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Operations ResearchProbability·Captain: mikedeng1

Scheduling Deteriorating Jobs on a Single Processor II: If E(X_j)/α_j and α_j/[c_j(1+α_j)] Both Increase in j, the Order 1, …, N Minimizes the Weighted Expected Completion Time (Proposition 2)Research Paper

Why deteriorating jobs need a scheduling rule

On one processor, the completion time of a job normally depends on how much work precedes it. In the model of Browne and Yechiali (1990), waiting also changes the job's own processing requirement: a job that starts later takes longer. The sequence therefore changes both when each job starts and how long subsequent jobs must wait. This matters when the goal is a weighted completion cost, because a delay to one job can raise the completion costs of many others.

The paper gives an expected-makespan ordering for this linear deterioration model and, in Proposition 2, a sufficient condition under which the original job order minimizes weighted expected completion cost. The latter is the target of this mission. Related platform work on Delayed SWPT and the AvgCompletionSched family treats weighted completion scheduling without this job-specific linear deterioration. Their additive processing-time models do not supply the completion-time object used here.

Jobs, schedules, and cost

There are NNN jobs, all available at time zero, processed one at a time on a single machine without idle time or preemption. A schedule π\piπ is a permutation of the jobs: π(k)\pi(k)π(k) is the job processed in position kkk. The paper labels positions and jobs from 111 to NNN; the Lean development labels them from 000 to N−1N-1N−1. The identity schedule π0\pi_0π0​ processes jobs in label order.

For job iii, XiX_iXi​ is its random initial processing requirement, αi\alpha_iαi​ its deterministic growth rate, and cic_ici​ its waiting cost rate. If the job starts at time ttt, its actual processing time is Yi(t)=Xi+αitY_i(t)=X_i+\alpha_i tYi​(t)=Xi​+αi​t. Deterioration stops once processing starts. Write Sk(π)S_k(\pi)Sk​(π) for the time at which the first kkk scheduled jobs have all finished. The model sets S0(π)=0S_0(\pi)=0S0​(π)=0 and

Sk+1(π)=Sk(π)+Xπ(k+1)+απ(k+1)Sk(π)S_{k+1}(\pi)=S_k(\pi)+X_{\pi(k+1)}+\alpha_{\pi(k+1)}S_k(\pi)Sk+1​(π)=Sk​(π)+Xπ(k+1)​+απ(k+1)​Sk​(π)

in the paper's one-based position notation. Thus the completion time of the job in position kkk is Sk(π)S_k(\pi)Sk​(π). Its cost is its own rate cπ(k)c_{\pi(k)}cπ(k)​ times that completion time, giving

C(π)=∑k=1Ncπ(k)Sk(π).C(\pi)=\sum_{k=1}^{N}c_{\pi(k)}S_k(\pi).C(π)=k=1∑N​cπ(k)​Sk​(π).

All of these are random quantities until an expectation is taken. Equation (2) of the paper writes SkS_kSk​ as a sum of the initial requirements multiplied by the later growth factors. Equation (8) substitutes that expression into C(π0)C(\pi_0)C(π0​). Both equations are included as milestones, stated along an arbitrary schedule by relabelling the jobs. The third milestone is the exact change in CCC from swapping two adjacent jobs. These three statements are pathwise identities, so their mathematical content does not depend on a probability distribution.

Formalization targets

The principal target is Proposition 2: if both sequences of job-indexed ratios are strictly increasing,

E(X1)α1<⋯<E(XN)αN,α1c1(1+α1)<⋯<αNcN(1+αN),\frac{E(X_1)}{\alpha_1}<\cdots<\frac{E(X_N)}{\alpha_N}, \qquad \frac{\alpha_1}{c_1(1+\alpha_1)} <\cdots< \frac{\alpha_N}{c_N(1+\alpha_N)},α1​E(X1​)​<⋯<αN​E(XN​)​,c1​(1+α1​)α1​​<⋯<cN​(1+αN​)αN​​,

then, for every permutation σ\sigmaσ,

E[C(π0)]≤E[C(σ)].E[C(\pi_0)]\le E[C(\sigma)].E[C(π0​)]≤E[C(σ)].

The first ratio compares an initial expected requirement with its growth rate. The second couples growth and the cost rate. The conclusion is global optimality over the paper's whole class of nonpreemptive, non-idling permutations. It does not assert that the identity order is the unique minimizer; strict input ratios do not by themselves justify a uniqueness claim.

The attack path records exactly the supporting statements printed in the paper: the closed completion-time formula (2), the weighted cost formula (8), and the unnumbered adjacent-interchange identity after (8). The milestone quotations preserve the paper's printed display, while the Lean statements use an arbitrary permutation where relabelling permits it. The interchange display has a multiplication dot before its second bracket; expansion for two jobs shows that the term is added. The formal statement records that correction, and the source quotation retains the printed symbol.

What the result establishes

The proposition identifies a directly checkable pair of ordering conditions under which the natural job-label order solves a weighted stochastic scheduling problem. A condition involving only E(Xi)/αiE(X_i)/\alpha_iE(Xi​)/αi​, enough for the paper's expected-makespan target, does not determine this weighted objective. The cost rates introduce another ordering requirement. The result gives a sufficient rule, not a characterization of every optimal schedule or of every parameter choice.

The mathematical result was published in 1990; this mission asks for its machine-checked formalization. A complete development will connect the processing-time recursion, the pathwise cost identities, and the expected optimality statement in Lean. The recursion and cost definitions can be reused for other finite single-machine problems in which a job's processing time depends on its start time. The milestone identities are also useful independently of the final sufficient condition, including for studying other choices of weights and ordering indices.

Where the argument is difficult

Sorting by expected initial requirement alone cannot settle the problem, because processing a job changes later start times and hence later processing times. Even sorting by the expected-makespan index leaves the cost rates unaccounted for. The value of an adjacent swap depends on the elapsed time before the pair and on the completion costs of jobs after the pair. It is not enough to compare the two jobs' own completion costs in isolation.

The source states the sufficient condition after its interchange display but does not present a full proof of the global claim. Closing the Lean goal requires connecting local comparisons to every schedule and handling the expected value of the recursively defined cost. The identities are finite, but their indices change between zero-based Lean positions and the paper's one-based display, especially at the first position and at an empty suffix.

Formalization scope

Jobs are Fin N\mathrm{Fin}\,NFinN, and a policy is an equivalence permutation with π(k)\pi(k)π(k) equal to the job in position kkk. Completion time is defined by the processing rule Yi(t)=Xi+αitY_i(t)=X_i+\alpha_i tYi​(t)=Xi​+αi​t, not by the closed form (2). At positions beyond the NNN jobs it stays constant, and theorems about the closed form restrict kkk to 0≤k≤N0\le k\le N0≤k≤N. The total cost is defined from job-weighted completion times, not from equation (8). This keeps both identities substantive.

The proposition uses a probability space and the Bochner integral of the real-valued cost. Every XiX_iXi​ is integrable, so its expectation and the finite linear combinations appearing in the cost are meaningful. Initial requirements are nonnegative at every outcome, reflecting the paper's standing positive-processing convention; strict positivity is unnecessary for the claim. Growth rates and cost rates are strictly positive. Those two assumptions make the printed ratios well-defined and support the ordering rule. The paper's common independence convention is not required for these expectations and is not assumed.

The two strict orderings are over the labels of jobs in π0\pi_0π0​, not positions of an arbitrary schedule. The conclusion compares π0\pi_0π0​ with every permutation, not only with schedules obtained by one adjacent swap. The N=0N=0N=0 and N=1N=1N=1 cases are allowed: the order conditions have no pair to compare, and there is only one permutation. Solvers may contribute the finite-sum, interchange, and integrability facts needed to link the milestones to Proposition 2. The pathwise identities require no probability assumptions and can support later variants.

Selected references

  • Browne, Sid, and Uri Yechiali, Scheduling Deteriorating Jobs on a Single Processor, Operations Research 38(3), 495–498 (1990). DOI: 10.1287/opre.38.3.495.
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Convex OptimizationFunctional Analysis·Captain: mikedeng1

Convex Programming in Hilbert Space: Gradient Projection x_{k+1} = P(x_k − ρ_k∇f(x_k)) with σ ≤ ρ_k ≤ 2ρ₀ − σ Stays in the Level Set, and for Convex f Drives f(x_k) to inf_C fResearch Paper

Motivation

Minimizing a smooth function over a closed convex set is the basic problem of constrained continuous optimization. When the constraint set is simple enough that the nearest point of the set to any given point can be computed (a ball, a box, an orthant, an affine subspace), the most direct method is the gradient projection method: take a gradient step and project back onto the set. The method is the ancestor of the projected gradient and proximal gradient algorithms used today in signal processing, machine learning, and optimal control, where the variable is often a function, so that the natural setting is an infinite-dimensional Hilbert space rather than Rn\mathbb R^nRn.

A. A. Goldstein's 1964 note in the Bulletin of the AMS (Goldstein 1964) is one of the two founding papers of the method, alongside the independent work of Levitin and Polyak (1966). It states, in a Hilbert space and with an explicit step-size window, that the iterates stay in the initial level set, that the objective values converge, and that under convexity they converge to the optimal value, with weak and strong convergence of the iterates under further hypotheses. Goldstein motivates the method by applications to control theory (Balakrishnan 1963; Goldstein, Minimizing functionals on Hilbert space, 1964).

Timeline.

  • 1959: Cheney and Goldstein study proximity maps (metric projections) onto convex sets and a fixed-point construction for the distance between two convex sets (Cheney–Goldstein 1959, cited by the note as [1]).
  • 1964: Goldstein, this note: the gradient projection method in Hilbert space with steps in [σ,2ρ0−σ][\sigma, 2\rho_0 - \sigma][σ,2ρ0​−σ].
  • 1966: Levitin and Polyak give the same method and convergence rates for constrained minimization.
  • 1987: Calamai and Moré extend the analysis to Armijo-type step rules and identification of the active constraints in Rn\mathbb R^nRn (Calamai–Moré 1987).

Setting

Let HHH be a real Hilbert space with inner product [x,y][x, y][x,y] and norm ∥x∥\|x\|∥x∥. Let C⊆HC \subseteq HC⊆H be closed and convex, and let P:H→HP : H \to HP:H→H be the projection onto CCC: P(x)P(x)P(x) is the point of CCC closest to xxx. In Lean, IsProjection C P says that P(x)∈CP(x) \in CP(x)∈C and ∥x−P(x)∥≤∥x−y∥\|x - P(x)\| \le \|x - y\|∥x−P(x)∥≤∥x−y∥ for all y∈Cy \in Cy∈C.

Let f:H→Rf : H \to \mathbb Rf:H→R, x0∈Cx_0 \in Cx0​∈C, and let

S={x∈C:f(x)≤f(x0)}S = \{x \in C : f(x) \le f(x_0)\}S={x∈C:f(x)≤f(x0​)}

be the level set (levelSet f C x0). Let S^\hat SS^ be an open set containing the convex hull of SSS. Write f′(x,h)f'(x, h)f′(x,h) for the Fréchet derivative of fff at xxx applied to hhh, ∇f(x)\nabla f(x)∇f(x) for the gradient (so f′(x,h)=[∇f(x),h]f'(x, h) = [\nabla f(x), h]f′(x,h)=[∇f(x),h]), and

f′′(x,h,h)=ddt∣t=0f′(x+th,h)f''(x, h, h) = \frac{d}{dt}\Big|_{t=0} f'(x + th, h)f′′(x,h,h)=dtd​​t=0​f′(x+th,h)

for the directional second derivative in the sense of Gâteaux (d2 f x h). The curvature hypothesis is that for some ρ0>0\rho_0 > 0ρ0​>0, at every x∈S^x \in \hat Sx∈S^ and for every h∈Hh \in Hh∈H, these derivatives exist and

∣f′′(x,h,h)∣≤∥h∥2ρ0.|f''(x, h, h)| \le \frac{\|h\|^2}{\rho_0}.∣f′′(x,h,h)∣≤ρ0​∥h∥2​.

Choose 0<σ≤ρ00 < \sigma \le \rho_00<σ≤ρ0​ and step sizes σ≤ρk≤2ρ0−σ\sigma \le \rho_k \le 2\rho_0 - \sigmaσ≤ρk​≤2ρ0​−σ. The method is

xk+1=P(xk−ρk∇f(xk)),k≥0.x_{k+1} = P\big(x_k - \rho_k \nabla f(x_k)\big), \qquad k \ge 0.xk+1​=P(xk​−ρk​∇f(xk​)),k≥0.

A point z∈Cz \in Cz∈C is stationary if P(z−ρ∇f(z))=zP(z - \rho \nabla f(z)) = zP(z−ρ∇f(z))=z for every ρ>0\rho > 0ρ>0.

Formalization targets

Goal: the THEOREM, parts (i)–(v)

Assume fff is bounded below and continuous on CCC. There is L∈RL \in \mathbb RL∈R such that

  1. (i) xk∈Sx_k \in Sxk​∈S for all kkk, xk+1−xk→0x_{k+1} - x_k \to 0xk+1​−xk​→0, and f(xk)f(x_k)f(xk​) decreases to LLL;
  2. (ii) if SSS is compact, every cluster point zzz of (xk)(x_k)(xk​) near which ∇f\nabla f∇f is continuous is stationary, and a unique cluster point is the limit of (xk)(x_k)(xk​);
  3. (iii) if SSS is convex and f′′(x,h,h)≥μ∥h∥2f''(x, h, h) \ge \mu \|h\|^2f′′(x,h,h)≥μ∥h∥2 on SSS for some μ≥0\mu \ge 0μ≥0, then
L=inf⁡{f(x):x∈C};L = \inf\{f(x) : x \in C\};L=inf{f(x):x∈C};
  1. (iv) under (iii) with SSS bounded, every weak cluster point of (xk)(x_k)(xk​) minimizes fff on CCC;
  2. (v) under (iii) with μ>0\mu > 0μ>0 and ∇f\nabla f∇f bounded on SSS, there is z∈Sz \in Sz∈S with f(z)=Lf(z) = Lf(z)=L, xk→zx_k \to zxk​→z in norm, and zzz is the unique minimizer of fff on CCC.

The goal is the whole theorem, because its five parts share one limit LLL and one standing setting.

Milestones

The projection inequality [x−y,P(x)−y]≥∥P(x)−y∥2[x - y, P(x) - y] \ge \|P(x) - y\|^2[x−y,P(x)−y]≥∥P(x)−y∥2 for y∈Cy \in Cy∈C; the Lipschitz property of PPP; the characterization of stationarity for convex fff at a differentiability point; the one-step Taylor estimate; the step lemma (for σ≤ρ≤2ρ0−σ\sigma \le \rho \le 2\rho_0 - \sigmaσ≤ρ≤2ρ0​−σ the new point stays in SSS and the decrease is at least ∥xk+1−xk∥2σ/4ρ02\|x_{k+1} - x_k\|^2 \sigma / 4\rho_0^2∥xk+1​−xk​∥2σ/4ρ02​); parts (i) and (ii); the strong-convexity bound f(x)≥f(y)+[∇f(y),x−y]+12μ∥x−y∥2f(x) \ge f(y) + [\nabla f(y), x - y] + \frac12\mu\|x - y\|^2f(x)≥f(y)+[∇f(y),x−y]+21​μ∥x−y∥2 on SSS; the supporting-hyperplane inequality of the proof of (iii); parts (iii), (iv) and (v). A companion item states the last clause of (ii) under convexity of fff on CCC.

Significance

The result. The theorem gives a step-size rule that needs only a curvature bound near the level set, not a global Lipschitz constant of the gradient, and it covers the infinite-dimensional case directly: (iii) gives convergence of the objective values to the optimal value without assuming that a minimizer exists, (iv) yields minimizers as weak cluster points when the level set is bounded, and (v) gives strong convergence of the iterates under strong convexity on the level set. These are the prototypes of the convergence statements now proved for projected and proximal gradient methods.

Formalizing it. The result is classical and proved on paper; it has no machine-checked proof. The note is two pages long and its proof is terse ("The proof of (ii) being straightforward"), and checking it in Lean exposes two places where the printed statement needs repair (see Formalization scope). A complete development also produces reusable infrastructure: the variational inequality and Lipschitz property of the metric projection in a Hilbert space, a one-dimensional Taylor estimate from a Gâteaux second derivative along a segment, and weak lower semicontinuity of convex continuous functions on closed convex sets used through cluster points in WeakSpace.

Difficulty

The obvious argument for (i) applies a quadratic upper bound for fff along the segment from xkx_kxk​ to xk+1x_{k+1}xk+1​. That bound is only available where the curvature hypothesis holds, on S^\hat SS^, and nothing guarantees in advance that xk+1x_{k+1}xk+1​, or the segment, lies in S^\hat SS^. Ruling this out requires control of fff up to the boundary of the level set, which the printed hypotheses do not give; this is where the added continuity hypothesis enters. In (iii) the iterates may be unbounded and no minimizer need exist, so compactness arguments are unavailable. In (iv) the cluster points are weak, so norm-closedness arguments do not apply directly.

Formalization scope

  • HHH is a real Hilbert space: [NormedAddCommGroup H] [InnerProductSpace ℝ H] [CompleteSpace H]. The inner product [x,y][x, y][x,y] is ⟪x, y⟫_ℝ, and ∇f\nabla f∇f is Mathlib's gradient f.
  • PPP is any map with IsProjection C P; there is no chosen projection and no junk value.
  • f′′(x,h,h)f''(x, h, h)f′′(x,h,h) is the derivative at t=0t = 0t=0 of t↦f′(x+th,h)t \mapsto f'(x + th, h)t↦f′(x+th,h). The hypothesis on S^\hat SS^ (SecondDerivBound) states both differentiabilities before the bound, so the bound is never on a junk zero.
  • The run starts at x0x_0x0​, and 0<σ≤ρ00 < \sigma \le \rho_00<σ≤ρ0​ makes the step window nonempty.
  • "L=inf⁡L = \infL=inf" is IsGLB (f '' C) L. Weak cluster points are cluster points in WeakSpace ℝ H.
  • Added hypothesis: fff is continuous on CCC. Part (i) as printed is false without it: on H=C=RH = C = \mathbb RH=C=R with P=idP = \mathrm{id}P=id, f(x)=(x−2)2f(x) = (x - 2)^2f(x)=(x−2)2 for x<1x < 1x<1 and f(x)=100f(x) = 100f(x)=100 for x≥1x \ge 1x≥1, x0=0x_0 = 0x0​=0, S^=(−1,1)\hat S = (-1, 1)S^=(−1,1), ρ0=1/2\rho_0 = 1/2ρ0​=1/2, σ=1/4\sigma = 1/4σ=1/4, ρk=1/2\rho_k = 1/2ρk​=1/2, the first step lands at x1=2x_1 = 2x1​=2 with f(x1)=100>f(x0)f(x_1) = 100 > f(x_0)f(x1​)=100>f(x0​).
  • Moved clause. The last clause of (ii), "zzz minimizes fff on CCC", is false for nonconvex fff (a unique cluster point can be a stationary point that is not a minimizer). The goal omits it, and a companion item states it under convexity of fff on CCC.
  • The goal assumes nothing about the step decrease, the step size ρ^\hat\rhoρ^​ of the proof, or the iterates beyond the run's definition. A formalization that adds such facts as hypotheses, or that proves only one of the five parts, does not count as closing the goal.

Contributions welcome: proofs of any milestone, in particular the projection inequality and Lipschitz property (independent of the rest), the Taylor estimate from the Gâteaux second derivative, and the weak-closedness argument of (iv).

Selected references

  • A. A. Goldstein, Convex programming in Hilbert space, Bull. Amer. Math. Soc. 70 (1964), 709–710. https://doi.org/10.1090/s0002-9904-1964-11178-2
  • E. W. Cheney and A. A. Goldstein, Proximity maps for convex sets, Proc. Amer. Math. Soc. 10 (1959), 448–450.
  • A. V. Balakrishnan, An operator theoretic formulation of a class of control problems and a steepest descent method of solution, J. SIAM Control Ser. A 1 (1963), 109–127.
  • E. S. Levitin and B. T. Polyak, Constrained minimization methods, USSR Comput. Math. Math. Phys. 6(5) (1966), 1–50.
  • P. H. Calamai and J. J. Moré, Projected gradient methods for linearly constrained problems, Math. Programming 39 (1987), 93–116. https://doi.org/10.1007/BF02592073
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🏆Completed
Convex OptimizationOperations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

Distributed Optimization and Statistical Learning via the Alternating Direction Method of Multipliers V: Sharing ADMM — the z-Update Reduces to One n-Variable Problem and the Dual Variables AgreeTextbook

Why consensus and sharing

Many large optimization problems arising in statistics, machine learning, signal processing and resource allocation have an objective that is a sum of terms, each depending on data held by a different processor, or a coupling term that depends on the sum of the agents' decisions. Chapter 7 of Boyd, Parikh, Chu, Peleato and Eckstein's monograph on the alternating direction method of multipliers (ADMM) (Found. Trends Mach. Learn. 3(1), 2011) introduces two templates that turn such problems into distributed algorithms: consensus and sharing. Nearly every distributed application in the rest of the monograph (distributed lasso, distributed logistic regression, splitting across examples and across features in Chapter 8) is an instance of one of the two. Consensus problems in the context of ADMM go back to Bertsekas and Tsitsiklis (Parallel and Distributed Computation, 1989).

The value of the templates lies in a handful of exact algebraic facts about the ADMM subproblems: the global update is an average, the dual variables average to zero, and the sharing update, which looks like a problem in NnNnNn variables, is really a problem in nnn variables. These facts are what this mission formalizes.

Setting

There are N≥1N\ge1N≥1 agents. Vectors live in Rn\mathbb R^nRn with the Euclidean inner product, and an overline denotes an average over agents, vˉ=1N∑i=1Nvi\bar v=\frac1N\sum_{i=1}^N v_ivˉ=N1​∑i=1N​vi​. Each local cost fif_ifi​ and the shared cost ggg are functions into R∪{+∞}\mathbb R\cup\{+\infty\}R∪{+∞}. The penalty parameter is ρ>0\rho>0ρ>0.

Global variable consensus (§7.1) is the problem

minimize ∑i=1Nfi(xi)subject to xi−z=0, i=1,…,N,\text{minimize }\sum_{i=1}^N f_i(x_i)\quad\text{subject to } x_i-z=0,\ i=1,\dots,N,minimize i=1∑N​fi​(xi​)subject to xi​−z=0, i=1,…,N,

with local variables xi∈Rnx_i\in\mathbb R^nxi​∈Rn and a global variable zzz. ADMM alternates a parallel xix_ixi​-update, an averaging zzz-update and a dual update of the multipliers yiy_iyi​. With a regularizer g(z)g(z)g(z) added (7.2), the zzz-update (7.4) becomes a minimization involving ggg.

General form consensus (§7.2) lets local variable xi∈Rnix_i\in\mathbb R^{n_i}xi​∈Rni​ copy only some entries of zzz: entry jjj of xix_ixi​ corresponds to entry zG(i,j)z_{\mathcal G(i,j)}zG(i,j)​, and z~i∈Rni\tilde z_i\in\mathbb R^{n_i}z~i​∈Rni​ is defined by (z~i)j=zG(i,j)(\tilde z_i)_j=z_{\mathcal G(i,j)}(z~i​)j​=zG(i,j)​. The number of local entries copying zgz_gzg​ is kgk_gkg​.

Sharing (§7.3) is the problem

minimize ∑i=1Nfi(xi)+g(∑i=1Nxi),(7.11)\text{minimize }\sum_{i=1}^N f_i(x_i)+g\Big(\sum_{i=1}^N x_i\Big),\tag{7.11}minimize i=1∑N​fi​(xi​)+g(i=1∑N​xi​),(7.11)

written for ADMM with copies ziz_izi​ of the xix_ixi​ (7.12). In scaled form, with ai=uik+xik+1a_i=u_i^k+x_i^{k+1}ai​=uik​+xik+1​, its zzz-update is

(z1k+1,…,zNk+1)∈argmin⁡z1,…,zN g(∑i=1Nzi)+(ρ/2)∑i=1N∥zi−ai∥22,(z_1^{k+1},\dots,z_N^{k+1})\in\operatorname*{argmin}_{z_1,\dots,z_N}\ g\Big(\sum_{i=1}^N z_i\Big)+(\rho/2)\sum_{i=1}^N\|z_i-a_i\|_2^2,(z1k+1​,…,zNk+1​)∈z1​,…,zN​argmin​ g(i=1∑N​zi​)+(ρ/2)i=1∑N​∥zi​−ai​∥22​,

followed by uik+1=uik+xik+1−zik+1u_i^{k+1}=u_i^k+x_i^{k+1}-z_i^{k+1}uik+1​=uik​+xik+1​−zik+1​.

Formalization targets

Goal: the sharing zzz-update reduction (§7.3, p. 57)

For every a1,…,aNa_1,\dots,a_Na1​,…,aN​: (z1,…,zN)(z_1,\dots,z_N)(z1​,…,zN​) solves the NnNnNn-variable zzz-update iff zˉ\bar zzˉ solves

minimize⁡zˉ∈Rn g(Nzˉ)+(ρ/2)∑i=1N∥zˉ−aˉ∥22\operatorname*{minimize}_{\bar z\in\mathbb R^n}\ g(N\bar z)+(\rho/2)\sum_{i=1}^N\|\bar z-\bar a\|_2^2zˉ∈Rnminimize​ g(Nzˉ)+(ρ/2)i=1∑N​∥zˉ−aˉ∥22​

and

zi=ai+zˉ−aˉ(7.13);z_i=a_i+\bar z-\bar a\quad (7.13);zi​=ai​+zˉ−aˉ(7.13);

and along every run of sharing ADMM,

uik+1=uˉk+xˉk+1−zˉk+1(7.14),u_i^{k+1}=\bar u^k+\bar x^{k+1}-\bar z^{k+1}\quad(7.14),uik+1​=uˉk+xˉk+1−zˉk+1(7.14),

so all scaled dual variables agree after one step.

Milestones

  • §7.1: the consensus zzz-update is zk+1=xˉk+1+(1/ρ)yˉkz^{k+1}=\bar x^{k+1}+(1/\rho)\bar y^kzk+1=xˉk+1+(1/ρ)yˉ​k; then yˉk+1=0\bar y^{k+1}=0yˉ​k+1=0, zk=xˉkz^k=\bar x^kzk=xˉk and the simplified iteration.
  • (7.4), §7.1.1: with a regularizer, the zzz-update is averaging followed by a proximal step with weight NρN\rhoNρ; the soft-threshold (g=λ∥⋅∥1g=\lambda\|\cdot\|_1g=λ∥⋅∥1​) and positive-part (ggg the indicator of R+n\mathbb R^n_+R+n​) examples.
  • §7.2: the general form zzz-update is local averaging, and the dual entries attached to each global index sum to zero after the first iteration.
  • (7.13): with zˉ\bar zzˉ fixed, zi=ai+zˉ−aˉz_i=a_i+\bar z-\bar azi​=ai​+zˉ−aˉ is the unique minimizer.

Significance

The reduction is what makes sharing ADMM scale: the central step needs only the averages xˉk+1\bar x^{k+1}xˉk+1, uˉk\bar u^kuˉk and one nnn-dimensional proximal problem, regardless of the number of agents, and the dual state collapses to a single vector. The same reduction underlies exchange ADMM (§7.3.2) and the splitting-across-features algorithms of §8.3. The consensus facts explain why the fusion center only averages and why the dual variables can be dropped from its update.

All results of the chapter are proved, informally, in the monograph; they are elementary. To our knowledge none has a machine-checked proof. The mission produces checked statements of the update formulas that later chapters of the series and distributed-optimization developments can cite instead of re-deriving.

Difficulty

The statements are exact identities between minimizer sets of nonsmooth problems in which ggg may be any extended-real-valued function: there is no first-order condition to use, so each step must be argued by comparing objective values, and the iff requires producing, for an arbitrary competitor, a competitor of the reduced problem with no larger value. The index bookkeeping is the other half: averages of sums of sequences indexed by agents and by iterations, the off-by-one in "after the first iteration", and in §7.2 sums over the fibres {(i,j):G(i,j)=g}\{(i,j):\mathcal G(i,j)=g\}{(i,j):G(i,j)=g} of an index map between local vectors of different dimensions.

Formalization scope

  • Vectors are EuclideanSpace ℝ (Fin n); agents are indexed by Fin N, so the book's i=1,…,Ni=1,\dots,Ni=1,…,N is Lean's i−1i-1i−1; components are 0-based as well.
  • An extended-real-valued function is encoded by its effective domain (a set) and its finite values; every minimization is over the domain. Convexity is not assumed: none of the stated identities needs it, so the statements are slightly more general than the chapter's standing assumption that each fif_ifi​ is convex.
  • Iterates are hypotheses: a run is any sequence satisfying the update rules (argmin properties, not chosen minimizers). The consensus run uses the averaging formula exactly as printed on p. 49; the general form and sharing runs use the argmin form printed on pp. 55–56.
  • Explicit hypotheses that the book leaves implicit: N≥1N\ge1N≥1, ρ>0\rho>0ρ>0, λ>0\lambda>0λ>0 (named lam), kg≥1k_g\ge1kg​≥1 for every global index ggg in §7.2, and the index ranges k≥1k\ge1k≥1 for yˉk=0\bar y^{k}=0yˉ​k=0 and k≥2k\ge2k≥2 for zk=xˉkz^k=\bar x^kzk=xˉk (the starting y0y^0y0 is arbitrary).
  • Corrected misprints: p. 52 prints xˉk+1−(1/ρ)yˉk\bar x^{k+1}-(1/\rho)\bar y^kxˉk+1−(1/ρ)yˉ​k in the soft-threshold and positive-part examples, while the proximal form gives xˉk+1+(1/ρ)yˉk\bar x^{k+1}+(1/\rho)\bar y^kxˉk+1+(1/ρ)yˉ​k; p. 55 prints ∑i=1m\sum_{i=1}^m∑i=1m​ for ∑i=1N\sum_{i=1}^N∑i=1N​; p. 57 writes u∈Rmu\in\mathbf R^mu∈Rm for a vector of Rn\mathbb R^nRn.
  • The goal is about minimizers of the NnNnNn-variable zzz-subproblem, not the algebraic identity (7.13) alone, and (7.14) is derived for every run rather than built into a single-dual-variable definition; either shortcut would make the goal trivial.
  • Not included: the consensus residual norms (p. 51), the duality discussion of §7.3.1 and exchange ADMM (§7.3.2). Contributions formalizing them on top of these definitions are welcome.

Selected references

  • S. Boyd, N. Parikh, E. Chu, B. Peleato, J. Eckstein, Distributed Optimization and Statistical Learning via the Alternating Direction Method of Multipliers, Foundations and Trends in Machine Learning 3(1), 1–122, 2011. https://doi.org/10.1561/2200000016
  • D. P. Bertsekas, J. N. Tsitsiklis, Parallel and Distributed Computation: Numerical Methods, Prentice Hall, 1989. https://web.mit.edu/dimitrib/www/pdc.html
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Linear OptimizationOperations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

On the Power of Robust Solutions in Two-Stage Stochastic and Adaptive Optimization Problems 5: For Hypercube Uncertainty, Even in the Constraints, the Robust and Adaptive Optima CoincideResearch Paper

Motivation

In two-stage optimization under uncertainty, a first-stage decision xxx is taken before the data are known, and a second-stage decision yyy is taken after a scenario ω\omegaω is revealed. The fully adaptive formulation lets yyy depend on ω\omegaω and minimizes the worst-case cost. It is the natural model of recourse, but it optimizes over policies, one decision per scenario, and is computationally hard in general. The static robust formulation fixes one yyy in advance that must be feasible in every scenario. It is a single deterministic mixed integer program and is the standard tractable surrogate (Ben-Tal, Goryashko, Guslitzer, Nemirovski 2004; Bertsimas & Sim 2004).

The question is how much is lost by the surrogate. Bertsimas and Goyal (2010) bound the gap by 222 against the stochastic problem and by 444 against the adaptive problem when the uncertainty set is symmetric. Their §5.3 identifies a case with no gap at all: when the uncertainty set is a hypercube (a box), the static robust optimum equals the adaptive optimum, and this holds even when the constraint matrices themselves are uncertain. Box uncertainty is the simplest and most common uncertainty model in practice (interval data on every coefficient), so the result says that for it, adaptivity buys nothing.

This mission formalizes that theorem, Theorem 5.4, together with Theorem 2.4, which shows that under right-hand-side uncertainty the robust problem is a single deterministic problem with the coordinatewise worst right-hand side.

Setting

Fix dimensions m,n1,n2m,n_1,n_2m,n1​,n2​ and sets I1,I2I_1,I_2I1​,I2​ of integer coordinates. The decision domains are

DI={x∈Rn:x≥0, xi∈Z for i∈I},D_{I}=\{x\in\mathbb R^n : x\ge0,\ x_i\in\mathbb Z\ \text{for } i\in I\},DI​={x∈Rn:x≥0, xi​∈Z for i∈I},

which is R+n−p×Z+p\mathbb R_+^{n-p}\times\mathbb Z_+^{p}R+n−p​×Z+p​ up to relabelling coordinates, p=∣I∣p=|I|p=∣I∣.

A scenario set Ω\OmegaΩ is given. In scenario ω\omegaω the data are a constraint matrix A(ω)∈Rm×n1A(\omega)\in\mathbb R^{m\times n_1}A(ω)∈Rm×n1​, a recourse matrix B(ω)∈Rm×n2B(\omega)\in\mathbb R^{m\times n_2}B(ω)∈Rm×n2​, a right-hand side b(ω)∈Rmb(\omega)\in\mathbb R^mb(ω)∈Rm and a second-stage cost d(ω)∈R+n2d(\omega)\in\mathbb R^{n_2}_+d(ω)∈R+n2​​. The first-stage cost c∈R+n1c\in\mathbb R^{n_1}_+c∈R+n1​​ is fixed.

  • The adaptive problem ΠAdapt(A,B,b,d)\Pi_{\mathrm{Adapt}}(A,B,b,d)ΠAdapt​(A,B,b,d) (5.6) chooses x∈DI1x\in D_{I_1}x∈DI1​​ and y(ω)∈DI2y(\omega)\in D_{I_2}y(ω)∈DI2​​ for every ω\omegaω with A(ω)x+B(ω)y(ω)≥b(ω)A(\omega)x+B(\omega)y(\omega)\ge b(\omega)A(ω)x+B(ω)y(ω)≥b(ω) for all ω\omegaω, and has value
zAdapt=inf⁡ cTx+sup⁡ω∈Ωd(ω)Ty(ω).z_{\mathrm{Adapt}}=\inf\ c^Tx+\sup_{\omega\in\Omega}d(\omega)^Ty(\omega).zAdapt​=inf cTx+ω∈Ωsup​d(ω)Ty(ω).
  • The robust problem ΠRob(A,B,b,d)\Pi_{\mathrm{Rob}}(A,B,b,d)ΠRob​(A,B,b,d) (5.7) chooses one x∈DI1x\in D_{I_1}x∈DI1​​, y∈DI2y\in D_{I_2}y∈DI2​​ with A(ω)x+B(ω)y≥b(ω)A(\omega)x+B(\omega)y\ge b(\omega)A(ω)x+B(ω)y≥b(ω) for all ω\omegaω, and has value
zRob=inf⁡ cTx+sup⁡ω∈Ωd(ω)Ty.z_{\mathrm{Rob}}=\inf\ c^Tx+\sup_{\omega\in\Omega}d(\omega)^Ty.zRob​=inf cTx+ω∈Ωsup​d(ω)Ty.

The uncertainty set is U={(A(ω),B(ω),b(ω),d(ω)):ω∈Ω}\mathcal U=\{(A(\omega),B(\omega),b(\omega),d(\omega)) : \omega\in\Omega\}U={(A(ω),B(ω),b(ω),d(ω)):ω∈Ω}, a subset of RN\mathbb R^NRN with N=mn1+mn2+m+n2N=mn_1+mn_2+m+n_2N=mn1​+mn2​+m+n2​. Following Definition 1.1, U\mathcal UU is a hypercube if U=[l1,u1]×⋯×[lN,uN]\mathcal U=[l_1,u_1]\times\cdots\times[l_N,u_N]U=[l1​,u1​]×⋯×[lN​,uN​] for some li≤uil_i\le u_ili​≤ui​.

For Theorem 2.4, AAA, BBB and ddd are fixed and only b(ω)∈R+mb(\omega)\in\mathbb R^m_+b(ω)∈R+m​ varies; ΠRob(b)\Pi_{\mathrm{Rob}}(b)ΠRob​(b) (1.2) is the robust problem above, and Π\PiΠ is the deterministic problem with right-hand side bjh=max⁡ωbj(ω)b^h_j=\max_\omega b_j(\omega)bjh​=maxω​bj​(ω).

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 5.4 (p. 31)

If U\mathcal UU is a hypercube, then

zRob(A,B,b,d)=zAdapt(A,B,b,d).z_{\mathrm{Rob}}(A,B,b,d)=z_{\mathrm{Adapt}}(A,B,b,d).zRob​(A,B,b,d)=zAdapt​(A,B,b,d).

The integer coordinates I1,I2I_1,I_2I1​,I2​ are arbitrary, and nothing is assumed about the signs of AAA, BBB, bbb.

Milestones

  1. Theorem 2.4 (p. 17). Under right-hand-side uncertainty, (x,y)(x,y)(x,y) is feasible for ΠRob(b)\Pi_{\mathrm{Rob}}(b)ΠRob​(b) if and only if Ax+By≥bhAx+By\ge b^hAx+By≥bh; hence zRob(b)=z(Π)z_{\mathrm{Rob}}(b)=z(\Pi)zRob​(b)=z(Π).
  2. p. 31 display. zAdapt(A,B,b,d)≤zRob(A,B,b,d)z_{\mathrm{Adapt}}(A,B,b,d)\le z_{\mathrm{Rob}}(A,B,b,d)zAdapt​(A,B,b,d)≤zRob​(A,B,b,d) for every uncertainty set.
  3. Eqs. (5.8)–(5.10). If U\mathcal UU is a hypercube, some scenario ωˉ\bar\omegaωˉ has A(ωˉ)A(\bar\omega)A(ωˉ), B(ωˉ)B(\bar\omega)B(ωˉ) entrywise minimal and b(ωˉ)b(\bar\omega)b(ωˉ), d(ωˉ)d(\bar\omega)d(ωˉ) entrywise maximal over Ω\OmegaΩ.
  4. Eqs. (5.11)–(5.13). For such ωˉ\bar\omegaωˉ, if (x,y(⋅))(x,y(\cdot))(x,y(⋅)) is adaptive feasible, then (x,y(ωˉ))(x,y(\bar\omega))(x,y(ωˉ)) is robust feasible.
  5. Eq. (5.14). For such ωˉ\bar\omegaωˉ, the robust worst-case cost of (x,y(ωˉ))(x,y(\bar\omega))(x,y(ωˉ)) is at most the adaptive worst-case cost of (x,y(⋅))(x,y(\cdot))(x,y(⋅)).

