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Convex OptimizationMachine Learning·Captain: mikedeng1

Introduction to Online Convex Optimization XIII: Blackwell's Approachability Theorem and Online Convex OptimizationTextbook

Motivation

Von Neumann's minimax theorem (Chapter VIII) settles two-player zero-sum games with scalar payoffs. In 1956, Blackwell asked the natural generalization: what can a player guarantee in a repeated game with vector-valued payoffs, where "winning" means driving the average payoff into a target set rather than above a target value? For decades the resulting theory — approachability — and the regret-minimization theory this book develops were believed to be different, with approachability seen as the stronger notion. Chapter 13 closes that gap: approachability and online convex optimization are shown to be algorithmically equivalent, each reducible to the other with no loss of efficiency, and along the way this equivalence yields a constructive, rate-quantified proof of Blackwell's own theorem.

Setting

A generalized vector game (Definition 13.2) is given by bounded convex closed decision sets K1,K2K_1,K_2K1​,K2​ and a vector payoff u:K1×K2→Rdu:K_1\times K_2\to\mathbb R^du:K1​×K2​→Rd. A set SSS is approachable (Definition 13.3) if some non-anticipating algorithm, playing in K1K_1K1​ against any sequence y1,y2,⋯∈K2y_1,y_2,\dots\in K_2y1​,y2​,⋯∈K2​, drives the average payoff's distance to SSS to zero. Blackwell's theorem (13.4) characterizes exactly which SSS are approachable via a purely geometric condition: every column-player strategy yyy admits a row-player best response xxx landing the payoff in SSS.

Section 13.2 constructs an explicit approachability algorithm from any OCO algorithm: given a best-response oracle realizing Blackwell's condition, Algorithm 37 runs the OCO algorithm on the proxy losses ft(w)=w⊤ut−1−hS(w)f_t(w) = w^\top u_{t-1} - h_S(w)ft​(w)=w⊤ut−1​−hS​(w) (the support function hS(w)=max⁡x∈S{w⊤x}h_S(w)=\max_{x\in S}\{w^\top x\}hS​(w)=maxx∈S​{w⊤x} letting distance-to-SSS be written, via Lemma 13.5's minimax duality, as a convex optimization problem over the unit ball), queries the oracle at the OCO algorithm's play wtw_twt​, and averages the resulting rewards.

Formalization targets

Theorem 13.7 (OCO-to-approachability rate, milestone)

Dist(uˉT,S)≤RegretT(A)T.\mathrm{Dist}(\bar u_T, S) \le \frac{\mathrm{Regret}_T(A)}{T}.Dist(uˉT​,S)≤TRegretT​(A)​.

Theorem 13.4 — the mission's goal (sufficiency direction only)

(∀y∈K2, ∃x∈K1, u(x,y)∈S)  ⟹  S is approachable.\big(\forall y\in K_2,\ \exists x\in K_1,\ u(x,y)\in S\big) \implies S\ \text{is approachable}.(∀y∈K2​, ∃x∈K1​, u(x,y)∈S)⟹S is approachable.

Significance

This chapter's headline claim — approachability and OCO are equivalent — is proved in two directions in the book (§13.2 and §13.3); this mission drafts the direction the book itself foregrounds as "the more interesting implication" and constructively proves: any sublinear-regret OCO algorithm converts directly into an explicit approachability algorithm with an explicit convergence rate, giving a self-contained, algorithmic proof of a 1956 game-theory theorem using 1990s–2000s online-learning machinery. Historically, this equivalence resolved a standing misconception (approachability believed strictly stronger) and reframes Blackwell's theorem as a special case of regret minimization rather than a separate theory requiring its own toolkit. No prior art was found on the platform for Blackwell approachability (planning search: q=Blackwell — the one hit, PRNGCompression.prng_no_free_lunch's cousin, an unrelated Rao-Blackwellization result, is not a substitute); this mission drafts both items fresh.

Difficulty

Theorem 13.4's statement is a clean geometric implication, but the book is explicit that its proof is entirely carried by Theorem 13.7 plus an unstated "explicit conclusion" left as an exercise (the passage from a finite-horizon rate bound to the asymptotic Dist → 0 claim, using any of the book's own sublinear-regret OCO algorithms as a witness). Theorem 13.7's own proof combines three nontrivial facts: Lemma 13.5's minimax-duality rewriting of Dist(⋅,S)\mathrm{Dist}(\cdot, S)Dist(⋅,S) as a linear optimization over the unit ball (itself proved via Sion's minimax theorem, not excerpted here), the best-response oracle's defining inequality (13.2) applied pointwise at each round's wtw_twt​, and the OCO algorithm's own regret guarantee applied to the specific proxy-loss sequence ftf_tft​ built from the realized game trajectory — a genuine composition of three separate pieces of machinery from earlier in the book (Chapters III–VIII), not a routine substitution.

Formalization scope

IsApproachable is declared as its own definition (per BRIEF.md's explicit instruction, since Theorem 13.4 depends on it), with the non-anticipation clause made explicit (matching the series' IsOnlineAlgorithm convention from Chunk 03) even though the book's own Definition 13.3 states it only informally ("x_t ← A(y_1,\dots,y_{t-1})"). SupportFunction is h_S exactly as displayed, as a real supremum (a genuine maximum given the chapter's standing "closed, bounded" hypothesis on S). Dist(⋅,S)\mathrm{Dist}(\cdot,S)Dist(⋅,S) throughout is Euclidean distance, rendered as Mathlib's Metric.infDist — confirmed the chapter uses no other distance notion (checked §13.1-13.3 directly, per the pitfall BRIEF.md flags). Theorem 13.7 transcribes Algorithm 37's ft(w)=w⊤ut−1−hS(w)f_t(w)=w^\top u_{t-1}-h_S(w)ft​(w)=w⊤ut−1​−hS​(w) construction faithfully, including its one-round offset (using the previous round's realized reward to build the current round's proxy loss, while the conclusion averages the current round's rewards) — exactly as the book's own pseudocode has it, not smoothed over.

Scope decision on Theorem 13.4's biconditional. The book states Theorem 13.4 as an ↔ but proves, and explicitly flags as proved, only the sufficiency direction (←): "The necessity of this condition is left as an exercise... Our reductions henceforth give an explicit proof of Blackwell's theorem [meaning: of the sufficiency direction]." Per CAPTAIN_BRIEF.md rule 6 and BRIEF.md's explicit instruction, this mission drafts only that direction, named as such in the goal item's own docstring; see STATUS.md.

Not formalized (out of scope for this mission, given the remaining budget and the explicit "exercise" status of several results on these pages): the necessity direction of Theorem 13.4; Lemma 13.5 (minimax duality for Dist, itself relying on Sion's theorem, not separately formalized here); Lemma 13.6 (the equivalent best-response-oracle condition); §13.3's entire approachability-to-OCO direction (Theorem 13.9, Lemma 13.8, the cone/polar-cone machinery of §13.3.1) and §13.3.3 (existence of a best-response oracle for the constructed set); the "explicit conclusion" of Blackwell's theorem from Theorem 13.7, left as an exercise by the book itself.

Selected references

  • E. Hazan, Introduction to Online Convex Optimization, 2nd ed., arXiv:1909.05207v3, Chapter 13.
  • D. Blackwell, "An analog of the minimax theorem for vector payoffs," Pacific Journal of Mathematics 6(1), 1956, 1-8.
  • N. Abernethy, P. Bartlett, E. Hazan, "Blackwell approachability and no-regret learning are equivalent," COLT 2011.
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Convex OptimizationMachine Learning·Captain: mikedeng1

Introduction to Online Convex Optimization V: RFTL and the Regret Bound of Follow-the-Regularized-LeaderTextbook

Motivation

Online convex optimization (OCO) asks a learner to repeatedly pick a point in a convex set KKK, pay a cost that an adversary reveals only after the choice is made, and be judged against the best fixed point in hindsight. Chapter III of this series formalized the simplest general-purpose answer, online gradient descent (OGD): take a gradient step, project back onto KKK. OGD's analysis, however, is tied to the Euclidean geometry of the projection step — it treats every coordinate of KKK alike, and its regret bound degrades badly when KKK's natural geometry is not Euclidean (the probability simplex under the ℓ1\ell_1ℓ1​ norm is the standard example, where a Euclidean-projection algorithm's regret scales with n\sqrt{n}n​ in the dimension nnn, while an algorithm that exploits the simplex's own geometry attains regret scaling only with log⁡n\sqrt{\log n}logn​).

Regularized Follow the Leader (RFTL) is the meta-algorithm this chapter introduces to fix this: rather than fixing a specific geometry, RFTL is parameterized by an arbitrary regularization function RRR, and its regret bound depends on RRR only through two scalar quantities the mission makes explicit — the range of RRR over KKK, and a RRR-dependent "local norm" of the gradients. Choosing RRR to match KKK's geometry (entropy regularization on the simplex, for instance) recovers the sharp bounds that plain OGD cannot. RFTL and its close relative Online Mirror Descent (OMD), also introduced here, are the ancestors of essentially every regularization-based online learning algorithm in use today, including the multiplicative-weights/Hedge algorithm of Chapter I as a special case (entropy regularization on the simplex) and the exponentiated-gradient algorithm this book's own Chapter VIII reuses (Corollary 5.7, a further specialization of Theorem 5.2 this mission's Theorem 5.2 underlies). The naive "Follow the Leader" strategy this chapter opens by refuting — always play the empirically best point so far — is a natural first idea and provably fails: the book gives an explicit two-point cost sequence on which it incurs regret linear in the horizon. Regularization is the fix, and quantifying exactly how much it costs and buys is this chapter's content.

Setting

Fix a convex, nonempty decision set KKK in a real inner product space EEE and a sequence of convex cost functions f1,f2,⋯:K→Rf_1, f_2, \dots : K \to \mathbb{R}f1​,f2​,⋯:K→R. As in Chapter III, regret after TTT rounds is

RegretT=∑t=1Tft(xt)−min⁡x⋆∈K∑t=1Tft(x⋆).\mathrm{Regret}_T = \sum_{t=1}^{T} f_t(x_t) - \min_{x^\star \in K} \sum_{t=1}^{T} f_t(x^\star).RegretT​=t=1∑T​ft​(xt​)−x⋆∈Kmin​t=1∑T​ft​(x⋆).

A regularization function R:K→RR : K \to \mathbb{R}R:K→R is a strongly convex, smooth, twice differentiable function with a positive-definite Hessian on the interior of KKK. Its Bregman divergence measures the gap between RRR and its own first-order Taylor approximation:

BR(x∥y)=R(x)−R(y)−∇R(y)⊤(x−y).B_R(x \| y) = R(x) - R(y) - \nabla R(y)^\top(x - y).BR​(x∥y)=R(x)−R(y)−∇R(y)⊤(x−y).

By the mean value theorem, BR(x∥y)=12∥x−y∥z2B_R(x\|y) = \tfrac12\|x-y\|_z^2BR​(x∥y)=21​∥x−y∥z2​ for some point zzz on the segment [x,y][x,y][x,y], where ∥⋅∥z\|\cdot\|_z∥⋅∥z​ is the norm induced by the Hessian ∇2R(z)\nabla^2 R(z)∇2R(z); its dual norm, denoted ∥⋅∥z∗\|\cdot\|_z^*∥⋅∥z∗​, is the local norm at zzz. Writing ∥⋅∥t\|\cdot\|_t∥⋅∥t​ for the local norm between consecutive iterates xt,xt+1x_t, x_{t+1}xt​,xt+1​, the RRR-diameter of KKK is DR2=max⁡x,y∈K(R(x)−R(y))D_R^2 = \max_{x,y\in K}(R(x)-R(y))DR2​=maxx,y∈K​(R(x)−R(y)).

The RFTL algorithm (Algorithm 13), with step size η>0\eta > 0η>0, plays x1=arg⁡min⁡x∈KR(x)x_1 = \arg\min_{x\in K} R(x)x1​=argminx∈K​R(x), then at every round updates

xt+1=arg⁡min⁡x∈K{η∑s=1t∇s⊤x+R(x)},∇t:=∇ft(xt).x_{t+1} = \arg\min_{x \in K}\Big\{\eta \sum_{s=1}^{t} \nabla_s^\top x + R(x)\Big\}, \qquad \nabla_t := \nabla f_t(x_t).xt+1​=argx∈Kmin​{ηs=1∑t​∇s⊤​x+R(x)},∇t​:=∇ft​(xt​).

The agile Online Mirror Descent algorithm (Algorithm 14, agile version) instead maintains a dual point yty_tyt​ with ∇R(y1)=0\nabla R(y_1) = 0∇R(y1​)=0, updates it by ∇R(yt+1)=∇R(xt)−η∇t\nabla R(y_{t+1}) = \nabla R(x_t) - \eta \nabla_t∇R(yt+1​)=∇R(xt​)−η∇t​, and projects via the Bregman divergence, xt+1=arg⁡min⁡x∈KBR(x∥yt+1)x_{t+1} = \arg\min_{x\in K} B_R(x\|y_{t+1})xt+1​=argminx∈K​BR​(x∥yt+1​) (with x1x_1x1​ defined the same way from y1y_1y1​). RFTL and the lazy variant of OMD coincide for linear costs (Lemma 5.5, not formalized here — it is not used by either target); the agile variant's analysis is genuinely different and is the mission's second target.

Formalization targets

Target (Theorem 5.2 — RFTL's regret bound)

RegretT  ≤  2η∑t=1T∥∇t∥t∗2  +  R(u)−R(x1)η,for every u∈K.\mathrm{Regret}_T \;\le\; 2\eta \sum_{t=1}^{T} \|\nabla_t\|_t^{*2} \;+\; \frac{R(u) - R(x_1)}{\eta}, \qquad \text{for every } u \in K.RegretT​≤2ηt=1∑T​∥∇t​∥t∗2​+ηR(u)−R(x1​)​,for every u∈K.

This is the mission's goal: RFTL, run with any admissible regularizer, attains a regret bound governed only by the cumulative squared local norm of the gradients and RRR's range over KKK. The bound is proved via two milestones: Lemma 5.3 (regret controlled by the total "prediction drift" ∑t∇t⊤(xt−xt+1)\sum_t \nabla_t^\top(x_t - x_{t+1})∑t​∇t⊤​(xt​−xt+1​) plus DR2/ηD_R^2/\etaDR2​/η), which in turn rests on Lemma 5.4 (a "follow-the-leader beats be-the-leader" comparison inequality, proved by induction on the horizon).

Further target (Theorem 5.6 — agile OMD's regret bound)

RegretT  ≤  η4∑t=1T∥∇t∥t∗2  +  R(u)−R(x1)2η,for every u∈K.\mathrm{Regret}_T \;\le\; \frac{\eta}{4} \sum_{t=1}^{T} \|\nabla_t\|_t^{*2} \;+\; \frac{R(u) - R(x_1)}{2\eta}, \qquad \text{for every } u \in K.RegretT​≤4η​t=1∑T​∥∇t​∥t∗2​+2ηR(u)−R(x1​)​,for every u∈K.

A structurally similar bound for the agile variant, included as its own goal-level item since — as the book states explicitly — its proof technique is unrelated to RFTL's, not a corollary of it.

Both targets are the book's own tightest, non-asymptotic statements: neither is weakened to an O(⋅)O(\cdot)O(⋅) form, and the book's own further (unnumbered) corollary specializing Theorem 5.2 to a uniform local-norm bound ∥∇t∥t∗≤GR\|\nabla_t\|_t^* \le G_R∥∇t​∥t∗​≤GR​ is left out, matching this series' convention of formalizing only the numbered results.

Significance

The results themselves. Theorem 5.2 is the general regret theorem behind every regularization scheme in online learning: instantiating RRR recovers the projected-gradient bound of Chapter III (Euclidean RRR), the multiplicative-weights bound of Chapter I (entropy RRR on the simplex), and — through the exponentiated-gradient specialization (Corollary 5.7, not itself a target here) — the row-player regret bound this book's own Chapter VIII cites as "Eq. (8.1)" in its reduction of zero-sum games to regret minimization. Theorem 5.6 gives the same guarantee for an algorithm (agile OMD) that, unlike RFTL, maintains a feasible point at every round, which the book notes is preferable in the adaptive-regret setting of Chapter X.

Formalizing it. Both theorems have complete, elementary proofs in the source (no gaps, no "with high probability", no hidden regularity conditions); the mission's work is converting the analytic argument — the Bregman-divergence identity, the generalized Cauchy-Schwarz inequality bounding the drift term by the local norm, and the two induction arguments underlying Lemma 5.4 — into machine-checked statements. No formalization of RFTL, OMD, or the local-norm machinery exists on the platform (checked below); the closest Formalpedia entries state a related but distinctly narrower result.

Difficulty

The central obstacle is that the regularizer RRR is a hypothesis, not a fixed function: the theorem must hold for every admissible RRR simultaneously, so nothing about RRR beyond its stated properties (strong convexity, smoothness, twice differentiability) may be used. A newcomer's first instinct — bound the local norm ∥∇t∥t∗\|\nabla_t\|_t^*∥∇t​∥t∗​ by a fixed multiple of the Euclidean dual norm ∥∇t∥2\|\nabla_t\|_2∥∇t​∥2​ — fails in general and is exactly the bound RFTL is designed to avoid needing; the whole point of the local-norm formulation is that it can be tight for regularizers (like entropy) whose Hessian is very far from a multiple of the identity. A second obstacle is Lemma 5.4's induction, which compares xt+1x_{t+1}xt+1​ (a minimizer over t+1t+1t+1 terms) against uuu using the minimality of xt+1x_{t+1}xt+1​ at exactly the right instantiation — an argument that looks almost circular until the induction hypothesis is applied at u=xt+2u = x_{t+2}u=xt+2​, not at the theorem's free variable.

Formalization scope

KKK ranges over an arbitrary real, complete inner product space (a real Hilbert space), matching Chapters III and IV, not a fixed Rn\mathbb{R}^nRn. The RFTL and agile-OMD update rules are represented relationally (IsArgMinOn), since Mathlib has no canonical argmin operator for a general convex set — mirroring IsMetricProjection's precedent from Chapter III. The Hessian at the mean-value-theorem's intermediate point is represented via the second Fréchet derivative of RRR's gradient map (HasFDerivAt), since Mathlib has no dedicated Hessian type; the local dual norm is then any value satisfying the resulting existential characterization (IsLocalDualNormSq), stated once and shared by both targets. A boundedness hypothesis on RRR over KKK is added to Lemma 5.3's statement to keep the RRR-diameter DR2D_R^2DR2​ from collapsing to Mathlib's junk value for an unbounded supremum — a condition every regularizer the book actually uses (strongly convex and smooth over a bounded KKK) already satisfies, so it narrows nothing.

Trivializing formalization ruled out. A regret bound stated for an "algorithm" defined loosely enough to include the after-the-fact optimal choice would be vacuous; IsRFTLRun and IsOMDAgileRun instead pin down the exact history-dependent update rule of Algorithms 13 and 14 (the current gradient sequence, the current regularizer, and nothing else) as a hypothesis, so a proof must genuinely use the specific update. Theorem 5.2 and Theorem 5.6 are kept as two separate items rather than one theorem parameterized by an algorithm choice, since — per the chapter's own remark that their analyses are unrelated — a merged statement would either need to branch internally on the algorithm or silently identify two genuinely different update rules.

Reuse and prior art. OnlineConvexOpt.FirstOrder.RegretT (Chapter III, published) is imported and reused verbatim, keeping the regret functional identical across the whole book. Definitions specific to Chapter IV (OnlineConvexOpt.SecondOrder, not yet published) are not imported per this series' convention that a draft cannot import another draft; quadForm is redeclared locally instead. On the platform, BanditAlgorithm.ftrl_regret_bound, BanditAlgorithm.mirror_descent_regret_bound, and BanditAlgorithm.ftrl_simplex_exp_weights_regret (the Bandit Algorithms series, Chapter XII) state regret bounds for FTRL and Mirror Descent in the linear-cost, bandit-idiom setting (a fixed linear loss ⟨a,yt⟩\langle a, y_t\rangle⟨a,yt​⟩ at each round, regret compared via a Bregman-divergence potential at fixed points). Hazan's Theorem 5.2 and 5.6 are for general convex ftf_tft​ and use the book's own local-norm object, which has no counterpart in those statements; they are read in full and are not faithful substitutes (different hypothesis class), so this mission drafts its own, independent items rather than reusing them.

Selected references

  • Hazan, Introduction to Online Convex Optimization, 2nd ed., Chapter 5. arXiv:1909.05207v3
  • Shalev-Shwartz, Online Learning and Online Convex Optimization, Foundations and Trends in Machine Learning, 2012 (surveys RFTL/Mirror Descent under the name "Online Mirror Descent"). https://doi.org/10.1561/2200000018
  • Zinkevich, Online Convex Programming and Generalized Infinitesimal Gradient Ascent, ICML 2003 (the Euclidean special case this chapter generalizes). https://www.aaai.org/Papers/ICML/2003/ICML03-120.pdf
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Convex OptimizationMachine Learning·Captain: mikedeng1

Introduction to Online Convex Optimization IV: The Online Newton Step AlgorithmTextbook

Motivation

Online convex optimization measures a decision maker against the best fixed decision in hindsight, and the standard guarantee — achieved, for instance, by online gradient descent — is regret growing like O(T)O(\sqrt T)O(T​) over TTT rounds. This rate is unimprovable for general convex losses: an adversary can always force Ω(T)\Omega(\sqrt T)Ω(T​) regret against any algorithm. But many losses that arise in practice are not merely convex — they carry extra curvature that a first-order method cannot exploit. The paradigm case is online portfolio selection: a trader repeatedly rebalances wealth across nnn assets, observes the market's return vector, and is scored by the logarithm of her wealth growth. Thomas Cover's 1991 universal portfolio theory showed that a decision maker with vanishing average regret against this log-wealth objective grows her wealth, asymptotically, at the same rate as the best fixed (constantly rebalanced) portfolio in hindsight — without any statistical assumption on how the market behaves, in sharp contrast to the Geometric Brownian Motion model of mainstream finance (Cover, Universal Portfolios, Mathematical Finance 1991). Cover's own algorithm, and the class of losses his analysis needs, turned out to generalize far beyond portfolio selection: the same curvature condition governs online square-loss regression (Azoury–Warmuth 2001) and other exp-concave learning problems. This chapter isolates that condition — exp-concavity — and shows it buys a logarithmic-in-TTT regret bound via a second-order algorithm, online Newton step, introduced by Hazan, Agarwal and Kale (Logarithmic Regret Algorithms for Online Convex Optimization, Machine Learning 2007), building on the polynomial-time randomization of Cover's algorithm due to Kalai and Vempala (Efficient Algorithms for Universal Portfolios, Journal of Machine Learning Research 2003) and on the multiplicative-weights algorithm EWOO, which Hazan, Kalai, Kale and Agarwal extended to general exp-concave losses (2006).

