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Dynamical SystemsStochastic Systems·Captain: mikedeng1

Subadditive Ergodic Theory 2: For Every Increasing Γ There Is a C^∞ Process with Stationary Increments and P{|y_t| ≤ Γ(t) for All Large t} = 0Research Paper

Motivation

Kingman's subadditive ergodic theorem (Theorem 1 of Kingman 1973, first proved in Kingman 1968) says that for a discrete-parameter subadditive process x=(xst)x=(x_{st})x=(xst​) the ratio x0t/tx_{0t}/tx0t​/t converges with probability one and in mean. Applications in first-passage percolation, products of random matrices and longest increasing subsequences often come with a continuous time parameter, so it is natural to ask whether the theorem holds with ttt ranging over [0,∞)[0,\infty)[0,∞).

Section 1.4 of the 1973 paper answers this question. Under separability alone, a continuous-parameter version would contain, as its additive special case, the claim that every separable process (yt; t≥0)(y_t;\,t\ge0)(yt​;t≥0) with stationary increments and finite expectations has a finite limit lim⁡t→∞yt/t\lim_{t\to\infty}y_t/tlimt→∞​yt​/t with probability one. Kingman remarks that no such theorem appears in the literature, "for the excellent reason that the conclusion is false, and in a very strong sense" (p. 888). Theorem 3 makes that sentence precise. It is the reason the continuous-parameter theorem of the paper (Theorem 4) carries an extra integrability hypothesis on the oscillation ΩI=sup⁡s<t, s,t∈I∣xst∣\Omega_I=\sup_{s<t,\,s,t\in I}|x_{st}|ΩI​=sups<t,s,t∈I​∣xst​∣.

Setting

A real-time process is a family (yt; t≥0)(y_t;\,t\ge0)(yt​;t≥0) of real random variables on a probability space (Ω,F,P)(\Omega,\mathcal F,P)(Ω,F,P). Its joint law is the law of the path t↦ytt\mapsto y_tt↦yt​ on R[0,∞)\mathbb R^{[0,\infty)}R[0,∞) with the product σ\sigmaσ-algebra, that is, the collection of all finite-dimensional distributions.

  • (yt)(y_t)(yt​) is stationary if for every τ≥0\tau\ge0τ≥0 the shifted process (yt+τ)t≥0(y_{t+\tau})_{t\ge0}(yt+τ​)t≥0​ has the same joint law as (yt)t≥0(y_t)_{t\ge0}(yt​)t≥0​.
  • (yt)(y_t)(yt​) has stationary increments if for every τ≥0\tau\ge0τ≥0 the process (yt+τ−yτ)t≥0(y_{t+\tau}-y_\tau)_{t\ge0}(yt+τ​−yτ​)t≥0​ has the same joint law as (yt−y0)t≥0(y_t-y_0)_{t\ge0}(yt​−y0​)t≥0​.
  • (yt)(y_t)(yt​) has finite expectations if E∣yt∣<∞E|y_t|<\inftyE∣yt​∣<∞ for every t≥0t\ge0t≥0.
  • The sample function at ω∈Ω\omega\in\Omegaω∈Ω is t↦yt(ω)t\mapsto y_t(\omega)t↦yt​(ω). It has derivatives of all orders if it is C∞C^\inftyC∞ on [0,∞)[0,\infty)[0,∞).

A growth bound is a function Γ:(0,∞)→(0,∞)\Gamma:(0,\infty)\to(0,\infty)Γ:(0,∞)→(0,∞) that is increasing (non-decreasing). The event "∣yt∣≤Γ(t)|y_t|\le\Gamma(t)∣yt​∣≤Γ(t) for all sufficiently large ttt" is the set of ω\omegaω for which some TTT exists with ∣yt(ω)∣≤Γ(t)|y_t(\omega)|\le\Gamma(t)∣yt​(ω)∣≤Γ(t) for every real t≥Tt\ge Tt≥T.

In the Lean development these notions are IsStationary, HasStationaryIncrements, Integrable (y t) P and ContDiffOn ℝ ∞ (fun t => y t ω) (Set.Ici 0), all in the namespace KingmanSubadditive.StationaryIncrements.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 3 (p. 888)

For every positive non-decreasing Γ\GammaΓ on (0,∞)(0,\infty)(0,∞) there are a probability space and a process (yt; t≥0)(y_t;\,t\ge0)(yt​;t≥0) with stationary increments, finite expectations and C∞C^\inftyC∞ sample functions such that

P{∣yt∣≤Γ(t) for all sufficiently large t}=0.(1.4.4)P\{|y_t|\le\Gamma(t)\ \text{for all sufficiently large }t\}=0. \tag{1.4.4}P{∣yt​∣≤Γ(t) for all sufficiently large t}=0.(1.4.4)

The quantifiers are "for every Γ\GammaΓ there exists yyy". Because Γ\GammaΓ may grow arbitrarily fast, no normalization yt/a(t)y_t/a(t)yt​/a(t) with a deterministic aaa can converge to a finite limit almost surely.

Milestones

The milestones are the four steps of Kingman's proof, stated for the explicit process yt=Yt+ηy_t=Y_{t+\eta}yt​=Yt+η​ of (1.4.5) built from a bump function ψ\psiψ, a uniform η\etaη and independent integer-valued ν0,ν1,…\nu_0,\nu_1,\dotsν0​,ν1​,… with a law mΓm_\GammamΓ​ that depends on Γ\GammaΓ:

  1. (yt)(y_t)(yt​) is stationary, hence has stationary increments, and its sample functions are C∞C^\inftyC∞ (p. 888).
  2. E(∣yt∣)=E(y0)=∫01ψ(u) du<∞E(|y_t|)=E(y_0)=\int_0^1\psi(u)\,du<\inftyE(∣yt​∣)=E(y0​)=∫01​ψ(u)du<∞ (p. 888).
  3. ∑n≥1P{νn>Γ(n+12)}≥∑n≥1∑r≥n1r(r+1)=∞\sum_{n\ge1}P\{\nu_n>\Gamma(n+\tfrac12)\}\ge\sum_{n\ge1}\sum_{r\ge n}\frac1{r(r+1)}=\infty∑n≥1​P{νn​>Γ(n+21​)}≥∑n≥1​∑r≥n​r(r+1)1​=∞ (p. 889).
  4. P{∣yt∣≤Γ(t) eventually}≤P{∣y(n+12νn−1−η)∣≤Γ(n+12νn−1−η) eventually}≤P{νn≤Γ(n+12) eventually}=0P\{|y_t|\le\Gamma(t)\text{ eventually}\}\le P\{|y(n+\tfrac12\nu_n^{-1}-\eta)|\le\Gamma(n+\tfrac12\nu_n^{-1}-\eta)\text{ eventually}\}\le P\{\nu_n\le\Gamma(n+\tfrac12)\text{ eventually}\}=0P{∣yt​∣≤Γ(t) eventually}≤P{∣y(n+21​νn−1​−η)∣≤Γ(n+21​νn−1​−η) eventually}≤P{νn​≤Γ(n+21​) eventually}=0 (p. 889).

Significance

The result. Theorem 3 rules out any continuous-parameter subadditive ergodic theorem whose only hypotheses are separability, stationarity of the increments and finite means, and in fact any such theorem whose hypotheses are met by smooth stationary processes with finite means. The obstruction does not come from irregular paths: the counterexample is as regular as a path can be short of analyticity. Any continuous-time ergodic theorem therefore needs a hypothesis that controls the behaviour of the process inside unit intervals, such as E(ΩI)<∞E(\Omega_I)<\inftyE(ΩI​)<∞ in Theorem 4, or the integrability of ∫I∣y′∣\int_I|y'|∫I​∣y′∣ in the classical continuous-parameter ergodic theorem. The result also separates two kinds of time. Along the integers, a stationary-increment process with finite mean is an additive discrete process, so yn/ny_n/nyn​/n converges almost surely; Theorem 3 shows that the real-time path can still escape any envelope between the integers.

Formalizing it. The theorem is classical and its proof is complete in the paper. To our knowledge it has no machine-checked proof. A formalization requires the existence of a probability space carrying a uniform variable and an independent i.i.d. sequence with a prescribed law on the integers, the joint-law notion of stationarity for real-time processes, a stationarity argument for a randomly shifted process, an expectation computation with a change of variables, and the second Borel–Cantelli lemma. The definitions of stationarity and stationary increments for real-time processes on [0,∞)[0,\infty)[0,∞) are reusable beyond this mission.

Difficulty

The natural first attempt is a process with linear or polynomial growth, such as yt=Zty_t=Ztyt​=Zt with a heavy-tailed integrable ZZZ. Every such attempt fails against a Γ\GammaΓ that grows faster, so the process must depend on Γ\GammaΓ. A process that is large on a whole interval of length one cannot have finite mean when Γ\GammaΓ grows fast. The difficulty is to have excursions that are taller than any prescribed envelope infinitely often, and still keep finite expectation, stationarity in real time and smoothness. In the formal proof, the stationarity step is where most of the work sits: the shifted path must be identified in law with the original one for every real shift τ\tauτ, not only for integer shifts.

Formalization scope

  • The process is y : ℝ → Ω → ℝ, with values at t<0t<0t<0 ignored; Ω\OmegaΩ lives in Type. Every yty_tyt​ with t≥0t\ge0t≥0 is measurable, and both stationarity definitions include almost-everywhere measurability, so Measure.map never takes its junk value.
  • Joint laws are push-forwards to Set.Ici (0:ℝ) → ℝ with the product σ\sigmaσ-algebra. Stationary increments compare the laws of (yt+τ−yτ)t(y_{t+\tau}-y_\tau)_t(yt+τ​−yτ​)t​ and (yt−y0)t(y_t-y_0)_t(yt​−y0​)t​ for every real τ≥0\tau\ge0τ≥0.
  • "Increasing" is non-decreasing on (0,∞)(0,\infty)(0,∞) (MonotoneOn Γ (Set.Ioi 0)), which gives the stronger theorem. Γ\GammaΓ is a total function on R\mathbb RR; its values at t≤0t\le0t≤0 are irrelevant.
  • "Derivatives of all orders" is ContDiffOn ℝ ((⊤ : ℕ∞) : WithTop ℕ∞) on [0,∞)[0,\infty)[0,∞) for every ω\omegaω. This is C∞C^\inftyC∞, not the analytic order.
  • In (1.4.4) "sufficiently large ttt" ranges over real ttt. The event need not be measurable a priori; PPP of a set is its outer measure.
  • A statement with a fixed Γ\GammaΓ, with ∃Γ\exists\Gamma∃Γ, with "for some large ttt", or with ttt restricted to the integers would be trivial or false and is not the theorem. The integer skeleton is precisely what does not fail.
  • For the milestones, the random ingredients are hypotheses: any η,ν0,ν1,…\eta,\nu_0,\nu_1,\dotsη,ν0​,ν1​,… that are independent, with η\etaη uniform on (0,1)(0,1)(0,1) and each νr\nu_rνr​ of law mΓm_\GammamΓ​. The existence of such a family is part of the goal's proof.

Contributions welcome: proofs of the milestones, a general lemma that a uniformly shifted process built from an i.i.d. sequence of unit blocks is stationary in real time, and a proof of the goal.

Selected references

  • J. F. C. Kingman, Subadditive ergodic theory, The Annals of Probability 1(6):883–899, 1973. https://doi.org/10.1214/aop/1176996798
  • J. F. C. Kingman, The ergodic theory of subadditive stochastic processes, Journal of the Royal Statistical Society, Series B 30(3):499–510, 1968. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.2517-6161.1968.tb00749.x
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Dynamic ProgrammingLinear OptimizationOperations Research+2·Captain: mikedeng1

Linear Programming and Finite Markovian Control Problems IX: Discounted Semi-Markov Decision Processes — the Value Vector Is the Smallest Superharmonic VectorTextbook

Why semi-Markov control matters

A decision maker may choose an action whenever a system changes state, even though the time until the next change is random. Maintenance and replacement decisions are examples: a repair choice changes both the next operating state and the length of time before another choice is available. A discrete-time Markov decision model gives every decision epoch the same duration. A semi-Markov decision process allows the holding time to depend on the current state, action, and next state. Kallenberg's Chapter 7 develops discounted and average-reward versions of this finite-state model, including a characterization of optimal discounted value through inequalities and a linear program (Kallenberg 1983, Chapter 7).

The mission focuses on the discounted part of that chapter. The result is known: Kallenberg proves it as Theorem 7.2.1. The formalization task is to state and eventually prove the result for the same policy class and the same general holding-time distributions. Those details matter because a stationary-policy-only version would omit the comparison that the theorem makes with all admissible policies.

Model and notation

Let EEE be a nonempty finite state set. Each i∈Ei\in Ei∈E has a finite nonempty set A(i)A(i)A(i) of available actions. If action a∈A(i)a\in A(i)a∈A(i) is chosen, the next state is jjj with probability piaj≥0p_{iaj}\geq0piaj​≥0, with ∑jpiaj=1\sum_jp_{iaj}=1∑j​piaj​=1. Conditional on jjj, the nonnegative time until that transition has distribution FiajF_{iaj}Fiaj​. The action earns a lump reward riar_{ia}ria​ immediately and a reward rate sias_{ia}sia​ during the ensuing sojourn. Neither the holding-time laws nor the reward rates are required to be identical across transitions (Kallenberg 1983, pp. 210–212).

Fix a positive continuous discount rate λ\lambdaλ. The factor applied after elapsed time ttt is e−λte^{-\lambda t}e−λt. Assumption 7.2.1 requires the Laplace–Stieltjes transform of each conditional holding-time law to satisfy

Liaj(λ):=∫0∞e−λt dFiaj(t)<1(i,j∈E, a∈A(i)).L_{iaj}(\lambda):=\int_0^\infty e^{-\lambda t}\,dF_{iaj}(t)<1 \qquad(i,j\in E,\ a\in A(i)).Liaj​(λ):=∫0∞​e−λtdFiaj​(t)<1(i,j∈E, a∈A(i)).

The assumption is strict for every triple; it does not require a particular parametric family. Define the one-epoch expected discounted reward and discounted transition entry by

ria∗=∑jpiaj∫0∞(ria+sia∫0te−λu du)dFiaj(t),piaj∗=piajLiaj(λ).r^*_{ia}=\sum_jp_{iaj}\int_0^\infty \left(r_{ia}+s_{ia}\int_0^t e^{-\lambda u}\,du\right)dF_{iaj}(t), \qquad p^*_{iaj}=p_{iaj}L_{iaj}(\lambda).ria∗​=j∑​piaj​∫0∞​(ria​+sia​∫0t​e−λudu)dFiaj​(t),piaj∗​=piaj​Liaj​(λ).

A policy RRR is a sequence of randomized decisions. At each epoch its choice may depend on every previously observed state and chosen action and the current state. It does not observe previous sojourn times when choosing. Let viλ(R)v_i^\lambda(R)viλ​(R) be the expected sum of discounted lump and rate rewards from initial state iii, as in equation (7.2.1). The DRD value vector is viλ=sup⁡Rviλ(R)v_i^\lambda=\sup_R v_i^\lambda(R)viλ​=supR​viλ​(R), with the supremum over this full policy class. A real vector www is DRD-superharmonic when

wi≥ria∗+∑jpiaj∗wj(i∈E, a∈A(i)).w_i\geq r^*_{ia}+\sum_jp^*_{iaj}w_j \qquad(i\in E,\ a\in A(i)).wi​≥ria∗​+j∑​piaj∗​wj​(i∈E, a∈A(i)).

These are Kallenberg's Definitions 7.2.1 and 7.2.2 (p. 214).

Formalization targets

Goal: the smallest superharmonic vector

Theorem 7.2.1 states that the value vector itself satisfies the superharmonic inequalities and lies below every other vector satisfying them:

vλ is DRD-superharmonic,w is DRD-superharmonic⟹viλ≤wi(i∈E).v^\lambda\text{ is DRD-superharmonic},\qquad w\text{ is DRD-superharmonic}\Longrightarrow v_i^\lambda\leq w_i\quad(i\in E).vλ is DRD-superharmonic,w is DRD-superharmonic⟹viλ​≤wi​(i∈E).

This is the mission goal. Its content includes both clauses: merely showing that every superharmonic vector bounds policy rewards would leave out the assertion that the value is superharmonic.

Supporting results

Lemma 7.2.1 expresses viλ(R)v_i^\lambda(R)viλ​(R) as a sum of expected discounted state-action occupancies. Theorem 7.2.2 says that a feasible action choice attaining equality in the value equation at every state yields an optimal pure stationary policy. Theorem 7.2.3 says that positive support in an optimal solution of the dual linear program (7.2.11) yields such a policy. Their statements and exact conditions are the mission's milestones (Kallenberg 1983, pp. 212, 216–217).

What the results provide

The goal turns a supremum over possibly history-dependent randomized policies into a finite system of inequalities indexed by available state-action pairs. The next two results explain how equality in those inequalities and an optimal linear-programming solution identify a pure stationary policy with the same value. Thus the finite programs are statements about the original semi-Markov process rather than a separate discounted matrix model (Kallenberg 1983, pp. 214–217).

Kallenberg supplies paper proofs. This mission supplies Lean statements and a shared model interface; the proposed theorem items still require machine-checked proofs. The model's arbitrary conditional holding-time measures, its distinction between the current reward and future discounted value, and its history-dependent policy class are reusable for other finite semi-Markov arguments. The average-reward section of Chapter 7 is outside this mission.

Main difficulty

The straightforward finite-state discounted equation concerns expected one-step rewards. The source value, however, is defined from rewards earned at random physical times, and a policy can react to its entire discrete history. Identifying these two descriptions requires accounting for the joint state, action, and elapsed-time law without giving the policy access to past holding times. Holding times may equal zero with positive probability; the strict transform assumption excludes a degenerate law concentrated entirely at zero, but it does not make each holding time strictly positive. A second issue is real-valuedness: all-policy suprema and integrals must represent the finite quantities in the source rather than Lean's default values on ill-posed inputs.

Formalization scope

Lean uses finite types for states and actions, with a nonempty available-action finset for each state. Conditional sojourn laws are probability measures on R\mathbb RR with no mass on negative times. This includes arbitrary distributions on [0,∞)[0,\infty)[0,∞) and permits an atom at zero. The model stores stochastic transition rows, lump rewards, and rate rewards. The discounted layer stores λ>0\lambda>0λ>0 and the source's strict per-triple transform inequality. The expected one-epoch reward uses a Lebesgue integral against each sojourn law.

Policy decision rules read a list of past state-action pairs and the current state. Finite-horizon value recursively integrates the original epoch reward and its holding-time discount; policy value is its limit. The coordinatewise supremum ranges over all such policies. The occupation sum of Lemma 7.2.1 is a separate theorem, not the definition of policy value. A proof must establish convergence and boundedness from Assumption 7.2.1 so that Lean's total limit, integral, and real-supremum operations have their intended meanings.

The dual program sums only over actions available in each state and uses strictly positive weights βj\beta_jβj​, equality flow constraints, and nonnegative variables as printed. Its pure stationary selector must choose an available action with positive dual mass in every state. Contributions establishing the occupation identity, value bounds, Bellman inequalities, or dual decoding all fit the mission.

Selected references

  • L. C. M. Kallenberg, Linear Programming and Finite Markovian Control Problems, Mathematical Centre Tracts 148, Mathematisch Centrum, Amsterdam, 1983, Chapter 7, pp. 210–227. Publisher repository.
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Operations ResearchOptimization·Captain: mikedeng1

Scheduling Deteriorating Jobs on a Single Processor II: If E(X_j)/α_j and α_j/[c_j(1+α_j)] Both Increase in j, the Order 1, …, N Minimizes the Weighted Expected Completion Time (Proposition 2)Research Paper

Why deteriorating jobs need a scheduling rule

On one processor, the completion time of a job normally depends on how much work precedes it. In the model of Browne and Yechiali (1990), waiting also changes the job's own processing requirement: a job that starts later takes longer. The sequence therefore changes both when each job starts and how long subsequent jobs must wait. This matters when the goal is a weighted completion cost, because a delay to one job can raise the completion costs of many others.

The paper gives an expected-makespan ordering for this linear deterioration model and, in Proposition 2, a sufficient condition under which the original job order minimizes weighted expected completion cost. The latter is the target of this mission. Related platform work on Delayed SWPT and the AvgCompletionSched family treats weighted completion scheduling without this job-specific linear deterioration. Their additive processing-time models do not supply the completion-time object used here.

Jobs, schedules, and cost

There are NNN jobs, all available at time zero, processed one at a time on a single machine without idle time or preemption. A schedule π\piπ is a permutation of the jobs: π(k)\pi(k)π(k) is the job processed in position kkk. The paper labels positions and jobs from 111 to NNN; the Lean development labels them from 000 to N−1N-1N−1. The identity schedule π0\pi_0π0​ processes jobs in label order.

For job iii, XiX_iXi​ is its random initial processing requirement, αi\alpha_iαi​ its deterministic growth rate, and cic_ici​ its waiting cost rate. If the job starts at time ttt, its actual processing time is Yi(t)=Xi+αitY_i(t)=X_i+\alpha_i tYi​(t)=Xi​+αi​t. Deterioration stops once processing starts. Write Sk(π)S_k(\pi)Sk​(π) for the time at which the first kkk scheduled jobs have all finished. The model sets S0(π)=0S_0(\pi)=0S0​(π)=0 and

Sk+1(π)=Sk(π)+Xπ(k+1)+απ(k+1)Sk(π)S_{k+1}(\pi)=S_k(\pi)+X_{\pi(k+1)}+\alpha_{\pi(k+1)}S_k(\pi)Sk+1​(π)=Sk​(π)+Xπ(k+1)​+απ(k+1)​Sk​(π)

in the paper's one-based position notation. Thus the completion time of the job in position kkk is Sk(π)S_k(\pi)Sk​(π). Its cost is its own rate cπ(k)c_{\pi(k)}cπ(k)​ times that completion time, giving

C(π)=∑k=1Ncπ(k)Sk(π).C(\pi)=\sum_{k=1}^{N}c_{\pi(k)}S_k(\pi).C(π)=k=1∑N​cπ(k)​Sk​(π).

All of these are random quantities until an expectation is taken. Equation (2) of the paper writes SkS_kSk​ as a sum of the initial requirements multiplied by the later growth factors. Equation (8) substitutes that expression into C(π0)C(\pi_0)C(π0​). Both equations are included as milestones, stated along an arbitrary schedule by relabelling the jobs. The third milestone is the exact change in CCC from swapping two adjacent jobs. These three statements are pathwise identities, so their mathematical content does not depend on a probability distribution.

Formalization targets

The principal target is Proposition 2: if both sequences of job-indexed ratios are strictly increasing,

E(X1)α1<⋯<E(XN)αN,α1c1(1+α1)<⋯<αNcN(1+αN),\frac{E(X_1)}{\alpha_1}<\cdots<\frac{E(X_N)}{\alpha_N}, \qquad \frac{\alpha_1}{c_1(1+\alpha_1)} <\cdots< \frac{\alpha_N}{c_N(1+\alpha_N)},α1​E(X1​)​<⋯<αN​E(XN​)​,c1​(1+α1​)α1​​<⋯<cN​(1+αN​)αN​​,

then, for every permutation σ\sigmaσ,

E[C(π0)]≤E[C(σ)].E[C(\pi_0)]\le E[C(\sigma)].E[C(π0​)]≤E[C(σ)].

The first ratio compares an initial expected requirement with its growth rate. The second couples growth and the cost rate. The conclusion is global optimality over the paper's whole class of nonpreemptive, non-idling permutations. It does not assert that the identity order is the unique minimizer; strict input ratios do not by themselves justify a uniqueness claim.

The attack path records exactly the supporting statements printed in the paper: the closed completion-time formula (2), the weighted cost formula (8), and the unnumbered adjacent-interchange identity after (8). The milestone quotations preserve the paper's printed display, while the Lean statements use an arbitrary permutation where relabelling permits it. The interchange display has a multiplication dot before its second bracket; expansion for two jobs shows that the term is added. The formal statement records that correction, and the source quotation retains the printed symbol.

What the result establishes

The proposition identifies a directly checkable pair of ordering conditions under which the natural job-label order solves a weighted stochastic scheduling problem. A condition involving only E(Xi)/αiE(X_i)/\alpha_iE(Xi​)/αi​, enough for the paper's expected-makespan target, does not determine this weighted objective. The cost rates introduce another ordering requirement. The result gives a sufficient rule, not a characterization of every optimal schedule or of every parameter choice.

The mathematical result was published in 1990; this mission asks for its machine-checked formalization. A complete development will connect the processing-time recursion, the pathwise cost identities, and the expected optimality statement in Lean. The recursion and cost definitions can be reused for other finite single-machine problems in which a job's processing time depends on its start time. The milestone identities are also useful independently of the final sufficient condition, including for studying other choices of weights and ordering indices.

Where the argument is difficult

Sorting by expected initial requirement alone cannot settle the problem, because processing a job changes later start times and hence later processing times. Even sorting by the expected-makespan index leaves the cost rates unaccounted for. The value of an adjacent swap depends on the elapsed time before the pair and on the completion costs of jobs after the pair. It is not enough to compare the two jobs' own completion costs in isolation.

The source states the sufficient condition after its interchange display but does not present a full proof of the global claim. Closing the Lean goal requires connecting local comparisons to every schedule and handling the expected value of the recursively defined cost. The identities are finite, but their indices change between zero-based Lean positions and the paper's one-based display, especially at the first position and at an empty suffix.

Formalization scope

Jobs are Fin N\mathrm{Fin}\,NFinN, and a policy is an equivalence permutation with π(k)\pi(k)π(k) equal to the job in position kkk. Completion time is defined by the processing rule Yi(t)=Xi+αitY_i(t)=X_i+\alpha_i tYi​(t)=Xi​+αi​t, not by the closed form (2). At positions beyond the NNN jobs it stays constant, and theorems about the closed form restrict kkk to 0≤k≤N0\le k\le N0≤k≤N. The total cost is defined from job-weighted completion times, not from equation (8). This keeps both identities substantive.