Significance

The result. Theorem 5.4 says that for interval uncertainty on every coefficient, the static robust program, whose size does not grow with the number of scenarios, solves the adaptive problem exactly. Combined with Theorem 2.4 for right-hand-side uncertainty, the adaptive problem collapses to one deterministic mixed integer program with worst-case data. It marks the boundary case of the paper's adaptability-gap bounds: the gap is at most 444 for symmetric sets, and exactly 111 for boxes.

Formalizing it. The result is proved in the paper; to our knowledge it has no machine-checked proof. The mission produces a Lean model of two-stage robust and adaptive mixed integer programs with uncertain constraint matrices, with values as extended-real infima, which other formalizations of adjustable robust optimization can build on.

Difficulty

The mathematics is elementary; the care is in the statement. The step that fails for a general uncertainty set is the existence of a single worst scenario ωˉ\bar\omegaωˉ that is simultaneously entrywise smallest in AAA, BBB and entrywise largest in bbb, ddd. For a set that is only contained in a box, the box's worst corner need not be realized. With two scenarios b=(1,0)b=(1,0)b=(1,0) and b=(0,1)b=(0,1)b=(0,1), B=IB=IB=I, d=(1,1)d=(1,1)d=(1,1), the adaptive value is 111 and the robust value is 222. A formalization therefore has to state the hypercube hypothesis as an equality of sets. A second point is the arithmetic of extended reals: the paper argues from optimal solutions, which need not exist, so the inequalities must be transported through infima over feasible sets that may be empty and through suprema that may be infinite.

Formalization scope

  • Decisions are vectors Fin n → ℝ; matrices are Matrix (Fin m) (Fin n) ℝ; constraints use Mathlib's componentwise order and mulVec.
  • Mixed-integer domains are "nonnegative, integer on a designated coordinate set III", the paper's R+n−p×Z+p\mathbb R_+^{n-p}\times\mathbb Z_+^pR+n−p​×Z+p​ up to relabelling.
  • Optimal values are EReal infima over the feasible set, +∞+\infty+∞ when infeasible; worst-case costs are EReal suprema over Ω\OmegaΩ. No optimal solution is assumed.
  • A scenario datum is a structure with the four blocks (A,B,b,d)(A,B,b,d)(A,B,b,d); the box and the hypercube predicate are written entrywise on these blocks, which is Definition 1.1 in RN\mathbb R^NRN.
  • The hypercube hypothesis is IsHypercube (uncertaintySet A B b d), i.e. the realized data are exactly a box. Assuming only that the data lie inside a box would make the statement false (example above); assuming fixed AAA, BBB would state Corollary 5.1 instead of Theorem 5.4.
  • Typos corrected in the Lean: (5.6)–(5.7) print Z+n2\mathbb Z^{n_2}_+Z+n2​​ for the second-stage integer block, read as Z+p2\mathbb Z^{p_2}_+Z+p2​​; §5.3's opening sentence names ΠAdapt(b,d)\Pi_{\mathrm{Adapt}}(b,d)ΠAdapt​(b,d) twice where the first is ΠRob(b,d)\Pi_{\mathrm{Rob}}(b,d)ΠRob​(b,d).
  • In Theorem 2.4 the paper's max⁡ωbj(ω)\max_\omega b_j(\omega)maxω​bj​(ω) is a real supremum under the hypothesis that the right-hand sides are bounded above, and the second stage is continuous (p2=0p_2=0p2​=0), as in the problem Π\PiΠ on the page.

Contributions welcome: proofs of the milestones and of the goal, and lemmas on monotonicity of mulVec for nonnegative vectors and on EReal infima over feasible sets, which are reusable across the other missions of this series.

Selected references

  • D. Bertsimas, V. Goyal, On the power of robust solutions in two-stage stochastic and adaptive optimization problems, Mathematics of Operations Research 35(2), 2010. https://doi.org/10.1287/moor.1090.0440 (cited from the authors' manuscript, MIT DSpace).
  • A. Ben-Tal, A. Goryashko, E. Guslitzer, A. Nemirovski, Adjustable robust solutions of uncertain linear programs, Mathematical Programming 99, 2004. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10107-003-0454-y
  • D. Bertsimas, M. Sim, The price of robustness, Operations Research 52(1), 2004. https://doi.org/10.1287/opre.1030.0065
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CombinatoricsOperations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

One-Processor Scheduling with Symmetric Earliness and Tardiness Penalties 3: For Maximum Discrepancy, Some Optimum Schedule Is in Standard Form and Has the Release Time PropertyResearch Paper

Motivation

In just-in-time scheduling each job has a preferred time, and finishing it early is as undesirable as finishing it late. Garey, Tarjan and Wilfong (Math. Oper. Res. 13 (1988), 330–348) study the one-processor version in which task TiT_iTi​ has a length li≥0l_i \ge 0li​≥0 and a preferred starting time ai≥0a_i \ge 0ai​≥0, and the discrepancy of a task started at time sis_isi​ is ∣si−ai∣|s_i - a_i|∣si​−ai​∣. The penalty is symmetric: earliness and tardiness cost the same. The paper shows that minimizing the total discrepancy is NP-complete, gives an O(Nlog⁡N)O(N \log N)O(NlogN) algorithm for a fixed task order, and, in §3, gives an efficient algorithm for minimizing the maximum discrepancy max⁡i∣si−ai∣\max_i |s_i - a_i|maxi​∣si​−ai​∣: a linear-time test for a given bound γ\gammaγ after an O(Nlog⁡N)O(N \log N)O(NlogN) sort, combined with a search over γ\gammaγ.

This mission formalizes the structural core of §3: the normal-form theorems (Theorem 4, Corollaries 1 and 2) on which the paper's algorithm for maximum discrepancy is built. The two companion missions of the series cover the NP-completeness result (THEOREM 1) and the fixed-order algorithm (THEOREMS 2 and 3).

Setting

Fix a bound γ≥0\gamma \ge 0γ≥0. A schedule has maximum discrepancy at most γ\gammaγ exactly when every task starts no earlier than its release time ri=max⁡{0,ai−γ}r_i = \max\{0, a_i - \gamma\}ri​=max{0,ai​−γ} and finishes no later than its deadline di=ai+li+γd_i = a_i + l_i + \gammadi​=ai​+li​+γ (p. 342). These release times and deadlines are in special form: with α=2γ\alpha = 2\gammaα=2γ, for every task

di−ri=li+αor(ri=0 and di<li+α).d_i - r_i = l_i + \alpha \quad\text{or}\quad \big(r_i = 0 \text{ and } d_i < l_i + \alpha\big).di​−ri​=li​+αor(ri​=0 and di​<li​+α).

From here on the data are arbitrary reals li≥0l_i \ge 0li​≥0, ri≥0r_i \ge 0ri​≥0, did_idi​ in special form for some α≥0\alpha \ge 0α≥0.

A schedule is an execution order σ\sigmaσ (σ(p)\sigma(p)σ(p) is the task in position ppp) with starting times sis_isi​, such that a task finishes no later than any later-positioned task starts: sσ(p)+lσ(p)≤sσ(q)s_{\sigma(p)} + l_{\sigma(p)} \le s_{\sigma(q)}sσ(p)​+lσ(p)​≤sσ(q)​ for p<qp < qp<q. It is feasible if ri≤sir_i \le s_iri​≤si​ and si+li≤dis_i + l_i \le d_isi​+li​≤di​ for every iii. Its makespan is max⁡i(si+li)\max_i (s_i + l_i)maxi​(si​+li​), and it is optimum if it is feasible and no feasible schedule has a smaller makespan.

Let TNT_NTN​ be a task of largest deadline. A schedule has the release time property if every task executed after TNT_NTN​ has release time strictly later than the starting time of TNT_NTN​. When the tasks are indexed with d1≤⋯≤dNd_1 \le \dots \le d_Nd1​≤⋯≤dN​, a schedule is in standard form with split index jjj, 0≤j≤N−10 \le j \le N-10≤j≤N−1, if it begins with an optimum schedule of T1,…,TjT_1, \dots, T_jT1​,…,Tj​, followed by TNT_NTN​ started at the maximum of rNr_NrN​ and the completion time of that first part, followed by Tj+1,…,TN−1T_{j+1}, \dots, T_{N-1}Tj+1​,…,TN−1​ in this order without idle time.

Formalization targets

Goal: Corollary 2 (p. 344)

∃ a feasible schedule  ⟹  ∃ an optimum schedule that is in standard form and has the release time property.\exists\ \text{a feasible schedule} \;\Longrightarrow\; \exists\ \text{an optimum schedule that is in standard form and has the release time property.}∃ a feasible schedule⟹∃ an optimum schedule that is in standard form and has the release time property.

Milestones

  1. Theorem 4 (pp. 342–343): if a feasible schedule exists, some optimum schedule has the release time property with respect to any task of largest deadline.
  2. The deadline split (proof of Corollary 1, p. 344): in every feasible schedule with the release time property, a task Ti≠TNT_i \neq T_NTi​=TN​ precedes TNT_NTN​ if and only if di≤sN+αd_i \le s_N + \alphadi​≤sN​+α.
  3. Corollary 1 (p. 344): some optimum schedule executes before TNT_NTN​ exactly the tasks of deadline at most β\betaβ, for some β≥0\beta \ge 0β≥0.
  4. Release before finish (p. 344): every task executed after TNT_NTN​ has ri≤sN+lNr_i \le s_N + l_Nri​≤sN​+lN​.
  5. Normalization after TNT_NTN​ (p. 344): an optimum schedule with the release time property can be changed, without moving TNT_NTN​ later and without touching the tasks before it, so that there is no idle time from the start of TNT_NTN​ on and the later tasks run in deadline order.

Two companion items state the reformulation of the maximum-discrepancy bound as release times and deadlines, and the special form with α=2γ\alpha = 2\gammaα=2γ.

Significance

Corollary 2 reduces the search for an optimum schedule of T1,…,TnT_1, \dots, T_nT1​,…,Tn​ to nnn candidates, one per split index, each assembled from an optimum schedule of a shorter prefix. This is the dynamic program of §3.2, which the paper implements in O(N)O(N)O(N) time after an O(Nlog⁡N)O(N \log N)O(NlogN) sort; combined with a search over γ\gammaγ it minimizes the maximum discrepancy. Without the special form, deciding whether one processor can meet arbitrary release times and deadlines is NP-complete (reference [4] of the paper, Garey and Johnson 1979), so the normal form is what separates the tractable case from the general one.

The results are proved in the paper; no machine-checked proof of them is known on Prove2Me. A formal proof of Corollary 2 would certify the correctness of the split-index recursion and, together with the companions, of the reduction from maximum discrepancy to this release-time/deadline problem.

Difficulty

The obvious argument fails in Theorem 4. Exchanging a straggler (a task after TNT_NTN​ released no later than TNT_NTN​ starts) with TNT_NTN​ shifts the tasks between them, and for general release times and deadlines those tasks can become infeasible. The paper's argument uses the special form at every step: a task released after TNT_NTN​ starts has ri>0r_i > 0ri​>0, hence di−ri=li+αd_i - r_i = l_i + \alphadi​−ri​=li​+α exactly, and this equality is what bounds how far tasks may move. It also needs an extremal choice of the optimum schedule (fewest tasks after TNT_NTN​, then fewest tasks between TNT_NTN​ and the first straggler), which requires showing that optimum schedules exist over the reals. The passage to standard form then combines this with an earliest-deadline exchange for the tasks after TNT_NTN​ and the replacement of the first part by an optimum sub-schedule without losing feasibility of the later tasks.

Formalization scope

Tasks are indexed by Fin N (0-based: the paper's T1,…,TNT_1, \dots, T_NT1​,…,TN​ are 0,…,N−10, \dots, N-10,…,N−1; the paper's TNT_NTN​ in Corollary 2 is the index N−1N-1N−1). All data are real. A schedule is a permutation σ : Fin N ≃ Fin N with starting times s : Fin N → ℝ; "executed before/after" refers to σ, not to a comparison of starting times, because zero-length tasks may share a starting time. Execution intervals meet at most at endpoints. The makespan is a supremum over Fin N; "optimum" quantifies over all feasible schedules, not only standard-form ones.

The standing hypotheses on every structural item are α≥0\alpha \ge 0α≥0, ri≥0r_i \ge 0ri​≥0, li≥0l_i \ge 0li​≥0 (from γ≥0\gamma \ge 0γ≥0, the max⁡{0,⋅}\max\{0, \cdot\}max{0,⋅} in rir_iri​, and nonnegative lengths); since si≥ris_i \ge r_isi​≥ri​, start times are nonnegative, as the paper assumes throughout. The special form is a hypothesis of every structural item and cannot be dropped. The paper's dummy task T0T_0T0​ (r0=d0=l0=0r_0 = d_0 = l_0 = 0r0​=d0​=l0​=0) is not a task; an empty first part completes at time 000. Corollary 1's "the set of all tasks with deadline β\betaβ or less" is read as excluding TNT_NTN​, the only reading under which it is true. The page's "(which can be assumed optimum)" is part of the standard form. The deadline-split and release-before-finish milestones are stated for every feasible schedule, as their arguments allow.

A trivializing formalization is excluded: the standard form pins TNT_NTN​'s start to max⁡(rN,C)\max(r_N, C)max(rN​,C) and the later tasks to consecutive positions in index order, so the goal is not Corollary 1 restated with an unconstrained split.

Running times (O(Nlog⁡N)O(N \log N)O(NlogN), O(N)O(N)O(N)) and the algorithm of §3.2 are out of scope. The development needs only finite permutations, finite suprema and the exchange arguments of §3.1; the existence of an optimum schedule (minimum makespan over finitely many orders, earliest-start schedules) is reusable for other single-machine problems with release times and deadlines. Proofs of any milestone, and a sorry-free proof of the existence of optimum schedules, are welcome.

Selected references

  • M. R. Garey, R. E. Tarjan, G. T. Wilfong, One-Processor Scheduling with Symmetric Earliness and Tardiness Penalties, Mathematics of Operations Research 13(2):330–348, 1988. https://doi.org/10.1287/moor.13.2.330
  • M. R. Garey, D. S. Johnson, Computers and Intractability: A Guide to the Theory of NP-Completeness, W. H. Freeman, 1979 (reference [4] of the paper, cited on p. 342 for the NP-completeness of one-processor scheduling with release times and deadlines). ISBN 0-7167-1045-5
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One-Processor Scheduling with Symmetric Earliness and Tardiness Penalties 2: For a Fixed Task Order, the Block-Shifting Algorithm Minimizes the Total DiscrepancyResearch Paper

Motivation

A task may have a preferred execution time because a material delivery, external event, or downstream operation is timed to it. Starting early can be as costly as starting late. Garey, Tarjan, and Wilfong study this situation on one processor, where tasks cannot overlap but idle time between tasks is permitted. Their total-discrepancy problem is hard when the execution order is free; fixing the order leaves a substantial timing problem because each start can still move and can force changes to earlier starts. The paper gives an explicit scheduling procedure for that case and proves that it minimizes the sum of deviations from preferred starts (Garey, Tarjan, and Wilfong, 1988, §§1–2).

This mission targets that procedure and its correctness theorem. It also records the paper's equal-length result: when task lengths are identical, a minimum-cost schedule exists in preferred-start order, so the fixed-order procedure applies after sorting. These are two precise claims about total discrepancy, distinct from the paper's separate maximum-discrepancy problem.

Setting

There are nnn tasks, indexed i=0,…,n−1i=0,\ldots,n-1i=0,…,n−1. Task iii has a nonnegative length lil_ili​, a nonnegative preferred starting time aia_iai​, and an actual starting time sis_isi​. Once started, it occupies the one processor until si+lis_i+l_isi​+li​. Each start must be nonnegative. For the fixed-order problem, task iii must finish before task i+1i+1i+1 starts, so si+li≤si+1s_i+l_i\le s_{i+1}si​+li​≤si+1​. This permits idle time when the inequality is strict. The task's discrepancy is ∣si−ai∣|s_i-a_i|∣si​−ai​∣; because its preferred completion is ai+lia_i+l_iai​+li​, this is also its absolute completion-time discrepancy. The total discrepancy is

cost⁡n(s)=∑i=0n−1∣si−ai∣.\operatorname{cost}_n(s)=\sum_{i=0}^{n-1}|s_i-a_i|.costn​(s)=i=0∑n−1​∣si​−ai​∣.

A block is a maximal consecutive set of tasks with no idle time between neighboring tasks. Within a block, Decrease counts tasks whose actual starts are later than preferred, and Increase counts tasks whose actual starts are no later than preferred. These names describe the effect of moving the entire block earlier: the discrepancy of a Decrease task falls initially, whereas that of an Increase task rises. The algorithm's state is a schedule SnS_nSn​ for the first nnn tasks. It inserts the next task at its preferred start when the previous task has finished, and at that finish time otherwise. In the latter case it may move the final block earlier until one of the paper's stopping events occurs: the block reaches time zero, a late task reaches its preferred start, or the block meets its predecessor (§2.2, p. 337).

For the equal-length result, schedules may execute tasks in any order. Two distinct tasks are feasible together when one completes before the other starts; meeting at endpoints is allowed. The objective remains the same sum of absolute discrepancies.

Formalization targets

Fixed-order optimality

The main target is the paper's Theorem 2. For all nonnegative task data and every nnn, the actual schedule SnS_nSn​ produced by the block-shifting algorithm is feasible and satisfies

cost⁡n(Sn)≤cost⁡n(s)for every feasible fixed-order schedule s.\operatorname{cost}_n(S_n)\le\operatorname{cost}_n(s) \qquad\text{for every feasible fixed-order schedule }s.costn​(Sn​)≤costn​(s)for every feasible fixed-order schedule s.

This includes the empty schedule and schedules with idle time. The milestone list follows the paper's own assertions: a balanced final block can move earlier without changing cost; every block of SnS_nSn​ has more Increase tasks than Decrease tasks or begins at zero (Lemma 7); and the two claims in Case 2 of the proof record the cost of adding a late task and the comparison with schedules that place it earlier (Theorem 2 and Lemma 7, p. 338).

Equal-length schedules

The companion target is Theorem 3. If every task has a common length L≥0L\ge0L≥0 and the preferred starts are indexed so that ai≤ai+1a_i\le a_{i+1}ai​≤ai+1​, then among all feasible schedules, including those with another task order, at least one minimum-cost schedule starts the tasks in index order:

∃s  [cost⁡n(s)≤cost⁡n(t) for every feasible t]with si≤si+1 whenever i+1<n.\exists s\;\bigl[ \operatorname{cost}_n(s)\le\operatorname{cost}_n(t) \text{ for every feasible }t \bigr] \quad\text{with }s_i\le s_{i+1}\text{ whenever }i+1<n.∃s[costn​(s)≤costn​(t) for every feasible t]with si​≤si+1​ whenever i+1<n.

The paper uses this statement to connect free-order equal-length scheduling to its fixed-order procedure (Theorem 3, p. 340).

Significance

Theorem 2 certifies an explicit schedule, not just the existence of an optimum. It fixes the objective value for a prescribed execution order and gives a baseline against which any other legal timing of the same tasks can be compared. Theorem 3 supplies the ordering fact needed to use that result when all lengths agree. Together they explain why a problem that is difficult for unrestricted task lengths still has these structured solvable cases (Garey, Tarjan, and Wilfong, 1988, abstract and §2.5).

The paper proves both theorems on paper. The work here is to formalize its schedule construction, cost, block boundaries, and comparison classes in Lean, then obtain machine-checked proofs of the stated targets. The draft theorem declarations compile with proof placeholders; this proposal does not claim that they are already machine-checked results. A completed development would make the model and the algorithm available for later formal work on scheduling with idle time and symmetric earliness and tardiness penalties.

Difficulty

Moving a task closer to its preferred start can move neighboring tasks farther from theirs. A simple task-by-task choice therefore does not establish global optimality. Nor does a count of late and early tasks in one block, by itself, justify arbitrary earlier movements of individual tasks. The difficult comparison in the paper is between the algorithm's schedule and a competing feasible schedule whose new task starts earlier: the whole final block and its constrained relative movements matter. The proof also has to account for the boundary at time zero and for blocks that merge when shifted. These are the reasons the explicit procedure and its block invariant need careful statements (§§2.2–2.3, pp. 337–338).

Formalization scope

The Lean development represents task data and starts as functions from natural-number indices to real numbers; only indices below nnn count. Task iii in Lean is the paper's Ti+1T_{i+1}Ti+1​. Preferred times, lengths, and legal starting times are nonnegative. The start-time condition is a standing convention used by the paper's algorithm, especially its zero-boundary stopping rule. Fixed-order feasibility requires successive tasks to be separated by at least the earlier task's length; unrestricted feasibility uses pairwise nonoverlap. An empty schedule is legal and has cost zero. The representation allows zero-length tasks, as does the paper's li≥0l_i\ge0li​≥0 model.

The algorithm is defined by its stated insertion and single-block-shift operations. Defining SnS_nSn​ as a chosen minimizer would erase the content of Theorem 2; the goal also explicitly asserts feasibility so that an illegal low-cost function cannot qualify. Theorem 3 compares with every feasible unrestricted-order schedule, not just schedules already in preferred-start order. The core definitions, the block invariant, and the cost comparisons are useful beyond this particular proof. Formalizing the paper's running-time bounds and heap implementation is outside this mission.

Selected references

  • Michael R. Garey, Robert E. Tarjan, and Gordon T. Wilfong, One-Processor Scheduling with Symmetric Earliness and Tardiness Penalties, Mathematics of Operations Research 13(2), 330–348, 1988. DOI: 10.1287/moor.13.2.330.
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Data-Driven Distributionally Robust Optimization Using the Wasserstein Metric: Performance Guarantees and Tractable Reformulations II: Worst-Case Distributions from a Finite Convex ProgramResearch Paper

Motivation

In data-driven stochastic optimization a decision maker knows the distribution of an uncertain parameter ξ\xiξ only through NNN samples ξ^1,…,ξ^N\hat\xi_1,\dots,\hat\xi_Nξ^​1​,…,ξ^​N​. Wasserstein distributionally robust optimization hedges against this ignorance by evaluating a loss ℓ\ellℓ under the worst distribution in a ball, measured in the Wasserstein metric, around the empirical distribution of the samples. Mohajerin Esfahani and Kuhn (arXiv:1505.05116v3, published in Mathematical Programming 171, 2018) showed that for piecewise concave losses the worst-case expectation is the optimal value of a finite convex program (their Theorem 4.2), which made the approach computationally practical.

Knowing the worst-case value is often not enough. Stress tests of a candidate decision require the extremal distributions themselves: the distributions inside the ball that (nearly) achieve the worst case. Section 4.2 of the paper answers this question. Its Theorem 4.4 shows that the worst case is approached by discrete distributions with at most NKNKNK atoms, read off from near-optimal solutions of a second finite convex program, and its Example 2 shows that a worst-case distribution need not exist at all. This mission formalizes that section. The source is the arXiv preprint version 3 (13 June 2017); all numbering below refers to it.

Setting

Let EEE be a finite-dimensional real vector space with an arbitrary norm ∥⋅∥\|\cdot\|∥⋅∥ (the paper's Rm\mathbb R^mRm), equipped with its Borel σ\sigmaσ-algebra. Linear functionals zzz on EEE act by ⟨z,ξ⟩\langle z,\xi\rangle⟨z,ξ⟩, and the dual norm is ∥z∥∗=sup⁡∥ξ∥≤1⟨z,ξ⟩\|z\|_* = \sup_{\|\xi\|\le 1}\langle z,\xi\rangle∥z∥∗​=sup∥ξ∥≤1​⟨z,ξ⟩. Extended reals R‾=[−∞,+∞]\overline{\mathbb R} = [-\infty,+\infty]R=[−∞,+∞] follow the paper's conventions 0⋅∞=0/0=00\cdot\infty = 0/0 = 00⋅∞=0/0=0 and ∞−∞=∞\infty - \infty = \infty∞−∞=∞.

  • Samples and empirical distribution. ξ^1,…,ξ^N\hat\xi_1,\dots,\hat\xi_Nξ^​1​,…,ξ^​N​ lie in a set Ξ⊆E\Xi\subseteq EΞ⊆E, and P^N=1N∑iδξ^i\widehat{\mathbb P}_N = \frac1N\sum_i\delta_{\hat\xi_i}PN​=N1​∑i​δξ^​i​​.
  • Wasserstein ball. dW(Q1,Q2)d_W(\mathbb Q_1,\mathbb Q_2)dW​(Q1​,Q2​) is the infimum of ∫∥ξ1−ξ2∥ Π(dξ1,dξ2)\int\|\xi_1-\xi_2\|\,\Pi(d\xi_1,d\xi_2)∫∥ξ1​−ξ2​∥Π(dξ1​,dξ2​) over couplings Π\PiΠ of Q1\mathbb Q_1Q1​ and Q2\mathbb Q_2Q2​, and Bε(P^N)\mathbb B_\varepsilon(\widehat{\mathbb P}_N)Bε​(PN​) is the set of probability distributions supported on Ξ\XiΞ within distance ε\varepsilonε of P^N\widehat{\mathbb P}_NPN​.
  • Loss. ℓ(ξ)=max⁡k≤Kℓk(ξ)\ell(\xi) = \max_{k\le K}\ell_k(\xi)ℓ(ξ)=maxk≤K​ℓk​(ξ) for measurable pieces ℓk:E→R‾\ell_k : E\to\overline{\mathbb R}ℓk​:E→R, and EQ[ℓ(ξ)]=EQ[max⁡{ℓ,0}]+EQ[min⁡{ℓ,0}]\mathbb E^{\mathbb Q}[\ell(\xi)] = \mathbb E^{\mathbb Q}[\max\{\ell,0\}] + \mathbb E^{\mathbb Q}[\min\{\ell,0\}]EQ[ℓ(ξ)]=EQ[max{ℓ,0}]+EQ[min{ℓ,0}].
  • Worst-case expectation (10). sup⁡Q∈Bε(P^N)EQ[ℓ(ξ)]\sup_{\mathbb Q\in\mathbb B_\varepsilon(\widehat{\mathbb P}_N)}\mathbb E^{\mathbb Q}[\ell(\xi)]supQ∈Bε​(PN​)​EQ[ℓ(ξ)].
  • Assumption 4.1. Ξ\XiΞ is convex and closed; every −ℓk-\ell_k−ℓk​ is proper, convex and lower semicontinuous; and no ℓk\ell_kℓk​ is identically −∞-\infty−∞ on Ξ\XiΞ.
  • Program (13). Over weights αik≥0\alpha_{ik}\ge 0αik​≥0 and displacements qik∈Eq_{ik}\in Eqik​∈E,
sup⁡αik,qik 1N∑i=1N∑k=1Kαik ℓk(ξ^i−qikαik)s.t.1N∑i,k∥qik∥≤ε,  ∑kαik=1,  ξ^i−qikαik∈Ξ.\sup_{\alpha_{ik},q_{ik}}\ \frac1N\sum_{i=1}^N\sum_{k=1}^K\alpha_{ik}\,\ell_k\Big(\hat\xi_i-\frac{q_{ik}}{\alpha_{ik}}\Big)\quad\text{s.t.}\quad\frac1N\sum_{i,k}\|q_{ik}\|\le\varepsilon,\ \ \sum_k\alpha_{ik}=1,\ \ \hat\xi_i-\frac{q_{ik}}{\alpha_{ik}}\in\Xi .αik​,qik​sup​ N1​i=1∑N​k=1∑K​αik​ℓk​(ξ^​i​−αik​qik​​)s.t.N1​i,k∑​∥qik​∥≤ε,  k∑​αik​=1,  ξ^​i​−αik​qik​​∈Ξ.

When αik=0\alpha_{ik}=0αik​=0 the last constraint forces qik=0q_{ik}=0qik​=0 and the ikikik-th objective term is 000.

  • Candidate distributions. Q=1N∑i,kαik δξik\mathbb Q = \frac1N\sum_{i,k}\alpha_{ik}\,\delta_{\xi_{ik}}Q=N1​∑i,k​αik​δξik​​ with ξik=ξ^i−qik/αik\xi_{ik} = \hat\xi_i - q_{ik}/\alpha_{ik}ξik​=ξ^​i​−qik​/αik​.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 4.4 (worst-case distributions)

Under Assumption 4.1 and for every ε≥0\varepsilon\ge 0ε≥0,

sup⁡Q∈Bε(P^N)EQ[ℓ(ξ)]=optimal value of (13),\sup_{\mathbb Q\in\mathbb B_\varepsilon(\widehat{\mathbb P}_N)}\mathbb E^{\mathbb Q}[\ell(\xi)] = \text{optimal value of (13)},Q∈Bε​(PN​)sup​EQ[ℓ(ξ)]=optimal value of (13),

and for every feasible sequence (αik(r),qik(r))r(\alpha_{ik}(r),q_{ik}(r))_r(αik​(r),qik​(r))r​ of (13) whose objective values converge to that optimal value, the distributions Qr\mathbb Q_rQr​ lie in Bε(P^N)\mathbb B_\varepsilon(\widehat{\mathbb P}_N)Bε​(PN​) and

sup⁡Q∈Bε(P^N)EQ[ℓ(ξ)]=lim⁡r→∞EQr[ℓ(ξ)]=lim⁡r→∞1N∑i,kαik(r) ℓ(ξik(r)).\sup_{\mathbb Q\in\mathbb B_\varepsilon(\widehat{\mathbb P}_N)}\mathbb E^{\mathbb Q}[\ell(\xi)] = \lim_{r\to\infty}\mathbb E^{\mathbb Q_r}[\ell(\xi)] = \lim_{r\to\infty}\frac1N\sum_{i,k}\alpha_{ik}(r)\,\ell(\xi_{ik}(r)).Q∈Bε​(PN​)sup​EQ[ℓ(ξ)]=r→∞lim​EQr​[ℓ(ξ)]=r→∞lim​N1​i,k∑​αik​(r)ℓ(ξik​(r)).

The limits may be +∞+\infty+∞; no finiteness is assumed.

Milestones, in the order of the proof

The proof starts from (10) = (12f) (proof of Theorem 4.2, p. 13), which is posed in mission I of this series, Wasserstein Worst-Case Expectations as Finite Convex Programs, and is not restated here; it will be linked as a milestone once that mission is live.

  1. Lemma 4.5: inf⁡z⟨z,q−αξ^⟩+αf∗(z)\inf_z\langle z,q-\alpha\hat\xi\rangle+\alpha f^*(z)infz​⟨z,q−αξ^​⟩+αf∗(z) is the extended perspective of q↦−f(ξ^−q)q\mapsto -f(\hat\xi-q)q↦−f(ξ^​−q) for proper, convex, lower semicontinuous fff.
  2. (14d)–(14f): the ikikik-th dual term equals αℓk(ξ^−q/α)−χΞ(ξ^−q/α)\alpha\ell_k(\hat\xi-q/\alpha)-\chi_\Xi(\hat\xi-q/\alpha)αℓk​(ξ^​−q/α)−χΞ​(ξ^​−q/α) under the extended-arithmetic conventions.
  3. (12f) = (13), the first part of the proof of Theorem 4.4.
  4. Qr∈Bε(P^N)\mathbb Q_r\in\mathbb B_\varepsilon(\widehat{\mathbb P}_N)Qr​∈Bε​(PN​) for every feasible point of (13).
  5. EQr[ℓ(ξ)]\mathbb E^{\mathbb Q_r}[\ell(\xi)]EQr​[ℓ(ξ)] equals 1N∑i,kαikℓ(ξik)\frac1N\sum_{i,k}\alpha_{ik}\ell(\xi_{ik})N1​∑i,k​αik​ℓ(ξik​) and is at least the objective of (13) for every feasible point.

Companion results

Corollary 4.6: if Ξ\XiΞ is compact or K=1K=1K=1, the sequence has an accumulation point that defines a worst-case distribution. Example 2: for Ξ=R\Xi=\mathbb RΞ=R, N=1N=1N=1, ξ^1=0\hat\xi_1=0ξ^​1​=0, ℓ=max⁡{0,ξ−1}\ell=\max\{0,\xi-1\}ℓ=max{0,ξ−1}, the worst-case expectation is ε\varepsilonε and, for ε>0\varepsilon>0ε>0, is attained by no distribution in the ball.

Significance

Theorem 4.4 turns the abstract supremum over an infinite-dimensional ball of distributions into a finite-dimensional convex program whose near-optimal solutions are near-worst-case distributions. The atoms ξik\xi_{ik}ξik​ sit within total weighted distance ∑i,kαik∥ξik−ξ^i∥≤Nε\sum_{i,k}\alpha_{ik}\|\xi_{ik}-\hat\xi_i\|\le N\varepsilon∑i,k​αik​∥ξik​−ξ^​i​∥≤Nε of the data, and they may lie off the data, which distinguishes Wasserstein balls from ambiguity sets based on the total variation distance or the Kullback–Leibler divergence. Example 2 marks the boundary: the theorem cannot be upgraded to the existence of a maximizer in general, while Corollary 4.6 names two cases where it can.

The results are proved in the paper; to our knowledge none of them has a machine-checked proof. The formalization adds a precise account of the extended-arithmetic conventions the paper relies on (0⋅∞=00\cdot\infty=00⋅∞=0, q/0∉Eq/0\notin Eq/0∈/E, ∞−∞=∞\infty-\infty=\infty∞−∞=∞), each of which is made explicit in the definitions, and a reusable Lean treatment of extended-valued conjugates and perspective functions on a normed space with an arbitrary norm.

Difficulty

The first claim goes through Lagrangian duality for program (12f), whose constraints involve conjugates that may take the value +∞+\infty+∞; the strong duality and the minimax interchange (14c) must be justified for extended-valued convex functions, not just finite ones. Lemma 4.5 needs the Fenchel–Moreau theorem f∗∗=ff^{**}=ff∗∗=f for proper, convex, lower semicontinuous R‾\overline{\mathbb R}R-valued functions on a finite-dimensional normed space, together with its degenerate case α=0\alpha=0α=0. The second claim is a squeeze argument, but it rests on computing an extended expectation of an R‾\overline{\mathbb R}R-valued function under a discrete measure and on an explicit coupling for the Wasserstein distance. A tempting shortcut, attaining the supremum by a limit distribution, fails: Example 2 shows the maximizing atoms can escape to infinity.

Formalization scope

  • The space is a finite-dimensional real normed space E with [BorelSpace E]; the dual space is StrongDual ℝ E, and the dual norm is the operator norm. All values are in EReal.
  • The Wasserstein distance, the ball (6) and P^N\widehat{\mathbb P}_NPN​ are the published WassersteinDRO.Duality.wassersteinDistance, ambiguitySet (with p=1p=1p=1) and empiricalDistribution.
  • The extended expectation is the published DupacovaWets.Consistency.expect; it integrates the positive and negative parts separately and returns +∞+\infty+∞ when the positive part is infinite; there is no integrability guard, so a distribution with infinite expected loss pushes (10) to +∞+\infty+∞ as in the paper.
  • Program values are infima or suprema over feasibility predicates, so an empty feasible set gives ±∞\pm\infty±∞, never a junk 000. Program (13) encodes αik=0\alpha_{ik}=0αik​=0 by the clauses "qik=0q_{ik}=0qik​=0" and "objective term =0=0=0" (p. 14).
  • Standing assumptions carried as hypotheses: N≥1N\ge1N≥1, K≥1K\ge1K≥1, ξ^i∈Ξ\hat\xi_i\in\Xiξ^​i​∈Ξ (§2), measurability of each ℓk\ell_kℓk​ (p. 11).
  • A trivializing formalization is ruled out: dropping the clause αik=0⇒qik=0\alpha_{ik}=0\Rightarrow q_{ik}=0αik​=0⇒qik​=0 or the hypothesis ξ^i∈Ξ\hat\xi_i\in\Xiξ^​i​∈Ξ would change program (13) or make the ball empty, and both are kept explicitly.
  • The objects shared with mission I (extended expectation, worst-case expectation, conjugate, Assumption 4.1, program (12f)) are restated verbatim in this mission's namespace; they will be merged with mission I's copies. Contributions to the convex-analysis groundwork (extended-valued Fenchel–Moreau, perspective functions) are welcome and reusable beyond this mission.

Selected references

  • P. Mohajerin Esfahani and D. Kuhn, Data-Driven Distributionally Robust Optimization Using the Wasserstein Metric: Performance Guarantees and Tractable Reformulations, Mathematical Programming 171, 2018. Version formalized: arXiv:1505.05116v3.
  • D. P. Bertsekas, Convex Optimization Theory, Athena Scientific, 2009 (Propositions 1.6.1 and 5.5.4, used in the proofs).
  • R. T. Rockafellar and R. J.-B. Wets, Variational Analysis, Springer, 1998. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-02431-3
  • C. Villani, Optimal Transport: Old and New, Springer, 2009. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-71050-9
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Data-Driven Distributionally Robust Optimization Using the Wasserstein Metric: Performance Guarantees and Tractable Reformulations I: Wasserstein Worst-Case Expectations as Finite Convex ProgramsResearch Paper

Motivation

A decision maker who must minimize an expected cost EP[h(x,ξ)]\mathbb E^{\mathbb P}[h(x,\xi)]EP[h(x,ξ)] rarely knows the distribution P\mathbb PP of the uncertain parameter ξ\xiξ; usually only NNN samples ξ^1,…,ξ^N\hat\xi_1,\dots,\hat\xi_Nξ^​1​,…,ξ^​N​ are available. Replacing P\mathbb PP by the empirical distribution (sample average approximation) tends to produce decisions that perform poorly out of sample when NNN is small. Distributionally robust optimization instead minimizes the worst expected cost over a set of distributions that are plausible given the data. Mohajerin Esfahani and Kuhn (arXiv:1505.05116v3, published in Mathematical Programming 171, 2018) take that set to be a ball in the Wasserstein metric around the empirical distribution. Such balls give finite-sample and asymptotic guarantees, but each evaluation of the robust objective is an optimization over infinitely many probability distributions. Section 4.1 of the paper shows that, for a large class of losses, this inner problem is a finite convex program. That result, Theorem 4.2, is the subject of this mission.