Setting

Fix a real inner-product space EEE (in the goal theorem, E=RnE = \mathbb{R}^nE=Rn) and a convex, bounded decision set K⊆EK \subseteq EK⊆E. As in Chapters I and III, an online convex optimization protocol runs for TTT rounds: at round ttt the player picks xt∈Kx_t \in Kxt​∈K, an adversary reveals a convex cost ft:E→Rf_t : E \to \mathbb{R}ft​:E→R, the player incurs ft(xt)f_t(x_t)ft​(xt​), and regret is

RegretT=∑t=1Tft(xt)−min⁡x⋆∈K∑t=1Tft(x⋆),\mathrm{Regret}_T = \sum_{t=1}^T f_t(x_t) - \min_{x^\star \in K} \sum_{t=1}^T f_t(x^\star),RegretT​=t=1∑T​ft​(xt​)−x⋆∈Kmin​t=1∑T​ft​(x⋆),

exactly Eq. (1.2) of Chapter I (OnlineConvexOpt.FirstOrder.RegretT, reused unchanged here). The costs are assumed GGG-gradient-bounded (∥∇ft(x)∥≤G\|\nabla f_t(x)\| \le G∥∇ft​(x)∥≤G on KKK) and KKK has diameter DDD (dist(x,y)≤D\mathrm{dist}(x,y) \le Ddist(x,y)≤D for x,y∈Kx,y \in Kx,y∈K), the same standing hypotheses as Chapters II–III.

A convex f:E→Rf : E \to \mathbb{R}f:E→R is α\alphaα-exp-concave over KKK (Definition 4.1) if g(x)=e−αf(x)g(x) = e^{-\alpha f(x)}g(x)=e−αf(x) is concave on KKK. This is strictly weaker than α\alphaα-strong convexity (Chapter III), yet Lemma 4.2 shows it is exactly a directional strong-convexity condition: a twice-differentiable fff is α\alphaα-exp-concave at xxx iff its Hessian dominates α∇f(x)∇f(x)⊤\alpha \nabla f(x)\nabla f(x)^\topα∇f(x)∇f(x)⊤ — strong curvature only along the gradient direction, not in every direction, which is what lets loss functions like −log⁡(r⊤x)-\log(r^\top x)−log(r⊤x) (rank-one Hessian, far from strongly convex) qualify. Lemma 4.3 turns this into the quadratic lower bound the whole chapter runs on: for γ≤12min⁡{1/(GD),α}\gamma \le \tfrac12\min\{1/(GD), \alpha\}γ≤21​min{1/(GD),α} and x,y∈Kx, y \in Kx,y∈K,

f(x)≥f(y)+∇f(y)⊤(x−y)+γ2(∇f(y)⊤(x−y))2.f(x) \ge f(y) + \nabla f(y)^\top (x - y) + \tfrac{\gamma}{2}\bigl(\nabla f(y)^\top (x-y)\bigr)^2 .f(x)≥f(y)+∇f(y)⊤(x−y)+2γ​(∇f(y)⊤(x−y))2.

Two algorithms are formalized. The Exponentially Weighted Online Optimizer (Algorithm 11, EWOO) plays the wtw_twt​-weighted centroid of KKK, xt=(∫Kwt)−1∫Kx wt(x) dxx_t = \bigl(\int_K w_t\bigr)^{-1}\int_K x\, w_t(x)\,dxxt​=(∫K​wt​)−1∫K​xwt​(x)dx with wt(x)=e−α∑τ<tfτ(x)w_t(x) = e^{-\alpha\sum_{\tau<t} f_\tau(x)}wt​(x)=e−α∑τ<t​fτ​(x); it needs no Lipschitz or diameter bound but is only quasi-polynomial-time in general. Online Newton step (Algorithm 12, ONS) instead maintains a running second-moment matrix At=At−1+∇t∇t⊤A_t = A_{t-1} + \nabla_t\nabla_t^\topAt​=At−1​+∇t​∇t⊤​ (A0=εIA_0 = \varepsilon IA0​=εI) and moves by yt+1=xt−γ−1At−1∇ty_{t+1} = x_t - \gamma^{-1}A_t^{-1}\nabla_tyt+1​=xt​−γ−1At−1​∇t​, projecting back onto KKK in the norm ∥⋅∥At\|\cdot\|_{A_t}∥⋅∥At​​ induced by AtA_tAt​ rather than the Euclidean norm. The formalization represents AtA_tAt​ not as a matrix but as an operator E→LEE \to_L EE→L​E, with At=At−1+∇t∇t⊤A_t = A_{t-1} + \nabla_t\nabla_t^\topAt​=At−1​+∇t​∇t⊤​ rendered as Mathlib's rank-one operator InnerProductSpace.rankOne ℝ ∇_t ∇_t, At−1A_t^{-1}At−1​ as ContinuousLinearMap.inverse, and the generalized projection as minimizing ⟨y−x,At(y−x)⟩\langle y - x, A_t(y-x)\rangle⟨y−x,At​(y−x)⟩ over KKK (quadForm/IsGeneralizedProjection in Def_..._OnlineNewtonStep).

Formalization targets

Goal — Theorem 4.5

RegretT(ONS)≤2(1α+GD) nlog⁡T,γ=12min⁡{1GD,α},  ε=1γ2D2,  T≥4.\mathrm{Regret}_T(\mathrm{ONS}) \le 2\Bigl(\tfrac1\alpha + GD\Bigr)\, n \log T , \qquad \gamma = \tfrac12\min\{\tfrac{1}{GD}, \alpha\},\ \ \varepsilon = \tfrac{1}{\gamma^2 D^2}, \ \ T \ge 4 .RegretT​(ONS)≤2(α1​+GD)nlogT,γ=21​min{GD1​,α},  ε=γ2D21​,  T≥4.

This is the chapter's capstone: logarithmic regret in TTT, at the price of a factor of the ambient dimension nnn — a genuine trade-off against the dimension-free O(T)O(\sqrt T)O(T​) of Chapter III, stated as such rather than hidden inside an O(⋅)O(\cdot)O(⋅).

Comparator — Theorem 4.4

RegretT(EWOO)≤nαlog⁡T+2α.\mathrm{Regret}_T(\mathrm{EWOO}) \le \tfrac{n}{\alpha}\log T + \tfrac{2}{\alpha}.RegretT​(EWOO)≤αn​logT+α2​.

Also logarithmic and, unlike Theorem 4.5, independent of GGG and DDD — the price is EWOO's running time, not its regret, so this is not a weaker version of the same target but an incomparable algorithm formalized for contrast.

Significance

Exp-concavity is the precise dividing line between Θ(T)\Theta(\sqrt T)Θ(T​)-regret losses and losses that admit O(log⁡T)O(\log T)O(logT) regret via a tractable algorithm — narrower than convexity, broader than strong convexity, and satisfied by the log-loss of universal portfolio selection, the square loss of online regression, and (Chapter IX onward) losses arising from PAC learning reductions. The dimension dependence in Theorem 4.5 is not an artifact of a loose proof: it is inherent to the second-moment-matrix approach and is the reason later work (self-concordant barriers, sketching) is needed to remove it in special cases. Both regret bounds have long been proved on paper; formalizing them contributes machine-checked statements of the exp-concavity characterization, the quadratic lower bound it yields, and both algorithms' regret guarantees — none of which currently exist on the platform in any form (a search for "exp-concave", "online Newton step", "second-order online" and "universal portfolio" returned no hits).

Difficulty

The natural first idea for bounding RegretT(ONS)\mathrm{Regret}_T(\mathrm{ONS})RegretT​(ONS) is to bound each round's progress the way online gradient descent's analysis does: a generalized-Pythagorean argument (Lemma 4.6) reduces the regret to (1α+GD)(∑t∇t⊤At−1∇t+1)\bigl(\tfrac1\alpha + GD\bigr)\bigl(\sum_t \nabla_t^\top A_t^{-1}\nabla_t + 1\bigr)(α1​+GD)(∑t​∇t⊤​At−1​∇t​+1) — this much follows the OGD template with the Euclidean norm replaced by the AtA_tAt​-norm. The obstruction is bounding ∑t∇t⊤At−1∇t\sum_t \nabla_t^\top A_t^{-1}\nabla_t∑t​∇t⊤​At−1​∇t​ itself: term-by-term it need not be summable, since ∇t⊤At−1∇t\nabla_t^\top A_t^{-1}\nabla_t∇t⊤​At−1​∇t​ does not shrink with ttt on its own. The book's proof instead recognizes ∇t⊤At−1∇t=At−1∙(At−At−1)\nabla_t^\top A_t^{-1}\nabla_t = A_t^{-1}\bullet(A_t - A_{t-1})∇t⊤​At−1​∇t​=At−1​∙(At​−At−1​) as a discrete log-determinant increment and telescopes it against log⁡∣AT∣/∣A0∣\log|A_T|/|A_0|log∣AT​∣/∣A0​∣, using a matrix generalization of the scalar inequality a−1(a−b)≤log⁡(a/b)a^{-1}(a-b) \le \log(a/b)a−1(a−b)≤log(a/b). This determinant argument (the book's Lemma 4.7) is not itself formalized as a milestone here — see Formalization scope — so a solver of Theorem 4.5 must reconstruct or restate it.

Formalization scope

KKK, DDD, GGG and α\alphaα are the chapter's standing hypotheses, stated explicitly on every theorem rather than left as ambient unused variables, exactly as in Chapters II–III; γ\gammaγ and ε\varepsilonε are pinned to the theorem's own formulas via explicit hypotheses (hγ, hε) rather than left as free existentials — Rule 7 of the captain brief. The running matrix AtA_tAt​ is formalized as a continuous linear operator on EEE, not as a Matrix (Fin n) (Fin n) ℝ: the rank-one update uses InnerProductSpace.rankOne, and At−1A_t^{-1}At−1​ uses ContinuousLinearMap.inverse, which is total (it returns the zero map when AtA_tAt​ is not invertible, a convention that never bites here since every AtA_tAt​ is positive definite by construction — A0=εI≻0A_0 = \varepsilon I \succ 0A0​=εI≻0 and each update only adds a positive semidefinite rank-one term, so .inverse always agrees with the genuine inverse). IsOnlineNewtonStep and IsGeneralizedProjection are dimension-free, stated for a general real inner-product space; only the goal theorem and Theorem 4.4 fix E=RnE = \mathbb{R}^nE=Rn, since only their bounds mention the dimension nnn explicitly. RegretT is imported unchanged from OnlineConvexOpt.FirstOrder.Protocol (kind: reference), keeping the regret notation identical across the whole book series. A trivializing formalization is ruled out by requiring 0<α0 < \alpha0<α, 0<G0 < G0<G, 0<D0 < D0<D and KKK nonempty throughout: dropping any of these would let γ\gammaγ, ε\varepsilonε, or the bound itself degenerate (e.g. γ≤0\gamma \le 0γ≤0 would make the projection's norm ill-behaved), producing a statement that is vacuously true rather than the book's actual claim. Lemma 4.7 (the log-determinant inequality) and the exercises are not formalized: the former is a general fact about positive definite operators disconnected from the OCO-specific definitions this mission introduces, and the latter are pedagogical, not numbered results the chapter's own proofs depend on. Reusable beyond this mission: the exp-concavity definitions (IsExpConcaveOn, IsExpConcaveAt) for any later chapter's exp-concave losses (the series plan flags Chapters V and X), and the generalized-projection machinery for any future second-order OCO algorithm.

Selected references

  • T. M. Cover, Universal Portfolios, Mathematical Finance 1(1), 1991. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9965.1991.tb00002.x
  • E. Hazan, A. Agarwal, S. Kale, Logarithmic Regret Algorithms for Online Convex Optimization, Machine Learning 69(2–3), 2007. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10994-007-5016-8
  • A. Kalai, S. Vempala, Efficient Algorithms for Universal Portfolios, Journal of Machine Learning Research 3, 2003. https://www.jmlr.org/papers/v3/kalai02a.html
  • K. Azoury, M. Warmuth, Relative Loss Bounds for On-Line Density Estimation with the Exponential Family of Distributions, Machine Learning 43, 2001. https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1010896012157
  • E. Hazan, Introduction to Online Convex Optimization, 2nd ed., arXiv:1909.05207v3, Chapter 4. https://arxiv.org/abs/1909.05207
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Introduction to Stochastic Programming VIII: Multistage Jensen Bounds and AggregationTextbook

Motivation

A multistage stochastic program's exact deterministic equivalent grows exponentially with the number of periods, even when each period's random data takes only a handful of values (Chapter 9's concern was the growth in the number of realizations; Chapter 10 adds growth in the number of periods). One remedy, generalizing Chapter 8's single-period Jensen bound, is to replace the exact per-period random data by a coarser, aggregated version — conditional expectations over a partition of the history space at each stage — and solve the resulting smaller deterministic equivalent instead. This is only useful if the aggregated problem's optimal value is provably a bound (here, a lower bound) on the exact problem's, and Birge & Louveaux's Chapter 10, §10.1, Theorem 1 is exactly the statement that makes this legitimate, together with a genuinely necessary extra condition the book states explicitly two paragraphs before the theorem: "if not [i.e. if the extra condition fails], then the conditional expectation form ... may not actually achieve a bound." This mission formalizes that theorem.

Setting

The book's exact multistage stochastic linear program (Eq. 1.1, p. 418) is

min c¹x¹ + E_Ω[c²x² + ⋯ + cᴴxᴴ]
s.t. W¹x¹ = h¹,  Tᵗ⁻¹xᵗ⁻¹ + Wᵗxᵗ = hᵗ (t=2,…,H, a.s.),  xᵗ ≥ 0 a.s., xᵗ nonanticipative (Σᵗ-measurable),

over the exact event space Ω = Ω₁ × ⋯ × Ω_H. Given a consistent nested partition of each Ωᵗ = Ω₁ × ⋯ × Ωₜ into finitely many blocks Sᵗ₁, …, Sᵗ_νₜ, and aggregated data (h̄ᵗᵢ, T̄ᵗᵢ) = E^{Sᵗᵢ}[(hᵗ,Tᵗ)] (the conditional expectation of the true random data over block i), the aggregated problem (Eq. 1.2, p. 419) replaces the exact recursion by a finite tree of blocks, one decision per block, linked to its parent block's decision. Both (1.1) and (1.2) are, structurally, the same kind of object — a finite-tree deterministic-equivalent recourse LP — differing only in which tree and which node data they use; this mission formalizes that shared shape once (Tree, Instance, Feasible, obj) and instantiates it twice.

Formalized as: a shared Tree H structure (a finite node type, per-node stage, anc, and a root), the same representation Chunk 06's Multistage.Tree uses for the exact scenario tree of its own (different) chapter, restated here rather than imported (a draft cannot import another chunk's draft). An Instance H n m T bundles a tree's node-varying LP data (c, W, Tmat, h, p); Feasible/obj give its feasible set and objective. The exact problem (1.1) is Instance H n m TFine for a fine/exact tree TFine; the aggregated problem (1.2) is Instance H n m TCoarse for a coarser tree TCoarse, connected to TFine by an aggregation map agg : TFine.Node → TCoarse.Node.

Formalization targets

Goal — Chapter 10, Theorem 1 (p. 419)

agg respects the tree structure (root, stage, ancestor);
W, c agree between the fine and coarse instances (up to agg);
coarse.h, coarse.Tmat are the p-weighted conditional expectations of fine.h, fine.Tmat over
  each aggregation fiber;
∀ coarse nodes i,i' at the same stage sharing a "current-period outcome",
  coarse.h i = coarse.h i' ∧ coarse.Tmat i = coarse.Tmat i'
  ⟹ zCoarse ≤ zFine

This is the mission's only formalization target: BRIEF.md records that no separately numbered lemma precedes Theorem 1's proof in this section to serve as an independent milestone (the proof is a direct LP-duality argument against the theorem's own hypotheses), and that Chapter 8's Theorem 1 — the two-period case this theorem generalizes — is a cross-chapter dependency belonging to Chunk 08's own mission, not a milestone here. milestones.yaml is accordingly empty; see STATUS.md for the explicit accounting of what else in this chapter was considered and left out (Theorem 3, the aggregation error bound of §10.2, an unrelated and substantially heavier result).

Significance

Theorem 1 is what licenses every aggregation-based approximation scheme the rest of the book's multistage material builds on: it says precisely when replacing a multistage recourse problem's random data by within-period conditional expectations preserves a valid lower bound, and precisely identifies the condition (aggregated nodes sharing a current-period outcome must carry identical aggregated data) whose failure breaks the bound — a condition the book states is not decorative ("if not, then the conditional expectation form ... may not actually achieve a bound," p. 418). Formalizing it gives Prove2Me a first structural result connecting Chapter 8's single-period Jensen bound (Chunk 08) to genuinely multistage approximation, using the same finite-scenario-tree deterministic-equivalent representation Chunk 06 uses for the exact nested Benders decomposition — the two missions' shared representation choice (documented in both STATUS.md files) means a future mission relating them formally (e.g. instantiating Chunk 06's exact tree as this mission's TFine) has a compatible object to work with, even though neither imports the other's draft.

Difficulty

The theorem's proof (p. 419-420) is a direct LP weak-duality argument: given an optimal dual solution to the aggregated problem, the book constructs a dual-feasible solution to the exact problem attaining the same value, using precisely the "common outcome ⟹ equal aggregated data" hypothesis to make the constructed dual solution well-defined across the exact tree's finer structure. This is a real argument, not a citation, but it is left as sorry: formalizing the proof would need the multistage LP duality machinery (the "multistage version of Theorem 3.13" the book's own proof invokes, itself left as Exercise 1) that no chunk of this series has built. The value of this mission is the faithful statement of the bound and its exact hypotheses.

Formalization scope

  • The book's own printed typo, resolved and documented. Theorem 1's hypothesis clause reads, as printed, "such that (ωt−1,ωt) ∈ Stj if and only if there exist some (ω̂t−1,ωt) ∈ Stj" — S^t_j appears on both sides of the "if and only if," where the sentence's own subject ("S^t_i and S^t_j that have a common outcome") requires the left side to range over S^t_i. Confirmed against a direct render of PDF page 436 (uv run --with pymupdf python), not assumed from OCR: the PDF's own typesetting has this repetition, not an artefact of text extraction. This formalization reads the corrected clause as "S^t_i and S^t_j project onto the same set of period-t outcomes" and states it via an explicit label type Θ and curOutcome : TCoarse.Node → Θ, since the aggregated tree alone does not carry a literal per-period outcome space to project onto (see Setting above — Tree records only history-node structure, not the underlying product space Ω = Ω₁ × ⋯ × Ω_H).
  • W, c shared exactly, not aggregated, matching the book's explicit assumption that the recourse matrix and per-stage cost are deterministic and identical across (1.1) and (1.2) ("Wt known and not random," "ct = ct," p. 418) — formalized as direct equality hypotheses (hW_agree, hc_agree) rather than folding W/c into the conditional-expectation machinery that h/Tmat go through.
  • zFine/zCoarse are hypothesis-characterized, not sInf-defined, avoiding the real infimum's junk value 0 on an unbounded-below or empty feasible set (reference/FAITHFULNESS_TRAPS.md trap 5) — neither tree-LP's feasible set is shown bounded or nonempty by the hypotheses alone.
  • The conditional-expectation defining equations are weighted, p·h/p·Tmat, not h/Tmat alone, matching the book's own E^{Sti}[·] = (h̄ti,T̄ti) read as "the fiber-sum of p·(h,T) equals p_i·(h̄ti,T̄ti)" — the standard definition of a conditional expectation against counting measure on a finite partition. Instance's own hp_pos (every node's probability is strictly positive) rules out the degenerate case a bare unweighted equation would need to guard separately (a coarse node of probability 0, which cannot occur, is what the read-back of this theorem flags as the one case where the weighted equation would not pin down h_coarse/ Tmat_coarse themselves — moot here since hp_pos excludes it).
  • Trivialization risk (this chapter's own). A formalization that let coarse.h/coarse.Tmat be arbitrary constants unrelated to fine.h/fine.Tmat (dropping the conditional-expectation defining equations) would still typecheck a "lower bound" conclusion but assert nothing about aggregation — exactly the risk BRIEF.md flags: "a formalization that treats (h̄ti,T̄ti) as arbitrary constants rather than as conditional expectations over a partition of the scenario space at time t loses the theorem's actual content." Both hCoarse_h/hCoarse_T (the defining equations) and hCommonOutcome (the theorem's own extra hypothesis) are load-bearing and present.

Selected references

  • Birge, J.R., Louveaux, F. Introduction to Stochastic Programming, 2nd ed., Springer 2011, Chapter 10, §10.1 (pp. 417-420), Theorem 1 (p. 419).
  • Birge, J.R. "Decomposition and partitioning methods for multistage stochastic linear programs." Operations Research 33 (1985), 989-1007 — the source Chapter 10's aggregation bounds draw on (cited in §10.2, the neighboring section this mission does not formalize).
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Introduction to Stochastic Programming III: The L-Shaped Method and Its Finite ConvergenceTextbook

Motivation

Two-stage stochastic programs with recourse — choose a first-stage decision xxx now, observe a random outcome ξ\xiξ, then choose a second-stage recourse decision y(ξ)y(\xi)y(ξ) to repair whatever xxx left infeasible or suboptimal — are the workhorse model of the field, used for capacity planning, inventory and financial portfolio problems since the 1950s (Dantzig 1955; Beale 1955). When ξ\xiξ ranges over a finite set of scenarios, the recourse function QQQ that averages the second-stage cost over scenarios is piecewise linear and convex in xxx, so the overall problem is itself a large linear program — but one whose constraint matrix has a scenario for every column block and can be far too large to hand to a general-purpose LP solver directly. Van Slyke and Wets' L-shaped method (1969), the subject of this mission, is the algorithm that made two-stage recourse problems with finite scenario sets practically solvable: it is Benders decomposition specialized to this block structure, alternating between a small master program over xxx (and a scalar θ\thetaθ approximating the recourse cost) and, at each candidate xxx, a batch of second-stage linear programs that either certify xxx's second-stage feasibility or supply a linear underestimate — a cut — of QQQ around xxx. Birge & Louveaux's Introduction to Stochastic Programming (2nd ed., Springer 2011), Chapter 5 §5.1, gives the algorithm and proves its two central guarantees: a shortcut feasibility test for a special case (Theorem 1) and the algorithm's finite convergence in general (Theorem 2), which is this mission's goal.

Setting

A two-stage recourse instance consists of a first-stage feasible region K1={x∣Ax=b, x≥0}K_1 = \{x \mid Ax = b,\ x \ge 0\}K1​={x∣Ax=b, x≥0} for x∈Rn1x \in \mathbb{R}^{n_1}x∈Rn1​, and, for each of KKK finite scenarios k=1,…,Kk = 1, \dots, Kk=1,…,K (occurring with probability pkp_kpk​), second-stage data (qk,hk,Tk)(q_k, h_k, T_k)(qk​,hk​,Tk​) defining the recourse subproblem

Q(x,ξk)=min⁡y≥0{qk⊤y∣Wy=hk−Tkx},Q(x, \xi_k) = \min_{y \ge 0} \{ q_k^\top y \mid W y = h_k - T_k x \},Q(x,ξk​)=y≥0min​{qk⊤​y∣Wy=hk​−Tk​x},

where the recourse matrix WWW is fixed — the same across every scenario, the case this chapter treats. K2={x∣Q(x,ξk)<∞ for all k}K_2 = \{x \mid Q(x,\xi_k) < \infty \text{ for all } k\}K2​={x∣Q(x,ξk​)<∞ for all k} is the set of xxx for which every scenario's subproblem is feasible, and the two-stage problem is

min⁡x c⊤x+Q(x)s.t.x∈K1∩K2,Q(x)=∑k=1Kpk Q(x,ξk).\min_{x} \ c^\top x + Q(x) \quad \text{s.t.} \quad x \in K_1 \cap K_2, \qquad Q(x) = \sum_{k=1}^K p_k\, Q(x, \xi_k).xmin​ c⊤x+Q(x)s.t.x∈K1​∩K2​,Q(x)=k=1∑K​pk​Q(x,ξk​).