The proposition uses a probability space and the Bochner integral of the real-valued cost. Every XiX_iXi​ is integrable, so its expectation and the finite linear combinations appearing in the cost are meaningful. Initial requirements are nonnegative at every outcome, reflecting the paper's standing positive-processing convention; strict positivity is unnecessary for the claim. Growth rates and cost rates are strictly positive. Those two assumptions make the printed ratios well-defined and support the ordering rule. The paper's common independence convention is not required for these expectations and is not assumed.

The two strict orderings are over the labels of jobs in π0\pi_0π0​, not positions of an arbitrary schedule. The conclusion compares π0\pi_0π0​ with every permutation, not only with schedules obtained by one adjacent swap. The N=0N=0N=0 and N=1N=1N=1 cases are allowed: the order conditions have no pair to compare, and there is only one permutation. Solvers may contribute the finite-sum, interchange, and integrability facts needed to link the milestones to Proposition 2. The pathwise identities require no probability assumptions and can support later variants.

Selected references

  • Browne, Sid, and Uri Yechiali, Scheduling Deteriorating Jobs on a Single Processor, Operations Research 38(3), 495–498 (1990). DOI: 10.1287/opre.38.3.495.
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Operations ResearchStatistics·Captain: mikedeng1

Residual Life Time at Great Age 4: α₁ ≤ tF′(t)/(1 − F(t)) ≤ α₂ for t ≥ t₀ Sandwiches P{(X − t)/t ≤ x | X > t} Between Γ_{α₁}(x) and Γ_{α₂}(x)Research Paper

Motivation

The residual life time of a lifetime XXX at age ttt is the remaining life X−tX - tX−t given survival past ttt. Its distribution at great age is a basic object in reliability, insurance and the statistics of extremes: excess-of-loss reinsurance prices the part of a claim above a retention level, and peaks-over-threshold methods fit a model to the observations exceeding a high level. Balkema and de Haan (Residual Life Time at Great Age, Ann. Probab. 2 (1974), 792–804, doi:10.1214/aop/1176996548) determined every possible limit law of the suitably normed residual life time as t→∞t \to \inftyt→∞ and the domains of attraction of these laws; Pickands (1975) obtained the continuous part of the same picture, which is the probabilistic basis of the generalized Pareto approximation used in practice.

Limit theorems describe the behaviour only as t→∞t \to \inftyt→∞. Section 4 of the paper gives approximation results for finite ttt. In extreme-value theory, von Mises (1936) gave a sufficient condition for attraction to the Fréchet law Φα\Phi_\alphaΦα​: tF′(t)/(1−F(t))→αtF'(t)/(1 - F(t)) \to \alphatF′(t)/(1−F(t))→α. Theorem 6 of the paper is a non-asymptotic, two-sided counterpart for the residual life time: two-sided bounds on the scaled hazard rate give two-sided bounds on the residual life distribution at every age past a threshold. This mission formalizes Theorem 6 (p. 801).

Setting

Let XXX be a real random variable with law μ\muμ and distribution function F(x)=P{X≤x}F(x) = P\{X \le x\}F(x)=P{X≤x}. For an age ttt with P{X>t}>0P\{X > t\} > 0P{X>t}>0, the residual life distribution function is

Ft(x)=P{X−t≤x∣X>t}=μ((t,t+x])μ((t,∞)),x∈R,F_t(x) = P\{X - t \le x \mid X > t\} = \frac{\mu((t, t + x])}{\mu((t, \infty))}, \qquad x \in \mathbb R,Ft​(x)=P{X−t≤x∣X>t}=μ((t,∞))μ((t,t+x])​,x∈R,

which is 000 for x<0x < 0x<0. For t>0t > 0t>0 the residual life scaled by the age has distribution function P{(X−t)/t≤x∣X>t}=Ft(xt)P\{(X - t)/t \le x \mid X > t\} = F_t(xt)P{(X−t)/t≤x∣X>t}=Ft​(xt).

For α>0\alpha > 0α>0 the Pareto-type law Γα\Gamma_\alphaΓα​ is

Γα(x)=1−(1+x)−α(x≥0),Γα(x)=0(x<0).\Gamma_\alpha(x) = 1 - (1 + x)^{-\alpha} \quad (x \ge 0), \qquad \Gamma_\alpha(x) = 0 \quad (x < 0).Γα​(x)=1−(1+x)−α(x≥0),Γα​(x)=0(x<0).

It is the law of Y−1Y - 1Y−1 when P{Y>y}=y−αP\{Y > y\} = y^{-\alpha}P{Y>y}=y−α for y≥1y \ge 1y≥1. FFF has a positive density F′F'F′ for t≥t0t \ge t_0t≥t0​ if FFF is differentiable at every t≥t0t \ge t_0t≥t0​ with derivative F′(t)>0F'(t) > 0F′(t)>0. The quantity F′(t)/(1−F(t))F'(t)/(1 - F(t))F′(t)/(1−F(t)) is the hazard rate of XXX at ttt, and tF′(t)/(1−F(t))tF'(t)/(1 - F(t))tF′(t)/(1−F(t)) is the hazard rate scaled by the age.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 6 (p. 801)

Let FFF have a positive density F′F'F′ for t≥t0t \ge t_0t≥t0​, and let α1,α2>0\alpha_1, \alpha_2 > 0α1​,α2​>0 satisfy α1≤tF′(t)/(1−F(t))≤α2\alpha_1 \le tF'(t)/(1 - F(t)) \le \alpha_2α1​≤tF′(t)/(1−F(t))≤α2​ for t≥t0t \ge t_0t≥t0​. Then for all t≥t0t \ge t_0t≥t0​ and all real xxx,

Γα1(x)  ≤  P{X−tt≤x  ∣  X>t}  ≤  Γα2(x).\Gamma_{\alpha_1}(x) \;\le\; P\Big\{\frac{X - t}{t} \le x \;\Big|\; X > t\Big\} \;\le\; \Gamma_{\alpha_2}(x).Γα1​​(x)≤P{tX−t​≤x​X>t}≤Γα2​​(x).

The smaller constant gives the lower bound: a smaller scaled hazard rate means a heavier tail and hence a larger chance that the remaining life is long. For a Pareto tail 1−F(t)=Ct−α1 - F(t) = Ct^{-\alpha}1−F(t)=Ct−α one may take α1=α2=α\alpha_1 = \alpha_2 = \alphaα1​=α2​=α, and both inequalities are equalities.

Milestone: the integrated hazard bounds (proof of Theorem 6, p. 801)

For t≥t0t \ge t_0t≥t0​ and x>0x > 0x>0,

α1∫t(1+x)tduu≤∫t(1+x)tF′(u)1−F(u) du≤α2∫t(1+x)tduu.\alpha_1 \int_t^{(1+x)t} \frac{du}{u} \le \int_t^{(1+x)t} \frac{F'(u)}{1 - F(u)}\,du \le \alpha_2 \int_t^{(1+x)t} \frac{du}{u}.α1​∫t(1+x)t​udu​≤∫t(1+x)t​1−F(u)F′(u)​du≤α2​∫t(1+x)t​udu​.

Significance

The theorem turns a pointwise condition on the hazard rate, which can be checked on a density, into a bound on the whole conditional distribution of the residual life, valid at every age t≥t0t \ge t_0t≥t0​ rather than only in the limit. If moreover tF′(t)/(1−F(t))→αtF'(t)/(1 - F(t)) \to \alphatF′(t)/(1−F(t))→α, then α1,α2\alpha_1, \alpha_2α1​,α2​ can be taken arbitrarily close to α\alphaα for large t0t_0t0​, which recovers the convergence P{(X−t)/t≤x∣X>t}→Γα(x)P\{(X - t)/t \le x \mid X > t\} \to \Gamma_\alpha(x)P{(X−t)/t≤x∣X>t}→Γα​(x) with an explicit error at finite ages. Such bounds are what a practitioner fitting a Pareto tail above a threshold needs to quantify the approximation.

The result is classical and its proof is short; it is not open. As far as is known, no machine-checked version exists, and Mathlib has no theory of residual life distributions or of the limit laws of Balkema and de Haan. A formal proof would provide reusable pieces: the identity between the integrated hazard rate and −log⁡(1−F)-\log(1 - F)−log(1−F) for a distribution function with a density, and the comparison of a residual life distribution with a Pareto law. The other missions of this series formalize the paper's limit theorems, for which this mission's objects (the residual life distribution and Γα\Gamma_\alphaΓα​) are shared.

Difficulty

The mathematics is elementary; the work lies in the regularity bookkeeping that the printed proof leaves implicit. The density is only assumed to exist pointwise, so the fundamental theorem of calculus must be applied to −log⁡(1−F)-\log(1 - F)−log(1−F) with a derivative that is not assumed continuous, and its integrability on [t,(1+x)t][t, (1+x)t][t,(1+x)t] has to come from the hazard bounds themselves. That 1−F1 - F1−F stays positive, that t0>0t_0 > 0t0​>0, and that the case x≤0x \le 0x≤0 is trivial all have to be derived from the hypotheses rather than assumed. Finally, the conditional probability must be identified with 1−R((1+x)t)/R(t)1 - R((1+x)t)/R(t)1−R((1+x)t)/R(t), where R=1−FR = 1 - FR=1−F, through the measure of intervals.

Formalization scope

The law of XXX is a probability measure μ\muμ on R\mathbb RR, and FFF is Mathlib's ProbabilityTheory.cdf μ. The probability P{(X−t)/t≤x∣X>t}P\{(X - t)/t \le x \mid X > t\}P{(X−t)/t≤x∣X>t} is residualLife μ t (x * t) =μ((t,t+xt])/μ((t,∞))= \mu((t, t + xt])/\mu((t, \infty))=μ((t,t+xt])/μ((t,∞)). Γα\Gamma_\alphaΓα​ is a real function defined by cases, with Real.rpow for the power. The density is an explicit function fff with FFF having derivative f(t)>0f(t) > 0f(t)>0 at every t≥t0t \ge t_0t≥t0​, the derivative taken within [t0,∞)[t_0, \infty)[t0​,∞). This is a right derivative at t0t_0t0​ and the ordinary derivative for t>t0t > t_0t>t0​. It is the weakest reading of "positive density F′F'F′ for t≥t0t \ge t_0t≥t0​", and it admits the exact Pareto law with t0=1t_0 = 1t0​=1, whose distribution function has no two-sided derivative at 111. The bounds are stated for t⋅f(t)/(1−F(t))t \cdot f(t)/(1 - F(t))t⋅f(t)/(1−F(t)) with Lean's real division.

No hypothesis is added to the printed theorem, and no printed slip was found. The conditions t0>0t_0 > 0t0​>0 and F(t)<1F(t) < 1F(t)<1 follow from the hypotheses: for t≤0t \le 0t≤0 the ratio is not ≥α1>0\ge \alpha_1 > 0≥α1​>0, and a positive derivative on [t0,∞)[t_0, \infty)[t0​,∞) makes FFF strictly increasing there. Lean's convention a/0=0a/0 = 0a/0=0 therefore never acts at the ages concerned. The conclusion is stated for all real xxx, as printed; for x≤0x \le 0x≤0 all three quantities are 000. The milestone does not assume the hazard rate integrable: it is bounded and measurable on [t,(1+x)t][t, (1+x)t][t,(1+x)t], and a non-integrable integrand would make the inequality false rather than trivially true. A formalization that dropped the density hypothesis, replaced F′F'F′ by deriv without differentiability, or let the bounds hold only on a set not containing every t≥t0t \ge t_0t≥t0​ would not be this theorem; all three are excluded by the statement.

A proof needs the fundamental theorem of calculus for derivatives within a half-line (in Mathlib), the identity ∫t(1+x)tdu/u=log⁡(1+x)\int_t^{(1+x)t} du/u = \log(1+x)∫t(1+x)t​du/u=log(1+x), and the chain rule for log⁡(1−F)\log(1 - F)log(1−F). Proofs of the milestone and the goal are welcome, as are sorry-free lemmas showing that Γα\Gamma_\alphaΓα​ is a distribution function and that the Pareto law satisfies the hypotheses with α1=α2\alpha_1 = \alpha_2α1​=α2​.

Selected references

  • A. A. Balkema, L. de Haan, Residual Life Time at Great Age, The Annals of Probability 2 (1974), no. 5, 792–804. https://doi.org/10.1214/aop/1176996548
  • J. Pickands III, Statistical Inference Using Extreme Order Statistics, The Annals of Statistics 3 (1975), no. 1, 119–131. https://doi.org/10.1214/aos/1176343003
  • R. von Mises, La distribution de la plus grande de n valeurs, Revue Mathématique de l'Union Interbalkanique 1 (1936), 141–160.
  • L. de Haan, A. Ferreira, Extreme Value Theory: An Introduction, Springer, 2006. https://doi.org/10.1007/0-387-34471-3
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Expected Critical Path Lengths in PERT Networks: With Bundle-Independent Arc Lengths, the Mean-Length Estimate g, Fulkerson's Recursion f and the Expected Critical Path Length e Satisfy g ≤ f ≤ eResearch Paper

Motivation

PERT (Program Evaluation and Review Technique) and the critical path method model a project as a directed acyclic network whose arcs are jobs and whose nodes are events; the duration of the project is the length of a longest path from the origin to the terminal. When job durations are random, the quantity a planner wants is the expected duration. Computing it exactly requires solving one longest-path problem for every joint outcome of the job durations: with mmm jobs each taking two values, 2m2^m2m deterministic problems. Classical PERT practice replaced every random duration by its mean and reported the longest path for the mean durations. That figure is known to be optimistically biased.

D. R. Fulkerson, Expected Critical Path Lengths in PERT Networks (RAND Memorandum RM-3075-PR, 1962; Operations Research 10(6):808–817, 1962, doi:10.1287/opre.10.6.808), proposed a second estimate, computed node by node with work exponential only in the size of a single node's bundle of incoming arcs, and proved that it lies between the classical mean-length figure and the true expectation.

Setting

A project network has events 0,1,…,n0,1,\dots,n0,1,…,n with n≥1n\ge1n≥1, origin 000 and terminal nnn. Its arcs are ordered pairs (i,j)(i,j)(i,j) with i<ji<ji<j, at most one per pair, and every event lies on a directed path from the origin to the terminal. Fulkerson numbers his nodes 1,…,n1,\dots,n1,…,n; his node iii is event i−1i-1i−1 here. The bundle BjB_jBj​ of an event jjj is the set of arcs entering jjj, and pred⁡(j)\operatorname{pred}(j)pred(j) the set of their tails; the origin's bundle is empty.

For arc lengths ttt, let ℓi(t)\ell_i(t)ℓi​(t) be the length of a longest (critical) path from the origin to iii; equivalently ℓ0=0\ell_0=0ℓ0​=0 and ℓj=max⁡i∈pred⁡(j)(ℓi+tij)\ell_j=\max_{i\in\operatorname{pred}(j)}(\ell_i+t_{ij})ℓj​=maxi∈pred(j)​(ℓi​+tij​).

The lengths of the arcs of each bundle BjB_jBj​ form a random vector with a finite distribution: a finite set SjS_jSj​ of bundle vectors vvv, where viv_ivi​ is the length of arc (i,j)(i,j)(i,j), with probabilities pj(v)≥0p_j(v)\ge 0pj​(v)≥0 summing to 111. Arcs within a bundle may be correlated; distinct bundles are independent, so an assignment ω=(ωj)j\omega=(\omega_j)_jω=(ωj​)j​ of one bundle vector per event has probability p(ω)=∏jpj(ωj)p(\omega)=\prod_j p_j(\omega_j)p(ω)=∏j​pj​(ωj​). Three numbers are attached to each event iii:

  1. the expected critical path length ei=∑ωp(ω) ℓi(t(ω))e_i=\sum_\omega p(\omega)\,\ell_i(t(\omega))ei​=∑ω​p(ω)ℓi​(t(ω));
  2. the mean-length estimate gi=ℓi(tˉ)g_i=\ell_i(\bar t)gi​=ℓi​(tˉ), where tˉij=∑v∈Sjpj(v) vi\bar t_{ij}=\sum_{v\in S_j}p_j(v)\,v_itˉij​=∑v∈Sj​​pj​(v)vi​ is the expected length of arc (i,j)(i,j)(i,j);
  3. Fulkerson's numbers f0=0f_0=0f0​=0 and, for j≠0j\neq0j=0,
fj=∑v∈Sjpj(v) max⁡i∈pred⁡(j)(fi+vi).f_j=\sum_{v\in S_j}p_j(v)\,\max_{i\in\operatorname{pred}(j)}\bigl(f_i+v_i\bigr).fj​=v∈Sj​∑​pj​(v)i∈pred(j)max​(fi​+vi​).

Formalization targets

Goal: (4.4)

gi  ≤  fi  ≤  eifor every event i.g_i\;\le\;f_i\;\le\;e_i\qquad\text{for every event } i .gi​≤fi​≤ei​for every event i.

Milestones

In the order of Fulkerson's induction (pp. 10–12):

  1. the recursion for ℓ\ellℓ computes the greatest path length (§3, (3.6), and the display on p. 11);
  2. ℓi(t)\ell_i(t)ℓi​(t) depends only on the arcs of the bundles B0,…,BiB_0,\dots,B_iB0​,…,Bi​ (p. 6);
  3. (4.8): max⁡i∈pred⁡(j)(fi+tˉij)≤fj\max_{i\in\operatorname{pred}(j)}(f_i+\bar t_{ij})\le f_jmaxi∈pred(j)​(fi​+tˉij​)≤fj​;
  4. (4.5)/(4.9): if gk≤fkg_k\le f_kgk​≤fk​ for all k<jk<jk<j, then gj≤fjg_j\le f_jgj​≤fj​;
  5. (4.13): ∑v∈Sjpj(v)max⁡i∈pred⁡(j)(ei+vi)≤ej\sum_{v\in S_j}p_j(v)\max_{i\in\operatorname{pred}(j)}(e_i+v_i)\le e_j∑v∈Sj​​pj​(v)maxi∈pred(j)​(ei​+vi​)≤ej​;
  6. (4.10)/(4.14): if fk≤ekf_k\le e_kfk​≤ek​ for all k<jk<jk<j, then fj≤ejf_j\le e_jfj​≤ej​.

Companion statements

  • gi≤eig_i\le e_igi​≤ei​ under an arbitrary joint distribution of all arc lengths (remark, p. 12).
  • Fig. 4.2: with correlated bundles, e3=g3=1e_3=g_3=1e3​=g3​=1 but f3=5/4f_3=5/4f3​=5/4, so (4.4) fails without bundle independence.
  • (4.17): an independent example with g3=f3=1<e3=5/4g_3=f_3=1<e_3=5/4g3​=f3​=1<e3​=5/4.
  • Fig. 4.1: explicit values g4=3/2g_4=3/2g4​=3/2, f2=1/2f_2=1/2f2​=1/2, f3=9/8f_3=9/8f3​=9/8, f4=55/32f_4=55/32f4​=55/32, and fi=eif_i=e_ifi​=ei​.

Significance

The chain (4.4) says that the classical PERT estimate ggg never overstates the expected project duration, and that the numbers fff are a lower bound at least as tight. The fff computation visits each node once and sums over the support of that node's bundle only, so its cost grows exponentially with bundle size rather than with network size, while the exact expectation eee requires the whole product space. The Fig. 4.2 example shows that the bundle-independence hypothesis cannot be dropped for the upper inequality, while the lower inequality g≤eg\le eg≤e survives arbitrary dependence.

The result has a complete published proof. This mission seeks a machine-checked proof of (4.4) for finite distributions, with the longest-path characterisation of the earliest-event-time recursion and the locality of critical path lengths as reusable lemmas, and machine-checkable versions of the paper's numerical examples, including the counterexample showing the role of independence.

Difficulty

The left inequality compares an average of maxima with a maximum of averages. The right inequality requires more: fjf_jfj​ averages over the bundle entering jjj, while eje_jej​ averages over assignments to every bundle. Taking expectations in ℓj=max⁡i(ℓi+tij)\ell_j=\max_i(\ell_i+t_{ij})ℓj​=maxi​(ℓi​+tij​) yields ej≥max⁡i(ei+tˉij)e_j\ge\max_i(e_i+\bar t_{ij})ej​≥maxi​(ei​+tˉij​), which gives the weaker bound g≤eg\le eg≤e. Fig. 4.2 shows that f≤ef\le ef≤e can fail when the bundles are dependent. In Lean, eee is a sum over a dependent product of finite supports (Fintype.piFinset); its interaction with the local recurrence for fff is the central technical difficulty.

Formalization scope

  • Network: the published CriticalPath.Events.ProjectNetwork (Kelley–Walker 1959): events Fin (n + 1), arcs a Finset of ordered pairs with strictly increasing labels, origin preceding and terminal following every event. This requires n≥1n\ge1n≥1. Fulkerson's numbering condition "i≤ji\le ji≤j" on p. 3 is read as the strict i<ji<ji<j (arcs join distinct nodes of an acyclic network). There is one arc per ordered pair, Fulkerson's own convention in (3.13).
  • Critical path length: the published CriticalPath.Events.earliest, a recursion with Finset.sup' over the nonempty set of incoming arcs. This is the paper's convention that terms of missing arcs are ignored. Nothing uses a default value of 000 or −∞-\infty−∞.
  • Distributions: finite, given as data (a support Finset and a weight function per bundle) plus a predicate IsProb (nonnegative weights on the support, summing to 111, for every event including the origin). Bundle vectors are functions on all events, and coordinates outside pred⁡(j)\operatorname{pred}(j)pred(j) are never read.
  • Arc lengths are arbitrary reals. §3 assumes nonnegative lengths, but its footnote on p. 4 states that nonnegativity "is not essential in this or the following section"; the statements are given in this more general form.
  • No trivialization: eie_iei​ is the sum over every assignment of bundle vectors, weighted by the product probability (3.5). It is not defined by a recursion, and the goal assumes none of the milestones. fff at node jjj uses only the distribution of the bundle of jjj.

Infrastructure that a full development needs, and that is reusable elsewhere, includes the longest-path characterisation of the earliest-event-time recursion, the locality lemma, and the factorisation of sums over Fintype.piFinset along one coordinate. Proofs of any milestone or companion are welcome. Out of scope here: §5 (computational examples) and the general-network analogues of §6.

Selected references

  • D. R. Fulkerson, Expected Critical Path Lengths in PERT Networks, RAND Memorandum RM-3075-PR, March 1962; published in Operations Research 10(6):808–817, 1962. doi:10.1287/opre.10.6.808
  • J. E. Kelley Jr. and M. R. Walker, Critical-Path Planning and Scheduling, Proceedings of the Eastern Joint Computer Conference, 1959, pp. 160–173. doi:10.1145/1460299.1460318
  • D. G. Malcolm, J. H. Roseboom, C. E. Clark and W. Fazar, Application of a Technique for Research and Development Program Evaluation, Operations Research 7(5):646–669, 1959. doi:10.1287/opre.7.5.646
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Operations ResearchOptimal TransportStatistics·Captain: mikedeng1

Data-Driven Distributionally Robust Optimization Using the Wasserstein Metric: Performance Guarantees and Tractable Reformulations III: Asymptotic Consistency of Wasserstein Robust SolutionsResearch Paper

Motivation

Many decisions in operations research and machine learning minimize an expected cost EP[h(x,ξ)]\mathbb E^{P}[h(x,\xi)]EP[h(x,ξ)] whose distribution PPP is unknown and is seen only through NNN independent samples. The sample-average approximation replaces PPP by the empirical distribution and is known to produce decisions with poor out-of-sample performance when NNN is small. Distributionally robust optimization instead minimizes the worst-case expected cost over a set of distributions that are plausible given the data. Mohajerin Esfahani and Kuhn (arXiv:1505.05116v3, published in Mathematical Programming 171, 2018) take this set to be a ball in the Wasserstein metric around the empirical distribution, and show that such balls deliver both finite-sample certificates and asymptotic consistency. This mission formalizes the statistical half of that paper: Section 3 and Appendix A.

A data-driven method should, at a minimum, be consistent: as the sample grows, its optimal value and decisions should approach those of the true problem. For Wasserstein balls this requires a measure concentration inequality for empirical distributions in the Wasserstein metric, which was supplied by Fournier and Guillin (PTRF 2015). The paper combines that inequality with the Kantorovich–Rubinstein duality and the Borel–Cantelli lemma.

Setting

Let EEE be Rm\mathbb R^mRm with an arbitrary norm ∥⋅∥\|\cdot\|∥⋅∥ and its Borel σ\sigmaσ-algebra. A decision xxx ranges over a feasible set X⊆RnX\subseteq\mathbb R^nX⊆Rn; the random vector ξ\xiξ has distribution PPP, supported on the uncertainty set Ξ⊆E\Xi\subseteq EΞ⊆E; the loss is h:Rn×E→Rh:\mathbb R^n\times E\to\mathbb Rh:Rn×E→R. The true problem (1) has optimal value

J⋆=inf⁡x∈XEP[h(x,ξ)].J^\star=\inf_{x\in X}\mathbb E^P[h(x,\xi)].J⋆=x∈Xinf​EP[h(x,ξ)].

The Wasserstein distance between distributions Q1,Q2Q_1,Q_2Q1​,Q2​ with finite first moment is

dW(Q1,Q2)=inf⁡{∫∥ξ1−ξ2∥ Π(dξ1,dξ2): Π a coupling of Q1 and Q2}.d_W(Q_1,Q_2)=\inf\Big\{\int\|\xi_1-\xi_2\|\,\Pi(d\xi_1,d\xi_2):\ \Pi\text{ a coupling of }Q_1\text{ and }Q_2\Big\}.dW​(Q1​,Q2​)=inf{∫∥ξ1​−ξ2​∥Π(dξ1​,dξ2​): Π a coupling of Q1​ and Q2​}.