Timeline. Wasserstein ambiguity sets for portfolio selection were proposed by Pflug and Wozabal (2007); before this paper, robust problems over such sets were solved with global optimization algorithms (Pflug and Pichler 2014). Strong duality for conic linear and moment problems (Shapiro 2001) underlies the reduction. Mohajerin Esfahani and Kuhn (preprint 2015, journal 2018) proved the convex reduction for piecewise concave losses; Gao and Kleywegt (arXiv:1604.02199) and Blanchet and Murthy (arXiv:1604.01446) proved strong duality for general transport costs in 2016.

Setting

Let EEE be a finite-dimensional real vector space with an arbitrary norm ∥⋅∥\|\cdot\|∥⋅∥ (the paper's Rm\mathbb R^mRm) and its Borel σ-algebra. Its dual norm is ∥z∥∗=sup⁡∥ξ∥≤1⟨z,ξ⟩\|z\|_* = \sup_{\|\xi\|\le 1}\langle z,\xi\rangle∥z∥∗​=sup∥ξ∥≤1​⟨z,ξ⟩, where ⟨z,ξ⟩\langle z,\xi\rangle⟨z,ξ⟩ is the value of the linear functional zzz at ξ\xiξ. Let Ξ⊆E\Xi\subseteq EΞ⊆E be the support set and ξ^1,…,ξ^N∈Ξ\hat\xi_1,\dots,\hat\xi_N\in\Xiξ^​1​,…,ξ^​N​∈Ξ the samples, with empirical distribution P^N=1N∑i=1Nδξ^i\widehat{\mathbb P}_N=\frac1N\sum_{i=1}^N\delta_{\hat\xi_i}PN​=N1​∑i=1N​δξ^​i​​.

The 1-Wasserstein distance between two distributions is the least transport cost ∫∥ξ−ξ′∥ Π(dξ,dξ′)\int\|\xi-\xi'\|\,\Pi(d\xi,d\xi')∫∥ξ−ξ′∥Π(dξ,dξ′) over all couplings Π\PiΠ with the given marginals. The Wasserstein ball Bε(P^N)\mathbb B_\varepsilon(\widehat{\mathbb P}_N)Bε​(PN​) is the set of probability distributions on Ξ\XiΞ within distance ε≥0\varepsilon\ge 0ε≥0 of P^N\widehat{\mathbb P}_NPN​.

The loss is a pointwise maximum ℓ(ξ)=max⁡k≤Kℓk(ξ)\ell(\xi)=\max_{k\le K}\ell_k(\xi)ℓ(ξ)=maxk≤K​ℓk​(ξ) of measurable functions ℓk:E→R‾=R∪{±∞}\ell_k:E\to\overline{\mathbb R}=\mathbb R\cup\{\pm\infty\}ℓk​:E→R=R∪{±∞}. Its expectation is EQ[ℓ]=EQ[max⁡{ℓ,0}]+EQ[min⁡{ℓ,0}]\mathbb E^{\mathbb Q}[\ell]=\mathbb E^{\mathbb Q}[\max\{\ell,0\}]+\mathbb E^{\mathbb Q}[\min\{\ell,0\}]EQ[ℓ]=EQ[max{ℓ,0}]+EQ[min{ℓ,0}] with ∞−∞=∞\infty-\infty=\infty∞−∞=∞. The worst-case expectation is

sup⁡Q∈Bε(P^N)EQ[ℓ(ξ)].(10)\sup_{\mathbb Q\in\mathbb B_\varepsilon(\widehat{\mathbb P}_N)}\mathbb E^{\mathbb Q}[\ell(\xi)].\tag{10}Q∈Bε​(PN​)sup​EQ[ℓ(ξ)].(10)

The conjugate of f:E→R‾f:E\to\overline{\mathbb R}f:E→R is f∗(z)=sup⁡ξ⟨z,ξ⟩−f(ξ)f^*(z)=\sup_\xi\langle z,\xi\rangle-f(\xi)f∗(z)=supξ​⟨z,ξ⟩−f(ξ), the characteristic function χΞ\chi_\XiχΞ​ is 000 on Ξ\XiΞ and +∞+\infty+∞ off it, and the support function is σΞ(z)=sup⁡ξ∈Ξ⟨z,ξ⟩\sigma_\Xi(z)=\sup_{\xi\in\Xi}\langle z,\xi\rangleσΞ​(z)=supξ∈Ξ​⟨z,ξ⟩. Assumption 4.1 requires Ξ\XiΞ to be convex and closed, each −ℓk-\ell_k−ℓk​ to be proper, convex and lower semicontinuous, and no ℓk\ell_kℓk​ to be identically −∞-\infty−∞ on Ξ\XiΞ.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 4.2 (convex reduction)

Under Assumption 4.1, for every ε≥0\varepsilon\ge0ε≥0, (10) equals

inf⁡λ,si,zik,νik λε+1N∑i=1Nsis.t.[−ℓk]∗(zik−νik)+σΞ(νik)−⟨zik,ξ^i⟩≤si,  ∥zik∥∗≤λ∀i,k.(11)\inf_{\lambda,s_i,z_{ik},\nu_{ik}}\ \lambda\varepsilon+\frac1N\sum_{i=1}^N s_i\quad\text{s.t.}\quad [-\ell_k]^*(z_{ik}-\nu_{ik})+\sigma_\Xi(\nu_{ik})-\langle z_{ik},\hat\xi_i\rangle\le s_i,\ \ \|z_{ik}\|_*\le\lambda\quad\forall i,k.\tag{11}λ,si​,zik​,νik​inf​ λε+N1​i=1∑N​si​s.t.[−ℓk​]∗(zik​−νik​)+σΞ​(νik​)−⟨zik​,ξ^​i​⟩≤si​,  ∥zik​∥∗​≤λ∀i,k.(11)

Milestones, in the order of the paper's proof

  1. (12a)–(12c). Without any convexity, (10) is at most the value of (12c): inf⁡{λε+1N∑isi: sup⁡ξ∈Ξ(ℓ(ξ)−λ∥ξ−ξ^i∥)≤si, λ≥0}\inf\{\lambda\varepsilon+\frac1N\sum_i s_i:\ \sup_{\xi\in\Xi}(\ell(\xi)-\lambda\|\xi-\hat\xi_i\|)\le s_i,\ \lambda\ge0\}inf{λε+N1​∑i​si​: supξ∈Ξ​(ℓ(ξ)−λ∥ξ−ξ^​i​∥)≤si​, λ≥0}.
  2. Corollary 4.3. Without Assumption 4.1, (10) is at most the value of (12f), the program with constraints [−ℓk+χΞ]∗(zik)−⟨zik,ξ^i⟩≤si[-\ell_k+\chi_\Xi]^*(z_{ik})-\langle z_{ik},\hat\xi_i\rangle\le s_i[−ℓk​+χΞ​]∗(zik​)−⟨zik​,ξ^​i​⟩≤si​ and ∥zik∥∗≤λ\|z_{ik}\|_*\le\lambda∥zik​∥∗​≤λ.
  3. (12a) is an equality for ε>0\varepsilon>0ε>0 under Assumption 4.1.
  4. The case ε=0\varepsilon=0ε=0. (10) is the sample average 1N∑iℓ(ξ^i)\frac1N\sum_i\ell(\hat\xi_i)N1​∑i​ℓ(ξ^​i​), the objective of (12b) converges to it as λ→∞\lambda\to\inftyλ→∞, and (12a) is again an equality.
  5. (12e) is an equality. For each constraint, sup⁡ξ∈Ξ(ℓk(ξ)−λ∥ξ−ξ^i∥)=min⁡∥z∥∗≤λsup⁡ξ∈Ξ(ℓk(ξ)−⟨z,ξ−ξ^i⟩)\sup_{\xi\in\Xi}(\ell_k(\xi)-\lambda\|\xi-\hat\xi_i\|)=\min_{\|z\|_*\le\lambda}\sup_{\xi\in\Xi}(\ell_k(\xi)-\langle z,\xi-\hat\xi_i\rangle)supξ∈Ξ​(ℓk​(ξ)−λ∥ξ−ξ^​i​∥)=min∥z∥∗​≤λ​supξ∈Ξ​(ℓk​(ξ)−⟨z,ξ−ξ^​i​⟩).
  6. (10) equals (12f) under Assumption 4.1.
  7. (12f) equals (11) under Assumption 4.1, as optimal values.

Significance

Theorem 4.2 is what makes Wasserstein distributionally robust optimization computable. Once the worst-case expectation is a convex program in (λ,s,z,ν)(\lambda,s,z,\nu)(λ,s,z,ν), minimizing over the decision xxx becomes one larger convex program. Section 5 of the paper derives linear and conic programs from it for piecewise affine losses, uncertainty quantification and two-stage problems. Theorem 4.4 of the same paper (mission II of this series) builds worst-case distributions from the same program. Corollary 4.3 gives a conservative convex bound for losses that are not piecewise concave.

The result is proved on paper; no machine-checked proof of it is known. A formal development needs a working theory of extended-valued conjugates, support functions and inf-convolution in a normed space, Kantorovich-type couplings of an empirical measure, and a minimax theorem over a compact dual ball. Each of these is reusable well beyond this paper.

Difficulty

The weak inequality, (10) ≤\le≤ (12f), is the elementary direction: integrate a pointwise bound against a near-optimal coupling. The difficulty lies in the two equalities. Equality in (12a) is strong duality for an infinite-dimensional moment problem whose loss may take the values ±∞\pm\infty±∞ and may be unbounded on an unbounded Ξ\XiΞ. A Slater point exists only for ε>0\varepsilon>0ε>0, so ε=0\varepsilon=0ε=0 needs a separate limit argument. The equality (12f) === (11) is subtle as well. The conjugate of −ℓk+χΞ-\ell_k+\chi_\Xi−ℓk​+χΞ​ is only the closure of the inf-convolution of [−ℓk]∗[-\ell_k]^*[−ℓk​]∗ and σΞ\sigma_\XiσΞ​, so the two constraint sets differ and only the optimal values agree. The paper's sentence "cl[f]≤0[f]\le 0[f]≤0 iff f≤0f\le0f≤0" is false pointwise and cannot be formalized as written.

Formalization scope

  • Space. EEE is a finite-dimensional real normed space with its Borel σ-algebra. The pairing ⟨z,ξ⟩\langle z,\xi\rangle⟨z,ξ⟩ is application of a continuous linear functional zzz, and ∥z∥∗\|z\|_*∥z∥∗​ is the operator norm. These choices keep the paper's arbitrary norm; §5 of the paper uses the 1- and ∞-norms.
  • Extended reals. Values are in EReal. Mathlib's EReal has ⊤+⊥=⊥\top+\bot=\bot⊤+⊥=⊥, whereas the paper has ∞−∞=∞\infty-\infty=\infty∞−∞=∞, so the expectation treats an infinite positive part separately, and [−ℓk+χΞ]∗(z)[-\ell_k+\chi_\Xi]^*(z)[−ℓk​+χΞ​]∗(z) is written as sup⁡ξ∈Ξ(⟨z,ξ⟩+ℓk(ξ))\sup_{\xi\in\Xi}(\langle z,\xi\rangle+\ell_k(\xi))supξ∈Ξ​(⟨z,ξ⟩+ℓk​(ξ)), with no addition at all. The one EReal sum, [−ℓk]∗+σΞ[-\ell_k]^*+\sigma_\Xi[−ℓk​]∗+σΞ​ in (11), never meets ⊤+⊥\top+\bot⊤+⊥ under Assumption 4.1.
  • Programs. Each optimal value is an infimum over a feasibility predicate with real epigraph variables, so an infeasible program has value +∞+\infty+∞.
  • Ball. The ball is the published WassersteinDRO.Duality.ambiguitySet with p=1p=1p=1 around empiricalDistribution. Its condition Q(Ξc)=0\mathbb Q(\Xi^{\mathrm c})=0Q(Ξc)=0 encodes Q∈M(Ξ)\mathbb Q\in\mathcal M(\Xi)Q∈M(Ξ). The finite first moment is automatic at finite distance from P^N\widehat{\mathbb P}_NPN​.
  • Standing assumptions. Every statement carries N≥1N\ge1N≥1, K≥1K\ge1K≥1, ξ^i∈Ξ\hat\xi_i\in\Xiξ^​i​∈Ξ (§2, p. 5) and measurability of each ℓk\ell_kℓk​ (p. 11). The radius condition is ε≥0\varepsilon\ge0ε≥0, or ε>0\varepsilon>0ε>0 in milestone 3.
  • Assumption 4.1. Convexity of −ℓk-\ell_k−ℓk​ is stated through its real epigraph, because ConvexOn cannot take an EReal codomain.
  • Not trivializable. The statements cannot be made vacuous by an empty ball, because the samples lie in Ξ\XiΞ. They cannot be trivialized by a junk expectation either: the expectation is not guarded by integrability, so a distribution with infinite expected loss makes (10) infinite, exactly as in the paper.

Welcome contributions are reusable lemmas on EReal-valued conjugates and support functions, the decomposition of a coupling with an empirical marginal into conditional distributions, the dual-norm identity max⁡∥z∥∗≤λ⟨z,v⟩=λ∥v∥\max_{\|z\|_*\le\lambda}\langle z,v\rangle=\lambda\|v\|max∥z∥∗​≤λ​⟨z,v⟩=λ∥v∥, and a Sion-type minimax theorem.

Selected references

  • P. Mohajerin Esfahani, D. Kuhn, Data-driven distributionally robust optimization using the Wasserstein metric: performance guarantees and tractable reformulations, arXiv:1505.05116v3, 2017; Math. Program. 171 (2018) 115–166. https://arxiv.org/abs/1505.05116v3
  • A. Shapiro, On duality theory of conic linear problems, in M. A. Goberna, M. A. López (eds.), Semi-Infinite Programming, Kluwer, 2001.
  • R. T. Rockafellar, R. J.-B. Wets, Variational Analysis, Springer, 2010 (Theorem 11.23(a), p. 493).
  • D. P. Bertsekas, Convex Optimization Theory, Athena Scientific, 2009 (Proposition 5.5.4).
  • G. Ch. Pflug, A. Pichler, Multistage Stochastic Optimization, Springer, 2014.
  • G. Ch. Pflug, D. Wozabal, Ambiguity in portfolio selection, Quantitative Finance 7 (2007) 435–442.
  • R. Gao, A. J. Kleywegt, Distributionally robust stochastic optimization with Wasserstein distance, arXiv:1604.02199, 2016. https://arxiv.org/abs/1604.02199
  • J. Blanchet, K. Murthy, Quantifying distributional model risk via optimal transport, arXiv:1604.01446, 2016. https://arxiv.org/abs/1604.01446
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Combinatorics·Captain: mikedeng1

Minimum Partition of a Matroid Into Independent Subsets: A Matroid Splits Into k Independent Sets Iff Every Subset A Has |A| ≤ k·r(A)Research Paper

Motivation

A matroid abstracts the dependence structure of the columns of a matrix: which sets of columns are linearly independent, forgetting the numbers themselves. Graphs are the special case of incidence matrices over the integers mod 2, where a set of edges is independent exactly when it contains no cycle. A natural combinatorial question in this setting is the minimum partition (or covering) problem: how few independent sets are needed to cover all the elements? For a graph this is the least number of forests that cover its edges, its arboricity.

J. Edmonds answered this question for every finite matroid in Minimum partition of a matroid into independent subsets (J. Res. NBS 69B, 1965, doi:10.6028/jres.069b.004). The answer is a good characterization in Edmonds's sense: there is a short certificate both that a partition into kkk independent sets exists (the partition itself) and that it does not (a single subset that is too large for its rank). The paper is also the source of the matroid partition algorithm, which together with matroid intersection became a basic tool of combinatorial optimization.

Timeline:

  • 1935 — H. Whitney introduces matroids through rank and independence postulates (doi:10.2307/2371182).
  • 1961–1964 — C. St. J. A. Nash-Williams and W. T. Tutte characterize graphs whose edges split into kkk forests, and graphs containing kkk edge-disjoint spanning trees (doi:10.1112/jlms/s1-39.1.12).
  • 1965 — Edmonds proves the partition theorem for all matroids, with Nash-Williams's forest theorem as a corollary; the companion paper "Lehman's switching game and a theorem of Tutte and Nash-Williams" treats the packing side.

Setting

Let MMM be a finite set of elements and call some subsets of MMM independent. Edmonds's two axioms are:

  • Axiom 1. Every subset of an independent set is independent. (A system satisfying this is an independence system.)
  • Axiom 2. For any subset AAA of the elements, all maximal independent sets contained in AAA contain the same number of elements.

A matroid is a system satisfying both. The rank r(A)r(A)r(A) of A⊆MA\subseteq MA⊆M is the largest cardinality of an independent subset of AAA; in a matroid every maximal independent subset of AAA has exactly r(A)r(A)r(A) elements.

A circuit is a minimal dependent set. A span (closed set) is a set SSS such that no circuit has exactly one element outside SSS, and the span S(A)S(A)S(A) of AAA is the minimal span containing AAA. A partition into kkk independent sets is a family I1,…,IkI_1,\dots,I_kI1​,…,Ik​ of mutually disjoint independent sets whose union is MMM; any number of the IiI_iIi​ may be empty.

Formalization targets

Goal: THEOREM 1 (p. 69)

For every finite matroid MMM and every integer k≥0k\ge 0k≥0, the elements of MMM can be partitioned into kkk independent sets if and only if there is no A⊆MA\subseteq MA⊆M with

∣A∣>k⋅r(A).|A|>k\cdot r(A).∣A∣>k⋅r(A).

The condition ranges over all subsets AAA of MMM, as printed.

Milestones

The milestones follow the paper's own lemmas and the claims of its main proof, in order.

  1. PROPOSITION 1. Axioms 1 and 2 are equivalent to Axioms 1 and 2', where Axiom 2' says that the union of an independent set and one element contains at most one circuit.
  2. PROPOSITION 2. Axioms 1 and 2' are equivalent to the circuit axioms 1c (no circuit contains another) and 2c (if distinct circuits C1,C2C_1,C_2C1​,C2​ share eee, then C1∪C2−eC_1\cup C_2-eC1​∪C2​−e contains a circuit).
  3. PROPOSITION 3 (Lehman). If e∈C1∩C2e\in C_1\cap C_2e∈C1​∩C2​ and a∈C1−C2a\in C_1-C_2a∈C1​−C2​ for circuits C1,C2C_1,C_2C1​,C2​, some circuit CCC satisfies a∈C⊆C1∪C2−ea\in C\subseteq C_1\cup C_2-ea∈C⊆C1​∪C2​−e.
  4. PROPOSITION 4. e∈S(A)e\in S(A)e∈S(A) if and only if e∈Ae\in Ae∈A or some circuit CCC has C−A={e}C-A=\{e\}C−A={e}.
  5. PROPOSITION 5. S(A)S(A)S(A) is the unique maximal set containing AAA with rank r(A)r(A)r(A); in particular r(S(I))=∣I∣r(S(I))=|I|r(S(I))=∣I∣ for independent III.
  6. "Only if" (§1.3). For any independence system, a partition into kkk independent sets gives ∣A∣≤k⋅r(A)|A|\le k\cdot r(A)∣A∣≤k⋅r(A) for all AAA.
  7. Counting step (§1.6). If xxx lies in none of kkk disjoint sets IiI_iIi​, and x∈Sx\in Sx∈S with ∣S∣≤k r(S)|S|\le k\,r(S)∣S∣≤kr(S), then some IiI_iIi​ has ∣Ii∩S∣<r(S)|I_i\cap S|<r(S)∣Ii​∩S∣<r(S).
  8. Rank drop (§1.6). For a span SSS and an independent III with ∣I∩S∣<r(S)|I\cap S|<r(S)∣I∩S∣<r(S): S(I∩S)⊆SS(I\cap S)\subseteq SS(I∩S)⊆S and r(S(I∩S))<r(S)r(S(I\cap S))<r(S)r(S(I∩S))<r(S).
  9. One-element augmentation (§1.6). If ∣S∣≤k r(S)|S|\le k\,r(S)∣S∣≤kr(S) for every span SSS, any kkk disjoint independent sets missing xxx can be rearranged into kkk disjoint independent sets covering exactly the old elements and xxx.
  10. "If" from spans (§1.6). If ∣S∣≤k⋅r(S)|S|\le k\cdot r(S)∣S∣≤k⋅r(S) holds for every span SSS, then MMM partitions into kkk independent sets.

A further item states the paper's COROLLARY (Nash-Williams): the edges of a loopless finite graph GGG can be colored with kkk colors so that no circuit is one color if and only if no nonempty node set UUU has ∣EU∣>k(∣U∣−1)|E_U|>k(|U|-1)∣EU​∣>k(∣U∣−1), where EUE_UEU​ is the set of edges with both ends in UUU.

Significance

THEOREM 1 is the base case of matroid union: the sets coverable by kkk independent sets form a matroid whose rank is min⁡A(∣M∖A∣+k r(A))\min_{A}\bigl(|M\setminus A|+k\,r(A)\bigr)minA​(∣M∖A∣+kr(A)), and the paper's proof is the origin of the polynomial-time matroid partition algorithm and of Edmonds's later matroid intersection theory. Its graphic case gives the arboricity formula of Nash-Williams, used for sparse-graph decompositions and orientation problems. The criterion is a certificate: a single set AAA with ∣A∣>k r(A)|A|>k\,r(A)∣A∣>kr(A) proves that no partition exists.

The theorem has been proved since 1965 and appears in every matroid textbook. As far as the platform and Mathlib record, it has no machine-checked proof: Mathlib has matroids, circuits, closure and strong circuit elimination for its own Matroid structure, but no matroid union or partition theorem. This mission produces a formal proof from Edmonds's own axioms (Axiom 2 as an equal-cardinality condition, not an exchange axiom), together with the equivalences between his axiom systems, which are themselves standard results.

Difficulty

The "only if" direction is a three-line count. The difficulty lies in the converse: a greedy procedure that fills the kkk sets one after another fails even for matroids, so an element xxx that fits in no current set must be accommodated by moving other elements between sets. Such a chain of exchanges must keep all kkk sets independent and disjoint at every step and must terminate; stating it with sets whose contents change while their labels persist is the part that needs careful bookkeeping in a formal proof. A second, smaller difficulty is the translation between the paper's equal-cardinality Axiom 2 and the circuit and span language its proof uses (PROPOSITIONS 1–5).

Formalization scope

  • Elements. A finite type α\alphaα with decidable equality; MMM is Finset.univ, subsets are Finset α, and the independent sets are a predicate Indep : Finset α → Prop.
  • Axiom 1 and the rank are the published Whitney definitions IndepI1 and rankOfIndep (WhitneyMatroid.RankIndep.Postulates). The rank is integer-valued, and every inequality ∣A∣|A|∣A∣ versus k r(A)k\,r(A)kr(A) is compared in Z\mathbb ZZ with k∈Nk\in\mathbb Nk∈N.
  • Axiom 2 is stated exactly as printed: maximal independent subsets of each AAA have equal cardinality. It is not replaced by an augmentation axiom or by Mathlib's Matroid.
  • Added hypothesis. Every matroid statement assumes that ∅\emptyset∅ is independent. The paper's rank presupposes it; for the empty family Axioms 1 and 2 hold vacuously and THEOREM 1 fails (an empty ground set and k=1k=1k=1).
  • Spans are formalized from the paper's words, ∣C∖S∣≠1|C\setminus S|\ne1∣C∖S∣=1 for every circuit CCC; the formula printed beside them, ∣S∩C∣≠1|S\cap C|\ne1∣S∩C∣=1, is a misprint. S(A)S(A)S(A) is the intersection of all spans containing AAA.
  • Partitions are indexed families Fin k → Finset α of pairwise disjoint independent sets covering MMM, with empty parts allowed and k=0k=0k=0 included.
  • The COROLLARY uses a graph given by ends : E → Sym2 V (parallel edges allowed, loops excluded), with independence as linear independence of incidence columns over Z/2Z\mathbb Z/2\mathbb ZZ/2Z. It quantifies over nonempty UUU: as printed, U=∅U=\emptysetU=∅ makes the statement false.
  • Not a trivialization. The goal mentions neither spans nor circuits and quantifies over all subsets AAA; the spans-only condition is a separate milestone, and the augmentation step requires the new family to cover exactly the old elements plus xxx.

Contributions welcome: proofs of the axiom equivalences (reusable for any work with Edmonds-style or circuit-axiom matroids), the span lemmas, the augmentation step, and bridges to Mathlib's Matroid that would let its circuit and closure library be reused.

Selected references

  • J. Edmonds, Minimum partition of a matroid into independent subsets, J. Res. Nat. Bur. Standards 69B (1965), 67–72. doi:10.6028/jres.069b.004
  • J. Edmonds, Lehman's switching game and a theorem of Tutte and Nash-Williams, J. Res. Nat. Bur. Standards 69B (1965), 73–77. doi:10.6028/jres.069b.005
  • C. St. J. A. Nash-Williams, Decomposition of finite graphs into forests, J. London Math. Soc. 39 (1964), 12. doi:10.1112/jlms/s1-39.1.12
  • H. Whitney, On the abstract properties of linear dependence, Amer. J. Math. 57 (1935), 509–533. doi:10.2307/2371182
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CombinatoricsOperations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

Assortment Optimization under Variants of the Nested Logit Model 6: For δ > 1, the Powers-of-δ LP Optimum Scaled by (δ^(2γ̄+1), δ^(γ̄+1)) Is Feasible for the Full LPResearch Paper

Motivation

Assortment optimization asks which products a retailer should offer when customers choose among the offered products according to a probabilistic choice model, so as to maximize expected revenue. Under the nested logit model the products are grouped into nests: a customer first picks a nest, then a product inside it. The model is the standard relaxation of the independence of irrelevant alternatives property of the multinomial logit, and it is used throughout revenue management and transportation demand modelling.

Davis, Gallego and Topaloglu (Oper. Res. 62(2), 2014) classify the complexity of the assortment problem under four variants of the nested logit model, according to whether the dissimilarity parameters are at most one and whether a customer who picks a nest always buys there. The problem is NP-hard as soon as some dissimilarity parameter exceeds one (their Theorem 5), and also when the nests have positive no-purchase weights (Theorem 8), so for the general variant approximation is the realistic aim. §6.2 of the paper gives an approximation scheme for the most general variant: for any δ>1\delta > 1δ>1 it restricts each nest to a short list of candidate assortments indexed by the powers of δ\deltaδ, solves a small linear program, and loses at most a factor δ2γˉ+1\delta^{2\bar\gamma+1}δ2γˉ​+1 of the optimal revenue. This mission formalizes the guarantee behind that scheme, Theorem 12.

Setting

There are nests MMM and products N={1,…,n}N = \{1, \dots, n\}N={1,…,n} in each nest. Product jjj of nest iii has revenue rij≥0r_{ij} \ge 0rij​≥0 and preference weight vij>0v_{ij} > 0vij​>0; the products are ordered so that ri1≥⋯≥rinr_{i1} \ge \dots \ge r_{in}ri1​≥⋯≥rin​. Nest iii has a no-purchase weight vi0≥0v_{i0} \ge 0vi0​≥0 and a dissimilarity parameter γi>0\gamma_i > 0γi​>0, and v0≥0v_0 \ge 0v0​≥0 is the weight of leaving without choosing a nest. Offering Si⊆NS_i \subseteq NSi​⊆N in nest iii gives

Vi(Si)=vi0+∑j∈Sivij,Ri(Si)=∑j∈SirijvijVi(Si),Π(S1,…,Sm)=∑iVi(Si)γiRi(Si)v0+∑iVi(Si)γi.V_i(S_i) = v_{i0} + \sum_{j \in S_i} v_{ij}, \qquad R_i(S_i) = \frac{\sum_{j \in S_i} r_{ij} v_{ij}}{V_i(S_i)}, \qquad \Pi(S_1, \dots, S_m) = \frac{\sum_i V_i(S_i)^{\gamma_i} R_i(S_i)}{v_0 + \sum_i V_i(S_i)^{\gamma_i}}.Vi​(Si​)=vi0​+j∈Si​∑​vij​,Ri​(Si​)=Vi​(Si​)∑j∈Si​​rij​vij​​,Π(S1​,…,Sm​)=v0​+∑i​Vi​(Si​)γi​∑i​Vi​(Si​)γi​Ri​(Si​)​.

The optimal expected revenue Z∗=max⁡ΠZ^* = \max \PiZ∗=maxΠ is the optimal value of the linear program (3): minimize xxx subject to v0x≥∑iyiv_0 x \ge \sum_i y_iv0​x≥∑i​yi​ and yi≥Vi(Si)γi(Ri(Si)−x)y_i \ge V_i(S_i)^{\gamma_i}(R_i(S_i) - x)yi​≥Vi​(Si​)γi​(Ri​(Si​)−x) for every nest iii and every Si⊆NS_i \subseteq NSi​⊆N. Problem (4) keeps the second family of constraints only for a candidate collection of assortments in each nest.

Let γˉ=max⁡iγi\bar\gamma = \max_i \gamma_iγˉ​=maxi​γi​, assumed >1> 1>1 throughout §6, and fix δ>1\delta > 1δ>1. Put viL=vi0+min⁡jvijv^L_i = v_{i0} + \min_j v_{ij}viL​=vi0​+minj​vij​, viU=vi0+∑jvijv^U_i = v_{i0} + \sum_j v_{ij}viU​=vi0​+∑j​vij​, and let liLl^L_iliL​, liUl^U_iliU​ be the least integers with δl≥viL\delta^{l} \ge v^L_iδl≥viL​, δl≥viU\delta^l \ge v^U_iδl≥viU​. For each level l=liL,…,liUl = l^L_i, \dots, l^U_il=liL​,…,liU​, problem (15) maximizes ∑j∈Srijvij\sum_{j \in S} r_{ij} v_{ij}∑j∈S​rij​vij​ over the assortments with δl−1≤Vi(S)≤δl\delta^{l-1} \le V_i(S) \le \delta^lδl−1≤Vi​(S)≤δl; its value is G^il\hat G_{il}G^il​. An assortment S^il\hat S_{il}S^il​ is feasible for (15) and satisfies δ∑j∈S^ilrijvij≥G^il\delta \sum_{j \in \hat S_{il}} r_{ij} v_{ij} \ge \hat G_{il}δ∑j∈S^il​​rij​vij​≥G^il​. The candidate collection of nest iii is {S^il:l=liL,…,liU}∪{∅}\{\hat S_{il} : l = l^L_i, \dots, l^U_i\} \cup \{\emptyset\}{S^il​:l=liL​,…,liU​}∪{∅}.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 12 (p. 28)

If (x^,y^)(\hat x, \hat y)(x^,y^​) is an optimal solution of problem (4) over the candidate collections {S^il}∪{∅}\{\hat S_{il}\} \cup \{\emptyset\}{S^il​}∪{∅}, then

(δ2γˉ+1x^, δγˉ+1y^) is feasible for problem (3).\big(\delta^{2\bar\gamma+1}\hat x,\ \delta^{\bar\gamma+1}\hat y\big) \text{ is feasible for problem (3).}(δ2γˉ​+1x^, δγˉ​+1y^​) is feasible for problem (3).

Milestones (Appendix A.6, pp. 53–54)

  1. x^≥0\hat x \ge 0x^≥0.
  2. Every nonempty assortment of nest iii lies in some level liL≤l≤liUl^L_i \le l \le l^U_iliL​≤l≤liU​.
  3. If δl−1≤a≤δl\delta^{l-1} \le a \le \delta^lδl−1≤a≤δl, then aγ−1≥(δl)γ−1δ−[γ−1]+a^{\gamma-1} \ge (\delta^l)^{\gamma-1}\delta^{-[\gamma-1]^+}aγ−1≥(δl)γ−1δ−[γ−1]+.
  4. Under the same hypothesis, (δl)γ−1≥δ−[1−γ]+aγ−1(\delta^l)^{\gamma-1} \ge \delta^{-[1-\gamma]^+} a^{\gamma-1}(δl)γ−1≥δ−[1−γ]+aγ−1.
  5. δγˉδ−[γi−1]+δ−[1−γi]+≥1\delta^{\bar\gamma}\delta^{-[\gamma_i-1]^+}\delta^{-[1-\gamma_i]^+} \ge 1δγˉ​δ−[γi​−1]+δ−[1−γi​]+≥1 and δγˉ+γi+1≤δ2γˉ+1\delta^{\bar\gamma+\gamma_i+1} \le \delta^{2\bar\gamma+1}δγˉ​+γi​+1≤δ2γˉ​+1.
  6. The scaled pair satisfies δγˉ+1y^i≥Vi(Si)γi(Ri(Si)−δ2γˉ+1x^)\delta^{\bar\gamma+1}\hat y_i \ge V_i(S_i)^{\gamma_i}(R_i(S_i) - \delta^{2\bar\gamma+1}\hat x)δγˉ​+1y^​i​≥Vi​(Si​)γi​(Ri​(Si​)−δ2γˉ​+1x^) for every nonempty SiS_iSi​.
  7. The same inequality for Si=∅S_i = \emptysetSi​=∅.

Companions

  • The guarantee stated after Theorem 12: with v0>0v_0 > 0v0​>0, the assortment assembled from the candidates solving problem (5) earns at least Z∗/δ2γˉ+1Z^*/\delta^{2\bar\gamma+1}Z∗/δ2γˉ​+1.
  • Proposition 15 (p. 51): when (15) is feasible, one of the explicit assortments S^(JL,JS)\hat S(J_L, J_S)S^(JL​,JS​), built from at most q=⌈δ/(δ−1)⌉q = \lceil \delta/(\delta-1)\rceilq=⌈δ/(δ−1)⌉ large and at most qqq small products by a greedy continuous knapsack, is feasible for (15) and within a factor δ\deltaδ of G^il\hat G_{il}G^il​.
  • The count liU−liL≤1+log⁡δ(viU/viL)l^U_i - l^L_i \le 1 + \log_\delta(v^U_i/v^L_i)liU​−liL​≤1+logδ​(viU​/viL​) (p. 28).

Significance

Theorem 12 is the analytical half of the approximation scheme. Together with the paper's Theorem 1 it shows that a linear program with 1+m1 + m1+m variables and at most 1+m(2+log⁡δ(viU/viL))1 + m(2 + \log_\delta(v^U_i/v^L_i))1+m(2+logδ​(viU​/viL​)) constraints yields an assortment within a factor δ2γˉ+1\delta^{2\bar\gamma+1}δ2γˉ​+1 of the optimum, for the most general variant, which is NP-hard, and Proposition 15 makes the candidate assortments computable. Letting δ↓1\delta \downarrow 1δ↓1 trades accuracy for running time, so the result is the paper's answer to how well the general problem can be approximated by this LP approach.

The result is proved in the paper; the work here is to formalize the known proof. To the best of a search of the Prove2Me library (local index and platform mirror, October 2026), no nested logit approximation result, and no knapsack lemma matching Proposition 15, has a machine-checked statement or proof. The definitions of the shared model (the instance, ViV_iVi​, RiR_iRi​, Π\PiΠ, the linear programs (3) and (4)) are common to the six missions of this series.

Difficulty

The obvious argument compares an arbitrary assortment SiS_iSi​ with the candidate of its level and uses the candidate's constraint in (4). This fails as a direct comparison because the nest weight Vi(⋅)γiV_i(\cdot)^{\gamma_i}Vi​(⋅)γi​ enters twice with different exponents, γi−1\gamma_i - 1γi​−1 in front of the revenue and γi\gamma_iγi​ in front of x^\hat xx^, and within one level ViV_iVi​ may vary by a factor δ\deltaδ. When γi>1\gamma_i > 1γi​>1 and when γi≤1\gamma_i \le 1γi​≤1 the monotonicity of t↦tγi−1t \mapsto t^{\gamma_i - 1}t↦tγi​−1 goes in opposite directions, so the losses must be tracked separately by [γi−1]+[\gamma_i - 1]^+[γi​−1]+ and [1−γi]+[1 - \gamma_i]^+[1−γi​]+, and they are absorbed by the common factor δγˉ\delta^{\bar\gamma}δγˉ​ only because γˉ>1\bar\gamma > 1γˉ​>1. The other half, Proposition 15, concerns a knapsack with both a lower and an upper bound on the total weight, where a feasible solution must be produced as well as a good objective value.

Formalization scope

Products are Fin n (0,…,n−10, \dots, n-10,…,n−1 for 1,…,n1, \dots, n1,…,n), nests a finite type, powers VγV^{\gamma}Vγ real powers, and x/0=0x/0 = 0x/0=0, which gives Ri(∅)=0R_i(\emptyset) = 0Ri​(∅)=0. The shared model carries the standing assumptions of §1 with the disclosed pins vij>0v_{ij} > 0vij​>0, rij≥0r_{ij} \ge 0rij​≥0 and γi>0\gamma_i > 0γi​>0 (the page allows γi=0\gamma_i = 0γi​=0 and zero-weight padding products, under which its convention 0γi=00^{\gamma_i} = 00γi​=0 and its proofs fail). Every statement of the mission also assumes n≥1n \ge 1n≥1 (for viLv^L_iviL​), γˉ\bar\gammaγˉ​ is the greatest of the γi\gamma_iγi​ (so at least one nest exists) with γˉ>1\bar\gamma > 1γˉ​>1, and δ>1\delta > 1δ>1. Integer powers δl\delta^lδl are zpow, and liLl^L_iliL​, liUl^U_iliU​ are written ⌈log⁡δviL⌉\lceil \log_\delta v^L_i\rceil⌈logδ​viL​⌉, ⌈log⁡δviU⌉\lceil \log_\delta v^U_i\rceil⌈logδ​viU​⌉, which equal the minima of the paper. An optimal solution of (4) is a feasible pair whose xxx is minimal among feasible pairs. The companion guarantee adds v0>0v_0 > 0v0​>0, the pin of Theorem 1. In Proposition 15 the capacity row of (33) includes v0v_0v0​, correcting a printed slip, and the running-time claim is not stated.

The assortments S^il\hat S_{il}S^il​ enter Theorem 12 as an arbitrary family with the two properties of p. 28; the theorem is stated for every such family. A level at which (15) has no feasible assortment imposes nothing on S^il\hat S_{il}S^il​, as on the page. Requiring S^il\hat S_{il}S^il​ to lie in its level unconditionally would make the hypothesis unsatisfiable for most instances and the goal vacuous; that encoding, and any goal that assumes displays (34)–(36) or the exponent bounds, is ruled out.

Contributions welcome: proofs of the real-power milestones (3)–(5), which are self-contained, of the two cases (6)–(7), and of Proposition 15, whose fractional knapsack lemma (the greedy solution of a continuous knapsack sorted by ratio is optimal) is reusable beyond this mission.