A basis of the recourse subproblem is an injective choice of m2m_2m2​ of WWW's columns (where m2m_2m2​ is WWW's row count); each basis bbb determines a simplex multiplier π=(Wb⊤)−1qb\pi = (W_b^\top)^{-1} q_bπ=(Wb⊤​)−1qb​, and when bbb attains the true optimum of Q(x,ξk)Q(x,\xi_k)Q(x,ξk​), LP duality gives Q(x,ξk)=π⊤(hk−Tkx)Q(x,\xi_k) = \pi^\top(h_k - T_k x)Q(x,ξk​)=π⊤(hk​−Tk​x) — the mechanism that turns a batch of second-stage LP solves into linear cuts on xxx.

Formalization targets

The L-shaped algorithm proceeds in three steps, repeated until neither applies:

  • Step 1 solves the current master program (the K1K_1K1​-feasible xxx, plus θ\thetaθ once at least one optimality cut exists, minimizing c⊤x+θc^\top x + \thetac⊤x+θ subject to every cut recorded so far — or just c⊤xc^\top xc⊤x over K1K_1K1​ before the first optimality cut, matching the book's convention that θ\thetaθ "is set equal to −∞-\infty−∞ and is not considered" until then).
  • Step 2 tests each scenario's second-stage feasibility at the Step-1 optimum via an auxiliary LP; if some scenario fails (the LP's optimal value is positive), its optimal basis yields a feasibility cut and the algorithm returns to Step 1.
  • Step 3, once every scenario is feasible, checks whether θ\thetaθ already dominates the true recourse cost at xxx (using each scenario's optimal basis via LP duality); if not, an optimality cut is added and the algorithm returns to Step 1; if so, xxx is optimal and the algorithm stops.

Goal — Chapter 5, Theorem 2 (p. 198)

When ξ is a finite random variable, the L-shaped algorithm finitely converges to\text{When } \xi \text{ is a finite random variable, the L-shaped algorithm finitely converges to}When ξ is a finite random variable, the L-shaped algorithm finitely converges to an optimal solution when it exists, or proves K1∩K2=∅.\text{an optimal solution when it exists, or proves } K_1 \cap K_2 = \varnothing.an optimal solution when it exists, or proves K1​∩K2​=∅.

Formalized as: starting from the empty cut set, there is a finite-length run of the algorithm's Step-1/2/3 transition relation, of length bounded by the total number of distinct feasibility- and optimality-cut witnesses available, ending at a state admitting no further step — at which point either the master program has become infeasible (certifying K1∩K2=∅K_1 \cap K_2 = \varnothingK1​∩K2​=∅) or its optimum is second-stage feasible, passes every fresh Step-3 test, and is optimal for the two-stage problem.

Milestone — Chapter 5, Theorem 1 (p. 194)

If T is deterministic, W is such that every t≥0 lies in pos W,\text{If } T \text{ is deterministic, } W \text{ is such that every } t \ge 0 \text{ lies in } \mathrm{pos}\,W,If T is deterministic, W is such that every t≥0 lies in posW, and a=min⁡khk (componentwise) is attained by some scenario hℓ,\text{and } a = \min_k h_k \text{ (componentwise) is attained by some scenario } h_\ell,and a=kmin​hk​ (componentwise) is attained by some scenario hℓ​, then x∈K2  ⟺  ∃ y≥0, Wy=a−Tx.\text{then } x \in K_2 \iff \exists\, y \ge 0,\ Wy = a - Tx.then x∈K2​⟺∃y≥0, Wy=a−Tx.

A shortcut avoiding KKK separate feasibility LPs at Step 2: under these structural assumptions on WWW, checking feasibility at the single componentwise-worst right-hand side certifies feasibility at every scenario simultaneously.

Significance

Van Slyke and Wets' method (and Benders decomposition more generally, of which it is the recourse-problem specialization) underlies essentially every large-scale two-stage stochastic program solved in practice, and its finite-convergence guarantee — not merely that an optimum exists, but that this specific cutting-plane procedure reaches it in finitely many outer iterations — is what makes the method a decision procedure rather than a heuristic. The proof's content is an explicit finiteness argument (the number of distinct simplex bases of the recourse subproblem and the feasibility-test LP is finite, so the algorithm cannot generate infinitely many distinct cuts before either exhausting the feasible region or converging), not a general compactness or fixed-point argument; formalizing it means formalizing the cutting-plane mechanism itself as a transition system and proving termination combinatorially, over the finite type of available bases, rather than proving only that some optimal xxx exists.

Difficulty

The natural shortcut — state only "an optimal xxx exists, or K1∩K2=∅K_1 \cap K_2 = \varnothingK1​∩K2​=∅" — is not Theorem 2's actual content and is not what this mission targets: that weaker claim would already follow from K1∩K2K_1 \cap K_2K1​∩K2​ being a nonempty polyhedron (or empty), with no reference to the algorithm at all, and would not require the finiteness-of-bases argument the book's proof turns on. The genuine difficulty is representing Steps 1-3 faithfully as a relation on accumulating cut sets, and pinning the termination bound to the actual combinatorial object the book cites (the finite set of bases of the two LPs the algorithm solves at each iteration) rather than to a numeral or an abstract compactness bound. A second, quieter difficulty is Step 1's own optimum: once optimality cuts exist, the master program optimizes c⊤x+θc^\top x + \thetac⊤x+θ jointly, but before the first one it optimizes c⊤xc^\top xc⊤x alone; conflating the two (e.g. always requiring θ\thetaθ to be part of the optimum) does not match Step 1 as the book states it.

Formalization scope

First-stage and second-stage vectors are Fin n1 → ℝ / Fin n2 → ℝ; the finite scenario set is Fin K with probability vector p. A basis is {b : Fin m2 → Fin n2 // Function.Injective b} (m2 = the recourse matrix's row count), matching "an injective choice of m2m_2m2​ columns of WWW"; its finiteness is definitional, from Fin m2 → Fin n2 being finite. Simplex multipliers use Matrix.inv, whose junk value 0 on a singular matrix is never reachable in a proof because multipliers are only ever used through an IsOptimalAt/IsFeasBasisOptimalAt hypothesis that pins the basis to one genuinely attaining the LP's true optimum. The recourse value Q(x,ξk)Q(x,\xi_k)Q(x,ξk​) is EReal-valued (reusing this series' Instance/QVal convention from Chunk 03), so an optimality-cut witness's claimed value is compared to it by an explicit EReal cast, never by EReal arithmetic. The algorithm's state is a pair of finite sets of witnesses recorded so far (Finset (Fin K × FeasBasis n2 m2) × Finset (Fin K → Basis n2 m2)); Step is an inductive relation with one constructor per Step-2 and Step-3 branch, each requiring its witness not already recorded, and the goal states a bounded-length Step-path from the empty state to a state admitting no further Step. This mission does not restate Chapter 3's polyhedrality fact about K2K_2K2​ as a separate lemma: the finiteness fact it is invoked for is already exposed directly and structurally by the finite Fintype bound on the number of bases, so no additional axiom stands in for it (see MODERATION_NOTES.md). Lemmas 3-9 and Theorem 10 of §5.2 (Regularized Decomposition, a different algorithm) are out of scope. The trivializing formalization this mission rules out is exactly the one named under Difficulty above: a bare existence-of-optimal-or- infeasible-xxx statement with no reference to Steps 1-3 or to a finite bound on the number of iterations — such a statement would be true of any nonempty polyhedron and would not be Theorem 2.

Selected references

  • R. Van Slyke and R. Wets, L-Shaped Linear Programs with Applications to Optimal Control and Stochastic Programming, SIAM Journal on Applied Mathematics, 17(4), 1969, pp. 638-663. https://doi.org/10.1137/0117061
  • J. Birge and F. Louveaux, Introduction to Stochastic Programming, 2nd ed., Springer, 2011, Chapter 5. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4614-0237-4
  • G. Dantzig, Linear Programming under Uncertainty, Management Science, 1(3-4), 1955, pp. 197-206. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.1.3-4.197
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Introduction to Online Convex Optimization X: Efficient Adaptive Regret for Online Convex OptimizationTextbook

Motivation

Every regret guarantee through Chapter IX compares the algorithm to the single best fixed decision in hindsight. That comparison is meaningless when the environment itself changes: a commuter's best route differs on weekdays versus weekends, an investor's best portfolio differs in a bull versus a bear market. A standard sublinear-regret algorithm, competing against one static comparator, will converge to some average compromise between regimes — exactly the wrong behavior when the regimes are genuinely different. Chapter 10 develops adaptive regret, a strictly stronger performance metric that demands low regret on every contiguous sub-interval of time simultaneously, and an efficient algorithm (Simple-FLH) that attains it for any base OCO algorithm at only a logarithmic additive cost.

Setting

For a comparator sequence u1,…,uTu_1,\dots,u_Tu1​,…,uT​ with path length P(u1,…,uT)=∑t=1T−1∥ut−ut+1∥+1P(u_1,\dots,u_T) = \sum_{t=1}^{T-1}\|u_t-u_{t+1}\|+1P(u1​,…,uT​)=∑t=1T−1​∥ut​−ut+1​∥+1, the dynamic regret DynamicRegretT(A,u)=∑tft(xt)−∑tft(ut)\mathrm{DynamicRegret}_T(A,u) = \sum_t f_t(x_t) - \sum_t f_t(u_t)DynamicRegretT​(A,u)=∑t​ft​(xt​)−∑t​ft​(ut​) measures performance against a moving target (§10.1). The chapter's central object, adaptive regret (Definition 10.2), instead takes the supremum of ordinary regret over every contiguous sub-interval [r,s]⊆[T][r,s]\subseteq[T][r,s]⊆[T]:

AdaptiveRegretT(A)=sup⁡[r,s]⊆[T]{∑t=rsft(xt)−min⁡x⋆∈K∑t=rsft(x⋆)}.\mathrm{AdaptiveRegret}_T(A) = \sup_{[r,s]\subseteq[T]}\Big\{\sum_{t=r}^s f_t(x_t) - \min_{x^\star\in K}\sum_{t=r}^s f_t(x^\star)\Big\}.AdaptiveRegretT​(A)=[r,s]⊆[T]sup​{t=r∑s​ft​(xt​)−x⋆∈Kmin​t=r∑s​ft​(x⋆)}.

An algorithm is strongly adaptive if its adaptive regret matches its ordinary regret up to logarithmic factors in TTT (§10.2.1).

The chapter builds toward this via the Fixed-Share algorithm (§10.3, Algorithm 30) — a variant of Hedge for the discrete expert-tracking problem, adding a uniform exploration term to each round's multiplicative update so that no expert's weight can vanish entirely — and then lifts it (§10.4) to the continuous OCO setting via Simple-FLH (Algorithm 32): run one fresh copy of a base OCO algorithm AAA per starting time 1,…,T1,\dots,T1,…,T, and apply Fixed-Share to this set of TTT "experts."

Formalization targets

Theorem 10.1 (dynamic regret, milestone)

Online gradient descent with constant step size η>0\eta > 0η>0 satisfies, for every comparator sequence u∈Ku \in Ku∈K,

DynamicRegretT(A,u)≤3D22ηP(u1,…,uT)+η2G2T.\mathrm{DynamicRegret}_T(A,u) \le \frac{3D^2}{2\eta}P(u_1,\dots,u_T) + \frac\eta2 G^2T.DynamicRegretT​(A,u)≤2η3D2​P(u1​,…,uT​)+2η​G2T.

Theorem 10.3 (Fixed-Share tracking regret, milestone)

Given α\alphaα-exp-concave losses, Fixed-Share with δ=1/(2T)\delta=1/(2T)δ=1/(2T) guarantees, for every interval [r,s][r,s][r,s] and every expert iii,

∑t=rsft(xt)−∑t=rsft(xti)≤1αlog⁡(2NT)+1α.\sum_{t=r}^s f_t(x_t) - \sum_{t=r}^s f_t(x^i_t) \le \frac1\alpha\log(2NT) + \frac1\alpha.t=r∑s​ft​(xt​)−t=r∑s​ft​(xti​)≤α1​log(2NT)+α1​.

Theorem 10.6 — the mission's goal

Simple-FLH guarantees

AdaptiveRegretT(Simple-FLH)≤RegretT(A)+1αlog⁡(2T2)+1α.\mathrm{AdaptiveRegret}_T(\text{Simple-FLH}) \le \mathrm{Regret}_T(A) + \frac1\alpha\log(2T^2) + \frac1\alpha.AdaptiveRegretT​(Simple-FLH)≤RegretT​(A)+α1​log(2T2)+α1​.

Significance

Theorem 10.6 answers §10.2.1's own question — are there algorithms simultaneously optimal in ordinary regret and adaptive regret? — affirmatively and constructively: Simple-FLH pays only an additive O(1αlog⁡T)O(\frac1\alpha\log T)O(α1​logT) over whatever regret its base algorithm AAA already achieves, for any α\alphaα-exp-concave-loss algorithm AAA (in particular, taking AAA to be the Online Newton Step algorithm of Chapter IV gives an adaptive-regret algorithm with no asymptotic cost at all). This is the chapter's capstone reduction, structurally similar to Chapter IX's OCO-to-PAC reduction: a generic wrapper around any algorithm in a broad class, converting one guarantee into a strictly stronger one. No prior art was found on the platform for adaptive regret, dynamic regret, or Fixed-Share (planning search: q=adaptive+regret, q=dynamic+regret, q=tracking+regret — no hits); this mission drafts all three results fresh.

Difficulty

Theorem 10.1's proof adapts Theorem 3.1's telescoping-sum argument to a moving comparator, picking up an extra term ∑txt⊤(ut−1−ut)\sum_t x_t^\top(u_{t-1}-u_t)∑t​xt⊤​(ut−1​−ut​) that Cauchy–Schwarz and the diameter bound convert into the path length P(u)P(u)P(u) — a genuinely different quantity from T\sqrt TT​ regret, not a trivial corollary. Theorem 10.3's proof (Lemma 10.4, an exp-concavity-driven potential argument structurally parallel to Hedge's own analysis in Chapter I) tracks how the fixed-share exploration term δ/N\delta/Nδ/N prevents any expert's weight from decaying below a usable floor, so that even an expert active only over a short sub-interval [r,s][r,s][r,s] still has enough accumulated weight at time rrr for the argument to close — the sup-over-all-intervals form of the guarantee is exactly what this floor buys. Theorem 10.6's own proof is comparatively short (a direct application of Theorem 10.3 to Simple-FLH's experts, instantiated at the expert matching the interval's own start point), but depends on both of the preceding results' analyses for its correctness.

Formalization scope

AdaptiveRegretT is stated as a genuine supremum over a finite index set (subintervals of [0,T-1]), so it is a maximum, never a real-suprema-of-an-unbounded-set junk value — the chapter brief's own flagged pitfall (do not state it as a sum or average). ExpConcave is redeclared locally (Chapter IV's own exp-concavity is not yet a published series definition; see MODERATION_NOTES.md). IsFixedShareRun gives expert decisions xi as external data (matching the book's own treatment, where "an expert i suggests decision x^i_t" is not itself part of Fixed-Share's specification) — Theorem 10.3 is drafted at this level of generality, applying to Fixed-Share on any experts, matching how the book itself proves it once and reuses it for Simple-FLH. The goal (Theorem 10.6) connects Simple-FLH's experts to the base algorithm A via the one property the book's own proof actually uses — each expert's interval-regret bound inherited from A — rather than mechanizing Algorithm 32's exact re-indexing formula for starting a fresh copy of A at each round, which never enters the numerical bound; see MODERATION_NOTES.md. Three of this chapter's headline results (Theorems 10.1, 10.3, 10.6) are stated in the book with a bare O(·); per CAPTAIN_BRIEF.md rule 7 and BRIEF.md's explicit guidance, this mission uses the explicit constant each proof actually derives instead (Theorem 10.1's own η-parametrized inequality before the unstated optimal choice of η; Theorems 10.3 and 10.6's own final displayed bounds before they are folded into O(·) notation).

Not formalized: Definition 10.2's own generalization to kkk-shifting comparators (a remark, not a numbered theorem), §10.2.1's tightness/lower-bound claims (left as exercises in the book, no proof given), Lemma 10.4 (an intermediate step whose content is folded directly into Theorem 10.3's own explicit bound), and §10.5's starred FLH2 (Theorem 10.7, poly-logarithmic running time) — an advanced, optional stretch goal per BRIEF.md, not attempted given the chapter's non-starred primary goal (Theorem 10.6) was reachable within budget.

Selected references

  • E. Hazan, Introduction to Online Convex Optimization, 2nd ed., arXiv:1909.05207v3, Chapter 10.
  • M. Herbster, M. Warmuth, "Tracking the best expert," Machine Learning 32(2), 1998, 151-178 (the Fixed-Share algorithm).
  • A. Daniely, A. Gonen, S. Shalev-Shwartz, "Strongly adaptive online learning," ICML 2015 (FLH/Simple-FLH).
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Operations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

Supermodularity and Complementarity II: Topkis's Monotonicity Theorem for Parameterized OptimizationTextbook

Motivation

A recurring question in economics and operations research is: when a decision problem depends on a parameter, does the optimal decision move monotonically as the parameter changes? A firm's optimal input mix as a price rises, a consumer's optimal consumption bundle as income grows, a Cournot firm's optimal output as a rival's output changes — in each case one wants "more of the parameter implies (weakly) more of the optimum" without assuming convexity, differentiability, or a unique optimizer. The classical tool for such comparative statics questions is the implicit function theorem, which needs smoothness and a nondegenerate Hessian and breaks down the moment the optimum is not unique or the objective is not differentiable. Topkis [1978] showed that a purely order-theoretic condition — supermodularity of the objective jointly in the decision variable and the parameter — is sufficient on its own, with no smoothness, uniqueness, or convexity assumed at all, and Milgrom and Roberts [1990a, 1994] later showed this lattice-theoretic approach subsumes and strengthens the classical monotone-comparative-statics results in economics. This mission formalizes the two central results this book calls "Topkis's theorem" (Theorem 2.8.1 and Theorem 2.8.2), together with the structural fact about maximizers of a supermodular function (Theorem 2.7.1) that both rest on, and the strengthening to strictly ordered optimal selections (Theorem 2.8.4).

Setting

Let XXX be a lattice: a partially ordered set (X,⪯)(X, \preceq)(X,⪯) in which every pair x,x′x, x'x,x′ has a join x∨x′x \vee x'x∨x′ and a meet x∧x′x \wedge x'x∧x′. A real-valued function f:X→Rf : X \to \mathbb{R}f:X→R is supermodular on XXX if f(x′)+f(x′′)≤f(x′∨x′′)+f(x′∧x′′)f(x') + f(x'') \le f(x' \vee x'') + f(x' \wedge x'')f(x′)+f(x′′)≤f(x′∨x′′)+f(x′∧x′′) for all x′,x′′∈Xx', x'' \in Xx′,x′′∈X; this is the same relativized notion (SupermodularOn) used, with S=XS = XS=X, throughout chunk I of this series.

Now let TTT also be a partially ordered set (the parameter set), and let f:X×T→Rf : X \times T \to \mathbb{R}f:X×T→R be a real-valued function of the pair (x,t)(x, t)(x,t). fff has increasing differences in (x,t)(x, t)(x,t) if, for every t′≺t′′t' \prec t''t′≺t′′ in TTT, the map x↦f(x,t′′)−f(x,t′)x \mapsto f(x, t'') - f(x, t')x↦f(x,t′′)−f(x,t′) is monotone (order-preserving) in xxx; equivalently, the marginal gain from raising ttt is itself increasing in xxx. Replacing "monotone" with "strictly monotone" gives strictly increasing differences. To compare the resulting sets of optimizers rather than single points, this mission reuses the induced set ordering ⊑\sqsubseteq⊑ from chunk I: for A,B⊆XA, B \subseteq XA,B⊆X, A⊑BA \sqsubseteq BA⊑B holds when a∧b∈Aa \wedge b \in Aa∧b∈A and a∨b∈Ba \vee b \in Ba∨b∈B for all a∈Aa \in Aa∈A, b∈Bb \in Bb∈B.

Formalization targets

Goal — Theorem 2.8.2 (Topkis's theorem)

Let XXX and TTT be lattices, let SSS be a sublattice of the product lattice X×TX \times TX×T, and let St={x∈X:(x,t)∈S}S_t = \{x \in X : (x, t) \in S\}St​={x∈X:(x,t)∈S} be the section of SSS at t∈Tt \in Tt∈T. If f:X×T→Rf : X \times T \to \mathbb{R}f:X×T→R is supermodular on SSS (jointly in the pair (x,t)(x, t)(x,t)), then

t  ⟼  argmax⁡x∈Stf(x,t)t \;\longmapsto\; \operatorname{argmax}_{x \in S_t} f(x, t)t⟼argmaxx∈St​​f(x,t)

is increasing in ttt, with respect to ⊑\sqsubseteq⊑, on {t∈T:argmax⁡x∈Stf(x,t)≠∅}\{t \in T : \operatorname{argmax}_{x \in S_t} f(x, t) \neq \emptyset\}{t∈T:argmaxx∈St​​f(x,t)=∅}.

Theorem 2.8.1 (the underlying, more elementary sufficient condition)

With St⊆XS_t \subseteq XSt​⊆X increasing in ttt (with respect to ⊑\sqsubseteq⊑), f(x,t)f(x,t)f(x,t) supermodular in xxx for each fixed ttt, and f(x,t)f(x,t)f(x,t) having increasing differences in (x,t)(x,t)(x,t) on X×TX \times TX×T, the same conclusion — t↦argmax⁡x∈Stf(x,t)t \mapsto \operatorname{argmax}_{x \in S_t} f(x,t)t↦argmaxx∈St​​f(x,t) increasing in ⊑\sqsubseteq⊑ — holds. Theorem 2.8.2's joint-supermodularity hypothesis on a sublattice of X×TX \times TX×T automatically forces both of Theorem 2.8.1's hypotheses, so 2.8.1 is the logically weaker, more elementary statement from which 2.8.2's proof proceeds.

Theorem 2.8.4 (strict strengthening)

Under the hypotheses of Theorem 2.8.1 but with strictly increasing differences, every individual optimal solution at a larger parameter value dominates every individual optimal solution at a smaller one: t′≺t′′t' \prec t''t′≺t′′, x′∈argmax⁡x∈St′f(x,t′)x' \in \operatorname{argmax}_{x \in S_{t'}} f(x,t')x′∈argmaxx∈St′​​f(x,t′), and x′′∈argmax⁡x∈St′′f(x,t′′)x'' \in \operatorname{argmax}_{x \in S_{t''}} f(x,t'')x′′∈argmaxx∈St′′​​f(x,t′′) together force x′⪯x′′x' \preceq x''x′⪯x′′ — a genuinely stronger conclusion than ⊑\sqsubseteq⊑ alone gives.