Given samples ξ^1,…,ξ^N\hat\xi_1,\dots,\hat\xi_Nξ^​1​,…,ξ^​N​ drawn independently from PPP (joint law PNP^NPN, and P∞P^\inftyP∞ for the infinite sequence), the empirical distribution is P^N=1N∑i=1Nδξ^i\widehat P_N=\frac1N\sum_{i=1}^N\delta_{\hat\xi_i}PN​=N1​∑i=1N​δξ^​i​​, and the Wasserstein ball Bε(P^N)\mathbb B_\varepsilon(\widehat P_N)Bε​(PN​) is the set of distributions QQQ on Ξ\XiΞ with dW(P^N,Q)≤εd_W(\widehat P_N,Q)\le\varepsilondW​(PN​,Q)≤ε. The distributionally robust program (5) has optimal value

J^N=inf⁡x∈X sup⁡Q∈Bε(P^N)EQ[h(x,ξ)],\widehat J_N=\inf_{x\in X}\ \sup_{Q\in\mathbb B_\varepsilon(\widehat P_N)}\mathbb E^Q[h(x,\xi)],JN​=x∈Xinf​ Q∈Bε​(PN​)sup​EQ[h(x,ξ)],

and an optimizer of it is written x^N\widehat x_NxN​.

The light-tail condition (Assumption 3.3) asks for an exponent a>1a>1a>1 with A=EP[exp⁡(∥ξ∥a)]<∞A=\mathbb E^P[\exp(\|\xi\|^a)]<\inftyA=EP[exp(∥ξ∥a)]<∞. Under it, and for m≠2m\ne2m=2, Theorem 3.4 (Fournier–Guillin) gives constants c1,c2>0c_1,c_2>0c1​,c2​>0 with

PN{dW(P,P^N)≥ε}≤{c1e−c2Nεmax⁡{m,2},ε≤1,c1e−c2Nεa,ε>1,(7)P^N\{d_W(P,\widehat P_N)\ge\varepsilon\}\le\begin{cases}c_1e^{-c_2N\varepsilon^{\max\{m,2\}}},&\varepsilon\le1,\\ c_1e^{-c_2N\varepsilon^{a}},&\varepsilon>1,\end{cases}\tag{7}PN{dW​(P,PN​)≥ε}≤{c1​e−c2​Nεmax{m,2},c1​e−c2​Nεa,​ε≤1,ε>1,​(7)

for all N≥1N\ge1N≥1, ε>0\varepsilon>0ε>0. Solving the right-hand side =β=\beta=β for ε\varepsilonε gives the radius

εN(β)=(log⁡(c1β−1)c2N)1/max⁡{m,2} if N≥log⁡(c1β−1)c2,(log⁡(c1β−1)c2N)1/a otherwise.(8)\varepsilon_N(\beta)=\Big(\frac{\log(c_1\beta^{-1})}{c_2N}\Big)^{1/\max\{m,2\}}\text{ if }N\ge\frac{\log(c_1\beta^{-1})}{c_2},\qquad\Big(\frac{\log(c_1\beta^{-1})}{c_2N}\Big)^{1/a}\text{ otherwise}.\tag{8}εN​(β)=(c2​Nlog(c1​β−1)​)1/max{m,2} if N≥c2​log(c1​β−1)​,(c2​Nlog(c1​β−1)​)1/a otherwise.(8)

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 3.6 (asymptotic consistency)

Let βN∈(0,1)\beta_N\in(0,1)βN​∈(0,1) with ∑NβN<∞\sum_N\beta_N<\infty∑N​βN​<∞ and εN(βN)→0\varepsilon_N(\beta_N)\to0εN​(βN​)→0, and use the radius εN(βN)\varepsilon_N(\beta_N)εN​(βN​) in (5).

(i) If h(x,⋅)h(x,\cdot)h(x,⋅) is upper semicontinuous on Ξ\XiΞ and ∣h(x,ξ)∣≤L(1+∥ξ∥)|h(x,\xi)|\le L(1+\|\xi\|)∣h(x,ξ)∣≤L(1+∥ξ∥) on X×ΞX\times\XiX×Ξ, then P∞P^\inftyP∞-almost surely

J^N≥J⋆ for all large NandJ^N→J⋆.\widehat J_N\ge J^\star\ \text{for all large }N\quad\text{and}\quad\widehat J_N\to J^\star.JN​≥J⋆ for all large NandJN​→J⋆.

(ii) If moreover XXX is closed and h(⋅,ξ)h(\cdot,\xi)h(⋅,ξ) is lower semicontinuous on XXX, then P∞P^\inftyP∞-almost surely every accumulation point of (x^N)(\widehat x_N)(xN​) is an optimal solution of (1).

Milestones

  1. Theorem 3.5 (finite sample guarantee). For fixed N≥1N\ge1N≥1 and β∈(0,1)\beta\in(0,1)β∈(0,1), with radius εN(β)\varepsilon_N(\beta)εN​(β),
PN{EP[h(x^N,ξ)]>J^N}≤β.P^N\big\{\mathbb E^P[h(\widehat x_N,\xi)]>\widehat J_N\big\}\le\beta.PN{EP[h(xN​,ξ)]>JN​}≤β.
  1. Lemma A.1. An upper semicontinuous hhh on Ξ\XiΞ with h(ξ)≤L(1+∥ξ∥)h(\xi)\le L(1+\|\xi\|)h(ξ)≤L(1+∥ξ∥) is the pointwise limit on Ξ\XiΞ of a non-increasing sequence of Lipschitz functions.
  2. Lemma 3.7 (convergence of distributions). Any data-dependent Q^N∈BεN(βN)(P^N)\widehat Q_N\in\mathbb B_{\varepsilon_N(\beta_N)}(\widehat P_N)Q​N​∈BεN​(βN​)​(PN​) satisfies
P∞{lim⁡N→∞dW(P,Q^N)=0}=1.P^\infty\Big\{\lim_{N\to\infty}d_W(P,\widehat Q_N)=0\Big\}=1.P∞{N→∞lim​dW​(P,Q​N​)=0}=1.

Theorem 3.2 (Kantorovich–Rubinstein duality, dW(Q1,Q2)=sup⁡{∫f dQ1−∫f dQ2: f 1-Lipschitz}d_W(Q_1,Q_2)=\sup\{\int f\,dQ_1-\int f\,dQ_2:\ f\ 1\text{-Lipschitz}\}dW​(Q1​,Q2​)=sup{∫fdQ1​−∫fdQ2​: f 1-Lipschitz}), which the proof of (i) uses, enters as a reference item: the open platform theorem WassersteinDRO.Duality.kantorovich_rubinstein, stated on the whole space for all Borel probability measures. It is not a milestone, because that statement is more general than the paper's version on M(Ξ)\mathcal M(\Xi)M(Ξ) (the two agree for distributions in M(Ξ)\mathcal M(\Xi)M(Ξ) by extending Lipschitz functions from Ξ\XiΞ to the whole space).

A companion item, Example 1 (1), records that upper semicontinuity cannot be dropped in (i): for Ξ=[0,1]\Xi=[0,1]Ξ=[0,1], P=δ0P=\delta_0P=δ0​ and h=1(0,1](ξ)h=\mathbb 1_{(0,1]}(\xi)h=1(0,1]​(ξ) one has J⋆=0J^\star=0J⋆=0 but J^N≥1\widehat J_N\ge1JN​≥1 for every radius ε>0\varepsilon>0ε>0.

Significance

Theorem 3.5 makes the robust optimal value an upper confidence bound on the out-of-sample cost of the robust decision. Theorem 3.6 shows that this protection does not cost consistency: with radii shrinking at a rate governed by summable confidence levels, such as βN=e−N\beta_N=e^{-\sqrt N}βN​=e−N​, both the certificate and the decisions converge to their true counterparts. Together they are the statistical justification for the Wasserstein ambiguity sets that the rest of the paper reformulates as finite convex programs, and they are cited as the reference consistency results for Wasserstein distributionally robust optimization.

All results here are proved in the paper. None of them, nor the Fournier–Guillin inequality, is formalized on Prove2Me or in Mathlib to our knowledge. The mission adds machine-checked versions of the finite-sample and consistency statements, a monotone Lipschitz approximation lemma for semicontinuous functions with linear growth (useful wherever Lipschitz duality has to be extended to semicontinuous integrands), and a convergence lemma for measures in shrinking Wasserstein balls.

Difficulty

The obvious argument for (i) bounds the worst-case expectation by the true expectation plus a Lipschitz constant times the radius. That fails, because hhh is only upper semicontinuous in ξ\xiξ, not Lipschitz, and has no Lipschitz constant to multiply. The expectations of a merely semicontinuous loss must be controlled uniformly over every distribution in the ball, including data-dependent worst-case distributions, and the almost-sure convergence of the empirical distribution alone does not give this. Example 1 of the paper shows that each regularity hypothesis is needed. On the formal side, the Wasserstein distance is an infimum over couplings on a Polish space; even its triangle inequality (gluing of couplings) and the Kantorovich–Rubinstein duality are substantial.

Formalization scope

EEE is a finite-dimensional real normed space with its Borel σ\sigmaσ-algebra (BorelSpace), and mmm is its dimension; decisions live in EuclideanSpace ℝ (Fin n). The definitions dWd_WdW​ (type p=1p=1p=1), P^N\widehat P_NPN​, Bε(P^N)\mathbb B_\varepsilon(\widehat P_N)Bε​(PN​), EQ\mathbb E^QEQ and the worst-case expectation are the published WassersteinDRO.Duality definitions. The optimal values J⋆J^\starJ⋆ and J^N\widehat J_NJN​ are extended reals. Standing conventions and pinned hypotheses:

  • "Supported on Ξ\XiΞ" is P(Ξc)=0P(\Xi^c)=0P(Ξc)=0; Ξ\XiΞ is neither closed nor convex in general. The samples lie in Ξ\XiΞ almost surely, and optimizers and ball selections are required only for samples in Ξ\XiΞ.
  • The constants c1,c2>0c_1,c_2>0c1​,c2​>0 enter as any constants for which (7) holds, which is how (8) is defined from Theorem 3.4. The theorem of Fournier and Guillin is not part of this mission, and m≠2m\ne2m=2 is assumed because (7) and (8) are printed only for m≠2m\ne2m=2.
  • The loss is real-valued. In Theorem 3.5 it is assumed PPP-integrable on XXX, because the worst-case expectation counts only distributions under which the loss is integrable. In Theorem 3.6 the linear growth bound makes this automatic.
  • Probabilities "at least 1−β1-\beta1−β" are stated as bounds on the outer measure of the failure event, and "P∞P^\inftyP∞-almost surely" as an almost-everywhere statement for the product measure on sequences.
  • The paper's "J^N↓J⋆\widehat J_N\downarrow J^\starJN​↓J⋆" is stated as eventual domination J^N≥J⋆\widehat J_N\ge J^\starJN​≥J⋆ plus convergence, which is what its proof establishes; monotonicity in NNN is not claimed.

A statement in which (7) could not hold for any constants would make the goal vacuous. The concentration inequality is satisfiable (for instance by a Dirac distribution with any constants), and εN(β)\varepsilon_N(\beta)εN​(β) is defined by the paper's formula, not chosen freely.

Welcome contributions: the triangle inequality and Kantorovich–Rubinstein duality for dWd_WdW​, the Borel–Cantelli step for product measures, Lemma A.1, and the Fatou argument of (ii).

Selected references

  • P. Mohajerin Esfahani and D. Kuhn, Data-driven distributionally robust optimization using the Wasserstein metric: performance guarantees and tractable reformulations, Mathematical Programming 171 (2018); source version arXiv:1505.05116v3. https://arxiv.org/abs/1505.05116v3
  • N. Fournier and A. Guillin, On the rate of convergence in Wasserstein distance of the empirical measure, Probability Theory and Related Fields 162 (2015). https://doi.org/10.1007/s00440-014-0583-7
  • L. V. Kantorovich and G. S. Rubinstein, On a space of totally additive functions, Vestnik Leningrad. Univ. 13 (1958).
  • C. Villani, Optimal Transport: Old and New, Springer, 2009. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-71050-9
  • D. Bertsimas, V. Gupta and N. Kallus, Robust sample average approximation, Mathematical Programming 171 (2018). https://arxiv.org/abs/1408.4445
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Supply Chain Coordination with Contracts X: Under Forced Compliance, Options Contracts with Shares λ_l and min{λ_h, λ̂_h} Separate the Two Demand Types and Coordinate CapacityTextbook

Motivation

A manufacturer launching a new product often depends on a single supplier for a critical component, and the supplier must build capacity before demand is known. The manufacturer usually knows more about demand than the supplier does: her sales force, market research and order history give her a forecast the supplier cannot verify, and she has a reason to inflate it, since more capacity costs her nothing if the supplier pays for it. Whether contracts can make forecast sharing credible, and at what cost to the supply chain, is the subject of Cachon and Lariviere, "Contracting to assure supply: how to share demand forecasts in a supply chain" (Management Science 47(5), 2001, doi:10.1287/mnsc.47.5.629.10486). Section 6.10 of G. P. Cachon's survey chapter Supply Chain Coordination with Contracts (Handbooks in OR & MS, Vol. 11, 2003) presents a simplified version of that model, and this mission formalizes it from the author's January 2003 draft.

The section separates two regimes. Under forced compliance the supplier must build exactly the capacity the contract specifies; under voluntary compliance he may build less. The section's conclusion is that forced compliance allows both coordination and credible forecast sharing, while voluntary compliance allows forecast sharing only at the price of under-investment in capacity.

Setting

Demand DθD_\thetaDθ​ has one of two types θ∈{h,l}\theta \in \{h, l\}θ∈{h,l} with distribution function Fθ(x)=F(x∣θ)F_\theta(x) = F(x\mid\theta)Fθ​(x)=F(x∣θ). The page assumes Fθ(x)=0F_\theta(x) = 0Fθ​(x)=0 for x<0x < 0x<0, Fθ(x)>0F_\theta(x) > 0Fθ​(x)>0 for x≥0x \ge 0x≥0 (so demand has an atom at 000), FθF_\thetaFθ​ increasing and differentiable, and stochastic dominance Fh(x)<Fl(x)F_h(x) < F_l(x)Fh​(x)<Fl​(x) for all x≥0x \ge 0x≥0. The supplier SSS builds capacity kkk at cost ck>0c_k > 0ck​>0 per unit; after demand is observed he produces min⁡{Dθ,k}\min\{D_\theta, k\}min{Dθ​,k} at cost cp>0c_p > 0cp​>0 per unit; the manufacturer MMM earns r>cp+ckr > c_p + c_kr>cp​+ck​ per unit of demand satisfied; unused capacity is worth nothing.

Expected sales with xxx units of capacity are Sθ(x)=x−E[(x−Dθ)+]S_\theta(x) = x - E[(x - D_\theta)^+]Sθ​(x)=x−E[(x−Dθ​)+], and the supply chain's expected profit is

Ωθ(k)=(r−cp)Sθ(k)−ckk.\Omega_\theta(k) = (r - c_p)S_\theta(k) - c_k k .Ωθ​(k)=(r−cp​)Sθ​(k)−ck​k.

An optimal capacity kθok_\theta^okθo​ maximizes Ωθ\Omega_\thetaΩθ​ over k≥0k \ge 0k≥0, and Ωθo=Ωθ(kθo)\Omega_\theta^o = \Omega_\theta(k_\theta^o)Ωθo​=Ωθ​(kθo​).

In an options contract MMM buys qiq_iqi​ options at wow_owo​ each and pays wew_ewe​ for each option exercised. With k=qik = q_ik=qi​ her profit is Πθ(qi)=(r−we)Sθ(qi)−woqi\Pi_\theta(q_i) = (r - w_e)S_\theta(q_i) - w_o q_iΠθ​(qi​)=(r−we​)Sθ​(qi​)−wo​qi​ and the supplier's is (we−cp)Sθ(qi)+woqi−ckqi(w_e - c_p)S_\theta(q_i) + w_o q_i - c_k q_i(we​−cp​)Sθ​(qi​)+wo​qi​−ck​qi​. The contract with share λ\lambdaλ sets r−we=λ(r−cp)r - w_e = \lambda(r - c_p)r−we​=λ(r−cp​) and wo=λckw_o = \lambda c_kwo​=λck​. Under a wholesale price contract with price www the supplier earns πθ(k)=(w−cp)Sθ(k)−ckk\pi_\theta(k) = (w - c_p)S_\theta(k) - c_k kπθ​(k)=(w−cp​)Sθ​(k)−ck​k; the price inducing capacity kkk is wθ(k)=ck/Fˉθ(k)+cpw_\theta(k) = c_k/\bar F_\theta(k) + c_pwθ​(k)=ck​/Fˉθ​(k)+cp​ with Fˉθ=1−Fθ\bar F_\theta = 1 - F_\thetaFˉθ​=1−Fθ​, and the manufacturer then earns Πθ(k)=(r−wθ(k))Sθ(k)\Pi_\theta(k) = (r - w_\theta(k))S_\theta(k)Πθ​(k)=(r−wθ​(k))Sθ​(k).

With asymmetric information only MMM observes θ\thetaθ. Let π^\hat\piπ^ be the supplier's minimum acceptable profit, and define the shares

λl=1−π^Ωlo,λh=1−π^Ωho,λ^h=Ωlo−π^Ωl(kho),λH=min⁡{λh,λ^h}.\lambda_l = 1 - \frac{\hat\pi}{\Omega_l^o},\qquad \lambda_h = 1 - \frac{\hat\pi}{\Omega_h^o},\qquad \hat\lambda_h = \frac{\Omega_l^o - \hat\pi}{\Omega_l(k_h^o)},\qquad \lambda_H = \min\{\lambda_h, \hat\lambda_h\}.λl​=1−Ωlo​π^​,λh​=1−Ωho​π^​,λ^h​=Ωl​(kho​)Ωlo​−π^​,λH​=min{λh​,λ^h​}.

Formalization targets

Goal: forced-compliance separating contracts (§6.10.3, pp. 103–104)

The low type offers the options contract with share λl\lambda_lλl​ and initial order klok_l^oklo​, the high type the one with share λH\lambda_HλH​ and initial order khok_h^okho​. Assuming 0<π^<Ωlo0 < \hat\pi < \Omega_l^o0<π^<Ωlo​ and Ωl(kho)>0\Omega_l(k_h^o) > 0Ωl​(kho​)>0:

0<λl<λH<1,λl Ωh(klo)<λH Ωho,λH Ωl(kho)≤Ωlo−π^,0 < \lambda_l < \lambda_H < 1,\qquad \lambda_l\,\Omega_h(k_l^o) < \lambda_H\,\Omega_h^o,\qquad \lambda_H\,\Omega_l(k_h^o) \le \Omega_l^o - \hat\pi,0<λl​<λH​<1,λl​Ωh​(klo​)<λH​Ωho​,λH​Ωl​(kho​)≤Ωlo​−π^,

the supplier earns π^\hat\piπ^ from the low type and at least π^\hat\piπ^ from the high type, and each initial order kθok_\theta^okθo​ maximizes both firms' profits. The profit comparisons are stated between the contract profit functions, not between shares.

Milestones

  1. Sθ(x)=x−∫0xFθS_\theta(x) = x - \int_0^x F_\thetaSθ​(x)=x−∫0x​Fθ​ (p. 98).
  2. Ωθ\Omega_\thetaΩθ​ is concave, and k>0k > 0k>0 is optimal iff Fˉθ(k)=ck/(r−cp)\bar F_\theta(k) = c_k/(r - c_p)Fˉθ​(k)=ck​/(r−cp​) (p. 99).
  3. Ωl(k)<Ωh(k)\Omega_l(k) < \Omega_h(k)Ωl​(k)<Ωh​(k) for k>0k > 0k>0, hence Ωlo<Ωho\Omega_l^o < \Omega_h^oΩlo​<Ωho​ (implicit on p. 104).
  4. The options contract with share λ∈[0,1]\lambda \in [0,1]λ∈[0,1] gives Πθ=λΩθ\Pi_\theta = \lambda\Omega_\thetaΠθ​=λΩθ​ and the supplier (1−λ)Ωθ(1-\lambda)\Omega_\theta(1−λ)Ωθ​, so it coordinates (pp. 99–100).
  5. Under voluntary compliance, ∂π(kθo,kθo,θ)/∂k<0\partial\pi(k_\theta^o, k_\theta^o, \theta)/\partial k < 0∂π(kθo​,kθo​,θ)/∂k<0 (p. 100).
  6. A capacity k>0k > 0k>0 is optimal for the supplier under a wholesale price www iff w=wθ(k)w = w_\theta(k)w=wθ​(k) (p. 101).
  7. A stationary point k∗k^*k∗ of Πθ\Pi_\thetaΠθ​ satisfies Fˉθ(k∗)=Fˉθ(kθo)(1+fθ(k∗)Sθ(k∗)/Fˉθ(k∗)2)\bar F_\theta(k^*) = \bar F_\theta(k_\theta^o)\bigl(1 + f_\theta(k^*)S_\theta(k^*)/\bar F_\theta(k^*)^2\bigr)Fˉθ​(k∗)=Fˉθ​(kθo​)(1+fθ​(k∗)Sθ​(k∗)/Fˉθ​(k∗)2), so k∗<kθok^* < k_\theta^ok∗<kθo​ (p. 102).

Significance

The goal shows that with forced compliance a high-demand manufacturer can share her forecast credibly through the terms of a coordinating contract rather than its form: both types use the same contract family, the supply chain is coordinated in every state, and the only cost of asymmetric information is that the high type may be unable to push the supplier down to his reservation profit. The voluntary-compliance milestones show the other side: once the supplier may under-build, only the wholesale price affects his capacity, and the resulting capacity is strictly below the integrated optimum. Together they explain why compliance regimes matter in capacity contracting.

The results are established on the page with short arguments; none has a machine-checked proof. Formalizing them requires the derivative of expected sales for a distribution with an atom, the first-order characterization of a concave maximizer on a half-line, and careful bookkeeping of the incentive constraints. The demand and profit definitions are reusable for other capacity-procurement and newsvendor-type models.

Difficulty

The incentive constraints look like arithmetic on shares, but the strict inequality λl<λ^h\lambda_l < \hat\lambda_hλl​<λ^h​ needs Ωl(kho)<Ωlo\Omega_l(k_h^o) < \Omega_l^oΩl​(kho​)<Ωlo​: the low type's chain profit at the high type's capacity must be strictly below its optimum. The obvious argument via uniqueness of the maximizer is not available, because the page does not assume FθF_\thetaFθ​ strictly increasing, so Ωl\Omega_lΩl​ need not be strictly concave and may have a whole interval of maximizers. Likewise Ωlo<Ωho\Omega_l^o < \Omega_h^oΩlo​<Ωho​ needs a strict comparison of integrals of distribution functions. In the voluntary-compliance part, the derivative of wθ(k)w_\theta(k)wθ​(k) needs the density at k∗k^*k∗, and k∗<kθok^* < k_\theta^ok∗<kθo​ fails when that density is 000.

Formalization scope

Each demand law is a probability measure on R\mathbb RR and FθF_\thetaFθ​ is Mathlib's cdf. FθF_\thetaFθ​ is required to be differentiable only on (0,∞)(0,\infty)(0,∞), because the page's Fθ(0)>0F_\theta(0) > 0Fθ​(0)>0 makes it jump at 000. SθS_\thetaSθ​ is defined by the expectation x−E[(x−Dθ)+]x - E[(x - D_\theta)^+]x−E[(x−Dθ​)+], whose integrand is integrable because Dθ≥0D_\theta \ge 0Dθ​≥0 almost surely. Optimal capacities are passed as arguments characterized as maximizers over [0,∞)[0,\infty)[0,∞), never chosen; kθo>0k_\theta^o > 0kθo​>0 is footnote 46's assumption. Derivatives are HasDerivAt statements.

Hypotheses added relative to the page, all disclosed in the items: 0<π^<Ωlo0 < \hat\pi < \Omega_l^o0<π^<Ωlo​ and Ωl(kho)>0\Omega_l(k_h^o) > 0Ωl​(kho​)>0 in the goal (the page divides by Ωl(kho)\Omega_l(k_h^o)Ωl​(kho​) and needs λl∈(0,1)\lambda_l \in (0,1)λl​∈(0,1)); λ>0\lambda > 0λ>0 for the voluntary-compliance derivative (at λ=0\lambda = 0λ=0 it vanishes); Fˉθ(k∗)>0\bar F_\theta(k^*) > 0Fˉθ​(k∗)>0 and fθ(k∗)>0f_\theta(k^*) > 0fθ​(k∗)>0 for the non-coordination result. The page's assumption wθ′′>0w''_\theta > 0wθ′′​>0 is not needed and not imposed; its strict-concavity claim on p. 101 is not stated, because it would need FθF_\thetaFθ​ strictly increasing. The prior Pr⁡(θ=h)=ρ\Pr(\theta = h) = \rhoPr(θ=h)=ρ does not enter any statement. The page's "separating equilibrium" is formalized by its defining incentive and participation conditions, not by a general signalling-game solution concept; a predicate that holds by construction of λ^h\hat\lambda_hλ^h​ (for example λH≤λ^h\lambda_H \le \hat\lambda_hλH​≤λ^h​) is not an acceptable substitute for the profit inequalities. The fixed-fee condition of p. 105 is pure algebra on four numbers and is not included.

All definitions are local to the namespace CachonCoord.CapacityForecast. No platform theorem formalizes this model; the Snyder–Shen newsvendor definitions (SupplyChainTheory_contracts) and the revenue-sharing model of Cachon–Lariviere 2005 (RevShareCoord.*) concern different games and are not reused. Proofs of any milestone, and a sanity instance showing the model's hypotheses are satisfiable (for example demand with an atom pθp_\thetapθ​ at 000 and an exponential tail, ph<plp_h < p_lph​<pl​), are welcome.