Selected references

  • J. M. Davis, G. Gallego, H. Topaloglu, Assortment optimization under variants of the nested logit model, Operations Research 62(2), 2014; cited from the revised manuscript of June 18, 2013. https://doi.org/10.1287/opre.2014.1256
  • A. M. Frieze, M. R. B. Clarke, Approximation algorithms for the m-dimensional 0–1 knapsack problem: worst-case and probabilistic analyses, European Journal of Operational Research 15(1), 1984. (cited on p. 50 of the paper for the continuous knapsack (33); link not verified here)
  • M. R. Garey, D. S. Johnson, Computers and Intractability: A Guide to the Theory of NP-Completeness, W. H. Freeman, 1979.
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Supply Chain Coordination with Contracts IX: An Internal Market at the Shadow Price w(α, Q) Allocates Output Optimally, and Paying Its Expectation per Unit Induces the Optimal Effort e°Textbook

Motivation

In most contracts of the supply chain coordination literature the transfer payments are fixed when the contract is signed: a wholesale price www, a buy-back rate bbb, a revenue share ϕ\phiϕ. Some settings need payments that respond to information arriving after signing, such as realized demand at several retailers and realized production output. Fixing the per-unit price in advance then fails twice: for some output realizations the retailers do not buy everything that was produced, and for others they want more than exists, so the supplier must ration, which invites strategic ordering and misallocation (Cachon and Lariviere, 1999).

Section 6.9 of Cachon's survey chapter Supply Chain Coordination with Contracts (Handbooks in OR & MS, vol. 11, 2003) studies an alternative after Kouvelis and Lariviere (2000): the supplier commits to hold an internal market for output after demand is observed, and pays her own production manager a fixed amount per unit of realized output. The model is a variant of Porteus and Whang (1991), who studied incentives between manufacturing and marketing managers in a firm. The section shows that this pair of mechanisms coordinates both the production decision and the allocation decision without the supplier observing either the demand shocks or the manager's effort.

This mission is part IX of a series formalizing the capstone results of that chapter.

Setting

One supplier employs a production manager and sells to two independent retailers. The constant demand elasticity is η>1\eta>1η>1.

  1. The manager chooses a production input level e≥0e\ge0e≥0. The output is Q=YeQ=YeQ=Ye, where Y∈[0,1]Y\in[0,1]Y∈[0,1] is a random variable. The manager incurs the cost c(e)c(e)c(e), strictly convex and increasing, with derivative c′c'c′.
  2. Retailer i∈{1,2}i\in\{1,2\}i∈{1,2} observes the realization αi\alpha_iαi​ of a random variable Ai>0A_i>0Ai​>0.
  3. The supplier allocates qiq_iqi​ units to retailer iii with q1+q2≤Qq_1+q_2\le Qq1​+q2​≤Q. Retailer iii earns revenue qipi(qi)q_ip_i(q_i)qi​pi​(qi​) with the inverse demand pi(qi)=αiqi−1/ηp_i(q_i)=\alpha_iq_i^{-1/\eta}pi​(qi​)=αi​qi−1/η​, that is, αiqi(η−1)/η\alpha_iq_i^{(\eta-1)/\eta}αi​qi(η−1)/η​.

If retailer one receives the share γ\gammaγ of QQQ, total retailer revenue is

π(γ,α,Q)=(α1γ(η−1)/η+α2(1−γ)(η−1)/η)Q(η−1)/η.\pi(\gamma,\alpha,Q)=\big(\alpha_1\gamma^{(\eta-1)/\eta}+\alpha_2(1-\gamma)^{(\eta-1)/\eta}\big)Q^{(\eta-1)/\eta}.π(γ,α,Q)=(α1​γ(η−1)/η+α2​(1−γ)(η−1)/η)Q(η−1)/η.

The optimal share is γo(α)=α1η/(α1η+α2η)\gamma^o(\alpha)=\alpha_1^\eta/(\alpha_1^\eta+\alpha_2^\eta)γo(α)=α1η​/(α1η​+α2η​) (Eq. (44)), and π(α,Q)=π(γo(α),α,Q)\pi(\alpha,Q)=\pi(\gamma^o(\alpha),\alpha,Q)π(α,Q)=π(γo(α),α,Q) is revenue under it. The expected supply chain profit is Π(e)=E[π(A,Ye)]−c(e)\Pi(e)=E[\pi(A,Ye)]-c(e)Π(e)=E[π(A,Ye)]−c(e), and the optimal effort eoe^oeo solves the first-order condition (45).

In the decentralized system, if the per-unit price is www, retailer iii's profit is πi(qi,w)=αiqi(η−1)/η−wqi\pi_i(q_i,w)=\alpha_iq_i^{(\eta-1)/\eta}-wq_iπi​(qi​,w)=αi​qi(η−1)/η​−wqi​. The contingent price is

w(α,Q)=(η−1η)(α1η+α2η)1/ηQ−1/η.w(\alpha,Q)=\Big(\frac{\eta-1}{\eta}\Big)(\alpha_1^\eta+\alpha_2^\eta)^{1/\eta}Q^{-1/\eta}.w(α,Q)=(ηη−1​)(α1η​+α2η​)1/ηQ−1/η.

The manager is paid a fixed amount per unit of realized output. With K=E[(A1η+A2η)1/ηY(η−1)/η]K=E\big[(A_1^\eta+A_2^\eta)^{1/\eta}Y^{(\eta-1)/\eta}\big]K=E[(A1η​+A2η​)1/ηY(η−1)/η], the payment is

(η−1η)(eo)−1/ηK/E[Y](46),\Big(\frac{\eta-1}{\eta}\Big)(e^o)^{-1/\eta}K/E[Y]\qquad(46),(ηη−1​)(eo)−1/ηK/E[Y](46),

and his expected utility is u(e)=(payment)⋅E[Ye]−c(e)u(e)=(\text{payment})\cdot E[Ye]-c(e)u(e)=(payment)⋅E[Ye]−c(e).

Formalization targets

Goal

The goal has two parts.

  1. For every realization α1,α2>0\alpha_1,\alpha_2>0α1​,α2​>0 and output Q>0Q>0Q>0, at the price w(α,Q)w(\alpha,Q)w(α,Q) retailer one's unique optimal order is γo(α)Q\gamma^o(\alpha)Qγo(α)Q and retailer two's is (1−γo(α))Q(1-\gamma^o(\alpha))Q(1−γo(α))Q. So the retailers order exactly QQQ, the allocation maximizes revenue over all feasible allocations, and
∂π(α,Q)∂Q=w(α,Q).\frac{\partial\pi(\alpha,Q)}{\partial Q}=w(\alpha,Q).∂Q∂π(α,Q)​=w(α,Q).
  1. If eo>0e^o>0eo>0 satisfies (45), then under the payment (46) the manager's unique optimal effort is eoe^oeo. The payment equals E[Qw(A,Q)∣eo]/E[Q∣eo]E[Qw(A,Q)\mid e^o]/E[Q\mid e^o]E[Qw(A,Q)∣eo]/E[Q∣eo], and the supplier's expected profit from the market is zero.

Milestones

  • (44): revenue is strictly concave in γ\gammaγ, and γo(α)\gamma^o(\alpha)γo(α) is the unique optimal share.
  • The closed form π(α,Q)=(α1η+α2η)1/ηQ(η−1)/η\pi(\alpha,Q)=(\alpha_1^\eta+\alpha_2^\eta)^{1/\eta}Q^{(\eta-1)/\eta}π(α,Q)=(α1η​+α2η​)1/ηQ(η−1)/η.
  • (45): Π(e)=Ke(η−1)/η−c(e)\Pi(e)=Ke^{(\eta-1)/\eta}-c(e)Π(e)=Ke(η−1)/η−c(e) is strictly concave, and an interior eoe^oeo is optimal if and only if ((η−1)/η)(eo)−1/ηK−c′(eo)=0((\eta-1)/\eta)(e^o)^{-1/\eta}K-c'(e^o)=0((η−1)/η)(eo)−1/ηK−c′(eo)=0.
  • The retailers' first-order condition, and the market allocation at w(α,Q)w(\alpha,Q)w(α,Q).
  • ∂π(α,Q)/∂Q=w(α,Q)\partial\pi(\alpha,Q)/\partial Q=w(\alpha,Q)∂π(α,Q)/∂Q=w(α,Q).
  • The identity (46).
  • The manager's optimal effort and the supplier's zero expected profit.

Significance

The result shows that one mechanism handles two separate information problems. The market price w(α,Q)w(\alpha,Q)w(α,Q) is the shadow price of output. Charging it makes the retailers' independent orders add up to exactly the output and split it as the integrated firm would, and the supplier never needs to observe AAA. Paying the manager the output-weighted expectation of that shadow price, a single number fixed in advance, aligns his marginal incentive with the supply chain's, and the supplier does not need to observe eee. The supplier breaks even on the market. Kouvelis and Lariviere (2000) show that in more general settings she breaks even or loses money, so any profit must come from fixed fees. The section therefore illustrates a general design principle: market-based transfer prices inside a firm, combined with linear output-based pay.

The derivations are short calculus on the page. Formalizing them pins down what the page leaves implicit: the range of efforts and allocations; the role of E[Y]>0E[Y]>0E[Y]>0 and of the integrability of the shock; the fact that each retailer's problem has a unique interior optimum only at a positive price; and how the realized output Q=0Q=0Q=0 enters the expectation E[Qw(A,Q)]E[Qw(A,Q)]E[Qw(A,Q)]. To our knowledge none of these statements has been machine-checked before.

Difficulty

The deterministic part requires real-power calculus with a non-integer exponent (η−1)/η∈(0,1)(\eta-1)/\eta\in(0,1)(η−1)/η∈(0,1). Strict concavity of γ↦γ(η−1)/η\gamma\mapsto\gamma^{(\eta-1)/\eta}γ↦γ(η−1)/η has to be used on the closed interval [0,1][0,1][0,1], where the derivative blows up at the endpoints. The retailer's optimum has to be shown to be interior even though the profit at q=0q=0q=0 is defined.

The stochastic part requires pulling the effort out of the expectation, E[π(A,Ye)]=Ke(η−1)/ηE[\pi(A,Ye)]=Ke^{(\eta-1)/\eta}E[π(A,Ye)]=Ke(η−1)/η, pointwise in the shock, including at realizations with Y=0Y=0Y=0. The natural first idea, to differentiate under the expectation sign, is unnecessary but tempting. The obstacle it hides is that w(α,Ye)w(\alpha,Ye)w(α,Ye) is undefined where Y=0Y=0Y=0, so the identity (46) only holds once Qw(A,Q)Qw(A,Q)Qw(A,Q) is read as its limit 000 at Q=0Q=0Q=0. Uniqueness of the manager's optimum depends on strict convexity of ccc alone, since his payment is linear in eee.

Formalization scope

All objects live in the namespace CachonCoord.InternalMarket. The deterministic file Revenue defines π(γ,α,Q)\pi(\gamma,\alpha,Q)π(γ,α,Q), γo(α)\gamma^o(\alpha)γo(α) (as the printed formula, not as an argmax), π(α,Q)\pi(\alpha,Q)π(α,Q), πi(qi,w)\pi_i(q_i,w)πi​(qi​,w) and w(α,Q)w(\alpha,Q)w(α,Q) with real powers (Real.rpow). The file Model bundles a probability space with measurable A1,A2>0A_1,A_2>0A1​,A2​>0 and Y∈[0,1]Y\in[0,1]Y∈[0,1], the elasticity η>1\eta>1η>1, and the cost ccc. The cost is strictly convex and increasing on [0,∞)[0,\infty)[0,∞) and has derivative c′c'c′ at every e>0e>0e>0. On top of these, Model defines Π\PiΠ, KKK, the payment (46) (by its printed left side, not as the ratio it is claimed to equal), expected output and market revenue, and the manager's utility (from the payment scheme, not by the printed formula). Derivatives are HasDerivAt statements and optima are IsMaxOn over [0,1][0,1][0,1] or [0,∞)[0,\infty)[0,∞).

The standing assumptions are those of the model paragraph on p. 92: risk neutrality and the distributional assumptions above. Added hypotheses, each disclosed in the item's Formalization Note:

  • E[Y]>0E[Y]>0E[Y]>0, because (46) divides by it.
  • Integrability of (A1η+A2η)1/ηY(η−1)/η(A_1^\eta+A_2^\eta)^{1/\eta}Y^{(\eta-1)/\eta}(A1η​+A2η​)1/ηY(η−1)/η.
  • A positive price in the retailer's first-order condition.
  • Differentiability of ccc only on (0,∞)(0,\infty)(0,∞).

The existence of an effort satisfying (45) is a hypothesis, as on the page. Clauses 1 of the goal are stated for fixed realizations, not as random variables.

A trivializing formalization would define γo(α)\gamma^o(\alpha)γo(α) as an argmax, or define the payment (46) as E[Qw]/E[Q]E[Qw]/E[Q]E[Qw]/E[Q]; neither is done here. Outside γ∈[0,1]\gamma\in[0,1]γ∈[0,1] and Q>0Q>0Q>0, Lean's real power returns junk values, and every statement restricts to that range. The companion claim that w(α,Q)w(\alpha,Q)w(α,Q) is the unique market-clearing price is not posed.

The formalization needs no infrastructure beyond Mathlib's real powers, convexity and Bochner integral. The concavity and first-order-condition lemmas for x↦axr−bxx\mapsto ax^{r}-bxx↦axr−bx with 0<r<10<r<10<r<1 may be reused for other constant-elasticity models. Contributions are welcome at any milestone; each is independent of the others except through the closed forms.

Selected references

  • G. P. Cachon, Supply Chain Coordination with Contracts, in S. Graves and T. de Kok (eds.), Handbooks in Operations Research and Management Science, Vol. 11: Supply Chain Management, North-Holland, 2003, Ch. 6, §6.9. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0927-0507(03)11006-7 (formalized from the author's 3rd draft, January 2003).
  • P. Kouvelis and M. A. Lariviere, Decentralizing cross-functional decisions: Coordination through internal markets, Management Science 46(8), 2000, 1049–1058. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.46.8.1049.12025
  • E. L. Porteus and S. Whang, On manufacturing/marketing incentives, Management Science 37(9), 1991, 1166–1181. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.37.9.1166
  • G. P. Cachon and M. A. Lariviere, Capacity choice and allocation: strategic behavior and supply chain performance, Management Science 45(8), 1999, 1091–1108. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.45.8.1091
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Supply Chain Coordination with Contracts V: With Market-Clearing Prices the Best Wholesale Price Earns θ/(2(1 + θ)) or θ/8, Below the (1 + θ)/8 a Full-Refund Buy-Back AttainsTextbook

Motivation

A supplier that sells through many competing retailers usually worries that competition among them pushes orders too high, because each retailer ignores the demand it takes from the others. Deneckere, Marvel and Peck (1997) identified the opposite failure. When the retail price is set by the market after demand is realized, retailers who hold too much stock in a weak market bid the price down, and anticipating this, perfectly competitive retailers order too little. The supplier then needs a contract that raises orders, and the classical justification for resale price maintenance (a price floor imposed on retailers) comes out of this model. G. P. Cachon's survey chapter Supply Chain Coordination with Contracts (Handbooks in OR & MS, Vol. 11, 2003) presents the model in §6.5.2 as a closed-form example. In it the supplier's best wholesale price contract is computed explicitly and compared with two contracts that recover the monopoly profit: resale price maintenance and a full-refund buy-back.

This mission is volume V of a series that formalizes the section capstones of that chapter, read in the author's 3rd draft (January 2003), pp. 53–58.

Setting

Fix θ>1\theta>1θ>1. Industry demand is low or high, each with probability 1/21/21/2. If the retailers hold a total stock qqq, the market clearing price is

pl(q)=(1−q)+ (low state),ph(q)=(1−qθ)+ (high state).p_l(q)=(1-q)^+\ \text{(low state)},\qquad p_h(q)=\Big(1-\frac q\theta\Big)^+\ \text{(high state)}.pl​(q)=(1−q)+ (low state),ph​(q)=(1−θq​)+ (high state).

Leftover inventory has no salvage value, and the supplier's production cost is zero.

  • Monopolist benchmark. A single firm orders a stock QQQ, observes the state, and sells xl≤Qx_l\le Qxl​≤Q (low) or xh≤Qx_h\le Qxh​≤Q (high) at the market clearing price. Its expected profit is 12pl(xl)xl+12ph(xh)xh\tfrac12p_l(x_l)x_l+\tfrac12p_h(x_h)x_h21​pl​(xl​)xl​+21​ph​(xh​)xh​, and Πo\Pi^oΠo is the maximum of this.
  • Wholesale price contract. The supplier charges www per unit. A continuum of retailers orders before demand is known and sells everything at the market clearing price. Their aggregate expected profit is
π(q)=12pl(q)q+12ph(q)q−wq.\pi(q)=\tfrac12p_l(q)q+\tfrac12p_h(q)q-wq .π(q)=21​pl​(q)q+21​ph​(q)q−wq.

Perfect competition means the retailers keep ordering until expected profit is zero. The competitive order is the q>0q>0q>0 with π(q)=0\pi(q)=0π(q)=0 and π>0\pi>0π>0 on (0,q)(0,q)(0,q). The supplier earns wqwqwq.

  • Resale price maintenance (pˉ,w)(\bar p,w)(pˉ​,w): retailers may not sell below pˉ\bar ppˉ​. When the clearing price would fall below pˉ\bar ppˉ​, only the demand at pˉ\bar ppˉ​ is sold, allocated in proportion to stock.
  • Buy-back (w,b)(w,b)(w,b): the supplier pays bbb per unsold unit. The market price then cannot fall below bbb, and retailers sell at most 1−b1-b1−b units (low) and θ(1−b)\theta(1-b)θ(1−b) units (high).

The page's notation q1(w)=2θ1+θ(1−w)q_1(w)=\frac{2\theta}{1+\theta}(1-w)q1​(w)=1+θ2θ​(1−w), q2(w)=θ(1−2w)q_2(w)=\theta(1-2w)q2​(w)=θ(1−2w), πs(w)\pi_s(w)πs​(w) and w∗(θ)w^*(\theta)w∗(θ) is kept in Lean under the names q1, q2, supplierProfit, wStar.

Formalization targets

Goal (pp. 55, 57)

With

πs∗={θ2(1+θ)θ≤3,θ8θ>3,\pi_s^*=\begin{cases}\dfrac{\theta}{2(1+\theta)}&\theta\le3,\\[4pt]\dfrac\theta8&\theta>3,\end{cases}πs∗​=⎩⎨⎧​2(1+θ)θ​8θ​​θ≤3,θ>3,​

the goal states four things:

  1. πs∗\pi_s^*πs∗​ is the greatest supplier profit wqwqwq over all wholesale prices and their competitive orders.
  2. w∗(θ)w^*(\theta)w∗(θ) attains it.
  3. The monopolist's maximum is Πo=(1+θ)/8\Pi^o=(1+\theta)/8Πo=(1+θ)/8, and πs∗<Πo\pi_s^*<\Pi^oπs∗​<Πo.
  4. Under the buy-back b=w=1/2b=w=1/2b=w=1/2 the competitive order is θ/2\theta/2θ/2 and the supplier earns exactly Πo\Pi^oΠo.

Milestones

  1. Πo=(1+θ)/8\Pi^o=(1+\theta)/8Πo=(1+θ)/8 (p. 54).
  2. The competitive order is q1(w)q_1(w)q1​(w) if w≥12−12θw\ge\tfrac12-\tfrac1{2\theta}w≥21​−2θ1​ and q2(w)q_2(w)q2​(w) otherwise, for 0≤w<10\le w<10≤w<1 (p. 55).
  3. w∗(θ)w^*(\theta)w∗(θ) maximizes πs\pi_sπs​ on [0,1)[0,1)[0,1), with the value πs∗\pi_s^*πs∗​ (p. 55).
  4. The orders and market clearing prices at w∗(θ)w^*(\theta)w∗(θ) (p. 55).
  5. Under resale price maintenance with pˉ=1/2\bar p=1/2pˉ​=1/2 and total stock θ/2\theta/2θ/2, πr(t)=q(t)(1+θ4θ−w)\pi_r(t)=q(t)\big(\frac{1+\theta}{4\theta}-w\big)πr​(t)=q(t)(4θ1+θ​−w) (p. 56).
  6. Under (pˉ,wˉ)(\bar p,\bar w)(pˉ​,wˉ) the competitive order is θ/2\theta/2θ/2 and the supplier earns Πo\Pi^oΠo (p. 57).
  7. Under the buy-back b=1/2b=1/2b=1/2 the retailers' profit is q(34−w−q2θ)q\big(\frac34-w-\frac q{2\theta}\big)q(43​−w−2θq​) for 1/2<q<θ/21/2<q<\theta/21/2<q<θ/2 (p. 57).
  8. 1/2>(1+θ)/(4θ)1/2>(1+\theta)/(4\theta)1/2>(1+θ)/(4θ) (p. 57).

Significance

The goal shows that in this model a wholesale price contract always falls short of the integrated profit, whatever θ\thetaθ. It also shows where the shortfall comes from: at the optimal wholesale price the low-state market price falls below the monopoly price 1/21/21/2 (milestone 4). Restoring the monopoly profit therefore requires a mechanism that holds the low-state price at 1/21/21/2. Resale price maintenance and a full-refund buy-back both do this, so the section gives a closed-form efficiency argument for vertical restraints that are often treated as anticompetitive. The section also contrasts the buy-back with revenue sharing, which coordinates the single newsvendor (§6.2) but not this model.

The results are proved on the printed pages by elementary algebra. None of them has a machine-checked proof, and nothing on Prove2Me covers this model. The mission produces checked versions of the case analysis, including the θ=3\theta=3θ=3 tie and the two regimes of the competitive order. It also adds a reusable encoding of "perfect competition" as the first zero of aggregate expected profit.

Difficulty

Every statement reduces to one-variable inequalities, but the case structure is easy to get wrong.

  • The retailers' profit is piecewise (prices hit zero at q=1q=1q=1 in the low state and at q=θq=\thetaq=θ in the high state). The competitive order lies on either side of q=1q=1q=1 depending on www.
  • The supplier's profit πs\pi_sπs​ is piecewise in www, and its second branch peaks at w=1/4w=1/4w=1/4 only when θ>2\theta>2θ>2.
  • The global optimum switches at θ=3\theta=3θ=3, where both prices are optimal.
  • A statement "the competitive order is q1(w)q_1(w)q1​(w)" needs the order to exist, to be unique, and to have positive profit everywhere below it. Exhibiting a root is not enough.
  • The buy-back profit is identically zero for q≥θ/2q\ge\theta/2q≥θ/2 when b=w=1/2b=w=1/2b=w=1/2. Only the "first zero" reading of perfect competition pins the order at θ/2\theta/2θ/2.

Formalization scope

All quantities are real numbers and θ>1\theta>1θ>1 throughout. The continuum of retailers enters only through the total order. No measure space of retailers is formalized, and footnote 26's multiplicity of individual equilibria is not stated. The sales rules under resale price maintenance (proportional allocation) and under the buy-back (price floor bbb) are written into the contract definitions, as the page describes them in words. The theorems use only pˉ=b=1/2\bar p=b=1/2pˉ​=b=1/2.

The formulas q1q_1q1​, q2q_2q2​, πs\pi_sπs​ and w∗w^*w∗ are definitions transcribed from the page. That they are the competitive order and the optimum is the content of the theorems. Defining Πo\Pi^oΠo or the competitive order by its closed form would trivialize the mission, so the competitive order is defined only by the zero-profit property and Πo\Pi^oΠo as a greatest element of the monopolist's feasible profits. The goal is stated over all real wholesale prices, so it also rules out profitable prices outside [0,1)[0,1)[0,1). Uniqueness of w∗(θ)w^*(\theta)w∗(θ) is not asserted at θ=3\theta=3θ=3.

The chapter's standing assumptions used here are risk neutrality and full information, together with the model paragraph of pp. 53–54 (two equally likely states, zero salvage value, zero production cost). No platform definition is referenced: no published item formalizes this model.

Selected references

  • G. P. Cachon, Supply Chain Coordination with Contracts, in S. Graves, T. de Kok (eds.), Handbooks in Operations Research and Management Science, Vol. 11: Supply Chain Management, North-Holland, 2003, §6.5.2 (3rd draft, January 2003, pp. 53–58). https://doi.org/10.1016/S0927-0507(03)11006-7
  • R. Deneckere, H. P. Marvel, J. Peck, Demand Uncertainty and Price Maintenance: Markdowns as Destructive Competition, American Economic Review 87(4), 619–641, 1997. https://www.jstor.org/stable/2951366
  • R. Deneckere, H. P. Marvel, J. Peck, Demand Uncertainty, Inventories, and Resale Price Maintenance, Quarterly Journal of Economics 111(3), 885–913, 1996. https://doi.org/10.2307/2946675
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Operations ResearchProbability·Captain: mikedeng1

Supply Chain Coordination with Contracts III: With Effort-Dependent Demand, Buy-Backs, Quantity Flexibility and Revenue Sharing Under-Reward Effort, While a Quantity Discount Gives λΠ(q, e°)Textbook

Why effort breaks the standard coordinating contracts

A supplier selling through a retailer earns more when the retailer works harder at selling. Examples are a better shelf position, more knowledgeable sales staff, local advertising and keeping the display in order. These activities cost the retailer, raise demand, and usually cannot be observed or verified by the supplier, so no contract can be written on them directly. Chapter 6 of the Handbook of Operations Research and Management Science, Vol. 11: Supply Chain Management (G. P. Cachon, Supply Chain Coordination with Contracts, 2003) surveys contracts that align a retailer's decisions with the interest of the whole supply chain. Its §6.4 asks which of these contracts survive when the retailer also chooses such an unverifiable effort level.

The question goes back to the marketing literature on retail effort (Chu and Desai 1995, Desai and Srinivasan 1995, Desiraju and Moorthy 1997, Lal 1990, Lariviere and Padmanabhan 1997). It was taken up for newsvendor contracts by Taylor (2000), who showed that a sales rebate combined with a buy back restores coordination, and by Krishnan, Kapuscinski and Butz (2001), who let effort be chosen after demand is observed. This mission is the third in a series that formalizes the chapter's section capstones. It covers §6.4.1.

The newsvendor with effort-dependent demand

One supplier sells to one retailer for a single selling season. Before the season the retailer chooses an order quantity q≥0q \ge 0q≥0 and an effort level e≥0e \ge 0e≥0. Effort costs him g(e)g(e)g(e), where g(0)=0g(0) = 0g(0)=0, g′>0g' > 0g′>0 and g′′>0g'' > 0g′′>0. Demand DDD given effort eee has distribution function F(⋅∣e)F(\cdot \mid e)F(⋅∣e) on [0,∞)[0, \infty)[0,∞), with F(0∣e)=0F(0 \mid e) = 0F(0∣e)=0 and F(⋅∣e)F(\cdot \mid e)F(⋅∣e) strictly increasing. Demand is stochastically increasing in effort: ∂F(y∣e)/∂e<0\partial F(y \mid e)/\partial e < 0∂F(y∣e)/∂e<0 for y>0y > 0y>0. Units sell at the retail price ppp and cost c<pc < pc<p to produce. Goodwill costs, the salvage value and the retailer's own unit cost are zero. Expected sales and the integrated channel's profit are

S(q,e)=E[min⁡(q,D)]=q−∫0qF(y∣e) dy,Π(q,e)=pS(q,e)−cq−g(e).S(q, e) = \mathbb E[\min(q, D)] = q - \int_0^q F(y \mid e)\,dy, \qquad \Pi(q, e) = pS(q, e) - cq - g(e).S(q,e)=E[min(q,D)]=q−∫0q​F(y∣e)dy,Π(q,e)=pS(q,e)−cq−g(e).

Let (qo,eo)(q^o, e^o)(qo,eo) maximize Π\PiΠ. A contract fixes the transfer the retailer pays the supplier, as a function of what the supplier can verify: the order and, for some contracts, sales or leftover units, but never effort. The contracts compared are the buy back {wb,b}\{w_b, b\}{wb​,b}, quantity flexibility {wq,δ}\{w_q, \delta\}{wq​,δ}, revenue sharing {wr,ϕ}\{w_r, \phi\}{wr​,ϕ}, the sales rebate {ws,r,t}\{w_s, r, t\}{ws​,r,t} and the quantity discount wd(q)w_d(q)wd​(q). Under each, the retailer's profit πr(q,e)\pi_r(q, e)πr​(q,e) is his revenue pS(q,e)pS(q, e)pS(q,e) less the transfer and g(e)g(e)g(e).

Formalization targets

Goal

The goal combines the section's negative and positive results.

  1. Buy backs distort effort (Eq. (19)). For every b>0b > 0b>0, q>0q > 0q>0 and e>0e > 0e>0,
∂πr(q,e,wb,b)∂e<∂Π(q,e)∂e.\frac{\partial \pi_r(q, e, w_b, b)}{\partial e} < \frac{\partial \Pi(q, e)}{\partial e}.∂e∂πr​(q,e,wb​,b)​<∂e∂Π(q,e)​.
  1. The quantity discount aligns effort and splits profit. With
wd(q)=(1−λ)p S(q,eo)q+λc−(1−λ)g(eo)q,λ∈[0,1],w_d(q) = (1 - \lambda)p\,\frac{S(q, e^o)}{q} + \lambda c - (1 - \lambda)\frac{g(e^o)}{q}, \qquad \lambda \in [0, 1],wd​(q)=(1−λ)pqS(q,eo)​+λc−(1−λ)qg(eo)​,λ∈[0,1],

the following hold for every q>0q > 0q>0. The retailer earns πr(q,eo)=λΠ(q,eo)\pi_r(q, e^o) = \lambda\Pi(q, e^o)πr​(q,eo)=λΠ(q,eo) and the supplier earns (1−λ)Π(q,eo)(1 - \lambda)\Pi(q, e^o)(1−λ)Π(q,eo). The retailer's marginal profit of effort equals the channel's. His optimal efforts are the channel's. 3. The optimal order. If (qo,eo)(q^o, e^o)(qo,eo) maximizes Π\PiΠ, both firms' profits at effort eoe^oeo are maximized by qoq^oqo.

Milestones

The milestones follow the section's own claims: the integral form of SSS (p. 41); the first-order condition (18) for the chain-optimal effort; (19); the analogous strict inequalities for quantity flexibility (δ>0\delta > 0δ>0) and revenue sharing (ϕ<1\phi < 1ϕ<1), and the reverse inequality for the sales rebate (r>0r > 0r>0, q>tq > tq>t); the two displays of πr\pi_rπr​ under the quantity discount; and the fact that S(q,e)/qS(q, e)/qS(q,e)/q decreases in qqq.

Significance

The result separates two jobs a contract does. To coordinate the order quantity, buy backs, quantity flexibility and revenue sharing all shield the retailer from part of the demand risk or take part of his revenue. The same shield dulls his incentive to raise demand, so each one leads him to under-invest in effort. The sales rebate pushes the other way, toward too much effort. The quantity discount works because the retailer keeps every unit of realized revenue and bears all of his own effort cost. The schedule then prices the order against expected revenue at the optimal effort, so the order is coordinated without touching the effort incentive. Because πr(q,eo)=λΠ(q,eo)\pi_r(q, e^o) = \lambda\Pi(q, e^o)πr​(q,eo)=λΠ(q,eo) with λ\lambdaλ free in [0,1][0, 1][0,1], any split of the channel's optimal profit is attainable. The chapter extends this observation to retailers that also set price (p. 43).

The section's claims are proved on the page only in outline; several are introduced with "it can be shown". To our knowledge none has a machine-checked proof. Formalizing them requires differentiating expected sales in a parameter of the demand law. That step recurs throughout stochastic inventory and pricing models.

Difficulty

Most of the algebra is short. The substance is in the derivatives. ∂S(q,e)/∂e=−∫0q∂F(y∣e)/∂e dy\partial S(q, e)/\partial e = -\int_0^q \partial F(y \mid e)/\partial e\,dy∂S(q,e)/∂e=−∫0q​∂F(y∣e)/∂edy is a differentiation under the integral sign. The strict inequalities need this integral to be strictly negative. That in turn needs ∂F/∂e\partial F/\partial e∂F/∂e to be integrable and negative on a set of positive length, which is why q>0q > 0q>0 (and q>t≥0q > t \ge 0q>t≥0 for the sales rebate) matters.

The natural reading "the quantity discount makes (qo,eo)(q^o, e^o)(qo,eo) the retailer's joint optimum" is not what the page shows, and it fails in general. The page gives two partial statements: for each fixed qqq the retailer's effort incentive is the chain's, and at e=eoe = e^oe=eo his best order is qoq^oqo. Since πr(q,e)=Π(q,e)−(1−λ)Π(q,eo)\pi_r(q, e) = \Pi(q, e) - (1 - \lambda)\Pi(q, e^o)πr​(q,e)=Π(q,e)−(1−λ)Π(q,eo), the retailer can gain by moving qqq and eee together when λ\lambdaλ is small. The goal states exactly the two partial claims.

Formalization scope

The Lean namespace is CachonCoord.EffortNewsvendor. A structure Model collects the data: ppp and ccc with 0≤c<p0 \le c < p0≤c<p; a family of demand laws indexed by effort (probability measures on [0,∞)[0, \infty)[0,∞) with finite mean, no atom at 000, strictly increasing distribution function); the effort derivative ∂F(y∣e)/∂e\partial F(y \mid e)/\partial e∂F(y∣e)/∂e, negative for y>0y > 0y>0, e>0e > 0e>0; and ggg with g(0)=0g(0) = 0g(0)=0 and positive first and second derivatives for e>0e > 0e>0. SSS is defined as an expectation, and its integral form is a milestone. Derivative claims are HasDerivAt statements at interior efforts e>0e > 0e>0. The inequalities assert that both derivatives exist.

The following hypotheses are standing assumptions or disclosed additions:

  • the chapter's model paragraph (p. 7) and the zeros gr=gs=v=cr=0g_r = g_s = v = c_r = 0gr​=gs​=v=cr​=0 of p. 41;
  • as regularity, differentiation of e↦∫abF(y∣e) dye \mapsto \int_a^b F(y \mid e)\,dye↦∫ab​F(y∣e)dy under the integral sign, with interval-integrable ∂F/∂e\partial F/\partial e∂F/∂e;
  • 0≤c0 \le c0≤c (a production cost);
  • wq>0w_q > 0wq​>0 and δ≤1\delta \le 1δ≤1 for quantity flexibility (the contract's range, p. 24);
  • t≥0t \ge 0t≥0 for the sales rebate threshold;
  • q>0q > 0q>0 wherever wdw_dwd​, which divides by qqq, is used.

Revenue sharing and the sales rebate use §6.2's profit functions (pp. 21, 27) with this section's zeros, less g(e)g(e)g(e).

The page prints the last term of wdw_dwd​ as +(1−λ)g(eo)/q+(1 - \lambda)g(e^o)/q+(1−λ)g(eo)/q. With that sign the page's own displays πr(q,eo)=λΠ(q,eo)\pi_r(q, e^o) = \lambda\Pi(q, e^o)πr​(q,eo)=λΠ(q,eo) and πr(q,e)\pi_r(q, e)πr​(q,e) fail by 2(1−λ)g(eo)2(1 - \lambda)g(e^o)2(1−λ)g(eo). The formalization uses −(1−λ)g(eo)/q-(1 - \lambda)g(e^o)/q−(1−λ)g(eo)/q, under which both hold. wdw_dwd​ is the explicit printed schedule with this correction. It is not defined as "a schedule with πr=λΠ\pi_r = \lambda\Piπr​=λΠ", which would make the goal empty.

Not covered: the price-and-effort schedule at the bottom of p. 43, for which the page gives no argument. The cachon-2005 revenue-sharing effort results (RevShareCoord.Effort.*, deterministic revenue R(q,e)R(q, e)R(q,e)) are a different model and are not referenced. Proofs of any milestone, and a reusable library for differentiating newsvendor expectations in a parameter, are welcome.

Selected references

  • G. P. Cachon, Supply Chain Coordination with Contracts, in S. Graves and T. de Kok (eds.), Handbooks in Operations Research and Management Science, Vol. 11: Supply Chain Management, North-Holland, 2003, Ch. 6. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0927-0507(03)11006-7 (read in the author's 3rd draft, January 2003).
  • T. A. Taylor, Supply Chain Coordination under Channel Rebates with Sales Effort Effects, Management Science 48(8), 2002, 992–1007. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.48.8.992.168
  • H. Krishnan, R. Kapuscinski, D. A. Butz, Coordinating Contracts for Decentralized Supply Chains with Retailer Promotional Effort, Management Science 50(1), 2004, 48–63. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.1030.0154
  • G. P. Cachon, M. A. Lariviere, Supply Chain Coordination with Revenue-Sharing Contracts: Strengths and Limitations, Management Science 51(1), 2005, 30–44. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.1040.0215
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Operations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

Assortment Optimisation Under a General Discrete Choice Model: A Tight Analysis of Revenue-Ordered Assortments VI: Revenue-Ordered Offer Sets Grow with Capacity Left and Shrink with Time LeftResearch Paper

Motivation

In airline and hotel revenue management a firm sells a fixed stock of a perishable resource (seats on a flight leg, rooms on a night) over a finite selling horizon, and in each period decides which fare classes to open. Customers do not buy a fixed fare: they choose among the fares on offer, or leave. Talluri and van Ryzin (Management Science, 2004) formulated this single-leg, choice-based problem as a dynamic program over the time remaining and the units remaining.

Practical revenue management systems rarely offer arbitrary sets of fares. They use nested controls: fares are opened from the most expensive downwards, so the open set is always "every fare above some threshold". Whether restricting to such revenue-ordered offer sets is natural depends on how the optimal threshold moves as the state changes. For mixtures of multinomial logit models, Rusmevichientong, Shmoys, Tong and Topaloglu (Production and Operations Management, 2014, Theorem 6) showed that the best revenue-ordered threshold moves monotonically in both the remaining capacity and the remaining time.

Berbeglia and Joret (arXiv:1606.01371v3, §5, Theorem 5.1) extend these two monotonicity properties to every regular discrete choice model, the class that contains essentially every model used in revenue management, including all random utility models. This mission formalizes that result.