A supporting result is formalized as a milestone because both goals' proofs use it directly: Theorem 2.7.1, that argmax⁡x∈Xf(x)\operatorname{argmax}_{x \in X} f(x)argmaxx∈X​f(x) is a sublattice of XXX whenever fff is supermodular on XXX — the structural fact that makes it meaningful to compare optimal-solution sets with ⊑\sqsubseteq⊑ in the first place.

Significance

The result itself. Theorem 2.8.2 is the book's own headline theorem, cited throughout the rest of the monograph: it underlies the assortative-matching existence theorem (Chapter 3), monotone optimal policies in Markov decision processes (Chapter 3), and equilibrium comparative statics in supermodular games (Chapter 4) — each a later mission in this series. Its distinguishing feature relative to the implicit function theorem is that it needs no differentiability, no uniqueness of the optimizer, and no interiority: it applies equally to discrete decision problems (integer programming, combinatorial selection) and continuous ones.

Formalizing it. Nothing in Mathlib currently states a parametric monotone-comparative- statics result of this shape: the closest neighboring material (order-preserving maps, MonotoneOn, lattice structures) supplies only the vocabulary, not the theorem. This mission is the first formalization of Topkis's theorem on this platform and introduces the increasing-differences vocabulary (IncreasingDifferencesOn, StrictlyIncreasingDifferencesOn) that later missions in this series (matching, MDPs, supermodular games) reuse directly.

Difficulty

The natural first idea — differentiate fff in xxx, set the gradient to zero, and use the implicit function theorem on the resulting first-order condition — fails immediately because nothing here is assumed differentiable, and argmax⁡x∈Stf(x,t)\operatorname{argmax}_{x \in S_t} f(x,t)argmaxx∈St​​f(x,t) need not be a single point. The correct argument instead compares two arbitrary elements x′∈St′x' \in S_{t'}x′∈St′​, x′′∈St′′x'' \in S_{t''}x′′∈St′′​ directly through the supermodularity inequality applied to the pair (x′,t′)(x', t')(x′,t′) against (x′∨x′′,t′)(x' \vee x'', t')(x′∨x′′,t′) (a chain of inequalities Topkis calls "Lemma 2.8.1"), using increasing differences only to move the parameter from t′t't′ to t′′t''t′′ inside that chain — at no point is a derivative, a selection function, or an interior point used. A second subtlety is that "increasing" in the conclusion is with respect to the induced set order ⊑\sqsubseteq⊑, not a claim that some selection t↦x(t)t \mapsto x(t)t↦x(t) is monotone: proving the stronger, pointwise-ordered conclusion (Theorem 2.8.4) genuinely needs the strict form of increasing differences, not merely increasing differences plus an extra hypothesis.

Formalization scope

XXX and TTT are kept as abstract Lattice/PartialOrder types throughout, matching the book's own generality — Theorem 2.8.1's and 2.8.2's Rn\mathbb{R}^nRn/Rm\mathbb{R}^mRm corollary via second partial derivatives (discussed in the book's prose immediately after Theorem 2.8.2, p. 77) is not itself a numbered theorem and is not formalized here. Supermodularity, increasing differences, and strictly increasing differences are each formalized as a single relativized definition (SupermodularOn f S, IncreasingDifferencesOn f S, StrictlyIncreasingDifferencesOn f S) so the same declaration expresses both "supermodular on the whole lattice XXX" (used by Theorem 2.7.1 and Theorem 2.8.1's per-ttt hypothesis) and "jointly supermodular on a sublattice SSS of X×TX \times TX×T" (Theorem 2.8.2) — a formalization that instead only ever supermodularized f(⋅,t)f(\cdot, t)f(⋅,t) for fixed ttt would collapse Theorem 2.8.2's genuinely joint hypothesis into a restatement of Theorem 2.8.1, which is exactly the trivialization this mission's chunk brief warns against. argmax⁡x∈Stf(x,t)\operatorname{argmax}_{x \in S_t} f(x,t)argmaxx∈St​​f(x,t) is written out as the set of x∈Stx \in S_tx∈St​ that dominate every other element of StS_tSt​ under f(⋅,t)f(\cdot, t)f(⋅,t), and every conclusion is stated only for pairs t⪯t′t \preceq t't⪯t′ at which both argmax sets are assumed nonempty — matching the book's own restriction to {t∈T:argmax⁡x∈Stf(x,t)≠∅}\{t \in T : \operatorname{argmax}_{x \in S_t} f(x,t) \neq \emptyset\}{t∈T:argmaxx∈St​​f(x,t)=∅}, since ⊑\sqsubseteq⊑ holds vacuously whenever either side is empty. This mission depends on chunk I's InducedSetOrder; it introduces no reusable infrastructure beyond its own three definitions, which later missions in the series (matching, MDPs, supermodular games) are expected to import directly rather than redefine.

Selected references

  • Topkis, D. M., Minimizing a submodular function on a lattice, Operations Research 26(2), 1978, pp. 305–321. https://doi.org/10.1287/opre.26.2.305
  • Topkis, D. M., Supermodularity and Complementarity, Princeton University Press, 2011 (DOI 10.1515/9781400822539), Chapter 2, §2.6–2.8.
  • Milgrom, P. and Shannon, C., Monotone comparative statics, Econometrica 62(1), 1994, pp. 157–180. https://doi.org/10.2307/2951479
  • Milgrom, P. and Roberts, J., Rationalizability, learning, and equilibrium in games with strategic complementarities, Econometrica 58(6), 1990, pp. 1255–1277. https://doi.org/10.2307/2938316
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Dynamic ProgrammingOperations ResearchProbability·Captain: Shuze Chen

Dynamic Programming and Optimal Control VII: Infinite Horizon ProblemsTextbook

Motivation

Infinite-horizon dynamic programming is the mathematical core of Markov decision processes and reinforcement learning: Bellman equations, value iteration, policy iteration, and their guarantees. Chapter 7 of Bertsekas, Dynamic Programming and Optimal Control, Vol. I (3rd ed., 2005) develops the finite-state theory in its cleanest generality — stochastic shortest path (SSP) problems first (Prop. 7.2.1–7.2.2), with discounted problems (Prop. 7.3.1) and average-cost problems (Prop. 7.4.1–7.4.2) derived from the SSP analysis. These propositions are cited throughout the MDP/RL literature as the base case of the theory; none of them exists in Mathlib.

Setting

States 1,…,n1, \dots, n1,…,n plus an implicit cost-free absorbing termination state ttt; finite nonempty control sets U(i)U(i)U(i); costs g(i,u)g(i,u)g(i,u); sub-stochastic transitions pij(u)≥0p_{ij}(u) \ge 0pij​(u)≥0, ∑jpij(u)≤1\sum_j p_{ij}(u) \le 1∑j​pij​(u)≤1, the deficit being the termination probability (BertsekasSSPModel). Operators

(TμJ)(i)=g(i,μ(i))+∑jpij(μ(i))J(j),(TJ)(i)=min⁡u∈U(i)[g(i,u)+∑jpij(u)J(j)](T_\mu J)(i) = g(i,\mu(i)) + \sum_j p_{ij}(\mu(i)) J(j), \qquad (TJ)(i) = \min_{u \in U(i)}\Big[g(i,u) + \sum_j p_{ij}(u) J(j)\Big](Tμ​J)(i)=g(i,μ(i))+j∑​pij​(μ(i))J(j),(TJ)(i)=u∈U(i)min​[g(i,u)+j∑​pij​(u)J(j)]

(BertsekasSSPPolicyOp, BertsekasSSPBellmanOp), NNN-stage costs by backward recursion with policy shift (BertsekasSSPNCost), and the survival mass P{xm≠t}P\{x_m \ne t\}P{xm​=t} (BertsekasSSPSurvival). Assumption 7.2.1: for some m>0m > 0m>0, every admissible policy has survival mass <1< 1<1 from every state after mmm stages. The discounted setting reuses the same model with stochastic rows and 0<α<10 < \alpha < 10<α<1 (BertsekasDiscounted*); the average-cost setting adds a designated state sss with the avoidance probability of Assumption 7.4.1 (BertsekasSSPAvoidProb).

Target

Under Assumption 7.2.1, there is a vector J∗J^*J∗ with

TkJ0→J∗  ∀J0,J∗=TJ∗ uniquely,J∗(i)≤Jπ(i)=lim⁡NJπN(i)  ∀π admissible,T^k J_0 \to J^* \ \ \forall J_0, \qquad J^* = T J^* \text{ uniquely}, \qquad J^*(i) \le J_\pi(i) = \lim_N J^N_\pi(i) \ \ \forall \pi \text{ admissible},TkJ0​→J∗  ∀J0​,J∗=TJ∗ uniquely,J∗(i)≤Jπ​(i)=Nlim​JπN​(i)  ∀π admissible,

and a stationary policy attaining J∗J^*J∗ — BertsekasDP.ssp_main_theorem (goal, Prop. 7.2.1(a),(b)). Milestones: 7.2.1(c) policy evaluation, 7.2.1(d) optimality iff greediness, 7.2.2 policy iteration, 7.3.1 the full discounted counterpart, 7.4.1 the average-cost Bellman equation, 7.4.2 average-cost policy iteration.

Significance

These are the convergence guarantees behind value iteration and policy iteration — the two algorithms at the root of dynamic programming practice and of RL analyses (Q-learning's target operator is exactly TTT). The SSP form is the strongest of the three: the discounted theory is its special case (termination with probability 1−α1 - \alpha1−α per stage) and the average-cost theory reduces to it through cycles at the recurrent state. Formalized, the chapter yields a reusable finite-MDP theory: monotone operators, mmm-stage contractions, and the machinery for later Vol. II material. All results are proved in the book; the formalization is new.

Difficulty

TTT is not a one-stage contraction in the sup-norm under Assumption 7.2.1 — only an mmm-stage contraction, uniformly over the finitely many mmm-stage policy prefixes; extracting the uniform contraction factor ρ<1\rho < 1ρ<1 (via finiteness of the policy space) is the crux of the whole chapter. The limit of NNN-stage costs for nonstationary policies must be established, not assumed (tail-sum estimate ρ⌊N/m⌋\rho^{\lfloor N/m \rfloor}ρ⌊N/m⌋). For the average-cost results the associated-SSP construction (stop on reaching sss) must be built inside the proof. The liminf phrasing of average-cost optimality is deliberate: for arbitrary nonstationary policies the Cesàro limit need not exist.

Formalization scope

Finite states Fin n, finite control type, constraint sets as Finsets with attained minima; no termination state in the carrier — termination is the sub-stochastic deficit, exactly as the book treats it computationally. Policies are sequences of stage policies (Markov); costs of nonstationary policies via the shift recursion. Convergence is Tendsto in the product topology (equivalently sup-norm, nnn finite). Average cost uses real liminf and division with the N=0N = 0N=0 term junk-valued at 0 (irrelevant at infinity). The discounted theorem packages parts (a)–(e) in one statement mirroring Prop. 7.3.1.

Selected references

  • D. P. Bertsekas, Dynamic Programming and Optimal Control, Vol. I, 3rd ed., Athena Scientific, 2005. (§7.1–7.4.) http://www.athenasc.com/dpbook.html
  • D. P. Bertsekas, J. N. Tsitsiklis, An analysis of stochastic shortest path problems, Math. Oper. Res. 16 (1991), 580–595. https://doi.org/10.1287/moor.16.3.580
  • M. L. Puterman, Markov Decision Processes, Wiley, 1994. https://doi.org/10.1002/9780470316887
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Convex OptimizationFunctional Analysis·Captain: wenxinzhang

Vector Space Methods V: Convex Separation and Distance DualityTextbook

Motivation

Linear approximation is only one instance of distance minimization. Feasible sets in optimization are typically convex rather than subspaces, so a useful certificate must compare a target point with an entire convex set and must allow an affine offset. Chapter 5 of Luenberger's Optimization by Vector Space Methods builds this certificate through geometric forms of the Hahn--Banach theorem, supporting hyperplanes, and separation of convex sets. The resulting minimum-distance theorem expresses the distance from a point to a convex set as an optimal gap measured by a norm-bounded continuous linear functional (Luenberger, §§5.12--5.13, pp. 130--137).

This mission advances the series from subspace annihilators to affine separation. It formalizes the Minkowski gauge used by the chapter, three progressively stronger separation statements, and a capstone distance-duality certificate. These results are standard infrastructure for constrained optimization: they turn a geometric exclusion or distance into a scalar inequality that can later become a multiplier or a dual bound.

Setting

Let XXX be a real normed space and K⊆XK\subseteq XK⊆X a nonempty convex set. Convexity is represented by Convex ℝ K, and topological interior, closure, and infimum distance use Mathlib's interior, closure, and Metric.infDist. A continuous affine separator is described by a continuous linear functional f:X\toL[R]Rf:X\toL[\mathbb R]\mathbb Rf:X\toL[R]R and a scalar level ccc. The inequality f(k)≤cf(k)\le cf(k)≤c for all k∈Kk\in Kk∈K places KKK in one closed half-space.

When a convex set contains zero in its interior, its Minkowski gauge is the functional gauge K. The source characterizes it by nonnegativity, positive homogeneity, subadditivity, continuity, and the level sets

{x:gK(x)≤1}=K‾,{x:gK(x)<1}=int⁡K.\{x:g_K(x)\le 1\}=\overline K, \qquad \{x:g_K(x)<1\}=\operatorname{int}K.{x:gK​(x)≤1}=K,{x:gK​(x)<1}=intK.

These properties are bundled into the first milestone, following Lemma 1 of §5.12 (pp. 131--132).

For two convex sets K1,K2K_1,K_2K1​,K2​, Eidelheit separation means finding nonzero fff and ccc with f(x)≤c≤f(y)f(x)\le c\le f(y)f(x)≤c≤f(y) for x∈K1x\in K_1x∈K1​ and y∈K2y\in K_2y∈K2​. The source assumes that K1K_1K1​ has nonempty interior and that its interior does not meet K2K_2K2​. The Lean statement records the nonemptiness of K2K_2K2​ explicitly, since otherwise nonzero separation is not forced.

Formalization targets

Gauge and geometric Hahn--Banach milestones

Formalize the six gauge properties above. Then, for a convex KKK with nonempty interior and an affine subspace VVV disjoint from that interior, produce f≠0f\ne0f=0 and ccc such that

f(v)=c(v∈V),f(k)<c(k∈int⁡K).f(v)=c\quad(v\in V), \qquad f(k)<c\quad(k\in\operatorname{int}K).f(v)=c(v∈V),f(k)<c(k∈intK).

This is Mazur's geometric Hahn--Banach theorem as stated in §5.12, Theorem 1 (p. 133).

Supporting hyperplanes and convex-set separation

For x∉int⁡Kx\notin\operatorname{int}Kx∈/intK, formalize a nonzero functional satisfying f(k)≤f(x)f(k)\le f(x)f(k)≤f(x) for all k∈Kk\in Kk∈K. Next formalize Eidelheit separation:

f(x)≤c≤f(y)for all x∈K1, y∈K2.f(x)\le c\le f(y) \quad\text{for all }x\in K_1,\ y\in K_2.f(x)≤c≤f(y)for all x∈K1​, y∈K2​.

These are Theorems 2 and 3 of §5.12 (pp. 133--134).

Convex minimum-distance duality

Let x1x_1x1​ have positive distance ddd from KKK. Produce fff and a real upper-bound level ccc with ∥f∥≤1\|f\|\le1∥f∥≤1, f(k)≤cf(k)\le cf(k)≤c on KKK, and

f(x1)−c=d.f(x_1)-c=d.f(x1​)−c=d.

Every other feasible pair (g,b)(g,b)(g,b) must satisfy g(x1)−b≤dg(x_1)-b\le dg(x1​)−b≤d. If x0∈Kx_0\in Kx0​∈K realizes the distance, require −f-f−f to align with x0−x1x_0-x_1x0​−x1​. This is the finite real certificate form of §5.13, Theorem 1 (pp. 136--137).

Significance

The capstone is an exact strong-duality statement for distance to a convex set. A feasible pair (g,b)(g,b)(g,b) yields a certified lower bound on the distance, and the distinguished pair reaches the primal value. Unlike a nearest-point characterization, it remains meaningful when KKK is not closed and no minimizing point exists. The conditional alignment clause identifies the equality case when attainment is available.

Formalizing the chapter's progression creates more than one isolated equality. The gauge package links convex geometry to sublinear analysis; Mazur separation handles affine constraints; the supporting-hyperplane and Eidelheit statements provide reusable interfaces for later multiplier rules. The results are known and proved in the 1969 text; the mission's contribution is a coherent machine-checked Lean layer that preserves the source hypotheses and can support later chapters on duality and optimization.

Difficulty

A direct reuse of subspace distance duality is insufficient because a general convex set is neither closed under subtraction nor described by an annihilator. An affine level ccc is unavoidable. The common shorthand sup⁡k∈Kf(k)\sup_{k\in K} f(k)supk∈K​f(k) introduces a second problem: KKK need not be bounded, so a real-valued supremum is not available for an arbitrary functional. The capstone therefore quantifies over a real upper bound ccc and asserts its optimality through a universal inequality; this records the same finite support value without imposing boundedness absent from the source.

Topological hypotheses also differ across the milestones. Separation uses nonempty interior, whereas the final distance theorem only assumes convexity, nonemptiness, and positive distance. Replacing positive distance by mere exclusion x1∉Kx_1\notin Kx1​∈/K would be invalid for a nonclosed set. Similarly, requiring closure or compactness would make formalization easier but would lose the theorem's intended infinite-dimensional scope.

Formalization scope

The mission is restricted to real normed spaces. Sets use Set X; affine varieties use AffineSubspace ℝ X; separators use ContinuousLinearMap. The gauge is Mathlib's existing gauge, so no competing definition is introduced. The bundled gauge milestone deliberately includes both level-set identities as well as continuity, positive homogeneity for positive real scalars, subadditivity, and nonnegativity.

The Eidelheit theorem includes K₂.Nonempty, an assumption used implicitly by the source's separating conclusion. The capstone includes K.Nonempty and 0 < Metric.infDist x₁ K; it does not assume closedness, boundedness, compactness, or attainment. Its pair (f,c)(f,c)(f,c) represents a finite support level, and the universal comparison over all feasible (g,b)(g,b)(g,b) rules out a weakened statement in which an arbitrarily loose upper bound could trivialize existence. The optional nearest-point clause uses the exact equality ∥x0−x1∥=d\|x_0-x_1\|=d∥x0​−x1​∥=d and fixes the sign of alignment. Contributions may add reusable lemmas on gauges, interiors, affine subspaces, or support bounds, but the public results should remain independent of finite-dimensionality and completeness.

Selected references

  • David G. Luenberger, Optimization by Vector Space Methods, John Wiley & Sons, 1969, Chapter 5, §§5.11--5.13, pp. 127--137. Public scan.
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Convex Optimization IV: Löwner–John EllipsoidsTextbook

Every full-dimensional convex body is sandwiched between an ellipsoid and its nnn-fold dilation: shrinking the minimum-volume covering (Löwner–John) ellipsoid E\mathcal{E}E about its centre x0x_0x0​ by the factor 1/n1/n1/n lands inside the body,

x0+1n (E−x0)  ⊆  C  ⊆  E,x_0 + \tfrac{1}{n}\,(\mathcal{E} - x_0) \;\subseteq\; C \;\subseteq\; \mathcal{E},x0​+n1​(E−x0​)⊆C⊆E,

and the factor nnn is tight on simplices. This rounding theorem underlies the ellipsoid method, John's theorem on the Banach–Mazur distance to the Euclidean ball, and much of modern convex geometry. The mission formalizes §8.4 of Boyd & Vandenberghe for polytopes C=conv⁡{x1,…,xm}C = \operatorname{conv}\{x_1,\dots,x_m\}C=conv{x1​,…,xm​}, exactly as the book proves it: existence and uniqueness of the extremal ellipsoid, the KKT identities at the normalized optimum (∑iλixixiT=I\sum_i \lambda_i x_i x_i^{T} = I∑i​λi​xi​xiT​=I, ∑iλixi=0\sum_i \lambda_i x_i = 0∑i​λi​xi​=0, ∑iλi=n\sum_i \lambda_i = n∑i​λi​=n), the convex-combination step that produces the 1/n1/n1/n ball, and affine invariance.

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Introduction to Linear Optimization XII: Interior Point Methods and Path FollowingTextbook

Interior point methods solve linear programs by moving through the interior of the feasible set instead of along its edges — the approach that turned Karmarkar's 1984 breakthrough into today's practical large-scale solvers. This mission formalizes the primal path following algorithm of Chapter 9 of Bertsimas–Tsitsiklis. For μ>0\mu > 0μ>0 the logarithmic barrier

Bμ(x)=c′x−μ∑j=1nlog⁡xjB_\mu(\mathbf{x}) = \mathbf{c}'\mathbf{x} - \mu\sum_{j=1}^n \log x_jBμ​(x)=c′x−μj=1∑n​logxj​

replaces the constraint x≥0\mathbf{x} \ge \mathbf{0}x≥0; the minimizers x(μ)\mathbf{x}(\mu)x(μ) of BμB_\muBμ​ over {Ax=b}\{A\mathbf{x} = \mathbf{b}\}{Ax=b} trace the central path, characterized by the KKT conditions (9.17): Ax=bA\mathbf{x} = \mathbf{b}Ax=b, x≥0\mathbf{x} \ge \mathbf{0}x≥0, A′p+s=cA'\mathbf{p} + \mathbf{s} = \mathbf{c}A′p+s=c, s≥0\mathbf{s} \ge \mathbf{0}s≥0, XSe=μeXS\mathbf{e} = \mu\mathbf{e}XSe=μe (Lemma 9.5). The algorithm follows the path with one Newton step of the barrier problem per shrink μk+1=αμk\mu^{k+1} = \alpha\mu^kμk+1=αμk, maintaining the proximity invariant

∥1μXSe−e∥≤β\|\frac{1}{\mu}XS\mathbf{e} - \mathbf{e}\| \le \beta∥μ1​XSe−e∥≤β

. The goal theorem is Theorem 9.7: with α=1−β−ββ+n\alpha = 1 - \frac{\sqrt{\beta}-\beta}{\sqrt{\beta}+\sqrt{n}}α=1−β​+n​β​−β​ and a β\betaβ-close start, after K=⌈β+nβ−β log⁡(s0)′x0(1+β)ε(1−β)⌉K = \Big\lceil \frac{\sqrt{\beta}+\sqrt{n}}{\sqrt{\beta}-\beta}\,\log\frac{(\mathbf{s}^0)'\mathbf{x}^0(1+\beta)}{\varepsilon(1-\beta)} \Big\rceilK=⌈β​−ββ​+n​​logε(1−β)(s0)′x0(1+β)​⌉ iterations the algorithm reaches primal and dual feasible solutions with duality gap (sK)′xK≤ε(\mathbf{s}^K)'\mathbf{x}^K \le \varepsilon(sK)′xK≤ε — the explicit form of the celebrated O(nlog⁡(1/ε))O(\sqrt{n}\log(1/\varepsilon))O(n​log(1/ε)) iteration bound. Alongside it we formalize the generic potential-reduction scheme (Theorem 9.4): any algorithm cutting G(x,s)=qlog⁡s′x−∑jlog⁡xj−∑jlog⁡sjG(\mathbf{x},\mathbf{s}) = q\log\mathbf{s}'\mathbf{x} - \sum_j \log x_j - \sum_j \log s_jG(x,s)=qlogs′x−∑j​logxj​−∑j​logsj​ by δ\deltaδ per step reaches gap ε\varepsilonε within an explicit KKK.