Selected references

  • G. P. Cachon, Supply Chain Coordination with Contracts, in S. Graves and T. de Kok (eds.), Handbooks in Operations Research and Management Science, Vol. 11: Supply Chain Management, North-Holland, 2003, Ch. 6. doi:10.1016/S0927-0507(03)11006-7 (formalized from the author's 3rd draft, January 2003).
  • G. P. Cachon and M. A. Lariviere, Contracting to assure supply: how to share demand forecasts in a supply chain, Management Science 47(5), 629–646, 2001. doi:10.1287/mnsc.47.5.629.10486
  • R. E. Barlow and F. Proschan, Mathematical Theory of Reliability, Wiley, 1965 (increasing failure rate distributions, cited on p. 102).
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Supply Chain Coordination with Contracts VIII: In the Two-Location Base-Stock Model the Linear Transfers (39)–(41) Make the Optimal Base Stocks the Unique Nash EquilibriumTextbook

Motivation

In a supply chain with stock at two locations, a supplier holds inventory that replenishes a retailer, and the retailer serves customers. Each firm sets its own inventory level to minimize its own cost. The retailer bears only part of the cost of customer backorders, and the supplier bears none of the retailer's holding cost, so their incentives differ. The resulting equilibrium generally differs from the policy that minimizes total cost. Cachon and Zipkin (Management Science 45(7), 1999) studied this game and proposed linear transfer payments that align the firms' incentives. In the chapter Supply Chain Coordination with Contracts (Handbooks in OR & MS, vol. 11, 2003, doi:10.1016/S0927-0507(03)11006-7), Cachon re-derives that analysis, adds a parameter λ\lambdaλ that divides the retail-level costs between the firms, and answers two questions the original paper left open: whether the contracts allow an arbitrary division of cost, and whether the optimal policy is the unique equilibrium under the contracts. This mission formalizes the second answer, together with the analysis of the decentralized game and of the optimal policy that it rests on (§6.8 of the 2003 chapter, read in the author's January 2003 draft).

Setting

Two firms, a retailer rrr and a supplier sss, each use a base stock policy: firm iii keeps its inventory position equal to its base stock level si∈Rs_i \in \mathbb Rsi​∈R. A negative supplier base stock means planned backorders. Let DrD_rDr​ and DsD_sDs​ be the demands during the retailer's and the supplier's lead times. They are nonnegative with finite means μr\mu_rμr​, μs\mu_sμs​, and their distribution functions FrF_rFr​, FsF_sFs​ are continuous, zero at 000, strictly increasing on [0,∞)[0,\infty)[0,∞) and differentiable on (0,∞)(0,\infty)(0,∞). Holding costs are hrh_rhr​ and hsh_shs​, with 0<hs<hr0 < h_s < h_r0<hs​<hr​. Each backorder at the retailer costs the retailer βr>0\beta_r > 0βr​>0 and the supplier βs>0\beta_s > 0βs​>0 per unit time. Write β=βr+βs\beta = \beta_r + \beta_sβ=βr​+βs​.

At retailer inventory level yyy the expected on-hand stock is Ir(y)=E[(y−Dr)+]I_r(y) = E[(y-D_r)^+]Ir​(y)=E[(y−Dr​)+] and the expected backorders are Br(y)=E[(Dr−y)+]B_r(y) = E[(D_r-y)^+]Br​(y)=E[(Dr​−y)+]. The retail-level cost rates are cr(y)=hrIr(y)+βrBr(y)c_r(y) = h_rI_r(y) + \beta_rB_r(y)cr​(y)=hr​Ir​(y)+βr​Br​(y), cs(y)=βsBr(y)c_s(y) = \beta_sB_r(y)cs​(y)=βs​Br​(y) and c(y)=cr(y)+cs(y)c(y) = c_r(y) + c_s(y)c(y)=cr​(y)+cs​(y). Because the supplier may stock out, the retailer's actual inventory level is sr−(Ds−ss)+s_r - (D_s - s_s)^+sr​−(Ds​−ss​)+, and every retail-level quantity is averaged accordingly:

g(sr,ss)=E[g(sr−(Ds−ss)+)]=Fs(ss)g(sr)+∫ss∞g(sr+ss−x)fs(x) dx.g(s_r,s_s) = E\big[g(s_r - (D_s-s_s)^+)\big] = F_s(s_s)g(s_r) + \int_{s_s}^\infty g(s_r+s_s-x)f_s(x)\,dx .g(sr​,ss​)=E[g(sr​−(Ds​−ss​)+)]=Fs​(ss​)g(sr​)+∫ss​∞​g(sr​+ss​−x)fs​(x)dx.

With the supplier's inventory Is(y)=E[(y−Ds)+]I_s(y) = E[(y-D_s)^+]Is​(y)=E[(y−Ds​)+] and backorders Bs(y)=μs−y+Is(y)B_s(y) = \mu_s - y + I_s(y)Bs​(y)=μs​−y+Is​(y), the firms' costs and the chain's cost are

πr(sr,ss)=cr(sr,ss),πs(sr,ss)=hsIs(ss)+cs(sr,ss),Π=πr+πs.\pi_r(s_r,s_s) = c_r(s_r,s_s), \qquad \pi_s(s_r,s_s) = h_sI_s(s_s) + c_s(s_r,s_s), \qquad \Pi = \pi_r + \pi_s .πr​(sr​,ss​)=cr​(sr​,ss​),πs​(sr​,ss​)=hs​Is​(ss​)+cs​(sr​,ss​),Π=πr​+πs​.

A pair {sro,sso}\{s_r^o, s_s^o\}{sro​,sso​} minimizing Π\PiΠ is an optimal policy. A Nash equilibrium is a pair from which neither firm can lower its own cost by a unilateral change of its base stock.

Under a linear transfer the supplier pays the retailer tIIr(sr,ss)+tBrBr(sr,ss)+tBsBs(ss)t_II_r(s_r,s_s) + t_B^rB_r(s_r,s_s) + t_B^sB_s(s_s)tI​Ir​(sr​,ss​)+tBr​Br​(sr​,ss​)+tBs​Bs​(ss​) (a negative amount is a payment the other way). The Cachon–Zipkin contracts with parameter λ∈(0,1]\lambda \in (0,1]λ∈(0,1] are

tI=(1−λ)hr,tBr=βr−λβ,tBs=λhsFs(sso)1−Fs(sso).t_I = (1-\lambda)h_r, \qquad t_B^r = \beta_r - \lambda\beta, \qquad t_B^s = \lambda h_s\frac{F_s(s_s^o)}{1-F_s(s_s^o)} .tI​=(1−λ)hr​,tBr​=βr​−λβ,tBs​=λhs​1−Fs​(sso​)Fs​(sso​)​.

Formalization targets

Goal: the contracts coordinate, uniquely

If {sro,sso}\{s_r^o, s_s^o\}{sro​,sso​} is optimal with sso>0s_s^o > 0sso​>0 and λ∈(0,1]\lambda \in (0,1]λ∈(0,1], then under the contracts

πr=λc(sr,ss)−tBsBs(ss),πs=(hs+tBs)Is(ss)+(1−λ)c(sr,ss)+tBs(μs−ss),\pi_r = \lambda c(s_r,s_s) - t_B^sB_s(s_s), \qquad \pi_s = (h_s+t_B^s)I_s(s_s) + (1-\lambda)c(s_r,s_s) + t_B^s(\mu_s - s_s),πr​=λc(sr​,ss​)−tBs​Bs​(ss​),πs​=(hs​+tBs​)Is​(ss​)+(1−λ)c(sr​,ss​)+tBs​(μs​−ss​),

{sro,sso}\{s_r^o, s_s^o\}{sro​,sso​} is a Nash equilibrium, and it is the only one. The goal contains no numerical constants. It holds for every demand distribution in the class and every λ\lambdaλ in the range.

Milestones

  1. In the uncontracted game, every retailer best response exceeds s^r>0\hat s_r > 0s^r​>0, where Fr(s^r)=βr/(hr+βr)F_r(\hat s_r) = \beta_r/(h_r+\beta_r)Fr​(s^r​)=βr​/(hr​+βr​), and every supplier best response is positive (pp. 79–80).
  2. In the uncontracted game, for every sss_sss​ the retailer's optimal base stock is below the chain's; consequently the competition penalty (Π(s∗)−Π(so))/Π(so)(\Pi(s^*) - \Pi(s^o))/\Pi(s^o)(Π(s∗)−Π(so))/Π(so) is positive at every equilibrium s∗s^*s∗ (pp. 80–81).
  3. The partial derivatives (35)–(36) of Π\PiΠ, and every optimum with ss>0s_s > 0ss​>0 satisfies c′(sr)=hsc'(s_r) = h_sc′(sr​)=hs​, i.e. Fr(sr)=(hs+β)/(hr+β)F_r(s_r) = (h_s+\beta)/(h_r+\beta)Fr​(sr​)=(hs​+β)/(hr​+β) (37) (p. 83).
  4. Optima with ss≤0s_s \le 0ss​≤0 have sr+ss=sˉs_r + s_s = \bar ssr​+ss​=sˉ, where Pr⁡(Dr+Ds≤sˉ)=β/(hr+β)\Pr(D_r + D_s \le \bar s) = \beta/(h_r+\beta)Pr(Dr​+Ds​≤sˉ)=β/(hr​+β) (38) (p. 83).
  5. The cost identities (42)–(43) under the contracts (p. 84).
  6. Under the contracts the retailer's best response decreases in sss_sss​, and the supplier's marginal cost along it has the closed form printed on p. 84.

Significance

The goal says that a contract built from quantities both firms can measure, namely the retailer's inventory and backorders and the supplier's backorders, makes the system-optimal policy the only equilibrium. The firms therefore reach the optimum without coordinating on an equilibrium. The parameter λ\lambdaλ splits the retail-level costs between the firms in any proportion up to λ=1\lambda = 1λ=1. Milestone 2 shows the contract is needed: without transfers, decentralization is always strictly suboptimal when the supplier is charged for retail backorders. The transfers tIt_ItI​ and tBrt_B^rtBr​ are those of the single-location model (§6.7), even though the retailer's target fractile changes from β/(β+hr)\beta/(\beta+h_r)β/(β+hr​) to (β+hs)/(β+hr)(\beta+h_s)/(\beta+h_r)(β+hs​)/(β+hr​).

The results are proved in the source and in Cachon and Zipkin (1999), with informal derivative arguments. No machine-checked version is known. Formalizing them requires differentiating expectations of piecewise-linear convex functions of a random lead-time shortfall. The page's argument also assumes densities, which the formal statements avoid, and contains several printing slips (see below). These would be settled by a complete development.

Difficulty

The firms' costs are compositions: a convex single-location cost evaluated at the random level sr−(Ds−ss)+s_r - (D_s - s_s)^+sr​−(Ds​−ss​)+, which is concave in sss_sss​. The supplier's cost is therefore not obviously convex in sss_sss​; its convexity at sr=sros_r = s_r^osr​=sro​ depends on the value of tBst_B^stBs​ and on c′(sro)=hsc'(s_r^o) = h_sc′(sro​)=hs​. Uniqueness is the hard part. Under the contracts the retailer's best response sr(ss)s_r(s_s)sr​(ss​) decreases, but the supplier's marginal cost along that best response, Fs(ss)(hs−(1−λ)c′(sr(ss))+tBs)−tBsF_s(s_s)(h_s - (1-\lambda)c'(s_r(s_s)) + t_B^s) - t_B^sFs​(ss​)(hs​−(1−λ)c′(sr​(ss​))+tBs​)−tBs​, is not monotone in general when λ\lambdaλ is small, contrary to a literal reading of p. 84. A uniqueness argument has to show that it has at most one zero, not that it increases.

Formalization scope

Demand laws are probability measures on R\mathbb RR with no mass below 000, finite means, and continuous distribution functions, zero at 000, strictly increasing on [0,∞)[0,\infty)[0,∞) and differentiable on (0,∞)(0,\infty)(0,∞). These are the section's standing assumptions, together with 0<hs<hr0 < h_s < h_r0<hs​<hr​ and βr,βs>0\beta_r, \beta_s > 0βr​,βs​>0 (footnote 34 excludes the zero cases). Expectations are Lebesgue integrals: IrI_rIr​, BrB_rBr​, IsI_sIs​ and the two-location averages are defined by expectation, and the page's integral forms are consequences. Integrals against fs(x) dxf_s(x)\,dxfs​(x)dx are written against the law of DsD_sDs​, so no density hypothesis is made. Base stocks range over all of R\mathbb RR, and "optimal" means minimizing Π\PiΠ over R2\mathbb R^2R2; the existence of an optimum is a hypothesis, as on p. 77. Derivatives are stated with HasDerivAt. Independence of DrD_rDr​ and DsD_sDs​, implicit on the page, enters only through the convolution of their laws in (38).

The contracted costs are defined from the firms' original costs and the transfer payment. Defining them by the closed forms (42)–(43) would make the identities trivial and is ruled out.

Corrected slips: (42) is stated with λc(sr,ss)\lambda c(s_r,s_s)λc(sr​,ss​) where the page prints λΠ(sr,ss)\lambda\Pi(s_r,s_s)λΠ(sr​,ss​) (the difference λhsIs(ss)\lambda h_sI_s(s_s)λhs​Is​(ss​) does not depend on srs_rsr​). The retailer's single-location fractile on p. 79 is stated as βr/(hr+βr)\beta_r/(h_r+\beta_r)βr​/(hr​+βr​), not the printed β/(hr+β)\beta/(h_r+\beta)β/(hr​+β). The garbled display after (43) and the fsf_sfs​/FsF_sFs​ slip in the best-response derivative are not reproduced. Not included: the contraction condition (34), the case split for the optimal policy (p. 84), the case sso≤0s_s^o \le 0sso​≤0, and the alternative schemes of §6.8.5 (Lee–Whang, Chen). Contributions of those, or of a reusable library for derivatives of E[g(s−(D−t)+)]E[g(s - (D-t)^+)]E[g(s−(D−t)+)], are welcome. The platform's Clark–Scarf items (InventoryControl_clarkScarf, ClarkScarf.Serial.*) concern periodic-review echelon policies and are not reused.

Selected references

  • G. P. Cachon, Supply Chain Coordination with Contracts, in S. Graves and T. de Kok (eds.), Handbooks in Operations Research and Management Science, vol. 11, North-Holland, 2003, §6.8. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0927-0507(03)11006-7
  • G. P. Cachon and P. H. Zipkin, Competitive and cooperative inventory policies in a two-stage supply chain, Management Science 45(7), 936–953, 1999. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.45.7.936
  • F. Chen and Y.-S. Zheng, Lower bounds for multi-echelon stochastic inventory systems, Management Science 40(11), 1426–1443, 1994. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.40.11.1426
  • A. Federgruen and P. Zipkin, Computational issues in an infinite-horizon, multiechelon inventory model, Operations Research 32(4), 818–836, 1984. https://doi.org/10.1287/opre.32.4.818
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Operations ResearchOptimization·Captain: mikedeng1

Supply Chain Coordination with Contracts III: With Effort-Dependent Demand, Buy-Backs, Quantity Flexibility and Revenue Sharing Under-Reward Effort, While a Quantity Discount Gives λΠ(q, e°)Textbook

Why effort breaks the standard coordinating contracts

A supplier selling through a retailer earns more when the retailer works harder at selling. Examples are a better shelf position, more knowledgeable sales staff, local advertising and keeping the display in order. These activities cost the retailer, raise demand, and usually cannot be observed or verified by the supplier, so no contract can be written on them directly. Chapter 6 of the Handbook of Operations Research and Management Science, Vol. 11: Supply Chain Management (G. P. Cachon, Supply Chain Coordination with Contracts, 2003) surveys contracts that align a retailer's decisions with the interest of the whole supply chain. Its §6.4 asks which of these contracts survive when the retailer also chooses such an unverifiable effort level.

The question goes back to the marketing literature on retail effort (Chu and Desai 1995, Desai and Srinivasan 1995, Desiraju and Moorthy 1997, Lal 1990, Lariviere and Padmanabhan 1997). It was taken up for newsvendor contracts by Taylor (2000), who showed that a sales rebate combined with a buy back restores coordination, and by Krishnan, Kapuscinski and Butz (2001), who let effort be chosen after demand is observed. This mission is the third in a series that formalizes the chapter's section capstones. It covers §6.4.1.

The newsvendor with effort-dependent demand

One supplier sells to one retailer for a single selling season. Before the season the retailer chooses an order quantity q≥0q \ge 0q≥0 and an effort level e≥0e \ge 0e≥0. Effort costs him g(e)g(e)g(e), where g(0)=0g(0) = 0g(0)=0, g′>0g' > 0g′>0 and g′′>0g'' > 0g′′>0. Demand DDD given effort eee has distribution function F(⋅∣e)F(\cdot \mid e)F(⋅∣e) on [0,∞)[0, \infty)[0,∞), with F(0∣e)=0F(0 \mid e) = 0F(0∣e)=0 and F(⋅∣e)F(\cdot \mid e)F(⋅∣e) strictly increasing. Demand is stochastically increasing in effort: ∂F(y∣e)/∂e<0\partial F(y \mid e)/\partial e < 0∂F(y∣e)/∂e<0 for y>0y > 0y>0. Units sell at the retail price ppp and cost c<pc < pc<p to produce. Goodwill costs, the salvage value and the retailer's own unit cost are zero. Expected sales and the integrated channel's profit are

S(q,e)=E[min⁡(q,D)]=q−∫0qF(y∣e) dy,Π(q,e)=pS(q,e)−cq−g(e).S(q, e) = \mathbb E[\min(q, D)] = q - \int_0^q F(y \mid e)\,dy, \qquad \Pi(q, e) = pS(q, e) - cq - g(e).S(q,e)=E[min(q,D)]=q−∫0q​F(y∣e)dy,Π(q,e)=pS(q,e)−cq−g(e).

Let (qo,eo)(q^o, e^o)(qo,eo) maximize Π\PiΠ. A contract fixes the transfer the retailer pays the supplier, as a function of what the supplier can verify: the order and, for some contracts, sales or leftover units, but never effort. The contracts compared are the buy back {wb,b}\{w_b, b\}{wb​,b}, quantity flexibility {wq,δ}\{w_q, \delta\}{wq​,δ}, revenue sharing {wr,ϕ}\{w_r, \phi\}{wr​,ϕ}, the sales rebate {ws,r,t}\{w_s, r, t\}{ws​,r,t} and the quantity discount wd(q)w_d(q)wd​(q). Under each, the retailer's profit πr(q,e)\pi_r(q, e)πr​(q,e) is his revenue pS(q,e)pS(q, e)pS(q,e) less the transfer and g(e)g(e)g(e).

Formalization targets

Goal

The goal combines the section's negative and positive results.

  1. Buy backs distort effort (Eq. (19)). For every b>0b > 0b>0, q>0q > 0q>0 and e>0e > 0e>0,
∂πr(q,e,wb,b)∂e<∂Π(q,e)∂e.\frac{\partial \pi_r(q, e, w_b, b)}{\partial e} < \frac{\partial \Pi(q, e)}{\partial e}.∂e∂πr​(q,e,wb​,b)​<∂e∂Π(q,e)​.
  1. The quantity discount aligns effort and splits profit. With
wd(q)=(1−λ)p S(q,eo)q+λc−(1−λ)g(eo)q,λ∈[0,1],w_d(q) = (1 - \lambda)p\,\frac{S(q, e^o)}{q} + \lambda c - (1 - \lambda)\frac{g(e^o)}{q}, \qquad \lambda \in [0, 1],wd​(q)=(1−λ)pqS(q,eo)​+λc−(1−λ)qg(eo)​,λ∈[0,1],

the following hold for every q>0q > 0q>0. The retailer earns πr(q,eo)=λΠ(q,eo)\pi_r(q, e^o) = \lambda\Pi(q, e^o)πr​(q,eo)=λΠ(q,eo) and the supplier earns (1−λ)Π(q,eo)(1 - \lambda)\Pi(q, e^o)(1−λ)Π(q,eo). The retailer's marginal profit of effort equals the channel's. His optimal efforts are the channel's. 3. The optimal order. If (qo,eo)(q^o, e^o)(qo,eo) maximizes Π\PiΠ, both firms' profits at effort eoe^oeo are maximized by qoq^oqo.

Milestones

The milestones follow the section's own claims: the integral form of SSS (p. 41); the first-order condition (18) for the chain-optimal effort; (19); the analogous strict inequalities for quantity flexibility (δ>0\delta > 0δ>0) and revenue sharing (ϕ<1\phi < 1ϕ<1), and the reverse inequality for the sales rebate (r>0r > 0r>0, q>tq > tq>t); the two displays of πr\pi_rπr​ under the quantity discount; and the fact that S(q,e)/qS(q, e)/qS(q,e)/q decreases in qqq.

Significance

The result separates two jobs a contract does. To coordinate the order quantity, buy backs, quantity flexibility and revenue sharing all shield the retailer from part of the demand risk or take part of his revenue. The same shield dulls his incentive to raise demand, so each one leads him to under-invest in effort. The sales rebate pushes the other way, toward too much effort. The quantity discount works because the retailer keeps every unit of realized revenue and bears all of his own effort cost. The schedule then prices the order against expected revenue at the optimal effort, so the order is coordinated without touching the effort incentive. Because πr(q,eo)=λΠ(q,eo)\pi_r(q, e^o) = \lambda\Pi(q, e^o)πr​(q,eo)=λΠ(q,eo) with λ\lambdaλ free in [0,1][0, 1][0,1], any split of the channel's optimal profit is attainable. The chapter extends this observation to retailers that also set price (p. 43).

The section's claims are proved on the page only in outline; several are introduced with "it can be shown". To our knowledge none has a machine-checked proof. Formalizing them requires differentiating expected sales in a parameter of the demand law. That step recurs throughout stochastic inventory and pricing models.

Difficulty

Most of the algebra is short. The substance is in the derivatives. ∂S(q,e)/∂e=−∫0q∂F(y∣e)/∂e dy\partial S(q, e)/\partial e = -\int_0^q \partial F(y \mid e)/\partial e\,dy∂S(q,e)/∂e=−∫0q​∂F(y∣e)/∂edy is a differentiation under the integral sign. The strict inequalities need this integral to be strictly negative. That in turn needs ∂F/∂e\partial F/\partial e∂F/∂e to be integrable and negative on a set of positive length, which is why q>0q > 0q>0 (and q>t≥0q > t \ge 0q>t≥0 for the sales rebate) matters.

The natural reading "the quantity discount makes (qo,eo)(q^o, e^o)(qo,eo) the retailer's joint optimum" is not what the page shows, and it fails in general. The page gives two partial statements: for each fixed qqq the retailer's effort incentive is the chain's, and at e=eoe = e^oe=eo his best order is qoq^oqo. Since πr(q,e)=Π(q,e)−(1−λ)Π(q,eo)\pi_r(q, e) = \Pi(q, e) - (1 - \lambda)\Pi(q, e^o)πr​(q,e)=Π(q,e)−(1−λ)Π(q,eo), the retailer can gain by moving qqq and eee together when λ\lambdaλ is small. The goal states exactly the two partial claims.

Formalization scope

The Lean namespace is CachonCoord.EffortNewsvendor. A structure Model collects the data: ppp and ccc with 0≤c<p0 \le c < p0≤c<p; a family of demand laws indexed by effort (probability measures on [0,∞)[0, \infty)[0,∞) with finite mean, no atom at 000, strictly increasing distribution function); the effort derivative ∂F(y∣e)/∂e\partial F(y \mid e)/\partial e∂F(y∣e)/∂e, negative for y>0y > 0y>0, e>0e > 0e>0; and ggg with g(0)=0g(0) = 0g(0)=0 and positive first and second derivatives for e>0e > 0e>0. SSS is defined as an expectation, and its integral form is a milestone. Derivative claims are HasDerivAt statements at interior efforts e>0e > 0e>0. The inequalities assert that both derivatives exist.

The following hypotheses are standing assumptions or disclosed additions:

  • the chapter's model paragraph (p. 7) and the zeros gr=gs=v=cr=0g_r = g_s = v = c_r = 0gr​=gs​=v=cr​=0 of p. 41;
  • as regularity, differentiation of e↦∫abF(y∣e) dye \mapsto \int_a^b F(y \mid e)\,dye↦∫ab​F(y∣e)dy under the integral sign, with interval-integrable ∂F/∂e\partial F/\partial e∂F/∂e;
  • 0≤c0 \le c0≤c (a production cost);
  • wq>0w_q > 0wq​>0 and δ≤1\delta \le 1δ≤1 for quantity flexibility (the contract's range, p. 24);
  • t≥0t \ge 0t≥0 for the sales rebate threshold;
  • q>0q > 0q>0 wherever wdw_dwd​, which divides by qqq, is used.

Revenue sharing and the sales rebate use §6.2's profit functions (pp. 21, 27) with this section's zeros, less g(e)g(e)g(e).

The page prints the last term of wdw_dwd​ as +(1−λ)g(eo)/q+(1 - \lambda)g(e^o)/q+(1−λ)g(eo)/q. With that sign the page's own displays πr(q,eo)=λΠ(q,eo)\pi_r(q, e^o) = \lambda\Pi(q, e^o)πr​(q,eo)=λΠ(q,eo) and πr(q,e)\pi_r(q, e)πr​(q,e) fail by 2(1−λ)g(eo)2(1 - \lambda)g(e^o)2(1−λ)g(eo). The formalization uses −(1−λ)g(eo)/q-(1 - \lambda)g(e^o)/q−(1−λ)g(eo)/q, under which both hold. wdw_dwd​ is the explicit printed schedule with this correction. It is not defined as "a schedule with πr=λΠ\pi_r = \lambda\Piπr​=λΠ", which would make the goal empty.

Not covered: the price-and-effort schedule at the bottom of p. 43, for which the page gives no argument. The cachon-2005 revenue-sharing effort results (RevShareCoord.Effort.*, deterministic revenue R(q,e)R(q, e)R(q,e)) are a different model and are not referenced. Proofs of any milestone, and a reusable library for differentiating newsvendor expectations in a parameter, are welcome.