Setting

A finite nonempty set C\mathcal CC of products is sold. For a choice set S⊆CS\subseteq\mathcal CS⊆C and a product xxx, P(x,S)\mathcal P(x,S)P(x,S) is the probability that a customer offered SSS buys xxx; the no-purchase probability is P(0,S)=1−∑x∈SP(x,S)\mathcal P(0,S)=1-\sum_{x\in S}\mathcal P(x,S)P(0,S)=1−∑x∈S​P(x,S). The system P\mathcal PP is regular when (i) all these probabilities are nonnegative, (ii) P(x,S)=0\mathcal P(x,S)=0P(x,S)=0 for x∉Sx\notin Sx∈/S, (iii) ∑x∈SP(x,S)≤1\sum_{x\in S}\mathcal P(x,S)\le 1∑x∈S​P(x,S)≤1, and (iv) P(x,S)≥P(x,S′)\mathcal P(x,S)\ge\mathcal P(x,S')P(x,S)≥P(x,S′) whenever S⊆S′S\subseteq S'S⊆S′, for every x∈Sx\in Sx∈S and for the no-purchase option x=0x=0x=0.

Each product xxx has a revenue r(x)>0r(x)>0r(x)>0. Let r1<r2<⋯<rkr_1<r_2<\cdots<r_kr1​<r2​<⋯<rk​ be the distinct revenues. For ℓ∈[k]={1,…,k}\ell\in[k]=\{1,\dots,k\}ℓ∈[k]={1,…,k} the revenue-ordered assortment is Sℓ={x∈C:r(x)≥rℓ}S_\ell=\{x\in\mathcal C:r(x)\ge r_\ell\}Sℓ​={x∈C:r(x)≥rℓ​}; a larger index ℓ\ellℓ gives a smaller set, S1=CS_1=\mathcal CS1​=C.

In the multi-period model one customer arrives per period. With ttt periods remaining and qqq units left, the firm offers some SℓS_\ellSℓ​. The values of the revenue-ordered dynamic program are

Jt(q,ℓ)=∑x∈SℓP(x,Sℓ)(r(x)+Jt−1(q−1))+P(0,Sℓ) Jt−1(q)(t,q>0),\mathcal J_t(q,\ell)=\sum_{x\in S_\ell}\mathcal P(x,S_\ell)\bigl(r(x)+\mathcal J_{t-1}(q-1)\bigr)+\mathcal P(0,S_\ell)\,\mathcal J_{t-1}(q)\qquad(t,q>0),Jt​(q,ℓ)=x∈Sℓ​∑​P(x,Sℓ​)(r(x)+Jt−1​(q−1))+P(0,Sℓ​)Jt−1​(q)(t,q>0),

Jt(q,ℓ)=0\mathcal J_t(q,\ell)=0Jt​(q,ℓ)=0 when t=0t=0t=0 or q=0q=0q=0, and Jt(q)=max⁡ℓ∈[k]Jt(q,ℓ)\mathcal J_t(q)=\max_{\ell\in[k]}\mathcal J_t(q,\ell)Jt​(q)=maxℓ∈[k]​Jt​(q,ℓ). The optimal revenue-ordered index is the smallest maximiser,

ℓt∗(q)=min⁡{ℓ∈[k]:Jt(q,ℓ)=Jt(q)},\ell^*_t(q)=\min\{\ell\in[k]:\mathcal J_t(q,\ell)=\mathcal J_t(q)\},ℓt∗​(q)=min{ℓ∈[k]:Jt​(q,ℓ)=Jt​(q)},

and ΔJt(q)=Jt(q)−Jt(q−1)\Delta\mathcal J_t(q)=\mathcal J_t(q)-\mathcal J_t(q-1)ΔJt​(q)=Jt​(q)−Jt​(q−1) is the marginal value of capacity.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 5.1

For every t≥1t\ge 1t≥1 and q≥1q\ge 1q≥1,

ℓt∗(q)≤ℓt∗(q−1)  if q≥2,ℓt∗(q)≥ℓt−1∗(q)  if t≥2.\ell^*_t(q)\le\ell^*_t(q-1)\ \text{ if } q\ge 2,\qquad \ell^*_t(q)\ge\ell^*_{t-1}(q)\ \text{ if } t\ge 2 .ℓt∗​(q)≤ℓt∗​(q−1)  if q≥2,ℓt∗​(q)≥ℓt−1∗​(q)  if t≥2.

More units left give a weakly larger optimal offer set; more periods left give a weakly smaller one. The paper states the theorem for t∈[T]t\in[T]t∈[T], q∈[Q]q\in[Q]q∈[Q]; the horizon and the capacity only bound ttt and qqq, so the goal is stated for all t,q≥1t,q\ge 1t,q≥1.

Milestones

  1. Lemma 2.1 (p. 6): ∑x∈SP(x,S)≤∑x∈S′P(x,S′)\sum_{x\in S}\mathcal P(x,S)\le\sum_{x\in S'}\mathcal P(x,S')∑x∈S​P(x,S)≤∑x∈S′​P(x,S′) for S⊆S′S\subseteq S'S⊆S′.
  2. Lemma .1 (p. 35): with L∗(δ)\mathcal L^*(\delta)L∗(δ) the set of indices ℓ\ellℓ maximising ∑x∈SℓP(x,Sℓ)(r(x)+δ)\sum_{x\in S_\ell}\mathcal P(x,S_\ell)(r(x)+\delta)∑x∈Sℓ​​P(x,Sℓ​)(r(x)+δ), if δ1+rk≥0\delta_1+r_k\ge 0δ1​+rk​≥0 and δ1≤δ2\delta_1\le\delta_2δ1​≤δ2​ then min⁡L∗(δ2)≤min⁡L∗(δ1)\min\mathcal L^*(\delta_2)\le\min\mathcal L^*(\delta_1)minL∗(δ2​)≤minL∗(δ1​).
  3. Equation (16) (p. 36): Jt(q)=max⁡ℓ∑x∈SℓP(x,Sℓ)(r(x)−ΔJt−1(q))+Jt−1(q)\mathcal J_t(q)=\max_{\ell}\sum_{x\in S_\ell}\mathcal P(x,S_\ell)(r(x)-\Delta\mathcal J_{t-1}(q))+\mathcal J_{t-1}(q)Jt​(q)=maxℓ​∑x∈Sℓ​​P(x,Sℓ​)(r(x)−ΔJt−1​(q))+Jt−1​(q).
  4. Equations (17)–(18) (p. 36): ℓt∗(q)=min⁡L∗(−ΔJt−1(q))\ell^*_t(q)=\min\mathcal L^*(-\Delta\mathcal J_{t-1}(q))ℓt∗​(q)=minL∗(−ΔJt−1​(q)).
  5. Marginal value at most rkr_krk​ (p. 36): ΔJt(q)≤rk\Delta\mathcal J_t(q)\le r_kΔJt​(q)≤rk​.
  6. Marginal value non-increasing in capacity (p. 36, citing Talluri–van Ryzin, Lemma 4): ΔJt(q+1)≤ΔJt(q)\Delta\mathcal J_t(q+1)\le\Delta\mathcal J_t(q)ΔJt​(q+1)≤ΔJt​(q).
  7. Marginal value non-decreasing in time (p. 37, citing Talluri–van Ryzin, Lemma 5): ΔJt(q)≤ΔJt+1(q)\Delta\mathcal J_t(q)\le\Delta\mathcal J_{t+1}(q)ΔJt​(q)≤ΔJt+1​(q).

Milestones 5–7 are asserted or cited in the paper, not proved there; milestones 6–7 are stated for this restricted dynamic program, which is the one the paper applies them to.

Significance

The theorem says that a firm restricted to revenue-ordered offer sets can implement its policy as a nested booking control: as seats sell out, the threshold fare can only rise, and as departure approaches with seats in hand, it can only fall. This is the structure that standard revenue management systems already assume, and Rusmevichientong et al. point out that such monotonicity can be used to implement them. The paper's contribution is that the property depends only on regularity of the choice model, not on its multinomial-logit form.

Formalizing it adds a machine-checked statement of the single-leg choice-based dynamic program over a general choice model, a precise account of the tie-breaking rule (the smallest maximiser), and machine-checked versions of the two marginal-value monotonicity facts that the paper cites from Talluri and van Ryzin rather than proves. To our knowledge none of these statements has been formalized in any proof assistant; the paper's proofs are informal.

Difficulty

The paper's proof is short, but two of its steps are not proved there. The marginal-value inequalities are imported from Talluri and van Ryzin, whose dynamic program optimises over all offer sets; here only the kkk revenue-ordered sets are available and the empty set is not, so those proofs have to be redone for this program, and the bound ΔJ≤rk\Delta\mathcal J\le r_kΔJ≤rk​ is needed to keep each stage's shifted problem well behaved. The claim ΔJ≤rk\Delta\mathcal J\le r_kΔJ≤rk​ itself is justified on the page only by an informal sentence.

The second subtlety is tie-breaking. The monotonicity is about the smallest optimal index. Several indices can be optimal at once, and the comparison of Lemma .1 transfers optimality of one index from one shift to another only through Lemma 2.1, that is, through the no-purchase case of the regularity axiom. Without that case the statement fails.

Formalization scope

  • Products form a finite nonempty type C; choice probabilities are P : C → Finset C → ℝ, defined on all pairs. The no-purchase option is not a product: its probability is the derived quantity noPurchase P S = 1 − ∑_{x∈S} P x S.
  • IsChoiceSystem P is axioms (i)–(iii); IsRegular P adds axiom (iv) for products and for the no-purchase option. Milestones 5–7 assume only axioms (i)–(iii), as the paper says suffices; Lemma .1, (16), (18) and the goal assume regularity and r>0r>0r>0.
  • Revenue levels use the paper's 1-based index: level r ℓ is rℓr_\ellrℓ​ for 1≤ℓ≤k1\le\ell\le k1≤ℓ≤k, topRevenue r is rkr_krk​, and roSet r ℓ is SℓS_\ellSℓ​ as a Finset. The paper's sorting of products (Sℓ={1,…,j(ℓ)}S_\ell=\{1,\dots,j(\ell)\}Sℓ​={1,…,j(ℓ)}) is notation only and is not used.
  • The dynamic program is defined by structural recursion on ttt; there is no stochastic process. Maxima over [k][k][k] are Finset.sup', and the minima defining ℓt∗(q)\ell^*_t(q)ℓt∗​(q) and min⁡L∗(δ)\min\mathcal L^*(\delta)minL∗(δ) are Finset.min' over sets proved nonempty.
  • ΔJt(q)\Delta\mathcal J_t(q)ΔJt​(q) is used only for q≥1q\ge 1q≥1; milestones are stated with t+1t+1t+1, q+1q+1q+1 in place of the paper's t−1t-1t−1, q−1q-1q−1 to avoid natural-number subtraction, which the goal keeps under its hypotheses q≥2q\ge 2q≥2, t≥2t\ge 2t≥2.

Formalizations that would trivialize the statement are ruled out: the dynamic program maximises over the kkk revenue-ordered sets only, never over all subsets (that is Talluri and van Ryzin's program); ℓ∗\ell^*ℓ∗ is the smallest maximiser, never the largest; and TTT, QQQ, kkk and the choice model are arbitrary, never fixed.

The definitions (regular choice model, revenue-ordered assortments, the restricted dynamic program) are reusable for other results on nested policies. Proofs of the cited Talluri–van Ryzin lemmas for this program are especially welcome, as they are the part the paper leaves to the literature.

Selected references

  • G. Berbeglia and G. Joret, Assortment Optimisation Under a General Discrete Choice Model: A Tight Analysis of Revenue-Ordered Assortments, arXiv:1606.01371v3, 2019; Algorithmica 82, 2020. https://arxiv.org/abs/1606.01371
  • K. Talluri and G. van Ryzin, Revenue Management Under a General Discrete Choice Model of Consumer Behavior, Management Science 50(1), 2004. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.1030.0147
  • P. Rusmevichientong, D. Shmoys, C. Tong and H. Topaloglu, Assortment Optimization under the Multinomial Logit Model with Random Choice Parameters, Production and Operations Management 23(11), 2014. https://doi.org/10.1111/poms.12191
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Graph TheoryLinear OptimizationOperations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

Finding Minimum-Cost Circulations by Successive Approximation I: The Generic Refine Subroutine Stops Within 3n(n − 1) + 3nm + 3n²(m + n) Update Operations at an ε-Optimal CirculationResearch Paper

Motivation

Minimum-cost circulation asks how to route flow around a directed network without accumulating flow at any vertex, while minimizing the total cost of the routed units. It is a basic network optimization problem: lower-bound and demand constraints in many flow models can be converted into circulation form. Goldberg and Tarjan's 1987 technical report develops a successive-approximation approach in which a local repair subroutine, refine, improves an approximately optimal circulation. The report was followed by a 1990 journal article; all theorem numbers and page citations in this mission refer to the 1987 report.

The mission isolates the generic form of refine, where an implementation may choose any applicable update at each step. Its question is whether every such choice sequence finishes after a controlled number of operations and returns a circulation with a stronger optimality certificate. The related Goldberg–Tarjan maximum-flow algorithm uses push and relabel operations with distance labels; here the labels are real-valued prices tied to arc costs. The authors' cycle-canceling work uses the same circulation network model and supplies published definitions reused in this development.

Setting

A circulation network has a finite vertex set VVV and a symmetric set EEE of directed arcs: whenever (v,w)(v,w)(v,w) is an arc, so is (w,v)(w,v)(w,v). Let n=∣V∣n=|V|n=∣V∣ and m=∣E∣m=|E|m=∣E∣, counting both orientations. Each arc has a real capacity u(v,w)u(v,w)u(v,w) and cost c(v,w)c(v,w)c(v,w), with c(v,w)=−c(w,v)c(v,w)=-c(w,v)c(v,w)=−c(w,v). A pseudoflow fff respects capacities and the paired-arc relation f(v,w)=−f(w,v)f(v,w)=-f(w,v)f(v,w)=−f(w,v). Its excess ef(v)e_f(v)ef​(v) is the sum of flow entering vvv. A circulation is a pseudoflow with zero excess everywhere. The already published CycleCanceling.MinMean.Network supplies this network, its circulation predicate, and residual capacity uf(v,w)=u(v,w)−f(v,w)u_f(v,w)=u(v,w)-f(v,w)uf​(v,w)=u(v,w)−f(v,w). An arc is residual when this capacity is positive.

A price function p:V→Rp:V\to\mathbb Rp:V→R changes an arc's reduced cost to cp(v,w)=c(v,w)−p(v)+p(w)c_p(v,w)=c(v,w)-p(v)+p(w)cp​(v,w)=c(v,w)−p(v)+p(w). A pseudoflow is ε\varepsilonε-optimal with respect to ppp when every residual arc has reduced cost at least −ε-\varepsilon−ε. A vertex is active when its excess is positive. An admissible arc is a residual arc of negative reduced cost. Refine takes an input circulation that is 2ε2\varepsilon2ε-optimal, saturates every arc whose reduced cost is negative, and then repeatedly applies an available update. A push sends flow from an active vertex along an admissible arc. A relabel raises the price of an active vertex with no outgoing admissible arc to the largest value permitted by ε\varepsilonε-optimality. These rules are Figures 4 and 5, printed pages 18–19.

Formalization targets

The supporting targets are the paper's progress and correctness results, its price bound, and the three operation counts. For any generic refine run from a 2ε2\varepsilon2ε-optimal circulation, Lemma 5.8 bounds each vertex's price increase by 3nε3n\varepsilon3nε. Lemmas 5.9–5.11 bound the numbers R,S,TR,S,TR,S,T of relabelings, saturating pushes, and nonsaturating pushes:

R≤3n(n−1),S≤3nm,T≤3n2(m+n).R\leq 3n(n-1),\qquad S\leq 3nm,\qquad T\leq 3n^2(m+n).R≤3n(n−1),S≤3nm,T≤3n2(m+n).

The goal combines the resulting bound on the number KKK of updates with progress and correctness:

K≤3n(n−1)+3nm+3n2(m+n).K\leq 3n(n-1)+3nm+3n^2(m+n).K≤3n(n−1)+3nm+3n2(m+n).

If the final state has an active vertex, another update exists. If no update applies, the final pseudoflow is a circulation and is ε\varepsilonε-optimal with respect to its final prices. This is the explicit operation-count content behind the generic subroutine's analysis in Section 5. It does not claim a bound for a particular data structure or a complete minimum-cost algorithm.

Significance

The theorem gives an order-independent finite bound: the choice of which applicable push or relabel to perform cannot cause generic refine to run forever or stop with an active vertex. Its output is a circulation whose approximate-optimality tolerance has been halved. That output can serve as the next input in the successive-approximation framework. For integral costs, the report's Theorem 2.3 later turns a sufficiently small tolerance into exact minimum cost; that outer-loop result is outside this mission.

This mission specifies the generic cost-scaling state machine in Lean and poses its quantitative analysis as open formalization targets. The shared network and circulation definitions from the published Goldberg–Tarjan 1989 series are available, and a related generic maximum-flow theorem in the 1988 series has a machine-checked proof. Those results do not prove refine's price-based bounds. Contributions that establish the paper's progress, price, or counting statements for this state machine, and reusable facts about finite residual networks, advance the open goal.

Difficulty

A push respects a capacity, but it can create activity at another vertex; a relabel changes which arcs are admissible. Thus checking a single update does not bound an arbitrary sequence. The price bound also depends on the circulation and prices supplied at entry, not merely on the current pseudoflow being ε\varepsilonε-optimal. Finally, a vertex with no admissible outgoing arc may appear to be stuck when the relabel minimum is over an empty set. Feasibility of the original circulation network is needed to establish that an active vertex still has a genuine next update. The operation bound requires accounting for the three update types across every possible choice sequence.

Formalization scope

Vertices form a finite type, and capacities, costs, flows, and prices are real-valued functions. The network has symmetric ordered arcs and antisymmetric costs. There is no separate nonnegativity assumption on capacities; feasibility is supplied by the input circulation. The new ε\varepsilonε is positive, so the entry circulation is 2ε2\varepsilon2ε-optimal before Figure 4 halves the error parameter. The run starts from the resulting saturated pseudoflow and records one applicable push or relabel per index k<Kk<Kk<K. Counts classify those actual steps by the selected arc's residual capacity after a push. Termination is the negation of the paper's loop guard, not a definition that assumes zero excess.

The reduced-cost sign is c−p(v)+p(w)c-p(v)+p(w)c−p(v)+p(w), and relabel raises p(v)p(v)p(v). This differs from the published 1989 epsilon-optimality definition, so only its network model is imported. The relabel relation requires an attained minimum over a nonempty set of outgoing residual arcs; it assigns no default value to an empty minimum. Loops may occur in the reused network model, but cost antisymmetry makes their reduced cost zero, so they cannot be push arcs. The explicit constants are the report's 3nε3n\varepsilon3nε, 3n(n−1)3n(n-1)3n(n−1), 3nm3nm3nm, and 3n2(m+n)3n^2(m+n)3n2(m+n); the goal sums the last three. The report's RAM-model O(⋅)O(\cdot)O(⋅) running times are outside the formal statements. A definition that makes termination equivalent to conservation or assigns an arbitrary relabel price at an empty set would miss the target.

Selected references

  • Andrew V. Goldberg and Robert E. Tarjan, Finding Minimum-Cost Circulations by Successive Approximation, MIT/LCS/TM-333, July 1987. Technical report.
  • Andrew V. Goldberg and Robert E. Tarjan, Finding Minimum-Cost Circulations by Successive Approximation, Mathematics of Operations Research 15(3), 1990, pp. 430–466. DOI. The report above supplies this mission's numbering.
  • Andrew V. Goldberg and Robert E. Tarjan, A New Approach to the Maximum-Flow Problem, Journal of the ACM 35(4), 1988. DOI.
  • Andrew V. Goldberg and Robert E. Tarjan, Finding Minimum-Cost Circulations by Canceling Negative Cycles, Journal of the ACM 36(4), 1989. DOI.
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Operations ResearchProbability·Captain: mikedeng1

Supply Chain Coordination with Contracts I: The Newsvendor Quantity-Flexibility Contract (w_q(δ), δ) Gives the Retailer at Least Π(q°) at δ = 0, the Supplier at Least Π(q°) at δ = 1Textbook

Why contracts in a newsvendor supply chain

A supplier sells to a retailer who must order before a single selling season with random demand. Each firm maximizes its own expected profit, and with the simplest contract, a fixed wholesale price per unit, the retailer orders too little: he bears all the risk of unsold stock but earns only part of the margin on each sale. The supply chain as a whole then earns less than it could. A contract is said to coordinate the supply chain if the chain-optimal actions are an equilibrium of the two firms' game. Which contracts coordinate, and how they divide the chain's profit, is the subject of a large literature in operations management. G. P. Cachon's survey chapter in the Handbooks in Operations Research and Management Science (Cachon 2003) gives its standard account. This mission formalizes §6.2 of that chapter, Coordinating the newsvendor, read in the author's 3rd draft (January 2003).

Timeline of the contracts treated in §6.2:

  • Pasternack (1985) shows that buy-back (returns) contracts coordinate the newsvendor.
  • Tsay (1999) and Tsay and Lovejoy (1999) study quantity flexibility contracts, in which the supplier refunds unsold units up to a fraction δ of the order.
  • Cachon and Lariviere (2005, working paper 2000) analyze revenue sharing and show it is equivalent to buy back in the newsvendor.
  • Taylor (2002) studies sales rebates. Moorthy (1987) and Kolay and Shaffer (2002) treat quantity discounts.

Setting

Demand D≥0D \ge 0D≥0 has distribution function FFF, with Fˉ=1−F\bar F = 1 - FFˉ=1−F and mean μ=E[D]\mu = E[D]μ=E[D]. The retail price is ppp. The supplier's unit production cost is csc_scs​ and the retailer's unit cost is crc_rcr​, with c=cs+cr<pc = c_s + c_r < pc=cs​+cr​<p. Unmet demand costs the retailer a goodwill penalty grg_rgr​ per unit and the supplier gsg_sgs​, with g=gs+grg = g_s + g_rg=gs​+gr​. Each unsold unit is worth v<cv < cv<c to the retailer.

Expected sales are S(q)=E[min⁡(q,D)]S(q) = E[\min(q, D)]S(q)=E[min(q,D)], leftover inventory is I(q)=E[(q−D)+]I(q) = E[(q - D)^+]I(q)=E[(q−D)+] and lost sales are L(q)=E[(D−q)+]L(q) = E[(D - q)^+]L(q)=E[(D−q)+]. If TTT is the expected payment from the retailer to the supplier, the firms earn

πr(q)=(p−v+gr)S(q)−(cr−v)q−grμ−T,πs(q)=gsS(q)−csq−gsμ+T,\pi_r(q) = (p - v + g_r)S(q) - (c_r - v)q - g_r\mu - T, \qquad \pi_s(q) = g_sS(q) - c_sq - g_s\mu + T,πr​(q)=(p−v+gr​)S(q)−(cr​−v)q−gr​μ−T,πs​(q)=gs​S(q)−cs​q−gs​μ+T,

and the chain earns Π(q)=(p−v+g)S(q)−(c−v)q−gμ\Pi(q) = (p - v + g)S(q) - (c - v)q - g\muΠ(q)=(p−v+g)S(q)−(c−v)q−gμ. Let qoq^oqo be a maximizer of Π\PiΠ, with Π(qo)>0\Pi(q^o) > 0Π(qo)>0.

Under the quantity flexibility contract (wq,δ)(w_q, \delta)(wq​,δ) the retailer pays wqw_qwq​ per unit ordered and is refunded wq+cr−vw_q + c_r - vwq​+cr​−v for each unsold unit, up to δq\delta qδq units:

Tq(q,wq,δ)=wqq−(wq+cr−v)∫(1−δ)qqF(y) dy.T_q(q, w_q, \delta) = w_qq - (w_q + c_r - v)\int_{(1-\delta)q}^q F(y)\,dy.Tq​(q,wq​,δ)=wq​q−(wq​+cr​−v)∫(1−δ)qq​F(y)dy.

The wholesale price that makes qoq^oqo satisfy the retailer's first-order condition is

wq(δ)=(p−v+gr) Fˉ(qo)Fˉ(qo)+(1−δ)F((1−δ)qo)−cr+v.w_q(\delta) = \frac{(p - v + g_r)\,\bar F(q^o)}{\bar F(q^o) + (1-\delta)F((1-\delta)q^o)} - c_r + v.wq​(δ)=Fˉ(qo)+(1−δ)F((1−δ)qo)(p−v+gr​)Fˉ(qo)​−cr​+v.

Formalization targets

Goal: the quantity flexibility contract can split the profit in any way

With πr(q,wq(δ),δ)\pi_r(q, w_q(\delta), \delta)πr​(q,wq​(δ),δ) and πs(q,wq(δ),δ)\pi_s(q, w_q(\delta), \delta)πs​(q,wq​(δ),δ) the firms' profits under (wq(δ),δ)(w_q(\delta), \delta)(wq​(δ),δ):

πr(qo,wq(0),0)=Π(qo)+gs(μ−S(qo)+Fˉ(qo)qo)≥Π(qo),\pi_r(q^o, w_q(0), 0) = \Pi(q^o) + g_s\big(\mu - S(q^o) + \bar F(q^o)q^o\big) \ge \Pi(q^o),πr​(qo,wq​(0),0)=Π(qo)+gs​(μ−S(qo)+Fˉ(qo)qo)≥Π(qo), πs(qo,wq(1),1)=Π(qo)+μgr≥Π(qo),\pi_s(q^o, w_q(1), 1) = \Pi(q^o) + \mu g_r \ge \Pi(q^o),πs​(qo,wq​(1),1)=Π(qo)+μgr​≥Π(qo),

and for every a∈[0,Π(qo)]a \in [0, \Pi(q^o)]a∈[0,Π(qo)] some δ∈[0,1]\delta \in [0,1]δ∈[0,1] gives the retailer aaa and the supplier Π(qo)−a\Pi(q^o) - aΠ(qo)−a (§6.2.5, p. 25).

Milestones, in attack order

  1. S(q)=q−∫0qFS(q) = q - \int_0^q FS(q)=q−∫0q​F, I(q)=q−S(q)I(q) = q - S(q)I(q)=q−S(q), L(q)=μ−S(q)L(q) = \mu - S(q)L(q)=μ−S(q) (p. 10).
  2. The unique maximizer qoq^oqo of Π\PiΠ satisfies Fˉ(qo)=(c−v)/(p−v+g)\bar F(q^o) = (c - v)/(p - v + g)Fˉ(qo)=(c−v)/(p−v+g) (Eq. (2), p. 11).
  3. wq(0)=(p−v+gr)Fˉ(qo)+v−crw_q(0) = (p - v + g_r)\bar F(q^o) + v - c_rwq​(0)=(p−v+gr​)Fˉ(qo)+v−cr​ and wq(1)=p+gr−crw_q(1) = p + g_r - c_rwq​(1)=p+gr​−cr​. Also, wqw_qwq​ is increasing on [0,1][0,1][0,1], which gives v−cr≤wq(δ)≤p+gr−crv - c_r \le w_q(\delta) \le p + g_r - c_rv−cr​≤wq​(δ)≤p+gr​−cr​ (p. 24).
  4. qoq^oqo maximizes the retailer's profit under (wq(δ),δ)(w_q(\delta), \delta)(wq​(δ),δ) (Eq. (11), p. 24).
  5. The supplier's first-order condition holds at qoq^oqo (p. 25).
  6. The δ = 0 identity and the δ = 1 identity (p. 25).

Companion results of §6.2

  • Revenue sharing {wr,ϕ}\{w_r,\phi\}{wr​,ϕ} equals the buy back wb=wr+(1−ϕ)pw_b = w_r + (1-\phi)pwb​=wr​+(1−ϕ)p, b=(1−ϕ)(p−v)b = (1-\phi)(p - v)b=(1−ϕ)(p−v) for every demand realization (p. 22).
  • The sales rebate contract: first-order condition (12), price (13), the retailer's profit and its monotonicity in the threshold (p. 27), and failure under voluntary compliance (p. 28).
  • The quantity discount gives the retailer πr=λ(Π(q)+gμ)−grμ\pi_r = \lambda(\Pi(q) + g\mu) - g_r\muπr​=λ(Π(q)+gμ)−gr​μ, so qoq^oqo is optimal for both firms (p. 29).
  • Under the wholesale price contract, the retailer's profit increases in the induced quantity (p. 14).

Significance

The goal is what makes quantity flexibility a complete coordinating family. Retailer optimality (milestone 4) says qoq^oqo can be implemented. The allocation statement says that bargaining power can then be expressed through the single parameter δ without losing efficiency. Together with the supplier's first-order condition, these are the facts that matter in practice: forced compliance suffices for coordination, and the choice of δ is purely distributional. The companions put §6.2's other contracts on the same footing. Revenue sharing and buy back are equivalent. Sales rebates coordinate only with forced compliance. Quantity discounts coordinate with a bounded retailer share.

All of these results are stated in the source. Related results are Proved on the platform in Snyder and Shen's chapter (SupplyChainTheory.*), including the chain-optimal fractile and retailer optimality under quantity flexibility. This mission states them locally because Snyder and Shen's contract data impose stronger restrictions on salvage value than Cachon's model. The efficiency formula (k+1)−(1+1/k)(k+2)(k+1)^{-(1+1/k)}(k+2)(k+1)−(1+1/k)(k+2) for the power distribution on p. 14 is already posed as the Open item RevShareCoord.Wholesale.alpha_family_efficiency and is not posed again.

Difficulty

Each identity is elementary algebra once SSS, its derivative and the integrals of FFF are under control. That is where the work lies. Expected sales are defined as an expectation, so S(q)=q−∫0qFS(q) = q - \int_0^q FS(q)=q−∫0q​F is a theorem to prove, not a definition to unfold.

Differentiating ∫(1−δ)qqF\int_{(1-\delta)q}^q F∫(1−δ)qq​F needs continuity of FFF at two points. The sales rebate transfer is piecewise and has a kink at the threshold, so derivatives must be taken on the right side of it.

The allocation clause rests on continuity of δ ↦ π_r(q^o, w_q(δ), δ). The obvious argument, "the profits are continuous in δ", hides two facts. First, the denominator of wq(δ)w_q(\delta)wq​(δ) stays positive on [0,1][0,1][0,1]. Second, F((1−δ)qo)F((1-\delta)q^o)F((1−δ)qo) moves continuously, which fails for a demand law with atoms. Both must be derived from the model, not assumed.

Formalization scope

The local ContractData follows Cachon's v<cs+crv<c_s+c_rv<cs​+cr​ and cs+cr<pc_s+c_r<pcs​+cr​<p. Its rrr is Cachon's price ppp, and its ps,prp_s,p_rps​,pr​ are the goodwill penalties gs,grg_s,g_rgs​,gr​. The penalties are nonnegative costs. Net salvage may be negative and may exceed crc_rcr​; both possibilities were excluded by the related published model.

A demand law is a probability measure on ℝ with no mass on (−∞,0)(-\infty, 0)(−∞,0), finite mean and no atoms (so FFF is continuous). FFF is strictly increasing on [0,∞)[0, \infty)[0,∞) as long as F<1F < 1F<1. Its derivative is specified on the positive interior of that active support. This reading admits the bounded-support power law the chapter itself uses on p. 14, whose cdf has a corner at the support endpoint. Derivative conclusions use HasDerivAt.

Optimality is IsMaxOn … Set.univ over real quantities; the optimum is positive under the model assumptions. Π(qo)>0\Pi(q^o) > 0Π(qo)>0 is a hypothesis wherever an optimum is named, following p. 11.

Cachon's sales rebate rrr is rebate in Lean.

Three printed slips are corrected, and the milestone quotes keep the print:

  • p. 24 writes www for wqw_qwq​ in TqT_qTq​.
  • p. 25 mixes qqq and qoq^oqo in the δ = 0 and δ = 1 displays.
  • p. 28 has a spurious −v-v−v in ws(r)−rw_s(r) - rws​(r)−r.

Two encodings are ruled out. wq(δ)w_q(\delta)wq​(δ) is the explicit formula, never "the solution of (11)". The supplier's profit is the model's own function, not Π\PiΠ minus the retailer's profit, so no clause holds by definition.

The local definition file CachonCoord.Newsvendor.Contracts contains the model, its expected profits, the contract transfers, the sales rebate price ws(r)w_s(r)ws​(r), the quantity discount schedule, and realized profits and payments. Lemmas about SSS, ∫F\int F∫F and continuity of contract prices are reusable across the series. The sales rebate existence-of-threshold argument and the normal-distribution counterexample of p. 25 are outside this mission.

Selected references

  • G. P. Cachon, Supply Chain Coordination with Contracts, in S. Graves, T. de Kok (eds.), Handbooks in OR & MS Vol. 11, North-Holland, 2003 (3rd draft, Jan. 2003). https://doi.org/10.1016/S0927-0507(03)11006-7
  • B. A. Pasternack, Optimal pricing and return policies for perishable commodities, Marketing Science 4(2), 1985. https://doi.org/10.1287/mksc.4.2.166
  • A. A. Tsay, The quantity flexibility contract and supplier–customer incentives, Management Science 45(10), 1999. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.45.10.1339
  • G. P. Cachon, M. A. Lariviere, Supply chain coordination with revenue-sharing contracts: strengths and limitations, Management Science 51(1), 2005. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.1040.0215
  • T. A. Taylor, Supply chain coordination under channel rebates with sales effort effects, Management Science 48(8), 2002. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.48.8.992.168
  • L. V. Snyder, Z.-J. M. Shen, Fundamentals of Supply Chain Theory, 2nd ed., Wiley, 2019, Ch. 14. https://doi.org/10.1002/9781119584445
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CombinatoricsOperations ResearchTheoretical Computer Science·Captain: mikedeng1

Assortment Optimisation Under a General Discrete Choice Model: A Tight Analysis of Revenue-Ordered Assortments III: The Three Revenue-Ordered Approximation Bounds Are TightResearch Paper

Motivation

A retailer or an airline chooses which products to offer, and customers choose among what is offered, or buy nothing. Choosing the offer set that maximizes expected revenue is the assortment problem, central to revenue management (Talluri and van Ryzin, 2004). It is NP-hard even for simple mixtures of logit models, so practice relies on heuristics. The most common one is the revenue-ordered assortments strategy: offer the products whose price is above a threshold, and pick the best threshold.

Berbeglia and Joret (arXiv:1606.01371) analyse this heuristic under every regular choice model, the broad class in which enlarging the offer set never raises the probability of choosing any given alternative, including not buying. They prove three approximation guarantees, then show that none of the three can be improved. This mission formalizes that last result, Theorem 3.4.

Timeline:

  • Talluri and van Ryzin (2004) showed that revenue-ordered assortments are optimal under the multinomial logit model.
  • Rusmevichientong, Shmoys, Tong and Topaloglu (2014) showed the problem NP-hard under a mixture of two logit models, and proved that revenue-ordered assortments earn at least OPT/(e(1+ln⁡(rk/r1)))\mathrm{OPT}/(e(1+\ln(r_k/r_1)))OPT/(e(1+ln(rk​/r1​))) under mixed logit.
  • Aouad, Farias, Levi and Segev (2018) proved an Ω(1/ln⁡(rk/r1))\Omega(1/\ln(r_k/r_1))Ω(1/ln(rk​/r1​)) guarantee under random utility models, and that the assortment problem there is NP-hard to approximate within Ω(1/n1−ϵ)\Omega(1/n^{1-\epsilon})Ω(1/n1−ϵ) and Ω(1/log⁡1−ϵ(rk/r1))\Omega(1/\log^{1-\epsilon}(r_k/r_1))Ω(1/log1−ϵ(rk​/r1​)).
  • Berbeglia and Joret (2016–2020, Algorithmica) proved the guarantees 1/k1/k1/k, 1/∑i(ri−ri−1)/ri≥1/(1+ln⁡(rk/r1))1/\sum_{i}(r_i-r_{i-1})/r_i\ge1/(1+\ln(r_k/r_1))1/∑i​(ri​−ri−1​)/ri​≥1/(1+ln(rk​/r1​)) and a purchase-probability bound under any regular model, and an instance on which all three, in their sum forms, are attained in the limit.

Setting

The products form a finite set C\mathcal CC. A system of choice probabilities gives, for every offer set S⊆CS\subseteq\mathcal CS⊆C and product xxx, the probability P(x,S)\mathcal P(x,S)P(x,S) that a customer buys xxx. The no-purchase probability is P(0,S)=1−∑x∈SP(x,S)\mathcal P(0,S)=1-\sum_{x\in S}\mathcal P(x,S)P(0,S)=1−∑x∈S​P(x,S). The model is regular if

  1. P(x,S)≥0\mathcal P(x,S)\ge0P(x,S)≥0 for x∈C∪{0}x\in\mathcal C\cup\{0\}x∈C∪{0};
  2. P(x,S)=0\mathcal P(x,S)=0P(x,S)=0 for x∉Sx\notin Sx∈/S;
  3. ∑x∈SP(x,S)≤1\sum_{x\in S}\mathcal P(x,S)\le1∑x∈S​P(x,S)≤1;
  4. P(x,S)≥P(x,S′)\mathcal P(x,S)\ge\mathcal P(x,S')P(x,S)≥P(x,S′) for S⊆S′S\subseteq S'S⊆S′ and every x∈S∪{0}x\in S\cup\{0\}x∈S∪{0}.

Each product has a revenue r(x)>0r(x)>0r(x)>0. Offering SSS earns rev(S)=∑x∈SP(x,S) r(x)\mathrm{rev}(S)=\sum_{x\in S}\mathcal P(x,S)\,r(x)rev(S)=∑x∈S​P(x,S)r(x), and OPT=max⁡S⊆Crev(S)\mathrm{OPT}=\max_{S\subseteq\mathcal C}\mathrm{rev}(S)OPT=maxS⊆C​rev(S).

Let r1<⋯<rkr_1<\dots<r_kr1​<⋯<rk​ be the distinct revenues, with r0:=0r_0:=0r0​:=0, and Si={x:r(x)≥ri}S_i=\{x: r(x)\ge r_i\}Si​={x:r(x)≥ri​}. The heuristic earns

RO=max⁡i∈[k]rev(Si).\mathrm{RO}=\max_{i\in[k]}\mathrm{rev}(S_i).RO=i∈[k]max​rev(Si​).