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Introduction to Linear Optimization XI: The Ellipsoid MethodTextbook

Can the feasibility of a system of linear inequalities be decided in a provably small number of iterations? The ellipsoid method — the algorithm with which Khachiyan showed in 1979 that linear programming is polynomially solvable — answers this with pure convex geometry. This mission formalizes Chapter 8 of Bertsimas–Tsitsiklis. An ellipsoid is

E(z,D)={x∈Rn∣(x−z)′D−1(x−z)≤1}E(\mathbf{z}, D) = \{\mathbf{x} \in \mathbb{R}^n \mid (\mathbf{x}-\mathbf{z})'D^{-1}(\mathbf{x}-\mathbf{z}) \le 1\}E(z,D)={x∈Rn∣(x−z)′D−1(x−z)≤1}

with DDD symmetric positive definite. The geometric engine is Theorem 8.1: the half-ellipsoid E∩{x∣a′x≥a′z}E \cap \{\mathbf{x} \mid \mathbf{a}'\mathbf{x} \ge \mathbf{a}'\mathbf{z}\}E∩{x∣a′x≥a′z} is contained in the explicitly constructed ellipsoid E′=E(zˉ,Dˉ)E' = E(\bar{\mathbf{z}}, \bar{D})E′=E(zˉ,Dˉ),

zˉ=z+1n+1Daa′Da,\bar{\mathbf{z}} = \mathbf{z} + \frac{1}{n+1}\frac{D\mathbf{a}}{\sqrt{\mathbf{a}'D\mathbf{a}}},zˉ=z+n+11​a′Da​Da​, Dˉ=n2n2−1(D−2n+1Daa′Da′Da),\bar{D} = \frac{n^2}{n^2-1}\big(D - \frac{2}{n+1}\frac{D\mathbf{a}\mathbf{a}'D}{\mathbf{a}'D\mathbf{a}}\big),Dˉ=n2−1n2​(D−n+12​a′DaDaa′D​),

and the volume contracts:

Vol(E′)<e−1/(2(n+1)) Vol(E)\mathrm{Vol}(E') < e^{-1/(2(n+1))}\,\mathrm{Vol}(E)Vol(E′)<e−1/(2(n+1))Vol(E)

. Two integer-data estimates make the contraction decisive: every extreme point of P={x∣Ax≥b}P = \{\mathbf{x} \mid A\mathbf{x} \ge \mathbf{b}\}P={x∣Ax≥b} with entries bounded by UUU has coordinates in [−(nU)n,(nU)n][-(nU)^n, (nU)^n][−(nU)n,(nU)n] (Lemma 8.2), and a full-dimensional bounded such polyhedron has Vol(P)>n−n(nU)−n2(n+1)\mathrm{Vol}(P) > n^{-n}(nU)^{-n^2(n+1)}Vol(P)>n−n(nU)−n2(n+1) (Lemma 8.4). The goal theorem is Theorem 8.2: started on a ball E(x0,r2I)E(\mathbf{x}_0, r^2 I)E(x0​,r2I) of volume at most VVV containing PPP, with vvv a lower bound on Vol(P)\mathrm{Vol}(P)Vol(P) when PPP is nonempty, the ellipsoid method correctly decides whether PPP is empty within t∗=⌈2(n+1)log⁡(V/v)⌉t^* = \lceil 2(n+1)\log(V/v) \rceilt∗=⌈2(n+1)log(V/v)⌉ iterations — the explicit iteration count behind the polynomial-time headline.

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Introduction to Linear Optimization IX: Network Flow IntegralityTextbook

Why do network linear programs return integer answers for free? This mission formalizes the structural theory of the minimum cost network flow problem of Chapter 7 of Bertsimas & Tsitsiklis: a directed graph G=(N,A)G=(\mathcal{N},\mathcal{A})G=(N,A) with external supplies bib_ibi​, arc costs cijc_{ij}cij​, and the node-arc incidence matrix A\mathbf{A}A — an n×mn\times mn×m matrix in which every column has exactly one +1+1+1 (start node) and one −1-1−1 (end node) — so that flow conservation reads Af=b\mathbf{A}\mathbf{f}=\mathbf{b}Af=b, forcing the standing assumption ∑i∈Nbi=0\sum_{i\in\mathcal{N}} b_i=0∑i∈N​bi​=0. Because the rows of A\mathbf{A}A sum to zero, the book works with the truncated matrix A~\tilde{\mathbf{A}}A~ of the first n−1n-1n−1 rows. The combinatorial heart is the correspondence between algebra and graph structure: a set TTT of n−1n-1n−1 arcs forming a tree determines a unique tree solution of A~f=b~\tilde{\mathbf{A}}\mathbf{f}=\tilde{\mathbf{b}}A~f=b~, fij=0f_{ij}=0fij​=0 off TTT (Theorem 7.3); connectedness makes A~\tilde{\mathbf{A}}A~ full-rank (Corollary 7.1); and a flow vector is a basic solution if and only if it is a tree solution (Theorem 7.4). The goal theorem is the integrality theorem (Theorem 7.5): for the uncapacitated problem on a connected graph, every basis matrix B\mathbf{B}B has an integer inverse B−1\mathbf{B}^{-1}B−1 (its determinant is ±1\pm 1±1 by the tree/lower-triangular argument), integer supplies make every basic solution integer, and integer costs make every dual basic solution integer — whence integer optimal primal and dual solutions exist whenever the optimal cost is finite (Corollary 7.2). This is the fountainhead of combinatorial integrality in linear optimization, feeding the max-flow min-cut mission that follows.

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Introduction to Linear Optimization VIII: Sensitivity Analysis and Subgradients of the Optimal CostTextbook

How does the optimal cost of a linear program respond when the problem data change? Chapter 5 of Bertsimas-Tsitsiklis studies the standard form problem min⁡{c′x∣Ax=b, x≥0}\min\{c'x \mid Ax = b,\ x \ge 0\}min{c′x∣Ax=b, x≥0} (rows of AAA linearly independent) as the requirement vector bbb and the cost vector ccc vary. On the convex set S={b∣P(b)≠∅}S = \{b \mid P(b) \neq \emptyset\}S={b∣P(b)=∅} of feasible right-hand sides, and under the standing assumption that the dual feasible set is nonempty, the optimal cost F(b)F(b)F(b) is finite and convex (Theorem 5.1) — indeed F(b)=max⁡i(pi)′bF(b) = \max_{i} (p^i)'bF(b)=maxi​(pi)′b over the extreme points p1,…,pNp^1, \dots, p^Np1,…,pN of the dual feasible set, a piecewise linear convex function whose breakpoints are exactly where the dual optimum is non-unique. The capstone (Theorem 5.2) identifies the generalized gradients of FFF: if the primal at b∗b^*b∗ is feasible with finite optimal cost, then ppp is an optimal solution of the dual if and only if ppp is a subgradient of FFF at b∗b^*b∗ (Definition 5.1: F(b∗)+p′(b−b∗)≤F(b)F(b^*) + p'(b - b^*) \le F(b)F(b∗)+p′(b−b∗)≤F(b) for all b∈Sb \in Sb∈S) — the precise sense in which dual variables are marginal costs. Dually (Theorem 5.3), the set TTT of cost vectors with finite optimal cost is convex, the optimal cost G(c)G(c)G(c) is concave on TTT, and near any ccc with a unique primal optimum x∗x^*x∗, GGG is linear with gradient x∗x^*x∗. Local ranging (Section 5.1) and parametric programming (Section 5.5) are the procedural companions, folded into the design notes.

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Introduction to Linear Optimization V: Duality TheoryTextbook

Every linear programming problem has a shadow. To the primal min⁡c′x\min c'xminc′x we associate the dual max⁡p′b\max p'bmaxp′b, whose variables price the primal constraints: one dual variable per primal constraint and one dual constraint per primal variable, with signs governed by the correspondence of Table 4.1. This mission formalizes §4.1–4.5 of Bertsimas–Tsitsiklis: the dual of a general-form linear program, the involution "the dual of the dual is the primal" (Theorem 4.1), and weak duality p′b≤c′xp'b \le c'xp′b≤c′x for any primal-feasible xxx and dual-feasible ppp (Theorem 4.3) with its two corollaries — an unbounded primal forces an infeasible dual (Corollary 4.1), and feasible x,px, px,p with p′b=c′xp'b = c'xp′b=c′x are automatically both optimal (Corollary 4.2). The goal theorem is strong duality (Theorem 4.4): if a linear programming problem has an optimal solution, so does its dual, and the respective optimal costs are equal — proved in the book by running the simplex method with the lexicographic pivoting rule of Mission IV on a standard-form transform. The statement is deliberately the book's attainment form: by Table 4.2 the primal and the dual can be simultaneously infeasible (Example 4.5), so an unguarded equality of optimal values is false. The mission closes with complementary slackness (Theorem 4.5): feasible xxx and ppp are simultaneously optimal if and only if pi(ai′x−bi)=0p_i(a_i'x - b_i) = 0pi​(ai′​x−bi​)=0 for all iii and (cj−p′Aj)xj=0(c_j - p'A_j)x_j = 0(cj​−p′Aj​)xj​=0 for all jjj — the certificate structure behind the dual simplex method and every LP optimality check.

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Introduction to Linear Optimization IV: The Simplex MethodTextbook

How does one actually solve a linear program? Chapter 2 showed that if a standard-form problem min⁡c′x\min c'xminc′x subject to Ax=bAx = bAx=b, x≥0x \ge 0x≥0 has an optimal solution, it has an optimal basic feasible solution; the simplex method searches among basic feasible solutions, moving along edges of the feasible set in cost-reducing directions. This mission formalizes the mathematics of Chapter 3 of Bertsimas–Tsitsiklis: feasible directions, the reduced costs

cˉj=cj−cB′B−1Aj\bar{c}_j = c_j - c_B'B^{-1}A_jcˉj​=cj​−cB′​B−1Aj​

measuring the cost rate along the basic directions, the optimality conditions of Theorem 3.1 (cˉ≥0\bar{c} \ge 0cˉ≥0 implies optimality, and conversely at nondegenerate optima), the basis change of Theorem 3.2, and the pivot iteration itself — encoded as a predicate relating a basis/BFS pair to its successor, so that every theorem covers every pivoting rule. The goal theorem is Theorem 3.3: if the feasible set is nonempty and every basic feasible solution is nondegenerate, the simplex method terminates after a finite number of iterations, ending either with an optimal basis and an associated optimal basic feasible solution, or with a direction ddd satisfying Ad=0Ad = 0Ad=0, d≥0d \ge 0d≥0, c′d<0c'd < 0c′d<0 certifying optimal cost −∞-\infty−∞. The secondary capstone, Theorem 3.4, removes the nondegeneracy assumption: under the lexicographic pivoting rule every tableau row other than the zeroth stays lexicographically positive, the zeroth row strictly increases lexicographically, and the simplex method terminates on every problem — the anticycling guarantee that also supplies the optimal-basis existence used by the strong duality theorem of Mission V.

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Introduction to Linear Optimization I: Polyhedra and Basic Feasible SolutionsTextbook

Every linear programming problem asks to minimize a linear cost c′xc'xc′x over a polyhedron — a set of the form P={x∈Rn∣Ax≥b}P = \{x \in \mathbb{R}^n \mid Ax \ge b\}P={x∈Rn∣Ax≥b}, or in standard form {x∣Ax=b, x≥0}\{x \mid Ax = b,\ x \ge 0\}{x∣Ax=b, x≥0}. Chapter 2 of Bertsimas–Tsitsiklis develops the geometry of these feasible sets, and its central achievement is making the intuitive notion of a "corner point" rigorous. There are three natural candidates: the extreme point — a point of PPP that cannot be written as a convex combination of two other points of PPP (purely geometric, representation-independent); the vertex — the unique minimizer of some linear cost c′yc'yc′y over PPP (geometric, via supporting hyperplanes); and the basic feasible solution — a feasible point at which nnn linearly independent constraints are active (algebraic, the object the simplex method actually computes with). This mission formalizes polyhedra, active constraints, vertices and basic (feasible) solutions, and proves the fundamental Theorem 2.3: for a nonempty polyhedron all three notions coincide. Around the capstone sit the supporting pillars: polyhedra are convex (Theorem 2.1), the characterization of points pinned down by nnn linearly independent active constraints (Theorem 2.2), finiteness of the set of basic solutions (Corollary 2.1), and the basis-column characterization of basic solutions in standard form (Theorem 2.4) — the combinatorial engine behind the simplex method of Chapter 3 and the root of the entire series.

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Algorithmic Game TheoryOperations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

Cross-licensing in a Supply Chain with Asymmetric Manufacturers II: Every Innovation Equilibrium Is a Downstream Duopoly, Boundary or InteriorResearch Paper

Motivation

In industries built on a key component sold by one dominant supplier, such as smartphone chipsets, the supplier's contract terms shape how much its downstream customers innovate. Some suppliers require their customers to cross-license their own patents to each other as a condition of buying the component, so that each manufacturer's innovation also improves its rival's product. Wang, Huang and Lee (SSRN 3053682; published in Manufacturing & Service Operations Management, 2023, doi:10.1287/msom.2019.0477) ask when a supplier facing two manufacturers of unequal innovation ability benefits from imposing cross-licensing. Their answer runs through the equilibrium of the manufacturers' innovation game, which is the subject of this mission: Proposition 2 describes how much each manufacturer innovates and shows that the supplier never ends up selling to a single manufacturer.

Setting

A supplier sells a component at wholesale price r≥0r \ge 0r≥0 to manufacturers M1M_1M1​ and M2M_2M2​. Manufacturer MiM_iMi​ chooses a quality improvement Ti≥0T_i \ge 0Ti​≥0 at cost kiTi2k_iT_i^2ki​Ti2​. With cross-licensing of effectiveness β∈[0,1]\beta \in [0, 1]β∈[0,1], the quality improvement of MiM_iMi​ is Ti+βTjT_i + \beta T_jTi​+βTj​ (j≠ij \ne ij=i), and its inverse demand is pi=1+Ti+βTj−qi−qjp_i = 1 + T_i + \beta T_j - q_i - q_jpi​=1+Ti​+βTj​−qi​−qj​. The standing assumptions are

0≤β≤1,49144<k2<k1,0 \le \beta \le 1, \qquad \tfrac{49}{144} < k_2 < k_1,0≤β≤1,14449​<k2​<k1​,

so M2M_2M2​ is the superior manufacturer. The game has three stages.

  1. Quantities. Given (T1,T2)(T_1, T_2)(T1​,T2​) and rrr, each MiM_iMi​ chooses qi≥0q_i \ge 0qi​≥0 to maximize Πi=(1+Ti+βTj−qi−qj−r)qi\Pi_i = (1 + T_i + \beta T_j - q_i - q_j - r)q_iΠi​=(1+Ti​+βTj​−qi​−qj​−r)qi​ (display (1)). The equilibrium quantities, display (2), are a duopoly when rrr is low and a monopoly of the manufacturer with the higher quality when rrr is higher.
  2. Price. The supplier chooses r≥0r \ge 0r≥0 to maximize r(q1+q2)r(q_1 + q_2)r(q1​+q2​). Its price r∗(T1,T2)r^*(T_1, T_2)r∗(T1​,T2​) is the least maximizer. Lemma 1 computes it: the supplier induces a duopoly exactly when β≥3−1\beta \ge \sqrt3 - 1β≥3​−1 or T2≤T^2(T1∣β)T_2 \le \hat T_2(T_1\mid\beta)T2​≤T^2​(T1​∣β), where
T^2(T1∣β)=2−3+T1(1−β(3−1))3−1−β.\hat T_2(T_1\mid\beta) = \frac{2 - \sqrt3 + T_1(1 - \beta(\sqrt3 - 1))}{\sqrt3 - 1 - \beta}.T^2​(T1​∣β)=3​−1−β2−3​+T1​(1−β(3​−1))​.
  1. Innovation. Each MiM_iMi​ chooses Ti≥0T_i \ge 0Ti​≥0 to maximize Πi∗(T1,T2∣β)−kiTi2\Pi^*_i(T_1, T_2\mid\beta) - k_iT_i^2Πi∗​(T1​,T2​∣β)−ki​Ti2​, where Πi∗\Pi^*_iΠi∗​ is its Cournot profit at the supplier's price. An innovation equilibrium is a pure Nash equilibrium of this game.

The proof of Proposition 2 defines two candidate profiles in closed form: the interior candidate TI=(T1I,T2I)T^I = (T^I_1, T^I_2)TI=(T1I​,T2I​), which solves both manufacturers' first-order conditions, and the boundary candidate TB=(T1B,T2B)T^B = (T^B_1, T^B_2)TB=(T1B​,T2B​), where M2M_2M2​ invests exactly up to T^2\hat T_2T^2​. A threshold k^2(k1∣β)\hat k_2(k_1\mid\beta)k^2​(k1​∣β) separates them, and T∗(β)=TBT^*(\beta) = T^BT∗(β)=TB if k2<k^2(k1∣β)k_2 < \hat k_2(k_1\mid\beta)k2​<k^2​(k1​∣β), T∗(β)=TIT^*(\beta) = T^IT∗(β)=TI otherwise.

Formalization targets

Goal: Proposition 2 (p. 12)

Under the standing assumptions:

  1. every innovation equilibrium is a duopoly, meaning both manufacturers sell a positive quantity at the supplier's price;
  2. T∗(β)T^*(\beta)T∗(β) is an innovation equilibrium and a duopoly;
  3. if k2<k^2(k1∣β)k_2 < \hat k_2(k_1\mid\beta)k2​<k^2​(k1​∣β), then β<3−1\beta < \sqrt3 - 1β<3​−1 and M2M_2M2​ is on the boundary:
T2∗=T^2(T1∗∣β);T^*_2 = \hat T_2(T^*_1\mid\beta);T2∗​=T^2​(T1∗​∣β);
  1. if k2≥k^2(k1∣β)k_2 \ge \hat k_2(k_1\mid\beta)k2​≥k^2​(k1​∣β), then T∗(β)=TIT^*(\beta) = T^IT∗(β)=TI and both duopoly first-order conditions hold at T∗(β)T^*(\beta)T∗(β).

Milestones

  • display (2): the Cournot quantities are the unique equilibrium of the quantity game;
  • Lemma 1: the supplier's price, the regime, its optimal profit, and the gross profits Π1∗,Π2∗\Pi^*_1, \Pi^*_2Π1∗​,Π2∗​;
  • monopoly infeasibility at T1=0T_1 = 0T1​=0, from the proof (p. A.1): M2M_2M2​'s monopoly optimum 1/(16k2−1)1/(16k_2 - 1)1/(16k2​−1) lies below T^2(0∣β)\hat T_2(0\mid\beta)T^2​(0∣β);
  • TIT^ITI is the unique solution of the two first-order conditions (p. A.1);
  • T2B=T^2(T1B∣β)T^B_2 = \hat T_2(T^B_1\mid\beta)T2B​=T^2​(T1B​∣β), and T1BT^B_1T1B​ is M1M_1M1​'s best response to T2BT^B_2T2B​ (p. A.1);
  • k^2\hat k_2k^2​ is where T2I=T2BT^I_2 = T^B_2T2I​=T2B​, and above it TIT^ITI lies in the duopoly region (p. A.2);
  • k^2(k1∣β)\hat k_2(k_1\mid\beta)k^2​(k1​∣β) is strictly decreasing in β\betaβ with k^2(k1∣1)=0\hat k_2(k_1\mid 1) = 0k^2​(k1​∣1)=0 (p. A.2), so the boundary region shrinks to empty as β\betaβ grows.

Significance

Proposition 2 is the paper's equilibrium characterization. Proposition 3 is its instance β=0\beta = 0β=0 (no cross-licensing), and Proposition 4 compares the supplier's equilibrium profits with and without cross-licensing on the closed forms TBT^BTB, TIT^ITI and k^2\hat k_2k^2​ established here. The economic content is that, under cross-licensing, the supplier always ends up selling to both manufacturers. When the superior manufacturer's cost advantage is large it caps its own innovation exactly where the supplier stops preferring a monopoly.

The paper's proof states the closed forms and asserts the checks ("one can obtain", "we verify"). This mission produces a machine-checked version: a complete definition of the three-stage game, with the supplier's price defined as an optimization rather than by its solution, and the equilibrium claims stated against that game. To our knowledge no part of this result has been formalized before.

Difficulty

The innovation payoff of the superior manufacturer is discontinuous. When T2T_2T2​ moves just above T^2(T1∣β)\hat T_2(T_1\mid\beta)T^2​(T1​∣β), the supplier switches from a duopoly price to a monopoly price, and M2M_2M2​'s gross profit jumps down. A first-order argument therefore does not show that T∗T^*T∗ is an equilibrium. One must also show that M2M_2M2​ never gains by moving into the monopoly region, and that M1M_1M1​ never gains by deviating above T2T_2T2​, where M1M_1M1​ itself becomes the potential monopolist. The boundary candidate is an equilibrium only because the supplier breaks its indifference at the boundary toward the duopoly.

Part 1 quantifies over every equilibrium, not only T∗T^*T∗. The paper checks monopoly infeasibility only at T1=0T_1 = 0T1​=0, so the general case needs its own argument. The equilibrium is not unique: for some parameters a mirrored profile with M1M_1M1​ at its own boundary is also an equilibrium. Uniqueness is therefore not claimed. The remaining steps are polynomial and rational inequalities in (k1,k2,β)(k_1, k_2, \beta)(k1​,k2​,β) involving 3\sqrt33​.

Formalization scope

  • Parameters β,k1,k2\beta, k_1, k_2β,k1​,k2​ are real numbers. The standing assumptions 0≤β≤10 \le \beta \le 10≤β≤1 and 49/144<k2<k149/144 < k_2 < k_149/144<k2​<k1​ are bundled as Standing β k1 k2.
  • Quantities and innovation levels range over R≥0\mathbb R_{\ge 0}R≥0​ (NNReal). Equilibria use the published two-player predicate CompetingChains.Cournot.IsPureNash.
  • Wholesale prices range over [0,∞)[0, \infty)[0,∞). The paper leaves this implicit, so it is a disclosed addition.
  • Display (2) is encoded in symmetric form, with the manufacturer of larger quality as the possible monopolist. The paper prints it for T2≥T1T_2 \ge T_1T2​≥T1​, but deviations in the innovation game reach T1>T2T_1 > T_2T1​>T2​.
  • The supplier's price is the least maximizer of r(q1+q2)r(q_1 + q_2)r(q1​+q2​) over r≥0r \ge 0r≥0. This is the tie-break Lemma 1 uses at T2=T^2T_2 = \hat T_2T2​=T^2​.
  • First-order conditions are stated as derivatives (HasDerivAt … 0) of Lemma 1's duopoly polynomials, because the game payoff is not differentiable at the boundary.
  • All closed forms are transcribed as printed, with 3\sqrt33​ as Real.sqrt 3. Every denominator is proved nonzero in its regime, never assumed.