Selected references

  • G. P. Cachon, Supply Chain Coordination with Contracts, in S. Graves and T. de Kok (eds.), Handbooks in Operations Research and Management Science, Vol. 11: Supply Chain Management, North-Holland, 2003, Ch. 6. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0927-0507(03)11006-7 (read in the author's 3rd draft, January 2003).
  • T. A. Taylor, Supply Chain Coordination under Channel Rebates with Sales Effort Effects, Management Science 48(8), 2002, 992–1007. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.48.8.992.168
  • H. Krishnan, R. Kapuscinski, D. A. Butz, Coordinating Contracts for Decentralized Supply Chains with Retailer Promotional Effort, Management Science 50(1), 2004, 48–63. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.1030.0154
  • G. P. Cachon, M. A. Lariviere, Supply Chain Coordination with Revenue-Sharing Contracts: Strengths and Limitations, Management Science 51(1), 2005, 30–44. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.1040.0215
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Supply Chain Coordination with Contracts I: The Newsvendor Quantity-Flexibility Contract (w_q(δ), δ) Gives the Retailer at Least Π(q°) at δ = 0, the Supplier at Least Π(q°) at δ = 1Textbook

Why contracts in a newsvendor supply chain

A supplier sells to a retailer who must order before a single selling season with random demand. Each firm maximizes its own expected profit, and with the simplest contract, a fixed wholesale price per unit, the retailer orders too little: he bears all the risk of unsold stock but earns only part of the margin on each sale. The supply chain as a whole then earns less than it could. A contract is said to coordinate the supply chain if the chain-optimal actions are an equilibrium of the two firms' game. Which contracts coordinate, and how they divide the chain's profit, is the subject of a large literature in operations management. G. P. Cachon's survey chapter in the Handbooks in Operations Research and Management Science (Cachon 2003) gives its standard account. This mission formalizes §6.2 of that chapter, Coordinating the newsvendor, read in the author's 3rd draft (January 2003).

Timeline of the contracts treated in §6.2:

  • Pasternack (1985) shows that buy-back (returns) contracts coordinate the newsvendor.
  • Tsay (1999) and Tsay and Lovejoy (1999) study quantity flexibility contracts, in which the supplier refunds unsold units up to a fraction δ of the order.
  • Cachon and Lariviere (2005, working paper 2000) analyze revenue sharing and show it is equivalent to buy back in the newsvendor.
  • Taylor (2002) studies sales rebates. Moorthy (1987) and Kolay and Shaffer (2002) treat quantity discounts.

Setting

Demand D≥0D \ge 0D≥0 has distribution function FFF, with Fˉ=1−F\bar F = 1 - FFˉ=1−F and mean μ=E[D]\mu = E[D]μ=E[D]. The retail price is ppp. The supplier's unit production cost is csc_scs​ and the retailer's unit cost is crc_rcr​, with c=cs+cr<pc = c_s + c_r < pc=cs​+cr​<p. Unmet demand costs the retailer a goodwill penalty grg_rgr​ per unit and the supplier gsg_sgs​, with g=gs+grg = g_s + g_rg=gs​+gr​. Each unsold unit is worth v<cv < cv<c to the retailer.

Expected sales are S(q)=E[min⁡(q,D)]S(q) = E[\min(q, D)]S(q)=E[min(q,D)], leftover inventory is I(q)=E[(q−D)+]I(q) = E[(q - D)^+]I(q)=E[(q−D)+] and lost sales are L(q)=E[(D−q)+]L(q) = E[(D - q)^+]L(q)=E[(D−q)+]. If TTT is the expected payment from the retailer to the supplier, the firms earn

πr(q)=(p−v+gr)S(q)−(cr−v)q−grμ−T,πs(q)=gsS(q)−csq−gsμ+T,\pi_r(q) = (p - v + g_r)S(q) - (c_r - v)q - g_r\mu - T, \qquad \pi_s(q) = g_sS(q) - c_sq - g_s\mu + T,πr​(q)=(p−v+gr​)S(q)−(cr​−v)q−gr​μ−T,πs​(q)=gs​S(q)−cs​q−gs​μ+T,

and the chain earns Π(q)=(p−v+g)S(q)−(c−v)q−gμ\Pi(q) = (p - v + g)S(q) - (c - v)q - g\muΠ(q)=(p−v+g)S(q)−(c−v)q−gμ. Let qoq^oqo be a maximizer of Π\PiΠ, with Π(qo)>0\Pi(q^o) > 0Π(qo)>0.

Under the quantity flexibility contract (wq,δ)(w_q, \delta)(wq​,δ) the retailer pays wqw_qwq​ per unit ordered and is refunded wq+cr−vw_q + c_r - vwq​+cr​−v for each unsold unit, up to δq\delta qδq units:

Tq(q,wq,δ)=wqq−(wq+cr−v)∫(1−δ)qqF(y) dy.T_q(q, w_q, \delta) = w_qq - (w_q + c_r - v)\int_{(1-\delta)q}^q F(y)\,dy.Tq​(q,wq​,δ)=wq​q−(wq​+cr​−v)∫(1−δ)qq​F(y)dy.

The wholesale price that makes qoq^oqo satisfy the retailer's first-order condition is

wq(δ)=(p−v+gr) Fˉ(qo)Fˉ(qo)+(1−δ)F((1−δ)qo)−cr+v.w_q(\delta) = \frac{(p - v + g_r)\,\bar F(q^o)}{\bar F(q^o) + (1-\delta)F((1-\delta)q^o)} - c_r + v.wq​(δ)=Fˉ(qo)+(1−δ)F((1−δ)qo)(p−v+gr​)Fˉ(qo)​−cr​+v.

Formalization targets

Goal: the quantity flexibility contract can split the profit in any way

With πr(q,wq(δ),δ)\pi_r(q, w_q(\delta), \delta)πr​(q,wq​(δ),δ) and πs(q,wq(δ),δ)\pi_s(q, w_q(\delta), \delta)πs​(q,wq​(δ),δ) the firms' profits under (wq(δ),δ)(w_q(\delta), \delta)(wq​(δ),δ):

πr(qo,wq(0),0)=Π(qo)+gs(μ−S(qo)+Fˉ(qo)qo)≥Π(qo),\pi_r(q^o, w_q(0), 0) = \Pi(q^o) + g_s\big(\mu - S(q^o) + \bar F(q^o)q^o\big) \ge \Pi(q^o),πr​(qo,wq​(0),0)=Π(qo)+gs​(μ−S(qo)+Fˉ(qo)qo)≥Π(qo), πs(qo,wq(1),1)=Π(qo)+μgr≥Π(qo),\pi_s(q^o, w_q(1), 1) = \Pi(q^o) + \mu g_r \ge \Pi(q^o),πs​(qo,wq​(1),1)=Π(qo)+μgr​≥Π(qo),

and for every a∈[0,Π(qo)]a \in [0, \Pi(q^o)]a∈[0,Π(qo)] some δ∈[0,1]\delta \in [0,1]δ∈[0,1] gives the retailer aaa and the supplier Π(qo)−a\Pi(q^o) - aΠ(qo)−a (§6.2.5, p. 25).

Milestones, in attack order

  1. S(q)=q−∫0qFS(q) = q - \int_0^q FS(q)=q−∫0q​F, I(q)=q−S(q)I(q) = q - S(q)I(q)=q−S(q), L(q)=μ−S(q)L(q) = \mu - S(q)L(q)=μ−S(q) (p. 10).
  2. The unique maximizer qoq^oqo of Π\PiΠ satisfies Fˉ(qo)=(c−v)/(p−v+g)\bar F(q^o) = (c - v)/(p - v + g)Fˉ(qo)=(c−v)/(p−v+g) (Eq. (2), p. 11).
  3. wq(0)=(p−v+gr)Fˉ(qo)+v−crw_q(0) = (p - v + g_r)\bar F(q^o) + v - c_rwq​(0)=(p−v+gr​)Fˉ(qo)+v−cr​ and wq(1)=p+gr−crw_q(1) = p + g_r - c_rwq​(1)=p+gr​−cr​. Also, wqw_qwq​ is increasing on [0,1][0,1][0,1], which gives v−cr≤wq(δ)≤p+gr−crv - c_r \le w_q(\delta) \le p + g_r - c_rv−cr​≤wq​(δ)≤p+gr​−cr​ (p. 24).
  4. qoq^oqo maximizes the retailer's profit under (wq(δ),δ)(w_q(\delta), \delta)(wq​(δ),δ) (Eq. (11), p. 24).
  5. The supplier's first-order condition holds at qoq^oqo (p. 25).
  6. The δ = 0 identity and the δ = 1 identity (p. 25).

Companion results of §6.2

  • Revenue sharing {wr,ϕ}\{w_r,\phi\}{wr​,ϕ} equals the buy back wb=wr+(1−ϕ)pw_b = w_r + (1-\phi)pwb​=wr​+(1−ϕ)p, b=(1−ϕ)(p−v)b = (1-\phi)(p - v)b=(1−ϕ)(p−v) for every demand realization (p. 22).
  • The sales rebate contract: first-order condition (12), price (13), the retailer's profit and its monotonicity in the threshold (p. 27), and failure under voluntary compliance (p. 28).
  • The quantity discount gives the retailer πr=λ(Π(q)+gμ)−grμ\pi_r = \lambda(\Pi(q) + g\mu) - g_r\muπr​=λ(Π(q)+gμ)−gr​μ, so qoq^oqo is optimal for both firms (p. 29).
  • Under the wholesale price contract, the retailer's profit increases in the induced quantity (p. 14).

Significance

The goal is what makes quantity flexibility a complete coordinating family. Retailer optimality (milestone 4) says qoq^oqo can be implemented. The allocation statement says that bargaining power can then be expressed through the single parameter δ without losing efficiency. Together with the supplier's first-order condition, these are the facts that matter in practice: forced compliance suffices for coordination, and the choice of δ is purely distributional. The companions put §6.2's other contracts on the same footing. Revenue sharing and buy back are equivalent. Sales rebates coordinate only with forced compliance. Quantity discounts coordinate with a bounded retailer share.

All of these results are stated in the source. Related results are Proved on the platform in Snyder and Shen's chapter (SupplyChainTheory.*), including the chain-optimal fractile and retailer optimality under quantity flexibility. This mission states them locally because Snyder and Shen's contract data impose stronger restrictions on salvage value than Cachon's model. The efficiency formula (k+1)−(1+1/k)(k+2)(k+1)^{-(1+1/k)}(k+2)(k+1)−(1+1/k)(k+2) for the power distribution on p. 14 is already posed as the Open item RevShareCoord.Wholesale.alpha_family_efficiency and is not posed again.

Difficulty

Each identity is elementary algebra once SSS, its derivative and the integrals of FFF are under control. That is where the work lies. Expected sales are defined as an expectation, so S(q)=q−∫0qFS(q) = q - \int_0^q FS(q)=q−∫0q​F is a theorem to prove, not a definition to unfold.

Differentiating ∫(1−δ)qqF\int_{(1-\delta)q}^q F∫(1−δ)qq​F needs continuity of FFF at two points. The sales rebate transfer is piecewise and has a kink at the threshold, so derivatives must be taken on the right side of it.

The allocation clause rests on continuity of δ ↦ π_r(q^o, w_q(δ), δ). The obvious argument, "the profits are continuous in δ", hides two facts. First, the denominator of wq(δ)w_q(\delta)wq​(δ) stays positive on [0,1][0,1][0,1]. Second, F((1−δ)qo)F((1-\delta)q^o)F((1−δ)qo) moves continuously, which fails for a demand law with atoms. Both must be derived from the model, not assumed.

Formalization scope

The local ContractData follows Cachon's v<cs+crv<c_s+c_rv<cs​+cr​ and cs+cr<pc_s+c_r<pcs​+cr​<p. Its rrr is Cachon's price ppp, and its ps,prp_s,p_rps​,pr​ are the goodwill penalties gs,grg_s,g_rgs​,gr​. The penalties are nonnegative costs. Net salvage may be negative and may exceed crc_rcr​; both possibilities were excluded by the related published model.

A demand law is a probability measure on ℝ with no mass on (−∞,0)(-\infty, 0)(−∞,0), finite mean and no atoms (so FFF is continuous). FFF is strictly increasing on [0,∞)[0, \infty)[0,∞) as long as F<1F < 1F<1. Its derivative is specified on the positive interior of that active support. This reading admits the bounded-support power law the chapter itself uses on p. 14, whose cdf has a corner at the support endpoint. Derivative conclusions use HasDerivAt.

Optimality is IsMaxOn … Set.univ over real quantities; the optimum is positive under the model assumptions. Π(qo)>0\Pi(q^o) > 0Π(qo)>0 is a hypothesis wherever an optimum is named, following p. 11.

Cachon's sales rebate rrr is rebate in Lean.

Three printed slips are corrected, and the milestone quotes keep the print:

  • p. 24 writes www for wqw_qwq​ in TqT_qTq​.
  • p. 25 mixes qqq and qoq^oqo in the δ = 0 and δ = 1 displays.
  • p. 28 has a spurious −v-v−v in ws(r)−rw_s(r) - rws​(r)−r.

Two encodings are ruled out. wq(δ)w_q(\delta)wq​(δ) is the explicit formula, never "the solution of (11)". The supplier's profit is the model's own function, not Π\PiΠ minus the retailer's profit, so no clause holds by definition.

The local definition file CachonCoord.Newsvendor.Contracts contains the model, its expected profits, the contract transfers, the sales rebate price ws(r)w_s(r)ws​(r), the quantity discount schedule, and realized profits and payments. Lemmas about SSS, ∫F\int F∫F and continuity of contract prices are reusable across the series. The sales rebate existence-of-threshold argument and the normal-distribution counterexample of p. 25 are outside this mission.

Selected references

  • G. P. Cachon, Supply Chain Coordination with Contracts, in S. Graves, T. de Kok (eds.), Handbooks in OR & MS Vol. 11, North-Holland, 2003 (3rd draft, Jan. 2003). https://doi.org/10.1016/S0927-0507(03)11006-7
  • B. A. Pasternack, Optimal pricing and return policies for perishable commodities, Marketing Science 4(2), 1985. https://doi.org/10.1287/mksc.4.2.166
  • A. A. Tsay, The quantity flexibility contract and supplier–customer incentives, Management Science 45(10), 1999. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.45.10.1339
  • G. P. Cachon, M. A. Lariviere, Supply chain coordination with revenue-sharing contracts: strengths and limitations, Management Science 51(1), 2005. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.1040.0215
  • T. A. Taylor, Supply chain coordination under channel rebates with sales effort effects, Management Science 48(8), 2002. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.48.8.992.168
  • L. V. Snyder, Z.-J. M. Shen, Fundamentals of Supply Chain Theory, 2nd ed., Wiley, 2019, Ch. 14. https://doi.org/10.1002/9781119584445
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CombinatoricsOperations ResearchTheoretical Computer Science·Captain: mikedeng1

Online Stochastic Matching: Beating 1-1/e 2: The Suggested Matching Algorithm Achieves 1 − 1/e with High Probability, and This Is Tight Even in ExpectationResearch Paper

Motivation

Online bipartite matching models decisions that must be made as requests arrive: an advertiser can be assigned to a compatible request once, and an assignment cannot be revised when later requests reveal a better alternative. Display advertising is the motivating example in Feldman, Mehta, Mirrokni, and Muthukrishnan's 2009 preprint: an ad server knows which advertisers accept each kind of impression and has estimates of how frequently those kinds will arrive. The question is how much this advance distributional information helps when decisions still have to be immediate.

This mission studies the paper's first offline-guided algorithm. It computes a maximum matching for the expected traffic and follows that matching during the actual random run. The paper shows that this natural policy reaches the familiar 1−1/e1-1/e1−1/e performance level and that its own analysis cannot be improved for this policy, even if performance is averaged over runs. The result sets the baseline for the paper's later two-suggested-matchings algorithm, which improves on that level under its stated assumptions. Feldman et al., §§1 and 4.1

Setting

An instance consists of a finite advertiser set AAA, a finite impression-type set III, and allowed edges E⊆A×IE\subseteq A\times IE⊆A×I. For each type iii, the nonnegative integer eie_iei​ is its expected number of arrivals. There are n=∑i∈Iei>0n=\sum_{i\in I}e_i>0n=∑i∈I​ei​>0 arrivals. Each arrival independently has type iii with probability ei/ne_i/nei​/n. A type with ei=0e_i=0ei​=0 remains in the graph but has zero arrival probability. On an arrival of type iii, an online algorithm may assign it to an adjacent advertiser that has not been assigned before, or may leave it unassigned. The hindsight optimum, OPT(ω)\mathrm{OPT}(\omega)OPT(ω), is the largest matching in the realization graph with one vertex for every arrival position, including separate vertices for repeated types. Feldman et al., §2, pp. 3–4

The suggested matching algorithm first selects any maximum integral flow in the expected-instance network. Each advertiser has capacity one, and each type iii has capacity eie_iei​. Equivalently, the selected edges form a maximum degree-capped bipartite matching M⊆EM\subseteq EM⊆E. Let A∗A^*A∗ be the advertisers covered by MMM. When type iii arrives, the algorithm chooses each advertiser joined to iii by a selected edge with probability 1/ei1/e_i1/ei​; any remaining probability chooses no advertiser. It assigns the chosen advertiser if available and otherwise makes no assignment. Its number of assignments is ALG(ω)\mathrm{ALG}(\omega)ALG(ω). This rule includes the algorithm's random choice in addition to the random arrival types. Feldman et al., §4.1, p. 5

The canonical residual cut of MMM places each advertiser and impression type on the source side if it is reachable from the source by residual edges. Write ATA_TAT​ for advertisers on the sink side and ISI_SIS​ for types on the source side. These sets describe the comparison between the expected-instance matching and the optimum of a realized run. The mission also uses occupancy: after nnn independent uniform throws into nnn bins, count how many bins in a fixed subset receive at least one ball. Feldman et al., §§2.1 and 4.1

Formalization targets

Theorem 4's general-instance guarantee is expressed in the additive form established by its analysis. For every ε>0\varepsilon>0ε>0, there are δ>0\delta>0δ>0 and NNN, uniform across all finite instances, all maximum integral flows, and all valid ways of realizing the algorithm's random choice, such that n≥Nn\ge Nn≥N implies

Pr⁡ ⁣[ALG(ω)≥(1−e−1)OPT(ω)−εn]≥1−e−δn.\Pr\!\left[\mathrm{ALG}(\omega)\ge(1-e^{-1})\mathrm{OPT}(\omega)-\varepsilon n\right] \ge 1-e^{-\delta n}.Pr[ALG(ω)≥(1−e−1)OPT(ω)−εn]≥1−e−δn.

The complete bipartite family gives the tightness target. When A=I={0,…,n−1}A=I=\{0,\ldots,n-1\}A=I={0,…,n−1} and every ei=1e_i=1ei​=1, every maximum expected-instance matching is perfect. For every run, OPT=n\mathrm{OPT}=nOPT=n, and

E[ALG]=n(1−(1−1n)n),lim⁡n→∞E[ALG]n=1−e−1.\mathbb E[\mathrm{ALG}] =n\left(1-\left(1-\frac1n\right)^n\right), \qquad \lim_{n\to\infty}\frac{\mathbb E[\mathrm{ALG}]}{n}=1-e^{-1}.E[ALG]=n(1−(1−n1​)n),n→∞lim​nE[ALG]​=1−e−1.

The milestone list follows the paper's Fact 1 and the named passages “Bounding ALG,” “Bounding OPT,” and “Tightness of the Analysis” in §4.1. The cut identity ∣A∗∣=∣AT∣+∑i∈ISei|A^*|=|A_T|+\sum_{i\in I_S}e_i∣A∗∣=∣AT​∣+∑i∈IS​​ei​ is a separate deterministic milestone. Feldman et al., Theorem 4 and §4.1, pp. 5–6

Significance

The result establishes exactly what this one-matching policy achieves under integer-frequency independent arrivals. It gives a guarantee for the actual number of assignments relative to the best assignment made with hindsight, and a family on which the limiting expected ratio equals the guarantee. That tight family explains why the paper introduces a second suggested matching rather than seeking a stronger bound for the same policy. Feldman et al., §4

The mathematical theorem is proved in the paper; the mission asks for its machine-checked formalization. The development would also provide reusable finite models of repeated-type realizations, integral degree-capped bipartite matchings, uniform occupancy, and residual reachability cuts. No machine-checked proof of these mission items is being claimed by this draft.

Difficulty

The expected-instance matching is selected before the arrivals, but the hindsight optimum can exploit the actual multiplicities of every type. Counting only the ads selected online does not compare the algorithm with that hindsight optimum. Also, a type may have several selected advertisers when ei>1e_i>1ei​>1, so replacing the algorithm's random choice by a deterministic designated ad would change its law. The cut and concentration statements have to apply uniformly to every maximum integral flow, including flows chosen by different tie-breaking rules. Feldman et al., §4.1, pp. 5–6

Formalization scope

Advertisers and types are finite Lean types. The edge relation is a finite set, and eie_iei​ and nnn are natural numbers with n=∑iei>0n=\sum_i e_i>0n=∑i​ei​>0. An integral maximum flow is represented by a maximum cardinality edge set with advertiser degree at most one and type-iii degree at most eie_iei​. The theorem quantifies over every such set. This is the unit-advertiser, integer-type-capacity flow used in §4.1, without a separate real-valued flow object. The canonical cut is defined through residual reachability. The hindsight optimum maximizes over matchings of the realized graph, with each arrival position distinct.

The run uses nnn independent uniform draws from ∑i{0,…,ei−1}\sum_i\{0,\ldots,e_i-1\}∑i​{0,…,ei​−1}. A valid labelling assigns each selected advertiser at type iii to a distinct copy. The drawn copy determines the type and, if labelled, the ad selected by the algorithm. This gives type probability ei/ne_i/nei​/n, conditional ad probability 1/ei1/e_i1/ei​ on selected edges, and the remaining “no ad” probability. Counts, probabilities, and expectations use finite sums, so there is no integrability convention. Since n>0n>0n>0, the run sample space is nonempty; no value of ALG/OPT\mathrm{ALG}/\mathrm{OPT}ALG/OPT at OPT=0\mathrm{OPT}=0OPT=0 is needed. The complete-graph family has n≥1n\ge1n≥1.

The paper writes 1−e−Ω(n)1-e^{-\Omega(n)}1−e−Ω(n) in both bounding passages. The Lean statements spell this out as ∀ε>0, ∃δ>0, ∃N, ∀\forall\varepsilon>0,\ \exists\delta>0,\ \exists N,\ \forall∀ε>0, ∃δ>0, ∃N, ∀ instances with n≥Nn\ge Nn≥N, with δ,N\delta,Nδ,N preceding the instance. Theorem 4's ratio language is represented by the additive estimate its proof yields; a vanishing ratio error requires a separate lower bound on OPT/n\mathrm{OPT}/nOPT/n. The exact finite-nnn expectation and its limit make “tight, even in expectation” precise. The printed Fact 1 exponent is εn/2\varepsilon n/2εn/2, while its Appendix A proof yields ε2n/2\varepsilon^2n/2ε2n/2; the formalized concentration statement uses the proved exponent and the milestone retains the printed wording. Neither a ratio with a zero denominator nor a labelling that changes the algorithm's choice law is accepted as a shortcut.

Contributions toward the occupancy bound, the residual cut identity, the realized matching bound, and the complete-graph expectation are welcome. The finite occupancy and matching interfaces are intended for reuse beyond this specific algorithm.

Selected references

  • Jon Feldman, Aranyak Mehta, Vahab Mirrokni, and S. Muthukrishnan, Online Stochastic Matching: Beating 1-1/e, arXiv:0905.4100v1, 2009; FOCS 2009. Preprint
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Operations ResearchOptimal TransportOptimization·Captain: mikedeng1

Quantifying Distributional Model Risk via Optimal Transport 3: A Worst-Case Transport Plan Exists in a Locally Compact Normed Space under Growth Conditions on c and fResearch Paper

Motivation

In distributionally robust modelling, a baseline probability model μ\muμ on a space SSS is distrusted, and the analyst reports the largest expected loss over every model within a budget of μ\muμ. Blanchet and Murthy (arXiv:1604.01446; Math. Oper. Res. 44(2), 2019, doi:10.1287/moor.2018.0936) measure the budget with an optimal transport cost and prove strong duality for the resulting worst-case expectation on an arbitrary Polish space, with a lower semicontinuous cost and an upper semicontinuous performance function. Duality computes the worst-case value. A risk manager also wants the worst-case model: a distribution that attains the value, whose structure explains which perturbation of μ\muμ is most harmful.

Such a model need not exist. Unlike the Kantorovich problem, where the set of couplings with two fixed marginals is weakly compact, the feasible set here fixes only one marginal and is not compact in general. Section 5 of the paper gives an example on R\mathbb RR where the supremum is not attained, then gives abstract conditions under which it is (Proposition 9), and growth conditions on a locally compact normed space that imply them (Corollary 1). Related existence results in Rd\mathbb R^dRd were obtained by Gao and Kleywegt (arXiv:1604.02199, 2016) and, for empirical baselines and norm costs, by Mohajerin Esfahani and Kuhn (arXiv:1505.05116, 2018).

Setting

Let SSS be a Polish space with its Borel σ\sigmaσ-algebra, μ\muμ a probability measure on SSS, δ>0\delta>0δ>0 a budget, c:S×S→[0,∞)c:S\times S\to[0,\infty)c:S×S→[0,∞) a cost and f:S→Rf:S\to\mathbb Rf:S→R a performance function. The standing assumptions are:

  • (A1) ccc is lower semicontinuous and c(x,y)=0c(x,y)=0c(x,y)=0 iff x=yx=yx=y;
  • (A2) fff is upper semicontinuous and μ\muμ-integrable.

