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Optimization

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Operations ResearchProbability·Captain: mikedeng1

Quantile Optimization via Multiple Timescale Local Search for Black-box Functions: SPQO's Mean Absolute Error Decays as O(α_k/γ_k) + O(c_k²) + O(β_k^{1/2}/c_k) for Strongly Convex QuantilesResearch Paper

Why optimize a quantile of a black box

Risk-sensitive decisions are often judged by a quantile of an outcome rather than by its mean: the 95th percentile of waiting time in a service system, the value-at-risk of a portfolio, the tail of a project's completion time. When the outcome is produced by a stochastic simulation or another black box, its distribution is unknown and only samples are available, so neither the quantile nor its gradient can be evaluated. Hu, Song and Fu (arXiv:2308.07607, Operations Research, 2025) propose a local search method for this problem that uses three samples per iteration in any dimension, and they prove that its iterates converge almost surely and at an explicit rate.

Earlier approaches estimate the quantile gradient by finite differences of order statistics, which requires sample sizes growing to infinity (Kibzun and Matveev 2012), or run a multi-timescale stochastic approximation driven by direct gradient estimators such as perturbation analysis or likelihood ratios (Hu, Peng, Zhang and Zhang 2022), which a black box does not provide. The present paper estimates the gradient from indicator differences along a simultaneous perturbation in the spirit of Spall's SPSA (1992), using a coordinate-wise variant (SDQO) as a baseline whose cost grows with the dimension ddd, and, by its own account (p. 5), gives the first convergence rate for a three-timescale stochastic approximation scheme.

Setting

For every input θ∈Rd\theta\in\mathbb R^dθ∈Rd a black box returns a random output Y(θ)Y(\theta)Y(θ) with c.d.f. F(y;θ)F(y;\theta)F(y;θ) and density f(y;θ)=∂F(y;θ)/∂yf(y;\theta)=\partial F(y;\theta)/\partial yf(y;θ)=∂F(y;θ)/∂y. For a fixed level φ∈(0,1)\varphi\in(0,1)φ∈(0,1) the quantile function q(θ)q(\theta)q(θ) solves F(q(θ);θ)=φF(q(\theta);\theta)=\varphiF(q(θ);θ)=φ, and the problem is

min⁡θ∈Θq(θ),\min_{\theta\in\Theta} q(\theta),θ∈Θmin​q(θ),

where the parameter set Θ={θ:hj(θ)≤0, j=1,…,m}\Theta=\{\theta: h_j(\theta)\le0,\ j=1,\dots,m\}Θ={θ:hj​(θ)≤0, j=1,…,m} is compact and convex, with each hjh_jhj​ continuously differentiable and ∇hj≠0\nabla h_j\ne0∇hj​=0 on {hj=0}\{h_j=0\}{hj​=0}. Under smoothness, ∇q(θ)=−∇θF(y;θ)∣y=q(θ)/f(q(θ);θ)\nabla q(\theta)=-\nabla_\theta F(y;\theta)|_{y=q(\theta)}/f(q(\theta);\theta)∇q(θ)=−∇θ​F(y;θ)∣y=q(θ)​/f(q(θ);θ).

Algorithm SPQO keeps a quantile estimate qkq_kqk​, a gradient estimate DkD_kDk​ and the decision θk\theta_kθk​. With step sizes αk,βk,γk\alpha_k,\beta_k,\gamma_kαk​,βk​,γk​, perturbation sizes ckc_kck​, the adaptive perturbation cˉk=ck/max⁡{1,∥Dk∥/d}\bar c_k=c_k/\max\{1,\|D_k\|/\sqrt d\}cˉk​=ck​/max{1,∥Dk​∥/d​} and a random direction Δk∈{±1}d\Delta_k\in\{\pm1\}^dΔk​∈{±1}d with independent uniform signs,

qk+1=qk+γk(φ−I{Y(θk)≤qk}),Dk+1=Dk+βk −I{Y(θk+cˉkΔk)≤qk+cˉkDkTΔk}+I{Y(θk−cˉkΔk)≤qk−cˉkDkTΔk}2cˉkΔk,θk+1=ΠΘ(θk−αkDk),\begin{aligned} q_{k+1}&=q_k+\gamma_k\big(\varphi-I\{Y(\theta_k)\le q_k\}\big),\\ D_{k+1}&=D_k+\beta_k\,\frac{-I\{Y(\theta_k+\bar c_k\Delta_k)\le q_k+\bar c_kD_k^T\Delta_k\}+I\{Y(\theta_k-\bar c_k\Delta_k)\le q_k-\bar c_kD_k^T\Delta_k\}}{2\bar c_k\Delta_k},\\ \theta_{k+1}&=\Pi_\Theta(\theta_k-\alpha_kD_k), \end{aligned}qk+1​Dk+1​θk+1​​=qk​+γk​(φ−I{Y(θk​)≤qk​}),=Dk​+βk​2cˉk​Δk​−I{Y(θk​+cˉk​Δk​)≤qk​+cˉk​DkT​Δk​}+I{Y(θk​−cˉk​Δk​)≤qk​−cˉk​DkT​Δk​}​,=ΠΘ​(θk​−αk​Dk​),​

with division by Δk\Delta_kΔk​ taken componentwise and ΠΘ\Pi_\ThetaΠΘ​ the Euclidean projection onto Θ\ThetaΘ. The timescales are separated by αk=o(γk)\alpha_k=o(\gamma_k)αk​=o(γk​) and γk=o(βk)\gamma_k=o(\beta_k)γk​=o(βk​).

The analysis rests on assumptions A1–A3 (local smoothness of FFF and a lower bound on fff near the iterates; Rademacher directions; step-size conditions) and, for rates, B1–B3 (two-sided bounds on fff between qkq_kqk​ and q(θk)q(\theta_k)q(θk​); Lipschitz continuity of fff and ∇θF\nabla_\theta F∇θ​F in yyy; a lower bound ϱ>0\varrho>0ϱ>0 on the smallest eigenvalue of the Hessian H(θ)=∇2q(θ)H(\theta)=\nabla^2q(\theta)H(θ)=∇2q(θ) along the segments [θk,θ∗][\theta_k,\theta^*][θk​,θ∗]). Section 4 uses step sizes αk=a/kα\alpha_k=a/k^\alphaαk​=a/kα, βk=b/kβ\beta_k=b/k^\betaβk​=b/kβ, γk=r/kγ\gamma_k=r/k^\gammaγk​=r/kγ, ck=c/kτc_k=c/k^\tauck​=c/kτ with exponents in (0,1)(0,1)(0,1).

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 3 (p. 19)

Under A1–A3 and B1–B3, with the Section 4 step sizes, qqq twice continuously differentiable and θ∗\theta^*θ∗ the unique equilibrium of the projected gradient ODE (25), lying in the interior of Θ\ThetaΘ,

E[∥θk−θ∗∥]=O(αkγk)+O(ck2)+O(βk1/2ck).E\big[\|\theta_k-\theta^*\|\big]=O\Big(\frac{\alpha_k}{\gamma_k}\Big)+O\big(c_k^2\big)+O\Big(\frac{\beta_k^{1/2}}{c_k}\Big).E[∥θk​−θ∗∥]=O(γk​αk​​)+O(ck2​)+O(ck​βk1/2​​).

The constants are left unspecified: the goal asserts the shape of the rate, which is what the paper proves.

Milestones

  1. Display (4): the quantile gradient formula.
  2. Lemma 1: sup⁡kE∥Dk∥2<∞\sup_kE\|D_k\|^2<\inftysupk​E∥Dk​∥2<∞ and sup⁡k∥Dk∥<∞\sup_k\|D_k\|<\inftysupk​∥Dk​∥<∞ almost surely.
  3. Lemma 2: the conditional bias of the simultaneous-perturbation estimator is O(ck2)O(c_k^2)O(ck2​) almost surely and in mean.
  4. Theorem 1 (strictly convex case): θk→θ∗\theta_k\to\theta^*θk​→θ∗ almost surely.
  5. Lemma 3: ∑i=1k[∏j=i+1k(1−a/jp)](a/ip)w(i)=O(k−s)\sum_{i=1}^k\big[\prod_{j=i+1}^k(1-a/j^p)\big](a/i^p)w(i)=O(k^{-s})∑i=1k​[∏j=i+1k​(1−a/jp)](a/ip)w(i)=O(k−s) when w(i)=O(i−s)w(i)=O(i^{-s})w(i)=O(i−s).
  6. Lemma 4: E[(qk−q(θk))2]=O(αk/γk)+O(γk1/2)\sqrt{E[(q_k-q(\theta_k))^2]}=O(\alpha_k/\gamma_k)+O(\gamma_k^{1/2})E[(qk​−q(θk​))2]​=O(αk​/γk​)+O(γk1/2​).
  7. Lemma 5: E∥Dk−∇q(θk)∥2=O(αk/γk)+O(ck2)+O(βk1/2/ck)\sqrt{E\|D_k-\nabla q(\theta_k)\|^2}=O(\alpha_k/\gamma_k)+O(c_k^2)+O(\beta_k^{1/2}/c_k)E∥Dk​−∇q(θk​)∥2​=O(αk​/γk​)+O(ck2​)+O(βk1/2​/ck​).

Significance

The rate (27) makes the trade-off among the three timescales explicit: αk/γk\alpha_k/\gamma_kαk​/γk​ is the cost of tracking a moving quantile, ck2c_k^2ck2​ the bias of the perturbation, and βk1/2/ck\beta_k^{1/2}/c_kβk1/2​/ck​ its noise. Balancing them selects the step-size exponents, and the special cases recover the O(1/k)O(1/\sqrt k)O(1/k​) rate of recursive quantile estimation and Spall's SPSA rate. The intermediate results (moment bounds for a gradient tracker with adaptive perturbation, an O(ck2)O(c_k^2)O(ck2​) bias bound for an indicator-based SPSA estimator, and the weighted-sum estimate of Lemma 3) apply to other multi-timescale stochastic approximation schemes.

The theorem is proved in the paper; no machine-checked version exists. A formalization would check a rate argument for three coupled recursions, a setting in which hypotheses are easily lost: the paper's own proofs use a bound on ∇θF\nabla_\theta F∇θ​F that A1 does not list, and one step of the proof of Theorem 3 (display (29)) treats a conditional mean as an unconditional one. The statement survives both, as recorded in the formalization notes.

Difficulty

The three recursions are coupled in both directions. The gradient tracker DkD_kDk​ is driven by indicator differences whose perturbation is itself scaled by DkD_kDk​, so the O(ck2)O(c_k^2)O(ck2​) bias holds only once DkD_kDk​ is known to be bounded, and boundedness must be shown with the adaptive cˉk\bar c_kcˉk​. The natural first idea, analyzing each recursion with the slower ones frozen, gives convergence but not rates: the targets q(θk)q(\theta_k)q(θk​) and ∇q(θk)\nabla q(\theta_k)∇q(θk​) move, and the error of each tracker must be bounded in mean square while the tracker it depends on is still converging. The rate also needs the almost-sure convergence of Theorem 1, which is an ODE-method argument for a projected, coupled scheme.

Formalization scope

Rd\mathbb R^dRd is EuclideanSpace ℝ (Fin d) with d≥1d\ge1d≥1. The black box is a family of laws μθ\mu_\thetaμθ​ on R\mathbb RR, defined for every θ∈Rd\theta\in\mathbb R^dθ∈Rd because SPQO samples outside Θ\ThetaΘ. A run lives on a probability space with a general filtration; initial values are deterministic with θ0∈Θ\theta_0\in\Thetaθ0​∈Θ; the sampling model fixes the conditional law of each output given the past (and Δk\Delta_kΔk​), which covers independent sampling and common random numbers. Expectations are Lebesgue integrals in [0,∞][0,\infty][0,∞], and the bias of Lemma 2 is an explicit average over the 2d2^d2d sign vectors. O(⋅)O(\cdot)O(⋅) is the paper's one-sided notion: a constant, depending on the instance and the run but not on kkk, times the rate, for all large kkk.

The following departures from the page are disclosed in every affected statement:

  • D1 the quantile step is projected onto a closed interval I⊇q(Θ)I\supseteq q(\Theta)I⊇q(Θ), the truncation the paper recommends on p. 13; I=RI=\mathbb RI=R is the printed recursion;
  • D2 step sizes use k+1k+1k+1 in place of kkk;
  • D3 A1 bounds the first derivatives of FFF, which the proofs use;
  • D4 only conditional marginal laws of the outputs are imposed;
  • D5 θ0∈Θ\theta_0\in\Thetaθ0​∈Θ;
  • D6 the Section 4 standing assumption (a unique globally asymptotically stable equilibrium θ∗\theta^*θ∗ of the projected ODE (25) in the interior of Θ\ThetaΘ) is stated in its equivalent first-order form: θ∗\theta^*θ∗ is interior and is the only θ∈Θ\theta\in\Thetaθ∈Θ with −∇q(θ)-\nabla q(\theta)−∇q(θ) in the normal cone of Θ\ThetaΘ at θ\thetaθ (the equilibria of (25); qqq is a Lyapunov function for (25), so uniqueness gives global asymptotic stability);
  • D7 joint continuity of fff is required on R×Θ\mathbb R\times\ThetaR×Θ.

B3 is stated as the quadratic-form bound vTH(θ)v≥ϱ∥v∥2v^TH(\theta)v\ge\varrho\|v\|^2vTH(θ)v≥ϱ∥v∥2, equivalent to the eigenvalue bound for the symmetric Hessian. Theorem 1 is formalized only in its strictly convex clause.

Several trivializing formalizations are ruled out. Without the truncation of D1 no run satisfies A1(b) or B1, so the untruncated statement would be vacuous. No statement takes a Bochner expectation or conditional expectation of a possibly non-integrable quantity. Gradients and Hessians of qqq are read only where qqq is C2C^2C2. No OOO-constant may depend on kkk.

A complete development needs stochastic approximation tools that Mathlib lacks: Robbins–Siegmund-type supermartingale convergence, the ODE method for projected recursions, and second-moment recursions for coupled trackers. These are reusable beyond this mission. Contributions are welcome for any milestone, and Lemma 3 is pure real analysis.

Selected references

  • J. Hu, M. Song, M. C. Fu, Quantile Optimization via Multiple Timescale Local Search for Black-box Functions, Operations Research, 2025; arXiv:2308.07607v1, 2023. https://arxiv.org/abs/2308.07607
  • J. C. Spall, Multivariate stochastic approximation using a simultaneous perturbation gradient approximation, IEEE Transactions on Automatic Control 37(3):332–341, 1992. https://doi.org/10.1109/9.119632
  • M. C. Fu, L. J. Hong, J.-Q. Hu, Conditional Monte Carlo estimation of quantile sensitivities, Management Science 55(12):2019–2027, 2009. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.1090.1090
  • J. Hu, Y. Peng, G. Zhang, Q. Zhang, A stochastic approximation method for simulation-based quantile optimization, INFORMS Journal on Computing 34(6):2889–2907, 2022.
  • A. I. Kibzun, E. Matveev, Optimization of the quantile criterion for the convex loss function by a stochastic quasi-gradient algorithm, Annals of Operations Research 200(1):183–198, 2012.
10 thms1 active userReviewed
Algorithmic Game TheoryOperations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

Telehealth in Acute Care: Pay Parity and Patient Access: Under Pay Parity, for Duplicate-Visit Probability q in (q†, q*), Telehealth Maximizes Provider Revenue but Office-Only Maximizes AccessResearch Paper

Motivation

During the COVID-19 pandemic most U.S. payers began reimbursing a telehealth consultation at the same rate as the corresponding office visit, a policy called pay parity. Many states have since made it permanent, on the stated ground that it improves patients' access to care. In acute care (primary and urgent care) a telehealth visit sometimes cannot resolve the problem and the patient must also come to the office: a duplicate visit. Duplicate visits are paid as well, and they consume office capacity.

Çakıcı and Mills (MSOM 2024; this mission follows the SSRN working-paper version of August 19, 2024) model a provider who splits capacity between an office and a telehealth channel, and patients who choose a channel strategically. Their main finding for the setting in which demand exceeds capacity is that pay parity can make the provider's revenue-maximizing choice and the access-maximizing choice disagree: for a moderate duplicate-visit probability the provider prefers telehealth while patients are better served by an office-only practice. This mission formalizes that result and the equilibrium analysis on which it rests.

Setting

A provider serves at total rate μ\muμ and devotes the fraction θ∈[0,1]\theta\in[0,1]θ∈[0,1] of its capacity, the telehealth commitment, to telehealth. Episodes of care arrive at rate λ\lambdaλ. Each patient balks (value 000), visits the office, or uses telehealth; a telehealth visit needs a duplicate office visit with probability qqq. A resolved episode is worth VVV; waiting costs hhh per unit of sojourn time; the co-payments are cOc_OcO​ and cTc_TcT​; an office visit costs an extra inconvenience τ\tauτ. With πO,πT\pi^O,\pi^TπO,πT the proportions choosing the office and telehealth, the expected sojourn times are

WO=1(1−θ)μ−(πO+qπT)λ,WT=1θμ−πTλ,W^O=\frac{1}{(1-\theta)\mu-(\pi^O+q\pi^T)\lambda},\qquad W^T=\frac{1}{\theta\mu-\pi^T\lambda},WO=(1−θ)μ−(πO+qπT)λ1​,WT=θμ−πTλ1​,

and the expected utilities are V−cO−τ−hWOV-c_O-\tau-hW^OV−cO​−τ−hWO (office) and V−cT−hWT−q(cO+τ+hWO)V-c_T-hW^T-q(c_O+\tau+hW^O)V−cT​−hWT−q(cO​+τ+hWO) (telehealth). A patient equilibrium is a split (πB,πO,πT)(\pi^B,\pi^O,\pi^T)(πB,πO,πT) in which every action used is a best response.

The paper assumes V>h/μ+cO+τV>h/\mu+c_O+\tauV>h/μ+cO​+τ, cT<cO+τc_T<c_O+\taucT​<cO​+τ, and, with κ(q)=h/μV−cT−q(cO+τ)\kappa(q)=\frac{h/\mu}{V-c_T-q(c_O+\tau)}κ(q)=V−cT​−q(cO​+τ)h/μ​, that 0<κ(q)≤1/(1+q)20<\kappa(q)\le 1/(1+\sqrt q)^20<κ(q)≤1/(1+q​)2. In the large-market setting some patients balk at every θ\thetaθ. There the equilibrium is of one of four types, by region of θ\thetaθ: balk/office on [0,θT][0,\theta^T][0,θT], balk/office/telehealth on (θT,θO)(\theta^T,\theta^O)(θT,θO), balk/telehealth on [θO,θˉ)[\theta^O,\bar\theta)[θO,θˉ), all-balk on [θˉ,1][\bar\theta,1][θˉ,1], with explicit thresholds θT,θO,θˉ\theta^T,\theta^O,\bar\thetaθT,θO,θˉ and explicit proportions πO(θ),πT(θ)\pi^O(\theta),\pi^T(\theta)πO(θ),πT(θ). The patient access rate and the provider's revenue rate under telehealth reimbursement rrr (office revenue RRR) are

A(θ)=(πO(θ)+πT(θ))λ,F(r,θ)=(RπO(θ)+(r+Rq)πT(θ))λ.A(\theta)=\bigl(\pi^O(\theta)+\pi^T(\theta)\bigr)\lambda,\qquad F(r,\theta)=\bigl(R\pi^O(\theta)+(r+Rq)\pi^T(\theta)\bigr)\lambda .A(θ)=(πO(θ)+πT(θ))λ,F(r,θ)=(RπO(θ)+(r+Rq)πT(θ))λ.

The commitment that maximizes telehealth usage in the balk/telehealth region is θ∗=(1−κ(q)(1−q)q)/(1+q)\theta^*=\bigl(1-\kappa(q)(1-q)\sqrt q\bigr)/(1+q)θ∗=(1−κ(q)(1−q)q​)/(1+q).

Formalization targets

Goal: Proposition 4 with the thresholds of Proposition 3

Fix all parameters except θ\thetaθ and qqq, with R>0R>0R>0. There are thresholds 0<q†<q∗<10<q^\dagger<q^*<10<q†<q∗<1 such that, for every admissible qqq, pay-parity revenue F(R,⋅)F(R,\cdot)F(R,⋅) is maximized over [0,1][0,1][0,1] at θ∗\theta^*θ∗ when q<q∗q<q^*q<q∗ and at 000 when q>q∗q>q^*q>q∗; access AAA is maximized at θ∗\theta^*θ∗ when q<q†q<q^\daggerq<q† and at 000 when q>q†q>q^\daggerq>q†; and for q†<q<q∗q^\dagger<q<q^*q†<q<q∗

A(θ∗)<A(0)andF(R,0)<F(R,θ∗).A(\theta^*)<A(0)\qquad\text{and}\qquad F(R,0)<F(R,\theta^*).A(θ∗)<A(0)andF(R,0)<F(R,θ∗).

The thresholds are existential; no closed form is fixed, so the statement survives any later computation of them.

Milestones

In attack order: Lemma 2 (order of θT,θO\theta^T,\theta^OθT,θO); Theorems 1–3 (where each equilibrium type occurs) and Lemma 3 (θˉ<1\bar\theta<1θˉ<1); Theorem 4 (shape of FFF in θ\thetaθ); Corollaries 1–2 (the maximizers of FFF and AAA are 000 or θ∗\theta^*θ∗); Proposition 3 (the two thresholds). Two further items are not milestones: the uniqueness of the large-market equilibrium proportions, and Proposition 5 (the reimbursement r~=R(1−q)\tilde r=R(1-q)r~=R(1−q) aligns the two objectives).

Significance

The result is the paper's argument against pay parity in acute care: when duplicate visits are neither rare nor frequent, paying telehealth at parity induces the provider to adopt it although fewer patients are then seen. Proposition 5 shows the misalignment disappears under the less-than-parity reimbursement R(1−q)R(1-q)R(1−q), which pays the same per patient seen through either channel. The thresholds q∗q^*q∗ and q†q^\daggerq† are what turn this into a policy statement about measurable duplicate-visit rates.

The paper proves these results by hand. None of them has a machine-checked proof, and nothing about strategic channel choice with duplicate service exists on Prove2Me. Formalizing them checks a case analysis with four regions, two square-root closed forms and an intermediate-value argument in qqq. The formalization has already exposed two places where the printed statements need a hypothesis (see Formalization scope).

Difficulty

Each step is elementary; the difficulty is bookkeeping. The equilibrium characterization requires solving the indifference conditions in each region and choosing the root of a quadratic that gives stable queues. The shape results require continuity of AAA and FFF across region boundaries and concavity of a function of the form cθ−κ2+(a−bθ)2c\theta-\sqrt{\kappa^2+(a-b\theta)^2}cθ−κ2+(a−bθ)2​. The obvious comparison of the closed-form values at 000 and at θ∗\theta^*θ∗ does not suffice on its own: the closed-form value at θ∗\theta^*θ∗ is the revenue only when θ∗\theta^*θ∗ lies in the balk/telehealth region, which fails for some admissible parameters. Whether that failure matters for the maximization is the central question.

Formalization scope

All objects are real-valued closed forms in the namespace TelehealthParity.Access. The definition Setting holds the parameters (the arrival rate is lam, since λ is a Lean keyword), κ,θT,θO,θˉ,θ∗\kappa,\theta^T,\theta^O,\bar\theta,\theta^*κ,θT,θO,θˉ,θ∗, the region-wise proportions, AAA, FFF, the large-market condition and the predicate Admissible p q. The definition Equilibrium holds the sojourn times, utilities and the equilibrium predicate. Conventions:

  • Lemma 1 (the sojourn times) is adopted as the model, as in the paper; no queueing theory is formalized.
  • A channel whose queue is unstable is unavailable: it cannot be used and constrains nothing. This is how the paper discards the unstable root in the balk/telehealth region.
  • "Large market" (stated verbally on p. 12) is encoded as A(θ)<λA(\theta)<\lambdaA(θ)<λ for all θ∈[0,1]\theta\in[0,1]θ∈[0,1].
  • Admissible p q collects 0<q<10<q<10<q<1, assumption (6), Lemma 2's ordering condition, the large market, and (1−q)V−cT>0(1-q)V-c_T>0(1−q)V−cT​>0. The last is not printed; the proof of Lemma 2 presumes it, and Lemma 2 fails without it.
  • R>0R>0R>0 is added where strictness needs it: Theorem 4, the goal, and Proposition 5. The paper allows R≥0R\ge0R≥0.
  • Corollary 1 carries the added hypothesis "r≤Rr\le Rr≤R or θO≤θ∗\theta^O\le\theta^*θO≤θ∗". As printed, for every r>0r>0r>0, it is false for some r>Rr>Rr>R, where the maximizer is θO\theta^OθO.
  • "Maximized at" is IsMaxOn over [0,1][0,1][0,1]; "linear" is affine.

Excluded trivializations. AAA, FFF and θ∗\theta^*θ∗ are closed forms, not suprema or argmaxes. The goal states the strict misalignment and the full threshold characterization, not a comparison with one point. A sorry-free sanity check shows that the hypotheses hold on an admissible instance in the misaligned range (V=4V=4V=4, cT=cO=τ=1c_T=c_O=\tau=1cT​=cO​=τ=1, h=1/2h=1/2h=1/2, μ=1\mu=1μ=1, λ=2\lambda=2λ=2, q=1/25q=1/25q=1/25).

Welcome contributions are proofs of any milestone. The real-analysis lemmas (concavity of cθ−κ2+(a−bθ)2c\theta-\sqrt{\kappa^2+(a-b\theta)^2}cθ−κ2+(a−bθ)2​, maximization of piecewise functions that are continuous across region boundaries) are reusable beyond this mission.

Selected references

  • Ö. E. Çakıcı and A. F. Mills, Telehealth in Acute Care: Pay Parity and Patient Access, Manufacturing & Service Operations Management, 2024. https://doi.org/10.1287/msom.2022.0345 (SSRN working paper, version of August 19, 2024, followed here).
12 thms1 active userReviewed
Dynamic ProgrammingOperations ResearchStochastic Systems·Captain: mikedeng1

Managing Resources for Shared Micromobility: Approximate Optimality in Large-Scale Systems: The Transient-Horizon Mean-Field Policy Has Optimality Gap at Most γCγᵀ/(1 − γ)Research Paper

Rebalancing shared vehicles at scale

Shared bike and scooter systems (micromobility) must decide, every period, how to move vehicles between stations, which depleted vehicles to recharge, and how many vehicles to source from or return to a central warehouse. Customer trips redistribute the fleet in the meantime, and some vehicles come back with a depleted battery. For a realistic network, the exact Markov decision process has a state space that grows exponentially in the number of stations, so its optimal policy cannot be computed.

Akturk, Candogan and Gupta (Management Science, 2022; preprint SSRN 4155841) group stations into finitely many types and replace the stochastic network by a deterministic mean-field model that tracks, for each type, the fraction of stations holding each number of charged vehicles and the scaled stock of depleted vehicles. They show that the mean-field model is asymptotically exact as the number of stations grows (their Theorem 3.4), and they propose a control algorithm for it whose optimality gap they bound explicitly (their Theorem 4.2). This mission formalizes the second result.

The compact mean-field model

There are e^\hat ee^ station types, with nen_ene​ stations of type eee and n=∑enen = \sum_e n_en=∑e​ne​ in total. A customer leaving a type-e′e'e′ station returns the vehicle at a type-eee station with probability pe′,e=newe′,e/∑e2we′,e2ne2p_{e',e} = n_e w_{e',e}/\sum_{e_2} w_{e',e_2} n_{e_2}pe′,e​=ne​we′,e​/∑e2​​we′,e2​​ne2​​. Demand at a type-eee station has a law DeD^eDe on N0\mathbb N_0N0​ with finite mean and variance; a returned vehicle is still charged with probability qqq, and costs are discounted by γ∈[0,1)\gamma \in [0, 1)γ∈[0,1).

The extended types are 000 (the warehouse), 1,…,e^1, \dots, \hat e1,…,e^ (charged vehicles of each type) and e^+1,…,2e^\hat e + 1, \dots, 2\hat ee^+1,…,2e^ (the depleted stock of each type). Moving one vehicle from extended type e1e_1e1​ to e2e_2e2​ costs ce1,e2c_{e_1,e_2}ce1​,e2​​, with ce1,e2≥ce1,e1/2+ce2,e2/2c_{e_1,e_2} \ge c_{e_1,e_1}/2 + c_{e_2,e_2}/2ce1​,e2​​≥ce1​,e1​​/2+ce2​,e2​​/2.

An action a^∈A^\hat a \in \hat Aa^∈A^ is a post-rebalancing distribution: fractions a^e,d≥0\hat a_{e,d} \ge 0a^e,d​≥0 of stations of type eee holding ddd vehicles, supported on {Le,…,Ue}\{L^e, \dots, U^e\}{Le,…,Ue} and summing to ne/nn_e/nne​/n, and a scaled depleted stock a^e,r∈[Lr,e,Ur,e]\hat a_{e,r} \in [L^{r,e}, U^{r,e}]a^e,r​∈[Lr,e,Ur,e]. A state x˘∈X˘\breve x \in \breve Xx˘∈X˘ records the fractions x˘e,d\breve x_{e,d}x˘e,d​ for d≤Ued \le U^ed≤Ue, the depleted stock x˘e,r\breve x_{e,r}x˘e,r​, and two aggregates x˘e,s,x˘e,u\breve x_{e,s}, \breve x_{e,u}x˘e,s​,x˘e,u​ of the vehicles above UeU^eUe, within the bounds of the paper's Appendix F.

The next state x˘′(a^)\breve x'(\hat a)x˘′(a^) depends on the action only, through the transitions (F.1)–(F.5): demand removes min⁡(b,De)\min(b, D^e)min(b,De) vehicles from a station holding bbb, and an independent Poisson number R^e\hat R^eR^e of charged vehicles arrives, with a rate (3.2) that is linear in the action's expected trips. Each period costs c^2(x˘,a^)+N^(a^)\hat c_2(\breve x, \hat a) + \hat N(\hat a)c^2​(x˘,a^)+N^(a^), where

  • c^2\hat c_2c^2​ (F.6) is a truncated Wasserstein term plus nnn times the optimal value of a min-cost-flow problem between the extended types;
  • N^\hat NN^ (3.4) is the expected holding and shortage cost.

The value function V^(x˘)\hat V(\breve x)V^(x˘) is the infimum over action sequences in A^\hat AA^ of ∑k≥0γk(c^2(x˘k,ak)+N^(ak))\sum_{k \ge 0}\gamma^k(\hat c_2(\breve x^k, a_k) + \hat N(a_k))∑k≥0​γk(c^2​(x˘k,ak​)+N^(ak​)), where x˘0=x˘\breve x^0 = \breve xx˘0=x˘ and x˘k+1=x˘′(ak)\breve x^{k+1} = \breve x'(a_k)x˘k+1=x˘′(ak​).

The algorithm. Given x˘\breve xx˘ and a transient horizon T≥0T \ge 0T≥0, solve the finite program (4.1): choose a~0,…,a~T∈A^\tilde a^0, \dots, \tilde a^T \in \hat Aa~0,…,a~T∈A^ to minimize

∑k=0T−1γk(c^2(x˘k,a~k)+N^(a~k))+γTc^2(x˘T,a~T)+γT1−γ(γc^2(x˘T+1,a~T)+N^(a~T)),\sum_{k=0}^{T-1}\gamma^k\big(\hat c_2(\breve x^k, \tilde a^k) + \hat N(\tilde a^k)\big) + \gamma^T\hat c_2(\breve x^T, \tilde a^T) + \frac{\gamma^T}{1-\gamma}\big(\gamma\hat c_2(\breve x^{T+1}, \tilde a^T) + \hat N(\tilde a^T)\big),k=0∑T−1​γk(c^2​(x˘k,a~k)+N^(a~k))+γTc^2​(x˘T,a~T)+1−γγT​(γc^2​(x˘T+1,a~T)+N^(a~T)),

then play a~0,…,a~T−1\tilde a^0, \dots, \tilde a^{T-1}a~0,…,a~T−1 and repeat a~T\tilde a^Ta~T forever ((4.2)–(4.3)). Call this policy π~\tilde\piπ~ and its discounted cost V^π~(x˘)\hat V_{\tilde\pi}(\breve x)V^π~​(x˘).

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 4.2

For every T≥0T \ge 0T≥0, every x˘∈X˘\breve x \in \breve Xx˘∈X˘ and every minimizer of (4.1),

V^π~(x˘)−V^(x˘)≤γ1−γ C γT,and, if q=0,V^π~(x˘)−V^(x˘)≤C γT,\hat V_{\tilde\pi}(\breve x) - \hat V(\breve x) \le \frac{\gamma}{1-\gamma}\,C\,\gamma^T, \qquad\text{and, if } q = 0,\qquad \hat V_{\tilde\pi}(\breve x) - \hat V(\breve x) \le C\,\gamma^T,V^π~​(x˘)−V^(x˘)≤1−γγ​CγT,and, if q=0,V^π~​(x˘)−V^(x˘)≤CγT,

where

C=2∑e=1e^(nemax⁡(c0,e,ce,0)(Ue−Le)+nmax⁡(c0,e^+e,ce^+e,0)(Ur,e−Lr,e)).C = 2\sum_{e=1}^{\hat e}\Big(n_e\max(c_{0,e}, c_{e,0})(U^e - L^e) + n\max(c_{0,\hat e+e}, c_{\hat e+e,0})(U^{r,e} - L^{r,e})\Big).C=2e=1∑e^​(ne​max(c0,e​,ce,0​)(Ue−Le)+nmax(c0,e^+e​,ce^+e,0​)(Ur,e−Lr,e)).

Milestones

  1. (3.6): V^\hat VV^ satisfies the Bellman equation V^(x˘)=min⁡a^∈A^c^2(x˘,a^)+N^(a^)+γV^(x˘′(a^))\hat V(\breve x) = \min_{\hat a \in \hat A}\hat c_2(\breve x, \hat a) + \hat N(\hat a) + \gamma\hat V(\breve x'(\hat a))V^(x˘)=mina^∈A^​c^2​(x˘,a^)+N^(a^)+γV^(x˘′(a^)) on X˘\breve XX˘, with the minimum attained.
  2. §4.1, p. 26: the cost of π~\tilde\piπ~ equals the optimal value of (4.1).
  3. Lemma H.7: c^2(x˘,a^)≤c^2(x˘,z^)+c^2(z^,a^)\hat c_2(\breve x, \hat a) \le \hat c_2(\breve x, \hat z) + \hat c_2(\hat z, \hat a)c^2​(x˘,a^)≤c^2​(x˘,z^)+c^2​(z^,a^), an action read as a state.
  4. Lemma H.9: c^2(a^1,a^2)≤C/2\hat c_2(\hat a^1, \hat a^2) \le C/2c^2​(a^1,a^2)≤C/2 for all a^1,a^2∈A^\hat a^1, \hat a^2 \in \hat Aa^1,a^2∈A^.
  5. Lemma H.8: under the triangle inequality, there is an optimal policy with π^∗(π^∗(x˘))=π^∗(x˘)\hat\pi^*(\hat\pi^*(\breve x)) = \hat\pi^*(\breve x)π^∗(π^∗(x˘))=π^∗(x˘).
  6. Proposition H.3: for q=0q = 0q=0, the dynamic program has a fixed point x˘f=x˘′(a^f)\breve x^f = \breve x'(\hat a^f)x˘f=x˘′(a^f) with a^f\hat a^fa^f optimal at x˘f\breve x^fx˘f (Definition H.1).

Significance

Theorem 4.2 makes the algorithm a certified approximation scheme. It turns an infinite-horizon problem into a finite program of T+1T + 1T+1 actions, and the loss from doing so decays geometrically in TTT, uniformly over the initial state, with a constant that depends only on the rebalancing costs and the action bounds. For q=0q = 0q=0 the transitions are affine, the program (4.1) becomes a linear program (the paper's Appendix G), and the sharper bound CγTC\gamma^TCγT applies.

The result is proved in the paper (Appendix H), but not formalized anywhere. A formal proof combines a triangle inequality for an LP-valued cost, a dynamic-programming principle with attainment on a compact action set, and a fixed-point argument for a convex deterministic dynamic program. The paper has several small printed slips on this path (for example, Proposition H.10 states the q=0q = 0q=0 constant without the factor 222 that its proof produces); the formal statements fix the corrected reading.

Difficulty

The bound is not a truncation estimate. Cutting the discounted sum at TTT gives a gap proportional to the per-period cost, not to CCC. The comparison has to be made against an optimal action sequence, whose first T+1T + 1T+1 actions are feasible for (4.1). After period TTT, the optimal sequence and π~\tilde\piπ~ diverge, and the cost of that divergence must be controlled by the cost of moving between two actions, which requires:

  • the triangle inequality for c^2\hat c_2c^2​, whose flow component is the value of a linear program, not a closed form;
  • the fact that, once rebalanced to an optimal action, staying there is optimal (Lemma H.8);
  • the bound of Lemma H.9 on the cost between any two feasible actions.

The q=0q = 0q=0 bound needs, in addition, a steady state of the controlled system (Proposition H.3), which rests on a fixed-point theorem for convex deterministic dynamic programs (Flynn 1979). The Bellman equation itself is not free: with V^\hat VV^ defined as an infimum over sequences, attainment of the minimum needs continuity of c^2\hat c_2c^2​, N^\hat NN^, the transition and V^\hat VV^ on the compact action set.

Formalization scope

Types are Fin ê (0-based) and the extended types are Fin (2ê+1) with chg e and dep e for the paper's eee and e^+e\hat e + ee^+e. Level vectors are functions N→R\mathbb N \to \mathbb RN→R that vanish outside their support. P[b−min⁡(b,De)+R^e=d]\mathbb P[b - \min(b, D^e) + \hat R^e = d]P[b−min(b,De)+R^e=d] is the convolution of the demand law with the Poisson law, so DeD^eDe and R^e\hat R^eR^e are independent, as the paper presupposes. V^\hat VV^ is the infimum over the subtype of A^\hat AA^-valued sequences (p. 18 and Proposition F.3), and (3.6) is posed as a milestone rather than used as a definition. X˘\breve XX˘ is formalized as printed on p. A-22. The policy cost is the discounted cost of a~0,…,a~T−1,a~T,a~T,…\tilde a^0, \dots, \tilde a^{T-1}, \tilde a^T, \tilde a^T, \dotsa~0,…,a~T−1,a~T,a~T,…, where a~\tilde aa~ is a hypothesis-given minimizer of (4.1). Everything is time-homogeneous and stated at t=0t = 0t=0.

Standing assumptions, as one predicate on the model: 0≤γ<10 \le \gamma < 10≤γ<1, 0≤q≤10 \le q \le 10≤q≤1, ne≥1n_e \ge 1ne​≥1, w≥0w \ge 0w≥0 with positive normalizers, Le≤UeL^e \le U^eLe≤Ue, 0≤Lr,e≤Ur,e0 \le L^{r,e} \le U^{r,e}0≤Lr,e≤Ur,e, finite second moments of DeD^eDe, the cost assumption ce1,e2≥ce1,e1/2+ce2,e2/2c_{e_1,e_2} \ge c_{e_1,e_1}/2 + c_{e_2,e_2}/2ce1​,e2​​≥ce1​,e1​​/2+ce2​,e2​​/2, c0,0=0c_{0,0} = 0c0,0​=0, ce^+e,e^+e=0c_{\hat e+e,\hat e+e} = 0ce^+e,e^+e​=0. Two additions are disclosed: γ≥0\gamma \ge 0γ≥0, and ce1,e2≥0c_{e_1,e_2} \ge 0ce1​,e2​​≥0, without which Lemma H.9 and the goal fail (the right-hand side could be negative).

Trivializing formalizations are excluded: V^\hat VV^ ranges only over A^\hat AA^-valued sequences, the policy is tied to a minimizer of (4.1) and to no other objective, the flow value is an infimum over a nonempty set bounded below (warehouse routing is always feasible), and CCC uses c0,ec_{0,e}c0,e​, ce,0c_{e,0}ce,0​, c0,e^+ec_{0,\hat e+e}c0,e^+e​, ce^+e,0c_{\hat e+e,0}ce^+e,0​ with the paper's indexing and the factor 222.

Two general objects are separate definitions on which the model is built: a discounted deterministic dynamic program (trajectory, discounted cost, value as an infimum over admissible action sequences) and the uncapacitated transshipment LP on a complete digraph with free nodes. Both are reusable beyond this mission. A complete development further needs Poisson tail sums, subadditivity of the flow value, compactness of A^\hat AA^, a dynamic-programming principle and a fixed-point theorem for convex deterministic programs. Proofs of any milestone, and alternative arguments for the q=0q = 0q=0 fixed point, are welcome.

Selected references

  • D. Akturk, O. Candogan, V. Gupta, Managing Resources for Shared Micromobility: Approximate Optimality in Large-Scale Systems, Management Science, 2022. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2022.02023 (read as SSRN 4155841, version of 2024-05-22: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4155841)
  • J. Flynn, Steady state policies for deterministic dynamic programs, SIAM Journal on Applied Mathematics 37(1):128–147, 1979 (as cited in the paper's appendix references).
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Machine LearningReinforcement Learning·Captain: mikedeng1

Structural Estimation of Markov Decision Processes in High-Dimensional State Space with Finite-Time Guarantees: Single-Loop ML-IRL Policy and Reward Iterates Converge at Explicit Finite-Time RatesResearch Paper

Motivation

Structural estimation of Markov decision processes recovers the parameters of an agent's reward from observed behavior, under the hypothesis that the agent acts optimally in a known dynamic environment. In econometrics this is the dynamic discrete choice model of Rust (Rust 1987); in artificial intelligence it is maximum-likelihood inverse reinforcement learning (ML-IRL). With Gumbel-distributed choice shocks the two coincide: the agent behaves like the optimal policy of an entropy-regularized MDP, and the reward parameter is estimated by maximizing the likelihood of the observed trajectories.

The classical estimators are nested: every evaluation of the likelihood solves the inner dynamic program to optimality (Rust's nested fixed-point algorithm), which is expensive when the state space is large. Zeng, Hong and Garcia (arXiv:2210.01282, Operations Research 2025) replace the nested loop by a single loop that alternates one approximate soft policy-iteration step with one stochastic gradient step on the reward parameter, and prove a finite-time guarantee for it. That guarantee, Theorem 1 of the paper, is the subject of this mission.

Setting

Let S\mathcal SS and A\mathcal AA be finite nonempty sets of states and actions, P(s′∣s,a)P(s'\mid s,a)P(s′∣s,a) a transition kernel, ρ\rhoρ an initial distribution on S\mathcal SS and γ∈[0,1)\gamma\in[0,1)γ∈[0,1) a discount factor. The reward r(s,a;θ)r(s,a;\theta)r(s,a;θ) depends on a parameter θ∈Rp\theta\in\mathbb R^pθ∈Rp. A policy π(a∣s)\pi(a\mid s)π(a∣s) is a distribution over actions at each state, with entropy H(π(⋅∣s))=−∑aπ(a∣s)log⁡π(a∣s)\mathcal H(\pi(\cdot\mid s))=-\sum_a\pi(a\mid s)\log\pi(a\mid s)H(π(⋅∣s))=−∑a​π(a∣s)logπ(a∣s).