For an optimal S∗S^*S∗ let Ni=∑x∈S∗, r(x)≥riP(x,S∗)N_i=\sum_{x\in S^*,\,r(x)\ge r_i}\mathcal P(x,S^*)Ni​=∑x∈S∗,r(x)≥ri​​P(x,S∗), Nk+1=0N_{k+1}=0Nk+1​=0, and ℓ\ellℓ the largest index with Nℓ>0N_\ell>0Nℓ​>0. Section 3 of the paper proves

  • (A) OPT≤k⋅RO\mathrm{OPT}\le k\cdot\mathrm{RO}OPT≤k⋅RO (Theorem 3.1);
  • (B) OPT≤Dr⋅RO\mathrm{OPT}\le D_r\cdot\mathrm{RO}OPT≤Dr​⋅RO, with Dr=∑i=1kri−ri−1ri≤1+ln⁡(rk/r1)D_r=\sum_{i=1}^{k}\frac{r_i-r_{i-1}}{r_i}\le 1+\ln(r_k/r_1)Dr​=∑i=1k​ri​ri​−ri−1​​≤1+ln(rk​/r1​) (Theorem 3.2);
  • (C) OPT≤DN(S∗)⋅RO\mathrm{OPT}\le D_N(S^*)\cdot\mathrm{RO}OPT≤DN​(S∗)⋅RO, with DN(S∗)=∑i=1ℓNi−Ni+1Ni≤1+ln⁡(N1/Nℓ)D_N(S^*)=\sum_{i=1}^{\ell}\frac{N_i-N_{i+1}}{N_i}\le 1+\ln(N_1/N_\ell)DN​(S∗)=∑i=1ℓ​Ni​Ni​−Ni+1​​≤1+ln(N1​/Nℓ​) (Theorem 3.3).

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 3.4

For every k≥1k\ge1k≥1 and every δ>0\delta>0δ>0 there are a finite nonempty product set, a regular P\mathcal PP, revenues r>0r>0r>0 with exactly kkk distinct values, and an optimal S∗S^*S∗ with N1>0N_1>0N1​>0, such that

k⋅RO<(1+δ) OPT,Dr⋅RO<(1+δ) OPT,DN(S∗)⋅RO<(1+δ) OPT.k\cdot\mathrm{RO}<(1+\delta)\,\mathrm{OPT},\qquad D_r\cdot\mathrm{RO}<(1+\delta)\,\mathrm{OPT},\qquad D_N(S^*)\cdot\mathrm{RO}<(1+\delta)\,\mathrm{OPT}.k⋅RO<(1+δ)OPT,Dr​⋅RO<(1+δ)OPT,DN​(S∗)⋅RO<(1+δ)OPT.

So none of the bounds (A), (B), (C) stays true when multiplied by 1+δ1+\delta1+δ, for any number kkk of distinct revenues.

The tight instance (milestones)

The paper's witness has products (i,j)(i,j)(i,j) with i∈[k]i\in[k]i∈[k] and j∈[i]j\in[i]j∈[i]. Product (i,j)(i,j)(i,j) has revenue ε−j\varepsilon^{-j}ε−j, and P((i,j),S)=εi\mathcal P((i,j),S)=\varepsilon^iP((i,j),S)=εi when (i,j)∈S(i,j)\in S(i,j)∈S and (i,1),…,(i,j−1)∉S(i,1),\dots,(i,j-1)\notin S(i,1),…,(i,j−1)∈/S, and 000 otherwise, for 0<ε≤120<\varepsilon\le\tfrac120<ε≤21​. The milestones follow the proof on pp. 10–11:

  • the axiom (iii) bound;
  • (7);
  • (8);
  • (9);
  • regularity;
  • the distinct revenues ri=ε−ir_i=\varepsilon^{-i}ri​=ε−i;
  • RO=rev(C)<1/(1−ε)\mathrm{RO}=\mathrm{rev}(\mathcal C)<1/(1-\varepsilon)RO=rev(C)<1/(1−ε);
  • OPT=k\mathrm{OPT}=kOPT=k, attained by {(i,i)}\{(i,i)\}{(i,i)};
  • the limits OPT/RO→k\mathrm{OPT}/\mathrm{RO}\to kOPT/RO→k and Dr→kD_r\to kDr​→k;
  • Ni=εi+⋯+εkN_i=\varepsilon^i+\dots+\varepsilon^kNi​=εi+⋯+εk and DN→kD_N\to kDN​→k as ε→0+\varepsilon\to0^+ε→0+.

Significance

With Theorems 3.1–3.3, Theorem 3.4 closes the analysis: in terms of the parameters kkk, DrD_rDr​ and DND_NDN​, revenue-ordered assortments are understood exactly under regular choice. It complements the hardness results of Aouad et al., which already show that no efficient strategy can do much better than (A) and (B) in general; Theorem 3.4 shows that the analysis of this particular heuristic is exact. The instance is also a concrete regular choice model in which the optimal offer set is far from every nested one.

On the formal side, the mission produces a reusable formal definition of regular discrete choice models, revenue-ordered assortments and the three bound quantities. These are shared, under other sub-namespaces, with the companion missions on Theorems 3.2 and 3.3. The result is proved in the paper. As far as is known it has not been machine-checked anywhere; the remaining work is formalizing the paper's proof, including the steps it leaves to the reader.

Difficulty

The proof is a construction, and the paper verifies most of it in a sentence each. The work lies in those sentences:

  • the regularity of the instance at the no-purchase option, (9), which needs the row decomposition (8);
  • the claim that {(i,i)}\{(i,i)\}{(i,i)} is optimal among all 2k(k+1)/22^{k(k+1)/2}2k(k+1)/2 offer sets, asserted without proof;
  • the claim that the full set is the best threshold set;
  • the evaluation of DN(S∗)D_N(S^*)DN​(S∗), which needs ℓ=k\ell=kℓ=k.

The naive witness, one instance per bound, does not help: the goal asks for one instance with exactly kkk revenues on which all three bounds are nearly attained, for every kkk.

Formalization scope

  • Products are an arbitrary finite type C. The no-purchase option is not a product: P(0,S)\mathcal P(0,S)P(0,S) is the derived quantity noPurchase P S. Offer sets are Finset C.
  • IsRegular carries axioms (i)–(iv), with (i) and (iv) stated both for products and for the no-purchase option. Regularity at x=0x=0x=0 is essential: without it the guarantees fail.
  • OPT\mathrm{OPT}OPT is Finset.sup' over all subsets, including ∅\emptyset∅. RO\mathrm{RO}RO is Finset.sup' over the kkk threshold sets only, and needs Nonempty C.
  • The distinct revenues are the sorted image of r, indexed by Fin k from 000: the Lean index iii is the paper's i+1i+1i+1, and r0=0r_0=0r0​=0 is a separate case. ℓ\ellℓ lives in WithBot (Fin k).
  • Bounds are multiplicative (OPT≤D⋅RO\mathrm{OPT}\le D\cdot\mathrm{RO}OPT≤D⋅RO); there is no ratio RO/OPT\mathrm{RO}/\mathrm{OPT}RO/OPT in the goal. Limits are along 𝓝[>] 0.
  • The tight instance keeps the paper's 1-based pairs (i,j)(i,j)(i,j) as a subtype of Fin (k+1) × Fin (k+1). Its regularity is a theorem to prove, never a field assumed.

Ruled out:

  • a fixed kkk, since "for every kkk" is the content;
  • tightness of the logarithmic forms 1/(1+ln⁡(rk/r1))1/(1+\ln(r_k/r_1))1/(1+ln(rk​/r1​)) and 1/(1+ln⁡ν)1/(1+\ln\nu)1/(1+lnν), which this instance does not show (there 1+ln⁡(rk/r1)→∞1+\ln(r_k/r_1)\to\infty1+ln(rk​/r1​)→∞ while OPT/RO→k\mathrm{OPT}/\mathrm{RO}\to kOPT/RO→k), so only the sum forms are claimed tight;
  • an instance whose regularity is assumed;
  • a heuristic maximizing over all subsets.

Contributions welcome: proofs of the milestones, especially (8), (9) and the optimality of {(i,i)}\{(i,i)\}{(i,i)}, and general lemmas on sorted distinct values of a finite function.

Selected references

  • G. Berbeglia and G. Joret, Assortment Optimisation Under a General Discrete Choice Model: A Tight Analysis of Revenue-Ordered Assortments, arXiv:1606.01371v3, 2019; published in Algorithmica, 2020. https://arxiv.org/abs/1606.01371
  • K. Talluri and G. van Ryzin, Revenue Management Under a General Discrete Choice Model of Consumer Behavior, Management Science 50(1), 2004. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.1030.0147
  • P. Rusmevichientong, D. Shmoys, C. Tong and H. Topaloglu, Assortment Optimization under the Multinomial Logit Model with Random Choice Parameters, Production and Operations Management 23(11), 2014. https://doi.org/10.1111/poms.12191
  • A. Aouad, V. Farias, R. Levi and D. Segev, The Approximability of Assortment Optimization Under Ranking Preferences, Operations Research 66(6), 2018. https://doi.org/10.1287/opre.2018.1724
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Operations ResearchTheoretical Computer Science·Captain: mikedeng1

Assortment Optimisation Under a General Discrete Choice Model: A Tight Analysis of Revenue-Ordered Assortments II: Revenue-Ordered Assortments Earn OPT/(1 + ln ν), ν the Optimum's Purchase RatioResearch Paper

Motivation

A retailer that can display only some of its products must choose an assortment: the set of products offered to an arriving customer. Customers substitute: whether a given product is bought depends on what else is on the shelf. The assortment problem asks for the offer set that maximises expected revenue under a model of this substitution behaviour. It is a core problem of revenue management (Talluri and van Ryzin, Management Science 2004), and it is NP-hard already for a mixture of two multinomial logit models (Rusmevichientong, Shmoys, Tong and Topaloglu, POMS 2014).

The heuristic used most widely in practice is revenue-ordered assortments: sort the products by price and offer, for some threshold, every product priced at least that threshold. It is optimal under the multinomial logit model (Talluri and van Ryzin 2004) but not in general. Berbeglia and Joret (arXiv:1606.01371v3, 2019; Algorithmica 2020) give a tight analysis of its approximation ratio for every regular discrete choice model, a class that includes all random utility models. They prove three incomparable guarantees. This mission formalizes the third, Theorem 3.3, whose ratio depends on the purchase behaviour of an optimal assortment rather than on the prices. Companion missions in this series cover the price-ratio bound (Theorem 3.2) and the tightness of all three bounds (Theorem 3.4).

Setting

Let C\mathcal CC be a finite nonempty set of products. A system of choice probabilities gives, for every offer set S⊆CS\subseteq\mathcal CS⊆C and product xxx, the probability P(x,S)\mathcal P(x,S)P(x,S) that a customer offered SSS buys xxx. Buying nothing is the option 000, with P(0,S)=1−∑x∈SP(x,S)\mathcal P(0,S)=1-\sum_{x\in S}\mathcal P(x,S)P(0,S)=1−∑x∈S​P(x,S). The model is regular when

  1. P(x,S)≥0\mathcal P(x,S)\ge0P(x,S)≥0 for products and for x=0x=0x=0;
  2. P(x,S)=0\mathcal P(x,S)=0P(x,S)=0 for x∉Sx\notin Sx∈/S;
  3. ∑x∈SP(x,S)≤1\sum_{x\in S}\mathcal P(x,S)\le1∑x∈S​P(x,S)≤1;
  4. P(x,S)≥P(x,S′)\mathcal P(x,S)\ge\mathcal P(x,S')P(x,S)≥P(x,S′) whenever S⊆S′S\subseteq S'S⊆S′ and x∈S∪{0}x\in S\cup\{0\}x∈S∪{0}.

Axiom 4 at x=0x=0x=0 says that enlarging the offer set never makes buying nothing more likely.

Prices are a function r:C→R>0r:\mathcal C\to\mathbb R_{>0}r:C→R>0​. Offering SSS earns rev(S)=∑x∈SP(x,S) r(x)\mathrm{rev}(S)=\sum_{x\in S}\mathcal P(x,S)\,r(x)rev(S)=∑x∈S​P(x,S)r(x), and OPT=max⁡S⊆Crev(S)\mathrm{OPT}=\max_{S\subseteq\mathcal C}\mathrm{rev}(S)OPT=maxS⊆C​rev(S). Let r1<⋯<rkr_1<\dots<r_kr1​<⋯<rk​ be the distinct values of rrr, and let Si={x:r(x)≥ri}S_i=\{x:r(x)\ge r_i\}Si​={x:r(x)≥ri​} for i∈[k]i\in[k]i∈[k]. The revenue-ordered strategy earns

RO=max⁡1≤i≤krev(Si).\mathrm{RO}=\max_{1\le i\le k}\mathrm{rev}(S_i).RO=1≤i≤kmax​rev(Si​).

For an assortment S∗S^*S∗, the purchase profile is

Ni=∑x∈S∗, r(x)≥riP(x,S∗)(i∈[k]),Nk+1:=0,N_i=\sum_{x\in S^*,\ r(x)\ge r_i}\mathcal P(x,S^*)\qquad(i\in[k]),\qquad N_{k+1}:=0,Ni​=x∈S∗, r(x)≥ri​∑​P(x,S∗)(i∈[k]),Nk+1​:=0,

the probability that a customer offered S∗S^*S∗ buys something priced at least rir_iri​. It is non-increasing in iii.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 3.3 (p. 9)

Let S∗S^*S∗ be optimal, rev(S∗)=OPT\mathrm{rev}(S^*)=\mathrm{OPT}rev(S∗)=OPT, suppose N1>0N_1>0N1​>0, and let ℓ∈[k]\ell\in[k]ℓ∈[k] be maximum with Nℓ>0N_\ell>0Nℓ​>0. Then

OPT≤(∑i=1ℓNi−Ni+1Ni)ROand∑i=1ℓNi−Ni+1Ni≤1+ln⁡ν,ν=N1Nℓ.\mathrm{OPT}\le\Big(\sum_{i=1}^{\ell}\frac{N_i-N_{i+1}}{N_i}\Big)\mathrm{RO} \qquad\text{and}\qquad \sum_{i=1}^{\ell}\frac{N_i-N_{i+1}}{N_i}\le1+\ln\nu,\quad\nu=\frac{N_1}{N_\ell}.OPT≤(i=1∑ℓ​Ni​Ni​−Ni+1​​)ROandi=1∑ℓ​Ni​Ni​−Ni+1​​≤1+lnν,ν=Nℓ​N1​​.

The first inequality is the paper's sum-form factor, the bound that Theorem 3.4 shows to be tight. The second is the closed form 1/(1+ln⁡ν)1/(1+\ln\nu)1/(1+lnν).

Milestones (in proof order)

  • Lemma 2.1 (p. 6): ∑x∈SP(x,S)≤∑x∈S′P(x,S′)\sum_{x\in S}\mathcal P(x,S)\le\sum_{x\in S'}\mathcal P(x,S')∑x∈S​P(x,S)≤∑x∈S′​P(x,S′) for S⊆S′S\subseteq S'S⊆S′.
  • First observation of the proof (p. 9): Ni≤∑x∈SiP(x,Si)N_i\le\sum_{x\in S_i}\mathcal P(x,S_i)Ni​≤∑x∈Si​​P(x,Si​) and Niri≤∑x∈SiP(x,Si)riN_ir_i\le\sum_{x\in S_i}\mathcal P(x,S_i)r_iNi​ri​≤∑x∈Si​​P(x,Si​)ri​.
  • Inequality (6) (p. 9): Niri≤RON_ir_i\le\mathrm{RO}Ni​ri​≤RO for every i∈[k]i\in[k]i∈[k].
  • Revenue identity (p. 9): rev(S∗)=∑i=1ℓ(Ni−Ni+1)ri=∑i=1ℓNi−Ni+1NiNiri\mathrm{rev}(S^*)=\sum_{i=1}^{\ell}(N_i-N_{i+1})r_i=\sum_{i=1}^{\ell}\frac{N_i-N_{i+1}}{N_i}N_ir_irev(S∗)=∑i=1ℓ​(Ni​−Ni+1​)ri​=∑i=1ℓ​Ni​Ni​−Ni+1​​Ni​ri​.
  • Logarithmic step (p. 9, the comparison 1/∑≥1/(1+ln⁡ν)1/\sum\ge1/(1+\ln\nu)1/∑≥1/(1+lnν) in Theorem 3.3, used in the last inequality of the proof): for N1≥⋯≥Nℓ>0N_1\ge\dots\ge N_\ell>0N1​≥⋯≥Nℓ​>0 and Nℓ+1=0N_{\ell+1}=0Nℓ+1​=0, ∑i=1ℓ(Ni−Ni+1)/Ni≤1+ln⁡(N1/Nℓ)\sum_{i=1}^{\ell}(N_i-N_{i+1})/N_i\le1+\ln(N_1/N_\ell)∑i=1ℓ​(Ni​−Ni+1​)/Ni​≤1+ln(N1​/Nℓ​). The paper states this step without proof.

Significance

Theorem 3.3 gives a guarantee that is independent of prices. The bound 1+ln⁡(rk/r1)1+\ln(r_k/r_1)1+ln(rk​/r1​) of Theorem 3.2 grows when prices are spread out. The bound 1+ln⁡ν1+\ln\nu1+lnν is small whenever an optimal assortment sells its expensive products with probability comparable to its overall purchase probability. In §4 the paper combines it with a reduction from unit-demand pricing to derive, for example, the 1/(1+ln⁡m)1/(1+\ln m)1/(1+lnm) guarantee of uniform pricing for the unit-demand min-pricing problem (Corollary 4.8, originally due to Aggarwal et al.). Together with Theorems 3.1 and 3.2, it describes the performance of the most common assortment heuristic over the whole class of regular models, with no parametric assumption on customer behaviour.

The theorem is proved on paper. To our knowledge it has no machine-checked proof, and no regular choice model has been formalized on the platform. This mission produces the regular model as a reusable definition, a statement of Theorem 3.3 in which every hypothesis is explicit, and formal versions of the proof's identities and inequalities. The logarithmic step is asserted without proof in the source, so a formal proof of it completes the paper's argument.

Difficulty

Each step is elementary. The difficulty is bookkeeping. The revenue of S∗S^*S∗ has to be regrouped by distinct price levels rather than by products: several products may share a price, and kkk counts values. The regrouping uses an Abel-type rearrangement with the boundary convention Nk+1=0N_{k+1}=0Nk+1​=0. Comparing NiN_iNi​ with the purchase probability of SiS_iSi​ needs regularity twice. First, axiom 4 for products passes from S∗S^*S∗ to S∗∩SiS^*\cap S_iS∗∩Si​. Then the no-purchase case passes from S∗∩SiS^*\cap S_iS∗∩Si​ to SiS_iSi​. A proof that uses axiom 4 only for products fails at the second step, and the claim is false without it.

Formalization scope

  • Products form a finite type C with [Fintype C] [DecidableEq C]. The goal adds [Nonempty C], the paper's k≥1k\ge1k≥1. Offer sets are Finset C, and P\mathcal PP is P : C → Finset C → ℝ. The no-purchase option is not a product: P(0,S)\mathcal P(0,S)P(0,S) is the derived quantity noPurchase P S. IsRegular P carries axioms 1–4, including both no-purchase cases.
  • OPT\mathrm{OPT}OPT is Finset.sup' over all subsets. RO\mathrm{RO}RO is Finset.sup' over the indices 1,…,k1,\dots,k1,…,k of the threshold sets only.
  • Indices are 1-based natural numbers. level r i is rir_iri​ for 1≤i≤k1\le i\le k1≤i≤k. purchaseProfile P r S i is NiN_iNi​ for 1≤i≤k1\le i\le k1≤i≤k and 000 otherwise, which builds in Nk+1=0N_{k+1}=0Nk+1​=0.
  • Optimality is the hypothesis rev(S∗)=OPT\mathrm{rev}(S^*)=\mathrm{OPT}rev(S∗)=OPT. The index ℓ\ellℓ is a variable with hypotheses 1≤ℓ≤k1\le\ell\le k1≤ℓ≤k, Nℓ>0N_\ell>0Nℓ​>0, and Ni≯0N_i\not>0Ni​>0 for ℓ<i≤k\ell<i\le kℓ<i≤k. N1>0N_1>0N1​>0 is kept as in the paper.
  • The approximation factor is stated in product form, OPT≤D⋅RO\mathrm{OPT}\le D\cdot\mathrm{RO}OPT≤D⋅RO, never as a ratio. Both the sum form and the logarithmic form are stated. ln⁡\lnln is Real.log, applied to ν≥1\nu\ge1ν≥1.
  • The milestones other than the goal are stated for an arbitrary S∗S^*S∗, because the proof does not use optimality there.

The following statements are trivial or false and are not this mission: a maximum over all subsets in place of RO\mathrm{RO}RO; regularity without its no-purchase case; a purchase profile taken from a non-optimal set while rev(S∗)\mathrm{rev}(S^*)rev(S∗) is still called the optimum; the logarithmic form alone; a specific choice model (MNL, Markov chain) in place of an arbitrary regular P\mathcal PP.

A complete development needs finite sums regrouped by the values of a function and an elementary logarithm inequality. The regular choice model and the revenue-ordered sets are shared with the other missions of this series and are reusable for any analysis of assortment heuristics. Proofs of any milestone are welcome. So are alternative arguments for the logarithmic step and a proof that NNN is non-increasing.

Selected references

  • G. Berbeglia and G. Joret, Assortment Optimisation Under a General Discrete Choice Model: A Tight Analysis of Revenue-Ordered Assortments, arXiv:1606.01371v3, 2019; Algorithmica 82, 2020. https://arxiv.org/abs/1606.01371v3
  • K. Talluri and G. van Ryzin, Revenue Management Under a General Discrete Choice Model of Consumer Behavior, Management Science 50(1), 2004. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.1030.0147
  • P. Rusmevichientong, D. Shmoys, C. Tong and H. Topaloglu, Assortment Optimization under the Multinomial Logit Model with Random Choice Parameters, Production and Operations Management 23(11), 2014. https://doi.org/10.1111/poms.12191
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Machine LearningReinforcement Learning·Captain: mikedeng1

On the Theory of Policy Gradient Methods: Optimality, Approximation, and Distribution Shift 3: Softmax Policy Gradient Ascent with Step Size η ≤ (1−γ)³/8 Converges to the Optimal ValuesResearch Paper

Motivation

Policy gradient methods optimize a parameterized policy of a Markov decision process by gradient ascent on its expected discounted return. They underlie much of modern reinforcement learning (REINFORCE, actor–critic methods, TRPO, PPO), yet the objective θ↦Vπθ(μ)\theta \mapsto V^{\pi_\theta}(\mu)θ↦Vπθ​(μ) is non-concave in the parameters, and until recently even the most basic question was open: does exact gradient ascent, run on a finite MDP with the standard softmax parameterization, reach the optimal values at all?

Agarwal, Kakade, Lee and Mahajan (arXiv:1908.00261v5, JMLR 22(98), 2021) answer this in the affirmative. Their Theorem 5.1 shows that unregularized softmax policy gradient with a small constant step size converges to the optimal value at every state, provided the start distribution used for the gradient puts positive mass on every state. The result is asymptotic: no rate is given. Later work (Mei, Xiao, Szepesvári and Schuurmans, ICML 2020, arXiv:2005.06392) obtained an O(1/t)O(1/t)O(1/t) rate with constants that can be exponentially large, and the same paper by Agarwal et al. gives polynomial rates once a log-barrier regularizer is added (its Corollary 5.1) or once the natural gradient is used (its Theorem 5.3). Theorem 5.1 is the unregularized baseline for all of these.

Setting

A finite MDP consists of finite sets S\mathcal SS of states and A\mathcal AA of actions (A\mathcal AA nonempty), a transition kernel P(s′∣s,a)P(s'\mid s,a)P(s′∣s,a), rewards r(s,a)∈[0,1]r(s,a)\in[0,1]r(s,a)∈[0,1] and a discount factor γ∈[0,1)\gamma\in[0,1)γ∈[0,1). A policy π\piπ assigns to each state a probability vector π(⋅∣s)\pi(\cdot\mid s)π(⋅∣s) on A\mathcal AA. Its value Vπ(s)V^\pi(s)Vπ(s) is the expected discounted sum of rewards E[∑t≥0γtr(st,at)∣s0=s]\mathbb E[\sum_{t\ge0}\gamma^t r(s_t,a_t)\mid s_0=s]E[∑t≥0​γtr(st​,at​)∣s0​=s] when actions are drawn from π\piπ; its state–action value is Qπ(s,a)=r(s,a)+γ∑s′P(s′∣s,a)Vπ(s′)Q^\pi(s,a)=r(s,a)+\gamma\sum_{s'}P(s'\mid s,a)V^\pi(s')Qπ(s,a)=r(s,a)+γ∑s′​P(s′∣s,a)Vπ(s′) and its advantage is Aπ(s,a)=Qπ(s,a)−Vπ(s)A^\pi(s,a)=Q^\pi(s,a)-V^\pi(s)Aπ(s,a)=Qπ(s,a)−Vπ(s). For a distribution μ\muμ on states, Vπ(μ)=∑sμ(s)Vπ(s)V^\pi(\mu)=\sum_s\mu(s)V^\pi(s)Vπ(μ)=∑s​μ(s)Vπ(s), and the discounted state visitation distribution is dμπ(s)=(1−γ)∑t≥0γtPr⁡π(st=s∣s0∼μ)d^\pi_\mu(s)=(1-\gamma)\sum_{t\ge0}\gamma^t\Pr^\pi(s_t=s\mid s_0\sim\mu)dμπ​(s)=(1−γ)∑t≥0​γtPrπ(st​=s∣s0​∼μ). A policy π⋆\pi^\starπ⋆ is optimal if Vπ(s)≤Vπ⋆(s)V^{\pi}(s)\le V^{\pi^\star}(s)Vπ(s)≤Vπ⋆(s) for every policy π\piπ and every state sss; V⋆=Vπ⋆V^\star=V^{\pi^\star}V⋆=Vπ⋆.

The softmax policy with parameters θ∈R∣S∣∣A∣\theta\in\mathbb R^{|\mathcal S||\mathcal A|}θ∈R∣S∣∣A∣ is

πθ(a∣s)=exp⁡(θs,a)∑a′∈Aexp⁡(θs,a′).\pi_\theta(a\mid s)=\frac{\exp(\theta_{s,a})}{\sum_{a'\in\mathcal A}\exp(\theta_{s,a'})}.πθ​(a∣s)=∑a′∈A​exp(θs,a′​)exp(θs,a​)​.

Softmax policy gradient ascent with step size η\etaη produces, from an arbitrary θ(0)\theta^{(0)}θ(0), the iterates

θ(t+1)=θ(t)+η ∇θV(t)(μ),V(t)=Vπθ(t).\theta^{(t+1)}=\theta^{(t)}+\eta\,\nabla_\theta V^{(t)}(\mu),\qquad V^{(t)}=V^{\pi_{\theta^{(t)}}} .θ(t+1)=θ(t)+η∇θ​V(t)(μ),V(t)=Vπθ(t)​.

The Lean development names these softmaxPolicy, softmaxValue P r γ µ θ =Vπθ(μ)=V^{\pi_\theta}(\mu)=Vπθ​(μ), and IsSoftmaxPGRun P r γ µ η θ for the update rule; PolicyValue, QFunction and IsOptimalPolicy are the published FoundationsML definitions, and valueAt, advantage and visitation are the series' shared layer.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 5.1

If μ(s)>0\mu(s)>0μ(s)>0 for every state and 0<η≤(1−γ)3/80<\eta\le(1-\gamma)^3/80<η≤(1−γ)3/8, then for every state sss

V(t)(s)⟶V⋆(s)(t→∞).V^{(t)}(s)\longrightarrow V^\star(s)\qquad(t\to\infty).V(t)(s)⟶V⋆(s)(t→∞).

Milestones (Appendices C.1 and D)

  1. Lemma C.1, the gradient formula ∂Vπθ(μ)/∂θs,a=11−γdμπθ(s)πθ(a∣s)Aπθ(s,a)\partial V^{\pi_\theta}(\mu)/\partial\theta_{s,a}=\frac1{1-\gamma}d^{\pi_\theta}_\mu(s)\pi_\theta(a\mid s)A^{\pi_\theta}(s,a)∂Vπθ​(μ)/∂θs,a​=1−γ1​dμπθ​​(s)πθ​(a∣s)Aπθ​(s,a).
  2. Lemma D.1, smoothness 5∥c∥∞5\|c\|_\infty5∥c∥∞​ of θs↦∑aπθ(a∣s)ca\theta_s\mapsto\sum_a\pi_\theta(a\mid s)c_aθs​↦∑a​πθ​(a∣s)ca​.
  3. Lemma D.4 at λ=0\lambda=0λ=0, smoothness 8/(1−γ)38/(1-\gamma)^38/(1−γ)3 of θ↦Vπθ(μ)\theta\mapsto V^{\pi_\theta}(\mu)θ↦Vπθ​(μ).
  4. Lemma C.2, pointwise monotone improvement of V(t)(s)V^{(t)}(s)V(t)(s) and Q(t)(s,a)Q^{(t)}(s,a)Q(t)(s,a) for η≤(1−γ)2/5\eta\le(1-\gamma)^2/5η≤(1−γ)2/5.
  5. Lemma C.3, existence of the limits V(∞)V^{(\infty)}V(∞), Q(∞)Q^{(\infty)}Q(∞) and the bound (40).
  6. Lemma C.4, eventual sign separation (41) of the advantages on I+s={a:Q(∞)(s,a)>V(∞)(s)}I^s_+=\{a:Q^{(\infty)}(s,a)>V^{(\infty)}(s)\}I+s​={a:Q(∞)(s,a)>V(∞)(s)} and I−s={a:Q(∞)(s,a)<V(∞)(s)}I^s_-=\{a:Q^{(\infty)}(s,a)<V^{(\infty)}(s)\}I−s​={a:Q(∞)(s,a)<V(∞)(s)}.
  7. Lemma C.5, vanishing gradients, π(t)(a∣s)→0\pi^{(t)}(a\mid s)\to0π(t)(a∣s)→0 off I0s={a:Q(∞)(s,a)=V(∞)(s)}I^s_0=\{a:Q^{(\infty)}(s,a)=V^{(\infty)}(s)\}I0s​={a:Q(∞)(s,a)=V(∞)(s)}, and ∑a∈I0sπ(t)(a∣s)→1\sum_{a\in I^s_0}\pi^{(t)}(a\mid s)\to1∑a∈I0s​​π(t)(a∣s)→1.
  8. Lemma C.6, eventual strict monotonicity of θs,a(t)\theta^{(t)}_{s,a}θs,a(t)​ on I±sI^s_\pmI±s​.
  9. Lemma C.7, divergence of max⁡a∈I0sθs,a(t)\max_{a\in I^s_0}\theta^{(t)}_{s,a}maxa∈I0s​​θs,a(t)​ and min⁡aθs,a(t)\min_a\theta^{(t)}_{s,a}mina​θs,a(t)​ when I+s≠∅I^s_+\neq\emptysetI+s​=∅.
  10. Lemma C.11, lower boundedness of θs,a(t)\theta^{(t)}_{s,a}θs,a(t)​ on I+sI^s_+I+s​ and θs,a(t)→−∞\theta^{(t)}_{s,a}\to-\inftyθs,a(t)​→−∞ on I−sI^s_-I−s​.

The goal states only convergence to the optimal values, with the paper's constants in the step-size bound; no rate is claimed.

Significance

The theorem establishes that the non-concavity of the softmax objective does not trap exact gradient ascent: from any initialization, the values of the iterates converge to V⋆V^\starV⋆ at every state, not only on average under μ\muμ. It is the reference point for the rate results of the same paper (log-barrier regularization, natural policy gradient) and for the subsequent literature on softmax policy gradient rates and lower bounds. It also isolates the role of exploration in the start distribution: Remark 5.1 of the paper leaves open whether μ>0\mu>0μ>0 can be dropped.

The result is proved in the paper; to the knowledge of the mission authors none of it is formalized in Lean or any other proof assistant. A complete development would provide a machine-checked gradient formula for the softmax class, smoothness bounds for discounted values, and a monotone-improvement argument for policy gradient, each reusable for other parameterizations and other policy optimization methods.

Difficulty

The obvious route fails. The gradient domination property of the direct parameterization (Lemma 4.1 of the paper) would conclude from ∇πVπ(μ)→0\nabla_\pi V^\pi(\mu)\to0∇π​Vπ(μ)→0, but under softmax ∂V/∂θs,a=πθ(a∣s) ∂V/∂πθ(a∣s)\partial V/\partial\theta_{s,a}=\pi_\theta(a\mid s)\,\partial V/\partial\pi_\theta(a\mid s)∂V/∂θs,a​=πθ​(a∣s)∂V/∂πθ​(a∣s), so a vanishing θ\thetaθ-gradient says nothing once some action probabilities vanish, and the iterates do drive probabilities to zero while parameters diverge. A smoothness-based argument therefore gives only stationarity in the limit. The asymptotic analysis must instead track which actions keep positive limiting advantage, how the individual parameters θs,a(t)\theta^{(t)}_{s,a}θs,a(t)​ move once the advantage signs are frozen, and why an action with strictly positive limiting advantage cannot coexist with the behaviour of the remaining parameters. Lemmas C.7–C.12 carry that bookkeeping; the limiting sets I0s,I±sI^s_0, I^s_\pmI0s​,I±s​ and the existence of the limits are themselves consequences of the pointwise monotone improvement of Lemma C.2, which needs its own smoothness bound.

Formalization scope

Standing setting of §3: finite types S, A with decidable equality, A nonempty; IsFiniteMDP P r γ (a transition kernel, rewards in [0,1][0,1][0,1], 0≤γ<10\le\gamma<10≤γ<1); IsDist µ. Parameters live in EuclideanSpace ℝ (S × A), so norms are ℓ2\ell_2ℓ2​ and Mathlib's gradient is ∇θ\nabla_\theta∇θ​; the coordinate (s,a)(s,a)(s,a) of the gradient is ∂/∂θs,a\partial/\partial\theta_{s,a}∂/∂θs,a​. Logarithms do not appear. Conventions committed to:

  • V⋆(s)V^\star(s)V⋆(s) is PolicyValue πstar P r γ s for a policy πstar with IsOptimalPolicy πstar P r γ, optimal simultaneously at every state; it is not a real supremum over all functions.
  • The step size satisfies 0<η0<\eta0<η, which "gradient ascent" presupposes and the page does not write; at η=0\eta=0η=0 the theorem is false.
  • μ(s)>0\mu(s)>0μ(s)>0 for every sss is a hypothesis of the goal and of Lemmas C.5–C.11; Lemmas C.1–C.4 are stated without it, and Lemma C.1 for an arbitrary real weighting μ\muμ.
  • In Lemmas C.4–C.11 the limits V(∞)V^{(\infty)}V(∞), Q(∞)Q^{(\infty)}Q(∞) are parameters with the hypotheses that they are the limits of V(t)V^{(t)}V(t), Q(t)Q^{(t)}Q(t). The paper's Δ=min⁡A(∞)(s,a)≠0∣A(∞)(s,a)∣\Delta=\min_{A^{(\infty)}(s,a)\neq0}|A^{(\infty)}(s,a)|Δ=minA(∞)(s,a)=0​∣A(∞)(s,a)∣ is replaced by any Δ>0\Delta>0Δ>0 bounded by every nonzero ∣A(∞)(s,a)∣|A^{(\infty)}(s,a)|∣A(∞)(s,a)∣, which avoids an undefined minimum over an empty set.
  • "→±∞\to\pm\infty→±∞" is Tendsto … atTop atTop / atBot; "strictly increasing for t≥T1t\ge T_1t≥T1​" is StrictMonoOn on Set.Ici T1, with T1T_1T1​ existentially quantified.

The goal theorem does not assume the existence of limits, monotonicity of the iterates, or anything about the sets I0s,I±sI^s_0, I^s_\pmI0s​,I±s​; a formalization that did would assume the substance of the proof. Lemmas C.7 and C.11 (first part) carry the hypothesis I+s≠∅I^s_+\neq\emptysetI+s​=∅ of the paper's proof by contradiction, which no actual run satisfies once Theorem 5.1 is proved; they are steps of that argument.

A full development needs: differentiability of θ↦Vπθ\theta\mapsto V^{\pi_\theta}θ↦Vπθ​ and the policy gradient theorem in the occupancy-measure form, the performance difference lemma, the descent lemma for LLL-smooth functions, and Hessian bounds for the softmax map. Contributions to any of these, to the optional Lemmas C.8–C.10 and C.12 of the paper, or to the final contradiction argument are welcome.

Selected references

  • A. Agarwal, S. M. Kakade, J. D. Lee, G. Mahajan, On the Theory of Policy Gradient Methods: Optimality, Approximation, and Distribution Shift, JMLR 22(98), 2021; arXiv:1908.00261v5. https://arxiv.org/abs/1908.00261
  • J. Mei, C. Xiao, C. Szepesvári, D. Schuurmans, On the Global Convergence Rates of Softmax Policy Gradient Methods, ICML 2020. https://arxiv.org/abs/2005.06392
  • S. Kakade, J. Langford, Approximately Optimal Approximate Reinforcement Learning, ICML 2002. https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.5555/645531.656005
  • R. S. Sutton, D. McAllester, S. Singh, Y. Mansour, Policy Gradient Methods for Reinforcement Learning with Function Approximation, NeurIPS 1999. https://papers.nips.cc/paper/1713-policy-gradient-methods-for-reinforcement-learning-with-function-approximation
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Adaptive Subgradient Methods for Online Learning and Stochastic Optimization 2: Full-Matrix AdaGrad's Regret Is Bounded by tr(G_T^{1/2})Research Paper

Motivation

Online convex optimization is the standard model for learning from a stream of data: in round ttt a learner commits to a point xtx_txt​ in a convex set X⊆Rd\mathcal X\subseteq\mathbb R^dX⊆Rd, a convex loss ftf_tft​ is revealed, and the learner pays ft(xt)+φ(xt)f_t(x_t)+\varphi(x_t)ft​(xt​)+φ(xt​), where φ\varphiφ is a fixed regularizer. Subgradient methods for this model use one fixed geometry (usually the Euclidean one) for every coordinate and every direction, regardless of the data. Duchi, Hazan and Singer (JMLR 12 (2011) 2121–2159) introduced ADAGRAD, which adapts the geometry to the observed subgradients. The diagonal version is one of the most widely used optimizers in machine learning and the ancestor of RMSProp and Adam. This mission formalizes the paper's full-matrix version: the proximal term is built from the matrix square root of the accumulated outer products of the subgradients, so the method adapts to correlated directions, not only to individual coordinates.

The analysis extends the regret bounds of primal-dual subgradient methods and regularized dual averaging (Nesterov 2009; Xiao 2010) and of composite mirror descent to proximal functions that change over time, and combines them with trace inequalities for the matrix square root. Concurrent work by McMahan and Streeter (COLT 2010) studied closely related adaptive proximal methods.