The primal feasible set Φμ,δ\Phi_{\mu,\delta}Φμ,δ​ consists of the probability measures π\piπ on S×SS\times SS×S with first marginal μ\muμ and ∫c dπ≤δ\int c\,d\pi\le\delta∫cdπ≤δ (transport plans out of μ\muμ of cost at most δ\deltaδ). The primal objective is I(π)=∫f(y) dπ(x,y)I(\pi)=\int f(y)\,d\pi(x,y)I(π)=∫f(y)dπ(x,y) and the primal value is I=sup⁡{I(π):π∈Φμ,δ}I=\sup\{I(\pi):\pi\in\Phi_{\mu,\delta}\}I=sup{I(π):π∈Φμ,δ​}. The dual feasible set Λc,f\Lambda_{c,f}Λc,f​ consists of pairs (λ,φ)(\lambda,\varphi)(λ,φ) with λ≥0\lambda\ge0λ≥0, φ:S→[−∞,∞]\varphi:S\to[-\infty,\infty]φ:S→[−∞,∞] universally measurable and φ(x)+λc(x,y)≥f(y)\varphi(x)+\lambda c(x,y)\ge f(y)φ(x)+λc(x,y)≥f(y) for all x,yx,yx,y. The dual objective is J(λ,φ)=λδ+∫φ dμJ(\lambda,\varphi)=\lambda\delta+\int\varphi\,d\muJ(λ,φ)=λδ+∫φdμ and the dual value is J=inf⁡J(λ,φ)J=\inf J(\lambda,\varphi)J=infJ(λ,φ). For λ≥0\lambda\ge0λ≥0 put φλ(x)=sup⁡y{f(y)−λc(x,y)}\varphi_\lambda(x)=\sup_y\{f(y)-\lambda c(x,y)\}φλ​(x)=supy​{f(y)−λc(x,y)}.

Section 5 assumes throughout that (λ∗,φλ∗)∈Λc,f(\lambda^*,\varphi_{\lambda^*})\in\Lambda_{c,f}(λ∗,φλ∗​)∈Λc,f​ is a dual optimal pair with I=J=J(λ∗,φλ∗)<∞I=J=J(\lambda^*,\varphi_{\lambda^*})<\inftyI=J=J(λ∗,φλ∗​)<∞. Write Φμ,δ′\Phi'_{\mu,\delta}Φμ,δ′​ for the plans in Φμ,δ\Phi_{\mu,\delta}Φμ,δ​ concentrated on {f(x)≤f(y)}\{f(x)\le f(y)\}{f(x)≤f(y)}.

(P-Compactness): for every ε>0\varepsilon>0ε>0 there are a compact KεK_\varepsilonKε​ with μ(Kε)>1−ε\mu(K_\varepsilon)>1-\varepsilonμ(Kε​)>1−ε and γ>0\gamma>0γ>0 such that {(x,y)∈Kε×S:f(y)−λ∗c(x,y)≥φλ∗(x)−γ}\{(x,y)\in K_\varepsilon\times S: f(y)-\lambda^*c(x,y)\ge\varphi_{\lambda^*}(x)-\gamma\}{(x,y)∈Kε​×S:f(y)−λ∗c(x,y)≥φλ∗​(x)−γ} has compact closure. (P-USC): lim sup⁡nI(πn)≤I(π∗)\limsup_n I(\pi_n)\le I(\pi^*)limsupn​I(πn​)≤I(π∗) whenever πn∈Φμ,δ′\pi_n\in\Phi'_{\mu,\delta}πn​∈Φμ,δ′​ converge weakly to π∗∈Φμ,δ\pi^*\in\Phi_{\mu,\delta}π∗∈Φμ,δ​.

On a normed space EEE: (A3) c(x,y)≥g(∥x−y∥)c(x,y)\ge g(\|x-y\|)c(x,y)≥g(∥x−y∥) for ∥x−y∥>C\|x-y\|>C∥x−y∥>C, with ggg nondecreasing and g(t)↑∞g(t)\uparrow\inftyg(t)↑∞. (A4) (f(y)−f(x))/(1+h(∥x−y∥))≤K(f(y)-f(x))/(1+h(\|x-y\|))\le K(f(y)−f(x))/(1+h(∥x−y∥))≤K for an increasing hhh with h(t)↑∞h(t)\uparrow\inftyh(t)↑∞; and for every ε>0\varepsilon>0ε>0, f(y)−f(x)≤ε(1+c(x,y))f(y)-f(x)\le\varepsilon(1+c(x,y))f(y)−f(x)≤ε(1+c(x,y)) once ∥x−y∥>Cε\|x-y\|>C_\varepsilon∥x−y∥>Cε​.

Formalization targets

Goal: Corollary 1 (p. 27)

Let EEE be a real normed space that is locally compact, and let c,fc,fc,f satisfy (A1)–(A4). Under the standing assumption, if λ∗>0\lambda^*>0λ∗>0 there is π∗∈Φμ,δ\pi^*\in\Phi_{\mu,\delta}π∗∈Φμ,δ​ with

I(π∗)=I=J=J(λ∗,φλ∗).I(\pi^*)=I=J=J(\lambda^*,\varphi_{\lambda^*}).I(π∗)=I=J=J(λ∗,φλ∗​).

Milestones

  1. Remark 4, (10)–(11) (p. 8): for π∈Φμ,δ\pi\in\Phi_{\mu,\delta}π∈Φμ,δ​, I−I(π)I-I(\pi)I−I(π) is the sum of two nonnegative gaps, ∫(φλ∗(x)−f(y)+λ∗c(x,y)) dπ\int(\varphi_{\lambda^*}(x)-f(y)+\lambda^*c(x,y))\,d\pi∫(φλ∗​(x)−f(y)+λ∗c(x,y))dπ and λ∗(δ−∫c dπ)\lambda^*(\delta-\int c\,d\pi)λ∗(δ−∫cdπ); so an ε\varepsilonε-optimal plan has both gaps at most ε\varepsilonε.
  2. Lemma 17 (p. 43): every plan in Φμ,δ\Phi_{\mu,\delta}Φμ,δ​ can be replaced by one in Φμ,δ′\Phi'_{\mu,\delta}Φμ,δ′​ with at least the same value.
  3. §5 display (p. 26): I=sup⁡{I(π):π∈Φμ,δ′}I=\sup\{I(\pi):\pi\in\Phi'_{\mu,\delta}\}I=sup{I(π):π∈Φμ,δ′​}.
  4. Proposition 9 (p. 26): on a Polish space, (P-Compactness) and (P-USC) give a primal optimizer.
  5. Corollary 1, Step 1 (p. 28): (A1)–(A4) and λ∗>0\lambda^*>0λ∗>0 give (P-Compactness).
  6. Corollary 1, Step 2 (pp. 28–29): (A1), (A2), (A4) and I<∞I<\inftyI<∞ give (P-USC):
lim sup⁡n∫f(y) dπn≤∫f(y) dπ∗.\limsup_n\int f(y)\,d\pi_n\le\int f(y)\,d\pi^*.nlimsup​∫f(y)dπn​≤∫f(y)dπ∗.

Significance

The result. An attained worst case turns duality into a structural statement. By Theorem 1(b) of the paper, an optimizer moves mass from xxx only to maximizers of f(y)−λ∗c(x,y)f(y)-\lambda^*c(x,y)f(y)−λ∗c(x,y) and, when λ∗>0\lambda^*>0λ∗>0, uses the full budget. When those maximizers are unique (Remark 8: ccc convex in yyy, fff concave) the worst-case model is unique and is the image of μ\muμ under a transport map. That map is what stress tests and robust estimators are built from. Without existence, these statements describe an object that may not be there.

Formalizing it. The paper's proofs are complete; nothing here is open. No machine-checked version of this result is known: the worst-case optimal transport literature, including the strong duality of this paper, is unformalized. The mission produces the transport objects of §2 in a form that keeps the paper's generality (Polish space, lower semicontinuous real cost, universally measurable dual variables, the ∞−∞\infty-\infty∞−∞ convention), a tightness argument for nearly optimal one-marginal plans, and an upper semicontinuity argument for unbounded upper semicontinuous integrands under uniform integrability.

Difficulty

The obvious argument takes a maximizing sequence and extracts a weak limit. Both steps fail without more structure. First, Φμ,δ\Phi_{\mu,\delta}Φμ,δ​ is not tight: only the first marginal is fixed, and a sequence may push mass to infinity at bounded cost. That is exactly what happens in Example 2 (p. 26), where λ∗=0\lambda^*=0λ∗=0 and the value 111 is approached but never reached. Tightness has to come from the dual: nearly optimal plans concentrate near maximizers of f(y)−λ∗c(x,y)f(y)-\lambda^*c(x,y)f(y)−λ∗c(x,y), and (A3)–(A4) with λ∗>0\lambda^*>0λ∗>0 confine those maximizers. Second, fff is only upper semicontinuous and unbounded, so weak convergence alone does not give lim sup⁡∫f dπn≤∫f dπ∗\limsup\int f\,d\pi_n\le\int f\,d\pi^*limsup∫fdπn​≤∫fdπ∗. A uniform integrability bound is needed, and it uses the restriction to Φμ,δ′\Phi'_{\mu,\delta}Φμ,δ′​ in an essential way. A third, Lean-specific difficulty is measure-theoretic: φλ∗\varphi_{\lambda^*}φλ∗​ is only universally measurable, and the gaps of Remark 4 are integrals against completions.

Formalization scope

All declarations sit in the namespace ModelRiskOT.PrimalOpt. Values of I(π)I(\pi)I(π), III, J(λ,φ)J(\lambda,\varphi)J(λ,φ), JJJ and φλ\varphi_\lambdaφλ​ are in EReal. I(π)I(\pi)I(π) is ∫f+(y) dπ−∫f−(y) dπ\int f^+(y)\,d\pi-\int f^-(y)\,d\pi∫f+(y)dπ−∫f−(y)dπ with lower integrals, and Mathlib's ⊤−⊤=⊥\top-\top=\bot⊤−⊤=⊥ realises the paper's reading of the supremum (footnote 2, p. 5). Integrals of nonnegative or extended-real functions are lower integrals (lintegral), never Bochner integrals. Universal measurability is the published BertsekasShreve.AnalyticSelection.IsUniversallyMeasurable. Weak convergence is the topology of ProbabilityMeasure (S × S). Measures on S×SS\times SS×S use the product σ\sigmaσ-algebra.

The following readings are fixed:

  • The standing assumption of §5 ((λ∗,φλ∗)∈Λc,f(\lambda^*,\varphi_{\lambda^*})\in\Lambda_{c,f}(λ∗,φλ∗​)∈Λc,f​, I=JI=JI=J, J=J(λ∗,φλ∗)J=J(\lambda^*,\varphi_{\lambda^*})J=J(λ∗,φλ∗​), finiteness) consists of hypotheses of Proposition 9 and Corollary 1. I=JI=JI=J is Theorem 1(a), the goal of the companion mission on strong duality, and is not assumed proved here.
  • In (P-Compactness) the constant γ\gammaγ may depend on ε\varepsilonε.
  • "Increasing" in (A4) is strict.
  • Remark 4's second conclusion in (11) is also stated as λ∗(δ−∫c dπ)≤ε\lambda^*(\delta-\int c\,d\pi)\le\varepsilonλ∗(δ−∫cdπ)≤ε, which covers λ∗=0\lambda^*=0λ∗=0.
  • Lemma 17's last inequality is stated for every plan, which is equivalent under the EReal convention.
  • Corollary 1's space is a real normed space with LocallyCompactSpace. It also carries PolishSpace, which is redundant, since a locally compact real normed space is finite-dimensional.

The goal cannot be satisfied by a junk value: III and JJJ are EReal suprema and infima, not real sSup, and the hypothesis λ∗>0\lambda^*>0λ∗>0 is kept because Example 2 shows the conclusion fails without it. A sorry-free check that c(x,y)=(x−y)2c(x,y)=(x-y)^2c(x,y)=(x−y)2, f(y)=yf(y)=yf(y)=y on R\mathbb RR satisfy (A1), (A3) and (A4) accompanies the drafts.

A complete development needs Prokhorov's theorem (in Mathlib), a Fatou lemma for weakly converging measures with a lower semicontinuous integrand, an upper semicontinuity theorem for uniformly integrable upper semicontinuous integrands, and the change of variables ∫φ(x) dπ=∫φ dμ\int\varphi(x)\,d\pi=\int\varphi\,d\mu∫φ(x)dπ=∫φdμ for universally measurable φ\varphiφ. The last three are reusable well beyond this mission. Proofs of any milestone, and these general lemmas as separate contributions, are welcome.

Selected references

  • J. Blanchet and K. Murthy, Quantifying Distributional Model Risk via Optimal Transport, Math. Oper. Res. 44(2):565–600, 2019. arXiv:1604.01446v2, doi:10.1287/moor.2018.0936
  • R. Gao and A. Kleywegt, Distributionally Robust Stochastic Optimization with Wasserstein Distance, 2016. arXiv:1604.02199
  • P. Mohajerin Esfahani and D. Kuhn, Data-driven distributionally robust optimization using the Wasserstein metric, Math. Program. 171:115–166, 2018. arXiv:1505.05116
  • A. M. Zapała, Unbounded mappings and weak convergence of measures, Statist. Probab. Lett. 78(6):698–706, 2008. doi:10.1016/j.spl.2007.09.033
  • C. Villani, Optimal Transport: Old and New, Springer, 2009. doi:10.1007/978-3-540-71050-9
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Operations ResearchOptimal TransportOptimization·Captain: mikedeng1

Quantifying Distributional Model Risk via Optimal Transport 2: The Worst-Case Probability of a Closed Set A Equals the Baseline Probability of Its Inflation {x : c(x, A) ≤ 1/λ*}Research Paper

Motivation

A probability model μ\muμ for a risk quantity, such as the reserve process of an insurer or the path of a queue, is usually chosen for tractability or fitted to limited data, and the true law of the system is unknown. Distributional model risk asks how large a probability of interest could be if the true law were any model "close" to μ\muμ. When closeness is measured by an optimal transport cost rather than a likelihood ratio, the competing models may put mass where μ\muμ puts none, which is the situation for rare events such as ruin or buffer overflow: the event of interest often lies outside the support of the baseline.

Blanchet and Murthy (arXiv:1604.01446, Mathematics of Operations Research 44(2), 2019) prove strong duality for worst-case expectations over an optimal-transport ball on a general Polish space, with a lower semicontinuous cost. Their §2.4 specializes the duality to worst-case probabilities of a closed set and obtains a closed-form answer: the worst-case probability of AAA is the baseline probability of an inflated version of AAA. This mission formalizes that result, Theorem 3 of the paper, together with the numbered statements its proof uses.

Setting

Let SSS be a Polish space with its Borel σ\sigmaσ-algebra, P(S)P(S)P(S) its probability measures, and μ∈P(S)\mu \in P(S)μ∈P(S) the baseline. A cost c:S×S→R+c : S \times S \to \mathbb R_+c:S×S→R+​ satisfies Assumption (A1): it is nonnegative, lower semicontinuous, and c(x,y)=0c(x,y) = 0c(x,y)=0 if and only if x=yx = yx=y.

For μ1,μ2∈P(S)\mu_1, \mu_2 \in P(S)μ1​,μ2​∈P(S), a coupling of μ1\mu_1μ1​ and μ2\mu_2μ2​ is a probability measure π\piπ on S×SS \times SS×S with marginals μ1\mu_1μ1​ and μ2\mu_2μ2​; Π(μ1,μ2)\Pi(\mu_1,\mu_2)Π(μ1​,μ2​) is the set of couplings, and the optimal transport cost is

dc(μ1,μ2)=inf⁡{∫c dπ:π∈Π(μ1,μ2)}.d_c(\mu_1,\mu_2) = \inf\Big\{\int c\,d\pi : \pi \in \Pi(\mu_1,\mu_2)\Big\}.dc​(μ1​,μ2​)=inf{∫cdπ:π∈Π(μ1​,μ2​)}.

For a budget δ>0\delta > 0δ>0, the primal feasible set Φμ,δ\Phi_{\mu,\delta}Φμ,δ​ consists of the probability measures π\piπ on S×SS \times SS×S with first marginal μ\muμ and ∫c dπ≤δ\int c\,d\pi \le \delta∫cdπ≤δ.

Fix a nonempty closed set A⊆SA \subseteq SA⊆S and let c(x,A)=inf⁡{c(x,y):y∈A}c(x,A) = \inf\{c(x,y) : y \in A\}c(x,A)=inf{c(x,y):y∈A} be the cheapest cost of moving unit mass from xxx into AAA. The worst-case probability is

I=sup⁡{P(A):dc(μ,P)≤δ}.(12)I = \sup\{P(A) : d_c(\mu,P) \le \delta\}. \tag{12}I=sup{P(A):dc​(μ,P)≤δ}.(12)

Its dual is the univariate problem

inf⁡λ≥0{λδ+Eμ[(1−λc(X,A))+]},(13)\inf_{\lambda \ge 0}\Big\{\lambda\delta + E_\mu\big[(1 - \lambda c(X,A))^+\big]\Big\}, \tag{13}λ≥0inf​{λδ+Eμ​[(1−λc(X,A))+]},(13)

and for a minimizer λ∗∈[0,∞)\lambda^* \in [0,\infty)λ∗∈[0,∞) of (13) the paper defines

c‾=∫{c(x,A)<1/λ∗}c(x,A) dμ(x),c‾=∫{c(x,A)≤1/λ∗}c(x,A) dμ(x).(14)\underline c = \int_{\{c(x,A) < 1/\lambda^*\}} c(x,A)\,d\mu(x), \qquad \overline c = \int_{\{c(x,A) \le 1/\lambda^*\}} c(x,A)\,d\mu(x). \tag{14}c​=∫{c(x,A)<1/λ∗}​c(x,A)dμ(x),c=∫{c(x,A)≤1/λ∗}​c(x,A)dμ(x).(14)

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 3 (p. 10)

If λ∗∈[0,∞)\lambda^* \in [0,\infty)λ∗∈[0,∞) attains the infimum in (13) and c‾=c‾\underline c = \overline cc​=c, then

sup⁡{P(A):dc(μ,P)≤δ}=μ{x:c(x,A)≤1/λ∗}.(15)\sup\{P(A) : d_c(\mu,P) \le \delta\} = \mu\{x : c(x,A) \le 1/\lambda^*\}. \tag{15}sup{P(A):dc​(μ,P)≤δ}=μ{x:c(x,A)≤1/λ∗}.(15)

Milestones, in the order the proof uses them

  1. Coupling form (§2.2, p. 5, for f=1Af = 1_Af=1A​): I=sup⁡{π(S×A):π∈Φμ,δ}I = \sup\{\pi(S \times A) : \pi \in \Phi_{\mu,\delta}\}I=sup{π(S×A):π∈Φμ,δ​}.
  2. Indicator supremum (pp. 8–9): sup⁡y{1A(y)−λc(x,y)}=(1−λc(x,A))+\sup_{y}\{1_A(y) - \lambda c(x,y)\} = (1 - \lambda c(x,A))^+supy​{1A​(y)−λc(x,y)}=(1−λc(x,A))+ for λ≥0\lambda \ge 0λ≥0.
  3. (13) (p. 9): III equals the infimum in (13).
  4. Remark 4, (11) for f=1Af = 1_Af=1A​ (p. 8): an ε\varepsilonε-optimal plan πε\pi_\varepsilonπε​ satisfies ∫(φλ∗(x)−(1A(y)−λ∗c(x,y))) dπε≤ε\int(\varphi_{\lambda^*}(x) - (1_A(y) - \lambda^* c(x,y)))\,d\pi_\varepsilon \le \varepsilon∫(φλ∗​(x)−(1A​(y)−λ∗c(x,y)))dπε​≤ε and, for λ∗>0\lambda^* > 0λ∗>0, (δ−ε/λ∗)+≤∫c dπε≤δ(\delta - \varepsilon/\lambda^*)^+ \le \int c\,d\pi_\varepsilon \le \delta(δ−ε/λ∗)+≤∫cdπε​≤δ.
  5. Lemma 4 (p. 11): plans πn∈Φμ,δ\pi_n \in \Phi_{\mu,\delta}πn​∈Φμ,δ​, n>1n > 1n>1, with πn(Cn)≥1−1/n\pi_n(C_n) \ge 1 - 1/nπn​(Cn​)≥1−1/n, no cost outside the set CnC_nCn​ of §2.4.1, and πn(S×A)≥I−2/n\pi_n(S \times A) \ge I - 2/nπn​(S×A)≥I−2/n.
  6. Lemma 2 (p. 10): c‾≤δ≤c‾\underline c \le \delta \le \overline cc​≤δ≤c if λ∗>0\lambda^* > 0λ∗>0 attains (13); δ≥c‾=c‾\delta \ge \overline c = \underline cδ≥c=c​ if λ∗=0\lambda^* = 0λ∗=0 does.

Significance

Theorem 3 converts a supremum over an infinite-dimensional ball of probability measures into a single probability under the baseline: μ\muμ of the set of points that can reach AAA at cost at most 1/λ∗1/\lambda^*1/λ∗, where 1/λ∗1/\lambda^*1/λ∗ is determined by δ\deltaδ through the one-dimensional function u↦∫{c(x,A)≤u}c(x,A) dμu \mapsto \int_{\{c(x,A) \le u\}} c(x,A)\,d\muu↦∫{c(x,A)≤u}​c(x,A)dμ. For the cost c=dc = dc=d of a metric this is the baseline probability of the 1/λ∗1/\lambda^*1/λ∗-neighbourhood of AAA. The paper uses it to compute worst-case ruin probabilities for the Cramér–Lundberg model around a Brownian approximation (§3, §6.1), where SSS is a path space; the result applies there because nothing in it uses local compactness of SSS.

The result is proved in the paper. As far as the platform's corpus shows, neither it nor the strong duality behind it has been formalized. A formal development produces, beyond Theorem 3: a reusable definition of optimal transport costs with lower semicontinuous costs on Polish spaces; the coupling reformulation of the transport ball, which rests on the existence of optimal transport plans (Villani, Optimal Transport, Theorem 4.1), not in Mathlib; and an ε\varepsilonε-optimal-plan argument that avoids assuming a primal optimizer exists.

Difficulty

The heuristic derivation on pp. 9–10 constructs an optimal transport plan that moves each xxx with c(x,A)≤1/λ∗c(x,A) \le 1/\lambda^*c(x,A)≤1/λ∗ to a nearest point of AAA and leaves the others in place. It needs a nearest point to exist and to be selectable measurably, which fails for general closed AAA in a non-locally-compact space, and it needs a primal optimizer, which need not exist. Theorem 3 assumes neither, so the construction is not a proof. A second point is the boundary level c(x,A)=1/λ∗c(x,A) = 1/\lambda^*c(x,A)=1/λ∗: when μ\muμ charges it, as for atomic baselines, the identity (15) can fail (for μ\muμ a point mass at distance 111 from AAA and δ<1\delta < 1δ<1, the worst case is δ\deltaδ, not 111), and the hypothesis c‾=c‾\underline c = \overline cc​=c is exactly what excludes this. Measurability is a second obstacle: x↦c(x,A)x \mapsto c(x,A)x↦c(x,A) is an infimum of a lower semicontinuous function over AAA and in general only universally measurable, so integrals of it are taken against the completion of μ\muμ.

Formalization scope

All objects live in the namespace ModelRiskOT.WorstProb. SSS carries [TopologicalSpace S] [PolishSpace S] [MeasurableSpace S] [BorelSpace S]; μ\muμ is a Measure S with IsProbabilityMeasure; the cost is a real-valued c : S → S → ℝ with (A1) bundled as a structure (nonnegativity, lower semicontinuity on S×SS \times SS×S, and c(x,y)=0  ⟺  x=yc(x,y) = 0 \iff x = yc(x,y)=0⟺x=y). Committed conventions:

  • Values in [0,∞][0,\infty][0,∞]. dcd_cdc​, III, the objective of (13), c‾\underline cc​ and c‾\overline cc are ℝ≥0∞; integrals are lower Lebesgue integrals and the positive part (⋅)+(\cdot)^+(⋅)+ is ENNReal.ofReal. For the universally measurable functions and sets that occur, lower integrals and outer measures agree with the completion of μ\muμ, which is the paper's reading (p. 4). No Bochner integral is used.
  • The threshold 1/λ∗1/\lambda^*1/λ∗ is written in multiplied form: c(x,A)≤1/λ∗c(x,A) \le 1/\lambda^*c(x,A)≤1/λ∗ is λ∗c(x,A)≤1\lambda^* c(x,A) \le 1λ∗c(x,A)≤1, and likewise for the strict inequality and for the sets CnC_nCn​. For λ∗>0\lambda^* > 0λ∗>0 this is the printed condition; at λ∗=0\lambda^* = 0λ∗=0 it is the whole space, the paper's convention 1/0=∞1/0 = \infty1/0=∞.
  • dcd_cdc​ fixes both marginals; Φμ,δ\Phi_{\mu,\delta}Φμ,δ​ fixes only the first.
  • c(x,A)c(x,A)c(x,A) is a real infimum over the subtype AAA; every statement assumes AAA nonempty.
  • "λ∗\lambda^*λ∗ attains the infimum in (13)" is λ∗≥0\lambda^* \ge 0λ∗≥0 and g(λ∗)≤g(λ)g(\lambda^*) \le g(\lambda)g(λ∗)≤g(λ) for all λ≥0\lambda \ge 0λ≥0.
  • Inequalities X≥I−tX \ge I - tX≥I−t are written I≤X+tI \le X + tI≤X+t in [0,∞][0,\infty][0,∞]; sequences "n>1n > 1n>1" are indexed by n∈Nn \in \mathbb Nn∈N with 1<n1 < n1<n.

A formalization in which the transport ball fixes only the first marginal would contain every probability measure and give I=1I = 1I=1 for every nonempty AAA; the definitions here fix both marginals of the couplings in dcd_cdc​, and the hypothesis c‾=c‾\underline c = \overline cc​=c is kept as stated rather than replaced by continuity of u↦∫{c(x,A)≤u}c(x,A) dμu \mapsto \int_{\{c(x,A) \le u\}} c(x,A)\,d\muu↦∫{c(x,A)≤u}​c(x,A)dμ.

A complete development needs the existence of optimal couplings for lower semicontinuous costs (tightness and Prokhorov's theorem, available in Mathlib), the strong duality of the paper's Theorem 1 specialized to indicators (milestone 3; a separate mission in this series formalizes Theorem 1 in general), and universal measurability of c(⋅,A)c(\cdot,A)c(⋅,A) through projections of Borel sets. The transport-cost definitions and the coupling reformulation are reusable beyond this mission. Proofs of any milestone are welcome, as are proofs that derive (13) from the general strong duality once that is published.