The soft Q-function of a pair (θ,π)(\theta,\pi)(θ,π) is Q(s,a)=r(s,a;θ)+γ Es′∼P(⋅∣s,a)[V(s′)]Q(s,a)=r(s,a;\theta)+\gamma\,\mathbb E_{s'\sim P(\cdot\mid s,a)}[V(s')]Q(s,a)=r(s,a;θ)+γEs′∼P(⋅∣s,a)​[V(s′)], where V(s)V(s)V(s) is the expected discounted sum of r(st,at;θ)+H(π(⋅∣st))r(s_t,a_t;\theta)+\mathcal H(\pi(\cdot\mid s_t))r(st​,at​;θ)+H(π(⋅∣st​)) along the trajectory of π\piπ from sss. The soft-optimal Q-function QθQ_\thetaQθ​ is the fixed point of the soft-Bellman operator ΛθQ(s,a)=r(s,a;θ)+γ∑s′P(s′∣s,a)log⁡∑beQ(s′,b)\Lambda_\theta Q(s,a)=r(s,a;\theta)+\gamma\sum_{s'}P(s'\mid s,a)\log\sum_b e^{Q(s',b)}Λθ​Q(s,a)=r(s,a;θ)+γ∑s′​P(s′∣s,a)log∑b​eQ(s′,b); the soft-optimal policy is πθ(a∣s)∝eQθ(s,a)\pi_\theta(a\mid s)\propto e^{Q_\theta(s,a)}πθ​(a∣s)∝eQθ​(s,a) and Vθ(s)=log⁡∑aeQθ(s,a)V_\theta(s)=\log\sum_a e^{Q_\theta(s,a)}Vθ​(s)=log∑a​eQθ​(s,a).

Given a finite dataset D\mathcal DD of expert trajectories, the surrogate likelihood is

L^(θ;D)=Eτ∼D[∑t≥0γtr(st,at;θ)]−Es0∼ρ[Vθ(s0)].\widehat L(\theta;\mathcal D)=\mathbb E_{\tau\sim\mathcal D}\Big[\sum_{t\ge0}\gamma^tr(s_t,a_t;\theta)\Big]-\mathbb E_{s_0\sim\rho}[V_\theta(s_0)].L(θ;D)=Eτ∼D​[t≥0∑​γtr(st​,at​;θ)]−Es0​∼ρ​[Vθ​(s0​)].

Algorithm 1 (ML-IRL). Starting from (θ0,π0)(\theta_0,\pi_0)(θ0​,π0​) and for k=0,…,K−1k=0,\dots,K-1k=0,…,K−1: estimate the soft Q-function QkQ_kQk​ of (θk,πk)(\theta_k,\pi_k)(θk​,πk​) by Q^k\widehat Q_kQ​k​ with ∥Q^k−Qk∥∞≤ε\|\widehat Q_k-Q_k\|_\infty\le\varepsilon∥Q​k​−Qk​∥∞​≤ε; set πk+1(a∣s)∝eQ^k(s,a)\pi_{k+1}(a\mid s)\propto e^{\widehat Q_k(s,a)}πk+1​(a∣s)∝eQ​k​(s,a); sample an expert trajectory τkE\tau^E_kτkE​ from D\mathcal DD and an agent trajectory τkA\tau^A_kτkA​ from πk+1\pi_{k+1}πk+1​; set θk+1=θk+α(h(θk;τkE)−h(θk;τkA))\theta_{k+1}=\theta_k+\alpha\big(h(\theta_k;\tau^E_k)-h(\theta_k;\tau^A_k)\big)θk+1​=θk​+α(h(θk​;τkE​)−h(θk​;τkA​)) with h(θ;τ)=∑tγt∇θr(st,at;θ)h(\theta;\tau)=\sum_t\gamma^t\nabla_\theta r(s_t,a_t;\theta)h(θ;τ)=∑t​γt∇θ​r(st​,at​;θ).

The assumptions are: (1) 0≤r≤Cr0\le r\le C_r0≤r≤Cr​; (2) under every policy the state chain mixes geometrically in total variation; (3) ∥∇θr∥≤Lr\|\nabla_\theta r\|\le L_r∥∇θ​r∥≤Lr​ and ∇θr\nabla_\theta r∇θ​r is LgL_gLg​-Lipschitz in θ\thetaθ.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 1, explicit form

Write Lq=Lr/(1−γ)L_q=L_r/(1-\gamma)Lq​=Lr​/(1−γ), Lc=2LqLrCd∣S∣∣A∣/(1−γ)+2Lg/(1−γ)L_c=2L_qL_rC_d\sqrt{|\mathcal S||\mathcal A|}/(1-\gamma)+2L_g/(1-\gamma)Lc​=2Lq​Lr​Cd​∣S∣∣A∣​/(1−γ)+2Lg​/(1−γ), C1=4CdLq2∣S∣∣A∣C_1=4C_dL_q^2\sqrt{|\mathcal S||\mathcal A|}C1​=4Cd​Lq2​∣S∣∣A∣​, C0=∥Q0−Qθ0∥∞C_0=\|Q_0-Q_{\theta_0}\|_\inftyC0​=∥Q0​−Qθ0​​∥∞​ and

B=C0K(1−γ)+2γε(1−γ)2+4Lq21−γα.B=\frac{C_0}{K(1-\gamma)}+\frac{2\gamma\varepsilon}{(1-\gamma)^2}+\frac{4L_q^2}{1-\gamma}\alpha .B=K(1−γ)C0​​+(1−γ)22γε​+1−γ4Lq2​​α.

There is Cd>0C_d>0Cd​>0 depending only on (P,ρ,γ)(P,\rho,\gamma)(P,ρ,γ) such that every run with K≥1K\ge1K≥1 and α=α0/Kσ\alpha=\alpha_0/K^\sigmaα=α0​/Kσ, α0>0\alpha_0>0α0​>0, σ∈(0,1)\sigma\in(0,1)σ∈(0,1), satisfies, for every realization,

1K∑k=0K−1∥log⁡πk+1−log⁡πθk∥∞≤2ε+2B,\frac1K\sum_{k=0}^{K-1}\|\log\pi_{k+1}-\log\pi_{\theta_k}\|_\infty\le2\varepsilon+2B,K1​k=0∑K−1​∥logπk+1​−logπθk​​∥∞​≤2ε+2B,

and in expectation

1K∑k=0K−1E∥∇θL^(θk;D)∥2≤2LcLq2α+C1(B+ε)+E[L^(θK;D)−L^(θ0;D)]Kα.\frac1K\sum_{k=0}^{K-1}\mathbb E\|\nabla_\theta\widehat L(\theta_k;\mathcal D)\|^2\le2L_cL_q^2\alpha+C_1(B+\varepsilon)+\frac{\mathbb E[\widehat L(\theta_K;\mathcal D)-\widehat L(\theta_0;\mathcal D)]}{K\alpha}.K1​k=0∑K−1​E∥∇θ​L(θk​;D)∥2≤2Lc​Lq2​α+C1​(B+ε)+KαE[L(θK​;D)−L(θ0​;D)]​.

The printed Theorem 1 states only the rates O(K−1)+O(K−σ)+O(ε)O(K^{-1})+O(K^{-\sigma})+O(\varepsilon)O(K−1)+O(K−σ)+O(ε) and O(K−σ)+O(K−1+σ)+O(K−1)+O(ε)O(K^{-\sigma})+O(K^{-1+\sigma})+O(K^{-1})+O(\varepsilon)O(K−σ)+O(K−1+σ)+O(K−1)+O(ε); the goal is the explicit pair of inequalities its proof derives, from which those rates follow because L^\widehat LL is bounded.

Milestones

Lemma 2 (the gradient of L^\widehat LL), Lemma 5 (Lipschitz visitation measures), Lemma 3 (Lipschitz QθQ_\thetaQθ​ and smooth L^\widehat LL), Lemma 6 and Lemma 7 (approximate soft policy iteration), and the proof's displays (35), (40), (41), the averaged tracking bound after (44) and the averaged gradient bound on p. 24. The bias bound (48) is a further item of the mission without being a milestone.

Significance

The result. Theorem 1 is a finite-time guarantee for a single-loop structural estimator: with σ=1/2\sigma=1/2σ=1/2 both the policy-tracking error and the squared gradient of the surrogate likelihood decay as O(K−1/2)+O(ε)O(K^{-1/2})+O(\varepsilon)O(K−1/2)+O(ε). It shows that the inner dynamic program need not be solved to optimality at each likelihood evaluation, and it quantifies the price of approximate policy evaluation through ε\varepsilonε. The paper reports it as the first finite-time result for an algorithm for either the dynamic discrete choice problem or ML-IRL.

Formalizing it. The result is proved on paper; no part of it is machine-checked. A complete development would put on the platform an entropy-regularized MDP layer (soft values, the soft-Bellman fixed point, the soft-optimal policy), its Lipschitz dependence on a reward parameter, the gradient of a soft-optimal value through its fixed point, and a two-timescale analysis with a biased stochastic gradient. Each of these is reusable by later soft-RL, IRL and structural-estimation formalizations.

Difficulty

Neither iterate converges on its own. The policy πk+1\pi_{k+1}πk+1​ chases a target πθk\pi_{\theta_k}πθk​​ that moves whenever θ\thetaθ moves, so the standard linear convergence of soft policy iteration for a fixed reward does not apply directly. The stochastic gradient gkg_kgk​ samples from πk+1\pi_{k+1}πk+1​ rather than from πθk\pi_{\theta_k}πθk​​, so it is biased, and the standard analysis of unbiased stochastic gradient ascent does not apply either. The analysis must show that the tracking error contracts faster than the reward drifts, and bound the bias by the tracking error through the dependence of the state-action visitation measure on the policy. The gradient formula itself requires differentiating a soft-optimal value through a fixed point.

Formalization scope

The Lean development works with finite S\mathcal SS and A\mathcal AA (both nonempty), policies as functions S→A→R\mathcal S\to\mathcal A\to\mathbb RS→A→R, θ∈\theta\inθ∈ EuclideanSpace ℝ (Fin p), and discounted expectations as tsums over the occupation distribution of the published FoundationsML.ReinforcementLearning layer. ∥⋅∥∞\|\cdot\|_\infty∥⋅∥∞​ is the maximum over (s,a)(s,a)(s,a); Lemma 5's ∥w−w′∥\|w-w'\|∥w−w′∥ is the Frobenius norm; total variation is half the ℓ1\ell_1ℓ1​ distance. QθQ_\thetaQθ​ is chosen by Classical.epsilon among fixed points of Λθ\Lambda_\thetaΛθ​, which exist and are unique because Λθ\Lambda_\thetaΛθ​ is a γ\gammaγ-contraction.

Disclosed deviations from the page: Assumption 3 is a hypothesis of the goal (Theorem 1 prints "Assumptions 1 - 2" but its proof uses Assumption 3); S\mathcal SS is finite, as the proof's ∣S∣∣A∣\sqrt{|\mathcal S||\mathcal A|}∣S∣∣A∣​ requires, although the title speaks of high-dimensional state spaces; Assumption 3 includes differentiability of rrr, which the page uses implicitly; ε≥0\varepsilon\ge0ε≥0 (the page writes ϵapp>0\epsilon_{\rm app}>0ϵapp​>0); Assumption 2 is stated as the mixing bound the paper derives from irreducibility and aperiodicity; and Algorithm 1's sampling is represented by the conditional means of the sampled gradients given the past, measurable with respect to a filtration, which is the only way the proof uses it.

The statement admits no trivializing reading: the run structure is inhabited (a sorry-free check exhibits a run), CdC_dCd​ is fixed before the reward, the data and the run, every expectation is of a bounded measurable function, the gradient is that of a differentiable function (Lemma 2), and the Frobenius norm is used where the page uses it rather than Lean's sup norm on function types.

Welcome contributions: the existence and uniqueness of the soft-Bellman fixed point, the performance-difference and Gibbs-variational facts behind Lemma 7, the visitation-measure Lipschitz bound of Lemma 5, and the fixed-point differentiation behind Lemma 2.

Selected references

  • S. Zeng, M. Hong, A. Garcia, Structural Estimation of Markov Decision Processes in High-Dimensional State Space with Finite-Time Guarantees, Operations Research, 2025; arXiv:2210.01282v3, 2024. https://arxiv.org/abs/2210.01282
  • J. Rust, Optimal Replacement of GMC Bus Engines: An Empirical Model of Harold Zurcher, Econometrica 55(5), 1987. https://doi.org/10.2307/1911259
  • B. D. Ziebart, A. Maas, J. A. Bagnell, A. K. Dey, Maximum Entropy Inverse Reinforcement Learning, AAAI 2008. https://cdn.aaai.org/AAAI/2008/AAAI08-227.pdf
  • T. Haarnoja, H. Tang, P. Abbeel, S. Levine, Reinforcement Learning with Deep Energy-Based Policies, ICML 2017. https://arxiv.org/abs/1702.08165
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Operations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

Simultaneous vs. Sequential: Optimal Assortment Recommendation in Multistore Retailing I: Under Simultaneous Recommendation, Offering the Single-Store Optimal Assortment in Every Store Is OptimalResearch Paper

Motivation

Retail chains increasingly run their physical stores and online channels as one network. A customer who walks into a store and finds nothing she wants can be shown products stocked in other stores of the chain, to be shipped or picked up later. This raises a basic assortment question: when every store can point its customers to the rest of the network, should the stores still carry the assortment each would choose on its own, or should they coordinate?

Liu, Chen, Liu and Wan (MSOM 2025, DOI 10.1287/msom.2024.0761) compare two ways of showing the network's products. Under simultaneous recommendation (SMR), a customer sees her store's products and the other stores' products at the same time. Under sequential recommendation (SQR), she sees the other stores' products only after declining everything in her own store. This mission formalizes the paper's result for SMR, Theorem 1, together with the lemmas of its proof and two consequences (Theorem 5(a) and Proposition 2). The single-store model it builds on is the multinomial logit (MNL) assortment problem of Talluri and van Ryzin (2004).

Setting

A seller operates mmm stores and sells nnn products, indexed 1,…,n1,\dots,n1,…,n, with revenues r1>r2>⋯>rn>0r_1>r_2>\dots>r_n>0r1​>r2​>⋯>rn​>0. Product kkk has attraction value vk=exp⁡(uk)>0v_k=\exp(u_k)>0vk​=exp(uk​)>0, where uku_kuk​ is its utility; the no-purchase option has attraction value 111. A fraction λi≥0\lambda_i\ge0λi​≥0 of customers first visits store iii, and ∑iλi=1\sum_i\lambda_i=1∑i​λi​=1.

An assortment profile S=(S1,…,Sm)\mathbf S=(S_1,\dots,S_m)S=(S1​,…,Sm​) lists the set Si⊆N={1,…,n}S_i\subseteq\mathcal N=\{1,\dots,n\}Si​⊆N={1,…,n} offered by each store. Write Sˉ=S1∪⋯∪Sm\bar S=S_1\cup\dots\cup S_mSˉ=S1​∪⋯∪Sm​ for the products offered somewhere. A customer of store iii who buys product kkk from store jjj suffers a utility discount cijk≥0c_{ij}^k\ge0cijk​≥0, with ciik=0c_{ii}^k=0ciik​=0. She buys from the cheapest store that offers kkk, so the effective discount is cik(S)=min⁡{cijk:k∈Sj}c_i^k(\mathbf S)=\min\{c_{ij}^k: k\in S_j\}cik​(S)=min{cijk​:k∈Sj​}, and cik(S)=∞c_i^k(\mathbf S)=\inftycik​(S)=∞ if no store offers kkk.

Under SMR, the customer of store iii chooses product kkk with the MNL probability

pikM(S)={vkDi(S),k∈Si,vke−cik(S)Di(S),k∈Sˉ∖Si,0,otherwise,Di(S)=1+∑l∈Sivl+∑l∈Sˉ∖Sivle−cil(S).p^M_{ik}(\mathbf S)=\begin{cases}\dfrac{v_k}{D_i(\mathbf S)},&k\in S_i,\\[2mm]\dfrac{v_ke^{-c_i^k(\mathbf S)}}{D_i(\mathbf S)},&k\in\bar S\setminus S_i,\\[2mm]0,&\text{otherwise},\end{cases}\qquad D_i(\mathbf S)=1+\sum_{l\in S_i}v_l+\sum_{l\in\bar S\setminus S_i}v_le^{-c_i^l(\mathbf S)}.pikM​(S)=⎩⎨⎧​Di​(S)vk​​,Di​(S)vk​e−cik​(S)​,0,​k∈Si​,k∈Sˉ∖Si​,otherwise,​Di​(S)=1+l∈Si​∑​vl​+l∈Sˉ∖Si​∑​vl​e−cil​(S).

The seller's problem is

max⁡S RM(S)=∑i=1mλi∑k=1nrk pikM(S).(SMR)\max_{\mathbf S}\ R_M(\mathbf S)=\sum_{i=1}^m\lambda_i\sum_{k=1}^nr_k\,p^M_{ik}(\mathbf S).\tag{SMR}Smax​ RM​(S)=i=1∑m​λi​k=1∑n​rk​pikM​(S).(SMR)

The single-store problem is

R∗=max⁡S⊆N∑k∈Srkvk1+∑k∈Svk.(3)R^*=\max_{S\subseteq\mathcal N}\frac{\sum_{k\in S}r_kv_k}{1+\sum_{k\in S}v_k}.\tag{3}R∗=S⊆Nmax​1+∑k∈S​vk​∑k∈S​rk​vk​​.(3)

An assortment is revenue-ordered if it is {1,…,k}\{1,\dots,k\}{1,…,k} for some k∈[n]k\in[n]k∈[n]. The paper writes S~\tilde SS~ for the smallest revenue-ordered optimal solution of (3).

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 1

RM(S) ≤ RM(S~,S~,…,S~)for every profile S.R_M(\mathbf S)\ \le\ R_M(\tilde S,\tilde S,\dots,\tilde S)\qquad\text{for every profile }\mathbf S.RM​(S) ≤ RM​(S~,S~,…,S~)for every profile S.

Offering the single-store optimal assortment in every store is optimal under SMR. The goal asserts optimality, not uniqueness: with ties, other profiles can be optimal too.

Milestones

  1. Existence of S~\tilde SS~ (p. 11): some revenue-ordered assortment is optimal for (3).
  2. Proposition A.1: in the two-store problem (A.1), store 1 offers products 1 through some threshold. A product belongs to the smallest revenue-ordered optimum if and only if its revenue exceeds the optimal value.
  3. Proposition A.2: the optimal value of (A.1) does not decrease when the discounts increase.
  4. The store-wise reduction: store iii's SMR revenue equals the objective of problem (A.2), the single-store problem with the other stores' products as discounted alternatives.
  5. The store-wise bound: every store earns at most R∗R^*R∗ under any profile, and exactly R∗R^*R∗ under (S~,…,S~)(\tilde S,\dots,\tilde S)(S~,…,S~).

Companions

  • Theorem 5(a): max⁡SRQ(S)≥max⁡SRM(S)\max_{\mathbf S}R_Q(\mathbf S)\ge\max_{\mathbf S}R_M(\mathbf S)maxS​RQ​(S)≥maxS​RM​(S), where RQR_QRQ​ is the SQR revenue built from the sequential choice probabilities (2).
  • Proposition 2: when store mmm is an online channel with Sm=NS_m=\mathcal NSm​=N, and cimk=ck>0c_{im}^k=c^k>0cimk​=ck>0 for every physical store iii, some optimal profile among those with Sm=NS_m=\mathcal NSm​=N offers one and the same revenue-ordered assortment S^⊇S~\hat S\supseteq\tilde SS^⊇S~ in every physical store.

Significance

Theorem 1 says that under simultaneous recommendation the network adds nothing for the seller: the revenue of independently run stores, R∗R^*R∗, is the best achievable. The paper calls this revenue the benchmark. Every later comparison is made against it. The sequential strategy beats it (Theorem 5(a)), and the paper's structural results on SQR and its ½-approximation are phrased relative to S~\tilde SS~ and R∗R^*R∗. Proposition 2 shows that adding an online channel enlarges the optimal assortments of the physical stores.

The results are proved in the paper, partly in an Additional Supplement. As far as is known, none of them has a machine-checked proof. The mission produces a reusable Lean model of multi-store MNL choice with cross-store discounts, the SQR choice probabilities, and checked proofs of the single-store threshold structure with discounted outside products (Propositions A.1 and A.2).

Difficulty

A store's SMR revenue depends on every other store's assortment, through both the denominator Di(S)D_i(\mathbf S)Di​(S) and the products of Sˉ∖Si\bar S\setminus S_iSˉ∖Si​. The objective does not separate across stores, so the obvious idea of optimizing each store on its own does not directly apply. Products of other stores enter at reduced weight e−cike^{-c_i^k}e−cik​, so the standard MNL result for (3) does not cover (A.1).

Proposition A.1's exchange argument has two cases, depending on whether the added product is already available elsewhere. In the second case the gain is weighted by 1−e−ck1-e^{-c^k}1−e−ck, which vanishes when ck=0c^k=0ck=0. Proposition A.2 compares optimal values across two discount vectors whose optimal assortments differ.

Formalization scope

Products are Fin n (the paper's product kkk is index k−1k-1k−1), stores are Fin m, and a profile is a function Fin m → Finset (Fin n). The attraction values vk>0v_k>0vk​>0 are the primitive parameters. The discount factor e−cik(S)e^{-c_i^k(\mathbf S)}e−cik​(S) is the largest e−cijke^{-c_{ij}^k}e−cijk​ over the offering stores, and 000 when none offers kkk. In (A.1) the discounts are encoded by the factors βk=e−ck∈[0,1]\beta_k=e^{-c^k}\in[0,1]βk​=e−ck∈[0,1], with βk=0\beta_k=0βk​=0 for ck=∞c^k=\inftyck=∞. S~\tilde SS~ and SM∗(c)S^*_M(\mathbf c)SM∗​(c) are predicates: revenue-ordered (hence nonempty), optimal, and of least cardinality among revenue-ordered optima. "Optimal" means a global maximizer, and comparisons of optimal values are written as "for every TTT there is an SSS with f(T)≤g(S)f(T)\le g(S)f(T)≤g(S)", with no maximum operator. The SMR and SQR objectives are written from the choice probabilities (1) and (2), exactly as the paper writes them.

The standing assumptions are explicit hypotheses: λi≥0\lambda_i\ge0λi​≥0, ∑iλi=1\sum_i\lambda_i=1∑i​λi​=1, rrr strictly decreasing, vk>0v_k>0vk​>0, cijk≥0c_{ij}^k\ge0cijk​≥0, ciik=0c_{ii}^k=0ciik​=0. Two hypotheses are pinned. The first is rk>0r_k>0rk​>0: revenues are prices, which the paper uses but never states as a sign condition. The second applies only to the second part of Proposition A.1: ck>0c^k>0ck>0, because its "if and only if" fails at ck=0c^k=0ck=0; the existence of a revenue-ordered optimum is stated for every c≥0\mathbf c\ge0c≥0. The goal and Proposition A.2 keep cijk≥0c_{ij}^k\ge0cijk​≥0, so zero cross-store discounts are allowed. The Gumbel derivation of (2) (Proposition 1, cited from Gao et al. 2021) is not formalized; (1) and (2) are the model.

The hypothesis on S~\tilde SS~ is satisfiable: its existence is the first milestone. A statement that assumed some optimal profile, or that defined R∗R^*R∗ through a junk-valued supremum, would be trivial or vacuous, and the formalization avoids both. Contributions are welcome on any milestone. Propositions A.1 and A.2 are reusable for other multi-store and omnichannel MNL problems.

Selected references

  • Y. Liu, X. A. Chen, Y. Liu, Z. Wan, Simultaneous vs. Sequential: Optimal Assortment Recommendation in Multistore Retailing, Manufacturing & Service Operations Management, 2025. https://doi.org/10.1287/msom.2024.0761 (cited from the authors' manuscript of 2024-09-17 with its Online and Additional Supplements)
  • K. Talluri, G. van Ryzin, Revenue Management Under a General Discrete Choice Model of Consumer Behavior, Management Science 50(1), 2004. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.1030.0147
  • P. Gao, Y. Ma, N. Chen, G. Gallego, A. Li, P. Rusmevichientong, H. Topaloglu, Assortment Optimization and Pricing Under the Multinomial Logit Model with Impatient Customers: Sequential Recommendation and Selection, Operations Research 69(5):1509–1532, 2021.
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Functional AnalysisOperations ResearchPartial Differential Equations+1·Captain: mikedeng1

Optimality Conditions in Control Problems with Random State Constraints in Probabilistic or Almost Sure Form III: Absolutely Continuous and Singular Multipliers for Almost Sure State ConstraintsResearch Paper

Motivation

Optimal control of partial differential equations under uncertainty asks for a single deterministic control uuu that performs well when the data of the PDE are random. When a constraint on the state must hold, the modeller has to decide how strictly: with high probability (a probabilistic constraint), for almost every realization (an almost-sure constraint), or for every realization in a support set (a robust constraint). C. Geiersbach and R. Henrion (arXiv:2306.03965v2, Math. Oper. Res. 2025) derive optimality conditions for all three forms on a common model problem. This mission covers §3.1 of that paper, the almost-sure case.

Almost-sure state constraints are the natural model when a bound (a temperature, a stress, a concentration) must never be violated, and they appear throughout risk-averse PDE-constrained optimization (Geiersbach and Wollner, SIAM J. Optim. 2021; Geiersbach and Hintermüller, ESAIM:COCV 2022). Their difficulty is functional-analytic: the constraint lives in LP∞(Ω,C(Dˉ))L^\infty_{\mathbb P}(\Omega,\mathcal C(\bar D))LP∞​(Ω,C(Dˉ)), a space whose dual is not a function space, so Lagrange multipliers are a priori only finitely additive objects.

Setting

Let D⊆RdD\subseteq\mathbb R^dD⊆Rd, d∈{1,2,3}d\in\{1,2,3\}d∈{1,2,3}, be open, bounded and of class S: there are γ∈(0,1)\gamma\in(0,1)γ∈(0,1) and r0>0r_0>0r0​>0 with meas⁡(Br(x)∖D)≥γmeas⁡(Br(x))\operatorname{meas}(B_r(x)\setminus D)\ge\gamma\operatorname{meas}(B_r(x))meas(Br​(x)∖D)≥γmeas(Br​(x)) for all x∈∂Dx\in\partial Dx∈∂D and 0<r<r00<r<r_00<r<r0​. For F∈L2(D)F\in L^2(D)F∈L2(D) the Dirichlet problem −Δy=F-\Delta y=F−Δy=F in DDD, y=0y=0y=0 on ∂D\partial D∂D has a unique weak solution y∈H01(D)∩C(Dˉ)y\in H^1_0(D)\cap\mathcal C(\bar D)y∈H01​(D)∩C(Dˉ); the solution map is a continuous linear operator A−1:L2(D)→C(Dˉ)A^{-1}:L^2(D)\to\mathcal C(\bar D)A−1:L2(D)→C(Dˉ).

Let (Ω,F,P)(\Omega,\mathcal F,\mathbb P)(Ω,F,P) be a probability space and f~∈LP∞(Ω,L2(D))\tilde f\in L^\infty_{\mathbb P}(\Omega,L^2(D))f~​∈LP∞​(Ω,L2(D)) a random source. For a control u∈L2(D)u\in L^2(D)u∈L2(D) the random state y(⋅,ω)y(\cdot,\omega)y(⋅,ω) solves −Δy(⋅,ω)=u+f~(⋅,ω)-\Delta y(\cdot,\omega)=u+\tilde f(\cdot,\omega)−Δy(⋅,ω)=u+f~​(⋅,ω), y(⋅,ω)=0y(\cdot,\omega)=0y(⋅,ω)=0 on ∂D\partial D∂D. With B\mathcal BB the embedding of L2(D)L^2(D)L2(D) into constant elements of LP∞(Ω,L2(D))L^\infty_{\mathbb P}(\Omega,L^2(D))LP∞​(Ω,L2(D)) and [A−1y](ω)=A−1y(⋅,ω)[\mathcal A^{-1}y](\omega)=A^{-1}y(\cdot,\omega)[A−1y](ω)=A−1y(⋅,ω), the control-to-state operator is S(u)=A−1(Bu+f~)\mathcal S(u)=\mathcal A^{-1}(\mathcal Bu+\tilde f)S(u)=A−1(Bu+f~​) and the constraint map is G(u)=S(u)−α\mathcal G(u)=\mathcal S(u)-\boldsymbol\alphaG(u)=S(u)−α, where α\boldsymbol\alphaα is the constant function α∈R\alpha\in\mathbb Rα∈R. The problem is

min⁡u∈L2(D)F(u)s.t.G(u)∈K,(51)\min_{u\in L^2(D)}F(u)\quad\text{s.t.}\quad\mathcal G(u)\in\mathcal K,\qquad(51)u∈L2(D)min​F(u)s.t.G(u)∈K,(51)

with the cone K={y∈LP∞(Ω,C(Dˉ)):y(x,ω)≤0 on Dˉ, P-a.s.}\mathcal K=\{y\in L^\infty_{\mathbb P}(\Omega,\mathcal C(\bar D)):y(x,\omega)\le0\text{ on }\bar D,\ \mathbb P\text{-a.s.}\}K={y∈LP∞​(Ω,C(Dˉ)):y(x,ω)≤0 on Dˉ, P-a.s.} and its polar K−⊆(LP∞(Ω,C(Dˉ)))∗\mathcal K^-\subseteq(L^\infty_{\mathbb P}(\Omega,\mathcal C(\bar D)))^*K−⊆(LP∞​(Ω,C(Dˉ)))∗. The cost FFF is convex and continuously Fréchet differentiable.

For a separable Banach space XXX, a functional v∈(LP∞(Ω,X))∗v\in(L^\infty_{\mathbb P}(\Omega,X))^*v∈(LP∞​(Ω,X))∗ is absolutely continuous if ⟨v,x⟩=∫Ω⟨x∗(ω),x(ω)⟩ dP\langle v,x\rangle=\int_\Omega\langle x^*(\omega),x(\omega)\rangle\,d\mathbb P⟨v,x⟩=∫Ω​⟨x∗(ω),x(ω)⟩dP for a weakly measurable x∗:Ω→X∗x^*:\Omega\to X^*x∗:Ω→X∗ with ∫∥x∗∥ dP<∞\int\|x^*\|\,d\mathbb P<\infty∫∥x∗∥dP<∞ (the set Λ1(X∗)\Lambda_1(X^*)Λ1​(X∗) of such x∗x^*x∗), and singular if it vanishes on every xxx that vanishes on some FnF_nFn​, for a decreasing sequence of events with P(Fn)→0\mathbb P(F_n)\to0P(Fn​)→0 (the set Λ∘(X∗)\Lambda_\circ(X^*)Λ∘​(X∗)).

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 3.10

Under the constraint qualification 0∈int⁡{G(L2(D))−K}0\in\operatorname{int}\{\mathcal G(L^2(D))-\mathcal K\}0∈int{G(L2(D))−K}, u∗u^*u∗ solves (51) if and only if there are λ∈Λ1(C(Dˉ)∗)\lambda\in\Lambda_1(\mathcal C(\bar D)^*)λ∈Λ1​(C(Dˉ)∗), λ∘∈Λ∘(C(Dˉ)∗)\lambda^\circ\in\Lambda_\circ(\mathcal C(\bar D)^*)λ∘∈Λ∘​(C(Dˉ)∗) and a state y∗y^*y∗ with

DF(u∗)+E[A−∗λ]+B∗A−∗λ∘=0,Ay∗(⋅,ω)=u∗+f~(⋅,ω),DF(u^*)+\mathbb E[A^{-*}\lambda]+\mathcal B^*\mathcal A^{-*}\lambda^\circ=0,\qquad Ay^*(\cdot,\omega)=u^*+\tilde f(\cdot,\omega),DF(u∗)+E[A−∗λ]+B∗A−∗λ∘=0,Ay∗(⋅,ω)=u∗+f~​(⋅,ω), y∗(⋅,ω)≤α,λ(⋅,ω)≥0,⟨λ(⋅,ω),y∗(⋅,ω)−α⟩=0  P-a.s.,λ∘∈K−,⟨λ∘,y∗−α⟩=0.y^*(\cdot,\omega)\le\alpha,\quad\lambda(\cdot,\omega)\ge0,\quad\langle\lambda(\cdot,\omega),y^*(\cdot,\omega)-\boldsymbol\alpha\rangle=0\ \ \mathbb P\text{-a.s.},\qquad\lambda^\circ\in\mathcal K^-,\quad\langle\lambda^\circ,y^*-\boldsymbol\alpha\rangle=0.y∗(⋅,ω)≤α,λ(⋅,ω)≥0,⟨λ(⋅,ω),y∗(⋅,ω)−α⟩=0  P-a.s.,λ∘∈K−,⟨λ∘,y∗−α⟩=0.

Milestones

  1. Lemma 3.6: the random state exists, is a.s. unique, lies in LP∞(Ω,C(Dˉ))L^\infty_{\mathbb P}(\Omega,\mathcal C(\bar D))LP∞​(Ω,C(Dˉ)), and obeys the bound (52).
  2. Lemma 3.7: the abstract KKT system (53) with a multiplier λ∗∈(LP∞(Ω,C(Dˉ)))∗\lambda^*\in(L^\infty_{\mathbb P}(\Omega,\mathcal C(\bar D)))^*λ∗∈(LP∞​(Ω,C(Dˉ)))∗.
  3. Theorem 3.9 (Ioffe–Levin): every v∗∈(LP∞(Ω,X))∗v^*\in(L^\infty_{\mathbb P}(\Omega,X))^*v∗∈(LP∞​(Ω,X))∗ splits uniquely as va+v∘v^a+v^\circva+v∘ with ∥v∗∥=∥va∥+∥v∘∥\|v^*\|=\|v^a\|+\|v^\circ\|∥v∗∥=∥va∥+∥v∘∥.
  4. The splitting ⟨λ∗,A−1Bh⟩=E[⟨λ,A−1h⟩]+⟨λ∘,A−1Bh⟩\langle\lambda^*,\mathcal A^{-1}\mathcal Bh\rangle=\mathbb E[\langle\lambda,A^{-1}h\rangle]+\langle\lambda^\circ,\mathcal A^{-1}\mathcal Bh\rangle⟨λ∗,A−1Bh⟩=E[⟨λ,A−1h⟩]+⟨λ∘,A−1Bh⟩.
  5. (57): λ∗∈K−\lambda^*\in\mathcal K^-λ∗∈K− passes to both parts.
  6. (59) and pointwise complementarity: λ(ω)≥0\lambda(\omega)\ge0λ(ω)≥0 and ⟨λ(ω),y∗(ω)−α⟩=0\langle\lambda(\omega),y^*(\omega)-\boldsymbol\alpha\rangle=0⟨λ(ω),y∗(ω)−α⟩=0 almost surely.

Significance

The result. Lemma 3.7 gives a multiplier in the dual of L∞L^\inftyL∞, which cannot be evaluated scenario by scenario. Theorem 3.10 shows that, for this problem, the multiplier consists of an honest random variable λ(ω)∈C(Dˉ)∗\lambda(\omega)\in\mathcal C(\bar D)^*λ(ω)∈C(Dˉ)∗ (a random signed measure on Dˉ\bar DDˉ) satisfying sign and complementarity conditions for almost every realization, plus a singular remainder. This is the form needed to write adjoint equations and to design discretizations and algorithms (Proposition 3.12 of the paper). As Remark 3.11 notes, the derivation does not require reflexivity of the state space, unlike earlier work on LP∞(Ω,X)L^\infty_{\mathbb P}(\Omega,X)LP∞​(Ω,X)-constraints.

Formalizing it. The paper's argument is complete, but it rests on two cited results: the regularity theory behind Lemma 1.2/3.6 (Stampacchia-type continuity of weak solutions on class-S domains, Kinderlehrer–Stampacchia) and the Ioffe–Levin decomposition of (LP∞(Ω,X))∗(L^\infty_{\mathbb P}(\Omega,X))^*(LP∞​(Ω,X))∗ (Ioffe–Levin, Appendix 1, Theorem 3, and Levin 1974). Neither is in Mathlib. A formal development produces machine-checked versions of both, of a Robinson-type KKT theorem in Banach spaces, and of the multiplier refinement itself. None of these results has a machine-checked proof as far as the platform's catalog shows.

Difficulty

The obvious route is to apply the Riesz representation pointwise in ω\omegaω. It fails: (LP∞(Ω,C(Dˉ)))∗(L^\infty_{\mathbb P}(\Omega,\mathcal C(\bar D)))^*(LP∞​(Ω,C(Dˉ)))∗ contains purely finitely additive functionals that are not given by any integrand, so λ∗\lambda^*λ∗ has no density in general. The decomposition theorem isolates them, and the proof of Theorem 3.10 must then show that the sign condition λ∗∈K−\lambda^*\in\mathcal K^-λ∗∈K− and the complementarity condition pass to each part separately. The step from E[⟨λ,y⟩]≤0\mathbb E[\langle\lambda,y\rangle]\le0E[⟨λ,y⟩]≤0 for all y∈Ky\in\mathcal Ky∈K to "λ(ω)≥0\lambda(\omega)\ge0λ(ω)≥0 for almost every ω\omegaω, simultaneously for all nonnegative test functions" requires the separability of C(Dˉ)\mathcal C(\bar D)C(Dˉ); a version with a null set depending on the test function is weaker and is not the statement. Lemma 3.6 needs C(Dˉ)\mathcal C(\bar D)C(Dˉ)-regularity of weak solutions, which is where class S and d≤3d\le3d≤3 enter.

Formalization scope

Rd\mathbb R^dRd is EuclideanSpace ℝ (Fin d). L2(D)L^2(D)L2(D) is Lp ℝ 2 (volume.restrict D) and LP∞(Ω,X)L^\infty_{\mathbb P}(\Omega,X)LP∞​(Ω,X) is Lp X ⊤ P; their elements are a.e. classes, so every pointwise statement in ω\omegaω is stated P\mathbb PP-a.s. C(Dˉ)\mathcal C(\bar D)C(Dˉ) is C(closure D, ℝ) with [CompactSpace (closure D)] as an instance argument (implied by boundedness). Weak derivatives use the published HunterPDE.Shared.HasWeakDeriv; a weak solution in H01(D)∩C(Dˉ)H^1_0(D)\cap\mathcal C(\bar D)H01​(D)∩C(Dˉ) is encoded as continuity on Dˉ\bar DDˉ, zero boundary values, L2L^2L2 weak gradient and the weak form. A−1A^{-1}A−1 is a hypothesis: a continuous linear map L2(D)→C(Dˉ)L^2(D)\to\mathcal C(\bar D)L2(D)→C(Dˉ) whose values are weak solutions. "≤0\le0≤0 a.e. in DDD" for a function continuous on Dˉ\bar DDˉ is read as "≤0\le0≤0 on Dˉ\bar DDˉ"; "λ(⋅,ω)≥0\lambda(\cdot,\omega)\ge0λ(⋅,ω)≥0" as positivity of the functional. "Solution of (51)" is a global minimizer. (56a) is stated applied to every direction hhh.

Trivializing formalizations are ruled out: the state operator is tied to the PDE, not an arbitrary bounded operator; the multipliers carry their sign and complementarity conditions; absolutely continuous functionals require a weakly measurable, integrable density; singular functionals are concentrated on a decreasing sequence of events of vanishing probability, not merely "not absolutely continuous"; optimality is global.

Needed infrastructure: Lax–Milgram on H01(D)H^1_0(D)H01​(D) and continuity of weak solutions (Lemma 3.6); a KKT theorem under Robinson's constraint qualification (Lemma 3.7); the Yosida–Hewitt decomposition for finitely additive measures and a weak*-measurable representation of L1(Ω,X)∗L^1(\Omega,X)^*L1(Ω,X)∗ (Theorem 3.9). The decomposition theorem is reusable far beyond this mission; contributions toward any of these are welcome.

Selected references

  • C. Geiersbach, R. Henrion, Optimality conditions in control problems with random state constraints in probabilistic or almost-sure form, arXiv:2306.03965v2, 2024; Math. Oper. Res. 2025. https://arxiv.org/abs/2306.03965
  • A. D. Ioffe, V. L. Levin, Subdifferentials of convex functions, Trudy Moskov. Mat. Obshch. 26, 3–73, 1972 (Appendix 1, Theorem 3).
  • V. L. Levin, The Lebesgue decomposition for functionals on the vector-function space LX∞L^\infty_XLX∞​, Funct. Anal. Appl. 8(4), 314–317, 1974. https://doi.org/10.1007/bf01075488
  • K. Yosida, E. Hewitt, Finitely additive measures, Trans. Amer. Math. Soc. 72, 1952. https://doi.org/10.1090/S0002-9947-1952-0045194-X
  • J. F. Bonnans, A. Shapiro, Perturbation Analysis of Optimization Problems, Springer, 2000. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4612-1394-9
  • C. Geiersbach, W. Wollner, Optimality conditions for convex stochastic optimization problems in Banach spaces with almost sure state constraints, SIAM J. Optim. 31(4), 2455–2480, 2021.
  • C. Geiersbach, M. Hintermüller, Optimality conditions and Moreau–Yosida regularization for almost sure state constraints, ESAIM: COCV 28, Paper No. 80, 2022. https://doi.org/10.1051/cocv/2022070
  • D. Kinderlehrer, G. Stampacchia, An Introduction to Variational Inequalities and Their Applications, Academic Press, 1980 (Chapter II, Appendices B and C). https://doi.org/10.1137/1.9780898719451
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EconomicsOperations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

Capturing the Benefits of Autonomous Vehicles in Ride-Hailing: The Role of Market Configuration 1: A Pure Human-Driver Market Has a Unique Maximal Stable Equilibrium, Increasing in Market SizeResearch Paper

Motivation

Ride-hailing platforms match riders with drivers who choose for themselves whether to work. Autonomous vehicles (AVs) would replace part of this self-scheduling labor with capital whose fleet size the platform chooses. Lian and van Ryzin study when, and under which market configuration, the cost savings of AVs reach riders. Their comparison needs a benchmark: the market served by human drivers (HVs) alone. This mission formalizes that benchmark, Proposition 1 of the paper, together with the lemmas on minimal supply and utilization that the rest of the paper uses.

Two economic forces drive the benchmark. The first is the density effect: in a denser market an idle car is closer to the next rider, so pickups are shorter and each driver spends more of the hour on paid trips. The second is the supply effect of labor: a larger fleet requires higher hourly earnings to attract the marginal driver. Proposition 1 describes how the equilibrium demand, fleet size, utilization and price respond to market size when both forces are present.

The source is the authors' 2023 SSRN working paper (abstract 3716491, version of 23 August 2023); all theorem, lemma and equation numbers refer to that version, not to the 2025 Management Science article.

Setting

A market has an ETA function t1(s)=as−rt_1(s) = a s^{-r}t1​(s)=as−r with a>0a > 0a>0 and 0≤r<10 \le r < 10≤r<1, the expected pickup time when sss cars are open (idle); rrr is the ETA elasticity, and r>0r > 0r>0 means a density effect. A trip lasts t2>0t_2 > 0t2​>0 hours. Rider values for a ride hour are uniform on [0,V][0, V][0,V], V>0V > 0V>0. HVs have the supply curve w(n)=w0+αnw(n) = w_0 + \alpha nw(n)=w0​+αn, w0>0w_0 > 0w0​>0, α≥0\alpha \ge 0α≥0: a fleet of nnn drivers participates when hourly earnings are w(n)w(n)w(n).

There are III demand scenarios with potential demand masses 0<m1<⋯<mI0 < m_1 < \dots < m_I0<m1​<⋯<mI​. In scenario iii, the inverse demand at demand rate d∈[0,mi]d \in [0, m_i]d∈[0,mi​] is pi(d)=V(1−d/mi)p_i(d) = V(1 - d/m_i)pi​(d)=V(1−d/mi​), and the market revenue per hour is ri(d)=d pi(d) t2r_i(d) = d\,p_i(d)\,t_2ri​(d)=dpi​(d)t2​.