Setting

Vectors live in Rd\mathbb R^dRd with the Euclidean inner product ⟨⋅,⋅⟩\langle\cdot,\cdot\rangle⟨⋅,⋅⟩ and norm ∥⋅∥2\|\cdot\|_2∥⋅∥2​. In round t=1,2,…t=1,2,\dotst=1,2,… the learner plays xt∈Xx_t\in\mathcal Xxt​∈X and observes a subgradient gt∈∂ft(xt)g_t\in\partial f_t(x_t)gt​∈∂ft​(xt​), that is, ft(y)≥ft(xt)+⟨gt,y−xt⟩f_t(y)\ge f_t(x_t)+\langle g_t,y-x_t\rangleft​(y)≥ft​(xt​)+⟨gt​,y−xt​⟩ for all yyy. The regret against a comparator x∗∈Xx^*\in\mathcal Xx∗∈X is

Rϕ(T)=∑t=1T[ft(xt)+φ(xt)−ft(x∗)−φ(x∗)].R_\phi(T)=\sum_{t=1}^T\big[f_t(x_t)+\varphi(x_t)-f_t(x^*)-\varphi(x^*)\big].Rϕ​(T)=t=1∑T​[ft​(xt​)+φ(xt​)−ft​(x∗)−φ(x∗)].

The outer product matrix is Gt=∑τ=1tgτgτ⊤G_t=\sum_{\tau=1}^t g_\tau g_\tau^\topGt​=∑τ=1t​gτ​gτ⊤​, a symmetric positive semidefinite d×dd\times dd×d matrix, and St=Gt1/2S_t=G_t^{1/2}St​=Gt1/2​ is its positive semidefinite square root. With parameters η>0\eta>0η>0 and δ≥0\delta\ge0δ≥0, ADAGRAD with full matrices (Figure 2 of the paper) sets

Ht=δI+St,ψt(x)=12⟨x,Htx⟩,Bψt(x,y)=12⟨x−y,Ht(x−y)⟩,H_t=\delta I+S_t,\qquad \psi_t(x)=\tfrac12\langle x,H_tx\rangle,\qquad B_{\psi_t}(x,y)=\tfrac12\langle x-y,H_t(x-y)\rangle,Ht​=δI+St​,ψt​(x)=21​⟨x,Ht​x⟩,Bψt​​(x,y)=21​⟨x−y,Ht​(x−y)⟩,

starts at x1=0x_1=0x1​=0, and computes xt+1x_{t+1}xt+1​ by one of two updates:

  • the primal-dual subgradient update (3): xt+1∈argmin⁡x∈X{η⟨1t∑τ≤tgτ,x⟩+ηφ(x)+1tψt(x)}x_{t+1}\in\operatorname{argmin}_{x\in\mathcal X}\{\eta\langle\tfrac1t\sum_{\tau\le t}g_\tau,x\rangle+\eta\varphi(x)+\tfrac1t\psi_t(x)\}xt+1​∈argminx∈X​{η⟨t1​∑τ≤t​gτ​,x⟩+ηφ(x)+t1​ψt​(x)};
  • the composite mirror descent update (4): xt+1∈argmin⁡x∈X{η⟨gt,x⟩+ηφ(x)+Bψt(x,xt)}x_{t+1}\in\operatorname{argmin}_{x\in\mathcal X}\{\eta\langle g_t,x\rangle+\eta\varphi(x)+B_{\psi_t}(x,x_t)\}xt+1​∈argminx∈X​{η⟨gt​,x⟩+ηφ(x)+Bψt​​(x,xt​)}.

The dual (semi)norm of ψt\psi_tψt​ is ∥v∥ψt∗2=⟨v,Ht†v⟩\|v\|_{\psi_t^*}^2=\langle v,H_t^\dagger v\rangle∥v∥ψt∗​2​=⟨v,Ht†​v⟩, where A†A^\daggerA† is the pseudo-inverse.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 7

Assume X\mathcal XX closed and convex, ftf_tft​ and φ\varphiφ convex, and φ\varphiφ minimized over X\mathcal XX at x1=0x_1=0x1​=0. For the primal-dual update with δ≥max⁡t≤T∥gt∥2\delta\ge\max_{t\le T}\|g_t\|_2δ≥maxt≤T​∥gt​∥2​, every x∗∈Xx^*\in\mathcal Xx∗∈X satisfies

Rϕ(T)≤δη∥x∗∥22+1η∥x∗∥22tr⁡(GT1/2)+ηtr⁡(GT1/2),R_\phi(T)\le\frac\delta\eta\|x^*\|_2^2+\frac1\eta\|x^*\|_2^2\operatorname{tr}(G_T^{1/2})+\eta\operatorname{tr}(G_T^{1/2}),Rϕ​(T)≤ηδ​∥x∗∥22​+η1​∥x∗∥22​tr(GT1/2​)+ηtr(GT1/2​),

and for the composite mirror descent update with any δ≥0\delta\ge0δ≥0,

Rϕ(T)≤δη∥x∗∥22+12ηmax⁡t≤T∥x∗−xt∥22tr⁡(GT1/2)+ηtr⁡(GT1/2).R_\phi(T)\le\frac\delta\eta\|x^*\|_2^2+\frac1{2\eta}\max_{t\le T}\|x^*-x_t\|_2^2\operatorname{tr}(G_T^{1/2})+\eta\operatorname{tr}(G_T^{1/2}).Rϕ​(T)≤ηδ​∥x∗∥22​+2η1​t≤Tmax​∥x∗−xt​∥22​tr(GT1/2​)+ηtr(GT1/2​).

Milestones

In the order the proof uses them:

  1. Lemma 16 and Propositions 3 and 2: regret bounds for mirror descent and dual averaging with time-varying quadratic proximal functions ψt(x)=12⟨x,Htx⟩\psi_t(x)=\tfrac12\langle x,H_tx\rangleψt​(x)=21​⟨x,Ht​x⟩ ((11) and (10)).
  2. Lemma 13: A⪰B⪰0A\succeq B\succeq0A⪰B⪰0 implies A1/2⪰B1/2A^{1/2}\succeq B^{1/2}A1/2⪰B1/2.
  3. The first display of the proof of Theorem 7 and inequality (16): the growth of the Bregman terms is controlled by tr⁡(Gt1/2)\operatorname{tr}(G_t^{1/2})tr(Gt1/2​).
  4. Lemma 14 (∇Xtr⁡(Xp)=pXp−1\nabla_X\operatorname{tr}(X^p)=pX^{p-1}∇X​tr(Xp)=pXp−1), Lemma 8 (a first-order concavity inequality for tr⁡(B1/2)\operatorname{tr}(B^{1/2})tr(B1/2) at singular BBB), Lemma 9, and Lemma 10, the doubling lemma
∑t=1T⟨gt,St†gt⟩≤2∑t=1T⟨gt,ST†gt⟩=2tr⁡(GT1/2).\sum_{t=1}^T\langle g_t,S_t^\dagger g_t\rangle\le2\sum_{t=1}^T\langle g_t,S_T^\dagger g_t\rangle=2\operatorname{tr}(G_T^{1/2}).t=1∑T​⟨gt​,St†​gt​⟩≤2t=1∑T​⟨gt​,ST†​gt​⟩=2tr(GT1/2​).
  1. (17): the dual-norm sums of both updates are at most 2tr⁡(GT1/2)2\operatorname{tr}(G_T^{1/2})2tr(GT1/2​).

Significance

The quantity tr⁡(GT1/2)\operatorname{tr}(G_T^{1/2})tr(GT1/2​) can be much smaller than the Tmax⁡t∥gt∥2\sqrt{T}\max_t\|g_t\|_2T​maxt​∥gt​∥2​ factor in the regret of non-adaptive online gradient descent with a tuned step size: it is small when the subgradients concentrate in a few directions, possibly not aligned with the coordinate axes. The paper's Corollary 11 rewrites it as d\sqrt dd​ times the square root of inf⁡{∑tgt⊤S−1gt:S⪰0,tr⁡(S)≤d}\inf\{\sum_t g_t^\top S^{-1}g_t: S\succeq0,\operatorname{tr}(S)\le d\}inf{∑t​gt⊤​S−1gt​:S⪰0,tr(S)≤d}, the gradient term of the best fixed full-matrix proximal function chosen in hindsight. The supporting results have their own uses. Propositions 2 and 3 are the generic regret bounds for adaptive proximal methods. Lemmas 8–10 are trace inequalities for the matrix square root that appear throughout the analysis of second-order online methods.

The results are proved in the paper. To our knowledge none of them has a machine-checked proof. Formalizing them requires the matrix functional calculus (square roots, pseudo-inverses, real powers) in a form usable for inequalities, which Mathlib has only partly: for instance, monotonicity of the square root is in Mathlib for C*-algebras, which covers complex but not real matrices. A complete development gives a verified regret bound for an adaptive full-matrix method together with these matrix inequalities.

Difficulty

The online-learning half (Lemma 16, Propositions 2 and 3) is a convex-analysis argument once the proximal functions are quadratic. The obstacle is the matrix half. The natural approach to Lemma 10 is induction with a scalar inequality b−a≤b−a/(2b)\sqrt{b-a}\le\sqrt b-a/(2\sqrt b)b−a​≤b​−a/(2b​) applied eigenvalue by eigenvalue. This fails because GT−1G_{T-1}GT−1​ and GTG_TGT​ do not commute, so their eigenvectors differ. One needs the concavity of A↦tr⁡(A1/2)A\mapsto\operatorname{tr}(A^{1/2})A↦tr(A1/2) on positive semidefinite matrices and its gradient, at points where AAA may be singular. That is where Lemma 8 and the pseudo-inverse enter: the inverse root does not exist, and a limit δ↓0\delta\downarrow0δ↓0 is needed. The same issue arises in Lemma 9 and in the dual norm when δ=0\delta=0δ=0.

Formalization scope

Vectors are EuclideanSpace ℝ (Fin d), so ‖·‖ is the Euclidean norm. Matrices are Matrix (Fin d) (Fin d) ℝ, acting on vectors through Matrix.toEuclideanLin. The square root is Mathlib's CFC.sqrt under the Loewner order (MatrixOrder). The pseudo-inverse is the functional calculus of λ↦λ−1\lambda\mapsto\lambda^{-1}λ↦λ−1 with 0−1=00^{-1}=00−1=0, and B−1/2B^{-1/2}B−1/2 is written as (B†)1/2(B^\dagger)^{1/2}(B†)1/2. Mathlib's matrix inverse is used only where the matrix is invertible or the vector is zero. Rounds are 1-based and G0=0G_0=0G0​=0. The losses and φ\varphiφ are real-valued convex functions, and the constraint is carried by X\mathcal XX. Each update's argmin is a predicate (the next iterate lies in X\mathcal XX and minimizes the objective there), which does not assert existence or uniqueness. A run consists of the TTT rounds of Figure 2, with the subgradient relation imposed in every round. The subgradient relation is the platform's published ShorNonsmooth.AlmostDiff.IsSubgradient.

Restrictions and conventions, each stated in the item that needs it:

  • φ\varphiφ is minimized over X\mathcal XX at x1=0x_1=0x1​=0. This is the paper's x1=arg⁡min⁡Xφx_1=\arg\min_{\mathcal X}\varphix1​=argminX​φ. Without it both parts of Theorem 7 are false.
  • Lemma 8 assumes ν≥0\nu\ge0ν≥0. The page says "for any ν\nuν", but the inequality fails for ν<0\nu<0ν<0 (for B=0B=0B=0, ν=−1\nu=-1ν=−1 it reads 2∥g∥2≤02\|g\|_2\le02∥g∥2​≤0). The paper only applies the lemma with ν=1\nu=1ν=1.
  • Lemma 16 and Propositions 2, 3 are specialised to quadratic proximal functions. In Lemma 16 and Proposition 3, HtH_tHt​ is positive semidefinite and gtg_tgt​ lies in its range, so the dual norm is finite. In Proposition 2, HtH_tHt​ is positive definite, the HtH_tHt​ increase, and x1=0x_1=0x1​=0. Lemma 16 asks for x∗∈Xx^*\in\mathcal Xx∗∈X. Proposition 3 is stated for T≥1T\ge1T≥1 rounds.
  • H0=δIH_0=\delta IH0​=δI in the dual norm ∥⋅∥ψ0∗\|\cdot\|_{\psi_0^*}∥⋅∥ψ0∗​​ of (17) and Theorem 7. Figure 2's H0=0H_0=0H0​=0 is never used by the updates.
  • Lemma 14's gradient is stated as a directional derivative along every symmetric direction.

A formalization in which the next iterate need not lie in X\mathcal XX, the comparator ranges outside X\mathcal XX, StS_tSt​ is GtG_tGt​ itself or its entrywise square root, or St†S_t^\daggerSt†​ is Mathlib's matrix inverse (which vanishes on singular matrices), states a different theorem and is excluded.

Proofs need the convex-analysis optimality conditions for the two updates, the Loewner-order calculus of CFC.sqrt on real matrices (Lemma 13), concavity and differentiability of tr⁡(A1/2)\operatorname{tr}(A^{1/2})tr(A1/2), and limits δ↓0\delta\downarrow0δ↓0 in the functional calculus. The matrix lemmas (13, 14, 8, 9, 10) are reusable outside this paper. Alternative proofs, for instance of Lemma 10 through operator concavity, are welcome.

Selected references

  • J. Duchi, E. Hazan, Y. Singer, Adaptive Subgradient Methods for Online Learning and Stochastic Optimization, Journal of Machine Learning Research 12 (2011) 2121–2159. https://jmlr.org/papers/v12/duchi11a.html
  • H. B. McMahan, M. Streeter, Adaptive Bound Optimization for Online Convex Optimization, COLT 2010. https://arxiv.org/abs/1002.4908
  • L. Xiao, Dual Averaging Methods for Regularized Stochastic Learning and Online Optimization, Journal of Machine Learning Research 11 (2010) 2543–2596. https://jmlr.org/papers/v11/xiao10a.html
  • Y. Nesterov, Primal-dual subgradient methods for convex problems, Mathematical Programming 120 (2009) 221–259. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10107-007-0149-x
  • T. Ando, Concavity of certain maps on positive definite matrices and applications to Hadamard products, Linear Algebra and its Applications 26 (1979) 203–241. https://doi.org/10.1016/0024-3795(79)90179-4
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Convex OptimizationNumerical Analysis·Captain: mikedeng1

Distributed Optimization and Statistical Learning via the Alternating Direction Method of Multipliers III: Parallel Projections — the Dual Average Vanishes and ADMM Reduces to Project-and-AverageTextbook

Motivation

Many feasibility problems ask for a point satisfying several constraints at once. When each constraint set admits a manageable Euclidean projection, a parallel method can project onto all sets independently and combine the results. Chapter 5 of Boyd, Parikh, Chu, Peleato and Eckstein (2011) places this construction inside the alternating direction method of multipliers (ADMM). That connection matters when a single projection onto the intersection is difficult but projections onto its individual factors are available.

The chapter first rewrites constrained convex optimization as a split problem. It then treats feasibility for two sets and finally an arbitrary finite collection of sets. For the latter, the product of the sets captures the separate constraints, while a consensus set forces all copies of the variable to agree. These are ordinary finite dimensional convex sets, so the account applies to geometric feasibility and to constrained optimization subproblems in which projection is the computational primitive. The mission isolates the identities that let the product-space algorithm run through parallel individual projections and one average.

Setting

A Euclidean projection of a vector vvv onto a set CCC is a point p∈Cp\in Cp∈C closest to vvv in Euclidean distance. Each set Ai⊆Rn\mathcal A_i\subseteq\mathbb R^nAi​⊆Rn, for i=1,…,Ni=1,\ldots,Ni=1,…,N, is assumed nonempty, closed and convex, and N≥1N\ge1N≥1. These properties give a unique projection for every input. They do not require the common intersection ⋂iAi\bigcap_i\mathcal A_i⋂i​Ai​ to be nonempty: the iteration and the algebraic identities still make sense when the feasibility problem has no solution.

A block vector x=(x1,…,xN)x=(x_1,\ldots,x_N)x=(x1​,…,xN​) belongs to the product set C=A1×⋯×AN\mathcal C=\mathcal A_1\times\cdots\times\mathcal A_NC=A1​×⋯×AN​ exactly when xi∈Aix_i\in\mathcal A_ixi​∈Ai​ for all iii. The consensus set D\mathcal DD consists of constant block vectors (z,…,z)(z,\ldots,z)(z,…,z). The block average is xˉ=N−1∑ixi\bar x=N^{-1}\sum_i x_ixˉ=N−1∑i​xi​. Distances in the stacked space use the ordinary Euclidean metric, whose square is ∑i∥xi−yi∥22\sum_i\|x_i-y_i\|_2^2∑i​∥xi​−yi​∥22​. A block vector need not carry a function-space norm in the formalization for this metric to be stated precisely.

Starting with arbitrary z0∈Rnz^0\in\mathbb R^nz0∈Rn and u0=(ui0)u^0=(u_i^0)u0=(ui0​), the parallel projection ADMM run has three updates: each xik+1x_i^{k+1}xik+1​ is the projection of zk−uikz^k-u_i^kzk−uik​ onto Ai\mathcal A_iAi​; zk+1z^{k+1}zk+1 is the average of xik+1+uikx_i^{k+1}+u_i^kxik+1​+uik​; and uik+1=uik+xik+1−zk+1u_i^{k+1}=u_i^k+x_i^{k+1}-z^{k+1}uik+1​=uik​+xik+1​−zk+1. The uiku_i^kuik​ are scaled dual variables, formed using a penalty parameter ρ>0\rho>0ρ>0. The source presents these equations as the specialization of scaled ADMM for the indicator functions of C\mathcal CC and D\mathcal DD §5.1.2, pp. 35–36.

Formalization targets

The first targets identify the projections that make the iteration parallel:

ΠC(x)=(ΠA1(x1),…,ΠAN(xN)),ΠD(x)=(xˉ,…,xˉ).\Pi_{\mathcal C}(x)=(\Pi_{\mathcal A_1}(x_1),\ldots,\Pi_{\mathcal A_N}(x_N)),\qquad \Pi_{\mathcal D}(x)=(\bar x,\ldots,\bar x).ΠC​(x)=(ΠA1​​(x1​),…,ΠAN​​(xN​)),ΠD​(x)=(xˉ,…,xˉ).

The goal is the full reduction of a run. Its dual average is zero after every update, and its common vector equals the primal average from the following update onward:

uˉk+1=0(k≥0),zk+1=xˉk+1(k≥1).\bar u^{k+1}=0\quad(k\ge0),\qquad z^{k+1}=\bar x^{k+1}\quad(k\ge1).uˉk+1=0(k≥0),zk+1=xˉk+1(k≥1).

Consequently, for every k≥2k\ge2k≥2 and every iii, the same iterates obey the simpler two-line algorithm

xik+1=ΠAi(xˉk−uik),uik+1=uik+xik+1−xˉk+1.x_i^{k+1}=\Pi_{\mathcal A_i}(\bar x^k-u_i^k),\qquad u_i^{k+1}=u_i^k+x_i^{k+1}-\bar x^{k+1}.xik+1​=ΠAi​​(xˉk−uik​),uik+1​=uik​+xik+1​−xˉk+1.

If uˉ0=0\bar u^0=0uˉ0=0, those last identities hold already for k≥1k\ge1k≥1. The index qualification is necessary because z0z^0z0 is arbitrary, and z1z^1z1 still contains the initial dual average unless that average was zero. This is the precise reading of the source's “after the first step” statement §5.1.2, p. 36. The milestone list also records the indicator-function projection update on p. 33 and the averaged identities on p. 36.

Significance

The result identifies what information must pass between the parallel projection steps: each local step needs the shared average and its own dual displacement. It also fixes the relationship between the displayed three-variable ADMM iteration and the shorter project-and-average rule. Without the dual-average identity, replacing zkz^kzk by xˉk\bar x^kxˉk is not justified at the initial indices. The product and consensus projection identities explain why the update can be decomposed into independent local projections followed by a mean §5.1.2, p. 35.

The chapter's identities are known mathematical results; this mission asks for machine-checked proofs of their stated finite dimensional version. A completed development supplies reusable statements about nearest-point projection onto products and diagonal sets, and a precise run predicate for later analysis of parallel ADMM. The goal is a statement about every valid run rather than a claim of convergence or existence of a feasible common point. Neither convergence nor feasibility of the intersection is concluded on these pages. Those distinctions keep the mission aligned with the actual scope of Chapter 5.

Difficulty

The product projection uses a sum of squared component distances. Treating a block vector as an arbitrary function and applying its default norm would change the metric, so a projection theorem stated that way would describe a different algorithm. The consensus projection likewise depends on the Euclidean sum and the finite average, including the condition N≥1N\ge1N≥1. The run reduction has a separate indexing difficulty: the vanishing average follows after one dual update, but the first simplified projection step can occur later because it uses the previous common vector. An argument that silently assumes z0=xˉ0z^0=\bar x^0z0=xˉ0 would erase the arbitrary initialization on the source page.

Formalization scope

Lean represents each Rn\mathbb R^nRn as EuclideanSpace ℝ (Fin n) and the NNN blocks as a function on Fin N; the latter is the source's 111-based indexing shifted to 000-based indices. Squared stacked distance is defined as the sum of squared component norms. The average uses the real factor 1/N1/N1/N only under 0<N0<N0<N. Individual projections reuse the published nearest-point relation RandomGradFree.Nonsmooth.IsMetricProjection. A run records the three updates as conditions on sequences, with arbitrary z0,u0z^0,u^0z0,u0 and unused x0x^0x0. The source's scaled dual variable uuu appears directly; ρ\rhoρ cancels from these projection updates once it is positive.

The source assumes closed convex sets; nonemptiness is stated explicitly here because a projection onto an empty set does not exist. The book prints −zk-z^k−zk in its averaged dual update on p. 36, while its defining update on p. 35 and the next line on p. 36 require −zk+1-z^{k+1}−zk+1. The formal statement uses the corrected index. The book also calls the individual sets Ci\mathcal C_iCi​ in its closing sentence; the sets defined for this subsection are Ai\mathcal A_iAi​. The milestone quote preserves the printed intermediate index. The goal includes the simplified primal and dual updates, since asserting only that the dual average vanishes would omit the chapter's advertised reduction.

The development needs finite sums in Euclidean spaces, convex-set projection, and elementary properties of product and diagonal sets. Product and consensus projection results are useful beyond ADMM. Contributions proving the four milestones, the full run theorem, or equivalent projection lemmas at the same generality are within scope.

Selected references

  • S. Boyd, N. Parikh, E. Chu, B. Peleato and J. Eckstein, Distributed Optimization and Statistical Learning via the Alternating Direction Method of Multipliers, Foundations and Trends in Machine Learning 3(1), 2011, pp. 1–122. DOI: 10.1561/2200000016.
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Operations ResearchOptimal TransportProbability·Captain: mikedeng1

Quantifying Distributional Model Risk via Optimal Transport 3: A Worst-Case Transport Plan Exists in a Locally Compact Normed Space under Growth Conditions on c and fResearch Paper

Motivation

In distributionally robust modelling, a baseline probability model μ\muμ on a space SSS is distrusted, and the analyst reports the largest expected loss over every model within a budget of μ\muμ. Blanchet and Murthy (arXiv:1604.01446; Math. Oper. Res. 44(2), 2019, doi:10.1287/moor.2018.0936) measure the budget with an optimal transport cost and prove strong duality for the resulting worst-case expectation on an arbitrary Polish space, with a lower semicontinuous cost and an upper semicontinuous performance function. Duality computes the worst-case value. A risk manager also wants the worst-case model: a distribution that attains the value, whose structure explains which perturbation of μ\muμ is most harmful.

Such a model need not exist. Unlike the Kantorovich problem, where the set of couplings with two fixed marginals is weakly compact, the feasible set here fixes only one marginal and is not compact in general. Section 5 of the paper gives an example on R\mathbb RR where the supremum is not attained, then gives abstract conditions under which it is (Proposition 9), and growth conditions on a locally compact normed space that imply them (Corollary 1). Related existence results in Rd\mathbb R^dRd were obtained by Gao and Kleywegt (arXiv:1604.02199, 2016) and, for empirical baselines and norm costs, by Mohajerin Esfahani and Kuhn (arXiv:1505.05116, 2018).

Setting

Let SSS be a Polish space with its Borel σ\sigmaσ-algebra, μ\muμ a probability measure on SSS, δ>0\delta>0δ>0 a budget, c:S×S→[0,∞)c:S\times S\to[0,\infty)c:S×S→[0,∞) a cost and f:S→Rf:S\to\mathbb Rf:S→R a performance function. The standing assumptions are:

  • (A1) ccc is lower semicontinuous and c(x,y)=0c(x,y)=0c(x,y)=0 iff x=yx=yx=y;
  • (A2) fff is upper semicontinuous and μ\muμ-integrable.

The primal feasible set Φμ,δ\Phi_{\mu,\delta}Φμ,δ​ consists of the probability measures π\piπ on S×SS\times SS×S with first marginal μ\muμ and ∫c dπ≤δ\int c\,d\pi\le\delta∫cdπ≤δ (transport plans out of μ\muμ of cost at most δ\deltaδ). The primal objective is I(π)=∫f(y) dπ(x,y)I(\pi)=\int f(y)\,d\pi(x,y)I(π)=∫f(y)dπ(x,y) and the primal value is I=sup⁡{I(π):π∈Φμ,δ}I=\sup\{I(\pi):\pi\in\Phi_{\mu,\delta}\}I=sup{I(π):π∈Φμ,δ​}. The dual feasible set Λc,f\Lambda_{c,f}Λc,f​ consists of pairs (λ,φ)(\lambda,\varphi)(λ,φ) with λ≥0\lambda\ge0λ≥0, φ:S→[−∞,∞]\varphi:S\to[-\infty,\infty]φ:S→[−∞,∞] universally measurable and φ(x)+λc(x,y)≥f(y)\varphi(x)+\lambda c(x,y)\ge f(y)φ(x)+λc(x,y)≥f(y) for all x,yx,yx,y. The dual objective is J(λ,φ)=λδ+∫φ dμJ(\lambda,\varphi)=\lambda\delta+\int\varphi\,d\muJ(λ,φ)=λδ+∫φdμ and the dual value is J=inf⁡J(λ,φ)J=\inf J(\lambda,\varphi)J=infJ(λ,φ). For λ≥0\lambda\ge0λ≥0 put φλ(x)=sup⁡y{f(y)−λc(x,y)}\varphi_\lambda(x)=\sup_y\{f(y)-\lambda c(x,y)\}φλ​(x)=supy​{f(y)−λc(x,y)}.

Section 5 assumes throughout that (λ∗,φλ∗)∈Λc,f(\lambda^*,\varphi_{\lambda^*})\in\Lambda_{c,f}(λ∗,φλ∗​)∈Λc,f​ is a dual optimal pair with I=J=J(λ∗,φλ∗)<∞I=J=J(\lambda^*,\varphi_{\lambda^*})<\inftyI=J=J(λ∗,φλ∗​)<∞. Write Φμ,δ′\Phi'_{\mu,\delta}Φμ,δ′​ for the plans in Φμ,δ\Phi_{\mu,\delta}Φμ,δ​ concentrated on {f(x)≤f(y)}\{f(x)\le f(y)\}{f(x)≤f(y)}.

(P-Compactness): for every ε>0\varepsilon>0ε>0 there are a compact KεK_\varepsilonKε​ with μ(Kε)>1−ε\mu(K_\varepsilon)>1-\varepsilonμ(Kε​)>1−ε and γ>0\gamma>0γ>0 such that {(x,y)∈Kε×S:f(y)−λ∗c(x,y)≥φλ∗(x)−γ}\{(x,y)\in K_\varepsilon\times S: f(y)-\lambda^*c(x,y)\ge\varphi_{\lambda^*}(x)-\gamma\}{(x,y)∈Kε​×S:f(y)−λ∗c(x,y)≥φλ∗​(x)−γ} has compact closure. (P-USC): lim sup⁡nI(πn)≤I(π∗)\limsup_n I(\pi_n)\le I(\pi^*)limsupn​I(πn​)≤I(π∗) whenever πn∈Φμ,δ′\pi_n\in\Phi'_{\mu,\delta}πn​∈Φμ,δ′​ converge weakly to π∗∈Φμ,δ\pi^*\in\Phi_{\mu,\delta}π∗∈Φμ,δ​.

On a normed space EEE: (A3) c(x,y)≥g(∥x−y∥)c(x,y)\ge g(\|x-y\|)c(x,y)≥g(∥x−y∥) for ∥x−y∥>C\|x-y\|>C∥x−y∥>C, with ggg nondecreasing and g(t)↑∞g(t)\uparrow\inftyg(t)↑∞. (A4) (f(y)−f(x))/(1+h(∥x−y∥))≤K(f(y)-f(x))/(1+h(\|x-y\|))\le K(f(y)−f(x))/(1+h(∥x−y∥))≤K for an increasing hhh with h(t)↑∞h(t)\uparrow\inftyh(t)↑∞; and for every ε>0\varepsilon>0ε>0, f(y)−f(x)≤ε(1+c(x,y))f(y)-f(x)\le\varepsilon(1+c(x,y))f(y)−f(x)≤ε(1+c(x,y)) once ∥x−y∥>Cε\|x-y\|>C_\varepsilon∥x−y∥>Cε​.

Formalization targets

Goal: Corollary 1 (p. 27)

Let EEE be a real normed space that is locally compact, and let c,fc,fc,f satisfy (A1)–(A4). Under the standing assumption, if λ∗>0\lambda^*>0λ∗>0 there is π∗∈Φμ,δ\pi^*\in\Phi_{\mu,\delta}π∗∈Φμ,δ​ with

I(π∗)=I=J=J(λ∗,φλ∗).I(\pi^*)=I=J=J(\lambda^*,\varphi_{\lambda^*}).I(π∗)=I=J=J(λ∗,φλ∗​).

Milestones

  1. Remark 4, (10)–(11) (p. 8): for π∈Φμ,δ\pi\in\Phi_{\mu,\delta}π∈Φμ,δ​, I−I(π)I-I(\pi)I−I(π) is the sum of two nonnegative gaps, ∫(φλ∗(x)−f(y)+λ∗c(x,y)) dπ\int(\varphi_{\lambda^*}(x)-f(y)+\lambda^*c(x,y))\,d\pi∫(φλ∗​(x)−f(y)+λ∗c(x,y))dπ and λ∗(δ−∫c dπ)\lambda^*(\delta-\int c\,d\pi)λ∗(δ−∫cdπ); so an ε\varepsilonε-optimal plan has both gaps at most ε\varepsilonε.
  2. Lemma 17 (p. 43): every plan in Φμ,δ\Phi_{\mu,\delta}Φμ,δ​ can be replaced by one in Φμ,δ′\Phi'_{\mu,\delta}Φμ,δ′​ with at least the same value.
  3. §5 display (p. 26): I=sup⁡{I(π):π∈Φμ,δ′}I=\sup\{I(\pi):\pi\in\Phi'_{\mu,\delta}\}I=sup{I(π):π∈Φμ,δ′​}.
  4. Proposition 9 (p. 26): on a Polish space, (P-Compactness) and (P-USC) give a primal optimizer.
  5. Corollary 1, Step 1 (p. 28): (A1)–(A4) and λ∗>0\lambda^*>0λ∗>0 give (P-Compactness).
  6. Corollary 1, Step 2 (pp. 28–29): (A1), (A2), (A4) and I<∞I<\inftyI<∞ give (P-USC):
lim sup⁡n∫f(y) dπn≤∫f(y) dπ∗.\limsup_n\int f(y)\,d\pi_n\le\int f(y)\,d\pi^*.nlimsup​∫f(y)dπn​≤∫f(y)dπ∗.

Significance

The result. An attained worst case turns duality into a structural statement. By Theorem 1(b) of the paper, an optimizer moves mass from xxx only to maximizers of f(y)−λ∗c(x,y)f(y)-\lambda^*c(x,y)f(y)−λ∗c(x,y) and, when λ∗>0\lambda^*>0λ∗>0, uses the full budget. When those maximizers are unique (Remark 8: ccc convex in yyy, fff concave) the worst-case model is unique and is the image of μ\muμ under a transport map. That map is what stress tests and robust estimators are built from. Without existence, these statements describe an object that may not be there.

Formalizing it. The paper's proofs are complete; nothing here is open. No machine-checked version of this result is known: the worst-case optimal transport literature, including the strong duality of this paper, is unformalized. The mission produces the transport objects of §2 in a form that keeps the paper's generality (Polish space, lower semicontinuous real cost, universally measurable dual variables, the ∞−∞\infty-\infty∞−∞ convention), a tightness argument for nearly optimal one-marginal plans, and an upper semicontinuity argument for unbounded upper semicontinuous integrands under uniform integrability.

Difficulty

The obvious argument takes a maximizing sequence and extracts a weak limit. Both steps fail without more structure. First, Φμ,δ\Phi_{\mu,\delta}Φμ,δ​ is not tight: only the first marginal is fixed, and a sequence may push mass to infinity at bounded cost. That is exactly what happens in Example 2 (p. 26), where λ∗=0\lambda^*=0λ∗=0 and the value 111 is approached but never reached. Tightness has to come from the dual: nearly optimal plans concentrate near maximizers of f(y)−λ∗c(x,y)f(y)-\lambda^*c(x,y)f(y)−λ∗c(x,y), and (A3)–(A4) with λ∗>0\lambda^*>0λ∗>0 confine those maximizers. Second, fff is only upper semicontinuous and unbounded, so weak convergence alone does not give lim sup⁡∫f dπn≤∫f dπ∗\limsup\int f\,d\pi_n\le\int f\,d\pi^*limsup∫fdπn​≤∫fdπ∗. A uniform integrability bound is needed, and it uses the restriction to Φμ,δ′\Phi'_{\mu,\delta}Φμ,δ′​ in an essential way. A third, Lean-specific difficulty is measure-theoretic: φλ∗\varphi_{\lambda^*}φλ∗​ is only universally measurable, and the gaps of Remark 4 are integrals against completions.

Formalization scope

All declarations sit in the namespace ModelRiskOT.PrimalOpt. Values of I(π)I(\pi)I(π), III, J(λ,φ)J(\lambda,\varphi)J(λ,φ), JJJ and φλ\varphi_\lambdaφλ​ are in EReal. I(π)I(\pi)I(π) is ∫f+(y) dπ−∫f−(y) dπ\int f^+(y)\,d\pi-\int f^-(y)\,d\pi∫f+(y)dπ−∫f−(y)dπ with lower integrals, and Mathlib's ⊤−⊤=⊥\top-\top=\bot⊤−⊤=⊥ realises the paper's reading of the supremum (footnote 2, p. 5). Integrals of nonnegative or extended-real functions are lower integrals (lintegral), never Bochner integrals. Universal measurability is the published BertsekasShreve.AnalyticSelection.IsUniversallyMeasurable. Weak convergence is the topology of ProbabilityMeasure (S × S). Measures on S×SS\times SS×S use the product σ\sigmaσ-algebra.

The following readings are fixed:

  • The standing assumption of §5 ((λ∗,φλ∗)∈Λc,f(\lambda^*,\varphi_{\lambda^*})\in\Lambda_{c,f}(λ∗,φλ∗​)∈Λc,f​, I=JI=JI=J, J=J(λ∗,φλ∗)J=J(\lambda^*,\varphi_{\lambda^*})J=J(λ∗,φλ∗​), finiteness) consists of hypotheses of Proposition 9 and Corollary 1. I=JI=JI=J is Theorem 1(a), the goal of the companion mission on strong duality, and is not assumed proved here.
  • In (P-Compactness) the constant γ\gammaγ may depend on ε\varepsilonε.
  • "Increasing" in (A4) is strict.
  • Remark 4's second conclusion in (11) is also stated as λ∗(δ−∫c dπ)≤ε\lambda^*(\delta-\int c\,d\pi)\le\varepsilonλ∗(δ−∫cdπ)≤ε, which covers λ∗=0\lambda^*=0λ∗=0.
  • Lemma 17's last inequality is stated for every plan, which is equivalent under the EReal convention.
  • Corollary 1's space is a real normed space with LocallyCompactSpace. It also carries PolishSpace, which is redundant, since a locally compact real normed space is finite-dimensional.

The goal cannot be satisfied by a junk value: III and JJJ are EReal suprema and infima, not real sSup, and the hypothesis λ∗>0\lambda^*>0λ∗>0 is kept because Example 2 shows the conclusion fails without it. A sorry-free check that c(x,y)=(x−y)2c(x,y)=(x-y)^2c(x,y)=(x−y)2, f(y)=yf(y)=yf(y)=y on R\mathbb RR satisfy (A1), (A3) and (A4) accompanies the drafts.

A complete development needs Prokhorov's theorem (in Mathlib), a Fatou lemma for weakly converging measures with a lower semicontinuous integrand, an upper semicontinuity theorem for uniformly integrable upper semicontinuous integrands, and the change of variables ∫φ(x) dπ=∫φ dμ\int\varphi(x)\,d\pi=\int\varphi\,d\mu∫φ(x)dπ=∫φdμ for universally measurable φ\varphiφ. The last three are reusable well beyond this mission. Proofs of any milestone, and these general lemmas as separate contributions, are welcome.

Selected references

  • J. Blanchet and K. Murthy, Quantifying Distributional Model Risk via Optimal Transport, Math. Oper. Res. 44(2):565–600, 2019. arXiv:1604.01446v2, doi:10.1287/moor.2018.0936
  • R. Gao and A. Kleywegt, Distributionally Robust Stochastic Optimization with Wasserstein Distance, 2016. arXiv:1604.02199
  • P. Mohajerin Esfahani and D. Kuhn, Data-driven distributionally robust optimization using the Wasserstein metric, Math. Program. 171:115–166, 2018. arXiv:1505.05116
  • A. M. Zapała, Unbounded mappings and weak convergence of measures, Statist. Probab. Lett. 78(6):698–706, 2008. doi:10.1016/j.spl.2007.09.033
  • C. Villani, Optimal Transport: Old and New, Springer, 2009. doi:10.1007/978-3-540-71050-9
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Operations ResearchOptimal TransportProbability·Captain: mikedeng1

Quantifying Distributional Model Risk via Optimal Transport 2: The Worst-Case Probability of a Closed Set A Equals the Baseline Probability of Its Inflation {x : c(x, A) ≤ 1/λ*}Research Paper

Motivation

A probability model μ\muμ for a risk quantity, such as the reserve process of an insurer or the path of a queue, is usually chosen for tractability or fitted to limited data, and the true law of the system is unknown. Distributional model risk asks how large a probability of interest could be if the true law were any model "close" to μ\muμ. When closeness is measured by an optimal transport cost rather than a likelihood ratio, the competing models may put mass where μ\muμ puts none, which is the situation for rare events such as ruin or buffer overflow: the event of interest often lies outside the support of the baseline.