Two trivializing formalizations are ruled out. Equilibria are never defined by first-order conditions or by the closed forms, and the supplier's price is never defined by Lemma 1's case rule. Both are theorems here.

The source is the authors' SSRN manuscript (abstract 3053682, version of 2023-04-27); its proofs are in the appendix, pp. A.1–A.9. The paper's equivalent threshold β^(k1,k2)\hat\beta(k_1, k_2)β^​(k1​,k2​) is not formalized. Proofs of any milestone are welcome. Lemma 1 and display (2) are self-contained, and the closed-form milestones need only real-algebraic inequalities with 3\sqrt33​.

Selected references

  • J. Wang, T. Huang, H. Lee, Cross-licensing in a Supply Chain with Asymmetric Manufacturers, SSRN 3053682, version of 2023-04-27. https://ssrn.com/abstract=3053682
  • J. Wang, T. Huang, H. Lee, Cross-licensing in a Supply Chain with Asymmetric Manufacturers, Manufacturing & Service Operations Management, 2023. https://doi.org/10.1287/msom.2019.0477
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Optimal Decision Making Under Strategic Behavior 2: A Three-Value Instance with Outcome Monotonic Costs Whose Optimal Policies Are All StochasticResearch Paper

Motivation

Many consequential decisions, such as lending, hiring or admissions, are made by policies that map an individual's features to a probability of a positive decision. When the policy is published, individuals respond to it: they change their features, at a cost, to raise their chance of a positive decision. Tsirtsis, Tabibian, Khajehnejad, Singla, Schölkopf and Gomez-Rodriguez (arXiv:1905.09239, Management Science 2024) model this as a Stackelberg game and ask which policy maximizes the decision maker's utility once individuals best respond.

In the classical, non-strategic setting, where features do not react to the policy, the optimal policy is a deterministic threshold rule: decide positively exactly when the probability of a good outcome is at least a cost constant γ\gammaγ (Corbett-Davies et al., KDD 2017; Valera, Singla and Gomez-Rodriguez, NeurIPS 2018). The paper shows that strategic behaviour breaks this picture. A three-value example in §3 (p. 5) exhibits an instance whose costs satisfy the natural outcome monotonicity condition and whose optimal policy is nevertheless stochastic. This mission formalizes that example.

Setting

There are mmm feature values x1,…,xmx_1,\dots,x_mx1​,…,xm​, a feature distribution P(x)P(x)P(x), an outcome probability P(y=1∣x)P(y=1\mid x)P(y=1∣x), a constant γ∈(0,1)\gamma\in(0,1)γ∈(0,1), and a cost c(xi,xj)≥0c(x_i,x_j)\ge0c(xi​,xj​)≥0 of changing from xix_ixi​ to xjx_jxj​.

  • A policy π\piπ assigns to each feature value a probability π(x)=π(d=1∣x)∈[0,1]\pi(x)=\pi(d=1\mid x)\in[0,1]π(x)=π(d=1∣x)∈[0,1] of a positive decision. The individual benefit is b(x)=π(x)b(x)=\pi(x)b(x)=π(x).
  • An individual starting at xix_ixi​ moves to a best response
xj∈argmax⁡k π(xk)−c(xi,xk)(5),x_j\in\operatorname*{argmax}_{k}\ \pi(x_k)-c(x_i,x_k)\qquad(5),xj​∈kargmax​ π(xk​)−c(xi​,xk​)(5),

with ties broken toward the feature value with the highest P(y∣xj)P(y\mid x_j)P(y∣xj​) (standing assumption (ii)).

  • The strategic utility is
u(π,γ)=∑iP(xi) (P(y=1∣xbr(i))−γ) π(xbr(i))(7),u(\pi,\gamma)=\sum_{i}P(x_i)\,\bigl(P(y=1\mid x_{\mathrm{br}(i)})-\gamma\bigr)\,\pi(x_{\mathrm{br}(i)})\qquad(7),u(π,γ)=i∑​P(xi​)(P(y=1∣xbr(i)​)−γ)π(xbr(i)​)(7),

and a policy is optimal if it maximizes uuu over all policies.

  • The non-strategic utility uNS(π,γ)=∑xP(x)(P(y=1∣x)−γ)π(x)u_{\mathrm{NS}}(\pi,\gamma)=\sum_x P(x)(P(y=1\mid x)-\gamma)\pi(x)uNS​(π,γ)=∑x​P(x)(P(y=1∣x)−γ)π(x) is the same quantity when nobody moves.
  • A cost is outcome monotonic (p. 6) if improving one's outcome requires increasing effort and worsening it requires none.

The instance of §3 has x∈{1,2,3}x\in\{1,2,3\}x∈{1,2,3}, γ=0.1\gamma=0.1γ=0.1, P(x)=(0.1,0.4,0.5)P(x)=(0.1,0.4,0.5)P(x)=(0.1,0.4,0.5), P(y=1∣x)=(1.0,0.7,0.4)P(y=1\mid x)=(1.0,0.7,0.4)P(y=1∣x)=(1.0,0.7,0.4) and

c(xi,xj)=(0000.3001.20.30),c(x_i,x_j)=\begin{pmatrix}0&0&0\\0.3&0&0\\1.2&0.3&0\end{pmatrix},c(xi​,xj​)=​00.31.2​000.3​000​​,

row iii being the origin. In Lean the feature values 1,2,31,2,31,2,3 are Fin 3 indices 0,1,20,1,20,1,2; the model lives in the namespace StrategicPolicy.StochasticOpt, with Policies, br, u, uNS, OMCost, StandingI and the instance γ0, p0, q0, c0.

Formalization targets

Goal: the optimal policies of the §3 instance

π optimal  ⟺  π(x=1)=1, π(x=2)=0.7, π(x=3)≤0.4,\pi\ \text{optimal}\iff \pi(x=1)=1,\ \pi(x=2)=0.7,\ \pi(x=3)\le 0.4,π optimal⟺π(x=1)=1, π(x=2)=0.7, π(x=3)≤0.4,

every optimal policy is non-deterministic, and u((1,0.7,0),γ)=0.66u\bigl((1,0.7,0),\gamma\bigr)=0.66u((1,0.7,0),γ)=0.66. The paper prints a single optimal policy, (1,0.7,0)(1,0.7,0)(1,0.7,0); the optimum is not unique, and the goal states the exact optimal set, which contains the printed policy and makes the "stochastic" claim a statement about every optimum.

Milestones

  1. The instance's cost is outcome monotonic and satisfies standing assumption (i).
  2. The non-strategic optimum is unique and equals the threshold policy (1,1,1)(1,1,1)(1,1,1).
  3. Under π∗=(1,0.7,0)\pi^*=(1,0.7,0)π∗=(1,0.7,0) the individuals at x=3x=3x=3 move to x=2x=2x=2 and those at x=2x=2x=2 move to x=1x=1x=1.
  4. uNS((1,1,1))<u(π∗)u_{\mathrm{NS}}((1,1,1))<u(\pi^*)uNS​((1,1,1))<u(π∗) and u((1,1,1))<u(π∗)u((1,1,1))<u(\pi^*)u((1,1,1))<u(π∗): the strategic optimum beats its non-strategic counterpart under either reading of "counterpart".

Significance

The example separates two regimes. Without strategic behaviour the optimum is a deterministic threshold rule; with it, randomization is strictly necessary, even under the cost structure (outcome monotonicity) that the paper later uses to restrict the search for optimal policies to a structured family (Proposition 2, Theorem 3). It is the concrete witness for the paper's claim that "optimal decision policies are not always deterministic threshold rules", and it shows that the outcome monotonic binary policies of Theorem 3 must include fractional values such as 0.7=1−0.30.7=1-0.30.7=1−0.3.

The paper reports the optimum from "a brute force search", that is, numerically. A formal proof replaces the search by an argument valid over the whole continuum [0,1]3[0,1]^3[0,1]3, determines the full optimal set rather than one optimizer, and certifies the tie-breaking at both thresholds. No part of this paper has a machine-checked proof that this mission is aware of.

Difficulty

The utility is piecewise linear in π\piπ but discontinuous: it jumps whenever a best response switches, and the switching surfaces are exactly where the optimum sits. At π(x=2)=0.7\pi(x=2)=0.7π(x=2)=0.7 the individuals at x=2x=2x=2 are indifferent between staying and moving to x=1x=1x=1, and at π(x=3)=0.4\pi(x=3)=0.4π(x=3)=0.4 those at x=3x=3x=3 are indifferent between staying and moving to x=2x=2x=2. The optimum is attained only because tie-break (ii) resolves both indifferences upward. Checking finitely many candidate policies proves nothing about the rest of [0,1]3[0,1]^3[0,1]3, and a naive concavity or first-order argument does not apply to a discontinuous objective. An upper bound must hold for every policy, across all configurations of best responses.

Formalization scope

  • Policies are functions Fin 3 → ℝ with values in [0,1][0,1][0,1]; optimality is IsMaxOn u (Policies 3) π, over the whole cube, never over a grid or over deterministic policies.
  • The best response br is computed from π\piπ, ccc and P(y∣x)P(y\mid x)P(y∣x) as the maximizer of (5) with the highest outcome, then the least index; it is never a free function constrained by hypotheses. With the instance's distinct outcomes the least-index rule never fires.
  • The model is the paper's base model: b(x)=π(x)b(x)=\pi(x)b(x)=π(x), and P(y∣x)P(y\mid x)P(y∣x) is unchanged by best responses (§2). Standing assumption (i) and outcome monotonicity are proved for the instance (milestone 1), not assumed.
  • Outcome monotonicity is imposed for distinct feature values together with c(x,x)=0c(x,x)=0c(x,x)=0, since the printed zero-cost equivalence at i=ji=ji=j would forbid free staying.
  • All numbers are exact rationals (1/101/101/10, 7/107/107/10, 2/52/52/5, 6/56/56/5, 3/103/103/10).
  • A formalization that states only "(1,0.7,0)(1,0.7,0)(1,0.7,0) is optimal", or optimality against finitely many policies, would drop the stochasticity claim or trivialize the goal; neither is posed.
  • Out of scope: Theorem 1 (NP-hardness), Proposition 2 and Theorem 3 (the structural results, mission 1 of this series), the general-cost example of §5 (mission 3), the algorithms and the experiments.

Needed infrastructure is small: finite sums over Fin 3, Finset.filter, Finset.min'. Lemmas evaluating br on regions of the policy cube are reusable across the series' examples.

Selected references

  • S. Tsirtsis, B. Tabibian, M. Khajehnejad, A. Singla, B. Schölkopf, M. Gomez-Rodriguez, Optimal Decision Making Under Strategic Behavior, Management Science, 2024; read as arXiv:1905.09239v5, 2020. https://arxiv.org/abs/1905.09239v5
  • S. Corbett-Davies, E. Pierson, A. Feller, S. Goel, A. Huq, Algorithmic Decision Making and the Cost of Fairness, KDD 2017. https://doi.org/10.1145/3097983.3098095
  • I. Valera, A. Singla, M. Gomez-Rodriguez, Enhancing the Accuracy and Fairness of Human Decision Making, NeurIPS 2018. https://arxiv.org/abs/1805.10318
  • M. Hardt, N. Megiddo, C. Papadimitriou, M. Wootters, Strategic Classification, ITCS 2016. https://doi.org/10.1145/2840728.2840730
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Optimal Decision Making Under Strategic Behavior 1: Under Additive Outcome Monotonic Costs Some Outcome Monotonic Binary Policy Is OptimalResearch Paper

Motivation

A lender or other decision maker may publish a rule that assigns a positive decision to an individual with some probability. Once the rule is visible, individuals can change the features on which it acts. The decision maker must therefore evaluate a rule under the distribution it induces after individuals respond, rather than only under the original population. Tsirtsis and coauthors study this problem with finitely many feature values and a cost for changing from one value to another. Their preprint gives a utility model, a best response rule, and structural results for costs that respect the ordering of outcomes.

This mission isolates Theorem 3 of that preprint. It asks whether, under additive and outcome monotonic costs, an optimal decision rule can be found among policies with a particular binary choice at each relevant feature value. The result concerns the structure of an optimum. It does not assert that an arbitrary starting policy is itself binary or that every optimum has this form.

Setting

There are m≥1m\ge1m≥1 feature values x1,…,xmx_1,\ldots,x_mx1​,…,xm​, indexed from highest to lowest positive-outcome probability. Write pi=P(xi)p_i=P(x_i)pi​=P(xi​) for their original population masses and qi=P(y=1∣xi)q_i=P(y=1\mid x_i)qi​=P(y=1∣xi​) for their outcomes. The masses are nonnegative and sum to one, qi∈[0,1]q_i\in[0,1]qi​∈[0,1], and the outcomes are distinct in this mission. A policy π\piπ chooses a positive decision at xix_ixi​ with probability πi∈[0,1]\pi_i\in[0,1]πi​∈[0,1]. Each positive decision costs the decision maker γ∈(0,1)\gamma\in(0,1)γ∈(0,1).

An individual originally at xix_ixi​ can move to xjx_jxj​ at change cost cijc_{ij}cij​. In the paper's base model, the individual's benefit at a destination is πj\pi_jπj​, so she maximizes πj−cij\pi_j-c_{ij}πj​−cij​. Ties go to a destination with higher qjq_jqj​. If a tie remains, the formalization picks the smallest index. Write rπ(i)r_\pi(i)rπ​(i) for this best response. The outcome probabilities qjq_jqj​ themselves do not change after the response; the response changes where the population mass is counted. The decision maker's utility is

u(π,γ)=∑i=1mpi(qrπ(i)−γ)πrπ(i).u(\pi,\gamma)=\sum_{i=1}^{m}p_i\bigl(q_{r_\pi(i)}-\gamma\bigr)\pi_{r_\pi(i)}.u(π,γ)=i=1∑m​pi​(qrπ​(i)​−γ)πrπ​(i)​.

A policy is outcome monotonic here when πi<πj\pi_i<\pi_jπi​<πj​ implies qi<qjq_i<q_jqi​<qj​. An outcome monotonic cost obeys the paper's two conditions for distinct feature values: improving outcome through successive values has the specified strict cost ordering, and a move to a lower outcome has zero cost. An additive cost satisfies cij+cjk=cikc_{ij}+c_{jk}=c_{ik}cij​+cjk​=cik​ when qi<qj<qkq_i<q_j<q_kqi​<qj​<qk​. Staying costs zero. The section's standing assumption also makes a distinct move toward a weakly higher outcome cost strictly positive.

Formalization targets

Main goal: Theorem 3

If π∗\pi^*π∗ maximizes utility among all policies in [0,1]m[0,1]^m[0,1]m, and the cost is additive and outcome monotonic, then some outcome monotonic policy π\piπ has u(π,γ)=u(π∗,γ)u(\pi,\gamma)=u(\pi^*,\gamma)u(π,γ)=u(π∗,γ) and satisfies

πi=πi−1orπi=max⁡{0,πi−1−ci,i−1}(i>1, qi>γ).\pi_i=\pi_{i-1} \quad\text{or}\quad \pi_i=\max\{0,\pi_{i-1}-c_{i,i-1}\} \qquad(i>1,\ q_i>\gamma).πi​=πi−1​orπi​=max{0,πi−1​−ci,i−1​}(i>1, qi​>γ).

The paper calls this an outcome monotonic binary policy. Binary describes the two allowed relationships between adjacent policy values; the probabilities themselves can be fractional. The goal is conditional on a maximizer π∗\pi^*π∗, exactly as Theorem 3 is stated. The preprint does not establish that an optimum always exists, and its best response tie thresholds make that question separate.

Milestones

The first milestone records the observation following Proposition 2: under an outcome monotonic policy, an individual never selects a destination with lower outcome than the origin. Proposition 2 then states that some outcome monotonic policy attains the utility of an optimal policy under outcome monotonic costs. The final two milestones formalize the two individual policy changes stated in Appendix A.3, one when a policy value lies between its predecessor and the cost threshold, and one when it lies below that threshold.

Significance

Theorem 3 narrows a continuous search over policy probabilities to a structured family without losing the optimal value, provided an optimum exists. The restriction depends on how feature changes affect the induced population distribution. It is therefore a statement about decision making with strategic responses, not merely about sorting policy values by outcome. Proposition 2 is independently useful: under outcome monotonic costs, the optimal utility can be attained by an outcome monotonic policy even without additivity.

The result is proved in the cited preprint, while the proposed Lean declarations are open proof targets. A complete formalization would make the finite best response rule, the tie convention, and the cost assumptions explicit, then give checked proofs of the structural claims. The definitions of the policy space, response rule, and induced utility may also support later work on the same paper's stochastic examples and algorithms. No machine-checked proof of these proposed statements is claimed here.

Difficulty

The utility depends on a best response selected by an argmax, so changing one policy probability can switch the destination of several population groups at once. The utility need not vary continuously across tie thresholds. A naive coordinate adjustment that improves the outcome probability at one destination can alter who moves there and change the contribution from other origins. This is why a direct appeal to monotonicity of the displayed sum does not establish Proposition 2 or Theorem 3.

The Appendix A.3 statements identify two threshold regimes for a policy value. Their comparisons must account for the tie rule and for all origins whose selected destination changes. The mission keeps these comparisons as separate targets because the conclusion about the whole policy depends on them.

Formalization scope

Lean represents the features by Fin m, with Lean index 000 standing for x1x_1x1​. The model requires m>0m>0m>0 so that the best response has a value. The initial distribution and the conditional outcome probabilities are real valued, with explicit probability bounds. Policies range over the full cube [0,1]m[0,1]^m[0,1]m. The best response is computed from the policy and cost, with the highest-outcome tie rule; it is not supplied as independent data. Optimality means membership in that cube and maximal utility over that cube.

The formalization records several readings needed to make the preprint's displays consistent. Formula (1) prints a strict biconditional, but formula (9) allows equal adjacent policy values, so policy monotonicity is the implication from a strictly larger policy value to a strictly larger outcome. The cost equivalences apply to distinct values; staying is free. Additivity applies along strictly improving outcome chains, since an all-triples equality would conflict with positive improvement cost. Outcomes are assumed distinct, as needed for this version of Theorem 3. These choices are stated on the definition item and checked against the source in the moderation notes.

The goal retains the optimal-policy hypothesis and every clause of the binary property. It cannot be satisfied by defining the best response arbitrarily, shrinking the policy set to a selected candidate, or asserting only that a binary policy exists. The model covers the paper's base case b(x)=π(x)b(x)=\pi(x)b(x)=π(x) with unchanged P(y∣x)P(y\mid x)P(y∣x). The algorithms, complexity claims, experiments, and the paper's other examples are outside this mission. Contributions on the best response interface, finite optimization lemmas, Proposition 2, and either Appendix comparison are welcome.

Selected references

  • S. Tsirtsis, B. Tabibian, M. Khajehnejad, A. Singla, B. Schölkopf, and M. Gomez-Rodriguez, Optimal Decision Making Under Strategic Behavior, arXiv:1905.09239v5, 2020, §§2–4 and Appendix A.2–A.3; published in Management Science, 2024. arXiv preprint
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Algorithmic Game TheoryOperations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

Cross-licensing in a Supply Chain with Asymmetric Manufacturers I: Ex Post, Enforcing Cross-Licensing Never Lowers the Supplier's Profit at Any Wholesale PriceResearch Paper

Why the final licensing choice matters

A component supplier can influence a product market through both the wholesale price it charges and the technology its customers may share. Wang, Huang and Lee study a supply chain with one upstream supplier and two downstream manufacturers that invest in product quality and then compete in quantities. A cross-licensing policy lets each manufacturer use some of the other's innovation. The supplier may promise a policy before the investments, or leave the decision until after the investments and wholesale price are fixed. The latter choice creates a precise comparison: at that final stage, does permitting cross-licensing reduce the supplier's revenue? The authors answer it in Proposition 1 of their SSRN manuscript, version of 2023-04-27. Its proof is in the attached appendix, p. A.1.

This mission concerns that final-stage comparison. It is one part of the paper's broader study of how a supplier's licensing commitment affects manufacturers' innovation incentives and downstream market structure. The later innovation and initial-contract comparisons are separate questions. Here, investments and wholesale price are fixed, so the result isolates the direct quantity-market effect of licensing at the moment the supplier chooses its policy.

The downstream quantity game

Manufacturers M1M_1M1​ and M2M_2M2​ have already selected nonnegative innovation levels T1T_1T1​ and T2T_2T2​, with T1≤T2T_1\le T_2T1​≤T2​ in the presentation of equations (2) and (3). Each chooses a nonnegative production quantity qiq_iqi​. The wholesale price rrr is the amount each manufacturer pays the common supplier for one unit. The market-size intercept is normalized to one and per-unit manufacturing cost to zero. If licensing effectiveness is β∈[0,1]\beta\in[0,1]β∈[0,1], manufacturer iii receives a quality improvement Ti+βTjT_i+\beta T_jTi​+βTj​; β=0\beta=0β=0 represents no cross-licensing. Its inverse demand is 1+Ti+βTj−q1−q21+T_i+\beta T_j-q_1-q_21+Ti​+βTj​−q1​−q2​. These are the model's conventions on pp. 9–10.

At fixed T1,T2,β,rT_1,T_2,\beta,rT1​,T2​,β,r, the manufacturers play a simultaneous quantity game. Their respective profits are

Π1(q1;q2)=(1+T1+βT2−q1−q2−r)q1,Π2(q2;q1)=(1+T2+βT1−q1−q2−r)q2.\Pi_1(q_1;q_2)=(1+T_1+\beta T_2-q_1-q_2-r)q_1, \qquad \Pi_2(q_2;q_1)=(1+T_2+\beta T_1-q_1-q_2-r)q_2.Π1​(q1​;q2​)=(1+T1​+βT2​−q1​−q2​−r)q1​,Π2​(q2​;q1​)=(1+T2​+βT1​−q1​−q2​−r)q2​.

A Nash equilibrium is a pair (q1,q2)∈[0,∞)2(q_1,q_2)\in[0,\infty)^2(q1​,q2​)∈[0,∞)2 for which neither manufacturer increases its profit by changing its own nonnegative quantity while the other's quantity stays fixed. The supplier's profit at a quantity profile is r(q1+q2)r(q_1+q_2)r(q1​+q2​). The supplier's comparison must therefore account for the manufacturers' responses under each licensing policy; it cannot compare profit at an arbitrary fixed quantity pair.

Formalization targets

The first milestone gives the exact equilibrium quantities of equation (2). Write r1=1+T1(2−β)−T2(1−2β)r_1=1+T_1(2-\beta)-T_2(1-2\beta)r1​=1+T1​(2−β)−T2​(1−2β) and r2=1+βT1+T2r_2=1+\beta T_1+T_2r2​=1+βT1​+T2​. For r≤r1r\le r_1r≤r1​ both manufacturers can sell; for r1<r≤r2r_1<r\le r_2r1​<r≤r2​ only M2M_2M2​ sells; above r2r_2r2​ neither sells. The statement characterizes every equilibrium and thereby gives existence and uniqueness across the two threshold boundaries, including the cases where a manufacturer's equilibrium quantity is zero.