To serve demand ddd with sss open cars, Little's law requires s+d(t1(s)+t2)s + d(t_1(s) + t_2)s+d(t1​(s)+t2​) cars. The minimal supply level is

n‾(d)=a~ d1r+1+t2d,a~=r1r+1a1r+1+r−rr+1a1r+1,\underline{n}(d) = \tilde a\, d^{\frac{1}{r+1}} + t_2 d, \qquad \tilde a = r^{\frac{1}{r+1}} a^{\frac{1}{r+1}} + r^{-\frac{r}{r+1}} a^{\frac{1}{r+1}},n​(d)=a~dr+11​+t2​d,a~=rr+11​ar+11​+r−r+1r​ar+11​,

and the maximal utilization is uˉ(d)=dt2/n‾(d)\bar u(d) = d t_2/\underline{n}(d)uˉ(d)=dt2​/n​(d). A demand rate d∈[0,mi]d \in [0, m_i]d∈[0,mi​] is an equilibrium when revenue covers exactly the minimal driver cost,

ri(d)=w(n‾(d)) n‾(d).(13)r_i(d) = w(\underline{n}(d))\,\underline{n}(d). \qquad (13)ri​(d)=w(n​(d))n​(d).(13)

It is stable (Definition 1) if there is no ϵ>0\epsilon > 0ϵ>0 with ri(d−ϵ)<w(n‾(d−ϵ))n‾(d−ϵ)r_i(d-\epsilon) < w(\underline{n}(d-\epsilon))\underline{n}(d-\epsilon)ri​(d−ϵ)<w(n​(d−ϵ))n​(d−ϵ) and ri(d+ϵ)>w(n‾(d+ϵ))n‾(d+ϵ)r_i(d+\epsilon) > w(\underline{n}(d+\epsilon))\underline{n}(d+\epsilon)ri​(d+ϵ)>w(n​(d+ϵ))n​(d+ϵ). The maximal stable equilibrium dHV,i∗d^*_{HV,i}dHV,i∗​ is the greatest stable equilibrium; then nHV,i∗=n‾(dHV,i∗)n^*_{HV,i} = \underline{n}(d^*_{HV,i})nHV,i∗​=n​(dHV,i∗​), uHV,i∗=uˉ(dHV,i∗)u^*_{HV,i} = \bar u(d^*_{HV,i})uHV,i∗​=uˉ(dHV,i∗​) and pHV,i∗=pi(dHV,i∗)p^*_{HV,i} = p_i(d^*_{HV,i})pHV,i∗​=pi​(dHV,i∗​). The loose labor market condition of scenario iii is

ri(mi/2)>w(n‾(mi/2)) n‾(mi/2),(33)r_i(m_i/2) > w(\underline{n}(m_i/2))\,\underline{n}(m_i/2), \qquad (33)ri​(mi​/2)>w(n​(mi​/2))n​(mi​/2),(33)

the paper's restatement of its Assumption 2: the revenue curve meets the cost curve on its decreasing branch.

In Lean the parameters form the structure MarketParams, and the objects above are aTilde, nMin, uBar, priceFn, revenue, wage, hvCost, IsEquilibrium, IsStable, IsMaxStableEq and LooseMarket, in the namespace AVRideHail.PureHV.

Formalization targets

Goal: Proposition 1 (p. 14)

Under the standing parameter assumptions and (33) in every scenario, each scenario has a unique maximal stable equilibrium, and for the family dHV,i∗d^*_{HV,i}dHV,i∗​:

dHV,i∗>0,ri(dHV,i∗)=w(nHV,i∗) nHV,i∗,pHV,i∗=w(nHV,i∗)uHV,i∗,d^*_{HV,i} > 0,\quad r_i(d^*_{HV,i}) = w(n^*_{HV,i})\, n^*_{HV,i}, \quad p^*_{HV,i} = \frac{w(n^*_{HV,i})}{u^*_{HV,i}},dHV,i∗​>0,ri​(dHV,i∗​)=w(nHV,i∗​)nHV,i∗​,pHV,i∗​=uHV,i∗​w(nHV,i∗​)​, dHV,i∗ and nHV,i∗ strictly increasing in i,uHV,i∗ {strictly increasing in i,r>0,constant in i,r=0.d^*_{HV,i}\ \text{and}\ n^*_{HV,i}\ \text{strictly increasing in } i, \qquad u^*_{HV,i}\ \begin{cases}\text{strictly increasing in } i, & r > 0,\\ \text{constant in } i, & r = 0.\end{cases}dHV,i∗​ and nHV,i∗​ strictly increasing in i,uHV,i∗​ {strictly increasing in i,constant in i,​r>0,r=0.​

Milestones

  1. Lemma 1 Item 1 (p. 38, with (26)): n‾(d)\underline{n}(d)n​(d) is the minimum of s+d(as−r+t2)s + d(as^{-r} + t_2)s+d(as−r+t2​) over s>0s > 0s>0, attained only at s=(ra)1/(r+1)d1/(r+1)s = (ra)^{1/(r+1)} d^{1/(r+1)}s=(ra)1/(r+1)d1/(r+1).
  2. Lemma 1 Item 2 (p. 38): n‾\underline{n}n​ is a strictly increasing bijection of [0,∞)[0,\infty)[0,∞), so its inverse dˉ(n)\bar d(n)dˉ(n) exists.
  3. Lemma 2 (p. 39): uˉ\bar uuˉ is strictly increasing and strictly concave, uˉ(0)=0\bar u(0) = 0uˉ(0)=0 and uˉ(d)→1\bar u(d) \to 1uˉ(d)→1.
  4. App. B.1.1 (p. 42): under (33), (13) has exactly one root in [mi/2,mi][m_i/2, m_i][mi​/2,mi​], and it is the maximal stable equilibrium.
  5. App. B.1.3 (p. 43): dHV,i∗d^*_{HV,i}dHV,i∗​ is strictly increasing in mim_imi​.
  6. App. B.1.6 (pp. 45–46): pHV,i∗p^*_{HV,i}pHV,i∗​ is strictly increasing in mim_imi​ when r=0r = 0r=0, α>0\alpha > 0α>0, and strictly decreasing when r>0r > 0r>0, α=0\alpha = 0α=0.

Significance

Proposition 1 is the reference point for every comparison in the paper: the AV markets of Sections 5–6 (common platform, independent platforms, monopoly AV supplier) are judged by how far their prices and served demand move from pHV,i∗p^*_{HV,i}pHV,i∗​ and dHV,i∗d^*_{HV,i}dHV,i∗​. Its Item 3 isolates the density effect as the source of rising utilization, and the special cases of Item 5 show that the HV price can rise or fall with market size, so neither direction can be assumed in the AV analysis. Lemmas 1 and 2 are used throughout the appendices.

The paper proves these results by hand; to our knowledge none of them has a machine-checked proof. The mission produces a checked version of the benchmark and of the two technical lemmas, with every boundary case (r=0r = 0r=0, α=0\alpha = 0α=0, d=0d = 0d=0) stated explicitly.

Difficulty

The equation (13) always has the root d=0d = 0d=0, and it can have a second, unstable positive root below the stable one; the naive reading "the equilibrium is the root of (13)" therefore picks the wrong point. The work is to show that the greatest stable root exists, lies on the decreasing branch of the revenue curve, and moves monotonically with mim_imi​. This requires strict monotonicity of the cost curve w(n‾(d))n‾(d)w(\underline{n}(d))\underline{n}(d)w(n​(d))n​(d), which combines a real power d1/(r+1)d^{1/(r+1)}d1/(r+1) with the linear supply curve, and continuity on [mi/2,mi][m_i/2, m_i][mi​/2,mi​]. Lemma 2 needs strict concavity of a quotient of real powers on a closed half-line including 000, where the function is defined by its limit.

Formalization scope

All quantities are real numbers; fleet sizes and demands are continuous, as in the paper. Powers are Real.rpow. Scenarios are indexed by Fin I, 0-based. The maximal stable equilibrium is never chosen by Classical.choose: statements take a family dstar with IsMaxStableEq in each scenario.

Committed conventions and pinned hypotheses:

  • a,t2,V,w0>0a, t_2, V, w_0 > 0a,t2​,V,w0​>0 and 0≤r<10 \le r < 10≤r<1, α≥0\alpha \ge 0α≥0 are explicit binders. Lemma 1 Item 1 and Lemma 2 add r>0r > 0r>0, which the page leaves implicit and without which they fail.
  • The loose-market condition (33) is a hypothesis of the goal in every scenario. Proposition 1's printed statement omits it, but its proof uses it, and without it a thin scenario has dHV,i∗=0d^*_{HV,i} = 0dHV,i∗​=0.
  • In Definition 1, ϵ\epsilonϵ ranges over 0<ϵ≤d0 < \epsilon \le d0<ϵ≤d with d+ϵ≤mid + \epsilon \le m_id+ϵ≤mi​, keeping d±ϵd \pm \epsilond±ϵ in the domain [0,mi][0, m_i][0,mi​] of pip_ipi​.
  • At r=0r = 0r=0, Real.rpow gives a~=a\tilde a = aa~=a and n‾(d)=(a+t2)d\underline{n}(d) = (a + t_2)dn​(d)=(a+t2​)d; uˉ(0)=0/0=0\bar u(0) = 0/0 = 0uˉ(0)=0/0=0 agrees with Lemma 2.
  • "Increasing" means strictly increasing.
  • The uniqueness in "unique maximal stable equilibrium" is automatic for a greatest element; the content of the first conjunct is existence.

Encoding the equilibrium as "the root of (13) in [mi/2,mi][m_i/2, m_i][mi​/2,mi​]" would make the goal follow from its own hypotheses; the goal instead quantifies over greatest stable equilibria, and that root is the conclusion of a milestone.

A complete development needs the intermediate value theorem on [mi/2,mi][m_i/2, m_i][mi​/2,mi​], strict monotonicity and concavity facts for real powers, and limits at infinity. The minimal-supply and utilization lemmas are reusable in any model with a pickup-time function as−ra s^{-r}as−r. Proofs of any milestone are welcome, as are proofs of the remark of Item 5 in other parameter regimes.

Selected references

  • Z. Lian and G. van Ryzin, Capturing the Benefits of Autonomous Vehicles in Ride-Hailing: The Role of Market Configuration, SSRN working paper 3716491, version of 23 August 2023. https://ssrn.com/abstract=3716491
  • Z. Lian and G. van Ryzin, Capturing the Benefits of Autonomous Vehicles in Ride-Hailing: The Role of Market Configuration, Management Science, 2025. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2020.03112
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Operations ResearchProbability·Captain: mikedeng1

Optimality Conditions in Control Problems with Random State Constraints in Probabilistic or Almost Sure Form I: Necessary and Sufficient Optimality Conditions for a Gaussian Probabilistic ConstraintResearch Paper

Motivation

Probabilistic (chance) constraints require that a decision keeps a random constraint satisfied with probability at least ppp. They are the standard way to model reliability requirements in engineering design, energy networks and the control of systems driven by uncertain data, and they are increasingly imposed on infinite-dimensional decisions such as the control of a partial differential equation. Geiersbach and Henrion (arXiv:2306.03965v2) derive first-order optimality conditions for such problems. This mission formalizes the general part of their paper (§2.1): a necessary and sufficient multiplier rule for a convex objective under a Gaussian probabilistic constraint on a Banach space.

The difficulty with chance constraints is that the probability function φ(u)=P(g(u,ξ)≤0)\varphi(u)=\mathbb P(g(u,\xi)\le0)φ(u)=P(g(u,ξ)≤0) is given only implicitly and is in general neither smooth nor convex. Prékopa's theory of log-concave measures (Prékopa 1995) shows that log⁡φ\log\varphilogφ is concave under joint convexity, and Farshbaf-Shaker, Henrion and Hömberg (2018) carried this to infinite dimensions. For Gaussian data, van Ackooij and Henrion (2014) gave gradient formulae via the spherical-radial decomposition, and Hantoute, Henrion and Pérez-Aros (2019) proved local Lipschitz continuity of φ\varphiφ and an estimate of its Clarke subdifferential under a moderate growth condition. The paper combines the two lines into an optimality system.

Setting

Let UUU be a reflexive separable Banach space with dual U∗U^*U∗, let F:U→RF:U\to\mathbb RF:U→R be convex and Fréchet differentiable with derivative DF(u)∈U∗DF(u)\in U^*DF(u)∈U∗, and let ξ\xiξ be an mmm-dimensional centered Gaussian random vector with nondegenerate covariance matrix Σ\SigmaΣ. A constraint function g:U×Rm→Rg:U\times\mathbb R^m\to\mathbb Rg:U×Rm→R is locally Lipschitzian with g(u,⋅)g(u,\cdot)g(u,⋅) convex for every uuu (Assumption 2.1). For p∈(0,1]p\in(0,1]p∈(0,1] the problem is

min⁡u∈UF(u)s.t.φ(u):=P(ω∣g(u,ξ(ω))≤0)≥p.(9)\min_{u\in U}F(u)\quad\text{s.t.}\quad\varphi(u):=\mathbb P(\omega\mid g(u,\xi(\omega))\le0)\ge p. \tag{9}u∈Umin​F(u)s.t.φ(u):=P(ω∣g(u,ξ(ω))≤0)≥p.(9)

The Clarke directional derivative of a locally Lipschitzian f:U→Rf:U\to\mathbb Rf:U→R is f∘(u;h)=lim sup⁡u′→u, t↓0(f(u′+th)−f(u′))/tf^\circ(u;h)=\limsup_{u'\to u,\,t\downarrow0}(f(u'+th)-f(u'))/tf∘(u;h)=limsupu′→u,t↓0​(f(u′+th)−f(u′))/t, and its Clarke subdifferential is ∂Cf(u)={x∗∈U∗∣⟨x∗,h⟩≤f∘(u;h) ∀h}\partial^Cf(u)=\{x^*\in U^*\mid\langle x^*,h\rangle\le f^\circ(u;h)\ \forall h\}∂Cf(u)={x∗∈U∗∣⟨x∗,h⟩≤f∘(u;h) ∀h}. At a point u∗u^*u∗ the paper assumes g(u∗,0)<0g(u^*,0)<0g(u∗,0)<0 (10) and either the moderate growth condition (12) or boundedness of M={z∣g(u∗,z)≤0}M=\{z\mid g(u^*,z)\le0\}M={z∣g(u∗,z)≤0} (11).

The radial probability function is e(u,v)=μη{r≥0∣g(u,rΣ1/2v)≤0}e(u,v)=\mu_\eta\{r\ge0\mid g(u,r\Sigma^{1/2}v)\le0\}e(u,v)=μη​{r≥0∣g(u,rΣ1/2v)≤0} for vvv on the unit sphere Sm−1\mathbb S^{m-1}Sm−1, where μη\mu_\etaμη​ is the chi distribution with mmm degrees of freedom; with μζ\mu_\zetaμζ​ the uniform distribution on Sm−1\mathbb S^{m-1}Sm−1, φ(u)=∫Sm−1e(u,v) dμζ(v)\varphi(u)=\int_{\mathbb S^{m-1}}e(u,v)\,d\mu_\zeta(v)φ(u)=∫Sm−1​e(u,v)dμζ​(v) (14). Integrals of set-valued maps are taken in the sense of Aumann.

Formalization targets

Goal: Proposition 2.6, statement (21)

If ggg is jointly convex, there is a generalized Slater point u^\hat uu^ with φ(u^)>p\varphi(\hat u)>pφ(u^)>p, and u∗u^*u∗ is feasible with (10) and either (12) or MMM bounded, then u∗u^*u∗ is a global minimizer of (9) if and only if, for some λ≥0\lambda\ge0λ≥0,

DF(u∗)∈λ ∂Cφ(u∗),φ(u∗)≥p,λ(φ(u∗)−p)=0.(21)DF(u^*)\in\lambda\,\partial^C\varphi(u^*),\qquad\varphi(u^*)\ge p,\qquad\lambda(\varphi(u^*)-p)=0. \tag{21}DF(u∗)∈λ∂Cφ(u∗),φ(u∗)≥p,λ(φ(u∗)−p)=0.(21)

Milestones

  1. Theorem 2.2, Lipschitz part: e(⋅,v)e(\cdot,v)e(⋅,v) is uniformly locally Lipschitzian and φ\varphiφ is locally Lipschitzian around uˉ\bar uuˉ.
  2. Prékopa's statement (p. 7): joint quasi-convexity of ggg and a log-concave density give a log-concave φ\varphiφ.
  3. Lemma 2.5: φ~=−log⁡φ+log⁡p\tilde\varphi=-\log\varphi+\log pφ~​=−logφ+logp is convex and lower semicontinuous, and (9) is equivalent to min⁡{F∣φ~≤0}\min\{F\mid\tilde\varphi\le0\}min{F∣φ~​≤0} (20).
  4. The convex multiplier rule for (20): −DF(u∗)∈λ∂φ~(u∗)-DF(u^*)\in\lambda\partial\tilde\varphi(u^*)−DF(u∗)∈λ∂φ~​(u∗), λφ~(u∗)=0\lambda\tilde\varphi(u^*)=0λφ~​(u∗)=0.
  5. Convex and Clarke subdifferentials agree for locally Lipschitz convex functions.
  6. The chain rule ∂Cφ~(u∗)=−φ(u∗)−1∂Cφ(u∗)\partial^C\tilde\varphi(u^*)=-\varphi(u^*)^{-1}\partial^C\varphi(u^*)∂Cφ~​(u∗)=−φ(u∗)−1∂Cφ(u∗).

Companion targets

The spherical-radial representation (14); the inclusion (15) ∂Cφ(uˉ)⊆∫Sm−1∂uCe(uˉ,v) dμζ(v)\partial^C\varphi(\bar u)\subseteq\int_{\mathbb S^{m-1}}\partial^C_ue(\bar u,v)\,d\mu_\zeta(v)∂Cφ(uˉ)⊆∫Sm−1​∂uC​e(uˉ,v)dμζ​(v) with equality under (16); the radius representation (17)–(19); Lemma 2.3 (Clarke regularity of −e(⋅,v)-e(\cdot,v)−e(⋅,v)); Theorem 2.4 (equality in (15) when MMM is bounded); and Proposition 2.6's second statement (22), where ∂Cφ(u∗)\partial^C\varphi(u^*)∂Cφ(u∗) is replaced by the spherical integral.

Significance

Statement (21) is a complete first-order characterization of optimality for a nonconvex, nonsmooth constraint in infinite dimensions: the constraint function is neither differentiable nor convex in general, yet the multiplier rule is both necessary and sufficient. The companion formula (22), with the exact subdifferential of Theorem 2.4, makes the system computable from the explicit radial function eee; the paper's later sections evaluate it for an elliptic PDE with a random source and derive explicit optimality conditions for a probabilistic state constraint.

The results of §2.1 are proved on paper, partly by citation. None of them has a machine-checked proof in Mathlib or on Prove2Me. Formalizing them requires a Clarke calculus on Banach spaces, Prékopa-type log-concavity for Gaussian measures, the spherical-radial decomposition of a Gaussian vector, and a convex multiplier rule with an extended-valued constraint. Each of these is reusable well beyond chance constraints.

Difficulty

The direct route fails because φ\varphiφ is not convex: probability functions bounded between 0 and 1 are essentially never concave, and the Clarke subdifferential of a nonconvex function supports only necessary conditions. The paper's argument needs the convex reformulation through −log⁡φ-\log\varphi−logφ, which is extended-valued where φ=0\varphi=0φ=0. It then needs three facts that do not come for free in a Banach space: local Lipschitz continuity of φ\varphiφ (which fails for merely locally Lipschitz ggg without (12) or a bounded MMM), the identification of the convex and Clarke subdifferentials, and a chain rule through the logarithm. The companion formula (22) needs Clarke's theorem on subdifferentials of integral functionals, whose equality case requires a regularity that the radial function only has after a sign change (Lemma 2.3).

Formalization scope

Rm\mathbb R^mRm is EuclideanSpace ℝ (Fin m) with m≥1m\ge1m≥1. The law of ξ\xiξ is Mathlib's multivariateGaussian 0 Sigma with Sigma.PosDef, and Σ1/2\Sigma^{1/2}Σ1/2 is the positive semidefinite square root used there. φ(u)\varphi(u)φ(u) is the real number P({g(u,ξ)≤0})\mathbb P(\{g(u,\xi)\le0\})P({g(u,ξ)≤0}). Reflexivity is surjectivity of the canonical map into the bidual. The Clarke directional derivative is the limsup over u′→uu'\to uu′→u, t↓0t\downarrow0t↓0 with denominator ttt (the page prints hhh, a misprint). Clarke regularity includes local Lipschitz continuity. φ~\tilde\varphiφ~​ is valued in EReal with −log⁡0=+∞-\log0=+\infty−log0=+∞, and its convexity is convexity of its epigraph. A solution is a global minimizer over the feasible set. "DF(u∗)∈λSDF(u^*)\in\lambda SDF(u∗)∈λS" is encoded as "DF(u∗)=λx∗DF(u^*)=\lambda x^*DF(u∗)=λx∗ for some x∗∈Sx^*\in Sx∗∈S", which is unambiguous at λ=0\lambda=0λ=0. The ball in (12) is open. The Aumann integral uses selections whose scalar components v↦⟨x^v∗,h⟩v\mapsto\langle\hat x^*_v,h\ranglev↦⟨x^v∗​,h⟩ are integrable.

The convex multiplier rule (milestone 4) carries one disclosed addition: the extended-valued constraint is finite and continuous near u∗u^*u∗. The paper cites [39, Theorem 3.66] without spelling out a qualification condition, and in the application this property follows from milestone 1. Prékopa's statement is formalized with log⁡0=−∞\log0=-\inftylog0=−∞ (the page prints +∞+\infty+∞), as the multiplicative inequality φ(u)tφ(w)1−t≤φ(tu+(1−t)w)\varphi(u)^t\varphi(w)^{1-t}\le\varphi(tu+(1-t)w)φ(u)tφ(w)1−t≤φ(tu+(1−t)w).

A formalization that makes any of these statements trivial is ruled out: the Clarke limsup is only used with a local Lipschitz hypothesis, so the junk value of an unbounded limsup never enters; the Aumann integral demands integrable selections; the multiplier carries its sign and complementarity condition; and optimality is global, not stationarity.

Contributions are welcome at every level: a Clarke calculus on normed spaces (subdifferential nonemptiness, sum and chain rules), log-concavity of Gaussian measures and Prékopa's theorem, polar coordinates for Gaussian vectors, and a Slater-type multiplier rule for extended-valued convex constraints.

Selected references

  • C. Geiersbach and R. Henrion, Optimality conditions in control problems with random state constraints in probabilistic or almost-sure form, arXiv:2306.03965v2, 2024 (Math. Oper. Res., 2025). https://arxiv.org/abs/2306.03965
  • A. Hantoute, R. Henrion and P. Pérez-Aros, Subdifferential characterization of probability functions under Gaussian distribution, Math. Program. 174, 167–194, 2019. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10107-018-1237-9
  • W. van Ackooij and R. Henrion, Gradient formulae for nonlinear probabilistic constraints with Gaussian and Gaussian-like distributions, SIAM J. Optim. 24(4), 1864–1889, 2014. https://doi.org/10.1137/130922689
  • M. H. Farshbaf-Shaker, R. Henrion and D. Hömberg, Properties of chance constraints in infinite dimensions with an application to PDE constrained optimization, Set-Valued Var. Anal. 26, 821–841, 2018. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11228-017-0452-5
  • A. Prékopa, Stochastic Programming, Kluwer, 1995. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-017-3087-7
  • F. H. Clarke, Optimization and Nonsmooth Analysis, Wiley, 1983. https://doi.org/10.1137/1.9781611971309
  • J. Peypouquet, Convex Optimization in Normed Spaces: Theory, Methods and Examples, SpringerBriefs in Optimization, Springer, 2015.
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Operations ResearchPartial Differential EquationsProbability·Captain: mikedeng1

Optimality Conditions in Control Problems with Random State Constraints in Probabilistic or Almost Sure Form II: Explicit Optimality Conditions for Probabilistic Elliptic PDE State ConstraintsResearch Paper

Motivation

Optimal control of partial differential equations under uncertainty arises whenever a physical system is steered by a control while its sources, coefficients or loads are only known in distribution. A typical requirement is a state constraint: the state (a temperature, a concentration, a displacement) must stay below a threshold everywhere in the domain. When the source term is random, demanding this for every realization is often impossible or too conservative, and the natural relaxation is a probabilistic (chance) constraint: the state must stay below the threshold uniformly on the domain with probability at least ppp.

Probabilistic constraints are classical in operations research (Prékopa, Stochastic Programming, 1995), but in a PDE setting the constraint is an infinite family of random inequalities, one per point of the domain, and the probability function is not differentiable in general. C. Geiersbach and R. Henrion (arXiv:2306.03965v2, Math. Oper. Res. 2025) derive optimality conditions for such problems in terms of the Clarke subdifferential, building on the spherical-radial decomposition of Gaussian vectors developed by Hantoute, Henrion and Pérez-Aros (Math. Program. 2019) and van Ackooij and Henrion. This mission formalizes the PDE half of §2 of that paper: explicit formulas for the subdifferential of the probability function and the resulting optimality conditions.

Setting

Let D⊆RdD\subseteq\mathbb R^dD⊆Rd, d∈{1,2,3}d\in\{1,2,3\}d∈{1,2,3}, be a nonempty, open, bounded set of class S: there are γ∈(0,1)\gamma\in(0,1)γ∈(0,1) and r0>0r_0>0r0​>0 with meas⁡(Br(x)∖D)≥γmeas⁡(Br(x))\operatorname{meas}(B_r(x)\setminus D)\ge\gamma\operatorname{meas}(B_r(x))meas(Br​(x)∖D)≥γmeas(Br​(x)) for all x∈∂Dx\in\partial Dx∈∂D and 0<r<r00<r<r_00<r<r0​. For F∈L2(D)F\in L^2(D)F∈L2(D) the Dirichlet problem −Δy=F-\Delta y=F−Δy=F in DDD, y=0y=0y=0 on ∂D\partial D∂D has a unique weak solution in H01(D)∩C(Dˉ)H^1_0(D)\cap C(\bar D)H01​(D)∩C(Dˉ); the solution operator A−1:L2(D)→C(Dˉ)A^{-1}:L^2(D)\to C(\bar D)A−1:L2(D)→C(Dˉ) is linear and continuous.

Fix f0,φ1,…,φm∈L2(D)f_0,\varphi_1,\dots,\varphi_m\in L^2(D)f0​,φ1​,…,φm​∈L2(D) and a threshold α∈R\alpha\in\mathbb Rα∈R. The control-to-state operator is

S(u,z)=A−1(u+f0+∑i=1mziφi)=P(u,z)+y0,P(u,z)=A−1u+∑iziA−1φi, y0=A−1f0.S(u,z)=A^{-1}\Big(u+f_0+\sum_{i=1}^m z_i\varphi_i\Big)=P(u,z)+y_0,\qquad P(u,z)=A^{-1}u+\sum_i z_iA^{-1}\varphi_i,\ y_0=A^{-1}f_0.S(u,z)=A−1(u+f0​+i=1∑m​zi​φi​)=P(u,z)+y0​,P(u,z)=A−1u+i∑​zi​A−1φi​, y0​=A−1f0​.

The random vector ξ\xiξ on a probability space (Ω,F,P)(\Omega,\mathcal F,\mathbb P)(Ω,F,P) is Gaussian N(0,Σ)\mathcal N(0,\Sigma)N(0,Σ) with Σ\SigmaΣ positive definite, and y(⋅,ω)=S(u,ξ(ω))y(\cdot,\omega)=S(u,\xi(\omega))y(⋅,ω)=S(u,ξ(ω)) is the random state. With g(u,z)=max⁡x∈Dˉ[S(u,z)](x)−αg(u,z)=\max_{x\in\bar D}[S(u,z)](x)-\alphag(u,z)=maxx∈Dˉ​[S(u,z)](x)−α and the probability function φ(u)=P(ω∣g(u,ξ(ω))≤0)\varphi(u)=\mathbb P(\omega\mid g(u,\xi(\omega))\le0)φ(u)=P(ω∣g(u,ξ(ω))≤0), the problem is

min⁡u∈L2(D)F(u)s.t.φ(u)=P(y(x,ω)≤α  ∀x∈D)≥p,(24)\min_{u\in L^2(D)}F(u)\quad\text{s.t.}\quad \varphi(u)=\mathbb P\big(y(x,\omega)\le\alpha\ \ \forall x\in D\big)\ge p,\tag{24}u∈L2(D)min​F(u)s.t.φ(u)=P(y(x,ω)≤α  ∀x∈D)≥p,(24)

with FFF convex and Fréchet differentiable and p∈(0,1]p\in(0,1]p∈(0,1].

The analysis uses the spherical-radial decomposition. Let μζ\mu_\zetaμζ​ be the uniform distribution on the unit sphere Sm−1\mathbb S^{m-1}Sm−1, μη\mu_\etaμη​ the chi distribution with mmm degrees of freedom and density χ(t)=Ktm−1e−t2/2\chi(t)=Kt^{m-1}e^{-t^2/2}χ(t)=Ktm−1e−t2/2, Σ1/2\Sigma^{1/2}Σ1/2 the square root of Σ\SigmaΣ. The radial probability function is e(u,v)=μη{r≥0∣g(u,rΣ1/2v)≤0}e(u,v)=\mu_\eta\{r\ge0\mid g(u,r\Sigma^{1/2}v)\le0\}e(u,v)=μη​{r≥0∣g(u,rΣ1/2v)≤0} and the radius function ρ(u,v)∈[0,∞]\rho(u,v)\in[0,\infty]ρ(u,v)∈[0,∞] is the supremum of that set. For x∈Dˉx\in\bar Dx∈Dˉ, ux∈L2(D)u_x\in L^2(D)ux​∈L2(D) is defined by (ux,h)L2(D)=(A−1h)(x)(u_x,h)_{L^2(D)}=(A^{-1}h)(x)(ux​,h)L2(D)​=(A−1h)(x), and

M∗(uˉ,v)={x∈Dˉ∣[P(0,Σ1/2v)](x)>0, yˉ(x)+ρ(uˉ,v)[P(0,Σ1/2v)](x)=α},yˉ=S(uˉ,0).M^*(\bar u,v)=\{x\in\bar D\mid[P(0,\Sigma^{1/2}v)](x)>0,\ \bar y(x)+\rho(\bar u,v)[P(0,\Sigma^{1/2}v)](x)=\alpha\},\qquad \bar y=S(\bar u,0).M∗(uˉ,v)={x∈Dˉ∣[P(0,Σ1/2v)](x)>0, yˉ​(x)+ρ(uˉ,v)[P(0,Σ1/2v)](x)=α},yˉ​=S(uˉ,0).

∂C\partial^C∂C is the Clarke subdifferential, with L2(D)∗L^2(D)^*L2(D)∗ identified with L2(D)L^2(D)L2(D), and integrals of set-valued maps are Aumann integrals.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 2.16

Assume a control u^\hat uu^ with φ(u^)>p\varphi(\hat u)>pφ(u^)>p (41), and let u∗u^*u∗ be feasible with expected state y~=S(u∗,0)\tilde y=S(u^*,0)y~​=S(u∗,0) satisfying y~(x)<α\tilde y(x)<\alphay~​(x)<α on Dˉ\bar DDˉ (42). If u∗u^*u∗ solves (24), there is λ≥0\lambda\ge0λ≥0 with

DF(u∗)∈−λ∫{v∣ρ(u∗,v)<∞}χ(ρ(u∗,v))⋅clco⁡{ux[P(0,Σ1/2v)](x) ∣ x∈M∗(u∗,v)} dμζ(v),DF(u^*)\in-\lambda\int_{\{v\mid\rho(u^*,v)<\infty\}}\chi(\rho(u^*,v))\cdot\operatorname{clco}\Big\{\frac{u_x}{[P(0,\Sigma^{1/2}v)](x)}\ \Big|\ x\in M^*(u^*,v)\Big\}\,d\mu_\zeta(v),DF(u∗)∈−λ∫{v∣ρ(u∗,v)<∞}​χ(ρ(u∗,v))⋅clco{[P(0,Σ1/2v)](x)ux​​ ​ x∈M∗(u∗,v)}dμζ​(v), λ(P(y∗(x,ω)≤α ∀x∈D)−p)=0,\lambda\big(\mathbb P(y^*(x,\omega)\le\alpha\ \forall x\in D)-p\big)=0,λ(P(y∗(x,ω)≤α ∀x∈D)−p)=0,

and these conditions are sufficient when M∗(u∗,v)M^*(u^*,v)M∗(u∗,v) is a singleton for μζ\mu_\zetaμζ​-a.e. vvv with ρ(u∗,v)<∞\rho(u^*,v)<\inftyρ(u∗,v)<∞, or the set {z∣g(u∗,z)≤0}\{z\mid g(u^*,z)\le0\}{z∣g(u∗,z)≤0} is bounded. The goal has no hard-coded constants; it asserts the form of the optimality system.

Milestones

In attack order: well-posedness of the state equation with the bound ∥y^∥C(Dˉ)≤C(∥z∥2+∥u+f0∥L2(D))\|\hat y\|_{C(\bar D)}\le C(\|z\|_2+\|u+f_0\|_{L^2(D)})∥y^​∥C(Dˉ)​≤C(∥z∥2​+∥u+f0​∥L2(D)​) (Lemma 1.2); measurability of the random state (Lemma 1.4); convexity and global Lipschitz continuity of ggg (Lemma 2.9); moderate growth (Lemma 2.10); the Lipschitz and subdifferential conclusions of the general theory under (26) (Corollary 2.11); the optimality conditions (21), (22) for (24) (Corollary 2.12); ∂uCe(uˉ,v)={0}\partial^C_ue(\bar u,v)=\{0\}∂uC​e(uˉ,v)={0} when ρ(uˉ,v)=∞\rho(\bar u,v)=\inftyρ(uˉ,v)=∞ (Lemma 2.13); the explicit formula ∂uCe(uˉ,v)=−χ(ρ(uˉ,v))⋅clco⁡{ux/[P(0,Σ1/2v)](x)∣x∈M∗(uˉ,v)}\partial^C_ue(\bar u,v)=-\chi(\rho(\bar u,v))\cdot\operatorname{clco}\{u_x/[P(0,\Sigma^{1/2}v)](x)\mid x\in M^*(\bar u,v)\}∂uC​e(uˉ,v)=−χ(ρ(uˉ,v))⋅clco{ux​/[P(0,Σ1/2v)](x)∣x∈M∗(uˉ,v)} when ρ(uˉ,v)<∞\rho(\bar u,v)<\inftyρ(uˉ,v)<∞ (Lemma 2.14); and the upper estimate (40) of ∂Cφ(uˉ)\partial^C\varphi(\bar u)∂Cφ(uˉ) with its equality cases (Theorem 2.15).

Significance

The result turns an abstract statement — DF(u∗)DF(u^*)DF(u∗) lies in a multiple of the Clarke subdifferential of a probability function that has no closed form — into a condition written in the problem data: Green-type functions uxu_xux​, the expected state, and the radius function along each direction of the sphere. This is what makes the conditions usable for checking candidate controls and for designing algorithms, and Example 2.18 of the paper computes a solution this way. The sufficiency half identifies when the nonconvex chance-constrained problem behaves like a convex one.

The paper's proofs are on paper only; to our knowledge none of these results, nor the spherical-radial decomposition, Clarke calculus in Hilbert spaces, or Aumann integrals in L2L^2L2, has a machine-checked proof. Formalizing Theorem 2.16 requires connecting elliptic regularity, Gaussian measure theory and nonsmooth analysis, and the milestones are reusable on their own: Lemma 1.2 is a regularity statement for the Poisson equation, and Lemmas 2.13 and 2.14 are max-function subdifferential formulas in an infinite-dimensional space.

Difficulty

The obvious route — differentiate φ\varphiφ and use a Lagrange multiplier — fails because φ\varphiφ is generally not differentiable even for smooth data (Example 2.17 of the paper), and because ggg is only Lipschitz, being a maximum over Dˉ\bar DDˉ. The general subdifferential estimate (Theorem 2.2, from Hantoute–Henrion–Pérez-Aros) needs a growth condition and only gives an inclusion, since the radial probability function is not Clarke regular; the radius function ρ(⋅,v)\rho(\cdot,v)ρ(⋅,v) is an infimum over the open set where P(0,Σ1/2v)>0P(0,\Sigma^{1/2}v)>0P(0,Σ1/2v)>0, which is neither compact nor independent of uuu, so standard max-function formulas do not apply directly. Directions with ρ=∞\rho=\inftyρ=∞ require a separate limiting argument through the Mordukhovich subdifferential (Lemma 2.13). The regularity input, continuity of solutions on Dˉ\bar DDˉ for class-S domains (Kinderlehrer–Stampacchia 1980), is not in Mathlib.

Formalization scope

All declarations are in the namespace ChanceStateCtrl.PDE. Rd\mathbb R^dRd and Rm\mathbb R^mRm are EuclideanSpace ℝ (Fin d) and EuclideanSpace ℝ (Fin m), indices are Fin m, L2(D)L^2(D)L2(D) is Lp ℝ 2 (volume.restrict D). Weak derivatives are the published HunterPDE.Shared.HasWeakDeriv; a weak solution is a function continuous on Dˉ\bar DDˉ, zero on ∂D\partial D∂D, in L2(D)L^2(D)L2(D) with weak first derivatives in L2(D)L^2(D)L2(D), satisfying the weak form against Cc∞(D)C_c^\infty(D)Cc∞​(D).

Standing hypotheses on every theorem: DDD open, bounded and nonempty, d∈{1,2,3}d\in\{1,2,3\}d∈{1,2,3}, class S, and CompactSpace (closure D) (a consequence of boundedness). Nonemptiness of DDD is the one added hypothesis: Lean's supremum over an empty domain is 000, not −∞-\infty−∞, and Lemma 2.9's identification of events fails for D=∅D=\emptysetD=∅. A−1A^{-1}A−1 is a continuous linear map to C(Dˉ)C(\bar D)C(Dˉ) together with the hypothesis that it returns the weak solution; it is never an arbitrary operator. m≥1m\ge1m≥1, as the uniform distribution on Sm−1\mathbb S^{m-1}Sm−1 requires. Σ1/2\Sigma^{1/2}Σ1/2 is the positive semidefinite root; ∥Σ1/2∥\|\Sigma^{1/2}\|∥Σ1/2∥ is its operator norm. The Clarke directional derivative is lim sup⁡u′→u,t↓0(f(u′+th)−f(u′))/t\limsup_{u'\to u,t\downarrow0}(f(u'+th)-f(u'))/tlimsupu′→u,t↓0​(f(u′+th)−f(u′))/t (the page's denominator hhh is a misprint). ρ\rhoρ takes values in [0,∞][0,\infty][0,∞]. clco is the norm closure of the convex hull. The integral in (40)/(43) is over the restriction of μζ\mu_\zetaμζ​ to {ρ<∞}\{\rho<\infty\}{ρ<∞}, not a renormalization. A solution is a global minimizer over {u∣φ(u)≥p}\{u\mid\varphi(u)\ge p\}{u∣φ(u)≥p}; the page's "solution to (9)" refers to this instance of the abstract problem (9).

Trivializing formalizations are ruled out: every Clarke subdifferential is taken at a point where the function is locally Lipschitz (proved in Corollary 2.11 and Theorem 2.15), the state operator is tied to the PDE, the multiplier carries its sign and complementarity, Aumann selections must be scalarly integrable, and optimality is global.

Needed infrastructure: elliptic regularity in C(Dˉ)C(\bar D)C(Dˉ) for class-S domains; the spherical-radial decomposition of N(0,Σ)\mathcal N(0,\Sigma)N(0,Σ); Clarke calculus (chain rule, max functions) on Hilbert spaces; Clarke's theorem on subdifferentials of integral functionals. Contributions of any of these as stand-alone theorems are welcome.

Selected references

  • C. Geiersbach, R. Henrion, Optimality conditions in control problems with random state constraints in probabilistic or almost-sure form, arXiv:2306.03965v2, 2024; Math. Oper. Res., 2025. https://arxiv.org/abs/2306.03965
  • A. Hantoute, R. Henrion, P. Pérez-Aros, Subdifferential characterization of probability functions under Gaussian distribution, Math. Program. 174 (2019), 167–194. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10107-018-1237-9
  • F. H. Clarke, Optimization and Nonsmooth Analysis, Wiley, 1983; SIAM reprint 1990. https://doi.org/10.1137/1.9781611971309
  • D. Kinderlehrer, G. Stampacchia, An Introduction to Variational Inequalities and Their Applications, Academic Press, 1980; SIAM reprint 2000. https://doi.org/10.1137/1.9780898719451
  • A. Prékopa, Stochastic Programming, Kluwer, 1995. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-017-3087-7
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EconomicsOperations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

The Bright Side of the GDPR: Welfare-Improving Privacy Management II: A Firm with Small Data-Based Revenue Earns More Profit After the GDPRResearch Paper

Motivation

The European Union's General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR, 2018) requires a firm to obtain a consumer's explicit consent before it collects personal data. The common expectation, in policy debate and in much of the empirical literature, is that consent requirements cost firms money: they shrink the pool of consumer data that can be monetized through advertising, personalization or resale. Choe, Matsushima and Shekhar (ISER Discussion Paper No. 1246, 2024; published as Management Science, 2025) build a monopoly pricing model in which consent creates a new purchase option. A consumer who would not have bought the service under compulsory data sharing can now buy it without sharing. They then ask how the firm's equilibrium price, profit and consumer surplus change.

This mission formalizes the paper's analytic profit result. If the firm's revenue is mostly usage based, meaning its revenue per unit of collected data is small, then the firm earns strictly more in equilibrium after the GDPR than before. The result is the source of the paper's title. Regulation that is usually read as a cost to firms raises the profit of one well-defined class of firms.

Setting

A monopolist sells an online service at zero marginal cost and sets a price p∈Rp\in\mathbb Rp∈R. Negative prices are allowed: they pay consumers to use the service. A consumer type is a pair (v,c)∈[0,1]2(v,c)\in[0,1]^2(v,c)∈[0,1]2, where vvv is the valuation of the service and ccc the privacy cost of sharing data. Types are independent and uniform on the unit square, so the mass of a set of consumers is its area. A consumer who shares data receives an opt-in benefit x∈(0,1)x\in(0,1)x∈(0,1). The utilities of opt-in purchase (buy and share) and opt-out purchase (buy without sharing) are

US(v,c)=v+(x−c)−p,UN(v,c)=v−p.U_S(v,c)=v+(x-c)-p,\qquad U_N(v,c)=v-p .US​(v,c)=v+(x−c)−p,UN​(v,c)=v−p.

The firm earns data revenue α≥0\alpha\ge0α≥0 per unit of collected data. Its profit is Π=pD+αDS\Pi=pD+\alpha D_SΠ=pD+αDS​, where DDD is total demand and DSD_SDS​ the mass of consumers who share data.

  • Before the GDPR opt-out purchase is unavailable. A consumer buys, and shares, iff US≥0U_S\ge0US​≥0. The demand D^(p)\widehat D(p)D(p) is the area of {(v,c)∈[0,1]2:US≥0}\{(v,c)\in[0,1]^2: U_S\ge 0\}{(v,c)∈[0,1]2:US​≥0}, and the profit is Π^(p)=(p+α)D^(p)\widehat\Pi(p)=(p+\alpha)\widehat D(p)Π(p)=(p+α)D(p).
  • After the GDPR the opt-in buyers are {(v,c)∈[0,1]2:c≤v+x−p, c≤x}\{(v,c)\in[0,1]^2 : c\le v+x-p,\ c\le x\}{(v,c)∈[0,1]2:c≤v+x−p, c≤x} and the opt-out buyers are {(v,c)∈[0,1]2:v≥p, c>x}\{(v,c)\in[0,1]^2: v\ge p,\ c>x\}{(v,c)∈[0,1]2:v≥p, c>x}. Their areas are D~S(p)\widetilde D_S(p)DS​(p) and D~N(p)\widetilde D_N(p)DN​(p), and the profit is Π~(p)=p(D~S(p)+D~N(p))+αD~S(p)\widetilde\Pi(p)=p(\widetilde D_S(p)+\widetilde D_N(p))+\alpha\widetilde D_S(p)Π(p)=p(DS​(p)+DN​(p))+αDS​(p).