Blanchet and Murthy (arXiv:1604.01446, Mathematics of Operations Research 44(2), 2019) prove strong duality for worst-case expectations over an optimal-transport ball on a general Polish space, with a lower semicontinuous cost. Their §2.4 specializes the duality to worst-case probabilities of a closed set and obtains a closed-form answer: the worst-case probability of AAA is the baseline probability of an inflated version of AAA. This mission formalizes that result, Theorem 3 of the paper, together with the numbered statements its proof uses.

Setting

Let SSS be a Polish space with its Borel σ\sigmaσ-algebra, P(S)P(S)P(S) its probability measures, and μ∈P(S)\mu \in P(S)μ∈P(S) the baseline. A cost c:S×S→R+c : S \times S \to \mathbb R_+c:S×S→R+​ satisfies Assumption (A1): it is nonnegative, lower semicontinuous, and c(x,y)=0c(x,y) = 0c(x,y)=0 if and only if x=yx = yx=y.

For μ1,μ2∈P(S)\mu_1, \mu_2 \in P(S)μ1​,μ2​∈P(S), a coupling of μ1\mu_1μ1​ and μ2\mu_2μ2​ is a probability measure π\piπ on S×SS \times SS×S with marginals μ1\mu_1μ1​ and μ2\mu_2μ2​; Π(μ1,μ2)\Pi(\mu_1,\mu_2)Π(μ1​,μ2​) is the set of couplings, and the optimal transport cost is

dc(μ1,μ2)=inf⁡{∫c dπ:π∈Π(μ1,μ2)}.d_c(\mu_1,\mu_2) = \inf\Big\{\int c\,d\pi : \pi \in \Pi(\mu_1,\mu_2)\Big\}.dc​(μ1​,μ2​)=inf{∫cdπ:π∈Π(μ1​,μ2​)}.

For a budget δ>0\delta > 0δ>0, the primal feasible set Φμ,δ\Phi_{\mu,\delta}Φμ,δ​ consists of the probability measures π\piπ on S×SS \times SS×S with first marginal μ\muμ and ∫c dπ≤δ\int c\,d\pi \le \delta∫cdπ≤δ.

Fix a nonempty closed set A⊆SA \subseteq SA⊆S and let c(x,A)=inf⁡{c(x,y):y∈A}c(x,A) = \inf\{c(x,y) : y \in A\}c(x,A)=inf{c(x,y):y∈A} be the cheapest cost of moving unit mass from xxx into AAA. The worst-case probability is

I=sup⁡{P(A):dc(μ,P)≤δ}.(12)I = \sup\{P(A) : d_c(\mu,P) \le \delta\}. \tag{12}I=sup{P(A):dc​(μ,P)≤δ}.(12)

Its dual is the univariate problem

inf⁡λ≥0{λδ+Eμ[(1−λc(X,A))+]},(13)\inf_{\lambda \ge 0}\Big\{\lambda\delta + E_\mu\big[(1 - \lambda c(X,A))^+\big]\Big\}, \tag{13}λ≥0inf​{λδ+Eμ​[(1−λc(X,A))+]},(13)

and for a minimizer λ∗∈[0,∞)\lambda^* \in [0,\infty)λ∗∈[0,∞) of (13) the paper defines

c‾=∫{c(x,A)<1/λ∗}c(x,A) dμ(x),c‾=∫{c(x,A)≤1/λ∗}c(x,A) dμ(x).(14)\underline c = \int_{\{c(x,A) < 1/\lambda^*\}} c(x,A)\,d\mu(x), \qquad \overline c = \int_{\{c(x,A) \le 1/\lambda^*\}} c(x,A)\,d\mu(x). \tag{14}c​=∫{c(x,A)<1/λ∗}​c(x,A)dμ(x),c=∫{c(x,A)≤1/λ∗}​c(x,A)dμ(x).(14)

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 3 (p. 10)

If λ∗∈[0,∞)\lambda^* \in [0,\infty)λ∗∈[0,∞) attains the infimum in (13) and c‾=c‾\underline c = \overline cc​=c, then

sup⁡{P(A):dc(μ,P)≤δ}=μ{x:c(x,A)≤1/λ∗}.(15)\sup\{P(A) : d_c(\mu,P) \le \delta\} = \mu\{x : c(x,A) \le 1/\lambda^*\}. \tag{15}sup{P(A):dc​(μ,P)≤δ}=μ{x:c(x,A)≤1/λ∗}.(15)

Milestones, in the order the proof uses them

  1. Coupling form (§2.2, p. 5, for f=1Af = 1_Af=1A​): I=sup⁡{π(S×A):π∈Φμ,δ}I = \sup\{\pi(S \times A) : \pi \in \Phi_{\mu,\delta}\}I=sup{π(S×A):π∈Φμ,δ​}.
  2. Indicator supremum (pp. 8–9): sup⁡y{1A(y)−λc(x,y)}=(1−λc(x,A))+\sup_{y}\{1_A(y) - \lambda c(x,y)\} = (1 - \lambda c(x,A))^+supy​{1A​(y)−λc(x,y)}=(1−λc(x,A))+ for λ≥0\lambda \ge 0λ≥0.
  3. (13) (p. 9): III equals the infimum in (13).
  4. Remark 4, (11) for f=1Af = 1_Af=1A​ (p. 8): an ε\varepsilonε-optimal plan πε\pi_\varepsilonπε​ satisfies ∫(φλ∗(x)−(1A(y)−λ∗c(x,y))) dπε≤ε\int(\varphi_{\lambda^*}(x) - (1_A(y) - \lambda^* c(x,y)))\,d\pi_\varepsilon \le \varepsilon∫(φλ∗​(x)−(1A​(y)−λ∗c(x,y)))dπε​≤ε and, for λ∗>0\lambda^* > 0λ∗>0, (δ−ε/λ∗)+≤∫c dπε≤δ(\delta - \varepsilon/\lambda^*)^+ \le \int c\,d\pi_\varepsilon \le \delta(δ−ε/λ∗)+≤∫cdπε​≤δ.
  5. Lemma 4 (p. 11): plans πn∈Φμ,δ\pi_n \in \Phi_{\mu,\delta}πn​∈Φμ,δ​, n>1n > 1n>1, with πn(Cn)≥1−1/n\pi_n(C_n) \ge 1 - 1/nπn​(Cn​)≥1−1/n, no cost outside the set CnC_nCn​ of §2.4.1, and πn(S×A)≥I−2/n\pi_n(S \times A) \ge I - 2/nπn​(S×A)≥I−2/n.
  6. Lemma 2 (p. 10): c‾≤δ≤c‾\underline c \le \delta \le \overline cc​≤δ≤c if λ∗>0\lambda^* > 0λ∗>0 attains (13); δ≥c‾=c‾\delta \ge \overline c = \underline cδ≥c=c​ if λ∗=0\lambda^* = 0λ∗=0 does.

Significance

Theorem 3 converts a supremum over an infinite-dimensional ball of probability measures into a single probability under the baseline: μ\muμ of the set of points that can reach AAA at cost at most 1/λ∗1/\lambda^*1/λ∗, where 1/λ∗1/\lambda^*1/λ∗ is determined by δ\deltaδ through the one-dimensional function u↦∫{c(x,A)≤u}c(x,A) dμu \mapsto \int_{\{c(x,A) \le u\}} c(x,A)\,d\muu↦∫{c(x,A)≤u}​c(x,A)dμ. For the cost c=dc = dc=d of a metric this is the baseline probability of the 1/λ∗1/\lambda^*1/λ∗-neighbourhood of AAA. The paper uses it to compute worst-case ruin probabilities for the Cramér–Lundberg model around a Brownian approximation (§3, §6.1), where SSS is a path space; the result applies there because nothing in it uses local compactness of SSS.

The result is proved in the paper. As far as the platform's corpus shows, neither it nor the strong duality behind it has been formalized. A formal development produces, beyond Theorem 3: a reusable definition of optimal transport costs with lower semicontinuous costs on Polish spaces; the coupling reformulation of the transport ball, which rests on the existence of optimal transport plans (Villani, Optimal Transport, Theorem 4.1), not in Mathlib; and an ε\varepsilonε-optimal-plan argument that avoids assuming a primal optimizer exists.

Difficulty

The heuristic derivation on pp. 9–10 constructs an optimal transport plan that moves each xxx with c(x,A)≤1/λ∗c(x,A) \le 1/\lambda^*c(x,A)≤1/λ∗ to a nearest point of AAA and leaves the others in place. It needs a nearest point to exist and to be selectable measurably, which fails for general closed AAA in a non-locally-compact space, and it needs a primal optimizer, which need not exist. Theorem 3 assumes neither, so the construction is not a proof. A second point is the boundary level c(x,A)=1/λ∗c(x,A) = 1/\lambda^*c(x,A)=1/λ∗: when μ\muμ charges it, as for atomic baselines, the identity (15) can fail (for μ\muμ a point mass at distance 111 from AAA and δ<1\delta < 1δ<1, the worst case is δ\deltaδ, not 111), and the hypothesis c‾=c‾\underline c = \overline cc​=c is exactly what excludes this. Measurability is a second obstacle: x↦c(x,A)x \mapsto c(x,A)x↦c(x,A) is an infimum of a lower semicontinuous function over AAA and in general only universally measurable, so integrals of it are taken against the completion of μ\muμ.

Formalization scope

All objects live in the namespace ModelRiskOT.WorstProb. SSS carries [TopologicalSpace S] [PolishSpace S] [MeasurableSpace S] [BorelSpace S]; μ\muμ is a Measure S with IsProbabilityMeasure; the cost is a real-valued c : S → S → ℝ with (A1) bundled as a structure (nonnegativity, lower semicontinuity on S×SS \times SS×S, and c(x,y)=0  ⟺  x=yc(x,y) = 0 \iff x = yc(x,y)=0⟺x=y). Committed conventions:

  • Values in [0,∞][0,\infty][0,∞]. dcd_cdc​, III, the objective of (13), c‾\underline cc​ and c‾\overline cc are ℝ≥0∞; integrals are lower Lebesgue integrals and the positive part (⋅)+(\cdot)^+(⋅)+ is ENNReal.ofReal. For the universally measurable functions and sets that occur, lower integrals and outer measures agree with the completion of μ\muμ, which is the paper's reading (p. 4). No Bochner integral is used.
  • The threshold 1/λ∗1/\lambda^*1/λ∗ is written in multiplied form: c(x,A)≤1/λ∗c(x,A) \le 1/\lambda^*c(x,A)≤1/λ∗ is λ∗c(x,A)≤1\lambda^* c(x,A) \le 1λ∗c(x,A)≤1, and likewise for the strict inequality and for the sets CnC_nCn​. For λ∗>0\lambda^* > 0λ∗>0 this is the printed condition; at λ∗=0\lambda^* = 0λ∗=0 it is the whole space, the paper's convention 1/0=∞1/0 = \infty1/0=∞.
  • dcd_cdc​ fixes both marginals; Φμ,δ\Phi_{\mu,\delta}Φμ,δ​ fixes only the first.
  • c(x,A)c(x,A)c(x,A) is a real infimum over the subtype AAA; every statement assumes AAA nonempty.
  • "λ∗\lambda^*λ∗ attains the infimum in (13)" is λ∗≥0\lambda^* \ge 0λ∗≥0 and g(λ∗)≤g(λ)g(\lambda^*) \le g(\lambda)g(λ∗)≤g(λ) for all λ≥0\lambda \ge 0λ≥0.
  • Inequalities X≥I−tX \ge I - tX≥I−t are written I≤X+tI \le X + tI≤X+t in [0,∞][0,\infty][0,∞]; sequences "n>1n > 1n>1" are indexed by n∈Nn \in \mathbb Nn∈N with 1<n1 < n1<n.

A formalization in which the transport ball fixes only the first marginal would contain every probability measure and give I=1I = 1I=1 for every nonempty AAA; the definitions here fix both marginals of the couplings in dcd_cdc​, and the hypothesis c‾=c‾\underline c = \overline cc​=c is kept as stated rather than replaced by continuity of u↦∫{c(x,A)≤u}c(x,A) dμu \mapsto \int_{\{c(x,A) \le u\}} c(x,A)\,d\muu↦∫{c(x,A)≤u}​c(x,A)dμ.

A complete development needs the existence of optimal couplings for lower semicontinuous costs (tightness and Prokhorov's theorem, available in Mathlib), the strong duality of the paper's Theorem 1 specialized to indicators (milestone 3; a separate mission in this series formalizes Theorem 1 in general), and universal measurability of c(⋅,A)c(\cdot,A)c(⋅,A) through projections of Borel sets. The transport-cost definitions and the coupling reformulation are reusable beyond this mission. Proofs of any milestone are welcome, as are proofs that derive (13) from the general strong duality once that is published.

Selected references

  • J. Blanchet, K. Murthy, Quantifying Distributional Model Risk via Optimal Transport, arXiv:1604.01446v2, 2017; Mathematics of Operations Research 44(2):565–600, 2019. https://arxiv.org/abs/1604.01446, https://doi.org/10.1287/moor.2018.0936
  • C. Villani, Optimal Transport: Old and New, Grundlehren der mathematischen Wissenschaften 338, Springer, 2009. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-71050-9
  • R. Gao, A. Kleywegt, Distributionally Robust Stochastic Optimization with Wasserstein Distance, arXiv:1604.02199, 2016. https://arxiv.org/abs/1604.02199
  • P. Mohajerin Esfahani, D. Kuhn, Data-driven distributionally robust optimization using the Wasserstein metric, Mathematical Programming 171:115–166, 2018. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10107-017-1172-1
  • D. P. Bertsekas, S. E. Shreve, Stochastic Optimal Control: The Discrete-Time Case, Academic Press, 1978 (universal measurability, Ch. 7).
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Operations ResearchProbability·Captain: mikedeng1

Scheduling Deteriorating Jobs on a Single Processor I: Under Linear Deterioration, Sequencing by Increasing E(X_i)/α_i Minimizes the Expected MakespanResearch Paper

Motivation

In classical single-machine stochastic scheduling, NNN jobs with independent random processing requirements XiX_iXi​ are processed one after another, and the makespan (the completion time of the last job) is the same for every schedule that never idles: it is X1+⋯+XNX_1+\dots+X_NX1​+⋯+XN​. Research therefore concentrated on weighted flow times and rewards. Browne and Yechiali (Operations Research 38(3), 1990, 495–498) studied jobs that deteriorate while they wait: the longer a job is delayed, the more processing it needs. Such models arose in the control of queueing and communication systems (Browne 1988; Browne and Yechiali 1989) and in inventory issuing, where stored items lose quality at item-specific rates. Under deterioration the actual processing times depend on the order, so the makespan, and its expectation, become functions of the schedule, and the basic question is which order minimizes the expected makespan.

Setting

There are NNN jobs, all available at time 000, and a single processor. Job iii has an initial processing requirement XiX_iXi​, a random variable on a probability space (Ω,F,P)(\Omega,\mathcal F,P)(Ω,F,P): the time needed to complete job iii if it is processed first. Under linear deterioration, a job whose processing is delayed until time ttt needs

Yi(t)=Xi+αit,Y_i(t) = X_i + \alpha_i t,Yi​(t)=Xi​+αi​t,

where αi>0\alpha_i>0αi​>0 is its deterministic growth rate. A job stops deteriorating once it is put on the processor.

Only nonpreemptive strategies without idling are allowed, so a policy is a permutation π\piπ of {1,…,N}\{1,\dots,N\}{1,…,N}, with π(i)=j\pi(i)=jπ(i)=j meaning that job jjj is the iii-th processed. The completion times follow the model: S0(π)=0S_0(\pi)=0S0​(π)=0, and the job in position kkk starts at Sk−1(π)S_{k-1}(\pi)Sk−1​(π) and takes Yπ(k)(Sk−1(π))Y_{\pi(k)}(S_{k-1}(\pi))Yπ(k)​(Sk−1​(π)), so

Sk(π)=Sk−1(π)+Xπ(k)+απ(k)Sk−1(π),k=1,…,N.S_k(\pi) = S_{k-1}(\pi) + X_{\pi(k)} + \alpha_{\pi(k)} S_{k-1}(\pi), \qquad k = 1,\dots,N.Sk​(π)=Sk−1​(π)+Xπ(k)​+απ(k)​Sk−1​(π),k=1,…,N.

The makespan is SN(π)S_N(\pi)SN​(π) and the expected makespan is E SN(π)\mathrm E\,S_N(\pi)ESN​(π). In Lean these are completionTime X α π k ω, makespan X α π ω and expectedMakespan P X α π in the namespace DeterioratingJobs.Makespan.

The paper's Lemma 1 concerns, for real numbers μi\mu_iμi​ and γi\gamma_iγi​, the sum (1)

Fμ,γ(π)=∑i=1Nμπ(i)∏r=i+1Nγπ(r),F_{\mu,\gamma}(\pi) = \sum_{i=1}^{N} \mu_{\pi(i)} \prod_{r=i+1}^{N} \gamma_{\pi(r)},Fμ,γ​(π)=i=1∑N​μπ(i)​r=i+1∏N​γπ(r)​,

the Lean lemma1Sum μ γ π (empty product =1=1=1).

Formalization targets

Goal: the expected-makespan index rule (§1, p. 496)

If the XiX_iXi​ are integrable, αi>0\alpha_i>0αi​>0, and π\piπ schedules the jobs by increasing values of E(Xi)/αi\mathrm E(X_i)/\alpha_iE(Xi​)/αi​, then

E SN(π)≤E SN(σ)for every permutation σ.\mathrm E\,S_N(\pi) \le \mathrm E\,S_N(\sigma) \qquad\text{for every permutation } \sigma .ESN​(π)≤ESN​(σ)for every permutation σ.

Milestones

  1. Lemma 1 (p. 495). If γi>1\gamma_i>1γi​>1 for all iii, the sum (1) is minimized over all permutations by any permutation ordered by increasing μi/[γi−1]\mu_i/[\gamma_i-1]μi​/[γi​−1], and maximized by any permutation ordered by decreasing values.
  2. Eq. (2) (p. 496). For every π\piπ and j≤Nj\le Nj≤N,
Sj(π)=∑i=1jXπ(i)∏r=i+1j(1+απ(r)).S_j(\pi) = \sum_{i=1}^{j} X_{\pi(i)} \prod_{r=i+1}^{j} \bigl(1+\alpha_{\pi(r)}\bigr).Sj​(π)=i=1∑j​Xπ(i)​r=i+1∏j​(1+απ(r)​).
  1. The expected makespan in the form (1) (p. 496, after (2)).
E SN(π)=∑i=1NE(Xπ(i))∏r=i+1N(1+απ(r))=FEX, 1+α(π).\mathrm E\,S_N(\pi) = \sum_{i=1}^{N} \mathrm E(X_{\pi(i)}) \prod_{r=i+1}^{N}\bigl(1+\alpha_{\pi(r)}\bigr) = F_{\mathrm E X,\,1+\alpha}(\pi).ESN​(π)=i=1∑N​E(Xπ(i)​)r=i+1∏N​(1+απ(r)​)=FEX,1+α​(π).

Significance

The result is an index rule: each job receives a number computed from its own data, E(Xi)/αi\mathrm E(X_i)/\alpha_iE(Xi​)/αi​, and sorting by that number is optimal. It needs only the means of the initial requirements, not their distributions, and it holds without independence. The same reduction to Lemma 1 gives the paper's other index rules: the variance of the makespan under independent requirements, the Poisson-shock model (5), Lévy-type growth (6) and setup/detach times (7). In inventory issuing, it says which stored item to issue first when items lose value at item-specific linear rates. Lemma 1 itself, which the paper attributes to Rau (1971) and relates to optimal search, is a general statement about ordering products of factors along a sequence.

The result is proved in the paper by an appeal to Lemma 1, whose proof is given there as one sentence ("direct upon an interchange argument"). None of these statements has a machine-checked proof on Prove2Me or in Mathlib. This mission produces a formal model of linear deterioration on a single machine, a formal proof of the interchange lemma with ties handled, and the formal index rule.

Difficulty

The algebra of one adjacent interchange is short. The work is in passing from that local comparison to optimality over all N!N!N! permutations, with ties allowed: the paper speaks of "the permutation ordered by increasing values", but with equal indices several permutations qualify, and each of them must be shown optimal. The natural route, "an optimal permutation exists and must be sorted", needs care, because a sorted permutation is not unique and the swap that improves an unsorted permutation may only weakly improve it. On the probabilistic side, the expectation of the makespan must be reduced to the expectations of the XiX_iXi​; the makespan is a polynomial in the XiX_iXi​ with deterministic coefficients, so this is linearity of the integral, but integrability has to be carried through the recursion.

Formalization scope

  • Jobs are Fin N (0-based: Lean job i is the paper's job i+1i+1i+1); a policy is π : Equiv.Perm (Fin N) with π k the job in position k, as in the paper's π(i)=j\pi(i)=jπ(i)=j. N=0N=0N=0 is allowed.
  • The probability space is (Ω, P) with [IsProbabilityMeasure P]; XiX_iXi​ is Ω → ℝ; expectations are Bochner integrals, and every theorem about them assumes each XiX_iXi​ integrable. The growth rates are deterministic reals.
  • Completion times are defined by the model recursion Sk=Sk−1+Yπ(k)(Sk−1)S_{k}=S_{k-1}+Y_{\pi(k)}(S_{k-1})Sk​=Sk−1​+Yπ(k)​(Sk−1​), never by the closed form (2), so that (2) is a theorem about the model.
  • Explicit readings of loose phrases: "the permutation ordered by increasing values of viv_ivi​" means any permutation with k↦vπ(k)k\mapsto v_{\pi(k)}k↦vπ(k)​ non-strictly increasing (Monotone), and "decreasing" means Antitone; "is minimized" means ≤\le≤ against every permutation; "expected" means the integral of an integrable random variable.
  • Added hypotheses: αi>0\alpha_i>0αi​>0 in the goal (the paper divides by αi\alpha_iαi​ without stating it) and γi>1\gamma_i>1γi​>1 in Lemma 1 (the paper applies it only with γi=1+αi\gamma_i = 1+\alpha_iγi​=1+αi​ or (1+αi)2(1+\alpha_i)^2(1+αi​)2; for γi<1\gamma_i<1γi​<1 the ordering reverses).
  • Omitted assumptions: positivity of the XiX_iXi​ and their independence. The goal holds without them, so the formal statement is slightly more general than the paper's.
  • Trivializing formalizations are excluded: defining SSS by formula (2) would make milestone 2 a definition unfolding; a strictly increasing ordering would make the goal vacuous whenever two indices tie; ordering π−1\pi^{-1}π−1 instead of π\piπ states a different theorem; dropping integrability makes all expectations 000; allowing αi=0\alpha_i=0αi​=0 makes E(Xi)/αi=0\mathrm E(X_i)/\alpha_i=0E(Xi​)/αi​=0 a meaningless index.
  • Not formalized here: the variance result (3), the Poisson model (5), the Lévy model (6), Proposition 1, setup times (7), exponential growth (9), and the NP-hardness conjecture. Proposition 2 (weighted expected completion time) is the companion mission Scheduling Deteriorating Jobs on a Single Processor II.
  • Related platform items, none of which states these results: PalmQueueing.Ordering.interchange_permutations (interchange permutations of a GI/GI/1 queue) and the additive, non-deteriorating completion-time models MooreLateJobs.Shared.completionTime and NumStochOpt.ListScheduling.Makespan.

Contributions welcome: proofs of the milestones, a reusable "sorted permutation minimizes a sum of products" lemma, and the variance index (3) as an extension.

Selected references

  • S. Browne, U. Yechiali, Scheduling Deteriorating Jobs on a Single Processor, Operations Research 38(3), 1990, 495–498. https://doi.org/10.1287/opre.38.3.495
  • J. G. Rau, Minimizing a Function of Permutations of n Integers, Operations Research 19(1), 1971, 237–240. https://doi.org/10.1287/opre.19.1.237
  • F. P. Kelly, A Remark on Search and Sequencing Problems, Mathematics of Operations Research 7(1), 1982, 154–157. https://doi.org/10.1287/moor.7.1.154
  • R. W. Conway, W. L. Maxwell, L. W. Miller, Theory of Scheduling, Addison-Wesley, 1967.
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Convex OptimizationOperations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

Distributed Optimization and Statistical Learning via the Alternating Direction Method of Multipliers I: Under a Lagrangian Saddle Point, ADMM Residuals Vanish and Objective Values ConvergeTextbook

Why ADMM convergence matters

The alternating direction method of multipliers (ADMM) is one of the most widely used algorithms for large-scale convex optimization in statistics, machine learning and signal processing. Its appeal is decomposition: a problem whose objective splits into two parts, coupled only by a linear constraint, is solved by alternately minimizing over each part and updating a dual variable. Each subproblem is often a proximity operator, a projection or a small linear system, so ADMM turns problems such as the lasso, sparse inverse covariance selection and consensus fitting across many machines into sequences of simple steps. The survey of Boyd, Parikh, Chu, Peleato and Eckstein (DOI 10.1561/2200000016) made the method standard, and every algorithm in its later chapters is justified by one convergence result, stated in §3.2.1 and proved in Appendix A. This mission formalizes that result and the inequalities behind it.

The method goes back to Gabay and Mercier (1976). Eckstein and Bertsekas (1992) proved convergence through the theory of maximal monotone operators, by identifying ADMM with Douglas–Rachford splitting applied to the dual problem. The proof in Appendix A of the survey is different: it is a direct Lyapunov argument in finite dimensions that uses only convexity and elementary algebra.

Setting

Let f:Rn→R∪{+∞}f:\mathbb R^n\to\mathbb R\cup\{+\infty\}f:Rn→R∪{+∞} and g:Rm→R∪{+∞}g:\mathbb R^m\to\mathbb R\cup\{+\infty\}g:Rm→R∪{+∞}, let A∈Rp×nA\in\mathbb R^{p\times n}A∈Rp×n, B∈Rp×mB\in\mathbb R^{p\times m}B∈Rp×m and c∈Rpc\in\mathbb R^pc∈Rp. The problem is

minimize f(x)+g(z)subject to Ax+Bz=c,(3.1)\text{minimize } f(x)+g(z)\quad\text{subject to } Ax+Bz=c, \tag{3.1}minimize f(x)+g(z)subject to Ax+Bz=c,(3.1)

with optimal value p⋆=inf⁡{f(x)+g(z)∣Ax+Bz=c}p^\star=\inf\{f(x)+g(z)\mid Ax+Bz=c\}p⋆=inf{f(x)+g(z)∣Ax+Bz=c}. The augmented Lagrangian with parameter ρ≥0\rho\ge0ρ≥0 is

Lρ(x,z,y)=f(x)+g(z)+yT(Ax+Bz−c)+ρ2∥Ax+Bz−c∥22,L_\rho(x,z,y)=f(x)+g(z)+y^T(Ax+Bz-c)+\tfrac{\rho}{2}\|Ax+Bz-c\|_2^2,Lρ​(x,z,y)=f(x)+g(z)+yT(Ax+Bz−c)+2ρ​∥Ax+Bz−c∥22​,

and L0L_0L0​ is the ordinary Lagrangian. For ρ>0\rho>0ρ>0, ADMM generates iterates by

xk+1∈argmin⁡xLρ(x,zk,yk),zk+1∈argmin⁡zLρ(xk+1,z,yk),yk+1=yk+ρ(Axk+1+Bzk+1−c).x^{k+1}\in\operatorname*{argmin}_x L_\rho(x,z^k,y^k),\quad z^{k+1}\in\operatorname*{argmin}_z L_\rho(x^{k+1},z,y^k),\quad y^{k+1}=y^k+\rho(Ax^{k+1}+Bz^{k+1}-c).xk+1∈xargmin​Lρ​(x,zk,yk),zk+1∈zargmin​Lρ​(xk+1,z,yk),yk+1=yk+ρ(Axk+1+Bzk+1−c).

The state is (zk,yk)(z^k,y^k)(zk,yk); x0x^0x0 plays no role. The primal residual is rk=Axk+Bzk−cr^k=Ax^k+Bz^k-crk=Axk+Bzk−c, the dual residual is sk=ρATB(zk−zk−1)s^k=\rho A^TB(z^k-z^{k-1})sk=ρATB(zk−zk−1), and pk=f(xk)+g(zk)p^k=f(x^k)+g(z^k)pk=f(xk)+g(zk).

Two assumptions are made. Assumption 1: fff and ggg are closed, proper and convex. Assumption 2: L0L_0L0​ has a saddle point (x⋆,z⋆,y⋆)(x^\star,z^\star,y^\star)(x⋆,z⋆,y⋆), i.e. L0(x⋆,z⋆,y)≤L0(x⋆,z⋆,y⋆)≤L0(x,z,y⋆)L_0(x^\star,z^\star,y)\le L_0(x^\star,z^\star,y^\star)\le L_0(x,z,y^\star)L0​(x⋆,z⋆,y)≤L0​(x⋆,z⋆,y⋆)≤L0​(x,z,y⋆) for all x,z,yx,z,yx,z,y. Nothing is assumed about the ranks of AAA and BBB. The convergence proof uses the Lyapunov function

Vk=1ρ∥yk−y⋆∥22+ρ∥B(zk−z⋆)∥22.V^k=\tfrac1\rho\|y^k-y^\star\|_2^2+\rho\|B(z^k-z^\star)\|_2^2 .Vk=ρ1​∥yk−y⋆∥22​+ρ∥B(zk−z⋆)∥22​.

Formalization targets

Goal: residual and objective convergence (§3.2.1, p. 17; Appendix A, p. 106)

Under Assumptions 1 and 2 and for ρ>0\rho>0ρ>0, every ADMM run satisfies

rk→0,f(xk)+g(zk)→p⋆,sk→0(k→∞).r^k\to0,\qquad f(x^k)+g(z^k)\to p^\star,\qquad s^k\to0\qquad(k\to\infty).rk→0,f(xk)+g(zk)→p⋆,sk→0(k→∞).

The statement fixes no rate and no constant. It does not claim convergence of xkx^kxk or zkz^kzk, which fails in general (p. 17).

Milestones

In the order of Appendix A:

  1. (3.10) holds along the iteration: 0∈∂g(zk+1)+BTyk+10\in\partial g(z^{k+1})+B^Ty^{k+1}0∈∂g(zk+1)+BTyk+1 (§3.3, p. 18);
  2. the dual residual inclusion ρATB(zk+1−zk)∈∂f(xk+1)+ATyk+1\rho A^TB(z^{k+1}-z^k)\in\partial f(x^{k+1})+A^Ty^{k+1}ρATB(zk+1−zk)∈∂f(xk+1)+ATyk+1 (§3.3, p. 18);
  3. (A.3) p⋆−pk+1≤y⋆Trk+1p^\star-p^{k+1}\le y^{\star T}r^{k+1}p⋆−pk+1≤y⋆Trk+1;
  4. (A.2) pk+1−p⋆≤−(yk+1)Trk+1−ρ(B(zk+1−zk))T(−rk+1+B(zk+1−z⋆))p^{k+1}-p^\star\le-(y^{k+1})^Tr^{k+1}-\rho(B(z^{k+1}-z^k))^T(-r^{k+1}+B(z^{k+1}-z^\star))pk+1−p⋆≤−(yk+1)Trk+1−ρ(B(zk+1−zk))T(−rk+1+B(zk+1−z⋆));
  5. (3.11) pk−p⋆≤−(yk)Trk+(xk−x⋆)Tskp^k-p^\star\le-(y^k)^Tr^k+(x^k-x^\star)^Ts^kpk−p⋆≤−(yk)Trk+(xk−x⋆)Tsk;
  6. the monotonicity step (yk+1−yk)T(B(zk+1−zk))≤0(y^{k+1}-y^k)^T(B(z^{k+1}-z^k))\le0(yk+1−yk)T(B(zk+1−zk))≤0 for k≥1k\ge1k≥1 (p. 110);
  7. (A.6) Vk−Vk+1≥ρ∥rk+1−B(zk+1−zk)∥22V^k-V^{k+1}\ge\rho\|r^{k+1}-B(z^{k+1}-z^k)\|_2^2Vk−Vk+1≥ρ∥rk+1−B(zk+1−zk)∥22​;
  8. (A.1) Vk+1≤Vk−ρ∥rk+1∥22−ρ∥B(zk+1−zk)∥22V^{k+1}\le V^k-\rho\|r^{k+1}\|_2^2-\rho\|B(z^{k+1}-z^k)\|_2^2Vk+1≤Vk−ρ∥rk+1∥22​−ρ∥B(zk+1−zk)∥22​ for k≥1k\ge1k≥1;
  9. the summed bound ρ∑k≥1(∥rk+1∥22+∥B(zk+1−zk)∥22)≤V1\rho\sum_{k\ge1}(\|r^{k+1}\|_2^2+\|B(z^{k+1}-z^k)\|_2^2)\le V^1ρ∑k≥1​(∥rk+1∥22​+∥B(zk+1−zk)∥22​)≤V1, with rk→0r^k\to0rk→0 and B(zk+1−zk)→0B(z^{k+1}-z^k)\to0B(zk+1−zk)→0;
  10. the stopping-rule bound pk−p⋆≤−(yk)Trk+d∥sk∥2≤∥yk∥2∥rk∥2+d∥sk∥2p^k-p^\star\le-(y^k)^Tr^k+d\|s^k\|_2\le\|y^k\|_2\|r^k\|_2+d\|s^k\|_2pk−p⋆≤−(yk)Trk+d∥sk∥2​≤∥yk∥2​∥rk∥2​+d∥sk∥2​ when ∥xk−x⋆∥2≤d\|x^k-x^\star\|_2\le d∥xk−x⋆∥2​≤d (§3.3.1, p. 19).

Significance

The theorem is what licenses every specialized ADMM of the survey (lasso, basis pursuit, covariance selection, consensus and sharing, distributed model fitting): each of these chapters only computes the subproblem solutions, and correctness of the overall method is inherited from §3.2.1. Inequality (3.11) and its corollary in §3.3.1 justify the primal/dual residual stopping criterion (3.12) used in practice: small residuals certify small suboptimality.

The result itself is classical and proved; it is not open. To our knowledge no machine-checked proof of convex two-block ADMM convergence exists in Lean's Mathlib. Formalizing it produces a reusable development of the augmented Lagrangian method with explicit domain handling for extended-valued convex functions, and checks a proof whose index bookkeeping the printed text leaves loose (the monotonicity step and (A.1) need k≥1k\ge1k≥1, see below).

Difficulty

The obvious argument, "the subproblem optimality conditions plus the saddle point give a decreasing quantity", works only once the right Lyapunov function is found and the cross term −2ρ r(k+1)TB(zk+1−zk)-2\rho\, r^{(k+1)T}B(z^{k+1}-z^k)−2ρr(k+1)TB(zk+1−zk) is controlled. That term has no sign from the optimality conditions of a single iteration, and at the first iteration, where z0z^0z0 is an arbitrary starting point, the decrease (A.1) can genuinely fail. A second obstacle is that xkx^kxk and zkz^kzk need not converge or even be bounded when AAA or BBB is rank deficient, so objective convergence cannot pass through limits of the primal iterates; it has to come from the two-sided bounds (A.2) and (A.3). Finally, the subdifferential sum rule used to linearize each subproblem must be handled for functions taking the value +∞+\infty+∞.

Formalization scope

  • Vectors are EuclideanSpace ℝ (Fin n); matrices act through Matrix.toEuclideanLin; the problem data are bundled in a structure Problem n m p.
  • An extended-valued fff is encoded by its effective domain CfC_fCf​ and its real values on CfC_fCf​. Assumption 1 is: CfC_fCf​ nonempty, fff convex on CfC_fCf​, epigraph over CfC_fCf​ closed. All minimizations, and the saddle-point inequality in (x,z)(x,z)(x,z), range over the domains; this is equivalent to the book's formulation with +∞+\infty+∞.
  • p⋆p^\starp⋆ is the infimum over feasible points of the domains, not f(x⋆)+g(z⋆)f(x^\star)+g(z^\star)f(x⋆)+g(z⋆) by definition.
  • The run is a hypothesis. An ADMM run is any triple of sequences satisfying (3.2)–(3.4) exactly. The book asserts on p. 16 that Assumption 1 makes the subproblems solvable; this is false in general (f(x)=ex1f(x)=e^{x_1}f(x)=ex1​, A=[0 1]A=[0\ 1]A=[0 1]), so no statement constructs iterates. A formalization that defined the iterates by choice, or required Axk+Bzk=cAx^k+Bz^k=cAxk+Bzk=c of a run, would trivialize the residual claim and is ruled out.
  • Indices: k∈Nk\in\mathbb Nk∈N starts at the book's k=0k=0k=0. Statements about xkx^kxk, rkr^krk, sks^ksk, pkp^kpk are for k≥1k\ge1k≥1 (written with k+1k+1k+1). The monotonicity step and (A.1) are stated for k≥1k\ge1k≥1; the book states (A.1) without a range, and at k=0k=0k=0 with an arbitrary z0z^0z0 it can fail. The summed bound accordingly starts at k=1k=1k=1 and is bounded by V1V^1V1 instead of V0V^0V0; it is stated as a bound on every partial sum.
  • Subdifferentials (milestones 1–2) use the published ShorNonsmooth.Subdiff.subdifferential relative to the domain.
  • The dual-variable convergence yk→y⋆y^k\to y^\staryk→y⋆ listed in §3.2.1 is not proved in the book and is not a target.

A complete development needs the subdifferential of a convex function plus a differentiable quadratic, the first-order characterization of a constrained minimizer, and elementary limits; all of this is reusable for the later missions of the series, which take ADMM runs as given. Proofs of individual milestones are welcome independently.

Selected references

  • S. Boyd, N. Parikh, E. Chu, B. Peleato, J. Eckstein, Distributed Optimization and Statistical Learning via the Alternating Direction Method of Multipliers, Foundations and Trends in Machine Learning 3(1), 2011, pp. 1–122. https://doi.org/10.1561/2200000016
  • D. Gabay, B. Mercier, A dual algorithm for the solution of nonlinear variational problems via finite element approximation, Computers & Mathematics with Applications 2(1), 1976, pp. 17–40. https://doi.org/10.1016/0898-1221(76)90003-1
  • J. Eckstein, D. P. Bertsekas, On the Douglas–Rachford splitting method and the proximal point algorithm for maximal monotone operators, Mathematical Programming 55, 1992, pp. 293–318. https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01581204
  • R. T. Rockafellar, Convex Analysis, Princeton University Press, 1970. https://doi.org/10.1515/9781400873173
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