Selected references

  • J. Blanchet, K. Murthy, Quantifying Distributional Model Risk via Optimal Transport, arXiv:1604.01446v2, 2017; Mathematics of Operations Research 44(2):565–600, 2019. https://arxiv.org/abs/1604.01446, https://doi.org/10.1287/moor.2018.0936
  • C. Villani, Optimal Transport: Old and New, Grundlehren der mathematischen Wissenschaften 338, Springer, 2009. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-71050-9
  • R. Gao, A. Kleywegt, Distributionally Robust Stochastic Optimization with Wasserstein Distance, arXiv:1604.02199, 2016. https://arxiv.org/abs/1604.02199
  • P. Mohajerin Esfahani, D. Kuhn, Data-driven distributionally robust optimization using the Wasserstein metric, Mathematical Programming 171:115–166, 2018. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10107-017-1172-1
  • D. P. Bertsekas, S. E. Shreve, Stochastic Optimal Control: The Discrete-Time Case, Academic Press, 1978 (universal measurability, Ch. 7).
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Operations ResearchOptimization·Captain: mikedeng1

Scheduling Deteriorating Jobs on a Single Processor I: Under Linear Deterioration, Sequencing by Increasing E(X_i)/α_i Minimizes the Expected MakespanResearch Paper

Motivation

In classical single-machine stochastic scheduling, NNN jobs with independent random processing requirements XiX_iXi​ are processed one after another, and the makespan (the completion time of the last job) is the same for every schedule that never idles: it is X1+⋯+XNX_1+\dots+X_NX1​+⋯+XN​. Research therefore concentrated on weighted flow times and rewards. Browne and Yechiali (Operations Research 38(3), 1990, 495–498) studied jobs that deteriorate while they wait: the longer a job is delayed, the more processing it needs. Such models arose in the control of queueing and communication systems (Browne 1988; Browne and Yechiali 1989) and in inventory issuing, where stored items lose quality at item-specific rates. Under deterioration the actual processing times depend on the order, so the makespan, and its expectation, become functions of the schedule, and the basic question is which order minimizes the expected makespan.

Setting

There are NNN jobs, all available at time 000, and a single processor. Job iii has an initial processing requirement XiX_iXi​, a random variable on a probability space (Ω,F,P)(\Omega,\mathcal F,P)(Ω,F,P): the time needed to complete job iii if it is processed first. Under linear deterioration, a job whose processing is delayed until time ttt needs

Yi(t)=Xi+αit,Y_i(t) = X_i + \alpha_i t,Yi​(t)=Xi​+αi​t,

where αi>0\alpha_i>0αi​>0 is its deterministic growth rate. A job stops deteriorating once it is put on the processor.

Only nonpreemptive strategies without idling are allowed, so a policy is a permutation π\piπ of {1,…,N}\{1,\dots,N\}{1,…,N}, with π(i)=j\pi(i)=jπ(i)=j meaning that job jjj is the iii-th processed. The completion times follow the model: S0(π)=0S_0(\pi)=0S0​(π)=0, and the job in position kkk starts at Sk−1(π)S_{k-1}(\pi)Sk−1​(π) and takes Yπ(k)(Sk−1(π))Y_{\pi(k)}(S_{k-1}(\pi))Yπ(k)​(Sk−1​(π)), so

Sk(π)=Sk−1(π)+Xπ(k)+απ(k)Sk−1(π),k=1,…,N.S_k(\pi) = S_{k-1}(\pi) + X_{\pi(k)} + \alpha_{\pi(k)} S_{k-1}(\pi), \qquad k = 1,\dots,N.Sk​(π)=Sk−1​(π)+Xπ(k)​+απ(k)​Sk−1​(π),k=1,…,N.

The makespan is SN(π)S_N(\pi)SN​(π) and the expected makespan is E SN(π)\mathrm E\,S_N(\pi)ESN​(π). In Lean these are completionTime X α π k ω, makespan X α π ω and expectedMakespan P X α π in the namespace DeterioratingJobs.Makespan.

The paper's Lemma 1 concerns, for real numbers μi\mu_iμi​ and γi\gamma_iγi​, the sum (1)

Fμ,γ(π)=∑i=1Nμπ(i)∏r=i+1Nγπ(r),F_{\mu,\gamma}(\pi) = \sum_{i=1}^{N} \mu_{\pi(i)} \prod_{r=i+1}^{N} \gamma_{\pi(r)},Fμ,γ​(π)=i=1∑N​μπ(i)​r=i+1∏N​γπ(r)​,

the Lean lemma1Sum μ γ π (empty product =1=1=1).

Formalization targets

Goal: the expected-makespan index rule (§1, p. 496)

If the XiX_iXi​ are integrable, αi>0\alpha_i>0αi​>0, and π\piπ schedules the jobs by increasing values of E(Xi)/αi\mathrm E(X_i)/\alpha_iE(Xi​)/αi​, then

E SN(π)≤E SN(σ)for every permutation σ.\mathrm E\,S_N(\pi) \le \mathrm E\,S_N(\sigma) \qquad\text{for every permutation } \sigma .ESN​(π)≤ESN​(σ)for every permutation σ.

Milestones

  1. Lemma 1 (p. 495). If γi>1\gamma_i>1γi​>1 for all iii, the sum (1) is minimized over all permutations by any permutation ordered by increasing μi/[γi−1]\mu_i/[\gamma_i-1]μi​/[γi​−1], and maximized by any permutation ordered by decreasing values.
  2. Eq. (2) (p. 496). For every π\piπ and j≤Nj\le Nj≤N,
Sj(π)=∑i=1jXπ(i)∏r=i+1j(1+απ(r)).S_j(\pi) = \sum_{i=1}^{j} X_{\pi(i)} \prod_{r=i+1}^{j} \bigl(1+\alpha_{\pi(r)}\bigr).Sj​(π)=i=1∑j​Xπ(i)​r=i+1∏j​(1+απ(r)​).
  1. The expected makespan in the form (1) (p. 496, after (2)).
E SN(π)=∑i=1NE(Xπ(i))∏r=i+1N(1+απ(r))=FEX, 1+α(π).\mathrm E\,S_N(\pi) = \sum_{i=1}^{N} \mathrm E(X_{\pi(i)}) \prod_{r=i+1}^{N}\bigl(1+\alpha_{\pi(r)}\bigr) = F_{\mathrm E X,\,1+\alpha}(\pi).ESN​(π)=i=1∑N​E(Xπ(i)​)r=i+1∏N​(1+απ(r)​)=FEX,1+α​(π).

Significance

The result is an index rule: each job receives a number computed from its own data, E(Xi)/αi\mathrm E(X_i)/\alpha_iE(Xi​)/αi​, and sorting by that number is optimal. It needs only the means of the initial requirements, not their distributions, and it holds without independence. The same reduction to Lemma 1 gives the paper's other index rules: the variance of the makespan under independent requirements, the Poisson-shock model (5), Lévy-type growth (6) and setup/detach times (7). In inventory issuing, it says which stored item to issue first when items lose value at item-specific linear rates. Lemma 1 itself, which the paper attributes to Rau (1971) and relates to optimal search, is a general statement about ordering products of factors along a sequence.

The result is proved in the paper by an appeal to Lemma 1, whose proof is given there as one sentence ("direct upon an interchange argument"). None of these statements has a machine-checked proof on Prove2Me or in Mathlib. This mission produces a formal model of linear deterioration on a single machine, a formal proof of the interchange lemma with ties handled, and the formal index rule.

Difficulty

The algebra of one adjacent interchange is short. The work is in passing from that local comparison to optimality over all N!N!N! permutations, with ties allowed: the paper speaks of "the permutation ordered by increasing values", but with equal indices several permutations qualify, and each of them must be shown optimal. The natural route, "an optimal permutation exists and must be sorted", needs care, because a sorted permutation is not unique and the swap that improves an unsorted permutation may only weakly improve it. On the probabilistic side, the expectation of the makespan must be reduced to the expectations of the XiX_iXi​; the makespan is a polynomial in the XiX_iXi​ with deterministic coefficients, so this is linearity of the integral, but integrability has to be carried through the recursion.

Formalization scope

  • Jobs are Fin N (0-based: Lean job i is the paper's job i+1i+1i+1); a policy is π : Equiv.Perm (Fin N) with π k the job in position k, as in the paper's π(i)=j\pi(i)=jπ(i)=j. N=0N=0N=0 is allowed.
  • The probability space is (Ω, P) with [IsProbabilityMeasure P]; XiX_iXi​ is Ω → ℝ; expectations are Bochner integrals, and every theorem about them assumes each XiX_iXi​ integrable. The growth rates are deterministic reals.
  • Completion times are defined by the model recursion Sk=Sk−1+Yπ(k)(Sk−1)S_{k}=S_{k-1}+Y_{\pi(k)}(S_{k-1})Sk​=Sk−1​+Yπ(k)​(Sk−1​), never by the closed form (2), so that (2) is a theorem about the model.
  • Explicit readings of loose phrases: "the permutation ordered by increasing values of viv_ivi​" means any permutation with k↦vπ(k)k\mapsto v_{\pi(k)}k↦vπ(k)​ non-strictly increasing (Monotone), and "decreasing" means Antitone; "is minimized" means ≤\le≤ against every permutation; "expected" means the integral of an integrable random variable.
  • Added hypotheses: αi>0\alpha_i>0αi​>0 in the goal (the paper divides by αi\alpha_iαi​ without stating it) and γi>1\gamma_i>1γi​>1 in Lemma 1 (the paper applies it only with γi=1+αi\gamma_i = 1+\alpha_iγi​=1+αi​ or (1+αi)2(1+\alpha_i)^2(1+αi​)2; for γi<1\gamma_i<1γi​<1 the ordering reverses).
  • Omitted assumptions: positivity of the XiX_iXi​ and their independence. The goal holds without them, so the formal statement is slightly more general than the paper's.
  • Trivializing formalizations are excluded: defining SSS by formula (2) would make milestone 2 a definition unfolding; a strictly increasing ordering would make the goal vacuous whenever two indices tie; ordering π−1\pi^{-1}π−1 instead of π\piπ states a different theorem; dropping integrability makes all expectations 000; allowing αi=0\alpha_i=0αi​=0 makes E(Xi)/αi=0\mathrm E(X_i)/\alpha_i=0E(Xi​)/αi​=0 a meaningless index.
  • Not formalized here: the variance result (3), the Poisson model (5), the Lévy model (6), Proposition 1, setup times (7), exponential growth (9), and the NP-hardness conjecture. Proposition 2 (weighted expected completion time) is the companion mission Scheduling Deteriorating Jobs on a Single Processor II.
  • Related platform items, none of which states these results: PalmQueueing.Ordering.interchange_permutations (interchange permutations of a GI/GI/1 queue) and the additive, non-deteriorating completion-time models MooreLateJobs.Shared.completionTime and NumStochOpt.ListScheduling.Makespan.

Contributions welcome: proofs of the milestones, a reusable "sorted permutation minimizes a sum of products" lemma, and the variance index (3) as an extension.

Selected references

  • S. Browne, U. Yechiali, Scheduling Deteriorating Jobs on a Single Processor, Operations Research 38(3), 1990, 495–498. https://doi.org/10.1287/opre.38.3.495
  • J. G. Rau, Minimizing a Function of Permutations of n Integers, Operations Research 19(1), 1971, 237–240. https://doi.org/10.1287/opre.19.1.237
  • F. P. Kelly, A Remark on Search and Sequencing Problems, Mathematics of Operations Research 7(1), 1982, 154–157. https://doi.org/10.1287/moor.7.1.154
  • R. W. Conway, W. L. Maxwell, L. W. Miller, Theory of Scheduling, Addison-Wesley, 1967.
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Operations ResearchOptimization·Captain: mikedeng1

Distributionally Robust Optimization Under Moment Uncertainty with Application to Data-Driven Problems 2: Worst-Case Distribution with Largest Covariance for Piecewise-Linear PortfoliosResearch Paper

Motivation

A portfolio manager who maximizes expected utility needs the distribution of asset returns, but in practice only estimates of its first two moments are available, and these estimates are themselves noisy. Distributionally robust optimization handles this by optimizing against the worst distribution in a set of plausible ones. Delage and Ye (Operations Research 58(3), 2010) proposed a set of distributions defined by confidence bounds on the mean and on the second-moment matrix, showed that the resulting problems are solvable in polynomial time for a large class of costs, and applied the framework to portfolio selection.

The set contains an upper bound on the covariance but no lower bound. Remark 1 of the paper says a lower bound "leads to important computational difficulties" and argues it should be unnecessary: for a concave utility, a less predictable market can only reduce expected utility, so the worst distribution should already have the largest covariance allowed. Proposition 3 in §5.2 turns this argument into a theorem for piecewise-linear concave utilities and unconstrained support. This mission formalizes Proposition 3 and the steps of its proof.

Setting

Let nnn assets have a random return vector ξ∈Rn\xi\in\mathbb R^nξ∈Rn, and let x∈Rnx\in\mathbb R^nx∈Rn be a portfolio, so the return is ξTx\xi^{\mathsf T}xξTx. A distribution of ξ\xiξ is a Borel probability measure on Rn\mathbb R^nRn with finite second moments. For symmetric matrices, A⪯BA\preceq BA⪯B (the Loewner order) means B−AB-AB−A is positive semidefinite.

Given a support set SSS, a centre μ0\mu_0μ0​, a positive definite matrix Σ0≻0\Sigma_0\succ0Σ0​≻0 and γ1≥0\gamma_1\ge0γ1​≥0, γ2>0\gamma_2>0γ2​>0, the distributional set of Assumption 3 is

D1(S,μ0,Σ0,γ1,γ2)={P : P(ξ∈S)=1, (E[ξ]−μ0)TΣ0−1(E[ξ]−μ0)≤γ1, E[(ξ−μ0)(ξ−μ0)T]⪯γ2Σ0}.\mathcal D_1(S,\mu_0,\Sigma_0,\gamma_1,\gamma_2)=\Big\{P\ :\ P(\xi\in S)=1,\ (\mathbb E[\xi]-\mu_0)^{\mathsf T}\Sigma_0^{-1}(\mathbb E[\xi]-\mu_0)\le\gamma_1,\ \mathbb E[(\xi-\mu_0)(\xi-\mu_0)^{\mathsf T}]\preceq\gamma_2\Sigma_0\Big\}.D1​(S,μ0​,Σ0​,γ1​,γ2​)={P : P(ξ∈S)=1, (E[ξ]−μ0​)TΣ0−1​(E[ξ]−μ0​)≤γ1​, E[(ξ−μ0​)(ξ−μ0​)T]⪯γ2​Σ0​}.

The second constraint, (1b), is the covariance constraint.

The utility is piecewise linear concave, u(y)=min⁡k∈{1,…,K}aky+bku(y)=\min_{k\in\{1,\dots,K\}}a_ky+b_ku(y)=mink∈{1,…,K}​ak​y+bk​ with K≥1K\ge1K≥1 pieces, and the cost of a return is −u-u−u:

h(x,ξ)=max⁡k (−ak ξTx−bk).h(x,\xi)=\max_{k}\ \big(-a_k\,\xi^{\mathsf T}x-b_k\big).h(x,ξ)=kmax​ (−ak​ξTx−bk​).

With estimates μ^\hat\muμ^​, Σ^≻0\hat\Sigma\succ0Σ^≻0 of the mean and covariance, the inner problem of the robust portfolio problem with unconstrained support and an exactly known mean (γ1=0\gamma_1=0γ1​=0) is

max⁡P∈D1(Rn,μ^,Σ^,0,γ2) EP[h(x,ξ)].(18)\max_{P\in\mathcal D_1(\mathbb R^n,\hat\mu,\hat\Sigma,0,\gamma_2)}\ \mathbb E_P\big[h(x,\xi)\big].\tag{18}P∈D1​(Rn,μ^​,Σ^,0,γ2​)max​ EP​[h(x,ξ)].(18)

The proof relates (18) to a semidefinite program in variables Λk∈Rn×n\Lambda_k\in\mathbb R^{n\times n}Λk​∈Rn×n, λk∈Rn\lambda_k\in\mathbb R^nλk​∈Rn, νk∈R\nu_k\in\mathbb Rνk​∈R:

max⁡ ∑k(−ak xTλk−bkνk)s.t.∑kΛk⪯γ2Σ^+μ^μ^T,  ∑kλk=μ^,  ∑kνk=1,  [ΛkλkλkTνk]⪰0.(19)\max\ \sum_k\big(-a_k\,x^{\mathsf T}\lambda_k-b_k\nu_k\big)\quad\text{s.t.}\quad \sum_k\Lambda_k\preceq\gamma_2\hat\Sigma+\hat\mu\hat\mu^{\mathsf T},\ \ \sum_k\lambda_k=\hat\mu,\ \ \sum_k\nu_k=1,\ \ \begin{bmatrix}\Lambda_k&\lambda_k\\\lambda_k^{\mathsf T}&\nu_k\end{bmatrix}\succeq0.\tag{19}max k∑​(−ak​xTλk​−bk​νk​)s.t.k∑​Λk​⪯γ2​Σ^+μ^​μ^​T,  k∑​λk​=μ^​,  k∑​νk​=1,  [Λk​λkT​​λk​νk​​]⪰0.(19)

Formalization targets

Goal: Proposition 3

For every γ1≥0\gamma_1\ge0γ1​≥0 (the mean-uncertainty radius of the robust portfolio problem (16); (18) is the case γ1=0\gamma_1=0γ1​=0),

∃ P∗∈D1(Rn,μ^,Σ^,γ1,γ2):EP∗[(ξ−μ^)(ξ−μ^)T]=γ2Σ^andEQ[h(x,ξ)]≤EP∗[h(x,ξ)]  ∀ Q∈D1(Rn,μ^,Σ^,γ1,γ2).\exists\,P^*\in\mathcal D_1(\mathbb R^n,\hat\mu,\hat\Sigma,\gamma_1,\gamma_2):\quad \mathbb E_{P^*}\big[(\xi-\hat\mu)(\xi-\hat\mu)^{\mathsf T}\big]=\gamma_2\hat\Sigma\quad\text{and}\quad \mathbb E_Q[h(x,\xi)]\le\mathbb E_{P^*}[h(x,\xi)]\ \ \forall\,Q\in\mathcal D_1(\mathbb R^n,\hat\mu,\hat\Sigma,\gamma_1,\gamma_2).∃P∗∈D1​(Rn,μ^​,Σ^,γ1​,γ2​):EP∗​[(ξ−μ^​)(ξ−μ^​)T]=γ2​Σ^andEQ​[h(x,ξ)]≤EP∗​[h(x,ξ)]  ∀Q∈D1​(Rn,μ^​,Σ^,γ1​,γ2​).

The worst-case expectation is attained, and at a distribution for which the covariance constraint holds with equality. The statement holds for every portfolio xxx, every K≥1K\ge1K≥1, every a,ba,ba,b, every μ^\hat\muμ^​, every Σ^≻0\hat\Sigma\succ0Σ^≻0, every γ1≥0\gamma_1\ge0γ1​≥0 and every γ2>0\gamma_2>0γ2​>0.

Milestones

  1. Every value of (18) is dominated by the value of a feasible point of (19).
  2. (19) has an optimal solution at which ∑kΛk=γ2Σ^+μ^μ^T\sum_k\Lambda_k=\gamma_2\hat\Sigma+\hat\mu\hat\mu^{\mathsf T}∑k​Λk​=γ2​Σ^+μ^​μ^​T.
  3. If [ΛλλTν]⪰0\begin{bmatrix}\Lambda&\lambda\\\lambda^{\mathsf T}&\nu\end{bmatrix}\succeq0[ΛλT​λν​]⪰0 and ν>0\nu>0ν>0, a random vector with mean λ/ν\lambda/\nuλ/ν and second moment Λ/ν\Lambda/\nuΛ/ν exists.
  4. The mixture ∑kνkPk\sum_k\nu_kP_k∑k​νk​Pk​ of such vectors, built from a tight feasible point with all νk>0\nu_k>0νk​>0, lies in D1\mathcal D_1D1​ and has second moment γ2Σ^\gamma_2\hat\Sigmaγ2​Σ^ about μ^\hat\muμ^​.
  5. The expected cost under that mixture is at least the objective value of (19) at the point.
  6. (18) and (19) have the same attained optimal value.

Significance

The proposition justifies a modelling decision of the whole paper: for portfolio problems with piecewise-linear concave utility, adding a lower bound γ3Σ0⪯E[(ξ−μ0)(ξ−μ0)T]\gamma_3\Sigma_0\preceq\mathbb E[(\xi-\mu_0)(\xi-\mu_0)^{\mathsf T}]γ3​Σ0​⪯E[(ξ−μ0​)(ξ−μ0​)T] (display (2)) to the distributional set cannot change the robust decision, so the computational difficulty that lower bound would cause is avoided at no loss. It also shows that, under these assumptions and with γ2=1\gamma_2=1γ2​=1, the paper's semidefinite formulation solves the known-moment portfolio problem of Popescu (2007) in polynomial time (Remark 4). The worst case is explicit: a finite mixture of distributions with prescribed first and second moments, read off an optimal solution of (19).

The result is proved in the paper; no machine-checked version is known. Formalizing it requires a moment-problem argument (from a distribution to a feasible point of an SDP) and its converse (from an SDP solution to a distribution), both of which are reusable for other moment-based distributionally robust results. The proposition concerns the robust portfolio problem with D1(Rn,μ^,Σ^,γ1,γ2)\mathcal D_1(\mathbb R^n,\hat\mu,\hat\Sigma,\gamma_1,\gamma_2)D1​(Rn,μ^​,Σ^,γ1​,γ2​); the paper's proof writes out only γ1=0\gamma_1=0γ1​=0 "for simplicity of our derivations". The goal states the proposition for every γ1≥0\gamma_1\ge0γ1​≥0; the milestones follow the written proof and are stated for γ1=0\gamma_1=0γ1​=0.

Difficulty

The obvious argument, "a concave utility prefers less spread, so the adversary maximizes spread", does not prove anything by itself: increasing the second-moment matrix of a given distribution in the Loewner order does not determine its law, and the expected cost depends on the whole law, not on the moments. The proof goes through the semidefinite program (19). Two steps carry the weight. First, every distribution in D1\mathcal D_1D1​ must be mapped to a feasible point of (19) with no smaller value, although the cost is only piecewise affine in ξ\xiξ. Second, an optimal point of (19) must be turned back into a distribution in D1\mathcal D_1D1​; this needs the existence of random vectors with prescribed first and second moments, and care with blocks where νk=0\nu_k=0νk​=0, which the paper sets aside "without loss of generality" although such a block can carry a nonzero Λk\Lambda_kΛk​ that the mixture would lose.

Formalization scope

  • Vectors are Fin n → ℝ; all Euclidean quantities are dot products, never the sup norm. Matrices are Matrix (Fin n) (Fin n) ℝ; A⪯BA\preceq BA⪯B is (B - A).PosSemidef; Σ0−1\Sigma_0^{-1}Σ0−1​ is Mathlib's matrix inverse, used only with Σ0≻0\Sigma_0\succ0Σ0​≻0.
  • A distribution is a Measure (Fin n → ℝ) that is a probability measure and whose coordinates are in L2L^2L2 (MemLp _ 2). This makes every mean, second moment and expected cost a genuine integral; without it a non-integrable expectation would evaluate to 000.
  • P(ξ∈S)=1P(\xi\in S)=1P(ξ∈S)=1 is an almost-everywhere statement; the goal uses S=RnS=\mathbb R^nS=Rn ("infinite support constraint"). The convexity of SSS, μ0∈int⁡S\mu_0\in\operatorname{int}Sμ0​∈intS and the separation oracle of Assumption 3 concern the paper's algorithms and are not part of the set.
  • The maximum of (18) is never a real supremum: the goal asserts a maximizer that dominates every member of the set. The cost uses a finite maximum over K≥1K\ge1K≥1 pieces ([NeZero K]).
  • Standing hypotheses: Σ^≻0\hat\Sigma\succ0Σ^≻0 (Assumption 3's Σ0≻0\Sigma_0\succ0Σ0​≻0, and endnote 1), γ2>0\gamma_2>0γ2​>0 (§3), γ1≥0\gamma_1\ge0γ1​≥0 (Assumption 3) in the goal; the milestones fix γ1=0\gamma_1=0γ1​=0 as the proof does. The portfolio xxx ranges over all of Rn\mathbb R^nRn; the simplex constraint (16b) plays no role in the inner problem, so dropping it only strengthens the statements.
  • The objective of (19) has the sign of the proof's final computation (p. 21), ∑k(−akxTλk−bkνk)\sum_k(-a_kx^{\mathsf T}\lambda_k-b_k\nu_k)∑k​(−ak​xTλk​−bk​νk​); display (19a) on p. 19 prints the opposite signs, a misprint.
  • Ruling out trivial readings: the goal requires both membership in D1\mathcal D_1D1​ with tight covariance and domination of every member of D1\mathcal D_1D1​. A distribution with covariance γ2Σ^\gamma_2\hat\Sigmaγ2​Σ^ alone, or a maximizer alone, would not suffice. The goal does not claim that every maximizer is tight; for K=1K=1K=1 the cost is linear and every member of D1\mathcal D_1D1​ is a maximizer.
  • Infrastructure needed: existence of distributions with prescribed mean and covariance (for instance multivariate Gaussians, or degenerate laws on a subspace), finite mixtures of measures and their moments, Schur complements of positive semidefinite block matrices, and compactness of the feasible set of (19). Proofs of the milestones in any order are welcome.

The source is the authors' draft of 20 February 2008 of the Operations Research paper; every page, display and label in this mission refers to that draft.