An equilibrium price is a global maximizer of the profit over p∈Rp\in\mathbb Rp∈R: the firm moves first and consumers respond. The paper's thresholds are

α1(x)=max⁡{1−2x2,0},α2(x)=max⁡{2−4x+x22x,0}.\alpha_1(x)=\max\Big\{\frac{1-2x}{2},0\Big\},\qquad \alpha_2(x)=\max\Big\{\frac{2-4x+x^2}{2x},0\Big\}.α1​(x)=max{21−2x​,0},α2​(x)=max{2x2−4x+x2​,0}.

"Case 1a" (before) and "case 2a" (after) are the equilibria with x<p⋆<1+xx<p^\star<1+xx<p⋆<1+x, in which low-valuation consumers stay out of the market.

Formalization targets

Goal: Proposition A3, first bullet (p. 34)

If α<α1(x)\alpha<\alpha_1(x)α<α1​(x), both profit functions attain their maxima over R\mathbb RR, and

max⁡p∈RΠ~(p)  >  max⁡p∈RΠ^(p),\max_{p\in\mathbb R}\widetilde\Pi(p)\;>\;\max_{p\in\mathbb R}\widehat\Pi(p),p∈Rmax​Π(p)>p∈Rmax​Π(p),

that is, Π~2a⋆>Π^1a⋆\widetilde\Pi^\star_{2a}>\widehat\Pi^\star_{1a}Π2a⋆​>Π1a⋆​. The hypothesis forces x<1/2x<1/2x<1/2, because α≥0\alpha\ge0α≥0.

Milestones

  1. Lemma A3, first bullet (p. 33): for x≤1/2x\le 1/2x≤1/2 and α<α1(x)\alpha<\alpha_1(x)α<α1​(x), every equilibrium price before the GDPR lies in (x,1+x)(x,1+x)(x,1+x) (case 1a), and so does every equilibrium price after it (case 2a).
  2. Equilibrium profit before the GDPR (p. 31): for α<α1(x)\alpha<\alpha_1(x)α<α1​(x), Π^⋆=2(1+x+α)3/27\widehat\Pi^\star=2(1+x+\alpha)^3/27Π⋆=2(1+x+α)3/27.
  3. Equilibrium profit after the GDPR (p. 32): for α<α2(x)\alpha<\alpha_2(x)α<α2​(x), Π~⋆=(4+4x(x+2α+2αx)+x2(x−2α)2)/16\widetilde\Pi^\star=\big(4+4x(x+2\alpha+2\alpha x)+x^2(x-2\alpha)^2\big)/16Π⋆=(4+4x(x+2α+2αx)+x2(x−2α)2)/16.
  4. Online Appendix §F, first display (OA p. 9): for α<α1(x)\alpha<\alpha_1(x)α<α1​(x), Π~⋆−Π^⋆=J(x,α)/432\widetilde\Pi^\star-\widehat\Pi^\star=J(x,\alpha)/432Π⋆−Π⋆=J(x,α)/432, with JJJ the explicit quartic polynomial printed there.
  5. Online Appendix §F, conclusion (OA p. 9): J(x,α)>0J(x,\alpha)>0J(x,α)>0 whenever 0<x<1/20<x<1/20<x<1/2 and 0≤α<(1−2x)/20\le\alpha<(1-2x)/20≤α<(1−2x)/2.

Significance

The result. Proposition A3 separates firms by revenue model. A firm whose revenue is mostly usage based gains from the GDPR. The opt-out option brings in consumers with high privacy costs who did not buy before, and this extra demand lets the firm both raise its price and sell to more consumers. Together these outweigh the lost data revenue. The other two bullets of Proposition A3 treat firms with larger α\alphaα, for which the comparison can go either way. Their thresholds α5(x)\alpha_5(x)α5​(x) and α6(x)\alpha_6(x)α6​(x) are defined only as "the value of α\alphaα that solves" an equation, with existence and uniqueness shown in plots, so they are not posed here. The paper's Propositions 1–4 are its main-text results at x=1/4x=1/4x=1/4. The price comparison (Proposition 1) is the x=1/4x=1/4x=1/4 instance of the general Proposition A1, the subject of the sibling mission in this series. Propositions 2–4, A2, A3 (bullets 2–3) and A4 rest on numerically located thresholds and are not posed.

Formalizing it. The paper's proof is in print, but no part of it has been machine-checked. The model is fully explicit (a uniform distribution, two areas, two profit functions on R\mathbb RR), so a complete formal proof would certify every link from the primitives to the inequality. That covers the computation of the polygon areas, the global maximization of a piecewise polynomial over all real prices, and the final polynomial inequality. The printed proof of the last step contains a slip: the value it gives for "J(x,α1(x))J(x,\alpha_1(x))J(x,α1​(x))" is the value of J/432J/432J/432. A formalization fixes such details for good.

Difficulty

The closed forms are easy to verify once the equilibrium is known to be interior to case 1a and case 2a. The work lies elsewhere. Computing the demands requires the Lebesgue area of a family of polygons whose shape changes with ppp. Over all of R\mathbb RR each demand is piecewise polynomial with several pieces, and the profits are piecewise cubic. Identifying the global maximizer means checking every piece, including negative prices before the GDPR and the corner pieces where demand saturates at 000 or 111. A first-order condition on one piece gives only a candidate. The comparison of the two maximal values then reduces to a two-variable quartic inequality on a triangle, which holds strictly on the open region but becomes tight at its corner x→0x\to0x→0, α→1/2\alpha\to1/2α→1/2, where J(0,1/2)=0J(0,1/2)=0J(0,1/2)=0.

Formalization scope

  • Model. One definitions file, GDPRPrivacy.PriceRise.Model, shared with the sibling mission on the equilibrium price. A type is q : ℝ × ℝ with q.1 = v and q.2 = c. Demands are (volume S).toReal for the explicit sets S⊆[0,1]2S\subseteq[0,1]^2S⊆[0,1]2 above, with the opt-in and opt-out sets of p. 13 copied literally. Ties are assigned to opt-in, which changes only null sets. The file also defines α1,α2,β,Γ\alpha_1,\alpha_2,\beta,\Gammaα1​,α2​,β,Γ.
  • Standing assumptions. Every theorem assumes 0<x<10<x<10<x<1 and α≥0\alpha\ge0α≥0 (§3, pp. 7–8). No other hypothesis is added. Milestone 1 keeps the paper's x≤1/2x\le 1/2x≤1/2, and milestone 5 keeps its printed region α<(1−2x)/2\alpha<(1-2x)/2α<(1−2x)/2, x<1/2x<1/2x<1/2.
  • Equilibria. An equilibrium price is any p with IsMaxOn (profitBefore x α) Set.univ p (respectively profitAfter). Every statement asserts that a maximizer exists and then quantifies over all maximizers.
  • Ruled-out trivializations. The goal compares the maximal values of the two model profit functions. It does not compare the closed forms 2(1+x+α)3/272(1+x+\alpha)^3/272(1+x+α)3/27 and Π~2a⋆\widetilde\Pi^\star_{2a}Π2a⋆​ (that is milestones 4–5 alone), it does not compare the profits at a common price, and it does not restrict the price range. The existence conjuncts prevent a vacuous "for every maximizer".
  • Needed infrastructure. Areas of polygons in R2\mathbb R^2R2 via MeasureTheory.volume (Fubini or regionBetween), maximization of piecewise polynomials on R\mathbb RR, and polynomial inequalities. Lemmas computing the area of {(v,c)∈[0,1]2:c≤v+t}\{(v,c)\in[0,1]^2: c\le v+t\}{(v,c)∈[0,1]2:c≤v+t} as a function of ttt are reusable for other uniform-type screening and pricing models. Contributions of such lemmas, and of the explicit demand formulas (4)–(6) of the paper, are welcome.

Selected references

  • C. Choe, N. Matsushima and S. Shekhar, The Bright Side of the GDPR: Welfare-Improving Privacy Management, ISER Discussion Paper No. 1246, Osaka University, June 2024. The artifact formalized here; theorem and page numbers refer to it.
  • C. Choe, N. Matsushima and S. Shekhar, The Bright Side of the GDPR: Welfare-Improving Privacy Management, Management Science, 2025. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2024.06653
  • S. P. Anderson and J. S. Gans, Platform Siphoning: Ad-Avoidance and Media Content, American Economic Journal: Microeconomics 3(4), 2011. https://doi.org/10.1257/mic.3.4.1
  • Regulation (EU) 2016/679 (General Data Protection Regulation), Official Journal of the European Union L 119, 2016. https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2016/679/oj
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The Value of Information Design in Supply Chain Management III: With Overlapping Supports, the Optimal Policy Goes from Partial to No to Full Disclosure as the Critical Ratio RisesResearch Paper

Motivation

A retailer often knows more about her own demand than the supplier who must produce for her. In a decentralized supply chain the supplier sets a production quantity before demand is realized, and an under-informed supplier produces too little or too much. The retailer can shape what the supplier believes by committing in advance to a disclosure policy, a rule that maps what she knows to messages she sends. This is the Bayesian persuasion or information design framework of Kamenica and Gentzkow (2011), applied by Candogan and Gurkan (2024) to a newsvendor supplier.

The natural expectation is that the retailer either tells the supplier everything or nothing. The paper shows the answer depends on the supplier's critical ratio, and that it can be non-monotone. For nested demand supports (the setting of the first missions in this series) partial disclosure appears for low critical ratios. This mission formalizes the paper's §4 extension to supports that overlap without being nested. There, under an explicit condition on the supports, the optimal policy moves from partial disclosure to no disclosure to full disclosure as the critical ratio rises.

Setting

The state is ω∈{0,1}\omega\in\{0,1\}ω∈{0,1} with prior p0=P(ω=0)∈[0,1]p_0=\mathbb P(\omega=0)\in[0,1]p0​=P(ω=0)∈[0,1]. In state ω\omegaω the retailer's demand DωD_\omegaDω​ is uniform on [aω,bω][a_\omega,b_\omega][aω​,bω​]. The supports intersect:

b0>b1>a0>a1≥0.b_0>b_1>a_0>a_1\ge 0 .b0​>b1​>a0​>a1​≥0.

Write δu=b0−b1\delta_u=b_0-b_1δu​=b0​−b1​, δd=a0−a1\delta_d=a_0-a_1δd​=a0​−a1​, δIS=b1−a0\delta_{\mathsf{IS}}=b_1-a_0δIS​=b1​−a0​; all three are positive.

The supplier holds a belief p=P(ω=0)p=\mathbb P(\omega=0)p=P(ω=0) and chooses a quantity Q≥0Q\ge 0Q≥0 that minimizes the newsvendor cost (2),

p E[ξ(D0−Q)++(1−ξ)(Q−D0)+]+(1−p) E[ξ(D1−Q)++(1−ξ)(Q−D1)+],p\,\mathbb E\big[\xi(D_0-Q)^+ + (1-\xi)(Q-D_0)^+\big]+(1-p)\,\mathbb E\big[\xi(D_1-Q)^+ + (1-\xi)(Q-D_1)^+\big],pE[ξ(D0​−Q)++(1−ξ)(Q−D0​)+]+(1−p)E[ξ(D1​−Q)++(1−ξ)(Q−D1​)+],

where ξ=Cs/(Cs+Ce)∈(0,1)\xi=C_s/(C_s+C_e)\in(0,1)ξ=Cs​/(Cs​+Ce​)∈(0,1) is the critical ratio of the shortage cost CsC_sCs​ and the excess cost CeC_eCe​. A best-response profile Q∗Q^*Q∗ assigns an optimal quantity Qp∗Q^*_pQp∗​ to every belief p∈[0,1]p\in[0,1]p∈[0,1].

A policy Γ=(M,π)\Gamma=(\mathcal M,\pi)Γ=(M,π) consists of a finite message space M\mathcal MM and probabilities π(m∣ω)\pi(m\mid\omega)π(m∣ω). After message mmm the supplier's belief is the Bayes posterior (1),

pm=π(m∣0) p0π(m∣0) p0+π(m∣1)(1−p0).p_m=\frac{\pi(m\mid 0)\,p_0}{\pi(m\mid 0)\,p_0+\pi(m\mid 1)(1-p_0)} .pm​=π(m∣0)p0​+π(m∣1)(1−p0​)π(m∣0)p0​​.

The retailer orders the realized demand and bears only the shortage. Her design problem (3) minimizes, over policies Γ\GammaΓ and best-response profiles Q∗Q^*Q∗, the expected shortage

E[p(D0−Qp∗)++(1−p)(D1−Qp∗)+ ∣ Γ],\mathbb E\Big[p(D_0-Q^*_p)^+ + (1-p)(D_1-Q^*_p)^+\ \Big|\ \Gamma\Big],E[p(D0​−Qp∗​)++(1−p)(D1​−Qp∗​)+ ​ Γ],

where ppp is the induced posterior. Full disclosure reveals ω\omegaω. No disclosure sends one uninformative message. The function

KIS(p)=p E[(D0−Qp∗)+]+(1−p) E[(D1−Qp∗)+]K_{\mathsf{IS}}(p)=p\,\mathbb E[(D_0-Q^*_p)^+]+(1-p)\,\mathbb E[(D_1-Q^*_p)^+]KIS​(p)=pE[(D0​−Qp∗​)+]+(1−p)E[(D1​−Qp∗​)+]

of (B.1) is the retailer's cost when the posterior is ppp, and κIS\kappa_{\mathsf{IS}}κIS​ denotes its lower convex envelope on [0,1][0,1][0,1].

Formalization targets

Goal: Proposition 3 (p. 15)

Assume δd>2δu\delta_d>2\delta_uδd​>2δu​ and δIS>max⁡(δd−2δu, δdδu/(δd−2δu))\delta_{\mathsf{IS}}>\max\big(\delta_d-2\delta_u,\ \delta_d\delta_u/(\delta_d-2\delta_u)\big)δIS​>max(δd​−2δu​, δd​δu​/(δd​−2δu​)). Let ξ˘=(δd−2δu)/(δd−δu)\breve\xi=(\delta_d-2\delta_u)/(\delta_d-\delta_u)ξ˘​=(δd​−2δu​)/(δd​−δu​) and τ‾IS(p)=(1−p)(a0−a1)/(b1−a1)\underline\tau_{\mathsf{IS}}(p)=(1-p)(a_0-a_1)/(b_1-a_1)τ​IS​(p)=(1−p)(a0​−a1​)/(b1​−a1​). Then:

ξ∈[ξ˘,1)  ⟹  full disclosure is optimal,ξ∈[τ‾IS(p0),ξ˘)  ⟹  no disclosure is optimal,ξ∈(0,τ‾IS(p0))  ⟹  ΓIS∗ of (7) is optimal,\begin{aligned} \xi\in[\breve\xi,1) &\implies \text{full disclosure is optimal},\\ \xi\in[\underline\tau_{\mathsf{IS}}(p_0),\breve\xi) &\implies \text{no disclosure is optimal},\\ \xi\in(0,\underline\tau_{\mathsf{IS}}(p_0)) &\implies \Gamma^*_{\mathsf{IS}} \text{ of (7) is optimal}, \end{aligned}ξ∈[ξ˘​,1)ξ∈[τ​IS​(p0​),ξ˘​)ξ∈(0,τ​IS​(p0​))​⟹full disclosure is optimal,⟹no disclosure is optimal,⟹ΓIS∗​ of (7) is optimal,​

where ΓIS∗\Gamma^*_{\mathsf{IS}}ΓIS∗​ has two messages, sends m0m_0m0​ in state 000 with probability 1, and sends m0m_0m0​ in state 111 with probability ξ(b1−a1)(a0−a1)−ξ(b1−a1)⋅p01−p0\frac{\xi(b_1-a_1)}{(a_0-a_1)-\xi(b_1-a_1)}\cdot\frac{p_0}{1-p_0}(a0​−a1​)−ξ(b1​−a1​)ξ(b1​−a1​)​⋅1−p0​p0​​.

Milestones (the paper's proof, App. C.1)

  1. Proposition 2 (p. 15): the supplier's optimal quantity Qp∗Q^*_pQp∗​ is unique and given by the three-branch formula (6), with thresholds τ‾IS(p)≤τˉIS(p)=1−p(b0−b1)/(b0−a0)\underline\tau_{\mathsf{IS}}(p)\le\bar\tau_{\mathsf{IS}}(p)=1-p(b_0-b_1)/(b_0-a_0)τ​IS​(p)≤τˉIS​(p)=1−p(b0​−b1​)/(b0​−a0​).
  2. (B.2) (p. 25): the optimal value of (3) is κIS(p0)\kappa_{\mathsf{IS}}(p_0)κIS​(p0​), the Kamenica–Gentzkow reduction.
  3. Equivalence of hypotheses (p. 32): the hypotheses of Proposition 3 hold if and only if τˉIS(1)>ξ˘>τ‾IS(0)\bar\tau_{\mathsf{IS}}(1)>\breve\xi>\underline\tau_{\mathsf{IS}}(0)τˉIS​(1)>ξ˘​>τ​IS​(0).
  4. KISK_{\mathsf{IS}}KIS​ in closed form (pp. 32–33), in the three regimes of (6).
  5. Lemma 2 (p. 31): κIS\kappa_{\mathsf{IS}}κIS​ is the chord (1−p)KIS(0)+pKIS(1)(1-p)K_{\mathsf{IS}}(0)+pK_{\mathsf{IS}}(1)(1−p)KIS​(0)+pKIS​(1) for ξ≥ξ˘\xi\ge\breve\xiξ≥ξ˘​; it is KISK_{\mathsf{IS}}KIS​ itself for ξ∈[τ‾IS(0),ξ˘)\xi\in[\underline\tau_{\mathsf{IS}}(0),\breve\xi)ξ∈[τ​IS​(0),ξ˘​); and for smaller ξ\xiξ it is KISK_{\mathsf{IS}}KIS​ above p˘=1−ξ(b1−a1)/(a0−a1)\breve p=1-\xi(b_1-a_1)/(a_0-a_1)p˘​=1−ξ(b1​−a1​)/(a0​−a1​) and the chord from 000 to p˘\breve pp˘​ below.
  6. The posteriors of ΓIS∗\Gamma^*_{\mathsf{IS}}ΓIS∗​ (p. 32): m0m_0m0​ has probability p0/p˘p_0/\breve pp0​/p˘​ and induces posterior p˘\breve pp˘​, while m1m_1m1​ induces posterior 000.

Significance

The result. With nested supports, more information can only hurt the retailer at low critical ratios. With overlapping supports, Proposition 3 shows the regimes of full, no and partial disclosure can occur in a different order. It also gives a sufficient condition on the shape of the supports for that pattern. Together with the paper's Theorem 1 (nested) and Theorem 3 (disjoint), it gives the optimal policy for the main configurations of two uniform supports. The explicit thresholds tell a practitioner which disclosure regime applies from four interval endpoints and a cost ratio.

Formalizing it. The paper's argument is in its Online Appendix (C.1, pp. 30–35). It cites Kamenica–Gentzkow for the value of the design problem and proves the envelope lemma through second-derivative sign computations. None of this is machine-checked. A complete development yields a formal concavification theorem for a finite-state persuasion problem over all finite message spaces, which is reusable well beyond this paper. It also yields a checked closed form for the newsvendor quantile under a two-uniform mixture. The goal and every milestone are open on the platform; only the published convex-envelope definition is reused.

Difficulty

The obvious argument compares full disclosure, no disclosure and one candidate partial policy, and picks the best of the three. That proves nothing, because optimality is claimed against every policy on every finite message space. The reduction to the convex envelope (milestone 2) is what makes the comparison finite, and it is itself a theorem about splitting a prior into posteriors.

The envelope of KISK_{\mathsf{IS}}KIS​ is the second obstacle. KISK_{\mathsf{IS}}KIS​ is piecewise rational in ppp, with two regime boundaries that move with ppp. Its curvature changes sign across the boundaries, and the sign of its second derivative depends on ξ\xiξ relative to ξ˘\breve\xiξ˘​. Verifying that the claimed κIS\kappa_{\mathsf{IS}}κIS​ is convex at the kink p˘\breve pp˘​ requires a one-sided slope inequality whose sign rests on the hypotheses on δd,δu,δIS\delta_d,\delta_u,\delta_{\mathsf{IS}}δd​,δu​,δIS​. The equivalence of milestone 3 is where those hypotheses enter.

Formalization scope

All objects live in the namespace SCInfoDesign.Intersecting. States are Fin 2; ω=0\omega=0ω=0 is the state with demand on [a0,b0][a_0,b_0][a0​,b0​], and beliefs are always P(ω=0)\mathbb P(\omega=0)P(ω=0). The uniform expectation is 1b−a∫ab\frac{1}{b-a}\int_a^bb−a1​∫ab​. Policies are stochastic maps from Fin 2 to any finite type; the paper does not bound the message space, and finite spaces are the standard Kamenica–Gentzkow setting. The supplier's cost is normalized by Cs+CeC_s+C_eCs​+Ce​, which leaves its minimizers unchanged, so ξ∈(0,1)\xi\in(0,1)ξ∈(0,1) is the only cost parameter. A message of probability zero carries the default posterior 000 and weight 000. No disclosure is the one-message policy. KISK_{\mathsf{IS}}KIS​ uses the largest optimal quantity, which is the unique one here. The envelope is the published BiconvexProg.BranchBound.convexEnvelope on [0,1][0,1][0,1].

Standing assumptions, added and disclosed because the paper uses them implicitly: 0<ξ<10<\xi<10<ξ<1; a1≥0a_1\ge 0a1​≥0 (nonnegative demand, so the constraint Q≥0Q\ge 0Q≥0 never binds); p0∈[0,1]p_0\in[0,1]p0​∈[0,1]. Nondegeneracy aω<bωa_\omega<b_\omegaaω​<bω​ follows from the support ordering. Two printed slips are corrected in the statements and quoted as printed in the milestones: bhb_hbh​ for b0b_0b0​ in the KISK_{\mathsf{IS}}KIS​ display, and the label m1m_1m1​ for m0m_0m0​ on p. 32. The overlapping indicators of (C.2) at p=p˘p=\breve pp=p˘​ are read piecewise.

Trivializing encodings are excluded. Optimality is over all finite policies and all best-response profiles, not over the three named policies. The supplier's response is an argmin of (2), never the closed form (6), which is a milestone. Each named policy is also asserted to be a policy.

Contributions are welcome on any milestone. The concavification theorem (milestone 2) and the uniform-mixture newsvendor quantile (milestone 1) are the reusable pieces. Proposition 5 (shift case) and the second-derivative display (C.3) are not posed here.

Selected references

  • O. Candogan, H. Gurkan, The Value of Information Design in Supply Chain Management, Management Science, 2024. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2023.03004 (statements cited from the SSRN preprint, abstract 4378997, https://ssrn.com/abstract=4378997)
  • E. Kamenica, M. Gentzkow, Bayesian Persuasion, American Economic Review 101(6), 2590–2615, 2011. https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.101.6.2590
  • F. A. Al-Khayyal, J. E. Falk, Jointly Constrained Biconvex Programming, Mathematics of Operations Research 8(2), 273–286, 1983 (source of the published convex-envelope definition). https://doi.org/10.1287/moor.8.2.273
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Algorithmic Game TheoryEconomicsOperations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

The Value of Information Design in Supply Chain Management IV: With Disjoint Supports, Full Disclosure Is Optimal When 2(b₀ − a₀) ≥ b₁ − a₁, Else No Disclosure at p₀ ≥ p̃ and Partial BelowResearch Paper

Motivation

A retailer usually knows more about her future demand than the supplier who has to produce for her. If the supplier must commit to a production quantity before the order arrives, the retailer bears the cost of every unit he fails to produce. She cannot pay him or contract on quantities, but she can decide how much of her demand information to share, and she can commit to that disclosure rule in advance. Which information should she share?

Candogan and Gurkan (Management Science, 2024; preprint SSRN 4378997) answer this question in a two-state model with uniform demand, using the Bayesian persuasion framework of Kamenica and Gentzkow (2011). Their main text treats nested demand supports. This mission formalizes their extension to disjoint supports, where the high-demand state's support lies entirely above the low-demand state's (Theorem 3). It is the fourth of four missions on the paper; the others cover nested supports (Theorem 1), the value of information (Theorem 2) and intersecting supports (Proposition 3).

Setting

There are two states ω∈{0,1}\omega\in\{0,1\}ω∈{0,1} with prior p0=P(ω=0)∈[0,1]p_0=\mathbb P(\omega=0)\in[0,1]p0​=P(ω=0)∈[0,1]. In state iii the retailer's demand is Di∼U[ai,bi]D_i\sim U[a_i,b_i]Di​∼U[ai​,bi​] with ai<bia_i<b_iai​<bi​ and ai≥0a_i\ge0ai​≥0. Here the supports are disjoint, b1<a0b_1<a_0b1​<a0​, so state 000 is the high-demand state.

A disclosure policy Γ=(π,M)\Gamma=(\pi,\mathcal M)Γ=(π,M) is a finite message space M\mathcal MM and, for each state ω\omegaω, a probability distribution π(⋅∣ω)\pi(\cdot\mid\omega)π(⋅∣ω) on M\mathcal MM. The retailer commits to Γ\GammaΓ, observes ω\omegaω, and sends a message m∼π(⋅∣ω)m\sim\pi(\cdot\mid\omega)m∼π(⋅∣ω). Message mmm has probability P(m)=p0π(m∣0)+(1−p0)π(m∣1)\mathbb P(m)=p_0\pi(m\mid0)+(1-p_0)\pi(m\mid1)P(m)=p0​π(m∣0)+(1−p0​)π(m∣1), and the supplier's posterior is given by Bayes' rule (1):

pm=p0 π(m∣0)P(m).p_m=\frac{p_0\,\pi(m\mid0)}{\mathbb P(m)}.pm​=P(m)p0​π(m∣0)​.

The supplier has unit shortage cost Cs>0C_s>0Cs​>0 and unit excess cost Ce>0C_e>0Ce​>0, with critical ratio ξ=Cs/(Cs+Ce)∈(0,1)\xi=C_s/(C_s+C_e)\in(0,1)ξ=Cs​/(Cs​+Ce​)∈(0,1). At belief ppp he solves the newsvendor problem (2), here normalized by Cs+CeC_s+C_eCs​+Ce​:

min⁡Q≥0 p E[ξ(D0−Q)++(1−ξ)(Q−D0)+]+(1−p) E[ξ(D1−Q)++(1−ξ)(Q−D1)+].\min_{Q\ge0}\ p\,\mathbb E\big[\xi(D_0-Q)^++(1-\xi)(Q-D_0)^+\big]+(1-p)\,\mathbb E\big[\xi(D_1-Q)^++(1-\xi)(Q-D_1)^+\big].Q≥0min​ pE[ξ(D0​−Q)++(1−ξ)(Q−D0​)+]+(1−p)E[ξ(D1​−Q)++(1−ξ)(Q−D1​)+].

A best-response profile Q∗Q^*Q∗ assigns to every belief p∈[0,1]p\in[0,1]p∈[0,1] an optimal quantity Qp∗Q^*_pQp∗​; the set of them is B(Γ)\mathcal B(\Gamma)B(Γ).

The retailer's cost at belief ppp and quantity QQQ is her expected shortage R(p,Q)=p E[(D0−Q)+]+(1−p) E[(D1−Q)+]R(p,Q)=p\,\mathbb E[(D_0-Q)^+]+(1-p)\,\mathbb E[(D_1-Q)^+]R(p,Q)=pE[(D0​−Q)+]+(1−p)E[(D1​−Q)+]. Her design problem (3) is

min⁡Γ, Q∗∈B(Γ) ∑m∈MP(m) R(pm,Qpm∗).\min_{\Gamma,\ Q^*\in\mathcal B(\Gamma)}\ \sum_{m\in\mathcal M}\mathbb P(m)\,R\big(p_m,Q^*_{p_m}\big).Γ, Q∗∈B(Γ)min​ m∈M∑​P(m)R(pm​,Qpm​∗​).

A policy is optimal if, paired with some best-response profile, it attains this minimum against every finite-message policy and every best-response profile. Full disclosure sends mim_imi​ exactly in state iii; no disclosure sends one message. The retailer's cost function (B.1) is KDS(p)=R(p,Qˉp)K_{DS}(p)=R(p,\bar Q_p)KDS​(p)=R(p,Qˉ​p​), where Qˉp\bar Q_pQˉ​p​ is the largest optimal quantity at ppp, and κDS\kappa_{DS}κDS​ is its lower convex envelope on [0,1][0,1][0,1], the greatest convex function on [0,1][0,1][0,1] below KDSK_{DS}KDS​.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 3 (p. 16)

Let p~=max⁡(1−ξ, 2(b0−a0)/(b1−a1))\tilde p=\max\big(1-\xi,\ 2(b_0-a_0)/(b_1-a_1)\big)p~​=max(1−ξ, 2(b0​−a0​)/(b1​−a1​)). For every p0∈[0,1]p_0\in[0,1]p0​∈[0,1]:

2(b0−a0)≥b1−a1 ⟹ full disclosure is optimal;2(b_0-a_0)\ge b_1-a_1\ \Longrightarrow\ \text{full disclosure is optimal;}2(b0​−a0​)≥b1​−a1​ ⟹ full disclosure is optimal; b1−a1>2(b0−a0) ⟹ {no disclosure is optimal,p0≥p~,ΓDS∗ is optimal,p0<p~,b_1-a_1>2(b_0-a_0)\ \Longrightarrow\ \begin{cases}\text{no disclosure is optimal}, & p_0\ge\tilde p,\\ \Gamma^*_{DS}\text{ is optimal}, & p_0<\tilde p,\end{cases}b1​−a1​>2(b0​−a0​) ⟹ {no disclosure is optimal,ΓDS∗​ is optimal,​p0​≥p~​,p0​<p~​,​

where ΓDS∗\Gamma^*_{DS}ΓDS∗​ has messages m0,m1m_0,m_1m0​,m1​ with πDS∗(m0∣ω=0)=1\pi^*_{DS}(m_0\mid\omega=0)=1πDS∗​(m0​∣ω=0)=1 and πDS∗(m0∣ω=1)=1−p~p~p01−p0\pi^*_{DS}(m_0\mid\omega=1)=\frac{1-\tilde p}{\tilde p}\frac{p_0}{1-p_0}πDS∗​(m0​∣ω=1)=p~​1−p~​​1−p0​p0​​ (8). The paper writes "there exists p~\tilde pp~​" and then gives its value; the goal states the value.

Milestones (App. C.2 and App. B)

  1. Proposition 6 (p. 37): the supplier's optimal quantity, Qp∗=ξ(b1−a1)/(1−p)+a1Q^*_p=\xi(b_1-a_1)/(1-p)+a_1Qp∗​=ξ(b1​−a1​)/(1−p)+a1​ for p<1−ξp<1-\xip<1−ξ and (ξ−1+p)(b0−a0)/p+a0(\xi-1+p)(b_0-a_0)/p+a_0(ξ−1+p)(b0​−a0​)/p+a0​ for p>1−ξp>1-\xip>1−ξ; at p=1−ξp=1-\xip=1−ξ every Q∈[b1,a0]Q\in[b_1,a_0]Q∈[b1​,a0​] is optimal.
  2. The value claim after (B.2) (p. 25): the optimal value of (3) is κDS(p0)\kappa_{DS}(p_0)κDS​(p0​).
  3. (C.9) (p. 38): KDSK_{DS}KDS​ in closed form.
  4. (C.13) (p. 39): lim⁡x→(1−ξ)−KDS(x)−KDS(1−ξ)=(1−ξ)(a0−b1)>0\lim_{x\to(1-\xi)^-}K_{DS}(x)-K_{DS}(1-\xi)=(1-\xi)(a_0-b_1)>0limx→(1−ξ)−​KDS​(x)−KDS​(1−ξ)=(1−ξ)(a0​−b1​)>0.
  5. Lemma 3 (p. 38): κDS\kappa_{DS}κDS​ is the chord pKDS(1)+(1−p)KDS(0)pK_{DS}(1)+(1-p)K_{DS}(0)pKDS​(1)+(1−p)KDS​(0) when 2(b0−a0)/(b1−a1)≥12(b_0-a_0)/(b_1-a_1)\ge12(b0​−a0​)/(b1​−a1​)≥1, and otherwise the chord from (0,KDS(0))(0,K_{DS}(0))(0,KDS​(0)) to (p~,KDS(p~))(\tilde p,K_{DS}(\tilde p))(p~​,KDS​(p~​)) followed by KDSK_{DS}KDS​ itself on [p~,1][\tilde p,1][p~​,1].

Significance

The result shows that the shape of the optimal disclosure policy is decided by the relative width of the two supports and, below a threshold, by the prior alone: when the high-demand support is at least half as wide as the low-demand one, the retailer reveals everything, whatever the supplier's cost structure. Otherwise the critical ratio enters only through p~\tilde pp~​, and the optimal partial policy pools the high state with part of the low state so that the supplier's posterior lands exactly at p~\tilde pp~​. Together with the nested and intersecting cases, it shows that the non-monotone dependence of informativeness on ξ\xiξ found under nested supports is not universal.

The paper proves the result in its Online Appendix (App. C.2, pp. 37–40), by citation of Kamenica–Gentzkow for the reduction to a convex envelope and by a case analysis for the envelope. To our knowledge none of it is machine-checked. This mission produces a formal model of persuasion with a newsvendor receiver, a formal proof of the concavification step for finite message spaces, and the envelope computation. Formalization also pins down a boundary case the printed proof leaves implicit (see Formalization scope).

Difficulty

The reduction to the envelope is cited from Kamenica and Gentzkow in the paper, so it has to be established from scratch for this model, with its joint choice of policy and best response and its finite message spaces. The envelope itself requires handling a function that is concave on [0,1−ξ)[0,1-\xi)[0,1−ξ), convex on (1−ξ,1](1-\xi,1](1−ξ,1] and discontinuous at 1−ξ1-\xi1−ξ, where it jumps down. The obvious argument — treat KDSK_{DS}KDS​ as continuous and compare one-sided derivatives — fails at that point, and the jump is what makes the chord to p~=1−ξ\tilde p=1-\xip~​=1−ξ admissible.

The newsvendor step is not just the critical-fractile formula: at p=1−ξp=1-\xip=1−ξ the mixture c.d.f. is flat at level ξ\xiξ on [b1,a0][b_1,a_0][b1​,a0​], so the supplier's best response is not unique there.

Formalization scope

The Lean development lives in the namespace SCInfoDesign.Disjoint. Conventions:

  • States are Fin 2, beliefs are P(ω=0)\mathbb P(\omega=0)P(ω=0), and uniform expectations are interval integrals divided by the interval length.
  • The supplier's cost (2) is divided by Cs+CeC_s+C_eCs​+Ce​, so ξ∈(0,1)\xi\in(0,1)ξ∈(0,1) is the parameter; this does not change his optimal quantities.
  • Message spaces are finite types; optimality is over all finite policies and all best-response profiles. The paper does not bound M\mathcal MM; binary messages already attain the optimum.
  • No disclosure is the one-message policy; every uninformative policy has the same cost.
  • A message of probability 000 gets posterior 000 and weight 000 in (3).
  • Standing hypotheses, implicit in the paper and stated in every item: a0<b0a_0<b_0a0​<b0​, a1<b1a_1<b_1a1​<b1​, 0≤a00\le a_00≤a0​, 0≤a10\le a_10≤a1​, 0<ξ<10<\xi<10<ξ<1, b1<a0b_1<a_0b1​<a0​, p0∈[0,1]p_0\in[0,1]p0​∈[0,1].
  • The boundary p=1−ξp=1-\xip=1−ξ. Proposition 6 and (C.9) print the quantity b1b_1b1​ there. The paper's own design problem (3) and its footnote 9 let the retailer select the supplier's best response, and she prefers the largest one, a0a_0a0​. KDSK_{DS}KDS​ is defined with the largest optimal quantity; with b1b_1b1​, (C.13) and Lemma 3 are false whenever p~=1−ξ\tilde p=1-\xip~​=1−ξ. Proposition 6 is therefore stated with the optimal set [b1,a0][b_1,a_0][b1​,a0​] at the boundary.

The formalization is not trivial by construction: the supplier's response is an argmin of (2), not the closed form of Proposition 6, and optimality quantifies over every finite policy with every best response, not over the three named policies.

Infrastructure needed: interval integrals of piecewise-linear functions, the convex envelope (the published BiconvexProg.BranchBound.convexEnvelope), and a Jensen/splitting argument for Bayes-plausible posteriors. The concavification step and the newsvendor argmin for uniform mixtures are reusable beyond this mission, by the three sibling missions in particular. Proofs of any milestone are welcome.

Selected references

  • O. Candogan, H. Gurkan, The Value of Information Design in Supply Chain Management, Management Science, 2024. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2023.03004 (preprint: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4378997)
  • E. Kamenica, M. Gentzkow, Bayesian Persuasion, American Economic Review 101(6), 2011. https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.101.6.2590
  • R. Levi, G. Perakis, J. Uichanco, The data-driven newsvendor problem: new bounds and insights, Operations Research 63(6), 2015. https://doi.org/10.1287/opre.2015.1422
  • S. Boyd, L. Vandenberghe, Convex Optimization, Cambridge University Press, 2004. https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511804441
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The Value of Information Design in Supply Chain Management II: Under Partial Disclosure the Value of Information Is Unimodal in p₀ and Falling in ξ Against No Disclosure, the Reverse Against FullResearch Paper

Motivation

A retailer often knows more about her own demand than the supplier who produces for her. When the supplier must commit to a production quantity before demand is realized, what the retailer tells him shapes how much he produces, and therefore how much demand she can serve. Information design (Bayesian persuasion, Kamenica and Gentzkow, 2011) asks how a sender should commit in advance to a randomized disclosure rule to steer a receiver's action.

O. Candogan and H. Gurkan, The Value of Information Design in Supply Chain Management (SSRN 4378997; Management Science, 2024, DOI 10.1287/mnsc.2023.03004) solve this problem for a supplier facing a newsvendor problem with uniform demand. Their Theorem 1 identifies the retailer's optimal policy: full disclosure, no disclosure, or an explicit two-message partial disclosure, according to thresholds on the critical ratio. Their Theorem 2, the goal of this mission, quantifies how much the optimal policy is worth compared with the two naive policies a practitioner would use by default, and how this gain moves with the retailer's prior and the supplier's cost structure.

Setting

The state is ω∈{0,1}\omega\in\{0,1\}ω∈{0,1} with prior p0=P(ω=0)p_0=\mathbb P(\omega=0)p0​=P(ω=0). Demand is D0∼U[a0,b0]D_0\sim U[a_0,b_0]D0​∼U[a0​,b0​] in state 000 and D1∼U[a1,b1]D_1\sim U[a_1,b_1]D1​∼U[a1​,b1​] in state 111, with nested supports a0≤a1<b1≤b0a_0\le a_1<b_1\le b_0a0​≤a1​<b1​≤b0​.

Supplier. At belief p=P(ω=0)p=\mathbb P(\omega=0)p=P(ω=0) the supplier chooses Q≥0Q\ge0Q≥0 to minimize the expected newsvendor cost

Sξ(p,Q)=p E[ξ(D0−Q)++(1−ξ)(Q−D0)+]+(1−p) E[ξ(D1−Q)++(1−ξ)(Q−D1)+],S_\xi(p,Q)=p\,\mathbb E\big[\xi(D_0-Q)^++(1-\xi)(Q-D_0)^+\big]+(1-p)\,\mathbb E\big[\xi(D_1-Q)^++(1-\xi)(Q-D_1)^+\big],Sξ​(p,Q)=pE[ξ(D0​−Q)++(1−ξ)(Q−D0​)+]+(1−p)E[ξ(D1​−Q)++(1−ξ)(Q−D1​)+],

where ξ=Cs/(Cs+Ce)∈(0,1)\xi=C_s/(C_s+C_e)\in(0,1)ξ=Cs​/(Cs​+Ce​)∈(0,1) is the critical ratio of the unit shortage cost CsC_sCs​ to the total unit cost Cs+CeC_s+C_eCs​+Ce​.

Retailer. The retailer learns ω\omegaω and sends a message mmm from a finite set M\mathcal MM according to a committed policy π(m∣ω)\pi(m\mid\omega)π(m∣ω). Message mmm has probability P(m)=p0π(m∣0)+(1−p0)π(m∣1)\mathbb P(m)=p_0\pi(m\mid0)+(1-p_0)\pi(m\mid1)P(m)=p0​π(m∣0)+(1−p0​)π(m∣1) and induces the posterior pm=p0π(m∣0)/P(m)p_m=p_0\pi(m\mid0)/\mathbb P(m)pm​=p0​π(m∣0)/P(m). The supplier best-responds with an optimal quantity Q∗(pm)Q^*(p_m)Q∗(pm​), and the retailer pays her expected shortage

R(p,Q)=p E[(D0−Q)+]+(1−p) E[(D1−Q)+].R(p,Q)=p\,\mathbb E[(D_0-Q)^+]+(1-p)\,\mathbb E[(D_1-Q)^+].R(p,Q)=pE[(D0​−Q)+]+(1−p)E[(D1​−Q)+].

Her optimal expected cost Vξ(p0)V_\xi(p_0)Vξ​(p0​) is the infimum of ∑mP(m) R(pm,Q∗(pm))\sum_m\mathbb P(m)\,R(p_m,Q^*(p_m))∑m​P(m)R(pm​,Q∗(pm​)) over all finite message sets, all policies and all best responses of the supplier.

Naive policies. Under no disclosure the supplier keeps the prior, and the retailer pays K(p0)=R(p0,Qp0∗)K(p_0)=R(p_0,Q^*_{p_0})K(p0​)=R(p0​,Qp0​∗​). Under full disclosure he learns ω\omegaω, and she pays KF(p0)=(1−p0)K(0)+p0K(1)K_F(p_0)=(1-p_0)K(0)+p_0K(1)KF​(p0​)=(1−p0​)K(0)+p0​K(1). The values of information are

VIND(ξ,p0)=K(p0)−Vξ(p0),VIFD(ξ,p0)=KF(p0)−Vξ(p0).VI_{ND}(\xi,p_0)=K(p_0)-V_\xi(p_0),\qquad VI_{FD}(\xi,p_0)=K_F(p_0)-V_\xi(p_0).VIND​(ξ,p0​)=K(p0​)−Vξ​(p0​),VIFD​(ξ,p0​)=KF​(p0​)−Vξ​(p0​).

Thresholds. τ‾(p)=p(a1−a0)/(b0−a0)\underline\tau(p)=p(a_1-a_0)/(b_0-a_0)τ​(p)=p(a1​−a0​)/(b0​−a0​), p^=ξ(b0−a0)/(a1−a0)\hat p=\xi(b_0-a_0)/(a_1-a_0)p^​=ξ(b0​−a0​)/(a1​−a0​), p0∗=p^p_0^*=\sqrt{\hat p}p0∗​=p^​​ and ξ∗=1−12(a1−a0)/(b0−b1+a1−a0)\xi^*=1-\tfrac12(a_1-a_0)/(b_0-b_1+a_1-a_0)ξ∗=1−21​(a1​−a0​)/(b0​−b1​+a1​−a0​).

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 2 (p. 13)

In the partial-disclosure regime ξ∈(0,τ‾(p0)]\xi\in(0,\underline\tau(p_0)]ξ∈(0,τ​(p0​)], with a0<a1a_0<a_1a0​<a1​:

VIND is unimodal in p0 with peak p0∗=ξ(b0−a0)/(a1−a0) and decreasing in ξ;VI_{ND}\ \text{is unimodal in } p_0 \text{ with peak } p_0^*=\sqrt{\xi(b_0-a_0)/(a_1-a_0)}\ \text{and decreasing in } \xi;VIND​ is unimodal in p0​ with peak p0∗​=ξ(b0​−a0​)/(a1​−a0​)​ and decreasing in ξ; VIFD is decreasing in p0 and unimodal in ξ with peak ξ∗.VI_{FD}\ \text{is decreasing in } p_0 \text{ and unimodal in } \xi \text{ with peak } \xi^*.VIFD​ is decreasing in p0​ and unimodal in ξ with peak ξ∗.