The second milestone identifies the supplier's revenue at an equilibrium with the piecewise expression πscl(r)\pi_s^{\mathrm{cl}}(r)πscl​(r) in equation (3). Setting β=0\beta=0β=0 in that expression gives the paper's no-licensing expression πsn(r)\pi_s^{\mathrm n}(r)πsn​(r) in equation (4). This milestone links the paper's algebraic profit comparison to the strategic quantity game, while keeping the equilibrium property as the premise.

The goal is the supplier's ex-post preference in Proposition 1. If qclq^{\mathrm{cl}}qcl is any equilibrium with licensing effectiveness β\betaβ and qnq^{\mathrm n}qn is any equilibrium at β=0\beta=0β=0, then both equilibria exist and

r(q1n+q2n)≤r(q1cl+q2cl)(0≤β≤1,  0≤T1≤T2,  r≥0).r\bigl(q^{\mathrm n}_1+q^{\mathrm n}_2\bigr) \le r\bigl(q^{\mathrm{cl}}_1+q^{\mathrm{cl}}_2\bigr) \qquad(0\le\beta\le1,\;0\le T_1\le T_2,\;r\ge0).r(q1n​+q2n​)≤r(q1cl​+q2cl​)(0≤β≤1,0≤T1​≤T2​,r≥0).

This weak inequality is intentional. At β=0\beta=0β=0 the two games coincide, and there are other parameter values at which the profits tie. The comparison holds at the same innovation levels and the same wholesale price; it is not a comparison after re-optimizing the supplier's price or the manufacturers' investment decisions.

What the result establishes

For fixed investments and price, the supplier need not lose revenue by enforcing cross-licensing after observing the manufacturers' innovation. This gives mathematical content to the paper's claim that, without an initial commitment, the supplier will choose to enforce licensing at the final contract stage. The model does not specify a separate final-contract bargaining game, so the formal goal is the profit comparison that supports that interpretation. The result does not settle whether committing to licensing before innovation is preferable: changing the initial policy can change the innovation levels themselves, which the ex-post comparison holds fixed.

The authors prove Proposition 1 by comparing the supplier-profit expressions (3) and (4) in the manuscript's appendix. A machine-checked development would additionally secure the connection from the manufacturers' Nash conditions to those expressions, including the monopoly and zero-sales regimes. These statements are currently posed as open formalization targets; a Lean file with sorry only checks that the statements are well formed, not that the paper's argument has been verified by Lean. The general two-player Nash definition can be reused for other real-strategy games; the payoff and threshold definitions are specific to this supply chain.

Where the argument has to account for cases

The quantity equilibrium changes form as the wholesale price crosses r1r_1r1​ and r2r_2r2​. An argument confined to the two-selling-firms region misses cases in which M1M_1M1​ sells nothing, or neither manufacturer sells. Comparing only the duopoly formulas cannot establish an inequality at every nonnegative price. The first milestone therefore covers all three regimes, and the goal compares the profits of actual equilibria. The fact that T2≥T1T_2\ge T_1T2​≥T1​ orders the possible monopoly toward M2M_2M2​ under the paper's chosen labels; a formulation that silently assumes both equilibrium quantities are strictly positive would lose part of Proposition 1.

Formalization scope

All parameters and quantities are real. The permitted quantity strategies and wholesale prices are nonnegative. The paper treats rrr as a wholesale price without writing a bound in Proposition 1; r≥0r\ge0r≥0 is made explicit because a negative price can reverse the supplier-profit inequality. The innovation ordering 0≤T1≤T20\le T_1\le T_20≤T1​≤T2​ is the convention immediately preceding equation (2). Licensing effectiveness lies in [0,1][0,1][0,1]. Innovation costs kiTi2k_iT_i^2ki​Ti2​ and the paper's bound k2>49/144k_2>49/144k2​>49/144 are unnecessary once innovation levels are fixed, so they do not enter this mission's statements.

The formalization uses an explicit pair (q1,q2)(q_1,q_2)(q1​,q2​), with the first coordinate for M1M_1M1​. The quantity-game equilibrium is defined by unilateral payoff comparisons over [0,∞)[0,\infty)[0,∞), and it is not defined by equation (2). Equation (2) is instead a theorem characterizing the equilibrium. The supplier's profit is defined as r(q1+q2)r(q_1+q_2)r(q1​+q2​) for any pair, independently of equation (3). These choices prevent the goal from becoming an inequality between two expressions whose connection to the game has merely been assumed. Equation (2)'s missing closing parenthesis in the manuscript is interpreted as the displayed first quantity divided by three. No division in the model's displayed formulas has a variable denominator.

Selected references

  • J. Wang, T. Huang and J. Lee, Cross-licensing in a Supply Chain with Asymmetric Manufacturers, SSRN manuscript 3053682, version of 2023-04-27, pp. 9–11 and Appendix p. A.1; published in Manufacturing & Service Operations Management, 2023. Manuscript; DOI.
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A Robust Spectral Clustering Algorithm for Sub-Gaussian Mixture Models with Outliers 3: Binary PSD Rank-r Lifting (4) Is Equivalent to Robust Cluster Assignment (3)Research Paper

Why this formulation matters

Clustering separates observations into groups whose members resemble one another. In kernel clustering, a matrix KKK records a similarity score for each pair of observations, and an assignment seeks groups with high total within-group similarity. Real data can also contain outliers, observations that should not be assigned to any cluster. Srivastava, Sarkar, and Hanasusanto use a binary assignment program that permits those unassigned observations and then express the same exact problem through a matrix of pairwise co-memberships. The relationship is stated as Proposition 1 of their preprint. It is the algebraic starting point for the tractable relaxations introduced immediately after the proposition in §3.

The two exact programs have different variables. The assignment program describes each observation's cluster directly. The lifted program records whether each pair belongs to the same cluster. The latter representation makes positive semidefiniteness and rank explicit, and it is the one the paper relaxes to obtain its semidefinite program. A precise equivalence matters because a relaxation of the wrong feasible set would no longer be a relaxation of the stated assignment problem.

The two finite matrix programs

Let NNN be the number of observations and rrr the number of available clusters. A binary assignment matrix Z∈{0,1}N×rZ\in\{0,1\}^{N\times r}Z∈{0,1}N×r has one row per observation and one column per cluster. In formulation (3), each row sums to at most one. A row with one nonzero entry assigns its observation to that cluster; a zero row leaves the observation unassigned. Thus the same matrix represents both inliers and outliers. Cluster sizes need not be equal, and unused cluster columns are allowed.

The clustering matrix X=ZZ⊤X=ZZ^\topX=ZZ⊤ has one row and column per observation. Its entry XijX_{ij}Xij​ is one when observations iii and jjj share a cluster and zero otherwise, including when either observation has a zero assignment row. Formulation (4) asks instead for an N×NN\times NN×N matrix XXX whose entries lie in {0,1}\{0,1\}{0,1}, that is positive semidefinite, and whose rank is at most rrr. The rank bound limits the number of distinct nonzero cluster directions. Positive semidefiniteness is a property of the full real matrix, including its symmetry; it is not merely a condition on its diagonal.

Let K∈RN×NK\in\mathbb R^{N\times N}K∈RN×N be the similarity matrix, γ∈R\gamma\in\mathbb Rγ∈R a penalty parameter, and ENE_NEN​ the all-ones N×NN\times NN×N matrix. The entrywise Frobenius inner product is ⟨A,B⟩=∑i,jAijBij\langle A,B\rangle=\sum_{i,j}A_{ij}B_{ij}⟨A,B⟩=∑i,j​Aij​Bij​. The programs maximize, respectively, ⟨K−γEN,ZZ⊤⟩\langle K-\gamma E_N,ZZ^\top\rangle⟨K−γEN​,ZZ⊤⟩ over feasible ZZZ and ⟨K−γEN,X⟩\langle K-\gamma E_N,X\rangle⟨K−γEN​,X⟩ over feasible XXX. Both have a feasible zero matrix, even at the boundary values N=0N=0N=0 and r=0r=0r=0.

Formalization targets

The goal is Proposition 1, stated with its factor and rotation. If X∗X^*X∗ is an optimal matrix for (4), there must exist G∈RN×rG\in\mathbb R^{N\times r}G∈RN×r and an orthogonal O∈Rr×rO\in\mathbb R^{r\times r}O∈Rr×r such that Z∗=GOZ^*=GOZ∗=GO is feasible and optimal for (3), with

X∗=GG⊤,⟨K−γEN,Z∗Z∗⊤⟩=⟨K−γEN,X∗⟩.X^*=GG^\top,\qquad \langle K-\gamma E_N,Z^*Z^{*\top}\rangle =\langle K-\gamma E_N,X^*\rangle.X∗=GG⊤,⟨K−γEN​,Z∗Z∗⊤⟩=⟨K−γEN​,X∗⟩.

Here “feasible and optimal” includes the zero-one entry condition, the row-sum bound, and comparison with every feasible assignment matrix. The objective identity alone would say little: once the Gram factorization and orthogonality hold, it follows algebraically. The substantive result is the existence of an assignment-compatible rotation of a factor of every lifted optimum.

The milestone list follows the five claims in Appendix B of the preprint: lifting a feasible assignment to a feasible XXX without changing its value; factoring a rank-bounded positive semidefinite XXX through rrr columns; classifying factor rows as zero or unit vectors; showing that distinct nonzero rows are orthogonal; and rotating those rows into assignment coordinates. These statements address both directions of the feasible-set correspondence used by Proposition 1.

What the result supplies

The proposition says that the matrix constraints in (4) describe the same exact clustering choices as the assignment constraints in (3), up to a choice of orthogonal coordinates for the factor. A lifted optimum therefore represents an assignment optimum rather than merely a matrix with the same numerical objective. Conversely, an assignment can always be lifted to a matrix accepted by (4). The paper can then drop the binary or rank constraints to obtain relaxations while keeping a clear exact program as their reference point; see §3 of the preprint.

The proposition is proved in the source paper. This mission seeks a machine-checked proof of that known claim and reusable finite-matrix results about binary positive semidefinite Gram matrices. In particular, the factorization and row-structure milestones can be used beyond spectral clustering whenever a zero-one Gram matrix appears with a rank bound. The Lean declarations here are proposed statements; their sorry proofs remain for solvers to complete.

Where the difficulty lies

The forward implication is immediate once a valid assignment matrix is given: its Gram matrix is positive semidefinite and has rank at most the number of cluster columns. The reverse implication carries the mathematical work. Positive semidefiniteness and low rank alone produce a real factor, but the factor need not have zero-one entries. A generic factor rotation also need not yield one-hot rows. The zero-one condition on every Gram entry is what constrains the relative positions of the nonzero rows strongly enough to recover assignment directions. The result must work when several observations share a direction, when some rows vanish, and when fewer than rrr clusters are occupied.

Formalization scope

The formalization uses Mathlib matrices indexed by Fin N and Fin r over R\mathbb RR. Feasibility of (3) is entrywise membership in {0,1}\{0,1\}{0,1} together with row sums at most one. Feasibility of (4) is entrywise membership in {0,1}\{0,1\}{0,1}, Matrix.PosSemidef, and Matrix.rank ≤ r. The objectives use the explicit sum of entrywise products, so no operator norm or alternate matrix inner product enters the statement. Global optimality is defined by comparison against the corresponding whole feasible set. The factor GGG has exactly rrr columns, and the rotation belongs to the real orthogonal group of dimension rrr.

The paper obtains KKK from a Gaussian kernel and takes γ∈(0,1)\gamma\in(0,1)γ∈(0,1) for the clustering application. Proposition 1 and Appendix B use only the displayed algebraic programs, so the formal statement permits arbitrary real KKK and γ\gammaγ. No probability model, symmetry assumption on KKK, positive dimension assumption, or nonempty-cluster condition is needed. The boundary cases N=0N=0N=0 and r=0r=0r=0 retain their literal meanings. The formalization cannot assume that a feasible XXX is already block diagonal or is already a Gram matrix of a binary assignment; that is the conclusion being established.

Useful contributions include proofs of the five Appendix B milestones, a finite-dimensional factorization theorem with the prescribed number of columns, and the rotation theorem that handles repeated or zero rows. These pieces should share the stated definitions so that the eventual proof of Proposition 1 uses precisely formulations (3) and (4).

Selected references

  • P. R. Srivastava, P. Sarkar, and G. A. Hanasusanto, A Robust Spectral Clustering Algorithm for Sub-Gaussian Mixture Models with Outliers, Operations Research 71(1), 2023; arXiv:1912.07546v3, §3, Proposition 1 and Appendix B.
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EconomicsOperations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

The Challenge of Understanding What Users Want: Inconsistent Preferences and Engagement Optimization II: On Low-Moreishness, Near-Constant-Value Manifolds, Engagement Maximization Is Near-OptimalResearch Paper

Motivation

Recommender systems on online platforms are usually trained to maximize engagement: time spent, items consumed, sessions returned. The implicit justification is revealed preference: a user who consumes more must value the content more. Behavioural economics questions that inference when a person's choices are driven by two conflicting processes, a deliberate one that weighs long-run utility and an impulsive one that reacts to the item in front of it.

Kleinberg, Mullainathan and Raghavan (2023) build a minimal model of such a user and ask when engagement is a good proxy for utility. Their first characterization (Theorem 4.1, a separate mission) says that the engagement-maximizing content differs from the utility-maximizing content only through higher moreishness, or higher span with lower value. This mission formalizes the complementary positive result, Theorem 4.2: on a content manifold where no content is very moreish and all content has roughly equal value (a "salad"-like manifold), maximizing engagement loses only a small, explicitly bounded amount of user utility.

Setting

A content distribution is a triple ω=(p,q,vˉ)\omega=(p,q,\bar v)ω=(p,q,vˉ) in the parameter space

Ω=[0,1)×[0,1)×R+.\Omega=[0,1)\times[0,1)\times\mathbb R_+ .Ω=[0,1)×[0,1)×R+​.

The user consumes items one at a time. System 2, the deliberate agent, collects utility with mean vˉ\bar vvˉ per item while it is still interested, and pays an outside option W>0W>0W>0 per step spent on the platform. After each item system 2 stays interested with probability qqq, the span. System 1, the impulsive agent, is hooked by each item with probability ppp, the moreishness, and then consumes the next item without consulting system 2. Define

gS(ω)=vˉ−W1−q−pW1−p,gT(ω)=11−q+p1−p.g_S(\omega)=\frac{\bar v-W}{1-q}-\frac{pW}{1-p},\qquad g_T(\omega)=\frac{1}{1-q}+\frac{p}{1-p}.gS​(ω)=1−qvˉ−W​−1−ppW​,gT​(ω)=1−q1​+1−pp​.

System 2 visits the platform only if this is worthwhile, so its expected utility is equation (1),

E[S(ω)]=max⁡(gS(ω),0),\mathbb E[S(\omega)]=\max\bigl(g_S(\omega),0\bigr),E[S(ω)]=max(gS​(ω),0),

and the session length TTT is 000 when the user does not visit (gS(ω)<0g_S(\omega)<0gS​(ω)<0) and otherwise has expectation E[T(ω)]=gT(ω)\mathbb E[T(\omega)]=g_T(\omega)E[T(ω)]=gT​(ω), equation (2).

A platform chooses content from a content manifold M⊆Ω\mathcal M\subseteq\OmegaM⊆Ω, which the paper assumes contains a point with E[S]>0\mathbb E[S]>0E[S]>0. The utility maximizer ωS=(pS,qS,vˉS)\omega_S=(p_S,q_S,\bar v_S)ωS​=(pS​,qS​,vˉS​) maximizes gSg_SgS​ over M\mathcal MM (3). The engagement maximizer ωT=(pT,qT,vˉT)\omega_T=(p_T,q_T,\bar v_T)ωT​=(pT​,qT​,vˉT​) maximizes gTg_TgT​ over the points of M\mathcal MM at which the user participates, {ω∈M:gS(ω)≥0}\{\omega\in\mathcal M:g_S(\omega)\ge0\}{ω∈M:gS​(ω)≥0} (4). The proof uses ai=11−pia_i=\frac{1}{1-p_i}ai​=1−pi​1​ and bi=11−qib_i=\frac{1}{1-q_i}bi​=1−qi​1​ for i∈{S,T}i\in\{S,T\}i∈{S,T}, so that E[T(ωS)]=aS+bS−1\mathbb E[T(\omega_S)]=a_S+b_S-1E[T(ωS​)]=aS​+bS​−1.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 4.2 (p. 17)

Suppose p≤α<1p\le\alpha<1p≤α<1 for every (p,q,vˉ)∈M(p,q,\bar v)\in\mathcal M(p,q,vˉ)∈M, and ∣vˉ−v0∣<β|\bar v-v_0|<\beta∣vˉ−v0​∣<β for every (p,q,vˉ)∈M(p,q,\bar v)\in\mathcal M(p,q,vˉ)∈M, for some v0v_0v0​. Then

E[S(ωT)] ≥ E[S(ωS)]−2β E[T(ωS)]−α(v0+β)1−α.\mathbb E[S(\omega_T)]\ \ge\ \mathbb E[S(\omega_S)]-2\beta\,\mathbb E[T(\omega_S)]-\frac{\alpha(v_0+\beta)}{1-\alpha}.E[S(ωT​)] ≥ E[S(ωS​)]−2βE[T(ωS​)]−1−αα(v0​+β)​.

Milestones (p. 18)

  1. Inequality (5): if gT(ωT)≥gT(ωS)g_T(\omega_T)\ge g_T(\omega_S)gT​(ωT​)≥gT​(ωS​), then bS−bT≤aT−aSb_S-b_T\le a_T-a_SbS​−bT​≤aT​−aS​.
  2. Inequality (7): if 0≤pi≤α<10\le p_i\le\alpha<10≤pi​≤α<1, then 1≤ai≤11−α1\le a_i\le\frac{1}{1-\alpha}1≤ai​≤1−α1​.
  3. The gap identity: when gS≥0g_S\ge0gS​≥0 at both points,
E[S(ωS)]−E[S(ωT)]=bS(vˉS−vˉT)+(bS−bT)(vˉT−W)+W(aT−aS).\mathbb E[S(\omega_S)]-\mathbb E[S(\omega_T)]=b_S(\bar v_S-\bar v_T)+(b_S-b_T)(\bar v_T-W)+W(a_T-a_S).E[S(ωS​)]−E[S(ωT​)]=bS​(vˉS​−vˉT​)+(bS​−bT​)(vˉT​−W)+W(aT​−aS​).

A supporting statement, implicit in the proof, is that participation gS(ω)≥0g_S(\omega)\ge0gS​(ω)≥0 at a point of Ω\OmegaΩ forces vˉ≥W\bar v\ge Wvˉ≥W.

Significance

The theorem is the paper's sufficient condition for engagement optimization to be benign. It is quantitative: the utility loss is linear in the value spread β\betaβ, scaled by the engagement E[T(ωS)]\mathbb E[T(\omega_S)]E[T(ωS​)] of the utility-optimal content, plus a term that vanishes as the moreishness bound α\alphaα goes to 000. The paper notes that the linear dependence on engagement is unavoidable, since a user can lose a constant utility per step when vˉT<vˉS\bar v_T<\bar v_SvˉT​<vˉS​. Together with Theorem 4.1 it delimits when a platform that observes only engagement can safely optimize it, and it motivates the paper's §5, on how a platform might learn which kind of manifold it is on.

The result is proved in the paper, with a short proof. As far as is known, neither the model nor the theorem has been machine-checked. The formalization fixes the participation convention for E[T]\mathbb E[T]E[T], the feasibility of ωS\omega_SωS​ in the engagement problem, and the implicit hypotheses listed below, which the printed proof uses without stating.

Difficulty

The algebra is elementary once the denominators are known to be positive. The difficulty lies in the bookkeeping the printed proof leaves implicit. Inequality (5) is derived from "E[T(ωT)]>E[T(ωS)]\mathbb E[T(\omega_T)]>\mathbb E[T(\omega_S)]E[T(ωT​)]>E[T(ωS​)]", but (4) only gives ≥\ge≥, and only once ωS\omega_SωS​ is shown feasible for (4), which needs gS(ωS)>0g_S(\omega_S)>0gS​(ωS​)>0, i.e. the standing assumption on M\mathcal MM. Multiplying (5) by vˉT−W\bar v_T-WvˉT​−W needs vˉT≥W\bar v_T\ge WvˉT​≥W, which follows from gS(ωT)≥0g_S(\omega_T)\ge0gS​(ωT​)≥0 and W>0W>0W>0. The bound on (aT−aS)vˉT(a_T-a_S)\bar v_T(aT​−aS​)vˉT​ splits on the sign of aT−aSa_T-a_SaT​−aS​, and uses α≥0\alpha\ge0α≥0 (from M≠∅\mathcal M\neq\emptysetM=∅) and v0+β>vˉT≥0v_0+\beta>\bar v_T\ge0v0​+β>vˉT​≥0. Finally, E[T(ωS)]\mathbb E[T(\omega_S)]E[T(ωS​)] must be identified with aS+bS−1a_S+b_S-1aS​+bS​−1 through participation at ωS\omega_SωS​. Using gTg_TgT​ in place of E[T]\mathbb E[T]E[T], or dropping the participation constraint from (4), changes the theorem.

Formalization scope

The Lean development lives in the namespace EngagementOpt.Salad and imports the frozen shared model in EngagementOpt.Misalign. There, a content distribution is a structure Params with real fields p, q, v; InOmega ω states 0≤p<10\le p<10≤p<1, 0≤q<10\le q<10≤q<1, 0≤vˉ0\le\bar v0≤vˉ. The shared functions gS W, gT and this chunk's ES W, ET W, aCoef, bCoef are as above, with ET W ω = if gS W ω < 0 then 0 else gT ω. The shared maximizer predicates IsUtilityMaximizer W M ωS (membership and IsMaxOn (gS W) M ωS) and IsEngagementMaximizer W M ωT (membership, 0 ≤ gS W ωT, and IsMaxOn gT {ω ∈ M | 0 ≤ gS W ω} ωT) hold for every maximizer, so the theorem holds for any tie-breaking rule. Closedness of M\mathcal MM only guarantees that maximizers exist and is not assumed. The goal's hypotheses are: W>0W>0W>0; M⊆Ω\mathcal M\subseteq\OmegaM⊆Ω; a point of M\mathcal MM with gS>0g_S>0gS​>0; the two maximizer predicates; α<1\alpha<1α<1 and p≤αp\le\alphap≤α on M\mathcal MM; and ∣vˉ−v0∣<β|\bar v-v_0|<\beta∣vˉ−v0​∣<β on M\mathcal MM for a given v0v_0v0​.

