopted": the scheme is feasible and its equilibrium supplier profit is best among the feasible available schemes, with ties resolved , the order forced by the paper's boundaries (, , ). Profits are compared, not the .
- "The unique value of that satisfies …": a point of satisfying the equation and the only such point. The equation is cross-multiplied, , since may be .
- "" is read through the paper's equivalence , i.e. : the stated assumptions give no single crossing in .
- "The unique equilibrium can be derived from …": the equilibrium exists and is unique, and it is exactly the solution of the system with ; this part is stated under feasibility.
- "Increasing/decreasing" is weak unless stated (p. 6075); is strictly decreasing, weakly.
- Continuity of is read on , and as the upper end of the support.
- Additions: wholesale prices are nonnegative; the retailer's reverse-factoring profit is the last line of the p. 6082 display (the middle line has a stray factor ).
- Corollary 1(i): "higher credit rating" is read as , "dominates" as a strictly larger equilibrium supplier profit whenever recourse is feasible.
A formalization in which feasibility or adoption is defined by the inequalities being proved (, largest ) makes the propositions trivial and is ruled out by the definitions above. The profit functions (7), (10) and the p. 6082 display are taken as the model; the derivation from bank and factor pricing (Eqs. (1), (5), (6), Lemma 1) is not formalized, and the unstated assumptions of Table EC.2 are not included. Contributions of reusable lemmas on , and under strict IFR are welcome.
Selected references
- P. Kouvelis and F. Xu, A Supply Chain Theory of Factoring and Reverse Factoring, Management Science 67(10):6071–6088, 2021. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2020.3788
- G. P. Cachon, The Allocation of Inventory Risk in a Supply Chain: Push, Pull, and Advance-Purchase Discount Contracts, Management Science 50(2):222–238, 2004. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.1030.0189
- D. A. Wuttke, E. Rosenzweig, H. S. Heese, An Empirical Analysis of Supply Chain Finance Adoption, Journal of Operations Management 65(3):242–261, 2019.
- P. Kouvelis and W. Zhao, Who Should Finance the Supply Chain? Impact of Credit Ratings on Supply Chain Decisions, Manufacturing & Service Operations Management 20(1):19–35, 2018.