For fixed ξ\xiξ the regime is p0∈[p^,1]p_0\in[\hat p,1]p0​∈[p^​,1]; for fixed p0p_0p0​ it is ξ∈(0,τ‾(p0)]\xi\in(0,\underline\tau(p_0)]ξ∈(0,τ​(p0​)].

Milestones

  1. Proposition 1 (p. 8): the supplier's optimal quantity is unique and given in closed form.
  2. (B.2) (p. 25): Vξ(p0)=κ(p0)V_\xi(p_0)=\kappa(p_0)Vξ​(p0​)=κ(p0​), the lower convex envelope of KKK on [0,1][0,1][0,1].
  3. (B.5) (p. 28): KKK in closed form for ξ≤(a1−a0)/(b0−a0)\xi\le(a_1-a_0)/(b_0-a_0)ξ≤(a1​−a0​)/(b0​−a0​).
  4. Lemma 1 (p. 25): κ\kappaκ in closed form in the three regimes of ξ\xiξ.
  5. The four derivative displays (p. 30): ∂VIND/∂ξ\partial VI_{ND}/\partial\xi∂VIND​/∂ξ, ∂VIND/∂p0\partial VI_{ND}/\partial p_0∂VIND​/∂p0​, ∂VIFD/∂ξ\partial VI_{FD}/\partial\xi∂VIFD​/∂ξ, ∂VIFD/∂p0\partial VI_{FD}/\partial p_0∂VIFD​/∂p0​ in the regime.

Significance

The result. Theorem 2 tells a retailer when designing information is worth the effort. Against no disclosure, the gain is largest at the intermediate prior p0∗p_0^*p0∗​ and shrinks as shortages become relatively more expensive for the supplier. Against full disclosure, the gain shrinks as the prior probability of the wide-support state ω=0\omega=0ω=0 grows and peaks at the intermediate critical ratio ξ∗\xi^*ξ∗. These comparative statics are what the paper's managerial discussion (pp. 13–14, Figures 4–5) rests on.

Formalizing it. The result is proved in the paper (Online Appendix B, pp. 24–30), by citing Kamenica–Gentzkow for the reduction to the convex envelope and by explicit calculus. No part of it is machine-checked. A complete formalization would contain a self-contained proof of the concavification reduction for a two-state sender–receiver game with finite message sets, the newsvendor quantile of a uniform mixture, and an exact convex-envelope computation, each reusable beyond this paper.

Difficulty

The derivative formulas are routine once KKK and κ\kappaκ are known in closed form. The work lies upstream. The optimal cost is an infimum over all finite policies and all best responses, and turning it into κ(p0)\kappa(p_0)κ(p0​) requires the Kamenica–Gentzkow argument: Jensen's inequality over Bayes-plausible posterior distributions for the lower bound, and a two-point splitting for attainment. κ\kappaκ itself is a supremum over all convex minorants, and identifying it requires showing that KKK is convex below p^\hat pp^​ and concave above, and that the chord from (p^,K(p^))(\hat p,K(\hat p))(p^​,K(p^​)) to (1,K(1))(1,K(1))(1,K(1)) is supporting. Finally, KKK is defined through an argmin, so its closed form needs the uniqueness of the newsvendor quantile. A solver who differentiates the closed forms of p. 28 directly proves only the last step.

Formalization scope

All objects live in the namespace SCInfoDesign.ValueInfo. The supports are bundled in a structure Params. The critical ratio ξ\xiξ is an explicit argument of every object, because Theorem 2 varies it.

Conventions.

  • Uniform expectations are interval integrals divided by the interval length.
  • The supplier's cost is the paper's cost (2) divided by Cs+CeC_s+C_eCs​+Ce​, which has the same minimizers.
  • Message sets are finite (Fin n).
  • A zero-probability message gets the junk posterior 000 and weight 000.
  • KKK uses the largest optimal quantity, which is the unique one here.
  • κ\kappaκ is the published BiconvexProg.BranchBound.convexEnvelope on [0,1][0,1][0,1].
  • The value of information is the difference, not its absolute value; the difference is nonnegative.
  • "Unimodal with peak x∗x^*x∗" means strictly increasing up to x∗x^*x∗ and strictly decreasing from x∗x^*x∗, on the regime.
  • The ξ\xiξ-claims are stated for p0<1p_0<1p0​<1: at p0=1p_0=1p0​=1 both values are identically 000.

Added hypotheses. These are the paper's implicit standing assumptions: a0<b0a_0<b_0a0​<b0​ and a1<b1a_1<b_1a1​<b1​, nonnegative demand (0≤a00\le a_00≤a0​, 0≤a10\le a_10≤a1​), and 0<ξ<10<\xi<10<ξ<1. The goal and the derivative displays also assume a0<a1a_0<a_1a0​<a1​: otherwise the regime is empty and p^\hat pp^​ is 0/00/00/0.

Ruled out. The optimal cost is not the cost of the paper's policy Γ∗\Gamma^*Γ∗, and the supplier's response is an argmin of (2), not the closed form of Proposition 1. Theorem 2 is therefore a statement about the game, not about a formula.

Infrastructure. A complete development needs the concavification theorem for finite policies (milestone 2, reusable for every two-state persuasion model), the uniform-mixture newsvendor quantile (milestone 1), the exact computation of a convex envelope (milestone 4) and one-variable calculus. Contributions of any milestone, of general lemmas on convex envelopes on an interval, or of the Kamenica–Gentzkow reduction in general form are welcome. The proofs of the paper are in its Online Appendix.

Selected references

  • O. Candogan, H. Gurkan, The Value of Information Design in Supply Chain Management, Management Science, 2024 (read as SSRN 4378997). https://ssrn.com/abstract=4378997 , https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2023.03004
  • E. Kamenica, M. Gentzkow, Bayesian Persuasion, American Economic Review 101(6), 2011. https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.101.6.2590
  • R. Levi, G. Perakis, J. Uichanco, The Data-Driven Newsvendor Problem: New Bounds and Insights, Operations Research 63(6), 2015. https://doi.org/10.1287/opre.2015.1422
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The Value of Information Design in Supply Chain Management I: With Nested Uniform Demand Supports, Full, No or Two-Message Partial Disclosure Is Optimal According to Critical-Ratio ThresholdsResearch Paper

Motivation

A retailer who sees her own demand before her supplier does can decide how much of that knowledge to pass upstream. Sharing everything is not obviously best: the supplier uses the information to set his production quantity for his own benefit, and the retailer bears a cost when he under-produces. Candogan and Gurkan (SSRN 4378997; published in Management Science, 2024, doi:10.1287/mnsc.2023.03004) treat this as a Bayesian persuasion (information design) problem in the sense of Kamenica and Gentzkow (AER 2011): the retailer commits in advance to a signalling policy, and the supplier best-responds to the posterior belief that each signal induces. The paper characterizes the retailer's optimal policy in closed form for uniform demand. This mission covers its first main result, the case where one demand support is nested inside the other.

The question links the supply-chain literature on information sharing between firms, where sharing is usually all-or-nothing, with the persuasion literature, where optimal signals are typically partial.

Setting

The state is ω∈{0,1}\omega\in\{0,1\}ω∈{0,1}, with prior p0=P(ω=0)∈[0,1]p_0=\mathbb P(\omega=0)\in[0,1]p0​=P(ω=0)∈[0,1]. Demand is DωD_\omegaDω​, where D0D_0D0​ is uniform on [a0,b0][a_0,b_0][a0​,b0​] and D1D_1D1​ is uniform on [a1,b1][a_1,b_1][a1​,b1​]. The supports are nested: 0≤a0≤a1<b1≤b00\le a_0\le a_1<b_1\le b_00≤a0​≤a1​<b1​≤b0​ and a0<b0a_0<b_0a0​<b0​.

A disclosure policy Γ=(π,M)\Gamma=(\pi,\mathcal M)Γ=(π,M) is a finite message space M\mathcal MM and conditional probabilities π(m∣ω)\pi(m\mid\omega)π(m∣ω). After message mmm the supplier holds the posterior

p=π(m∣ω=0) p0π(m∣ω=0) p0+π(m∣ω=1)(1−p0).p=\frac{\pi(m\mid\omega=0)\,p_0}{\pi(m\mid\omega=0)\,p_0+\pi(m\mid\omega=1)(1-p_0)}.p=π(m∣ω=0)p0​+π(m∣ω=1)(1−p0​)π(m∣ω=0)p0​​.

Full disclosure sends message mim_imi​ exactly in state iii; no disclosure sends the same message in both states.

At belief ppp the supplier solves the newsvendor problem

min⁡Q≥0  p E[ξ(D0−Q)++(1−ξ)(Q−D0)+]+(1−p) E[ξ(D1−Q)++(1−ξ)(Q−D1)+],\min_{Q\ge 0}\; p\,\mathbb E\big[\xi(D_0-Q)^+ + (1-\xi)(Q-D_0)^+\big] + (1-p)\,\mathbb E\big[\xi(D_1-Q)^+ + (1-\xi)(Q-D_1)^+\big],Q≥0min​pE[ξ(D0​−Q)++(1−ξ)(Q−D0​)+]+(1−p)E[ξ(D1​−Q)++(1−ξ)(Q−D1​)+],

where ξ=Cs/(Cs+Ce)∈(0,1)\xi=C_s/(C_s+C_e)\in(0,1)ξ=Cs​/(Cs​+Ce​)∈(0,1) is his critical ratio (shortage cost CsC_sCs​, excess cost CeC_eCe​). A best-response profile Q∗Q^*Q∗ picks an optimal quantity Qp∗Q^*_pQp∗​ for every belief p∈[0,1]p\in[0,1]p∈[0,1]. The retailer pays the expected shortage p E(D0−Qp∗)++(1−p) E(D1−Qp∗)+p\,\mathbb E(D_0-Q^*_p)^+ + (1-p)\,\mathbb E(D_1-Q^*_p)^+pE(D0​−Qp∗​)++(1−p)E(D1​−Qp∗​)+ at the induced posterior. Her design problem (3) minimizes the expectation of this cost over the random posterior, jointly over policies Γ\GammaΓ and best-response profiles Q∗Q^*Q∗. The function K(p)K(p)K(p) of (B.1) is her cost when both parties hold belief ppp.

The thresholds are

ξh=a1−a0b0−a0−b1+a1,τ‾(p)=p(a1−a0)b0−a0,τˉ(p)=1−p(b0−b1)b0−a0.\xi_h=\frac{a_1-a_0}{b_0-a_0-b_1+a_1},\qquad \underline\tau(p)=\frac{p(a_1-a_0)}{b_0-a_0},\qquad \bar\tau(p)=1-\frac{p(b_0-b_1)}{b_0-a_0}.ξh​=b0​−a0​−b1​+a1​a1​−a0​​,τ​(p)=b0​−a0​p(a1​−a0​)​,τˉ(p)=1−b0​−a0​p(b0​−b1​)​.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 1 (p. 9)

For every prior p0∈[0,1]p_0\in[0,1]p0​∈[0,1]:

ξ∈[ξh,1)⇒full disclosure is optimal;ξ∈[τ‾(p0),ξh]⇒no disclosure is optimal;\xi\in[\xi_h,1)\Rightarrow\text{full disclosure is optimal};\qquad \xi\in[\underline\tau(p_0),\xi_h]\Rightarrow\text{no disclosure is optimal};ξ∈[ξh​,1)⇒full disclosure is optimal;ξ∈[τ​(p0​),ξh​]⇒no disclosure is optimal; ξ∈(0,τ‾(p0)]⇒Γ∗ is optimal,π∗(m1∣ω=0)=1−p0p0 ξ(b0−a0)(a1−a0)−ξ(b0−a0),  π∗(m1∣ω=1)=1.\xi\in(0,\underline\tau(p_0)]\Rightarrow\Gamma^*\text{ is optimal},\quad \pi^*(m_1\mid\omega=0)=\frac{1-p_0}{p_0}\,\frac{\xi(b_0-a_0)}{(a_1-a_0)-\xi(b_0-a_0)},\ \ \pi^*(m_1\mid\omega=1)=1.ξ∈(0,τ​(p0​)]⇒Γ∗ is optimal,π∗(m1​∣ω=0)=p0​1−p0​​(a1​−a0​)−ξ(b0​−a0​)ξ(b0​−a0​)​,  π∗(m1​∣ω=1)=1.

Milestones

  1. Proposition 1 (p. 8): the supplier's optimal quantity Qp∗Q^*_pQp∗​ is unique and has an explicit three-piece form in (p,ξ)(p,\xi)(p,ξ).
  2. (B.2) (p. 25): the optimal value of (3) is κ(p0)\kappa(p_0)κ(p0​), where κ\kappaκ is the lower convex envelope of KKK on [0,1][0,1][0,1].
  3. (B.5) (p. 28): KKK in closed form when ξ≤(a1−a0)/(b0−a0)\xi\le(a_1-a_0)/(b_0-a_0)ξ≤(a1​−a0​)/(b0​−a0​).
  4. Lemma 1 (p. 25): κ\kappaκ in the three regimes of ξ\xiξ.
  5. The Γ∗\Gamma^*Γ∗ display (p. 26): under Γ∗\Gamma^*Γ∗, message m0m_0m0​ has probability (p0−p^)/(1−p^)(p_0-\hat p)/(1-\hat p)(p0​−p^​)/(1−p^​) and induces posterior 111, and, when p0<1p_0<1p0​<1 (so that m1m_1m1​ has positive probability), m1m_1m1​ induces p^=ξ(b0−a0)/(a1−a0)\hat p=\xi(b_0-a_0)/(a_1-a_0)p^​=ξ(b0​−a0​)/(a1​−a0​).

Significance

The result shows that the optimal amount of disclosure depends on the critical ratio. When ξ\xiξ is high the retailer reveals everything; in an intermediate band she reveals nothing; when ξ\xiξ is low she uses a two-message policy that always reveals the narrow-support state (ω=1\omega=1ω=1 always sends m1m_1m1​) but pools part of the wide-support state with it. Corollaries 1–4 of the paper read the thresholds off this theorem (independence of the prior for large ξ\xiξ, full disclosure when a0=a1a_0=a_1a0​=a1​, never full disclosure when b0=b1b_0=b_1b0​=b1​), and Theorem 2 of the paper, on the value of information design relative to full and no disclosure, is built on Lemma 1 and (B.5).

The paper proves the result in its Online Appendix, citing Kamenica and Gentzkow for the reduction to a convex envelope. None of it has been machine-checked. A formalization would make the persuasion reduction explicit for finite message spaces and best-response profiles, and would check the case analysis of the envelope, where the paper prints one overlapping-indicator slip (Lemma 1, case 3).

Difficulty

The obvious argument is to compare the three named policies and pick the cheapest. That is not a proof: optimality is over every policy on every finite message space, and it is only the convex-envelope reduction that cuts the comparison down to splittings of the prior into posteriors. The reduction itself requires showing that the attainable expected costs are exactly the convex combinations of values of KKK at Bayes-plausible posteriors. The envelope computation then needs the shape of KKK: the supplier's quantity is piecewise defined, so KKK is a piecewise rational function of ppp whose convexity changes across the boundaries τ‾(p)=ξ\underline\tau(p)=\xiτ​(p)=ξ and τˉ(p)=ξ\bar\tau(p)=\xiτˉ(p)=ξ. In the low-ξ\xiξ regime KKK is neither convex nor concave on [0,1][0,1][0,1], so its greatest convex minorant is a genuine mixture of KKK itself and a line segment, whose junction point p^\hat pp^​ has to be located exactly.

Formalization scope

States are Fin 2; a policy on a finite type MMM is a map π:Fin 2→M→R\pi : \mathrm{Fin}\,2\to M\to\mathbb Rπ:Fin2→M→R with nonnegative entries and rows summing to 111. The paper does not bound M\mathcal MM; finite message spaces are a convention, and binary spaces already attain the optimum. Uniform expectations are interval integrals divided by the length. The supplier's cost is normalized by Cs+CeC_s+C_eCs​+Ce​ and parameterized by ξ\xiξ, which leaves its minimizers unchanged. A message of probability zero is given posterior 000 and weight 000.

The supplier's response is defined as an argmin of (2), never by the closed form of Proposition 1, and optimality quantifies over all finite policies and all best-response profiles, never over the three named policies; a formalization that hard-codes either would make the goal a statement about a formula. KKK is evaluated at the largest optimal quantity, which is the unique one under the mission's hypotheses. The envelope κ\kappaκ is the published definition BiconvexProg.BranchBound.convexEnvelope (greatest convex minorant) on [0,1][0,1][0,1].

Standing hypotheses, stated in every theorem: a0<b0a_0<b_0a0​<b0​, a1<b1a_1<b_1a1​<b1​, 0<ξ<10<\xi<10<ξ<1, p0∈[0,1]p_0\in[0,1]p0​∈[0,1], and nesting a0≤a1a_0\le a_1a0​≤a1​, b1≤b0b_1\le b_0b1​≤b0​. The hypotheses 0≤a00\le a_00≤a0​, 0≤a10\le a_10≤a1​ are added: demand is nonnegative, and without them the constraint Q≥0Q\ge0Q≥0 can bind. Equal supports are allowed; the threshold ξh\xi_hξh​ is then 0/0=00/0=00/0=0 in Lean and the goal remains true. Lemma 1's third case is formalized as the piecewise function its two indicators intend.

A complete development needs: the convex-envelope (concavification) theorem for finite-support distributions on [0,1][0,1][0,1], the newsvendor quantile characterization for a mixture of uniforms, and calculus for piecewise rational functions. The first two are reusable beyond this mission. Contributions to any milestone are welcome.

Selected references

  • O. Candogan, H. Gurkan, The Value of Information Design in Supply Chain Management, Management Science, 2024. SSRN preprint: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4378997; DOI: https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2023.03004
  • E. Kamenica, M. Gentzkow, Bayesian Persuasion, American Economic Review 101(6), 2011. https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.101.6.2590
  • R. Levi, G. Perakis, J. Uichanco, The Data-Driven Newsvendor Problem: New Bounds and Insights, Operations Research 63(6), 2015. https://doi.org/10.1287/opre.2015.1422
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EconomicsOperations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

Asset Pricing with Costly Short Sales 1: The Lending Agent Charges Half the Pessimist's Frictionless Sharpe Ratio, and Lending Is Active Exactly When Her Net Sharpe Ratio Is NegativeResearch Paper

Why the price of borrowing a stock matters

To sell a stock short, an investor must first borrow it, and the owner who lends it charges a lending fee. Securities lending is a large market, and the fee varies across stocks: D'Avolio (2002) documents that shorting costs are positively related to the dispersion of investors' beliefs. Short-sale constraints have a long history in asset pricing (Miller 1977; Harrison and Kreps 1978; Jones and Lamont 2002), but most models either forbid short sales outright or take the fee as an exogenous parameter. Neither explains where the fee comes from, nor when a lending market is active at all.

Evgeniou, Hugonnier and Prieto build a dynamic general equilibrium model in which the fee is endogenous: two investors with logarithmic utility disagree about the expected return of a risky asset, and a lending agent, acting for the asset owners, sets the fee charged to short sellers to maximize the owners' fee revenue. Their §3 derives the equilibrium shorting cost in closed form at every state of the economy. This mission formalizes that derivation.

Setting

The economy has a riskless asset and two risky assets with strictly positive volatilities σ1,σ2\sigma_1,\sigma_2σ1​,σ2​. Asset 1 can be shorted at a cost; asset 2 cannot be shorted at all. There are two investors, an optimist ooo and a pessimist ppp, with wealths W(o),W(p)>0W^{(o)},W^{(p)}>0W(o),W(p)>0. Each investor aaa perceives market prices of risk (Sharpe ratios) θ1(a),θ2(a)\theta^{(a)}_1,\theta^{(a)}_2θ1(a)​,θ2(a)​, and the optimist is more optimistic about asset 1: θ1(p)≤θ1(o)\theta^{(p)}_1\le\theta^{(o)}_1θ1(p)​≤θ1(o)​, the disagreement Δ≥0\Delta\ge0Δ≥0.

A short position in asset 1 pays a shorting cost Φ\PhiΦ per dollar shorted, and a long position earns a lending yield Γ\GammaΓ. Both are measured per unit of volatility of asset 1: ϕ=Φ/σ1\phi=\Phi/\sigma_1ϕ=Φ/σ1​ and γ=Γ/σ1\gamma=\Gamma/\sigma_1γ=Γ/σ1​. A position mmm in asset 1 earns fees at the rate

Λ(m;Φ,Γ)=m+Γ−m−Φ,\Lambda(m;\Phi,\Gamma)=m^+\Gamma-m^-\Phi ,Λ(m;Φ,Γ)=m+Γ−m−Φ,

with m+=max⁡{m,0}m^+=\max\{m,0\}m+=max{m,0} and m−=max⁡{−m,0}m^-=\max\{-m,0\}m−=max{−m,0}. Investor aaa chooses wealth fractions p=(p1,p2)p=(p_1,p_2)p=(p1​,p2​) with p2≥0p_2\ge0p2​≥0 to solve the mean-variance problem

max⁡p∈R×R+{Λ(p1;Φ,Γ)+p1σ1θ1(a)+p2σ2θ2(a)−12(p1σ1+p2σ2)2},\max_{p\in\mathbb R\times\mathbb R_+}\Big\{\Lambda(p_1;\Phi,\Gamma)+p_1\sigma_1\theta^{(a)}_1+p_2\sigma_2\theta^{(a)}_2-\tfrac12(p_1\sigma_1+p_2\sigma_2)^2\Big\},p∈R×R+​max​{Λ(p1​;Φ,Γ)+p1​σ1​θ1(a)​+p2​σ2​θ2(a)​−21​(p1​σ1​+p2​σ2​)2},

which is what logarithmic utility reduces to at each instant. The lending agent's revenue per unit of volatility at fee yyy is

R(y)=∑ay (θ1(a)+y)− W(a).R(y)=\sum_a y\,\big(\theta^{(a)}_1+y\big)^-\,W^{(a)} .R(y)=a∑​y(θ1(a)​+y)−W(a).

An equilibrium at a state consists of these quantities such that: the no-dominance condition θ2(a)=θ1(a)+γ\theta^{(a)}_2=\theta^{(a)}_1+\gammaθ2(a)​=θ1(a)​+γ holds for both investors (equation (7)); each investor's portfolio is optimal; asset 1, in positive supply S1>0S_1>0S1​>0, clears; the lending market clears (fees paid by short sellers equal fees received by long holders); and ϕ\phiϕ is the least maximizer of RRR over y≥γy\ge\gammay≥γ. The inactive set is L={γ=0}\mathcal L=\{\gamma=0\}L={γ=0} and the active set S\mathcal SS is its complement.

Formalization targets

Goal: equations (15)–(17)

At every equilibrium state,

γ=0  ⟺  θ2(p)≥0,ϕ=−12 θ1(p) 1{θ2(p)<0}.\gamma=0\iff\theta^{(p)}_2\ge0,\qquad \phi=-\tfrac12\,\theta^{(p)}_1\,\mathbb 1_{\{\theta^{(p)}_2<0\}} .γ=0⟺θ2(p)​≥0,ϕ=−21​θ1(p)​1{θ2(p)​<0}​.

Lending is active exactly where the pessimist perceives a strictly negative net Sharpe ratio on long positions, and there the lending agent charges half the Sharpe ratio −θ1(p)-\theta^{(p)}_1−θ1(p)​ the pessimist could earn by shorting absent frictions.

Milestones, in attack order

  1. Proposition 1 (p. 17): the optimal portfolios of the mean-variance problem under (7) and ϕ≥γ\phi\ge\gammaϕ≥γ.
  2. (11) (p. 18): the optimist is long, θ2(o)=θ1(o)+γ>0\theta^{(o)}_2=\theta^{(o)}_1+\gamma>0θ2(o)​=θ1(o)​+γ>0.
  3. (14) (p. 18): γσ1S1=(ϕ−γ)(θ1(p)+ϕ)−W(p)\gamma\sigma_1S_1=(\phi-\gamma)(\theta^{(p)}_1+\phi)^-W^{(p)}γσ1​S1​=(ϕ−γ)(θ1(p)​+ϕ)−W(p).
  4. (12)–(13) (p. 18): the maximizers of the revenue over y≥γy\ge\gammay≥γ, and their least element max⁡{γ,−12θ1(p)}\max\{\gamma,-\tfrac12\theta^{(p)}_1\}max{γ,−21​θ1(p)​}.

Two companion statements are also included: (18) (p. 20), that the pessimist is strictly short on S\mathcal SS, and the fee flow (π1(p))−Φ=14(θ1(p))2W(p)1S(\pi^{(p)}_1)^-\Phi=\tfrac14(\theta^{(p)}_1)^2W^{(p)}\mathbb 1_{\mathcal S}(π1(p)​)−Φ=41​(θ1(p)​)2W(p)1S​ (p. 19).

Significance

The goal is the paper's description of the short market. It identifies the active set by a condition on one observable-in-principle quantity, the pessimist's net Sharpe ratio, and it gives the fee as a fixed fraction of the pessimist's frictionless Sharpe ratio. The rest of the paper rests on it: the one-asset closed forms of §4.1, the trading regions of §3.3, and the pricing results of Proposition 2 all start from (15)–(16). The fee-flow identity shows that the optimist captures a quarter of the pessimist's frictionless excess return, which is the upper bound Remark 1 attributes to any alternative fee-setting mechanism.

The result is proved in the paper, partly in the text and partly in Appendix A. Some steps are argued informally: (11) rests on the sentence "agents cannot be short simultaneously in equilibrium", and (14) on "substituting the optimal portfolios of Proposition 1 into the market clearing conditions". As far as is known, none of it has been machine-checked. A formalization makes each step explicit, including the degenerate states the text passes over. In checking the statements against each other, three printed slips were found and are corrected here (see Formalization scope).

Difficulty

The goal combines optimality, clearing and revenue maximization, and the obvious argument fails at its degenerate edge. On the inactive set the shorting cost equals the lending yield (ϕ=γ=0\phi=\gamma=0ϕ=γ=0). There Proposition 1's characterization of optimal portfolios no longer holds: portfolios that short asset 1 to buy asset 2 are also optimal. So the step "substitute the optimal portfolios" is not available, and (14) must be obtained from the clearing conditions directly in that case. Similarly the revenue maximizer is not unique on the inactive set; the shorting cost is pinned down only by the paper's selection of the least maximizer, and (16) is false for any other selection. Finally, (11) requires an argument that the two investors cannot both be short while asset 1 is in positive supply. This uses optimality of both portfolios, not just of one.

Formalization scope

Everything is stated at one state (ω,t)(\omega,t)(ω,t) of the paper's continuous-time economy, about real numbers. The continuous-time economy of §2 (Brownian filtrations, consumption streams, the dynamics of wealth) is the paper's motivation and is not formalized; the formalized statements are its instantaneous equilibrium conditions. The time index is dropped throughout, and the paper's "arbitrary process xtx_txt​" in Proposition 1 becomes an arbitrary real number.

Conventions:

  • Rates are per unit of volatility; the dollar rates are Φ=ϕσ1\Phi=\phi\sigma_1Φ=ϕσ1​ and Γ=γσ1\Gamma=\gamma\sigma_1Γ=γσ1​, never obtained by division.
  • m+m^+m+ and m−m^-m− are written as max⁡{m,0}\max\{m,0\}max{m,0} and max⁡{−m,0}\max\{-m,0\}max{−m,0}; indicators are if … then … else 0.
  • Dollar positions are π1(a)=W(a)p1(a)\pi^{(a)}_1=W^{(a)}p^{(a)}_1π1(a)​=W(a)p1(a)​.
  • The standing assumptions are hypotheses of every equilibrium statement: σ1,σ2>0\sigma_1,\sigma_2>0σ1​,σ2​>0 (the standing assumption of §3), S1>0S_1>0S1​>0, W(o),W(p)>0W^{(o)},W^{(p)}>0W(o),W(p)>0, and θ1(p)≤θ1(o)\theta^{(p)}_1\le\theta^{(o)}_1θ1(p)​≤θ1(o)​.
  • The shorting-cost condition (4) is stated in its per-volatility form (10), over y≥γy\ge\gammay≥γ, with the least maximizer selected as in (13). A single lending agent is built in.
  • Consumption clearing and asset-2 clearing are not part of the equilibrium predicate; no statement uses them, so leaving them out makes every statement more general.

Corrected slips of the page, each disclosed in the item concerned:

  1. Proposition 1's "the optimal portfolio satisfies (9)" fails when ϕ=γ\phi=\gammaϕ=γ; the converse direction is stated under ϕ>γ\phi>\gammaϕ>γ, and the constraint 0≤x≤θ20\le x\le\theta_20≤x≤θ2​ only where θ2≥0\theta_2\ge0θ2​≥0.
  2. The indicator in (12) should be 1{θ1(p)+γ≥0}\mathbb 1_{\{\theta^{(p)}_1+\gamma\ge0\}}1{θ1(p)​+γ≥0}​, not 1{θ1(p)≥0}\mathbb 1_{\{\theta^{(p)}_1\ge0\}}1{θ1(p)​≥0}​; the least maximizer (13) is unaffected.
  3. (18) prints "≠∅\neq\emptyset=∅"; its proof shows the set is empty, which is what is stated.

The results (11), (13) and (14) are not built into the equilibrium predicate. With them assumed, the goal would reduce to a four-line computation; they are separate items to be proved. The definitions are short and self-contained, needing only real arithmetic from Mathlib. Proofs of the milestones, and proofs of the goal that use the milestones, are welcome.

Selected references

  • T. Evgeniou, J. Hugonnier, R. Prieto, Asset Pricing with Costly Short Sales, Swiss Finance Institute Research Paper N°22-21, version of September 22, 2022 — the source of this mission. Published as J. Hugonnier, R. Prieto, Asset Pricing with Costly Short Sales, Management Science (2024), https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2023.01887, whose numbering is not used here.
  • G. D'Avolio, The market for borrowing stock, Journal of Financial Economics 66 (2002), 271–306.
  • C. Jones, O. Lamont, Short-sale constraints and stock returns, Journal of Financial Economics 66 (2002).
  • R. Radner, Existence of equilibrium of plans, prices and price expectations in a sequence of markets, Econometrica 40 (2) (1972), 289–303.
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Dynamic ProgrammingOperations ResearchProbability·Captain: mikedeng1

Coordinating Inventory Control and Pricing Strategies for Perishable Products 2: With Zero Lead Time and Minimal Disposal, Two Myopic Solutions Bound the Optimal Order-Up-To LevelResearch Paper

Why bound the order-up-to level of a perishable product

Food, blood products, pharmaceuticals and many retail goods are perishable: a unit is usable for a fixed number of periods and is then discarded. A seller of such a product decides every period how much to order, what price to charge, and how much stock to deplete or dispose of. Because units of different ages coexist, the state of the system is a vector of inventory levels by remaining lifetime, and the exact dynamic program suffers from the curse of dimensionality in that vector. Nahmias's survey (Nahmias 1982) records this obstacle for the pure ordering problem; adding pricing makes it worse.

Chen, Pang and Pan (Operations Research 62(2), 2014) analyse the joint ordering, pricing and disposal problem with the tools of L♮-concavity (Murota's discrete convex analysis, extended to real vectors). Their §4 shows that the optimal profit-to-go is L♮-concave, which yields monotone policies with bounded sensitivity. Their §6.1 then shows that two one-dimensional, myopic problems bracket the optimal order-up-to level, which is the starting point of the heuristics of §6.2. This mission formalizes the backlogging case of that bracketing result, Theorem 3.

Setting

A single product has lifetime l≥2l\ge 2l≥2 periods; the replenishment lead time is zero, and unmet demand is backlogged. The unit costs are ccc (ordering), h+h^+h+ (holding), h−h^-h− (backlogging) and θ\thetaθ (disposal); γ\gammaγ is the discount factor. The seller chooses the expected demand ddd in an interval D=[d‾,dˉ]\mathcal D=[\underline d,\bar d]D=[d​,dˉ], which is equivalent to choosing the price P(d)P(d)P(d), where PPP is strictly decreasing. The expected revenue P(d) dP(d)\,dP(d)d is continuous and concave on D\mathcal DD (Assumption 1). Realized demand is dt=d+εtd_t=d+\varepsilon_tdt​=d+εt​, with independent, identically distributed, zero-mean noise supported in [A,B][A,B][A,B], A≤0≤BA\le 0\le BA≤0≤B, and d‾+A≥0\underline d+A\ge 0d​+A≥0.

The state s=(s1,…,sl−1)s=(s_1,\dots,s_{l-1})s=(s1​,…,sl−1​) lies in S={s1≤⋯≤sl−1}\mathcal S=\{s_1\le\dots\le s_{l-1}\}S={s1​≤⋯≤sl−1​}: sis_isi​ is the inventory with residual lifetime at most iii periods (negative values are backorders), and sl−1s_{l-1}sl−1​ is the inventory position. Each period the seller picks an order-up-to level sl≥sl−1s_l\ge s_{l-1}sl​≥sl−1​, the demand level ddd, and, after demand is realized, a depletion aaa with s1∨dt≤a≤sl∨dts_1\vee d_t\le a\le s_l\vee d_ts1​∨dt​≤a≤sl​∨dt​. The next state is s~=(s2−a,…,sl−a)\tilde s=(s_2-a,\dots,s_l-a)s~=(s2​−a,…,sl​−a). The one-period objective is

φt(s,sl,d,a∣εt)=γc s~l−1−csl−θ(a−dt)−h+(sl−a)+−h−(a−sl)++γft+1(s~),\varphi_t(s,s_l,d,a\mid\varepsilon_t)=\gamma c\,\tilde s_{l-1}-cs_l-\theta(a-d_t)-h^+(s_l-a)^+-h^-(a-s_l)^++\gamma f_{t+1}(\tilde s),φt​(s,sl​,d,a∣εt​)=γcs~l−1​−csl​−θ(a−dt​)−h+(sl​−a)+−h−(a−sl​)++γft+1​(s~),

gtg_tgt​ maximizes it over aaa, Gt(s,sl,d)=P(d)d+E[gt]G_t(s,s_l,d)=P(d)d+\mathbb E[g_t]Gt​(s,sl​,d)=P(d)d+E[gt​], and the profit-to-go is ft(s)=max⁡sl≥sl−1, d∈DGt(s,sl,d)f_t(s)=\max_{s_l\ge s_{l-1},\,d\in\mathcal D}G_t(s,s_l,d)ft​(s)=maxsl​≥sl−1​,d∈D​Gt​(s,sl​,d) with fT+1=0f_{T+1}=0fT+1​=0.

Under θ≥h+/(1−γ)\theta\ge h^+/(1-\gamma)θ≥h+/(1−γ) only expiring stock is disposed of (Proposition 1). With θ~=θ+γc−h+\tilde\theta=\theta+\gamma c-h^+θ~=θ+γc−h+ and vt(sl,dt)=−(1−γ)csl−γcdt−h+(sl−dt)+−h−(dt−sl)+v_t(s_l,d_t)=-(1-\gamma)cs_l-\gamma cd_t-h^+(s_l-d_t)^+-h^-(d_t-s_l)^+vt​(sl​,dt​)=−(1−γ)csl​−γcdt​−h+(sl​−dt​)+−h−(dt​−sl​)+, the two myopic objectives are

Πt(sl,d)=P(d)d+E[vt(sl,dt)],Π~t(sl,d)=Πt(sl,d)−γcsl−K E[(sl−dt)+],\Pi_t(s_l,d)=P(d)d+\mathbb E[v_t(s_l,d_t)],\qquad \tilde\Pi_t(s_l,d)=\Pi_t(s_l,d)-\gamma cs_l-K\,\mathbb E[(s_l-d_t)^+],Πt​(sl​,d)=P(d)d+E[vt​(sl​,dt​)],Π~t​(sl​,d)=Πt​(sl​,d)−γcsl​−KE[(sl​−dt​)+],

with K=γh++⋯+γl−2h++γl−1θ~K=\gamma h^++\dots+\gamma^{l-2}h^++\gamma^{l-1}\tilde\thetaK=γh++⋯+γl−2h++γl−1θ~. Sˉt(d)\bar S_t(d)Sˉt​(d) and S‾t(d)\underline S_t(d)S​t​(d) are their largest maximizers over sl≥0s_l\ge0sl​≥0.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 3 (Bounds), backlogging case

For every period, every state s∈Ss\in\mathcal Ss∈S and every d∈Dd\in\mathcal Dd∈D, the largest optimal order-up-to level slt(s,d)s_{lt}(s,d)slt​(s,d) satisfies

S‾t(d)∨sl−1 ≤ slt(s,d) ≤ Sˉt(d)∨sl−1.\underline S_t(d)\vee s_{l-1}\ \le\ s_{lt}(s,d)\ \le\ \bar S_t(d)\vee s_{l-1}.S​t​(d)∨sl−1​ ≤ slt​(s,d) ≤ Sˉt​(d)∨sl−1​.

Milestones, in attack order

  1. Lemma 6 (p. 290): ftf_tft​ is nonincreasing in each coordinate of the state.
  2. Proposition 1 (p. 292): if θ≥h+/(1−γ)\theta\ge h^+/(1-\gamma)θ≥h+/(1−γ), depleting dt∨s1d_t\vee s_1dt​∨s1​ is optimal.
  3. The p. 294 decomposition: φt\varphi_tφt​ at a=dt∨s1a=d_t\vee s_1a=dt​∨s1​ equals vt(sl,dt)−θ~(s1−dt)++γft+1(s~)v_t(s_l,d_t)-\tilde\theta(s_1-d_t)^++\gamma f_{t+1}(\tilde s)vt​(sl​,dt​)−θ~(s1​−dt​)++γft+1​(s~).
  4. Theorem 1, first sentence (p. 291), at zero lead time: ftf_tft​, gtg_tgt​, φt\varphi_tφt​ are L♮-concave.
  5. Concavity in sls_lsl​ (p. 295): Πt(⋅,d)\Pi_t(\cdot,d)Πt​(⋅,d) and Gt(s,⋅,d)G_t(s,\cdot,d)Gt​(s,⋅,d) are concave.
  6. Upper step (p. 295): Gt(s,sl′,d)−Gt(s,sl,d)≤Πt(sl′,d)−Πt(sl,d)G_t(s,s'_l,d)-G_t(s,s_l,d)\le\Pi_t(s'_l,d)-\Pi_t(s_l,d)Gt​(s,sl′​,d)−Gt​(s,sl​,d)≤Πt​(sl′​,d)−Πt​(sl​,d) for sl′>sl≥sl−1s'_l>s_l\ge s_{l-1}sl′​>sl​≥sl−1​.

The proof's lower-bound display (p. 295) is not a milestone: as printed, for arbitrary sl′>sl≥sl−1s'_l>s_l\ge s_{l-1}sl′​>sl​≥sl−1​, it is false when h+>γch^+>\gamma ch+>γc (see Formalization scope).

Significance

The result. The bounds reduce an (l−1)(l-1)(l−1)-dimensional optimization to two scalar newsvendor-type problems whose solutions do not depend on the period (Remark 6), and they give interpretable brackets: Sˉt(d)\bar S_t(d)Sˉt​(d) ignores the future cost of excess stock, while S‾t(d)\underline S_t(d)S​t​(d) charges every excess unit holding until expiry and then disposal. They justify the one-dimensional heuristics of §6.2 and give a check on any computed policy.

Formalizing it. The paper's proof is short but compresses three steps that need care: the structural results of §4 at zero lead time, the minimal-disposal property, and a coupling argument for the lower bound whose printed display is not correct as stated (see below). A machine-checked development would make the whole chain from the recursion to the bounds explicit, including the existence conventions for optimal decisions. To the knowledge of this mission, none of these results has been formalized in any proof assistant.

Difficulty

The central obstacle is the concavity of Gt(s,⋅,d)G_t(s,\cdot,d)Gt​(s,⋅,d) in the order-up-to level. It is not visible from the one-period terms: it rests on L♮-concavity of the whole recursion (Theorem 1), and the depletion constraint s1∨dt≤a≤sl∨dts_1\vee d_t\le a\le s_l\vee d_ts1​∨dt​≤a≤sl​∨dt​ is not an L♮-convex set, so the standard preservation lemma does not apply to (5) as written.

The lower bound needs a quantitative estimate of how much an extra unit of fresh stock can cost in the future. The printed estimate charges the expiring unit θ~\tilde\thetaθ~ where an unused unit actually costs θ\thetaθ, so it cannot hold for every pair of order-up-to levels; the lower bound must use that the comparison is only needed below S‾t(d)\underline S_t(d)S​t​(d), where excess stock is not pushed past the next period's optimal order-up-to level.

Formalization scope

The Lean development lives in the namespace PerishablePricing.Bounds. Its conventions are:

  • Carrier R\mathbb RR. The paper treats real and integer vectors at once; only the real case is formalized. L♮-convexity is defined on an explicit domain with real values, the paper's convention for "L♮-convex on a set".
  • Indices. States are Fin L → ℝ with L=l−1≥1L=l-1\ge1L=l−1≥1, 0-based.
  • Time. Time counts periods to go: f 0 = 0 is fT+1f_{T+1}fT+1​, and GtG_tGt​, gtg_tgt​, φt\varphi_tφt​ use the continuation f n.
  • Maxima and expectations. The maxima in the recursion are suprema over nonempty sets whose values are bounded above, and expectations are Bochner integrals against the noise law.
  • Optimal decisions. Every optimal decision is a largest maximizer, taken as a hypothesis at the points where it is used. With an arbitrary maximizer the upper bound fails when Πt(⋅,d)\Pi_t(\cdot,d)Πt​(⋅,d) is flat.

The standing assumptions are the hypotheses of every statement:

  • nonnegative unit costs and 0≤γ≤10\le\gamma\le10≤γ≤1;
  • the noise conditions and the strictly decreasing inverse demand;
  • Assumption 1;
  • (1−γ)c≤h−(1-\gamma)c\le h^-(1−γ)c≤h−, the §4 assumption c≤h−/(1−γ)c\le h^-/(1-\gamma)c≤h−/(1−γ);
  • h+≤(1−γ)θh^+\le(1-\gamma)\thetah+≤(1−γ)θ with γ<1\gamma<1γ<1, the §6.1 assumption θ≥h+/(1−γ)\theta\ge h^+/(1-\gamma)θ≥h+/(1−γ), which divides by 1−γ1-\gamma1−γ.

Deviations from the page, all disclosed in the items:

  • Only the backlogging case of Theorem 3 is stated. The lost-sales case rests on Theorem 2, which is not posed.
  • The hypothesis "the starting inventory level of the planning horizon is zero" constrains no object of the statement, and the conclusion is stated for every state.
  • Π~t\tilde\Pi_tΠ~t​'s printed term −γc s~l−1-\gamma c\,\tilde s_{l-1}−γcs~l−1​ depends on the state and the noise. It is read as −γc sl-\gamma c\,s_l−γcsl​, which leaves the maximizers unchanged.
  • The objective missing from the printed definition of Sˉt(d)\bar S_t(d)Sˉt​(d) is Πt\Pi_tΠt​.
  • The upper step's "Gt=Πt+γE[ft+1]G_t=\Pi_t+\gamma\mathbb E[f_{t+1}]Gt​=Πt​+γE[ft+1​]" omits a term constant in sls_lsl​.
  • The lower-bound display of the proof of Theorem 3 is not stated. Its exponents t+l−3t+l-3t+l−3, t+l−2t+l-2t+l−2 should read l−3l-3l−3, l−2l-2l−2, and even then, for arbitrary sl′>sl≥sl−1s'_l>s_l\ge s_{l-1}sl′​>sl​≥sl−1​, it fails when h+>γch^+>\gamma ch+>γc. Example: l=2l=2l=2, deterministic demand, c=1c=1c=1, γ=12\gamma=\tfrac12γ=21​, h+=h−=1h^+=h^-=1h+=h−=1, θ=2\theta=2θ=2, one period after the current one, s1=0s_1=0s1​=0, d=12d=\tfrac12d=21​, sl=100s_l=100sl​=100, sl′=101s'_l=101sl′​=101: the left side is −3-3−3 and the right side is −2.75-2.75−2.75. In that case an unused unit is disposed of at cost θ\thetaθ, not θ~\tilde\thetaθ~. Theorem 3 itself is stated as printed, with S‾t(d)\underline S_t(d)S​t​(d) defined through Π~t\tilde\Pi_tΠ~t​.