Three of these are implicit in the paper and are disclosed: W>0W>0W>0 (§2.1 normalizes W=1W=1W=1); α<1\alpha<1α<1, without which condition 1 is vacuous on Ω\OmegaΩ and the bound fails (Lean's x/0=0x/0=0x/0=0 would turn α=1\alpha=1α=1 into a false statement); and the standing assumption of p. 16. Neither 0≤α0\le\alpha0≤α nor 0<β0<\beta0<β is assumed; both follow from the hypotheses. Inequality (5) is posed with ≤\le≤ rather than the printed <<<, because only ≥\ge≥ is available from (4). The hypotheses are satisfiable: with W=1W=1W=1, M={(0,12,3),(12,12,3)}\mathcal M=\{(0,\tfrac12,3),(\tfrac12,\tfrac12,3)\}M={(0,21​,3),(21​,21​,3)}, α=12\alpha=\tfrac12α=21​, v0=3v_0=3v0​=3, β=0.1\beta=0.1β=0.1, the maximizers are ωS=(0,12,3)\omega_S=(0,\tfrac12,3)ωS​=(0,21​,3) and ωT=(12,12,3)\omega_T=(\tfrac12,\tfrac12,3)ωT​=(21​,21​,3), and the bound reads 3≥0.53\ge0.53≥0.5.

Everything needed is in Mathlib (real arithmetic, max, |·|, IsMaxOn). Proofs of the milestones and the goal are welcome; the base model module is shared with the Theorem 4.1 mission of the same paper.

Selected references

  • J. Kleinberg, S. Mullainathan, M. Raghavan, The Challenge of Understanding What Users Want: Inconsistent Preferences and Engagement Optimization, Management Science, 2023. DOI 10.1287/mnsc.2022.03683; read as arXiv:2202.11776v3.
  • G. S. Becker, K. M. Murphy, A Theory of Rational Addiction, Journal of Political Economy 96(4), 1988. DOI 10.1086/261558.
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Algorithmic Game TheoryEconomicsOperations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

Quantum Economic Advantage: A Quantum Computing Firm Can Out-Invest a Cheaper-to-Scale Classical Rival in Subgame-Perfect EquilibriumResearch Paper

Why investment can reverse a cost advantage

Quantum algorithms can reduce the work needed for some computations, but a provider also has to build hardware capable of serving a market. Bova, Goldfarb, and Melko model these two costs separately in Quantum Economic Advantage. Their question is whether a quantum provider can choose more market-creating investment than a classical rival even when building that additional quantum capacity is more expensive. The answer matters to their economic comparison: a lower variable cost does not, by itself, order the firms' investment decisions.

The working paper was circulated as NBER Working Paper No. 29724 in February 2022 and appeared in Management Science in 2023. This mission cites the NBER version throughout. It addresses the paper's Proposition 2, its explicit numerical witness, and the model results used around that proposition. The paper proves these results analytically; the remaining task here is a machine-checked formalization of their statements and proofs.

The two-stage duopoly

There are two firms. Firm 1 supplies quantum computing and has constant unit cost ccc; firm 2 supplies classical computing and has unit cost c2c^2c2. A common demand intercept aaa measures the initial market size. The paper assumes a>c2>c>1a>c^2>c>1a>c2>c>1. The firms sell differentiated computing services, with substitution parameter γ∈[0,1]\gamma\in[0,1]γ∈[0,1]: at γ=0\gamma=0γ=0 their products do not compete through demand, while at γ=1\gamma=1γ=1 they are identical in the model. This is an economic representation of quantum advantage, rather than a formal model of a quantum algorithm. See §2 of the working paper.

In stage 1, firms simultaneously choose investments x1,x2≥0x_1,x_2\ge0x1​,x2​≥0. Firm iii pays Bixi2/2B_i x_i^2/2Bi​xi2​/2, where Bi>0B_i>0Bi​>0, and its investment raises its own demand intercept to a+xia+x_ia+xi​. In stage 2, after observing both investments, firms simultaneously choose quantities q1,q2≥0q_1,q_2\ge0q1​,q2​≥0. Their inverse-demand prices and profits are

p1=a+x1−q1−γq2,p2=a+x2−q2−γq1,p_1=a+x_1-q_1-\gamma q_2,\qquad p_2=a+x_2-q_2-\gamma q_1,p1​=a+x1​−q1​−γq2​,p2​=a+x2​−q2​−γq1​, π1=q1p1−cq1−B1x122,π2=q2p2−c2q2−B2x222.\pi_1=q_1p_1-cq_1-\frac{B_1x_1^2}{2},\qquad \pi_2=q_2p_2-c^2q_2-\frac{B_2x_2^2}{2}.π1​=q1​p1​−cq1​−2B1​x12​​,π2​=q2​p2​−c2q2​−2B2​x22​​.

A subgame-perfect equilibrium consists of an investment pair and a quantity strategy assigning a Cournot Nash equilibrium to every feasible investment pair, including pairs reached after a unilateral deviation. At the chosen investments, neither firm can improve its profit by changing its own investment, anticipating the stage-2 strategy. The stage-2 payoff excludes investment cost because that cost is already sunk when quantities are chosen.

Formalization targets

Proposition 2: investment reversal

The goal is the paper's existence claim, over the game itself:

∃ (a,c,γ,B1,B2) satisfying the model and Lemma 1 conditions,B2<B1,∃ an SPE,∀ SPEs,  x2<x1.\exists\,(a,c,\gamma,B_1,B_2)\text{ satisfying the model and Lemma 1 conditions},\quad B_2<B_1,\quad \exists\,\text{an SPE},\quad \forall\,\text{SPEs},\;x_2<x_1.∃(a,c,γ,B1​,B2​) satisfying the model and Lemma 1 conditions,B2​<B1​,∃an SPE,∀SPEs,x2​<x1​.

The classical firm's cost coefficient is smaller, yet the quantum firm invests more. The proof gives a=20a=20a=20, c=2c=2c=2, γ=1\gamma=1γ=1, B1=10B_1=10B1​=10, B2=8B_2=8B2​=8; its investments are x1∗=102/109x_1^*=102/109x1∗​=102/109 and x2∗=89/109x_2^*=89/109x2∗​=89/109. The goal concerns the actual two-stage equilibrium, so the closed forms are supporting milestones rather than the definition of success. The paper's Proposition 2 and its proof appear on PDF pages 14 and 27–28.

Supporting results

Equations (3)–(4) give the interior Cournot quantities; (14)–(15) give the second derivatives of reduced profit; Lemma 1 gives sufficient parameter thresholds for positive investments and concavity; and (5)–(6) give equilibrium investments. Section 7 derives an exact threshold for the inequality x1∗>x2∗x_1^*>x_2^*x1∗​>x2∗​ and evaluates it at the numerical witness. Additional milestones record the displayed optimal profits, Proposition 1 on positive quantum profit, the no-investment comparative static of (11)–(12), and Corollary 1's monopoly case. These targets follow the working paper's equations and proofs.

What the result establishes

The result separates a firm's marginal cost of supplying computations from its cost of expanding the market. In this model, the quantum firm can justify a larger investment even with a larger coefficient on investment cost. The exact threshold identifies which combination of demand, variable cost, competition, and investment costs creates that ordering. Proposition 1 and the comparative static make related claims about profitability and the value of additional market size.

A complete formalization would connect the printed algebraic formulas to best responses over nonnegative actions, including possible corner outcomes after off-path investments. The reusable component is the published linear differentiated Cournot game; this mission adds the investment stage and source-specific parameters. The working paper supplies proofs on paper, while the Lean theorem files here are open statements awaiting machine-checked proofs.

Where the argument is delicate

Equations (3)–(4) solve interior first-order conditions, but stage-2 deviations can drive one firm's quantity to zero. A proof about a genuine subgame-perfect equilibrium must handle those corners throughout the strategy, not only at the final investment pair. Likewise, the second derivatives of the algebraic interior profit do not automatically settle every stage-1 deviation in the constrained game. The mission's equilibrium milestone must bridge those two readings. Lemma 1's thresholds also contain quotients whose denominators require checking under the stated parameter conditions.

Formalization scope and conventions

All parameters, investments, quantities, profits, and thresholds are real. The formalization requires xi,qi≥0x_i,q_i\ge0xi​,qi​≥0 in the equilibrium predicates. Standing records 0≤γ≤10\le\gamma\le10≤γ≤1, a>c2>c>1a>c^2>c>1a>c2>c>1, and positive BiB_iBi​. Lemma1Cond records the strict thresholds at the end of the proof of Lemma 1, with the paper's Max⁡\operatorname{Max}Max represented by real max. Firm 1 is quantum throughout; firm 2's unit cost is defined as c2c^2c2, not an independent parameter. The closed-form quantities and investments are used in milestones; the main goal quantifies over the subgame-perfect equilibrium predicate.

Several printed or implicit conventions affect the statements. Lemma 1 is phrased loosely on PDF page 11; its proof's exact sufficient conditions on page 26 are the milestone. The proof's strict claims about differences of thresholds become equalities when γ=0\gamma=0γ=0, without changing the final sufficient condition. Corollary 1 uses a different regime, a<c2a<c^2a<c2, and is stated without the main model's Standing condition; c<ac<ac<a ensures the asserted quantum monopoly has positive output. The comparative static concerns the separate model with x1=x2=0x_1=x_2=0x1​=x2​=0. A printed reference to optimal profits in “(11)” in the proof of Proposition 1 points to the unnumbered optimal-profit display on PDF page 12. The repeated x1∗x_1^*x1∗​ in the proof of Proposition 2 is read as x1∗,x2∗x_1^*,x_2^*x1∗​,x2∗​.

Useful contributions include proofs about nonnegative Cournot best responses and their uniqueness, the boundary behavior of stage-1 reduced profits, the exact sign conditions on the paper's denominators, and proofs of the source-indexed statements. The definition layer is meant to be shared by all results in this one paper.

Selected references

  • Francesco Bova, Avi Goldfarb, and Roger G. Melko, Quantum Economic Advantage, NBER Working Paper No. 29724, 2022. Working paper.
  • Francesco Bova, Avi Goldfarb, and Roger G. Melko, Quantum Economic Advantage, Management Science, 2023. DOI: 10.1287/mnsc.2022.4578. The mission's theorem numbering follows the NBER version above.
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EconomicsOperations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

A Theory of Liquidity in Private Equity I: Without a Secondary Market, Two Capital-Share Thresholds Characterize Equilibrium, and Liquid LPs Earn Strictly More When Both Fund Types ExistResearch Paper

Why liquidity can explain persistent private equity returns

Private equity funds are organized as limited partnerships. Limited partners (LPs: pension funds, endowments, insurers) commit capital, and a general partner (GP) manages the fund and calls the committed capital over several years. A well-documented empirical regularity is that some LPs earn persistently higher returns than others, and that fund returns persist across a GP's successive funds (Kaplan and Schoar, 2005; Lerner, Schoar and Wongsunwai, 2007). The usual explanation is differences in skill.

Maurin, Robinson and Strömberg propose a different channel. Because capital is called gradually, an LP hit by a liquidity shock may default on the remaining commitment. GPs who raise money from LPs that tolerate illiquidity can invest efficiently. GPs who raise money from LPs that do not must call capital early to protect themselves against default, which distorts investment. When illiquidity-tolerant capital is scarce, GPs compete for it and pay its owners a premium. This mission formalizes the paper's main equilibrium result without a secondary market: that premium exists exactly when both kinds of funds are raised.

Setting

An investment pays RRR per unit on success and 000 on failure. It succeeds with probability ppp if the GP exerts effort and with probability q<pq<pq<p if the GP shirks, in which case the GP enjoys a private benefit BBB per unit invested. Each GP has wealth AAA and runs one fund of total size I>AI>AI>A. A share x∈[0,1]x\in[0,1]x∈[0,1] of the fund is invested in period 0 and the rest, 1−x1-x1−x, in period 1; both investments succeed or fail independently.

A fee schedule fff pays the GP a fee per unit of investment that depends on which investments succeeded. It must satisfy limited liability, 0≤f≤0\le f\le0≤f≤ the fund's cash flow, and incentive compatibility: effort on both investments must be at least as profitable for the GP as shirking on either or both. Write fˉ\bar ffˉ​ for the expected fee under effort. LPs who receive the promised expected return Rˉ\bar RRˉ per unit contributed supply I−AI-AI−A, which ties the fund size to the fee through

(pR−fˉ) I=Rˉ (I−A).(3)(pR-\bar f)\,I=\bar R\,(I-A).\qquad(3)(pR−fˉ​)I=Rˉ(I−A).(3)

LPs consume in periods 1 and 2. With probability λ∈(0,1)\lambda\in(0,1)λ∈(0,1) an aggregate liquidity shock hits in period 1. After the shock an LP discounts period-2 consumption by δ∈(0,1)\delta\in(0,1)δ∈(0,1). There are two types, LLL and HHH, with δL<δH\delta_L<\delta_HδL​<δH​, holding the shares 1−μH1-\mu_H1−μH​ and μH\mu_HμH​ of the LPs' total capital KKK. Without a secondary market an LP honours the second capital call only if the claim is worth at least its cost:

1−x≤δ Rˉ.(4)1-x\le\delta\,\bar R.\qquad(4)1−x≤δRˉ.(4)

A GP chooses (x,I,f)(x,I,f)(x,I,f) to maximize the profit ΠGP=fˉI\Pi_{GP}=\bar f IΠGP​=fˉ​I subject to (3) and (4). LPs invest in private equity when its value (1−λ)Rˉ+λδRˉ(1-\lambda)\bar R+\lambda\delta\bar R(1−λ)Rˉ+λδRˉ exceeds the value 111 of cash. An equilibrium (Definition 2) consists of the fractions αL,αH\alpha_L,\alpha_HαL​,αH​ of GPs raising each fund type, the returns RˉPE,L∗,RˉPE,H∗\bar R^*_{PE,L},\bar R^*_{PE,H}RˉPE,L∗​,RˉPE,H∗​, and optimal contracts such that GPs raise only profit-maximizing fund types and each primary market clears.

The key quantities are the LPs' break-even return 1+r(λ,δ)=1/(1−λ(1−δ))1+r(\lambda,\delta)=1/(1-\lambda(1-\delta))1+r(λ,δ)=1/(1−λ(1−δ)), the minimal safe early call x^(λ,δ)=1−δ/(1−λ(1−δ))\hat x(\lambda,\delta)=1-\delta/(1-\lambda(1-\delta))x^(λ,δ)=1−δ/(1−λ(1−δ)), and the tolerance threshold δ^(λ)=1−p/(p+(1−λ)q)\hat\delta(\lambda)=1-p/(p+(1-\lambda)q)δ^(λ)=1−p/(p+(1−λ)q). The Lean development uses the namespace PELiquidity.Primary, with grossReturn, xHat, deltaHat, xLow, xBar, IsFeasibleContract, IsOptimalContract, IsCapitalSupply and IsEquilibrium.

Formalization targets

Goal: Proposition 2

There are thresholds

0<μ‾H<μˉH<10<\underline\mu_H<\bar\mu_H<10<μ​H​<μˉ​H​<1

such that for every μH∈(0,1)\mu_H\in(0,1)μH​∈(0,1) an equilibrium exists, and every equilibrium satisfies the following:

  • if μH<μ‾H\mu_H<\underline\mu_HμH​<μ​H​, both fund types are raised and RˉPE,H∗>RˉPE,L∗=1+r(λ,δL)\bar R^*_{PE,H}>\bar R^*_{PE,L}=1+r(\lambda,\delta_L)RˉPE,H∗​>RˉPE,L∗​=1+r(λ,δL​);
  • if μH≥μ‾H\mu_H\ge\underline\mu_HμH​≥μ​H​, then αL∗=0\alpha^*_L=0αL∗​=0;
  • RˉPE,H∗\bar R^*_{PE,H}RˉPE,H∗​ is strictly decreasing in μH\mu_HμH​ on [μ‾H,μˉH][\underline\mu_H,\bar\mu_H][μ​H​,μˉ​H​];
  • if μH≥μˉH\mu_H\ge\bar\mu_HμH​≥μˉ​H​, then RˉPE,H∗=1+r(λ,δH)\bar R^*_{PE,H}=1+r(\lambda,\delta_H)RˉPE,H∗​=1+r(λ,δH​).

The thresholds are existential, as in the paper. A variant pinning μˉH\bar\mu_Hμˉ​H​ by (C.3) is a welcome strengthening.

Milestones

  1. (11): the break-even return 1+r(λ,δ)1+r(\lambda,\delta)1+r(λ,δ), decreasing in δ\deltaδ.
  2. Lemma 1 with (12): ΠGP=pRI−Rˉ(I−A)\Pi_{GP}=pRI-\bar R(I-A)ΠGP​=pRI−Rˉ(I−A), so an optimal contract minimizes fˉ\bar ffˉ​.
  3. Lemma 2: the minimal incentive-compatible fee is (15), minimized exactly on x∈[q/(p+q),p/(p+q)]x\in[q/(p+q),p/(p+q)]x∈[q/(p+q),p/(p+q)].
  4. Proposition 1: under (4) the optimal early call is [max⁡{x‾,x^},xˉ][\max\{\underline x,\hat x\},\bar x][max{x​,x^},xˉ] if δ≥δ^(λ)\delta\ge\hat\delta(\lambda)δ≥δ^(λ), and x^(λ,δ)\hat x(\lambda,\delta)x^(λ,δ) with a strictly higher fee if δ<δ^(λ)\delta<\hat\delta(\lambda)δ<δ^(λ).
  5. (C.4): when only H-funds are raised above the H-LPs' break-even rate, μHK=IH−A=(pR−fˉH)A/(RˉH−(pR−fˉH))\mu_HK=I_H-A=(pR-\bar f_H)A/(\bar R_H-(pR-\bar f_H))μH​K=IH​−A=(pR−fˉ​H​)A/(RˉH​−(pR−fˉ​H​)); for fixed fee, the contribution decreases with RˉH\bar R_HRˉH​.
  6. (18): the indifference rate RˉPE,Hmax∈(1+r(λ,δL),pR)\bar R^{max}_{PE,H}\in(1+r(\lambda,\delta_L),pR)RˉPE,Hmax​∈(1+r(λ,δL​),pR).
  7. Lemma C.1: αL∗>0\alpha^*_L>0αL∗​>0 implies RˉPE,L∗=1+r(λ,δL)\bar R^*_{PE,L}=1+r(\lambda,\delta_L)RˉPE,L∗​=1+r(λ,δL​).

Significance

The result shows that heterogeneous liquidity needs alone, without any difference in skill, produce a cross-section of LP returns: when capital from liquidity-tolerant LPs is scarce, those LPs earn strictly more than other LPs investing in otherwise identical funds. When it is abundant, they earn only their fair liquidity premium. This separates a liquidity explanation of return persistence from a skill explanation, and it is the benchmark against which the paper's second main result, the effect of a secondary market (Proposition 3, a separate mission), is measured.

The paper proves the result by hand. No part of it has a machine-checked proof. A formalization would check the three-case equilibrium argument, including uniqueness, which the paper treats briefly. It would also fix the readings of Definition 2 that the printed statement leaves open (see below) and record the hypotheses the proofs use without stating. The fee-design lemma (Lemma 2) is a small linear program of independent interest for moral-hazard models with several projects.

Difficulty

The equilibrium statements quantify over every equilibrium, and an equilibrium includes an optimal contract for each fund type, optimal against all fee schedules, call shares and fund sizes. The obvious approach, substituting the closed-form fee (15) and the optimal call (17) into the profit function, does not suffice. Uniqueness requires showing that no other combination of returns, fund fractions and contracts clears both markets. That includes returns at which a fund type is not raised. It also includes returns above the break-even rate, where the no-default constraint loosens and the fee falls. Ruling these out needs the GP's optimal profit to be decreasing in the promised return even when the no-default constraint binds. The boundary at μ‾H\underline\mu_Hμ​H​, where the HHH-market just clears with every GP raising an HHH-fund, has to be placed correctly.

Formalization scope

  • Parameters. The parameter structure records 0<q<p≤10<q<p\le 10<q<p≤1, B,A,K>0B,A,K>0B,A,K>0, λ,δL,δH∈(0,1)\lambda,\delta_L,\delta_H\in(0,1)λ,δL​,δH​∈(0,1), and Assumptions 1, 2, 3 and 6 as printed. Two hypotheses are added and disclosed:
    • Assumption 5 is required strictly for δL\delta_LδL​, 1+r(λ,δL)<pR1+r(\lambda,\delta_L)<pR1+r(λ,δL​)<pR. With equality the GP's profit does not depend on the fee, and the strict ranking of returns fails.
    • B≤p(p−q)RB\le p(p-q)RB≤p(p−q)R makes limited liability compatible with incentive compatibility at every call share. The paper's Claim A.1 assumes the stronger R≥B/(p−q)2R\ge B/(p-q)^2R≥B/(p−q)2.
  • Fee schedules are indexed by the four success outcomes rather than the four cash-flow values. These differ only at x=1/2x=1/2x=1/2, and the minimal fee is the same.
  • Equation (3) is stated multiplied out with I>AI>AI>A, never as a quotient. A return at which the GP's profit is unbounded therefore admits no optimal contract and cannot be an equilibrium price. Contract optimality is global over (x,I,f)(x,I,f)(x,I,f).
  • Definition 2 is read with αL+αH=1\alpha_L+\alpha_H=1αL​+αH​=1, which the proof uses. GP fund choice is read as "a raised fund type is profit-maximizing", the only-if direction of the printed biconditional. The literal biconditional admits no equilibrium at μH=μ‾H\mu_H=\underline\mu_HμH​=μ​H​.
  • Two printed boundaries are corrected. Proposition 2 i) is stated for μH<μ‾H\mu_H<\underline\mu_HμH​<μ​H​, which resolves the overlap of its two cases as the proof does. "Decreasing" is read as strict.
  • Out of scope. Assumption 4 and capital-call relief (Appendix C.1) are not formalized, since the no-default constraint (4) is imposed directly. The GP takes Rˉ\bar RRˉ as given, so raising the promised return (C.2) is not modelled. Appendix A's alternative contracts and the "no fund" option are also out of scope.
  • Trivializations ruled out. The goal asserts existence of an equilibrium for every μH∈(0,1)\mu_H\in(0,1)μH​∈(0,1), so its "every equilibrium" clauses are not vacuous. The strict chain 0<μ‾H<μˉH<10<\underline\mu_H<\bar\mu_H<10<μ​H​<μˉ​H​<1 excludes degenerate thresholds.

Everything is built from Mathlib's real numbers and finite sums. The fee-schedule linear program (Lemma 2), the contract problem (Proposition 1) and the equilibrium predicate are reusable for the secondary-market mission of the same paper. Proofs of any milestone, and the pinned-threshold variant of the goal, are welcome.

Selected references

  • V. Maurin, D. T. Robinson and P. Strömberg, A Theory of Liquidity in Private Equity, working paper, draft of December 2020; published in Management Science 69(10), 2023. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2022.4612
  • S. N. Kaplan and A. Schoar, Private Equity Performance: Returns, Persistence, and Capital Flows, Journal of Finance 60(4), 1791–1823, 2005. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-6261.2005.00775.x
  • J. Lerner, A. Schoar and W. Wongsunwai, Smart Institutions, Foolish Choices: The Limited Partner Performance Puzzle, Journal of Finance 62(2), 731–764, 2007. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-6261.2007.01220.x
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