The goal must not be trivialized. Its continuation, the concavity of GtG_tGt​ and the monotonicity of ft+1f_{t+1}ft+1​ are properties of the model's own recursion, never hypotheses on abstract functions. Likewise slt(s,d)s_{lt}(s,d)slt​(s,d) is defined through GtG_tGt​, never through Πt\Pi_tΠt​ or Π~t\tilde\Pi_tΠ~t​.

A complete development needs:

  • L♮-concavity preservation under partial maximization over an L♮-convex set and under expectation;
  • concavity of expectations of piecewise-linear functions of the noise;
  • measurability and integrability of the stage value gtg_tgt​ in the noise;
  • the coupling arguments for Proposition 1 and the lower bound.

The L♮ preservation lemmas are reusable for other discrete-convexity models in inventory theory. Contributions toward any milestone, or toward that infrastructure, are welcome.

The source is the published Operations Research article. In the held scan, printed page = PDF page + 282.

Selected references

  • X. Chen, Z. Pang, L. Pan, Coordinating Inventory Control and Pricing Strategies for Perishable Products, Operations Research 62(2):284–300, 2014. https://doi.org/10.1287/opre.2014.1261
  • K. Murota, Discrete Convex Analysis, SIAM, 2003. https://doi.org/10.1137/1.9780898718508
  • P. Zipkin, On the Structure of Lost-Sales Inventory Models, Operations Research 56(4):937–944, 2008. https://doi.org/10.1287/opre.1070.0482
  • S. Nahmias, Perishable Inventory Theory: A Review, Operations Research 30(4):680–708, 1982. https://doi.org/10.1287/opre.30.4.680
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The Continuous-Time Joint Replenishment Problem: ϵ-Optimal Policies via Pairwise Alignment: Ψ-Pairwise Alignment Yields a Replenishment Policy Within Factor 1 + 5ϵ of Any PolicyResearch Paper

Motivation

The joint replenishment problem is a basic model of coordinated inventory control. A firm stocks nnn commodities, each of which follows its own Economic Order Quantity (EOQ) model, but every order also incurs a joint ordering cost K0K_0K0​, regardless of which commodities it contains. Ordering commodities together therefore saves money, and the question is how to synchronize their replenishment cycles.

Since the mid-1980s the best known guarantee for the continuous-time problem came from power-of-2 policies (Roundy 1985, 1986; Jackson, Maxwell and Muckstadt 1985; Muckstadt and Roundy 1987). Their cost is within 9/8≈1.06\sqrt{9/8}\approx1.069/8​≈1.06 of optimal for a fixed base period, and within 1/(2ln⁡2)≈1.021/(\sqrt2\ln2)\approx1.021/(2​ln2)≈1.02 when the base is optimized. On the hardness side, Schulz and Telha (2022) and Tuisov and Yedidsion (2020) showed the problem to be intractable; the latter proved it strongly NP-hard, which rules out a fully polynomial-time approximation scheme.

Segev (arXiv:2302.09941, published in Management Science, 2025) gave the first improvement over power-of-2 policies. For every ϵ∈(0,12)\epsilon\in(0,\tfrac12)ϵ∈(0,21​) the problem can be approximated within 1+ϵ1+\epsilon1+ϵ of optimal in time O(2O~(1/ϵ3)⋅nO(1))O(2^{\tilde O(1/\epsilon^3)}\cdot n^{O(1)})O(2O~(1/ϵ3)⋅nO(1)). This mission formalizes the approximation guarantee behind that theorem. The source is the arXiv v1 preprint, and all theorem numbers refer to it.

Setting

Commodity i∈[n]i\in[n]i∈[n] has ordering cost Ki>0K_i>0Ki​>0 and holding cost Hi>0H_i>0Hi​>0. Ordering it every Ti>0T_i>0Ti​>0 time units costs per unit time

Ci(Ti)=KiTi+HiTi.C_i(T_i)=\frac{K_i}{T_i}+H_iT_i .Ci​(Ti​)=Ti​Ki​​+Hi​Ti​.

A policy is a vector T=(T1,…,Tn)T=(T_1,\dots,T_n)T=(T1​,…,Tn​) of positive intervals. For t>0t>0t>0 and Δ≥0\Delta\ge0Δ≥0, let Mt,Δ={0,t,2t,…,⌊Δ/t⌋t}\mathcal M_{t,\Delta}=\{0,t,2t,\dots,\lfloor\Delta/t\rfloor t\}Mt,Δ​={0,t,2t,…,⌊Δ/t⌋t} be the multiples of ttt in [0,Δ][0,\Delta][0,Δ]. A policy places

N(T,Δ)=∣⋃i∈[n]MTi,Δ∣N(T,\Delta)=\Big|\bigcup_{i\in[n]}\mathcal M_{T_i,\Delta}\Big|N(T,Δ)=​i∈[n]⋃​MTi​,Δ​​

joint orders in [0,Δ][0,\Delta][0,Δ]. Its joint ordering cost and total cost are

J(T)=K0⋅lim⁡Δ→∞N(T,Δ)Δ,F(T)=J(T)+∑i∈[n]Ci(Ti).J(T)=K_0\cdot\lim_{\Delta\to\infty}\frac{N(T,\Delta)}{\Delta},\qquad F(T)=J(T)+\sum_{i\in[n]}C_i(T_i).J(T)=K0​⋅Δ→∞lim​ΔN(T,Δ)​,F(T)=J(T)+i∈[n]∑​Ci​(Ti​).

For N⊆[n]\mathcal N\subseteq[n]N⊆[n], MNM_{\mathcal N}MN​ is the least common multiple of {Ti}i∈N\{T_i\}_{i\in\mathcal N}{Ti​}i∈N​, and MN=∞M_{\mathcal N}=\inftyMN​=∞ when the intervals have no common multiple.

The algorithm works against a reference policy T∗T^*T∗ with Tmin⁡∗=min⁡iTi∗T^*_{\min}=\min_iT^*_iTmin∗​=mini​Ti∗​ and an estimate F(T∗)≤OPT~≤2F(T∗)F(T^*)\le\widetilde{\mathrm{OPT}}\le2F(T^*)F(T∗)≤OPT≤2F(T∗).

  • Easy regime. When Tmin⁡∗≥nϵ⋅K0OPT~T^*_{\min}\ge\frac n\epsilon\cdot\frac{K_0}{\widetilde{\mathrm{OPT}}}Tmin∗​≥ϵn​⋅OPTK0​​, it uses the easy policy T^i=(K0+Ki)/Hi\hat T_i=\sqrt{(K_0+K_i)/H_i}T^i​=(K0​+Ki​)/Hi​​.
  • Difficult regime. Otherwise it guesses T~min⁡\tilde T_{\min}T~min​ with (1−ϵ/2)Tmin⁡∗≤T~min⁡≤Tmin⁡∗(1-\epsilon/2)T^*_{\min}\le\tilde T_{\min}\le T^*_{\min}(1−ϵ/2)Tmin∗​≤T~min​≤Tmin∗​ (2). It cuts [T~min⁡,T~min⁡/ϵ][\tilde T_{\min},\tilde T_{\min}/\epsilon][T~min​,T~min​/ϵ] into segments Sℓ=[(1+ϵ)ℓ−1T~min⁡,(1+ϵ)ℓT~min⁡)S_\ell=[(1+\epsilon)^{\ell-1}\tilde T_{\min},(1+\epsilon)^\ell\tilde T_{\min})Sℓ​=[(1+ϵ)ℓ−1T~min​,(1+ϵ)ℓT~min​), ℓ=1,…,L\ell=1,\dots,Lℓ=1,…,L. It keeps the active segments A∗\mathcal A^*A∗, those containing some Ti∗T^*_iTi∗​, and picks one representative Rℓ∗R^*_\ellRℓ∗​ among the Ti∗T^*_iTi∗​ in each.

Two representatives are Ψ\PsiΨ-aligned when aRℓ1∗=bRℓ2∗aR^*_{\ell_1}=bR^*_{\ell_2}aRℓ1​∗​=bRℓ2​∗​ for positive integers a,b≤Ψ=2L22L/ϵa,b\le\Psi=2L^2 2^L/\epsilona,b≤Ψ=2L22L/ϵ. The alignment graph GΨ∗G^*_\PsiGΨ∗​ joins Ψ\PsiΨ-aligned active segments. The linear system (LP) asks for Rℓ∈SˉℓR_\ell\in\bar S_\ellRℓ​∈Sˉℓ​ satisfying the same alignment relations as R∗R^*R∗. A solution is misaligned across components when representatives in different components of GΨ∗G^*_\PsiGΨ∗​ are not Ψ\PsiΨ-aligned. The final policy gives commodity iii the CiC_iCi​-cheapest of the RℓR_\ellRℓ​ and of the single large interval ⌈max⁡{T~min⁡/ϵ,Ki/Hi}⌉(R1)\lceil\max\{\tilde T_{\min}/\epsilon,\sqrt{K_i/H_i}\}\rceil^{(R_1)}⌈max{T~min​/ϵ,Ki​/Hi​​}⌉(R1​), rounded up to a multiple of R1R_1R1​.

Formalization targets

Goal: the approximation half of Theorem 1.3

Fix n≥1n\ge1n≥1, K0,Ki,Hi>0K_0,K_i,H_i>0K0​,Ki​,Hi​>0, ϵ∈(0,12)\epsilon\in(0,\tfrac12)ϵ∈(0,21​), a policy T∗T^*T∗ with all Ti∗>0T^*_i>0Ti∗​>0, and OPT~\widetilde{\mathrm{OPT}}OPT with F(T∗)≤OPT~≤2F(T∗)F(T^*)\le\widetilde{\mathrm{OPT}}\le2F(T^*)F(T∗)≤OPT≤2F(T∗).

  • (a) In the easy regime,
F(T^)≤(1+2ϵ)F(T∗).F(\hat T)\le(1+2\epsilon)F(T^*).F(T^)≤(1+2ϵ)F(T∗).
  • (b) In the difficult regime, the grid of powers of 1+ϵ/21+\epsilon/21+ϵ/2 contains a guess satisfying (2). For every such guess and every choice of representatives, a feasible, cross-misaligned solution of (LP) exists, and every final policy T^\hat TT^ built from such a solution satisfies
F(T^)≤(1+5ϵ) F(T∗).F(\hat T)\le(1+5\epsilon)\,F(T^*).F(T^)≤(1+5ϵ)F(T∗).

Milestones

The goal's proof uses the following results, in this order:

  • Claim 1.1 (EOQ facts) and Lemma 1.2 (the density exists and equals ∑N(−1)∣N∣+1/MN\sum_{\mathcal N}(-1)^{|\mathcal N|+1}/M_{\mathcal N}∑N​(−1)∣N∣+1/MN​).
  • Lemma 2.1 (the easy regime) and Observations 2.2 and 2.3.
  • Lemma 2.4, Lemma 2.5 and Corollary 2.6 (the structure of (LP)).
  • Lemmas 3.2 and 3.3 and Claims 3.4 and 3.5 (crossing and uncrossing terms).
  • Lemma 3.1 and inequality (3) (density), and Lemma 3.6 (assignability).

Significance

The theorem gives the first approximation scheme for continuous-time joint replenishment. It settles the problem's approximability up to the form of the exponential dependence on ϵ\epsilonϵ, after nearly four decades in which power-of-2 policies were the best available. Its central device, synchronizing pairs of representatives through bounded integer multiples and controlling everything else by inclusion–exclusion over the alignment graph, is proposed in the paper as a template for other multi-item lot-sizing models.

The result is proved on paper, and no machine-checked version is known. A formalization adds three things.

  • Lemma 1.2. A verified proof that the joint ordering cost of every positive policy is well defined. The paper notes that this is not obvious from (1).
  • Bookkeeping. A check of the paper's constants and signs across a long inclusion–exclusion argument.
  • Generality. Making explicit that the guarantee holds against any positive reference policy, not only an optimal one, whose existence the paper never establishes.

Difficulty

The obvious argument runs as follows: round every Ti∗T^*_iTi∗​ to a nearby point of a small grid and charge joint orders to the grid. It fails because the cost of the joint orders depends on the least common multiples of the intervals, not on their sizes. Two nearby reals can have a small lcm, or none at all, and an arbitrarily small perturbation changes N(T,Δ)N(T,\Delta)N(T,Δ) by a constant factor. The proof must therefore keep the arithmetic relations among the representatives exactly where they matter: within components of GΨ∗G^*_\PsiGΨ∗​, through (LP). It must also show that relations across components contribute only lower-order terms. This requires two nested inclusion–exclusion expansions (Lemma 3.3 and Claim 3.5) whose error terms, of order ∣A∗∣22∣A∗∣|\mathcal A^*|^2 2^{|\mathcal A^*|}∣A∗∣22∣A∗∣, are absorbed by the choice of Ψ\PsiΨ.

Lemma 1.2 is a squeeze argument, but it rests on showing that the common multiples of finitely many positive reals form the set M⋅NM\cdot\mathbb NM⋅N.

Formalization scope

All declarations live in the namespace ContJRP.Align.

Representation.

  • The model is defined on Mathlib with no external dependency.
  • Commodities are Fin n with n≥1n\ge1n≥1.
  • N(⋅,Δ)N(\cdot,\Delta)N(⋅,Δ) counts a finite union of Finset ℝ, and 000 is a member of every Mt,Δ\mathcal M_{t,\Delta}Mt,Δ​.
  • The density is a limUnder.
  • 1/MN1/M_{\mathcal N}1/MN​ is 0 when no common multiple exists.
  • Segments are indexed from 000 in Lean, so the paper's SℓS_\ellSℓ​ and R1R_1R1​ are Lean's index ℓ−1\ell-1ℓ−1 and R 0.

Committed conventions.

  • K0,Ki,Hi>0K_0,K_i,H_i>0K0​,Ki​,Hi​>0 and ϵ∈(0,12)\epsilon\in(0,\tfrac12)ϵ∈(0,21​) everywhere.
  • LLL is the least natural number with (1+ϵ)L>1/ϵ(1+\epsilon)^L>1/\epsilon(1+ϵ)L>1/ϵ, which the page leaves as O(1ϵlog⁡1ϵ)O(\frac1\epsilon\log\frac1\epsilon)O(ϵ1​logϵ1​).
  • Every alignment multiple and the β±\beta^\pmβ± of Lemma 2.4 are positive integers.
  • Inclusion–exclusion sums range over nonempty index sets.
  • The reference policy T∗T^*T∗ is any positive policy whose cost the estimate brackets; it need not be optimal.
  • Lemmas in §2–§3 do not assume the difficult-regime inequality, which their proofs do not use.

What is left out. The running-time half of Theorem 1.3, the time bounds of Lemmas 2.4 and 2.5, and the final selection of the cheapest candidate (§3.3) are not formalized. The goal carries the constants the analysis proves, 1+2ϵ1+2\epsilon1+2ϵ and 1+5ϵ1+5\epsilon1+5ϵ, rather than the rescaled 1+ϵ1+\epsilon1+ϵ.

Trivializing formalizations ruled out.

  • (LP) cannot be empty, because the goal asserts that a feasible, cross-misaligned solution exists.
  • limUnder cannot return a junk value, because Lemma 1.2 and (3) are stated as Tendsto limits.
  • The final policy is not a free parameter: each T^i\hat T_iT^i​ must be one of its options and CiC_iCi​-minimal among them.
  • Misalignment quantifies over positive multiples only, so it is satisfiable.

Infrastructure and contributions. A complete development needs three pieces:

  • the lattice of common multiples of positive reals, and the floor-count ∣⋂iMTi,Δ∣=⌊Δ/M⌋+1|\bigcap_{i}\mathcal M_{T_i,\Delta}|=\lfloor\Delta/M\rfloor+1∣⋂i​MTi​,Δ​∣=⌊Δ/M⌋+1;
  • inclusion–exclusion for finite unions (Finset.inclusion_exclusion_card_biUnion in Mathlib);
  • elementary calculus for the EOQ cost.

The density results (Lemma 1.2) are reusable for any periodic-scheduling model. Proofs of any milestone are welcome, as are alternative statements of the selection step.

Selected references

  • D. Segev, The Continuous-Time Joint Replenishment Problem: ϵ-Optimal Policies via Pairwise Alignment, arXiv:2302.09941v1, 2023; Management Science, 2025. https://arxiv.org/abs/2302.09941
  • R. Roundy, 98%-effective integer-ratio lot-sizing for one-warehouse multi-retailer systems, Management Science 31(11), 1985. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.31.11.1416
  • P. Jackson, W. Maxwell, J. Muckstadt, The joint replenishment problem with a powers-of-two restriction, IIE Transactions 17(1), 1985. https://doi.org/10.1080/07408178508975270
  • C.-P. Teo, D. Bertsimas, Multistage lot sizing problems via randomized rounding, Operations Research 49(4), 2001. https://doi.org/10.1287/opre.49.4.599.11225
  • A. S. Schulz, C. Telha, Integer factorization: Why two-item joint replenishment is hard, Operations Research, 2022 (forthcoming at the time of the preprint).
  • A. Tuisov, L. Yedidsion, The continuous joint replenishment problem is strongly NP-hard, arXiv:2006.05310, 2020. https://arxiv.org/abs/2006.05310
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Markov Decision Processes with Observation Costs: Framework and Computation with a Penalty Scheme: The Quasi-Variational Inequality with Inspection Operator Has a Unique Bounded SolutionResearch Paper

Motivation

In many sequential decision problems the state of a system is not observed for free. A controller monitoring a machine, a patient or an inventory must pay to inspect it, and between inspections it acts on a belief rather than on the state. The observation cost model (OCM) makes this precise for a finite Markov chain: at each time the controller either pays a fixed cost cobs>0c_{\mathrm{obs}}>0cobs​>0 to observe the state and choose a new action, or keeps the previous action without observing. Reisinger and Tam (arXiv:2201.07908v3, published in Mathematics of Operations Research, 2025) show that, after augmenting the state with the time elapsed since the last observation, the dynamic programming equation of the discounted OCM is a discrete quasi-variational inequality (QVI): an obstacle problem whose obstacle depends on the unknown itself.

Earlier work on the OCM (Anderson and Friedman, 1977; Hajek, Mitzel and Yang, 2008) treated fixed dynamics of the underlying chain. Discrete QVIs with interconnected obstacles and their penalty approximation were analysed by Reisinger and Zhang (2019) for switching problems, with the identity matrix in place of the transition operator QnQ_nQn​. The paper recasts the OCM QVI in an abstract form and proves it is well-posed.

Setting

Let XXX be a finite state space and AAA a finite nonempty action set. The unknown is a function u:N×X→RAu:\mathbb N\times X\to\mathbb R^Au:N×X→RA with components ua(n,x)=ua,xnu_a(n,x)=u^n_{a,x}ua​(n,x)=ua,xn​. A driver is a family Fa:N×X×RA×RN×X→RF_a:\mathbb N\times X\times\mathbb R^A\times\mathbb R^{\mathbb N\times X}\to\mathbb RFa​:N×X×RA×RN×X→R, a∈Aa\in Aa∈A; its third argument is the vector u(n,x)u(n,x)u(n,x) and its fourth the whole function uau_aua​. Given a sequence {Qn}\{Q_n\}{Qn​} of substochastic matrices on XXX (nonnegative entries, row sums at most 111) and a vector c∈RX×Ac\in\mathbb R^{X\times A}c∈RX×A, the inspection operator is

Mu(n,x)=(Qn u1−c‾)x,(u1−c‾)y=max⁡a∈A(ua,y1−ca,y).\mathcal Mu(n,x)=\big(Q_n\,\overline{u^1-c}\big)_x,\qquad \big(\overline{u^1-c}\big)_y=\max_{a\in A}\big(u^1_{a,y}-c_{a,y}\big).Mu(n,x)=(Qn​u1−c​)x​,(u1−c​)y​=a∈Amax​(ua,y1​−ca,y​).

It reads uuu only at time 111 and couples all actions. The QVI (3.1) is

min⁡{Fa(n,x,u(n,x),ua),  ua(n,x)−Mu(n,x)}=0,n∈N, x∈X, a∈A.\min\big\{F_a(n,x,u(n,x),u_a),\;u_a(n,x)-\mathcal Mu(n,x)\big\}=0,\qquad n\in\mathbb N,\ x\in X,\ a\in A.min{Fa​(n,x,u(n,x),ua​),ua​(n,x)−Mu(n,x)}=0,n∈N, x∈X, a∈A.

Assumption 3.2 asks for a constant β>0\beta>0β>0 with Fa(n,x,r,ua+θ)−Fa(n,x,s,va)≥βθF_a(n,x,r,u_a+\theta)-F_a(n,x,s,v_a)\ge\beta\thetaFa​(n,x,r,ua​+θ)−Fa​(n,x,s,va​)≥βθ whenever u≤vu\le vu≤v are bounded and θ=ra−sa=max⁡j(rj−sj)≥0\theta=r_a-s_a=\max_j(r_j-s_j)\ge0θ=ra​−sa​=maxj​(rj​−sj​)≥0, together with boundedness in xxx and uniform continuity in rrr. Assumption 3.12 asks that Fa(n,x,r,ϕ)F_a(n,x,r,\phi)Fa​(n,x,r,ϕ) depend on ϕ\phiϕ only through finitely many values. For the OCM, Fa(n,x,r,ϕ)=ra−γϕ(n+1,x)−(Panra)xF_a(n,x,r,\phi)=r_a-\gamma\phi(n+1,x)-(P^n_ar_a)_xFa​(n,x,r,ϕ)=ra​−γϕ(n+1,x)−(Pan​ra​)x​.

For the computation the paper truncates time to {1,…,N}\{1,\dots,N\}{1,…,N}, giving a finite QVI (3.7) for a map F~:RN×L×d→RN×L\tilde F:\mathbb R^{N\times L\times d}\to\mathbb R^{N\times L}F~:RN×L×d→RN×L with the monotonicity property (3.5), and replaces it by the penalised problem (3.8), F~a(u)−ρ π(Mu−ua)=0\tilde F_a(u)-\rho\,\pi(\mathcal Mu-u_a)=0F~a​(u)−ρπ(Mu−ua​)=0, with a continuous non-decreasing penalty π\piπ vanishing exactly on (−∞,0](-\infty,0](−∞,0].

Formalization targets

Goal: well-posedness (Theorem 3.13)

Under Assumptions 3.2 and 3.12, a uniform bound sup⁡a,n,x∣Fa(n,x,0,0)∣<∞\sup_{a,n,x}|F_a(n,x,0,0)|<\inftysupa,n,x​∣Fa​(n,x,0,0)∣<∞, and ca,x>0c_{a,x}>0ca,x​>0:

∃! u:N×X→RA bounded with min⁡{Fa(n,x,u(n,x),ua), ua−Mu}=0 everywhere.\exists!\,u:\mathbb N\times X\to\mathbb R^A\ \text{bounded with}\ \min\{F_a(n,x,u(n,x),u_a),\,u_a-\mathcal Mu\}=0\ \text{everywhere}.∃!u:N×X→RA bounded with min{Fa​(n,x,u(n,x),ua​),ua​−Mu}=0 everywhere.

Milestones

  • Lemma 3.5: the restriction of FFF to {1,…,N}\{1,\dots,N\}{1,…,N} satisfies (3.5) with the same β\betaβ.
  • Proposition 3.10: for every ρ≥0\rho\ge0ρ≥0, a subsolution of (3.8) lies below a supersolution.
  • Lemma 3.11: for c≥0c\ge0c≥0, every solution of (3.8) satisfies ∥uρ∥∞≤∥F~(0)∥∞/β\|u^\rho\|_\infty\le\|\tilde F(0)\|_\infty/\beta∥uρ∥∞​≤∥F~(0)∥∞​/β.
  • Theorem 3.13, truncated part: (3.8) has a unique solution uρ,Nu^{\rho,N}uρ,N, which increases to a limit uNu^NuN as ρ→∞\rho\to\inftyρ→∞; for c>0c>0c>0, uNu^NuN solves (3.7).
  • Proposition 3.8: comparison for the truncated QVI (3.7) when c>0c>0c>0.
  • Proposition 3.3: comparison for bounded sub- and supersolutions of (3.1) when c>0c>0c>0.
  • Corollary 3.4: bounded solutions of the OCM QVI (2.11) are unique.

Significance

The well-posedness theorem identifies the value function of the discounted observation cost model as the unique bounded solution of a QVI, which is what justifies computing it: truncating time and penalising the obstacle gives a sequence of finite nonlinear systems whose solutions converge to it, and these systems are solved in practice by semismooth Newton iterations. The abstract framework covers other models with a non-local, action-coupling obstacle, such as discretised switching problems.

The results are proved in the paper, partly by reference: existence of the penalised solutions and the convergence uρ,N→uNu^{\rho,N}\to u^Nuρ,N→uN are delegated to Reisinger and Zhang (2019, Theorems 2.5 and 2.6), and Lemma 3.11 is stated as "a direct adaptation" of a lemma there. None of the results is formalized. A formal development makes the delegated steps explicit and fixes the hypotheses under which the statements hold (see Formalization scope).

Difficulty

The comparison principle (Proposition 3.3) is a maximum principle on an infinite index set: the supremum of u−vu-vu−v need not be attained, so the argument works along maximising sequences and needs the uniform continuity of the driver in rrr. In the obstacle branch, the inspection operator transports the maximum to time 111, and excluding that case uses c>0c>0c>0 through a chain argument over the finite set A×XA\times XA×X; with c=0c=0c=0 comparison fails.

Existence is harder. A direct fixed-point argument fails because the driver is only monotone, not a contraction, and the obstacle depends on the unknown. The paper's route goes through two limits, ρ→∞\rho\to\inftyρ→∞ and N→∞N\to\inftyN→∞, each requiring bounds uniform in the other parameter and a passage to the limit in a nonlinear, non-local equation; the N→∞N\to\inftyN→∞ limit uses Assumption 3.12 to localise the dependence on ϕ\phiϕ.

Formalization scope

Everything is finite-dimensional or a function on the discrete set N×X\mathbb N\times XN×X; no measure theory is involved. Unknowns are curried as u n x a =ua(n,x)=u_a(n,x)=ua​(n,x), costs as c a x. Time in (3.1) ranges over all of N\mathbb NN, including 000, and u1u^1u1 is u 1. The truncated time set {1,…,N}\{1,\dots,N\}{1,…,N} is Fin N with the index kkk standing for time k+1k+1k+1, so u1u^1u1 is u 0. Substochastic means nonnegative entries with row sums at most 111; c>0c>0c>0 and c≥0c\ge0c≥0 are componentwise; norms are sup norms, written out entrywise. Bounded sets of rrr in Assumption 3.2.2 are cubes.

Two additions to the paper's hypotheses are made, each because the statement is false without it. The goal assumes sup⁡a,n,x∣Fa(n,x,0,0)∣<∞\sup_{a,n,x}|F_a(n,x,0,0)|<\inftysupa,n,x​∣Fa​(n,x,0,0)∣<∞: Assumption 3.2.2 only bounds FFF for each fixed nnn, and the driver ra−γϕ(n+1,x)−nr_a-\gamma\phi(n+1,x)-nra​−γϕ(n+1,x)−n satisfies both assumptions yet has no bounded solution. Corollary 3.4 is stated for bounded solutions of (2.11). The truncated QVI is stated without Problem 3.6's time boundary condition ua(N,⋅)=Mu(N,⋅)u_a(N,\cdot)=\mathcal Mu(N,\cdot)ua​(N,⋅)=Mu(N,⋅), which (3.8) does not encode. The continuity of the restricted driver claimed in Lemma 3.5 is not part of that milestone; the truncated part of Theorem 3.13 takes continuity of an abstract F~\tilde FF~ as a hypothesis.

The N→∞N\to\inftyN→∞ clause of Theorem 3.13 ("u=lim⁡N→∞uNu=\lim_{N\to\infty}u^Nu=limN→∞​uN, monotone from below") is not stated: the paper does not define the truncated operator beyond time NNN, and with the zero extension the monotonicity in NNN fails. The goal keeps the clause's well-defined content, existence and uniqueness of the bounded solution. A goal asserting only uniqueness (Proposition 3.3), or existence with the uniform bound hidden inside a definition, would be a different theorem; the bound is an explicit hypothesis.

A complete development needs solvability of finite-dimensional monotone nonlinear systems (the existence result cited from Reisinger and Zhang), monotone convergence in finite dimensions, and maximum-principle arguments on N×X\mathbb N\times XN×X. The comparison principles and the a-priori bound are reusable for other monotone schemes. Proofs of any milestone, and alternative existence arguments for the goal, are welcome.

Selected references

  • C. Reisinger and J. Tam, Markov decision processes with observation costs: framework and computation with a penalty scheme, arXiv:2201.07908v3, 2023; Mathematics of Operations Research, 2025. https://arxiv.org/abs/2201.07908v3
  • C. Reisinger and Y. Zhang, A penalty scheme for monotone systems with interconnected obstacles: convergence and error estimates, SIAM Journal on Numerical Analysis 57(4):1625–1648, 2019 (reference [28] of the paper).
  • R. F. Anderson and A. Friedman, Optimal inspections in a stochastic control problem with costly observations, Mathematics of Operations Research 2(2):155–190, 1977. https://doi.org/10.1287/moor.2.2.155
  • B. Hajek, K. Mitzel and S. Yang, Paging and registration in cellular networks: jointly optimal policies and an iterative algorithm, IEEE Transactions on Information Theory 54:608–622, 2008.
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Advance Selling and Upgrading in Priority Queues: With Only Online Customers, Upgrading Raises the Optimal Revenue Exactly When Bₛ − Bₐ > α(p(λₕ) − p(λₗ))Research Paper

Motivation

Amusement parks and similar attractions sell two kinds of ticket for the same ride: a regular ticket, which joins a first-come-first-served queue, and a fast-track ticket, which joins a separate queue served with non-preemptive priority. Increasingly these tickets are sold online in advance, before the customer knows whether the park will be crowded on the day, and some parks also let a customer who bought a regular ticket online upgrade to fast track on arrival for a fee. Whether such an upgrading option earns the seller anything beyond what advance selling already earns is a pricing question that combines two literatures: the economics of priority queues, going back to Naor's toll model (Naor 1969) and equilibrium threshold strategies in priority queues (Hassin and Haviv 1997), and advance selling under demand uncertainty (Xie and Shugan 2001), where upgrades had been studied for inventory but not for queues (Cui, Duenyas and Sahin 2018).

Wang, Cao, Xie and Zhan (MSOM 2025) answer it in a stylised M/M/1 model. This mission formalizes their main result for the case in which every customer buys online, Theorem 1, together with the propositions its proof rests on.

Setting

A single server has exponential service times with rate μ\muμ. The day is crowded (arrival rate λh\lambda_hλh​) or uncrowded (rate λl\lambda_lλl​), with 0<λl<λh<μ0<\lambda_l<\lambda_h<\mu0<λl​<λh​<μ; an arriving customer sees a crowded day with probability α∈(0,1)\alpha\in(0,1)α∈(0,1). Each customer has a cost ccc per unit of waiting time, uniform on [0,cˉ][0,\bar c][0,cˉ] with cˉ>0\bar c>0cˉ>0. Regular tickets cost BaB_aBa​ in advance and BsB_sBs​ on the spot; these prices are exogenous and may be any real numbers. The seller chooses the fast-track prices PaP_aPa​ (advance) and PsP_sPs​ (spot), and in the upgrading scheme also the fee KKK.

Customers sort themselves by two delay-sensitivity cutoffs 0<cr≤cf≤cˉ0<c_r\le c_f\le\bar c0<cr​≤cf​≤cˉ. If on a day of rate λ\lambdaλ the customers with cost above a cutoff ccc use the fast track, the expected waits are

WF(c)=λμ(μ−(1−c/cˉ)λ),WR(c)=μWF(c)μ−λ,W_F(c)=\frac{\lambda}{\mu\bigl(\mu-(1-c/\bar c)\lambda\bigr)},\qquad W_R(c)=\frac{\mu W_F(c)}{\mu-\lambda},WF​(c)=μ(μ−(1−c/cˉ)λ)λ​,WR​(c)=μ−λμWF​(c)​,

Cobham's formulas for a two-class priority queue. The crowded-day waits WhW^hWh are evaluated at (λh,cr)(\lambda_h,c_r)(λh​,cr​) and the uncrowded-day waits WlW^lWl at (λl,cf)(\lambda_l,c_f)(λl​,cf​).

The paper reduces the seller's problem to two explicit programs. Under AS (advance and spot selling) the seller maximises

ΠAS=Pa(1−cfcˉ)+(αPs+(1−α)Bs)cf−crcˉ+min⁡{Ba,Bs}crcˉ\Pi^{AS}=P_a\Bigl(1-\frac{c_f}{\bar c}\Bigr)+\bigl(\alpha P_s+(1-\alpha)B_s\bigr)\frac{c_f-c_r}{\bar c}+\min\{B_a,B_s\}\frac{c_r}{\bar c}ΠAS=Pa​(1−cˉcf​​)+(αPs​+(1−α)Bs​)cˉcf​−cr​​+min{Ba​,Bs​}cˉcr​​

over (cr,cf,Pa,Ps)(c_r,c_f,P_a,P_s)(cr​,cf​,Pa​,Ps​) subject to Pa≤PsP_a\le P_sPa​≤Ps​, 0<cr≤cf≤cˉ0<c_r\le c_f\le\bar c0<cr​≤cf​≤cˉ, and three indifference conditions that apply only when cr<cfc_r<c_fcr​<cf​, when cf<cˉc_f<\bar ccf​<cˉ, and when cf=cˉc_f=\bar ccf​=cˉ respectively (program (7)). Under AUS (advance and spot selling with upgrading), the term αPs+(1−α)Bs\alpha P_s+(1-\alpha)B_sαPs​+(1−α)Bs​ becomes min⁡{αPs+(1−α)Bs, Ba+αK}\min\{\alpha P_s+(1-\alpha)B_s,\ B_a+\alpha K\}min{αPs​+(1−α)Bs​, Ba​+αK} and Pa≤Ba+KP_a\le B_a+KPa​≤Ba​+K is added (program (8)). Write ΠAS⋆\Pi^{AS\star}ΠAS⋆ and ΠAUS⋆\Pi^{AUS\star}ΠAUS⋆ for their optimal values, and

p(λ)=(μ−μ(μ−λ))λcˉ(μ−λ)μ2,c(λ)=(μ(μ−λ)−(μ−λ))cˉλ,π(λ)=(μ−μ−λ)2cˉμ(μ−λ).p(\lambda)=\frac{\bigl(\mu-\sqrt{\mu(\mu-\lambda)}\bigr)\lambda\bar c}{(\mu-\lambda)\mu^2},\quad c(\lambda)=\frac{\bigl(\sqrt{\mu(\mu-\lambda)}-(\mu-\lambda)\bigr)\bar c}{\lambda},\quad \pi(\lambda)=\frac{(\sqrt\mu-\sqrt{\mu-\lambda})^2\bar c}{\mu(\mu-\lambda)}.p(λ)=(μ−λ)μ2(μ−μ(μ−λ)​)λcˉ​,c(λ)=λ(μ(μ−λ)​−(μ−λ))cˉ​,π(λ)=μ(μ−λ)(μ​−μ−λ​)2cˉ​.

These are the optimal price premium, cutoff and revenue gain when the rate λ\lambdaλ is known.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 1

ΠAS⋆=ΠAUS⋆  if Bs−Ba≤α(p(λh)−p(λl)),ΠAUS⋆>ΠAS⋆  if Bs−Ba>α(p(λh)−p(λl)).\Pi^{AS\star}=\Pi^{AUS\star}\ \text{ if } B_s-B_a\le\alpha\bigl(p(\lambda_h)-p(\lambda_l)\bigr),\qquad \Pi^{AUS\star}>\Pi^{AS\star}\ \text{ if } B_s-B_a>\alpha\bigl(p(\lambda_h)-p(\lambda_l)\bigr).ΠAS⋆=ΠAUS⋆  if Bs​−Ba​≤α(p(λh​)−p(λl​)),ΠAUS⋆>ΠAS⋆  if Bs​−Ba​>α(p(λh​)−p(λl​)).

The goal compares the two optima and does not mention their common value. It asserts that the AS supremum exists, that the AUS maximum is attained, and the comparison.

Milestones

  1. The ordering 0<c(λh)<c(λl)<cˉ0<c(\lambda_h)<c(\lambda_l)<\bar c0<c(λh​)<c(λl​)<cˉ (§5.1, p. 15).
  2. Lemma 1: with all customers buying on the spot, the equilibrium cutoffs are the closed form (5).
  3. The single-rate cutoff problem from the proof of Proposition 3: ψ(c^)=c^(WR(c^)−WF(c^))\psi(\hat c)=\hat c(W_R(\hat c)-W_F(\hat c))ψ(c^)=c^(WR​(c^)−WF​(c^)) is strictly increasing, and the revenue as a function of the cutoff is maximised at c(λ)c(\lambda)c(λ) with value π(λ)\pi(\lambda)π(λ).
  4. Proposition 3: with a known rate λ\lambdaλ, the optimal spot price is Bs+p(λ)B_s+p(\lambda)Bs​+p(λ) and the optimal revenue π(λ)+Bs\pi(\lambda)+B_sπ(λ)+Bs​.
  5. Proposition 5, parts 1)–2): if Bs−Ba<α(p(λh)−p(λl))B_s-B_a<\alpha(p(\lambda_h)-p(\lambda_l))Bs​−Ba​<α(p(λh​)−p(λl​)), the AS optimum is απ(λh)+(1−α)π(λl)+min⁡{Ba,Bs}\alpha\pi(\lambda_h)+(1-\alpha)\pi(\lambda_l)+\min\{B_a,B_s\}απ(λh​)+(1−α)π(λl​)+min{Ba​,Bs​}, attained only at cutoffs (c(λh),c(λl))(c(\lambda_h),c(\lambda_l))(c(λh​),c(λl​)) and explicit prices.
  6. Proposition 5, last sentence: if Bs−Ba>α(p(λh)−p(λl))B_s-B_a>\alpha(p(\lambda_h)-p(\lambda_l))Bs​−Ba​>α(p(λh​)−p(λl​)), the AS supremum is strictly below απ(λh)+(1−α)π(λl)+Ba\alpha\pi(\lambda_h)+(1-\alpha)\pi(\lambda_l)+B_aαπ(λh​)+(1−α)π(λl​)+Ba​.
  7. Proposition 6: the AUS optimum is always απ(λh)+(1−α)π(λl)+min⁡{Ba,Bs}\alpha\pi(\lambda_h)+(1-\alpha)\pi(\lambda_l)+\min\{B_a,B_s\}απ(λh​)+(1−α)π(λl​)+min{Ba​,Bs​}, with explicit optimal prices and fees in three regimes.

Significance

The value απ(λh)+(1−α)π(λl)+B\alpha\pi(\lambda_h)+(1-\alpha)\pi(\lambda_l)+Bαπ(λh​)+(1−α)π(λl​)+B is what a seller would earn by charging a different fast-track price on crowded and uncrowded days. Theorem 1 says that the upgrading option always recovers this state-dependent benchmark, whereas advance selling alone recovers it only while the spot regular premium Bs−BaB_s-B_aBs​−Ba​ stays below the threshold α(p(λh)−p(λl))\alpha(p(\lambda_h)-p(\lambda_l))α(p(λh​)−p(λl​)). The threshold gives a concrete pricing rule: offer upgrades exactly when the spot regular ticket is much dearer than the advance one. The paper builds its welfare comparison (§5.4) and its extensions with balking and extra on-site waiting (§6) on the same programs.

The result is proved in the paper, with proofs in its Online Appendix. Nothing in this model has a machine-checked proof. A formalization would check the case analysis of the conditional constraints, which the printed statement gets wrong at the boundary (see Formalization scope), and would provide a Lean model of the waits, the single-rate optimum and the two programs that later missions on this paper can reuse.

Difficulty

Each single-rate step is one-variable calculus with square roots. The difficulty lies in the two programs. Their constraints switch on and off with the cutoffs. Treating them as equalities throughout, or as a disjunction of cases, changes the feasible set. The obvious argument shows that every feasible value is at most the benchmark, by maximising the separable revenue in each cutoff. That is enough for Proposition 6 and for the equality case of Theorem 1, but not for the strict inequality. There the benchmark's maximiser violates Pa≤PsP_a\le P_sPa​≤Ps​, the supremum of (7) need not be attained, and the AS value must be shown to stay a positive distance below the benchmark over a feasible set that is not closed.

Formalization scope

All objects are explicit real expressions in a definitions file, AdvSellUpgrade.Online.Setting. The parameters (μ,λh,λl,α,cˉ,Ba,Bs)(\mu,\lambda_h,\lambda_l,\alpha,\bar c,B_a,B_s)(μ,λh​,λl​,α,cˉ,Ba​,Bs​) are bundled in a structure. The standing assumptions are 0<λl<λh<μ0<\lambda_l<\lambda_h<\mu0<λl​<λh​<μ, cˉ>0\bar c>0cˉ>0 and 0<α<10<\alpha<10<α<1; no sign is assumed on any price. The conventions are:

  • The mission is stated on the reduced programs (7) and (8) as printed. The queueing game they come from (Definition 1, Propositions 1–2 and the revenue (3)) is not formalized; the waits are taken in Cobham's closed form.
  • α\alphaα is a free parameter in (0,1)(0,1)(0,1). The paper defines it as βλh/λˉ\beta\lambda_h/\bar\lambdaβλh​/λˉ, and every value in (0,1)(0,1)(0,1) arises from exactly one β\betaβ. Theorem 1 fails at α=1\alpha=1α=1.
  • The "if" constraints of (7) and (8) are implications.
  • The fourth constraint of (8) is printed with WhW^hWh. It is read with WlW^lWl, as in (7). It binds only at cf=cˉc_f=\bar ccf​=cˉ and does not affect any statement of the mission.
  • Optimal values are stated as a least upper bound (for AS) or a greatest element (for AUS) of the set of attainable objective values, never as a bare supremum, which Lean sets to 000 on an empty or unbounded set. This rules out the trivializing reading of Theorem 1 as 0=00=00=0. The goal does not contain the closed-form optimum.
  • Boundary repairs. Theorem 1 prints "<<<" for the equality case and "Otherwise" for the strict one. At Bs−Ba=α(p(λh)−p(λl))B_s-B_a=\alpha(p(\lambda_h)-p(\lambda_l))Bs​−Ba​=α(p(λh​)−p(λl​)) the AS program attains the AUS optimum, so the boundary point belongs to the equality case, as in the paper's own proof (Online Appendix p. 13). The same repair applies to the last sentence of Proposition 5.
  • Proposition 5 is formalized in parts 1)–2) and its last sentence. Parts 3)–4) use a threshold and a root defined only implicitly in the appendix.
  • Proposition 3 and the single-rate milestones are stated for every rate λ∈(0,μ)\lambda\in(0,\mu)λ∈(0,μ), which covers both states.

Useful contributions include the one-variable lemmas on ppp, ccc, π\piπ and the waits, and the reduction of (7) and (8) to the separable revenue in the cutoffs.

Selected references

  • Y. Wang, P. Cao, J. Xie, D. Zhan, Advance Selling and Upgrading in Priority Queues, Manufacturing & Service Operations Management, 2025. https://doi.org/10.1287/msom.2023.0410
  • A. Cobham, Priority assignment in waiting line problems, Journal of the Operations Research Society of America 2(1), 1954. https://doi.org/10.1287/opre.2.1.70
  • P. Naor, The regulation of queue size by levying tolls, Econometrica 37(1), 1969. https://doi.org/10.2307/1909200
  • R. Hassin, M. Haviv, Equilibrium threshold strategies: the case of queues with priorities, Operations Research 45(6), 1997. https://doi.org/10.1287/opre.45.6.966
  • J. Xie, S. M. Shugan, Electronic tickets, smart cards, and online prepayments: when and how to advance sell, Marketing Science 20(3), 2001. https://doi.org/10.1287/mksc.20.3.219.9765
  • Y. Cui, I. Duenyas, Ö. Şahin, Pricing of conditional upgrades in the presence of strategic consumers, Management Science 64(7), 2018. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2017.2783
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A Model of Shoppertainment Live Streaming: Zero Entertainment Bandwidth Is Never Optimal, the Optimal Bandwidth Lies Beyond the Traffic Peak, and Is Full Entertainment When vₑ > v(1+q)/4Research Paper

Motivation

In shoppertainment live streaming a single streamer sells products from many manufacturers during live sessions that mix product presentation with entertainment. Some of the most successful streamers spend much of their air time on content unrelated to the products; the paper cites Dong Yuhui, who devotes his sessions to English lessons. Traditional TV shopping (QVC) does the opposite and spends all air time on product features. This raises a question for operations and marketing: how should a streamer split a session's limited bandwidth between entertainment and product information?

Gu, Zhao and Wu (Management Science, 2024) answer it in a three-stage game between a streamer, a pool of manufacturers and a population of consumers. Entertainment attracts consumers directly, but it also leaves them less certain whether a product fits, and that uncertainty changes how manufacturers price. The paper's headline result, Proposition 3, says that zero entertainment is never optimal. This mission formalizes Proposition 3 together with the chain of lemmas and propositions of Section 4 on which it rests.

Setting

A product has quality q∈[0,1]q \in [0,1]q∈[0,1], the probability that it fits a consumer. A good fit is worth v>0v > 0v>0 and a bad fit 000. The qualities of the contracted manufacturers are uniform on [q‾,1][\underline q, 1][q​,1], where q‾∈[0,1)\underline q \in [0,1)q​∈[0,1) is the streamer's quality threshold; write dF(q)=dq/(1−q‾)dF(q) = dq/(1-\underline q)dF(q)=dq/(1−q​). The streamer keeps a commission rate α∈(0,1)\alpha \in (0,1)α∈(0,1) of sales revenue.

The streamer chooses an entertainment bandwidth te∈[0,1]t_e \in [0,1]te​∈[0,1], the share of a session spent on entertainment. Each attending consumer receives a fit signal whose accuracy is 1−te1 - t_e1−te​. After a good signal the posterior fit probability is 1−te+teq1 - t_e + t_e q1−te​+te​q, after a bad one it is teqt_e qte​q. The two willingness-to-pay levels are therefore

pH=(1−te+teq) v,pL=teqv.p_H = (1 - t_e + t_e q)\,v, \qquad p_L = t_e q v .pH​=(1−te​+te​q)v,pL​=te​qv.

With TTT attending consumers, the demand at price ppp is TTT if p≤pLp \le p_Lp≤pL​ (everyone buys), qTqTqT if pL<p≤pHp_L < p \le p_HpL​<p≤pH​ (only good-signal consumers buy), and 000 above pHp_HpH​. A manufacturer earns (1−α) p D(p)(1-\alpha)\,p\,D(p)(1−α)pD(p).

Write t^e=1/(2−q‾)\hat t_e = 1/(2-\underline q)t^e​=1/(2−q​) and q^=2−1/te\hat q = 2 - 1/t_eq^​=2−1/te​. In equilibrium a manufacturer of quality qqq prices low (pLp_LpL​) exactly when te>1/(2−q)t_e > 1/(2-q)te​>1/(2−q), that is, when q<q^q < \hat qq<q^​. A consumer's expected shopping surplus Eup(te)Eu_p(t_e)Eup​(te​) is the average, over manufacturers, of what the consumer gains at the equilibrium price. Attending costs are uniform on [0,K][0,K][0,K], and the streamer's entertaining capability ve≥0v_e \ge 0ve​≥0 gives the entertainment utility vetev_e t_eve​te​, so the attending traffic is

T(te)=vete+Eup(te)K.T(t_e) = \frac{v_e t_e + Eu_p(t_e)}{K}.T(te​)=Kve​te​+Eup​(te​)​.

The individual profitability π(te)\pi(t_e)π(te​) is the streamer's expected commission from one attending consumer, and the streamer's payoff is Π(te)=T(te) π(te)\Pi(t_e) = T(t_e)\,\pi(t_e)Π(te​)=T(te​)π(te​).

Formalization targets

Goal: Proposition 3 (p. 33)

For 0<α<10 < \alpha < 10<α<1, v>0v > 0v>0, K>0K > 0K>0, 0≤q‾<10 \le \underline q < 10≤q​<1 and ve≥0v_e \ge 0ve​≥0:

  1. te=0t_e = 0te​=0 is not a maximizer of Π\PiΠ on [0,1][0,1][0,1], and Π\PiΠ attains its maximum on [0,1][0,1][0,1];
  2. if ve≤v(1+q‾)/4v_e \le v(1+\underline q)/4ve​≤v(1+q​)/4, every maximizer te∗t^*_ete∗​ of Π\PiΠ satisfies te∗≥teTt^*_e \ge t^T_ete∗​≥teT​ for every maximizer teTt^T_eteT​ of TTT;
  3. if ve>v(1+q‾)/4v_e > v(1+\underline q)/4ve​>v(1+q​)/4, then
Π(te)<Π(1)for all te∈[0,1).\Pi(t_e) < \Pi(1) \qquad \text{for all } t_e \in [0,1).Π(te​)<Π(1)for all te​∈[0,1).

Milestones

  • Lemma 2 (p. 24): a manufacturer of quality q>0q > 0q>0 maximizes profit at pLp_LpL​ (uniquely) when te>1/(2−q)t_e > 1/(2-q)te​>1/(2−q) and at pHp_HpH​ when te≤1/(2−q)t_e \le 1/(2-q)te​≤1/(2−q).
  • Proposition 1 (p. 25): the proportion of low-pricing manufacturers is ψ(te)=(q^−q‾)/(1−q‾)\psi(t_e) = (\hat q - \underline q)/(1-\underline q)ψ(te​)=(q^​−q​)/(1−q​) for te>t^et_e > \hat t_ete​>t^e​ and 000 otherwise; it increases in tet_ete​ and decreases in q‾\underline qq​.
  • Lemma 3 (p. 27): Eup=∫q‾q^(1−te) qv dF(q)Eu_p = \int_{\underline q}^{\hat q}(1-t_e)\,q v\,dF(q)Eup​=∫q​q^​​(1−te​)qvdF(q) for te>t^et_e > \hat t_ete​>t^e​, and 000 otherwise.
  • Display (14) (p. 31): π(te)=α(∫q‾q^pL dF+∫q^1pHq dF)\pi(t_e) = \alpha\big(\int_{\underline q}^{\hat q} p_L\,dF + \int_{\hat q}^1 p_H q\,dF\big)π(te​)=α(∫q​q^​​pL​dF+∫q^​1​pH​qdF) for te>t^et_e > \hat t_ete​>t^e​, and α∫q‾1pHq dF\alpha \int_{\underline q}^1 p_H q\,dFα∫q​1​pH​qdF otherwise.
  • Proposition 2 (p. 27): TTT is strictly increasing on [0,1][0,1][0,1] if ve>v(1+q‾)/2v_e > v(1+\underline q)/2ve​>v(1+q​)/2; otherwise it strictly increases up to a peak teT∈[t^e,1]t^T_e \in [\hat t_e, 1]teT​∈[t^e​,1] and strictly decreases after it.
  • Lemma 4 (p. 32): π\piπ strictly decreases and then strictly increases on [0,1][0,1][0,1], is maximal at both te=0t_e = 0te​=0 and te=1t_e = 1te​=1, and is strictly increasing in q‾\underline qq​.

Significance

Proposition 3 is the paper's managerial conclusion. Spending all bandwidth on product information, as TV shopping does, is never optimal. A streamer should allocate at least the traffic-maximizing share to entertainment, and should go to full entertainment once its entertaining capability exceeds v(1+q‾)/4v(1+\underline q)/4v(1+q​)/4. Corollary 2 and the extensions of Section 5 of the paper (informing capability, in-session adjustment, competing streamers) build on this result and on the Section 4 chain.

The results are proved in the paper and its Online Supplementary, and none is machine-checked. The supplement's argument for the regime ve>v(1+q‾)/4v_e > v(1+\underline q)/4ve​>v(1+q​)/4 shows only that dΠ/dte>0d\Pi/dt_e > 0dΠ/dte​>0 at te=1t_e = 1te​=1, a local statement. The goal here asks for the global claim that te=1t_e = 1te​=1 is the unique maximizer, so a complete formalization closes a gap in the published argument. The milestones make the paper's equilibrium derivation (manufacturer pricing, consumer surplus, traffic, profitability) checkable step by step.

Difficulty

Lemma 2, Proposition 1, Lemma 3 and display (14) are elementary: case analysis of a price and integrals of piecewise polynomials whose switch point q^(te)\hat q(t_e)q^​(te​) depends on tet_ete​. Proposition 2 and Lemma 4 need sign analysis of explicit rational functions of tet_ete​ on [t^e,1][\hat t_e, 1][t^e​,1], uniformly in q‾∈[0,1)\underline q \in [0,1)q​∈[0,1). The traffic is not concave there: its surplus component is convex on part of the interval and concave on the rest.

The goal is the hard part. Π=Tπ\Pi = T\piΠ=Tπ is the product of a function that rises and then falls (Proposition 2) and a function that falls and then rises (Lemma 4), so the shape of either factor does not settle where the product peaks. Comparing maximizers of Π\PiΠ with maximizers of TTT, and ruling out an interior maximum of Π\PiΠ above the threshold v(1+q‾)/4v(1+\underline q)/4v(1+q​)/4 for every q‾\underline qq​ and vev_eve​, requires quantitative control of the product, not just the monotonicity pattern of its factors. Checking the sign of dΠ/dted\Pi/dt_edΠ/dte​ at te=1t_e = 1te​=1 alone is not enough.

Formalization scope

All parameters are real numbers and every function of the model is total; the statements carry the standing ranges as hypotheses. The bandwidth domain is Set.Icc 0 1, and "optimal" means IsMaxOn on that set. The single definitions file Shoppertainment.OptimalBandwidth.Model contains pHp_HpH​, pLp_LpL​, the demand (8) extended by 000 above pHp_HpH​, the manufacturer's profit, t^e\hat t_et^e​, q^\hat qq^​, the equilibrium pricing rule, ψ\psiψ (as a Lebesgue measure), the consumer's ex-ante surplus, EupEu_pEup​, TTT, the revenue per attending consumer, π\piπ and Π\PiΠ. EupEu_pEup​ and π\piπ are integrals over the uniform law of quantities evaluated at each manufacturer's equilibrium price. They are not defined by the closed forms (12) and (14). This keeps Lemma 3 and (14) genuine statements and ties the goal to the manufacturers' equilibrium.

Conventions and pinned hypotheses:

  • q‾<1\underline q < 1q​<1, so that the uniform law on [q‾,1][\underline q,1][q​,1] exists (the paper allows q‾≤1\underline q \le 1q​≤1).
  • α<1\alpha < 1α<1, the standing range of p. 13.
  • Lemma 2 pins q>0q > 0q>0 and T>0T > 0T>0. Without them every positive price earns 000.
  • Lemma 2 uses the manufacturer's own threshold 1/(2−q)1/(2-q)1/(2−q), as in the Online Supplementary A.2 and Figure 4(b). The printed display (10) reads 1/(2−q‾)1/(2-\underline q)1/(2−q​), which would contradict Proposition 1.
  • A tie te=1/(2−q)t_e = 1/(2-q)te​=1/(2−q) is priced high, as in (10). It is a null set for every integral.
  • Proposition 2 assumes ve>0v_e > 0ve​>0 (Table 1), and the goal assumes ve≥0v_e \ge 0ve​≥0 (as printed in Proposition 3).
  • The peaks teTt^T_eteT​ and te∗t^*_ete∗​ are stated as maximizers, never through the first-order conditions of the supplement.
  • Proposition 1's decrease in q‾\underline qq​ is strict for te<1t_e < 1te​<1 and weak at te=1t_e = 1te​=1, where ψ≡1\psi \equiv 1ψ≡1.

Two formalizations would trivialize the mission, and both are excluded. Without the existence clause, a "for every maximizer" statement could hold vacuously, so the goal asserts existence. Defining EupEu_pEup​ and π\piπ by (12) and (14) would make two milestones true by definition.

Lemma 1, Corollaries 1–2, Remark 1 and the Section 5 extensions are not posed. A complete development needs only Mathlib's interval integrals, Lebesgue measure on R\mathbb RR and elementary real analysis. Proofs of the closed forms of the Online Supplementary (Γ\GammaΓ in A.4, (A1) in A.6) are welcome as auxiliary lemmas.

Selected references

  • Z. Gu, X. Zhao, D. J. Wu, A Model of Shoppertainment Live Streaming, Management Science, 2024; authors' accepted manuscript, October 2024. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2023.01724
  • R. Lal, M. Sarvary, When and How Is the Internet Likely to Decrease Price Competition?, Marketing Science 18(4), 1999. https://doi.org/10.1287/mksc.18.4.485
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Robust Markov Decision Processes: Beyond Rectangularity 2: With Polyhedral r-Rectangular Factor Sets, One Deterministic Policy and Factor Matrix Stay Robust-Optimal for All Discount Factors Near 1Research Paper

Motivation

A Markov decision process (MDP) models sequential decisions under uncertainty: in each state a decision maker picks an action, collects a reward, and the system moves to a random next state according to a transition kernel. In applications the kernel is estimated from data, and an optimal policy for the estimated kernel can perform poorly under a slightly different one. Robust MDPs replace the single kernel by an uncertainty set and maximize the worst-case discounted reward over that set (Iyengar 2005; Nilim and El Ghaoui 2005; Wiesemann, Kuhn and Rustem 2013).

Goyal and Grand-Clément (arXiv:1811.00215v8) introduce r-rectangular uncertainty sets, in which transitions are mixtures of a small number of uncertain factors chosen independently by an adversary. Beyond the algorithmic results (the subject of the first mission of this series), they prove two structural properties of optimal robust policies in this model: a robust maximum principle and robust Blackwell optimality.

In a classical MDP, a policy is Blackwell optimal if it is optimal for every discount factor close enough to 111 (Blackwell 1962; Puterman 1994, §10.1.2). Blackwell optimal policies are optimal for the long-run average reward and for every finer nnn-discount criterion, so they connect discounted and average-reward control. For two-player perfect-information zero-sum stochastic games the existence of Blackwell optimal strategies is due to Gaubert and Gunawardena (1998). Goyal and Grand-Clément establish the analogous statement for robust MDPs with r-rectangular uncertainty, under the assumption that the factor sets have finitely many extreme points, as polyhedral factor sets do.

Setting

Let S\mathbb SS and A\mathbb AA be finite sets of states and actions, with rewards rsa≥0r_{sa}\ge0rsa​≥0, an initial distribution p0∈Δ(S)p_0\in\Delta(\mathbb S)p0​∈Δ(S), and a discount factor λ∈(0,1)\lambda\in(0,1)λ∈(0,1). Fix coefficients usai≥0u^i_{sa}\ge0usai​≥0, i∈[r]i\in[r]i∈[r], with ∑iusai=1\sum_i u^i_{sa}=1∑i​usai​=1. A factor matrix W=(w1,…,wr)W=(w_1,\dots,w_r)W=(w1​,…,wr​) has probability vectors wi∈Δ(S)w_i\in\Delta(\mathbb S)wi​∈Δ(S) as columns and induces the kernel

Psas′=∑i=1rusai wi,s′.P_{sas'}=\sum_{i=1}^r u^i_{sa}\,w_{i,s'} .Psas′​=i=1∑r​usai​wi,s′​.

The adversary chooses WWW from a nonempty convex compact set W\mathcal WW. Its projections are the factor sets W1,…,Wr\mathcal W^1,\dots,\mathcal W^rW1,…,Wr, and W\mathcal WW is r-rectangular when W=W1×⋯×Wr\mathcal W=\mathcal W^1\times\dots\times\mathcal W^rW=W1×⋯×Wr.

A stationary policy π∈Π\pi\in\Piπ∈Π picks πs∈Δ(A)\pi_s\in\Delta(\mathbb A)πs​∈Δ(A) in each state; it is deterministic when each πs\pi_sπs​ is a point mass. With rπ=(∑aπsarsa)sr_\pi=(\sum_a\pi_{sa}r_{sa})_srπ​=(∑a​πsa​rsa​)s​ and L(π,W)ss′=∑aπsaPsas′L(\pi,W)_{ss'}=\sum_a\pi_{sa}P_{sas'}L(π,W)ss′​=∑a​πsa​Psas′​, the value function and the expected reward are

vλπ,W=∑t≥0λtL(π,W)trπ,R(π,W,λ)=p0⊤vλπ,W.v^{\pi,W}_\lambda=\sum_{t\ge0}\lambda^tL(\pi,W)^tr_\pi,\qquad R(\pi,W,\lambda)=p_0^\top v^{\pi,W}_\lambda .vλπ,W​=t≥0∑​λtL(π,W)trπ​,R(π,W,λ)=p0⊤​vλπ,W​.

The worst-case value of π\piπ is zλ(π)=min⁡W∈WR(π,W,λ)z_\lambda(\pi)=\min_{W\in\mathcal W}R(\pi,W,\lambda)zλ​(π)=minW∈W​R(π,W,λ). A pair (π∗,W∗)(\pi^*,W^*)(π∗,W∗) is an optimal solution of the robust MDP problem (1.2) at discount λ\lambdaλ when π∗\pi^*π∗ maximizes zλz_\lambdazλ​ over Π\PiΠ and W∗W^*W∗ attains min⁡W∈WR(π∗,W,λ)\min_{W\in\mathcal W}R(\pi^*,W,\lambda)minW∈W​R(π∗,W,λ). The Lean development uses this notation: value, R, z, IsRobustSolution, IsRRect, factorSet, IsDeterministic.

Formalization targets

Goal: robust Blackwell optimality (Proposition 6.2)

If W\mathcal WW is r-rectangular and every factor set Wi\mathcal W^iWi has finitely many extreme points, there exist a deterministic policy π∗\pi^*π∗, a factor matrix W∗∈WW^*\in\mathcal WW∗∈W and λ0∈(0,1)\lambda_0\in(0,1)λ0​∈(0,1) with

∀λ∈(λ0,1):(π∗,W∗) is an optimal solution of (1.2) at discount λ.\forall\lambda\in(\lambda_0,1):\quad(\pi^*,W^*)\ \text{is an optimal solution of (1.2) at discount }\lambda .∀λ∈(λ0​,1):(π∗,W∗) is an optimal solution of (1.2) at discount λ.

The pair is fixed before λ0\lambda_0λ0​ and does not depend on λ\lambdaλ. The statement fixes no constant and no rate.

Milestones

  1. Proposition 6.1.1: a minimizer W1W^1W1 of R(π,⋅,λ)R(\pi,\cdot,\lambda)R(π,⋅,λ) is a worst case from every initial state, vλ,sπ,W1≤vλ,sπ,W0v^{\pi,W^1}_{\lambda,s}\le v^{\pi,W^0}_{\lambda,s}vλ,sπ,W1​≤vλ,sπ,W0​ for all W0∈WW^0\in\mathcal WW0∈W.
  2. Proposition 6.1.2 (robust maximum principle): if (π∗,W∗)(\pi^*,W^*)(π∗,W∗) solves (1.2), then vλ,sπ,W1≤vλ,sπ∗,W∗v^{\pi,W^1}_{\lambda,s}\le v^{\pi^*,W^*}_{\lambda,s}vλ,sπ,W1​≤vλ,sπ∗,W∗​ for every policy π\piπ, every minimizer W1W^1W1 of R(π,⋅,λ)R(\pi,\cdot,\lambda)R(π,⋅,λ) and every state sss.
  3. Appendix G.1, p. 26: for each λ\lambdaλ, (1.2) has an optimal solution (πλ,Wλ)(\pi_\lambda,W_\lambda)(πλ​,Wλ​) with πλ\pi_\lambdaπλ​ deterministic and WλW_\lambdaWλ​ an extreme point of W\mathcal WW.
  4. Appendix G.1, p. 27: vtπ,W=(I−tL(π,W))−1rπv^{\pi,W}_t=(I-tL(\pi,W))^{-1}r_\pivtπ,W​=(I−tL(π,W))−1rπ​ on (0,1)(0,1)(0,1), and each coordinate is a rational function of ttt whose denominator has no zero in (0,1)(0,1)(0,1).

Stronger: finitely many breakpoints (Proposition 6.3, optional)

Under the same hypotheses there are 0=λ0<λ1<⋯<λp=10=\lambda_0<\lambda_1<\dots<\lambda_p=10=λ0​<λ1​<⋯<λp​=1 and, for each jjj, a single deterministic pair (πj,Wj)(\pi_j,W_j)(πj​,Wj​) optimal for every λ∈(λj,λj+1)\lambda\in(\lambda_j,\lambda_{j+1})λ∈(λj​,λj+1​).

Significance

The result. Robust Blackwell optimality says that, for polyhedral r-rectangular uncertainty, a decision maker who is patient enough does not need to know the discount factor exactly: one deterministic policy is robust-optimal for all discounts near 111, and the adversary has one matching worst-case factor matrix. This is the robust counterpart of the classical bridge from discounted to average-reward criteria, and it is the natural entry point for a theory of robust MDPs under the long-run average criterion, for which the paper notes no results were known. The robust maximum principle states that an optimal robust policy has the highest worst-case value from every starting state, a comparison that has been used to derive structural properties of robust policies in a healthcare setting (Grand-Clément et al. 2020, cited on p. 13 of the paper).

Formalizing it. The results are proved in the paper; none has a machine-checked proof. The nominal analogues (Blackwell 1962, Theorem 5, and the rationality of the discounted value) are posed on Prove2Me as open targets on a different, nominal model and are not reused here. The formalization also corrects two printed statements: Proposition 6.1 is false for an initial distribution with a zero entry and is posed with p0>0p_0>0p0​>0, and the claim in Appendix G.1 that the factor matrix of a solution is an extreme point is posed in its existential form, the form the proof uses.

Difficulty

The obvious argument for the goal is a pigeonhole over the finitely many candidate pairs (deterministic policies and extreme factor matrices): some pair is optimal for discounts λn→1\lambda_n\to1λn​→1. The step that fails is passing from this sequence to a whole interval. Optimality of a pair is not a comparison between two fixed rational functions of λ\lambdaλ: the worst-case value zλ(π)z_\lambda(\pi)zλ​(π) is a minimum over W\mathcal WW, and optimality quantifies over all randomized policies. A comparison of worst-case values at one discount does not by itself give a comparison of value functions that can be propagated to other discounts. The paper bridges this gap with the robust maximum principle, which turns a worst-case comparison into a statewise comparison of two value functions, each rational in λ\lambdaλ. The maximum principle itself rests on the saddle-point structure of r-rectangular robust MDPs (Theorem 4.2 and Lemma 4.3 of the paper), which a solver must develop.

Formalization scope

All objects live in the definition FactorRMDP.Blackwell.Model. States and actions are finite types, with A\mathbb AA nonempty. Factors are indexed by Fin r, i.e. 0-based. A factor matrix is a function Fin r → S → ℝ. W\mathcal WW is a nonempty convex compact set of factor matrices with stochastic factors. Its factor sets are its projections, and r-rectangularity is the predicate IsRRect, not built into the structure. Rewards are nonnegative and p0∈Δ(S)p_0\in\Delta(\mathbb S)p0​∈Δ(S). The value function is the discounted series, not a fixed point, so no Bellman identity holds by definition. Minima and maxima are stated with IsLeast/IsGreatest, and statements at a fixed discount assume 0<λ<10<\lambda<10<λ<1. Optimality in (1.2) is over stationary randomized policies, as in the paper's proof, and requires both halves: π∗\pi^*π∗ maximizes zλz_\lambdazλ​ and W∗W^*W∗ attains min⁡WR(π∗,W,λ)\min_W R(\pi^*,W,\lambda)minW​R(π∗,W,λ). "Finitely many extreme points" is Mathlib's Set.extremePoints of each factor set. The second sentence of Assumption 2.4 (an optimization oracle) is not formalized.

Explicit choices relative to the printed text:

  • W\mathcal WW nonempty, A\mathbb AA nonempty and λ∈(0,1)\lambda\in(0,1)λ∈(0,1) are stated explicitly.
  • Proposition 6.1 (both parts) assumes p0(s)>0p_0(s)>0p0​(s)>0 for every state. As printed, it is false when p0p_0p0​ vanishes on a state.
  • The extreme-point claim of Appendix G.1 is posed as the existence of an optimal pair with an extreme factor matrix.
  • The goal (Proposition 6.2) keeps p0p_0p0​ arbitrary.

A goal in which the pair (π∗,W∗)(\pi^*,W^*)(π∗,W∗) may depend on λ\lambdaλ would only restate milestone 3 and is not robust Blackwell optimality; the pair is quantified before λ0\lambda_0λ0​.

A complete development needs the saddle-point theory of r-rectangular robust MDPs (shared with the first mission of this series), Neumann series and Cramer's rule for I−tLI-tLI−tL, extreme points of products of compact convex sets, and the finiteness of zeros of a nonzero polynomial. The rationality of discounted values and the extreme-point lemmas are reusable for nominal Blackwell optimality and for other robust models. Proofs of any milestone, of the optional Proposition 6.3, and auxiliary lemmas are welcome.

Selected references

  • V. Goyal and J. Grand-Clément, Robust Markov Decision Process: Beyond Rectangularity, arXiv:1811.00215v8, 2021; Mathematics of Operations Research, 2023. https://arxiv.org/abs/1811.00215, https://doi.org/10.1287/moor.2022.1259
  • D. Blackwell, Discrete Dynamic Programming, Annals of Mathematical Statistics 33, 1962. https://doi.org/10.1214/aoms/1177704593
  • S. Gaubert and J. Gunawardena, A Non-Linear Hierarchy for Discrete Event Dynamical Systems, 1998 (as cited in Goyal and Grand-Clément, reference list, arXiv:1811.00215v8).
  • G. N. Iyengar, Robust Dynamic Programming, Mathematics of Operations Research 30, 2005. https://doi.org/10.1287/moor.1040.0129
  • A. Nilim and L. El Ghaoui, Robust Control of Markov Decision Processes with Uncertain Transition Matrices, Operations Research 53, 2005. https://doi.org/10.1287/opre.1050.0216
  • W. Wiesemann, D. Kuhn and B. Rustem, Robust Markov Decision Processes, Mathematics of Operations Research 38, 2013. https://doi.org/10.1287/moor.1120.0566
  • M. L. Puterman, Markov Decision Processes: Discrete Stochastic Dynamic Programming, Wiley, 1994. https://doi.org/10.1002/9780470316887
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Coordinating Inventory Control and Pricing Strategies for Perishable Products 1: With Backlogging, the Profit-to-Go Is L♮-Concave and the Optimal Policy Is Monotone with Bounded SensitivityResearch Paper

Motivation

Food, blood and pharmaceuticals are perishable: a unit not sold within its lifetime is thrown away. A seller decides each period how much to order, which price to charge, and whether to dispose of stock early. A large stock of old units argues for a lower price and a smaller order.

Optimal policies for fixed-lifetime inventory are hard to characterize: the state is a vector of inventory levels by remaining lifetime (Fries 1975; Nahmias 1982), and later work turned largely to heuristics.

Chen, Pang and Pan (Oper. Res. 62(2), 2014) obtained structural results for the joint ordering, pricing and disposal problem with a positive replenishment lead time. They used L♮-concavity, a notion from discrete convex analysis (Murota 2003) that Zipkin (2008) used to analyze lost-sales inventory systems with lead times. This mission formalizes the paper's result for the case where unmet demand is backlogged.

Setting

A product with a lifetime of exactly l≥2l \ge 2l≥2 periods is reviewed periodically over a finite horizon of TTT periods. Orders arrive after a lead time of kkk periods, 0≤k<l0 \le k < l0≤k<l. Write L=l−1L = l - 1L=l−1.

Vectors and L♮-convexity. For vectors u,v∈Rnu, v \in \mathbb{R}^nu,v∈Rn, u∧vu \wedge vu∧v and u∨vu \vee vu∨v are the componentwise minimum and maximum, and eee is the all-ones vector. A set V\mathcal{V}V is L♮-convex if (u+αe)∧v(u + \alpha e) \wedge v(u+αe)∧v and u∨(v−αe)u \vee (v - \alpha e)u∨(v−αe) lie in V\mathcal{V}V for all u,v∈Vu, v \in \mathcal{V}u,v∈V and α≥0\alpha \ge 0α≥0. A function fff is L♮-convex on V\mathcal{V}V if moreover

f(u)+f(v)≥f((u+αe)∧v)+f(u∨(v−αe)),f(u) + f(v) \ge f\big((u + \alpha e) \wedge v\big) + f\big(u \vee (v - \alpha e)\big),f(u)+f(v)≥f((u+αe)∧v)+f(u∨(v−αe)),

and L♮-concave if −f-f−f is L♮-convex. The ordered sets are Vn,k={s∈Rn:s1≤⋯≤sk}\mathcal{V}_{n,k} = \{s \in \mathbb{R}^n : s_1 \le \dots \le s_k\}Vn,k​={s∈Rn:s1​≤⋯≤sk​}.

Data. The unit costs are ccc (ordering), h+h^+h+ (holding), h−h^-h− (backlogging) and θ\thetaθ (disposal), all nonnegative, and γ∈[0,1]\gamma \in [0, 1]γ∈[0,1] is the discount factor. The seller chooses the expected demand d∈D=[d‾,dˉ]d \in \mathcal{D} = [\underline d, \bar d]d∈D=[d​,dˉ] in place of the price. The price is P(d)P(d)P(d), strictly decreasing, and the expected revenue P(d)dP(d)dP(d)d is continuous and concave on D\mathcal{D}D. The realized demand is dt=d+εtd_t = d + \varepsilon_tdt​=d+εt​, where the noise terms are i.i.d. with mean zero and support in [A,B][A, B][A,B], A≤0≤BA \le 0 \le BA≤0≤B, and d‾+A≥0\underline d + A \ge 0d​+A≥0.

State and decisions. The state s=(s1,…,sl−1)s = (s_1, \dots, s_{l-1})s=(s1​,…,sl−1​) satisfies s1≤⋯≤sl−1s_1 \le \dots \le s_{l-1}s1​≤⋯≤sl−1​, so the state space is S=Vl−1,l−1\mathcal{S} = \mathcal{V}_{l-1,l-1}S=Vl−1,l−1​. The coordinate sis_isi​ is the inventory, net of backorders, with residual lifetime at most iii, including orders in transit. Each period the seller chooses:

  • an order-up-to level sl≥sl−1s_l \ge s_{l-1}sl​≥sl−1​;
  • a demand level d∈Dd \in \mathcal{D}d∈D;
  • after demand is realized, a depletion aaa with s1∨dt≤a≤sl−k∨dts_1 \vee d_t \le a \le s_{l-k} \vee d_ts1​∨dt​≤a≤sl−k​∨dt​, so a−dta - d_ta−dt​ units are disposed of.

The next state is s~=(s2−a,…,sl−a)\tilde s = (s_2 - a, \dots, s_l - a)s~=(s2​−a,…,sl​−a).

Recursion. The modified profit-to-go satisfies fT+1=0f_{T+1} = 0fT+1​=0 and

ft(s)=max⁡sl≥sl−1, d∈D{P(d)d+E[gt(s,sl,d∣εt)]},gt=max⁡s1∨dt≤a≤sl−k∨dtϕt,f_t(s) = \max_{s_l \ge s_{l-1},\ d \in \mathcal{D}} \Big\{ P(d)d + \mathbb{E}\big[g_t(s, s_l, d \mid \varepsilon_t)\big] \Big\}, \qquad g_t = \max_{s_1 \vee d_t \le a \le s_{l-k} \vee d_t} \phi_t,ft​(s)=sl​≥sl−1​, d∈Dmax​{P(d)d+E[gt​(s,sl​,d∣εt​)]},gt​=s1​∨dt​≤a≤sl−k​∨dt​max​ϕt​, ϕt(s,sl,d,a∣εt)=γc s~l−1−csl−θ(a−dt)−h+(sl−k−a)+−h−(a−sl−k)++γft+1(s~).\phi_t(s, s_l, d, a \mid \varepsilon_t) = \gamma c\,\tilde s_{l-1} - c s_l - \theta(a - d_t) - h^+(s_{l-k} - a)^+ - h^-(a - s_{l-k})^+ + \gamma f_{t+1}(\tilde s).ϕt​(s,sl​,d,a∣εt​)=γcs~l−1​−csl​−θ(a−dt​)−h+(sl−k​−a)+−h−(a−sl−k​)++γft+1​(s~).

In §4 the paper also assumes c≤h−/(1−γ)c \le h^-/(1 - \gamma)c≤h−/(1−γ).

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 1 (p. 291)

For t=1,…,T+1t = 1, \dots, T+1t=1,…,T+1, ftf_tft​, gtg_tgt​ and ϕt\phi_tϕt​ are L♮-concave in sss, (s,sl,d)(s, s_l, d)(s,sl​,d) and (s,sl,d,a)(s, s_l, d, a)(s,sl​,d,a). The largest optimal order-up-to level slt(s)s_{lt}(s)slt​(s) and demand level dt(s)d_t(s)dt​(s) are nondecreasing in sss, the optimal price is nonincreasing, and

slt(s+ωe)≤slt(s)+ω,dt(s+ωe)≤dt(s)+ω(ω≥0).s_{lt}(s + \omega e) \le s_{lt}(s) + \omega, \qquad d_t(s + \omega e) \le d_t(s) + \omega \qquad (\omega \ge 0).slt​(s+ωe)≤slt​(s)+ω,dt​(s+ωe)≤dt​(s)+ω(ω≥0).

The largest optimal depletion at(s,sl,d∣ε)a_t(s, s_l, d \mid \varepsilon)at​(s,sl​,d∣ε) is nondecreasing, and at(s+ωe,sl+ω,d+ω∣ε)≤at(s,sl,d∣ε)+ωa_t(s + \omega e, s_l + \omega, d + \omega \mid \varepsilon) \le a_t(s, s_l, d \mid \varepsilon) + \omegaat​(s+ωe,sl​+ω,d+ω∣ε)≤at​(s,sl​,d∣ε)+ω.

Milestones

  • The ordered sets Vn,k\mathcal{V}_{n,k}Vn,k​, Vn,k+\mathcal{V}^+_{n,k}Vn,k+​ are L♮-convex (p. 287).
  • Lemma 1: g(x,ξ)=f(x−ξe)g(x, \xi) = f(x - \xi e)g(x,ξ)=f(x−ξe) is L♮-convex when fff is (p. 287).
  • Lemma 2: partial minimization over an L♮-convex set preserves L♮-convexity (p. 287).
  • The set {a≥s1∨dt}\{a \ge s_1 \vee d_t\}{a≥s1​∨dt​} is L♮-convex (p. 291).
  • The bound ft+1(s~′)−ft+1(s~)≤(θ+c)δf_{t+1}(\tilde s') - f_{t+1}(\tilde s) \le (\theta + c)\deltaft+1​(s~′)−ft+1​(s~)≤(θ+c)δ for the next states generated by a′>a≥sl−k∨dta' > a \ge s_{l-k}\vee d_ta′>a≥sl−k​∨dt​ (p. 291).
  • (9): ϕt\phi_tϕt​ is nonincreasing in aaa beyond sl−k∨dts_{l-k} \vee d_tsl−k​∨dt​, so the upper bound on aaa can be dropped (p. 291).
  • Lemma 3: the largest minimizer of an L♮-convex function is monotone, with ξ(x+ωe)≤ξ(x)+ω\xi(x + \omega e) \le \xi(x) + \omegaξ(x+ωe)≤ξ(x)+ω (p. 287).
  • The first sentence of Theorem 1, the L♮-concavity of ftf_tft​, gtg_tgt​, ϕt\phi_tϕt​.
  • Corollary 1: monotone sensitivity of the order quantity and the demand level in each age class (p. 292).
  • Proposition 1: if θ≥h+/(1−γ)\theta \ge h^+/(1-\gamma)θ≥h+/(1−γ), depleting only dt∨s1d_t \vee s_1dt​∨s1​ is optimal (p. 292).

Significance

The result. Theorem 1 gives a qualitative description of the optimal policy in a model where no closed form is available. Fresher inventory leads to ordering less and charging more. One more unit of inventory of any age raises the order-up-to level and the demand level by at most one unit. Corollary 1 refines this by age: the order quantity is most sensitive to young inventory, and the price discount is most sensitive to inventory close to expiry. These properties underlie the bounds and heuristics of §6 of the paper.

The formalization. The result is proved in the paper, but parts of the argument are informal: the (θ+c)δ(\theta + c)\delta(θ+c)δ bound is a coupling argument, existence of optimal solutions is "straightforward to check and thus omitted", and Lemmas 1–3 are stated without proof. A formalization makes the induction checkable and yields a reusable library of L♮-convexity on real vectors with domains, used by the wider family of inventory models built on the same technique. None of these results is known to be machine-checked.

Difficulty

The obvious induction, that each step of the recursion preserves L♮-concavity, fails at the depletion problem (5): its constraint set is not L♮-convex, because of the upper bound a≤sl−k∨dta \le s_{l-k} \vee d_ta≤sl−k​∨dt​, so Lemma 2 does not apply. The bound must first be shown inactive, which needs a quantitative estimate of how the profit-to-go changes when backorders are added, a property of the value function itself.

Lemma 3 handles a scalar decision, while Theorem 1 has a pair (sl,d)(s_l, d)(sl​,d) and needs the componentwise-largest maximizer; every supremum and expectation must also be shown to be finite.

Formalization scope

  • Carrier. The paper treats F∈{R,Z}\mathbb{F} \in \{\mathbb{R}, \mathbb{Z}\}F∈{R,Z} at once. The mission formalizes the real case only.

  • L♮-convexity. Functions are real-valued on an explicit domain set, which is the paper's own convention for "L♮-convex on a set". The submodularity characterization is not used as the definition.

  • Indexing. States are Fin L → ℝ with L=l−1≥1L = l - 1 \ge 1L=l−1≥1, indexed from 0, and the lead time satisfies k≤Lk \le Lk≤L. The paper's sl−ks_{l-k}sl−k​ is coordinate L−kL - kL−k of (s1,…,sl)(s_1, \dots, s_l)(s1​,…,sl​): at k=0k = 0k=0 it is the decision sls_lsl​, and at k=Lk = Lk=L it is s1s_1s1​.

  • Time. Time is counted in periods to go, which is faithful because the data are stationary. f 0 = 0 is fT+1f_{T+1}fT+1​. The parts of Theorem 1 about gtg_tgt​, ϕt\phi_tϕt​ and decisions cover the decision periods t≤Tt \le Tt≤T.

  • Suprema and expectations. Every maximum is sSup of the image of a nonempty feasible set that is bounded above. Expectations are Bochner integrals against the noise law μ\muμ.

  • Optimal decisions. Largest optimal decisions are hypotheses at the points compared; at γ=1\gamma = 1γ=1, k≥1k \ge 1k≥1 no largest order-up-to level exists in the last period.

  • Standing assumptions. All the §3 assumptions (nonnegative costs, γ∈[0,1]\gamma \in [0,1]γ∈[0,1], strictly decreasing PPP, continuous concave revenue, zero-mean noise with support in [A,B][A, B][A,B], d‾+A≥0\underline d + A \ge 0d​+A≥0) are fields of the model structure. The §4 assumption c≤h−/(1−γ)c \le h^-/(1-\gamma)c≤h−/(1−γ) is a hypothesis (1−γ)c≤h−(1-\gamma)c \le h^-(1−γ)c≤h− of every §4 statement.

  • Corrected slips.

    • The paper sets ft=+∞f_t = +\inftyft​=+∞ off S\mathcal{S}S, a slip for −∞-\infty−∞. The Lean evaluates ftf_tft​ on S\mathcal{S}S only.
    • In Lemma 3, "ξ(x)+ω∈dom(f)\xi(x) + \omega \in \mathrm{dom}(f)ξ(x)+ω∈dom(f)" reads x+ωe∈dom(f)x + \omega e \in \mathrm{dom}(f)x+ωe∈dom(f).
    • The final "<0< 0<0" of (9) is stated as "≤0\le 0≤0". It is an equality when h−=0h^- = 0h−=0 and either γ=1\gamma = 1γ=1 or θ=0\theta = 0θ=0.
    • Proposition 1 needs γ<1\gamma < 1γ<1 for its quotient, and it asserts that dt∨s1d_t \vee s_1dt​∨s1​ is optimal, not that it is unique.
  • Ruled-out formalizations. Any of the following would trivialize the mission:

    • defining ftf_tft​ as an arbitrary L♮-concave function, or taking the continuation in ϕt\phi_tϕt​ as a hypothesis-bound function;
    • dropping the upper bound a≤sl−k∨dta \le s_{l-k} \vee d_ta≤sl−k​∨dt​ from the depletion interval;
    • restricting to l=2l = 2l=2.

    The value functions here are the model's own recursion, for every l≥2l \ge 2l≥2.

  • What is needed. L♮-convexity on Rn\mathbb{R}^nRn with domains (shifts, sums, expectations, partial maximization, comparative statics for largest maximizers) and integrability of gtg_tgt​ in the noise; all reusable. Proofs of single milestones are welcome.

  • Source. The source is the published Operations Research article; in the copy held, printed page = PDF page + 282.

Selected references

  • X. Chen, Z. Pang, L. Pan, Coordinating Inventory Control and Pricing Strategies for Perishable Products, Operations Research 62(2):284–300, 2014. https://doi.org/10.1287/opre.2014.1261
  • P. Zipkin, On the Structure of Lost-Sales Inventory Models, Operations Research 56(4):937–944, 2008. https://doi.org/10.1287/opre.1070.0482
  • K. Murota, Discrete Convex Analysis, SIAM Monographs on Discrete Mathematics and Applications, 2003. https://doi.org/10.1137/1.9780898718508
  • B. Fries, Optimal Ordering Policy for a Perishable Commodity with Fixed Lifetime, Operations Research 23(1):46–61, 1975. https://doi.org/10.1287/opre.23.1.46
  • S. Nahmias, Perishable Inventory Theory: A Review, Operations Research 30(4):680–708, 1982. https://doi.org/10.1287/opre.30.4.680
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Robust Markov Decision Processes: Beyond Rectangularity 1: Under r-Rectangular Factor Uncertainty, Robust Value Iteration Converges to the Optimal Worst-Case Value, Attained by a Deterministic PolicyResearch Paper

Motivation

A Markov decision process (MDP) is optimized for a transition kernel that, in practice, is estimated from data, and the optimal policy for the estimated kernel can perform poorly under small perturbations of it. The robust MDP approach replaces the single kernel by an uncertainty set of kernels and asks for the policy with the best worst-case expected reward. It goes back to Satia and Lave (1973).

Whether a robust MDP is tractable depends on the shape of the uncertainty set.

  • 2005. Iyengar and Nilim and El Ghaoui treat (s,a)-rectangular sets, in which every row PsaP_{sa}Psa​ is chosen independently. An optimal robust policy is stationary and deterministic, and robust value iteration computes it.
  • 2013. Wiesemann, Kuhn and Rustem treat s-rectangular sets. Optimal robust policies are stationary but may need randomization. For general uncertainty sets, computing an optimal robust policy is strongly NP-hard.
  • 2018. Goh et al. introduce factor-based uncertainty for a medical cost-effectiveness application and evaluate the worst case of a fixed policy.
  • 2021–2023. Goyal and Grand-Clément compute optimal robust policies for factor uncertainty with independent factors. This mission formalizes that result.

Rectangular sets let the adversary choose the transitions out of different states independently, which is conservative when all transitions depend on a few common factors, such as a patient's physiology across health states. Factor uncertainty couples the states, and it is the first coupled model in which an optimal robust policy can still be computed.

Setting

There are finite sets of states S\mathbb SS and actions A\mathbb AA, with S=∣S∣S = |\mathbb S|S=∣S∣ and A=∣A∣A=|\mathbb A|A=∣A∣. The rewards satisfy rsa≥0r_{sa}\ge 0rsa​≥0, p0p_0p0​ is an initial distribution on S\mathbb SS, and λ∈(0,1)\lambda\in(0,1)λ∈(0,1) is the discount factor. Fix rrr factors indexed by [r][r][r] and coefficients usai≥0u^i_{sa}\ge0usai​≥0 with ∑iusai=1\sum_i u^i_{sa}=1∑i​usai​=1. A factor matrix W=(w1,…,wr)W=(w_1,\dots,w_r)W=(w1​,…,wr​) has probability vectors wiw_iwi​ on S\mathbb SS as columns, and it induces the kernel

Psas′=∑i=1rusai wi,s′.P_{sas'}=\sum_{i=1}^r u^i_{sa}\,w_{i,s'} .Psas′​=i=1∑r​usai​wi,s′​.

The uncertainty set is a nonempty convex compact set W\mathcal WW of factor matrices. It is r-rectangular if W=W1×⋯×Wr\mathcal W=\mathcal W^1\times\cdots\times\mathcal W^rW=W1×⋯×Wr, so that each factor is chosen independently of the others.

A stationary policy π∈Π\pi\in\Piπ∈Π gives a distribution πs\pi_sπs​ on A\mathbb AA at each state. It is deterministic if each πs\pi_sπs​ is a point mass. Write rπ=(∑aπsarsa)sr_\pi=(\sum_a\pi_{sa}r_{sa})_srπ​=(∑a​πsa​rsa​)s​ and Tπ=(∑aπsausai)s,iT_\pi=(\sum_a \pi_{sa}u^i_{sa})_{s,i}Tπ​=(∑a​πsa​usai​)s,i​. The decision maker's value function and the expected discounted reward are

vπ,W=∑t≥0λt(TπW⊤)trπ,R(π,W)=p0⊤vπ,W.v^{\pi,W}=\sum_{t\ge0}\lambda^t (T_\pi W^\top)^t r_\pi, \qquad R(\pi,W)=p_0^\top v^{\pi,W}.vπ,W=t≥0∑​λt(Tπ​W⊤)trπ​,R(π,W)=p0⊤​vπ,W.

The policy evaluation problem computes z(π)=min⁡W∈WR(π,W)z(\pi)=\min_{W\in\mathcal W}R(\pi,W)z(π)=minW∈W​R(π,W). The policy improvement problem computes z∗=max⁡π∈Πz(π)z^*=\max_{\pi\in\Pi}z(\pi)z∗=maxπ∈Π​z(π). Let

F(v)s=max⁡a∈A{rsa+λ∑i=1rusaimin⁡wi∈Wiwi⊤v}.F(v)_s=\max_{a\in\mathbb A}\Big\{r_{sa}+\lambda\sum_{i=1}^r u^i_{sa}\min_{w_i\in\mathcal W^i}w_i^\top v\Big\}.F(v)s​=a∈Amax​{rsa​+λi=1∑r​usai​wi​∈Wimin​wi⊤​v}.

Algorithm VI-PI is the iteration v0=0v^0=0v0=0, vk+1=F(vk)v^{k+1}=F(v^k)vk+1=F(vk).

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 5.1, by its mathematical content

Assume W\mathcal WW is r-rectangular. Then FFF has a unique fixed point v∗v^*v∗, and

z∗=max⁡π∈Πmin⁡W∈WR(π,W)=p0⊤v∗,vk→v∗.z^*=\max_{\pi\in\Pi}\min_{W\in\mathcal W}R(\pi,W)=p_0^\top v^*,\qquad v^k\to v^* .z∗=π∈Πmax​W∈Wmin​R(π,W)=p0⊤​v∗,vk→v∗.

Write θ(ε)=ε(1−λ)(2λ)−1\theta(\varepsilon)=\varepsilon(1-\lambda)(2\lambda)^{-1}θ(ε)=ε(1−λ)(2λ)−1. If ∥vk+1−vk∥∞<θ(ε)\|v^{k+1}-v^k\|_\infty<\theta(\varepsilon)∥vk+1−vk∥∞​<θ(ε), then ∥vk+1−v∗∥∞≤ε\|v^{k+1}-v^*\|_\infty\le\varepsilon∥vk+1−v∗∥∞​≤ε, and the deterministic policy that VI-PI computes at that iteration is ε\varepsilonε-optimal. The test is passed as soon as λkmax⁡r<θ(ε)\lambda^k\max r<\theta(\varepsilon)λkmaxr<θ(ε).

Milestones

The milestones follow the paper's route to the goal.

  1. The adversary's Bellman recursion (Proposition 3.1).
  2. The identity W⊤vπ,W=βπ,WW^\top v^{\pi,W}=\beta^{\pi,W}W⊤vπ,W=βπ,W (Lemma 4.3).
  3. The resolvent and linear-programming forms of z(π)z(\pi)z(π) (Lemmas A.2, A.3).
  4. The monotone contraction φ(π,⋅)\varphi(\pi,\cdot)φ(π,⋅) (Appendix A).
  5. The reformulation of z(π)z(\pi)z(π) with constraints βi≤min⁡wiwi⊤(rπ+λTπβ)\beta_i\le\min_{w_i}w_i^\top(r_\pi+\lambda T_\pi\beta)βi​≤minwi​​wi⊤​(rπ​+λTπ​β) (Lemma 3.3).
  6. The existence of a deterministic optimal robust policy (Lemma 4.1).
  7. The saddle point and the min-max duality (Theorem 4.2):
max⁡π∈Πmin⁡W∈WR(π,W)=min⁡W∈Wmax⁡π∈ΠR(π,W).\max_{\pi\in\Pi}\min_{W\in\mathcal W}R(\pi,W)=\min_{W\in\mathcal W}\max_{\pi\in\Pi}R(\pi,W).π∈Πmax​W∈Wmin​R(π,W)=W∈Wmin​π∈Πmax​R(π,W).
  1. The monotone contraction FFF (Lemma E.1).
  2. The fixed-point equation (5.1).

Theorem 3.2, the policy-evaluation analogue of the goal (Algorithm VI-PE), is included as a further item.

Significance

The theorem shows that factor uncertainty, in which transitions out of different states are coupled, is as tractable as (s,a)-rectangular uncertainty, provided the factors are independent. An optimal robust policy exists among deterministic stationary policies, the robust and nominal problems share a saddle point, and value iteration on a λ\lambdaλ-contraction computes the robust value. The structure is also what the companion mission builds on: the robust maximum principle and robust Blackwell optimality are derived from (5.1) and Theorem 4.2.

The results are proved in the paper. None of them is formalized: no factor-matrix robust MDP exists in Lean. The platform's robust-MDP items for (s,a)-rectangular sets (Nilim–El Ghaoui, Iyengar) and s-rectangular sets (Wiesemann et al.) are other uncertainty models and do not specialize to this one. A formal proof would also check a printed statement, since one clause of Theorem 4.2 needs correcting (see below).

Difficulty

The obvious argument writes a robust Bellman equation state by state and appeals to the contraction principle. Here that argument fails. Under factor uncertainty the adversary cannot choose the transitions out of each state separately, because one factor wiw_iwi​ enters every row PsaP_{sa}Psa​ with usai>0u^i_{sa}>0usai​>0. Minimizing state by state therefore yields kernels that need not come from a single feasible WWW. The decision maker's equation for vvv does not close on its own.

The step that requires care links two dynamic programs, the decision maker's over S\mathbb SS and the adversary's over [r][r][r], and shows that factor-wise minimization is feasible. That is where r-rectangularity enters. The paper's Appendix A gives an instance in which the factor-wise minimizers are infeasible once a constraint couples the factors.

Formalization scope

  • States and actions are arbitrary finite types. A\mathbb AA is nonempty, and S\mathbb SS is nonempty because p0p_0p0​ is a distribution. Factors are indexed by Fin r (0-based).
  • W\mathcal WW is a set of maps Fin r → S → ℝ whose values are probability vectors. It is nonempty, convex and compact. Nonemptiness is implicit in the paper and explicit here. Wi\mathcal W^iWi is the projection of W\mathcal WW, and r-rectangularity is a hypothesis (IsRRect). Proposition 3.1, Lemmas 4.3, A.2 and A.3, and both contraction statements are stated without it. Lemma 3.3 is stated with it, since it is false without it.
  • Rewards are nonnegative, as on p. 1. The discount satisfies 0<λ<10<\lambda<10<λ<1 in every statement.
  • vπ,Wv^{\pi,W}vπ,W and the adversary's value βπ,W\beta^{\pi,W}βπ,W are discounted sums, never solutions of a Bellman equation by definition. Defining them as fixed points would make Proposition 3.1, Lemma 4.3 and (5.1) true by definition.
  • Every min and max is attained. Statements use IsLeast/IsGreatest, and Lemma A.2 states the invertibility of I−λW⊤TπI-\lambda W^\top T_\piI−λW⊤Tπ​, because Lean's matrix inverse is 000 on singular matrices.
  • FFF is stated with a maximum over actions. The paper (p. 10) says this is equivalent to its maximum over πs∈Δ\pi_s\in\Deltaπs​∈Δ. Lemma E.1 and the contraction of φ\varphiφ are stated on all of RS\mathbb R^SRS and Rr\mathbb R^rRr.
  • Not formalized: the count of arithmetic operations in Theorems 3.2 and 5.1, and the ε\varepsilonε-optimization oracle of Assumption 2.4 that it counts. The iteration count is stated explicitly instead.
  • Corrections. The paper states (4.6) for every robust solution (π∗,W∗)(\pi^*,W^*)(π∗,W∗) with π∗\pi^*π∗ deterministic. That claim is false: a two-state instance has every policy robust-optimal, yet one robust solution is not nominally optimal against its own W∗W^*W∗. Theorem 4.2 and (5.1) are stated in existence form, which is the form the proof of Theorem 5.1 uses.
  • A goal that kept only the convergence vk→v∗v^k\to v^*vk→v∗ would be a different and weaker theorem. The goal also requires z∗=p0⊤v∗z^*=p_0^\top v^*z∗=p0⊤​v∗, the stopping rule, and the ε\varepsilonε-optimality of the computed deterministic policy.

Reusable infrastructure includes the discounted value of a stationary policy for a stochastic matrix, monotone sup-norm contractions with the standard stopping rule, and minimization of linear forms over compact sets. Contributions to any of these are welcome.

Selected references

  • V. Goyal, J. Grand-Clément, Robust Markov Decision Processes: Beyond Rectangularity, Mathematics of Operations Research, 2023; preprint arXiv:1811.00215v8, 2021 (the version formalized). https://arxiv.org/abs/1811.00215 · https://doi.org/10.1287/moor.2022.1259
  • A. Nilim, L. El Ghaoui, Robust control of Markov decision processes with uncertain transition probabilities, Operations Research 53(5), 2005. https://doi.org/10.1287/opre.1050.0216
  • G. Iyengar, Robust dynamic programming, Mathematics of Operations Research 30(2), 2005. https://doi.org/10.1287/moor.1040.0129
  • W. Wiesemann, D. Kuhn, B. Rustem, Robust Markov decision processes, Mathematics of Operations Research 38(1), 2013. https://doi.org/10.1287/moor.1120.0566
  • J. Goh, M. Bayati, S. A. Zenios, S. Singh, D. Moore, Data uncertainty in Markov chains: application to cost-effectiveness analyses of medical innovations, Operations Research 66(3), 2018. https://doi.org/10.1287/opre.2017.1685
  • J. K. Satia, R. L. Lave, Markov decision processes with uncertain transition probabilities, Operations Research 21(3), 1973. https://doi.org/10.1287/opre.21.3.728
  • M. L. Puterman, Markov Decision Processes: Discrete Stochastic Dynamic Programming, Wiley, 1994.
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Convex OptimizationOperations ResearchProbability·Captain: mikedeng1

A Soft Robust Model for Optimization Under Ambiguity: For Every δ > 0, Soft Robust Feasibility Is a Convex Risk Measure Constraint, and Every Normalized Convex Risk Measure Arises This WayResearch Paper

Motivation

Optimization under uncertainty usually fixes one probability distribution P\mathbb PP for the uncertain data and optimizes an expected payoff, or fixes a set Q\mathcal QQ of distributions and protects against the worst one (robust optimization). The first is sensitive to a misspecified P\mathbb PP; the second can be very conservative, because it treats a barely plausible distribution exactly like the nominal one. Ben-Tal, Bertsimas and Brown (Oper. Res. 58(4), 2010) propose a graded alternative, the soft robust model: the decision maker accepts a loss of at most ε\varepsilonε in expected payoff under every distribution of a set Q(ε)\mathcal Q(\varepsilon)Q(ε), simultaneously for all levels ε\varepsilonε up to a budget δ\deltaδ. Larger sets of distributions are allowed a larger shortfall.

The paper's central result, Theorem 2.1, shows that this model is exactly a constraint on a convex risk measure in the sense of Föllmer and Schied (Finance Stoch. 6, 2002), and that every normalized convex risk measure arises from some soft robust model. This connects distributionally robust optimization with the theory of monetary risk measures, and gives a tractable convex reformulation of soft robust constraints. Related earlier work connected coherent risk measures with standard robust optimization (Bertsimas and Brown, Oper. Res. 57(6), 2009).

Setting

Let (Ω,F)(\Omega,\mathcal F)(Ω,F) be a measurable space and P\mathcal PP the set of all probability measures on it. A decision xxx ranges over a nonempty, closed, convex set X⊆RnX\subseteq\mathbb R^nX⊆Rn; a random variable u:Ω→Rmu:\Omega\to\mathbb R^mu:Ω→Rm carries the uncertain parameters, and f(x,u(ω))f(x,u(\omega))f(x,u(ω)) is the payoff, concave in x∈Xx\in Xx∈X for every ω\omegaω. For each x∈Xx\in Xx∈X the random variable f(x)=f(x,u(⋅))f(x)=f(x,u(\cdot))f(x)=f(x,u(⋅)) is assumed bounded and measurable.

A family of measures is Q={Q(ε)⊆P:ε≥0}\mathbf Q=\{\mathcal Q(\varepsilon)\subseteq\mathcal P:\varepsilon\ge0\}Q={Q(ε)⊆P:ε≥0}. It is nondecreasing if Q(ε1)⊆Q(ε2)\mathcal Q(\varepsilon_1)\subseteq\mathcal Q(\varepsilon_2)Q(ε1​)⊆Q(ε2​) for ε1≤ε2\varepsilon_1\le\varepsilon_2ε1​≤ε2​, and convex if Qi∈Q(εi)\mathbb Q_i\in\mathcal Q(\varepsilon_i)Qi​∈Q(εi​) implies λQ1+(1−λ)Q2∈Q(λε1+(1−λ)ε2)\lambda\mathbb Q_1+(1-\lambda)\mathbb Q_2\in\mathcal Q(\lambda\varepsilon_1+(1-\lambda)\varepsilon_2)λQ1​+(1−λ)Q2​∈Q(λε1​+(1−λ)ε2​) for λ∈[0,1]\lambda\in[0,1]λ∈[0,1]. The standing assumptions are that Q\mathbf QQ is nondecreasing and convex and that Q(0)≠∅\mathcal Q(0)\neq\emptysetQ(0)=∅. The soft robust feasible set at level δ≥0\delta\ge0δ≥0 is

XQ(δ)={x∈X: inf⁡Q∈Q(ε)EQ[f(x)] ≥ −ε∀ ε∈[0,δ]}.(5)X^Q(\delta)=\Big\{x\in X:\ \inf_{\mathbb Q\in\mathcal Q(\varepsilon)}\mathbb E_{\mathbb Q}[f(x)]\ \ge\ -\varepsilon\quad\forall\,\varepsilon\in[0,\delta]\Big\}.\tag{5}XQ(δ)={x∈X: Q∈Q(ε)inf​EQ​[f(x)] ≥ −ε∀ε∈[0,δ]}.(5)

A risk measure, on the space Y\mathcal YY of bounded payoffs, is a map ρ:Y→R\rho:\mathcal Y\to\mathbb Rρ:Y→R with Y1≥Y2⇒ρ(Y1)≤ρ(Y2)Y_1\ge Y_2\Rightarrow\rho(Y_1)\le\rho(Y_2)Y1​≥Y2​⇒ρ(Y1​)≤ρ(Y2​) and ρ(Y+c)=ρ(Y)−c\rho(Y+c)=\rho(Y)-cρ(Y+c)=ρ(Y)−c for c∈Rc\in\mathbb Rc∈R; it is convex if ρ(λY1+(1−λ)Y2)≤λρ(Y1)+(1−λ)ρ(Y2)\rho(\lambda Y_1+(1-\lambda)Y_2)\le\lambda\rho(Y_1)+(1-\lambda)\rho(Y_2)ρ(λY1​+(1−λ)Y2​)≤λρ(Y1​)+(1−λ)ρ(Y2​). It is generated by a convex penalty α:P→[0,∞]\alpha:\mathcal P\to[0,\infty]α:P→[0,∞] if ρ(Y)=sup⁡Q∈P{−EQ[Y]−α(Q)}\rho(Y)=\sup_{\mathbb Q\in\mathcal P}\{-\mathbb E_{\mathbb Q}[Y]-\alpha(\mathbb Q)\}ρ(Y)=supQ∈P​{−EQ​[Y]−α(Q)}, and normalized if in addition α(Q)=0\alpha(\mathbb Q)=0α(Q)=0 for some Q\mathbb QQ. A family and a penalty determine each other:

αQ(Q)=inf⁡{ε≥0:Q∈Q(ε)},Qα(ε)={Q∈P:α(Q)≤ε},\alpha^Q(\mathbb Q)=\inf\{\varepsilon\ge0:\mathbb Q\in\mathcal Q(\varepsilon)\},\qquad \mathcal Q^\alpha(\varepsilon)=\{\mathbb Q\in\mathcal P:\alpha(\mathbb Q)\le\varepsilon\},αQ(Q)=inf{ε≥0:Q∈Q(ε)},Qα(ε)={Q∈P:α(Q)≤ε},

and ρQ\rho^QρQ denotes the risk measure generated by αQ\alpha^QαQ.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 2.1 for δ>0\delta>0δ>0

For every nondecreasing, convex family Q\mathbf QQ with Q(0)≠∅\mathcal Q(0)\ne\emptysetQ(0)=∅, ρQ\rho^QρQ is a convex risk measure generated by the normalized convex penalty αQ\alpha^QαQ, the minimum below is attained for every x∈Xx\in Xx∈X, and

XQ(δ)={x∈X: min⁡λ≥0{λδ+(λ+1) ρQ(f(x)λ+1)}≤0}.(6)X^Q(\delta)=\Big\{x\in X:\ \min_{\lambda\ge0}\Big\{\lambda\delta+(\lambda+1)\,\rho^Q\Big(\frac{f(x)}{\lambda+1}\Big)\Big\}\le0\Big\}.\tag{6}XQ(δ)={x∈X: λ≥0min​{λδ+(λ+1)ρQ(λ+1f(x)​)}≤0}.(6)

Conversely, for every convex risk measure ρ\rhoρ generated by a normalized convex penalty α\alphaα, the family Qα\mathbf Q^\alphaQα is nondecreasing and convex with Qα(0)≠∅\mathcal Q^\alpha(0)\ne\emptysetQα(0)=∅, and (6) holds with ρ\rhoρ on the right and Qα\mathbf Q^\alphaQα on the left.

Milestones: the steps of the proof (p. 1224)

  1. The soft robust infimum inf⁡{EQ[f(x)]+ε:ε∈[0,δ], Q∈Q(ε)}\inf\{\mathbb E_{\mathbb Q}[f(x)]+\varepsilon:\varepsilon\in[0,\delta],\ \mathbb Q\in\mathcal Q(\varepsilon)\}inf{EQ​[f(x)]+ε:ε∈[0,δ], Q∈Q(ε)} equals inf⁡{EQ[f(x)]+αQ(Q):αQ(Q)≤δ}\inf\{\mathbb E_{\mathbb Q}[f(x)]+\alpha^Q(\mathbb Q):\alpha^Q(\mathbb Q)\le\delta\}inf{EQ​[f(x)]+αQ(Q):αQ(Q)≤δ}.
  2. Strong duality with an attained multiplier: that infimum equals max⁡λ≥0{−λδ+inf⁡Q{EQ[f(x)]+(λ+1)αQ(Q)}}\max_{\lambda\ge0}\{-\lambda\delta+\inf_{\mathbb Q}\{\mathbb E_{\mathbb Q}[f(x)]+(\lambda+1)\alpha^Q(\mathbb Q)\}\}maxλ≥0​{−λδ+infQ​{EQ​[f(x)]+(λ+1)αQ(Q)}}.
  3. The scaling identity inf⁡Q{EQ[Y]+(λ+1)αQ(Q)}=−(λ+1)ρQ(Y/(λ+1))\inf_{\mathbb Q}\{\mathbb E_{\mathbb Q}[Y]+(\lambda+1)\alpha^Q(\mathbb Q)\}=-(\lambda+1)\rho^Q(Y/(\lambda+1))infQ​{EQ​[Y]+(λ+1)αQ(Q)}=−(λ+1)ρQ(Y/(λ+1)).
  4. ρQ\rho^QρQ is a convex risk measure generated by the convex, normalized penalty αQ\alpha^QαQ.
  5. For a convex normalized α\alphaα, Qα\mathbf Q^\alphaQα is nondecreasing and convex with Qα(0)≠∅\mathcal Q^\alpha(0)\ne\emptysetQα(0)=∅.
  6. αQα=α\alpha^{Q^\alpha}=\alphaαQα=α.

Significance

Theorem 2.1 makes the soft robust constraint usable: the right side of (6) is a single constraint in (λ,x)(\lambda,x)(λ,x), and the function (λ+1)ρ(f(x)/(λ+1))(\lambda+1)\rho(f(x)/(\lambda+1))(λ+1)ρ(f(x)/(λ+1)) is jointly convex in (λ,x)(\lambda,x)(λ,x) for λ≥0\lambda\ge0λ≥0, so soft robust problems are convex programs whenever the risk measure can be evaluated. Read in the other direction, it gives every normalized convex risk measure an interpretation as a graded robustness requirement over the level sets of its penalty, which is how the paper derives soft robust counterparts of optimized certainty equivalents, CVaR and entropic risk, and its later bounds on the probability of a loss.

The theorem is proved in the paper; to our knowledge it has no machine-checked proof. Formalizing it produces a Lean development of convex risk measures generated by penalties on an arbitrary measurable space, with extended-valued penalties and mixtures of probability measures, and a one-constraint Lagrange duality theorem over a convex set of probability measures. Mathlib does not currently provide Lagrange duality in this form.

Difficulty

The equalities of the proof read as routine, and two of them are not. The first equality is described as "the definition of αQ\alpha^QαQ", but a measure with αQ(Q)=δ\alpha^Q(\mathbb Q)=\deltaαQ(Q)=δ need not belong to Q(δ)\mathcal Q(\delta)Q(δ), because the infimum defining αQ\alpha^QαQ need not be attained; the equality relies on the convexity of the family, the nonemptiness of Q(0)\mathcal Q(0)Q(0) and the boundedness of f(x)f(x)f(x). The second equality is Lagrange duality with dual attainment for a convex program whose variable is a probability measure and whose objective and constraint are extended-valued; the classical theorem applies to convex subsets of vector spaces, and transferring it to mixtures of probability measures with [0,∞][0,\infty][0,∞]-valued penalties is the main formal work. Attainment of the minimum in (6), which the paper asserts by writing "min", is exactly dual attainment and does not follow from the inequality alone.

Formalization scope

The probability measures are ProbabilityMeasure Ω on a measurable space; a family is a map from levels ε∈R≥0\varepsilon\in\mathbb R_{\ge0}ε∈R≥0​ to sets of probability measures, and mixtures are built from the measures t Q1+(1−t) Q2t\,\mathbb Q_1+(1-t)\,\mathbb Q_2tQ1​+(1−t)Q2​. Penalties, including αQ\alpha^QαQ, take values in [0,∞][0,\infty][0,∞], so that a measure in no Q(ε)\mathcal Q(\varepsilon)Q(ε) has penalty +∞+\infty+∞; a real-valued αQ\alpha^QαQ would give such measures penalty 000 through the junk value of an empty infimum, and is excluded. Risk measures are real functions whose axioms are imposed on bounded measurable payoffs, "generated by" includes the least-upper-bound property of the supremum, and "min" in (6) is attainment on [0,∞)[0,\infty)[0,∞) together with a nonpositive minimum. The decision set and payoff carry the paper's assumptions; concavity of the payoff and closedness and convexity of XXX are kept although Theorem 2.1 does not use them. Infima over measures in the milestones are taken in the extended reals.

The case δ=0\delta=0δ=0 is excluded. The paper states Theorem 2.1 for δ≥0\delta\ge0δ≥0, but at δ=0\delta=0δ=0 its proof interchanges a limit in λ\lambdaλ with a supremum over measures without justification, and (6) fails: on Ω={a,b}\Omega=\{a,b\}Ω={a,b} with Q(0)\mathcal Q(0)Q(0) the measures giving aaa mass at most 1/41/41/4 and Q(ε)\mathcal Q(\varepsilon)Q(ε) those giving it mass at most 1/21/21/2 for ε>0\varepsilon>0ε>0, the payoff f(a)=−2f(a)=-2f(a)=−2, f(b)=1f(b)=1f(b)=1 is soft robust at level 000 while the right side of (6) is empty. The goal and the milestones therefore fix δ>0\delta>0δ>0, the case the paper's main argument treats.

A complete development needs: convex risk measures and their generation by penalties, mixtures of probability measures, Lagrange duality with Slater's condition over convex sets of measures, and the scaling identity for ρQ\rho^QρQ. The duality theorem and the risk-measure layer are reusable beyond this mission. Contributions of any milestone are welcome, as are general convex-duality lemmas that the strong-duality step can import.

Selected references

  • A. Ben-Tal, D. Bertsimas, D. B. Brown, A Soft Robust Model for Optimization Under Ambiguity, Operations Research 58(4, Part 2):1220–1234, 2010. https://doi.org/10.1287/opre.1100.0821
  • H. Föllmer, A. Schied, Convex measures of risk and trading constraints, Finance and Stochastics 6(4):429–447, 2002. https://doi.org/10.1007/s007800200072
  • H. Föllmer, A. Schied, Stochastic Finance: An Introduction in Discrete Time, 2nd ed., de Gruyter, 2004. https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110212075
  • D. G. Luenberger, Optimization by Vector Space Methods, Wiley, 1969, Chapter 8.
  • D. Bertsimas, D. B. Brown, Constructing Uncertainty Sets for Robust Linear Optimization, Operations Research 57(6):1483–1495, 2009. https://doi.org/10.1287/opre.1080.0695
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Convex OptimizationOperations ResearchProbability·Captain: mikedeng1

A Distributionally Robust Perspective on Uncertainty Quantification and Chance Constrained Programming: Individual Chance Constraints over Markov Ambiguity Sets Are Finite Conic SystemsResearch Paper

Motivation

Many engineering and operations problems must guarantee that a system operates safely with high probability, when the uncertain parameters z~\tilde zz~ are only partially known. A chance constraint asks that the safety condition Sz~≤tS\tilde z \le tSz~≤t hold with probability at least 1−ϵ1-\epsilon1−ϵ for a tolerance ϵ∈(0,1)\epsilon \in (0,1)ϵ∈(0,1). When the distribution of z~\tilde zz~ is itself uncertain, the distributionally robust version asks this for every distribution in an ambiguity set P\mathcal PP built from what is known: moments, supports, confidence regions. Two problems then arise: computing the worst-case probability inf⁡P∈PP[Sz~≤t]\inf_{\mathbb P \in \mathcal P}\mathbb P[S\tilde z \le t]infP∈P​P[Sz~≤t] (uncertainty quantification), and optimizing a design xxx under the constraint inf⁡P∈PP[S(x)z~≤t(x)]≥1−ϵ\inf_{\mathbb P \in \mathcal P}\mathbb P[S(x)\tilde z \le t(x)] \ge 1-\epsiloninfP∈P​P[S(x)z~≤t(x)]≥1−ϵ (chance constrained programming).

Hanasusanto, Roitch, Kuhn and Wiesemann (Math. Program. 151, 2015) chart which combinations of ambiguity sets and constraint structures admit exact finite reformulations and which are strongly NP-hard. This mission takes the positive core of that chart: for Markov ambiguity sets (first-order moment information plus a conic support), the worst-case probability is the value of a finite conic program, and an individual chance constraint is equivalent to a finite system of linear conic inequalities.

Timeline. Chebyshev-type bounds for worst-case probabilities under moment information go back to the generalized Chebyshev inequalities of Vandenberghe, Boyd and Comanor (2007), and to the duality theory of moment problems summarized by Shapiro (2001). Wiesemann, Kuhn and Sim (2014) introduced the nested conic ambiguity sets used here to evaluate worst-case expectations. Hanasusanto et al. (2015) applied them to worst-case probabilities of polytopes and to chance constraints, proving Theorem 3 (moment problem reformulation) and Theorem 7 (individual chance constraints over Markov sets), together with strong NP-hardness results, such as Theorem 8, showing that the restrictions cannot be dropped.

Setting

Let z~∈RP\tilde z \in \mathbb R^Pz~∈RP be the uncertain parameters and u~∈RQ\tilde u \in \mathbb R^Qu~∈RQ an auxiliary random vector. Fix A∈RK×PA \in \mathbb R^{K\times P}A∈RK×P, B∈RK×QB \in \mathbb R^{K\times Q}B∈RK×Q, b∈RKb \in \mathbb R^Kb∈RK, and a confidence set

C1={(z,u):C1z+D1u≼K1d1},\mathcal C_1 = \{(z,u) : C_1 z + D_1 u \preccurlyeq_{\mathcal K_1} d_1\},C1​={(z,u):C1​z+D1​u≼K1​​d1​},

where C1∈RL1×PC_1 \in \mathbb R^{L_1\times P}C1​∈RL1​×P, D1∈RL1×QD_1 \in \mathbb R^{L_1\times Q}D1​∈RL1​×Q, d1∈RL1d_1 \in \mathbb R^{L_1}d1​∈RL1​ and K1\mathcal K_1K1​ is a proper cone (closed, convex, pointed, with nonempty interior); x≼Kyx \preccurlyeq_{\mathcal K} yx≼K​y means y−x∈Ky - x \in \mathcal Ky−x∈K, and K1⋆={y:x⊤y≥0 ∀x∈K1}\mathcal K_1^\star = \{y : x^\top y \ge 0\ \forall x \in \mathcal K_1\}K1⋆​={y:x⊤y≥0 ∀x∈K1​} is the dual cone. The Markov ambiguity set is

P={P:EP[Az~+Bu~]=b, P[(z~,u~)∈C1]=1},\mathcal P = \{\mathbb P : \mathbb E_{\mathbb P}[A\tilde z + B\tilde u] = b,\ \mathbb P[(\tilde z,\tilde u) \in \mathcal C_1] = 1\},P={P:EP​[Az~+Bu~]=b, P[(z~,u~)∈C1​]=1},

the case I=1I = 1I=1, p‾1=p‾1=1\underline p_1 = \overline p_1 = 1p​1​=p​1​=1 of the paper's nested set (4).

Two regularity notions enter. C1\mathcal C_1C1​ is essentially strictly feasible if it contains a point satisfying all non-polyhedral constraints of its description strictly. The Slater condition (S) for I=1I = 1I=1 requires bbb to lie in the interior of {Az+Bu:(z,u)∈C1}\{Az + Bu : (z,u) \in \mathcal C_1\}{Az+Bu:(z,u)∈C1​}.

For the safety system Sz~≤tS\tilde z \le tSz~≤t with rows sj⊤s_j^\topsj⊤​, j∈J={1,…,J}j \in \mathcal J = \{1,\dots,J\}j∈J={1,…,J}, let L={j:∃(z,u)∈C1, sj⊤z>tj}\mathcal L = \{j : \exists (z,u) \in \mathcal C_1,\ s_j^\top z > t_j\}L={j:∃(z,u)∈C1​, sj⊤​z>tj​} be the rows that can be violated on C1\mathcal C_1C1​. Problem (17) at I=1I = 1I=1 maximizes b⊤γ+p‾1λ−p‾1κb^\top\gamma + \underline p_1\lambda - \overline p_1\kappab⊤γ+p​1​λ−p​1​κ over γ∈RK\gamma \in \mathbb R^Kγ∈RK, λ,κ≥0\lambda,\kappa \ge 0λ,κ≥0, ϕ∈K1⋆\phi \in \mathcal K_1^\starϕ∈K1⋆​ and, for j∈Lj \in \mathcal Lj∈L, τj≥0\tau_j \ge 0τj​≥0, ψj∈K1⋆\psi_j \in \mathcal K_1^\starψj​∈K1⋆​, subject to λ−κ+d1⊤ϕ≤1\lambda - \kappa + d_1^\top\phi \le 1λ−κ+d1⊤​ϕ≤1, A⊤γ=C1⊤ϕA^\top\gamma = C_1^\top\phiA⊤γ=C1⊤​ϕ, B⊤γ=D1⊤ϕB^\top\gamma = D_1^\top\phiB⊤γ=D1⊤​ϕ and, for j∈Lj \in \mathcal Lj∈L, λ−κ+d1⊤ψj−τjtj≤0\lambda - \kappa + d_1^\top\psi_j - \tau_j t_j \le 0λ−κ+d1⊤​ψj​−τj​tj​≤0, A⊤γ+τjsj=C1⊤ψjA^\top\gamma + \tau_j s_j = C_1^\top\psi_jA⊤γ+τj​sj​=C1⊤​ψj​, B⊤γ=D1⊤ψjB^\top\gamma = D_1^\top\psi_jB⊤γ=D1⊤​ψj​.

For an individual constraint (J=1J = 1J=1) write s⊤z~≤ts^\top\tilde z \le ts⊤z~≤t. System (26) asks for β∈R\beta \in \mathbb Rβ∈R, γ∈RK\gamma \in \mathbb R^Kγ∈RK, ϕ,ψ∈K1⋆\phi,\psi \in \mathcal K_1^\starϕ,ψ∈K1⋆​, τ≥0\tau \ge 0τ≥0 with

β+b⊤γ≥(1−ϵ)τ,  β+d1⊤ϕ≤τ,  β+d1⊤ψ≤t,  A⊤γ=C1⊤ϕ,  B⊤γ=D1⊤ϕ,  A⊤γ+s=C1⊤ψ,  B⊤γ=D1⊤ψ.\beta + b^\top\gamma \ge (1-\epsilon)\tau,\ \ \beta + d_1^\top\phi \le \tau,\ \ \beta + d_1^\top\psi \le t,\ \ A^\top\gamma = C_1^\top\phi,\ \ B^\top\gamma = D_1^\top\phi,\ \ A^\top\gamma + s = C_1^\top\psi,\ \ B^\top\gamma = D_1^\top\psi.β+b⊤γ≥(1−ϵ)τ,  β+d1⊤​ϕ≤τ,  β+d1⊤​ψ≤t,  A⊤γ=C1⊤​ϕ,  B⊤γ=D1⊤​ϕ,  A⊤γ+s=C1⊤​ψ,  B⊤γ=D1⊤​ψ.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 7 (p. 18)

Under essential strict feasibility of C1\mathcal C_1C1​, (S), and ϵ∈(0,1)\epsilon \in (0,1)ϵ∈(0,1),

inf⁡P∈PP[s⊤z~≤t]≥1−ϵ  ⟺  (26) is solvable.\inf_{\mathbb P \in \mathcal P}\mathbb P[s^\top\tilde z \le t] \ge 1-\epsilon \iff \text{(26) is solvable}.P∈Pinf​P[s⊤z~≤t]≥1−ϵ⟺(26) is solvable.

Milestones

  1. Theorem 3 (case I=1I = 1I=1), sufficiency. Every feasible point of (17) has objective value at most P[Sz~≤t]\mathbb P[S\tilde z \le t]P[Sz~≤t] for every P∈P\mathbb P \in \mathcal PP∈P.
  2. Theorem 3 (case I=1I = 1I=1). Under essential strict feasibility and (S),
inf⁡P∈PP[Sz~≤t]=sup⁡ (17).\inf_{\mathbb P \in \mathcal P}\mathbb P[S\tilde z \le t] = \sup\,(17).P∈Pinf​P[Sz~≤t]=sup(17).
  1. §5 feasibility claim (with (17), case I=1I = 1I=1). Under the same hypotheses and ϵ∈(0,1)\epsilon \in (0,1)ϵ∈(0,1), the chance constraint holds iff (17) has a feasible point of value at least 1−ϵ1-\epsilon1−ϵ.
  2. Theorem 7, sufficiency. Any solution of (26) certifies P[s⊤z~≤t]≥1−ϵ\mathbb P[s^\top\tilde z \le t] \ge 1-\epsilonP[s⊤z~≤t]≥1−ϵ for all P∈P\mathbb P \in \mathcal PP∈P.

Significance

Theorem 7 turns an individual distributionally robust chance constraint over a Markov ambiguity set into finitely many linear conic constraints whose size is polynomial in the data. Since s(x)s(x)s(x) and t(x)t(x)t(x) are affine in the design xxx, the chance constrained program becomes a single conic program, solvable with standard software. The paper notes (p. 18) that, apart from the Wasserstein set, all ambiguity sets of its Section 2.3 are Markov sets or intersections of Markov sets with structural ambiguity sets, and Theorem 8 shows that adding a second confidence set already makes the problem strongly NP-hard, so the theorem marks a precise tractability boundary. Theorem 3 underlies the paper's later results and its §5 heuristic for intractable cases.

All five statements are proved in the literature: the paper defers its proofs to an accompanying technical report. None is machine-checked. A formal proof would supply a verified duality theory for moment problems with conic supports, a reusable bridge between semi-infinite constraints and conic certificates, and a verified basis for the paper's hardness results to be stated against.

Difficulty

The sufficiency halves are weak-duality arguments. The converse directions are not: the worst-case probability is an infimum over an infinite-dimensional set of measures, and the conclusion of Theorem 7 requires the dual certificate to be attained, not just approached. Two separate duality steps must both close without a gap and with attainment: the moment problem against its semi-infinite dual, which is where (S) enters, and each semi-infinite constraint against its conic dual over C1\mathcal C_1C1​, which is where essential strict feasibility enters. The event {s⊤z>t}\{s^\top z > t\}{s⊤z>t} is open, so the semi-infinite constraint must also be passed to its closure. Mathlib has neither a duality theorem for moment problems nor conic strong duality with attainment.

Formalization scope

The mission covers Markov ambiguity sets only (I=1I = 1I=1, p‾1=p‾1=1\underline p_1 = \overline p_1 = 1p​1​=p​1​=1). The general nested case of Theorem 3 is not stated, because the paper does not make (S) explicit for I>1I > 1I>1. Symmetry and unimodality information, joint chance constraints and the hardness results are out of scope. The paper's proofs are in a technical report that the mission does not use.

Conventions committed to in Lean:

  • Vectors are Fin n → ℝ, the single confidence set is index 0 : Fin 1 of the published DRConvexOpt.Reform.AmbData, and its field c 0 is d1d_1d1​.
  • Probabilities are μ.real. The local paperAmbiguitySet reuses the published data and confidence-set definitions and requires integrability only of Az~+Bu~A\tilde z+B\tilde uAz~+Bu~. This makes the expectation condition void when K=0K=0K=0, as the paper states.
  • "inf⁡PP[E]≥1−ϵ\inf_{\mathbb P}\mathbb P[E] \ge 1-\epsiloninfP​P[E]≥1−ϵ" is stated as "1−ϵ≤P[E]1-\epsilon \le \mathbb P[E]1−ϵ≤P[E] for every P∈P\mathbb P \in \mathcal PP∈P", so an empty P\mathcal PP is not mishandled by sInf ∅ = 0.
  • "Coincides with the optimal value" is one real number that is both the greatest lower bound of the probabilities and the least upper bound of the objective values of (17).
  • Essential strict feasibility is read as: K1=Kp∩Kn\mathcal K_1 = \mathcal K_p \cap \mathcal K_nK1​=Kp​∩Kn​ for some polyhedral cone Kp\mathcal K_pKp​ and closed convex cone Kn\mathcal K_nKn​, with a point of C1\mathcal C_1C1​ whose slack lies in Kp∩int⁡Kn\mathcal K_p \cap \operatorname{int}\mathcal K_nKp​∩intKn​.
  • The decision xxx is fixed: s,ts, ts,t stand for s(x),t(x)s(x), t(x)s(x),t(x), and the program (2) and the set X\mathcal XX are not formalized.
  • ϵ∈(0,1)\epsilon \in (0,1)ϵ∈(0,1), proper K1\mathcal K_1K1​, essential strict feasibility and (S) are explicit hypotheses. The sufficiency halves drop (S) and essential strict feasibility, which they do not need.

Replacing essential strict feasibility by full strict feasibility, adding τ>0\tau > 0τ>0 to (26), or imposing the ψj\psi_jψj​-constraints for j∉Lj \notin \mathcal Lj∈/L would each change the theorem and is ruled out. The hypotheses are jointly satisfiable: C1=[−1,1]\mathcal C_1 = [-1,1]C1​=[−1,1], A=1A = 1A=1, b=0b = 0b=0, K1=R+2\mathcal K_1 = \mathbb R^2_+K1​=R+2​ satisfies all of them, with a nonempty ambiguity set.

A complete development needs conic duality with attainment under partial Slater conditions, Lagrangian duality for moment problems, and the reduction of a measure-valued infimum to finitely supported measures. All three are reusable well beyond this mission, and contributions to any of them are welcome.

Selected references

  • G. A. Hanasusanto, V. Roitch, D. Kuhn, W. Wiesemann, A distributionally robust perspective on uncertainty quantification and chance constrained programming, Mathematical Programming 151(1), 35–62, 2015. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10107-015-0896-z
  • W. Wiesemann, D. Kuhn, M. Sim, Distributionally robust convex optimization, Operations Research 62(6), 1358–1376, 2014. https://doi.org/10.1287/opre.2014.1314
  • A. Shapiro, On duality theory of conic linear problems, in: Semi-Infinite Programming, Kluwer, 135–165, 2001. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4757-3403-4_7
  • L. Vandenberghe, S. Boyd, K. Comanor, Generalized Chebyshev bounds via semidefinite programming, SIAM Review 49(1), 52–64, 2007. https://doi.org/10.1137/S0036144504440543
  • A. Ben-Tal, A. Nemirovski, Lectures on Modern Convex Optimization, SIAM, 2001. https://doi.org/10.1137/1.9780898718829
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