Selected references

  • E. Delage and Y. Ye, Distributionally robust optimization under moment uncertainty with application to data-driven problems, Operations Research 58(3):595–612, 2010 (authors' draft of 20 February 2008 used here). https://doi.org/10.1287/opre.1090.0741
  • I. Popescu, Robust mean-covariance solutions for stochastic optimization, Operations Research 55(1):98–112, 2007. https://doi.org/10.1287/opre.1060.0353
  • Y. Nesterov and A. Nemirovski, Interior-Point Polynomial Algorithms in Convex Programming, SIAM, 1994. https://doi.org/10.1137/1.9781611970791
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Convex OptimizationOperations ResearchOptimization·Captain: mikedeng1

Optimality and Duality Theory for Stochastic Optimization Problems with Nonlinear Dominance Constraints 2: With Finite Scenarios and Slater's Condition, Piecewise-Linear Utilities Are MultipliersResearch Paper

Motivation

Second-order stochastic dominance constraints let a decision maker require that a random outcome of a decision be preferred to a fixed benchmark outcome by every risk-averse expected-utility maximizer, without choosing a utility function in advance. Dentcheva and Ruszczyński introduced optimization under such constraints in Optimization with stochastic dominance constraints (SIAM J. Optim., 2003), for the case where the decision enters the outcome linearly (the pure-dominance case). Their follow-up paper, Optimality and duality theory for stochastic optimization problems with nonlinear dominance constraints (Math. Program., 2004), allows the decision to affect many random outcomes in a nonlinear, concave way, and derives optimality and duality theory in which the Lagrange multipliers of the dominance constraints are utility functions.

In applications (portfolio selection against a benchmark index is the paper's own example in §6) the probability space is a finite set of scenarios. Section 5 of the paper specialises the theory to that case. This mission formalizes that section: the reduction of the dominance constraints to finitely many inequalities, and the optimality and duality theorems (Theorems 6 and 7) in which the multipliers become piecewise-linear concave utilities.

Setting

There are nnn scenarios ω1,…,ωn\omega_1,\dots,\omega_nω1​,…,ωn​ with probabilities pj≥0p_j \ge 0pj​≥0, ∑jpj=1\sum_j p_j = 1∑j​pj​=1, and mmm benchmark constraints, indexed by i∈I={1,…,m}i \in I = \{1,\dots,m\}i∈I={1,…,m}; J={1,…,n}J = \{1,\dots,n\}J={1,…,n}. A decision zzz ranges over a convex set Z⊆RNZ \subseteq \mathbb R^NZ⊆RN. For each scenario jjj, hj:RN→Rh_j:\mathbb R^N\to\mathbb Rhj​:RN→R is the objective contribution and gij:RN→Rg_{ij}:\mathbb R^N\to\mathbb Rgij​:RN→R the iiith outcome, all concave. The benchmark YiY_iYi​ has realizations yijy_{ij}yij​. Write (t)+=max⁡(t,0)(t)_+=\max(t,0)(t)+​=max(t,0).

The second-order dominance of a finitely distributed XiX_iXi​ (realizations xijx_{ij}xij​) over YiY_iYi​ on an interval [ai,bi][a_i,b_i][ai​,bi​] reads

∑jpj(η−xij)+≤∑jpj(η−yij)+for all η∈[ai,bi].(36)\sum_{j} p_j(\eta - x_{ij})_+ \le \sum_j p_j(\eta-y_{ij})_+ \quad\text{for all } \eta\in[a_i,b_i]. \tag{36}j∑​pj​(η−xij​)+​≤j∑​pj​(η−yij​)+​for all η∈[ai​,bi​].(36)

The split-variable problem (38)–(41) is

max⁡∑j=1npjhj(z)s.t.∑jpj(yik−xij)+≤∑jpj(yik−yij)+,xik≤gik(z),z∈Z,\max \sum_{j=1}^n p_j h_j(z)\quad\text{s.t.}\quad \sum_{j} p_j(y_{ik}-x_{ij})_+ \le \sum_j p_j(y_{ik}-y_{ij})_+,\quad x_{ik}\le g_{ik}(z),\quad z\in Z,maxj=1∑n​pj​hj​(z)s.t.j∑​pj​(yik​−xij​)+​≤j∑​pj​(yik​−yij​)+​,xik​≤gik​(z),z∈Z,

for all i∈Ii\in Ii∈I, k∈Jk\in Jk∈J, over zzz and X=(xij)∈RmnX=(x_{ij})\in\mathbb R^{mn}X=(xij​)∈Rmn. The Slater condition asks for z~∈relint⁡Z\tilde z \in \operatorname{relint} Zz~∈relintZ and X~\tilde XX~ satisfying the dominance constraints (39) with x~ik<gik(z~)\tilde x_{ik} < g_{ik}(\tilde z)x~ik​<gik​(z~) for all i,ki,ki,k.

The utility set ViV_iVi​ consists of the functions u:R→Ru:\mathbb R\to\mathbb Ru:R→R that are concave, nondecreasing, piecewise linear with break points only at the yiky_{ik}yik​, and zero on [max⁡kyik,∞)[\max_k y_{ik},\infty)[maxk​yik​,∞). With θij≥0\theta_{ij}\ge 0θij​≥0 multipliers for the splitting constraints xij≤gij(z)x_{ij}\le g_{ij}(z)xij​≤gij​(z), the Lagrangian is

L(z,X,u,θ)=∑j=1npj[hj(z)+∑i=1mθijgij(z)]+∑i=1m∑j=1npj[ui(xij)−ui(yij)−θijxij].(42)L(z,X,u,\theta) = \sum_{j=1}^n p_j\Big[h_j(z)+\sum_{i=1}^m\theta_{ij}g_{ij}(z)\Big]+\sum_{i=1}^m\sum_{j=1}^n p_j\big[u_i(x_{ij})-u_i(y_{ij})-\theta_{ij}x_{ij}\big]. \tag{42}L(z,X,u,θ)=j=1∑n​pj​[hj​(z)+i=1∑m​θij​gij​(z)]+i=1∑m​j=1∑n​pj​[ui​(xij​)−ui​(yij​)−θij​xij​].(42)

Multipliers μik\mu_{ik}μik​ of the inequalities (39) generate the utility ui(t)=−∑kμik(yik−t)+u_i(t)=-\sum_k\mu_{ik}(y_{ik}-t)_+ui​(t)=−∑k​μik​(yik​−t)+​ (46). The dual functional is D(u,θ)=sup⁡z∈Z, XL(z,X,u,θ)D(u,\theta)=\sup_{z\in Z,\,X}L(z,X,u,\theta)D(u,θ)=supz∈Z,X​L(z,X,u,θ) (47).

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 6

Under the Slater condition, (z^,X^)(\hat z,\hat X)(z^,X^) optimal for (38)–(41) implies that there are u^i∈Vi\hat u_i\in V_iu^i​∈Vi​ and θ^≥0\hat\theta\ge 0θ^≥0 with

L(z^,X^,u^,θ^)=max⁡(z,X)∈Z×RmnL(z,X,u^,θ^),∑jpj[u^i(x^ij)−u^i(yij)]=0,θ^ij(x^ij−gij(z^))=0;L(\hat z,\hat X,\hat u,\hat\theta)=\max_{(z,X)\in Z\times\mathbb R^{mn}}L(z,X,\hat u,\hat\theta),\qquad \sum_j p_j[\hat u_i(\hat x_{ij})-\hat u_i(y_{ij})]=0,\qquad \hat\theta_{ij}(\hat x_{ij}-g_{ij}(\hat z))=0;L(z^,X^,u^,θ^)=(z,X)∈Z×Rmnmax​L(z,X,u^,θ^),j∑​pj​[u^i​(x^ij​)−u^i​(yij​)]=0,θ^ij​(x^ij​−gij​(z^))=0;

conversely, these conditions together with feasibility imply optimality.

Milestones

  1. Lemma 2 (p. 15): if ai≤yij≤bia_i\le y_{ij}\le b_iai​≤yij​≤bi​, then (36) is equivalent to the mnmnmn inequalities (37) at the realizations η=yik\eta=y_{ik}η=yik​, and also to (36) on the whole line.
  2. Eq. (46) (p. 17): for any μ\muμ, the standard Lagrangian Λ(z,X,μ,θ)\Lambda(z,X,\mu,\theta)Λ(z,X,μ,θ) equals L(z,X,u,θ)L(z,X,u,\theta)L(z,X,u,θ) with uuu given by (46).
  3. p. 18: for μi≥0\mu_i\ge0μi​≥0, the utility (46) lies in ViV_iVi​.
  4. pp. 16–17: under Slater, an optimal solution admits Kuhn–Tucker multipliers μ≥0\mu\ge0μ≥0, θ≥0\theta\ge0θ≥0 for (38)–(41) with complementarity.
  5. p. 18: every v∈Viv\in V_iv∈Vi​ is of the form (46) with μi≥0\mu_i\ge0μi​≥0.
  6. Theorem 7 (p. 18), after the goal: the dual problem min⁡{D(u,θ):u∈V1×⋯×Vm, θ≥0}\min\{D(u,\theta): u\in V_1\times\dots\times V_m,\ \theta\ge0\}min{D(u,θ):u∈V1​×⋯×Vm​, θ≥0} has a solution and no duality gap.

Significance

Theorem 6 says that, for finitely many scenarios, the infinite-dimensional multiplier of the general theory (a concave utility in a cone of functions, Theorem 2 of the paper) can always be taken piecewise linear with kinks exactly at the benchmark's realizations. The multiplier space becomes finite-dimensional, ViV_iVi​ is a polyhedral cone, and the dual problem of Theorem 7 is a finite-dimensional convex program. The paper's decomposition (49)–(51) of the dual functional and its numerical method in §6 rest on this. Lemma 2 is the standard reduction that makes dominance against a finitely distributed benchmark a finite set of polyhedral constraints, used throughout the later literature on dominance-constrained portfolio optimization.

The results are proved in the paper; none of them is formalized. The mission produces machine-checked statements of the finite-scenario theory, a Lean model of the utility set ViV_iVi​ and of the correspondence between nonnegative multipliers and piecewise-linear utilities, and a Kuhn–Tucker theorem for concave programs with polyhedral constraints and a relative-interior Slater point.

Difficulty

The obvious route to Theorem 6 is to invoke a Kuhn–Tucker theorem. The available formal versions require every inequality constraint to hold strictly at the Slater point and range over all of RN\mathbb R^NRN. Neither fits: the dominance constraint at the smallest realization yi,[1]y_{i,[1]}yi,[1]​ has right-hand side 000 and a nonnegative left-hand side, so it can never hold strictly, and ZZZ may be lower-dimensional (a simplex), so only its relative interior is available. The polyhedral structure of (39) must be used, as in Rockafellar's Theorem 28.2. The second obstacle is the converse direction of the multiplier–utility correspondence: a utility in ViV_iVi​ must be written as a nonnegative combination of the kinks (yik−t)+(y_{ik}-t)_+(yik​−t)+​, which requires handling repeated realizations and the one-sided slopes at each break point.

Formalization scope

  • RN\mathbb R^NRN is Fin N → ℝ; XXX, θ\thetaθ, μ\muμ are Fin m → Fin n → ℝ; expectations are finite sums and positive parts are max t 0. No measure theory is used.
  • Probabilities satisfy pj≥0p_j\ge0pj​≥0, ∑jpj=1\sum_jp_j=1∑j​pj​=1; pj=0p_j=0pj​=0 is allowed, as on the page.
  • Standing assumptions of p. 2 are explicit hypotheses: ZZZ convex and hjh_jhj​, gijg_{ij}gij​ concave on RN\mathbb R^NRN. Continuity is not stated, since finite concave functions on RN\mathbb R^NRN are continuous.
  • The relative interior is intrinsicInterior ℝ Z, not the topological interior. In the Slater condition only the splitting constraints are strict; the dominance constraints hold non-strictly.
  • ViV_iVi​ is defined by concavity, monotonicity, affinity on every interval whose interior contains no yiky_{ik}yik​, and u=0u=0u=0 on [max⁡kyik,∞)[\max_ky_{ik},\infty)[maxk​yik​,∞). This last clause is the page's u(yi,[n])=0u(y_{i,[n]})=0u(yi,[n]​)=0 combined with Vi⊂U1([ai,bi])V_i\subset\mathcal U_1([a_i,b_i])Vi​⊂U1​([ai​,bi​]). No positive slope is required, because the printed "c>0c>0c>0" in U1\mathcal U_1U1​ is a misprint for c≥0c\ge0c≥0.
  • "max" in (43) is an attained maximum over all of Z×RmnZ\times\mathbb R^{mn}Z×Rmn, with no constraints on XXX. The dual functional (47) is an EReal supremum.
  • Theorem 6 keeps the Slater condition as a hypothesis of the whole statement, as printed, although its converse part does not use it.
  • A trivializing formalization is ruled out. ViV_iVi​ is not defined as the set of functions of the form (46), which would make milestones 3 and 5 true by definition. Slater does not require strict dominance constraints, which would make it unsatisfiable. A sorry-free check confirms that the goal's hypotheses hold on an instance (n=2n=2n=2, Z=[0,1]Z=[0,1]Z=[0,1]).
  • Reusable beyond this mission: the Kuhn–Tucker theorem with polyhedral constraints and relative-interior Slater point (milestone 4), and Lemma 2. Proofs of any item, and alternative proofs of the goal that avoid milestone 4, are welcome.
  • The pure-dominance case is the earlier paper of Dentcheva–Ruszczyński (2003). The function F2F_2F2​ and its expected-shortfall form are due to Ogryczak–Ruszczyński. The general Lagrange duality on the platform (ConvexOptimization.slater_strong_duality, Boyd–Vandenberghe §5.3.2) assumes a strict Slater point for every constraint and no set constraint, so it does not cover milestone 4.

Selected references

  • D. Dentcheva, A. Ruszczyński, Optimality and duality theory for stochastic optimization problems with nonlinear dominance constraints, Math. Program., 2004 (cited here from the authors' revised manuscript, April 2003). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10107-003-0453-z
  • D. Dentcheva, A. Ruszczyński, Optimization with stochastic dominance constraints, SIAM J. Optim. 14 (2003) 548–566. https://doi.org/10.1137/S1052623402420528
  • W. Ogryczak, A. Ruszczyński, Dual stochastic dominance and related mean-risk models, SIAM J. Optim. 13 (2002) 60–78. https://doi.org/10.1137/S1052623400375075
  • R. T. Rockafellar, Convex Analysis, Princeton University Press, 1970, §28. https://doi.org/10.1515/9781400873173
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Operations ResearchStochastic Systems·Captain: mikedeng1

Maximum Pressure Policies in Stochastic Processing Networks I: Under the EAA Assumption, Maximum Pressure Is Pathwise Stable Whenever the Static Planning LP Has a Feasible Solution with ρ ≤ 1Research Paper

Why throughput matters

A processing network must decide which activities receive scarce processor capacity while jobs move among buffers. Such decisions matter in manufacturing, service systems, and switches: one activity can consume several processors at once, and a job can be routed to another buffer after processing. A policy that sees current buffer levels but does not need to know arrival or routing rates is easier to operate when those rates are difficult to estimate. Dai and Lin's 2005 paper studies whether a maximum pressure policy, which uses the buffer vector and an input-output matrix, can stabilize every network that is stabilizable in their model. Their Theorems 1 and 2 give, respectively, a necessary planning condition for any stabilizing policy and a sufficient condition for maximum pressure under the extreme-allocation-available assumption. Dai and Lin (2005)

Here pathwise stability means that each internal buffer grows sublinearly in time almost surely. This is a rate statement about sample paths. It does not assert positive recurrence of a Markov chain, nor does it require a stationary distribution. The paper allows general primitive processing and routing processes with almost-sure long-run averages. Dai and Lin (2005), §§2–4

Network and allocations

There are III internal buffers, JJJ activities, and KKK processors. Buffer 000 represents the outside world. The K×JK\times JK×J matrix AAA records resource use: Akj=1A_{kj}=1Akj​=1 when activity jjj requires processor kkk. The J×(I+1)J\times(I+1)J×(I+1) matrix BBB records which buffers an activity processes. An input activity processes Buffer 000; a service activity does not. Input processors serve only input activities and must be fully used, while all processors have at most unit capacity.

For activity jjj, the processing requirements have mean mjm_jmj​ and the routing counts have long-run matrix PjP^jPj. Write μj=1/mj\mu_j=1/m_jμj​=1/mj​. The input-output matrix is

Rij=μj(Bji−∑i′=0IBji′Pi′ij),i=1,…,I.R_{ij}=\mu_j\left(B_{ji}-\sum_{i'=0}^{I}B_{ji'}P^j_{i'i}\right),\qquad i=1,\ldots,I.Rij​=μj​(Bji​−i′=0∑I​Bji′​Pi′ij​),i=1,…,I.

Positive RijR_{ij}Rij​ means activity jjj consumes net material from internal buffer iii; negative means it produces net material there. An allocation a∈Aa\in\mathcal Aa∈A assigns nonnegative activity levels subject to the processor capacity bounds and the equality for every input processor. The finite set E\mathcal EE consists of the extreme points of this allocation set. At buffer vector zzz, allocation aaa has network pressure p(a,z)=z⋅Rap(a,z)=z\cdot Rap(a,z)=z⋅Ra. The maximum pressure rule chooses an allocation of greatest pressure among the currently feasible members of E\mathcal EE. Feasibility depends on jobs actually available to each constituent buffer. Dai and Lin (2005), §§2–3

The extreme-allocation-available assumption (EAA) says that for every nonnegative zzz, a pressure maximizer in E\mathcal EE can be chosen whose constituent buffers all have positive levels. It links the static pressure maximization to the jobs that a policy can process. The static planning LP asks for activity fractions x≥0x\ge0x≥0 and a service-processor load ρ\rhoρ such that Rx=0Rx=0Rx=0, every input processor has load one, and every service processor has load at most ρ\rhoρ. Dai and Lin (2005), p. 202

Formalization targets

The goal is Theorem 2. For a network satisfying EAA and run by a preemptive, processor-splitting maximum pressure policy, LP feasibility with ρ≤1\rho\le1ρ≤1 implies

P ⁣(∀i∈{1,…,I}, lim⁡t→∞Zi(t)t=0)=1.\mathbb P\!\left(\forall i\in\{1,\ldots,I\},\ \lim_{t\to\infty}\frac{Z_i(t)}{t}=0\right)=1.P(∀i∈{1,…,I}, t→∞lim​tZi​(t)​=0)=1.

The milestones follow the paper's route from stochastic paths to deterministic fluid limits. A fluid limit is a uniform-on-compact limit of (Z(rt),T(rt))/r(Z(rt),T(rt))/r(Z(rt),T(rt))/r along positive scales r→∞r\to\inftyr→∞. The milestones state that fluid limits satisfy (14)–(18), weak stability of the corresponding fluid model transfers to pathwise stability (Theorem 3), maximum pressure adds (52)–(55) and (20) (Lemmas 5 and 4), quadratic fluid energy obeys (22)–(23), and LP feasibility with EAA makes the maximum-pressure fluid model weakly stable (Theorem 4). Dai and Lin (2005), pp. 203, 213–214

What the result gives

Theorem 2 identifies a policy whose almost-sure buffer growth rate vanishes whenever the planning LP permits load at most one and EAA holds. Together with the paper's necessary condition in Theorem 1, it characterizes the feasibility boundary for this policy class under EAA. Its scope includes networks in which an activity uses multiple processors and processes multiple buffers simultaneously. It does not claim that all such networks satisfy EAA. Dai and Lin (2005), Theorems 1–2

The result is proved in the 2005 article. This mission asks for a machine-checked proof of that known theorem and its selected intermediate claims. The Lean statements are open draft targets. Reusable outcomes include a model of cumulative routing and service counts, a uniform-on-compact fluid-limit interface, and the weak-fluid-stability transfer theorem for networks without a Markov assumption.

Why the proof is difficult

Maximizing pressure over the static allocation polytope does not by itself describe an executable service policy. An allocation can demand work from an empty buffer. EAA addresses the existence of a maximizing allocation supported by positive buffer levels, but the stochastic policy acts on actual jobs and completion times. The proof must connect those discrete, pathwise decisions to the limiting differential equation (20). At a regular fluid time, the maximum-pressure equation is decisive; away from regular times, derivatives need not exist. The fluid model therefore carries a time qualifier that cannot simply be dropped. Dai and Lin (2005), pp. 201–203, 214

Formalization scope

The Lean model uses finite index types for buffers, activities, and processors. Internal buffers are Fin I; Buffer 0 is the zero index of Fin (I+1), and an internal buffer maps to its successor index. Activity and processor labels use zero-based Fin. Time is real but all network equations are asserted for nonnegative time. The shared Bell–Williams Paths definition supplies the renewal count in N∪{∞}\mathbb N\cup\{\infty\}N∪{∞} and uniform-on-compact distance using the ℓ1\ell^1ℓ1 norm. The completion count is required finite wherever the network equations convert it to a natural number; this prevents infinity from becoming a zero count. Bell and Williams (2001)

The network standing assumptions record binary incidence matrices, nonempty constituencies, processor coverage, activity types, and an input activity. Two refinements are explicit: each input processor has an activity, so its mandatory unit allocation is feasible, and mj>0m_j>0mj​>0, so μj=1/mj\mu_j=1/m_jμj​=1/mj​ is defined as the intended positive rate. Routing counts are cumulative and nonnegative. Their row sums are constrained only for buffers an activity processes: the printed sentence requiring the same sum for every buffer conflicts with its immediately preceding statement that the count vanishes when the activity does not process that buffer. The corresponding rows of PjP^jPj sum to one for processed buffers and vanish for unprocessed buffers, as follows from (4). Dai and Lin (2005), pp. 199–200

The policy predicate records allocation-time decomposition (49)–(51) and the non-employment consequence of Definition 1 used in (56)–(58). It checks feasibility of a competing extreme allocation through the paper's threshold JJJ at every time of the interval. Individual job states and tie breaking are outside the pathwise interface. The goal retains EAA, the exact ρ≤1\rho\le1ρ≤1 bound, and all network and policy equations, so an empty allocation set or an unconstrained service path cannot make the target automatic. Contributions formalizing the finite extreme-point set, fluid-limit compactness, Lemmas 4–5, and the weak-stability transfer are welcome.

Selected references

  • J. G. Dai and W. Lin, Maximum pressure policies in stochastic processing networks, Operations Research 53(2):197–218, 2005. DOI.
  • S. L. Bell and R. J. Williams, Dynamic scheduling of a system with two parallel servers in heavy traffic with resource pooling: asymptotic optimality of a threshold policy, Annals of Applied Probability 11(3):608–649, 2001. DOI.
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Bandit AlgorithmsMachine LearningStatistics·Captain: mikedeng1

Kullback–Leibler Upper Confidence Bounds for Optimal Sequential Allocation II: Empirical KL-UCB Draws a Suboptimal Arm log(T)/K_inf(ν_a, μ*) + O((log T)^{4/5} log log T) TimesResearch Paper

Motivation

In a stochastic multi-armed bandit a player repeatedly chooses one of KKK arms and receives a random reward drawn from that arm's unknown distribution; the aim is to pull suboptimal arms as rarely as possible. Lai and Robbins (1985) and, for general models, Burnetas and Katehakis (1996) showed that any reasonable strategy must pull a suboptimal arm aaa at least (1+o(1))log⁡T/Kinf⁡(νa,μ⋆)(1+o(1))\log T/\mathcal K_{\inf}(\nu_a,\mu^\star)(1+o(1))logT/Kinf​(νa​,μ⋆) times in TTT rounds, where Kinf⁡\mathcal K_{\inf}Kinf​ is a minimal Kullback–Leibler divergence defined below. A strategy whose expected number of pulls matches this constant is asymptotically optimal.

For rewards in [0,1][0,1][0,1], classical index policies such as UCB (Auer, Cesa-Bianchi and Fischer, 2002) achieve O(log⁡T)O(\log T)O(logT) pulls but with a constant governed by the gap of the means, not by Kinf⁡\mathcal K_{\inf}Kinf​. Cappé, Garivier, Maillard, Munos and Stoltz, Kullback–Leibler upper confidence bounds for optimal sequential allocation, Ann. Statist. 41(3), 2013 (arXiv:1210.1136v4), introduce the KL-UCB family of index policies and prove finite-time bounds whose leading term is the Lai–Robbins/Burnetas–Katehakis constant. This mission formalizes their result for empirical KL-UCB (Algorithm 3, Theorem 2), which is asymptotically optimal in the nonparametric model of finitely supported distributions on [0,1][0,1][0,1]. A companion mission covers kl-UCB in one-parameter exponential families (Theorem 1).

Timeline: Lai and Robbins (1985), lower bound for parametric families; Burnetas and Katehakis (1996), lower bound and asymptotically optimal policies for general models; Honda and Takemura (2010, 2011), the DMED algorithm, asymptotically optimal for finitely supported and bounded rewards; Cappé et al. (2013), the first index policy with a non-asymptotic bound whose leading term is optimal in this model.

Setting

A bandit has K≥2K\ge2K≥2 arms with reward distributions ν1,…,νK\nu_1,\dots,\nu_Kν1​,…,νK​ in a known model F\mathcal FF: the set of probability distributions over [0,1][0,1][0,1] with finite support. Write E(ν)=∫x dν(x)\mathrm E(\nu)=\int x\,d\nu(x)E(ν)=∫xdν(x), μa=E(νa)\mu_a=\mathrm E(\nu_a)μa​=E(νa​) and μ⋆=max⁡aμa\mu^\star=\max_a\mu_aμ⋆=maxa​μa​; arm aaa is suboptimal if μa<μ⋆\mu_a<\mu^\starμa​<μ⋆. At each round t≥1t\ge1t≥1 the player picks an arm AtA_tAt​ based on past observations and observes a reward drawn from νAt\nu_{A_t}νAt​​. Na(T)=∑t=1TI{At=a}N_a(T)=\sum_{t=1}^T\mathbb I\{A_t=a\}Na​(T)=∑t=1T​I{At​=a} is the number of pulls of arm aaa up to round TTT.

Equivalently, each arm has a reward stack Xa,1,Xa,2,…X_{a,1},X_{a,2},\dotsXa,1​,Xa,2​,… of i.i.d. draws from νa\nu_aνa​, all stacks independent, and the nnn-th pull of arm aaa returns Xa,nX_{a,n}Xa,n​. The empirical distribution of the first nnn rewards is ν^a,n=1n∑k=1nδXa,k\hat\nu_{a,n}=\frac1n\sum_{k=1}^n\delta_{X_{a,k}}ν^a,n​=n1​∑k=1n​δXa,k​​, and ν^a(t)=ν^a,Na(t)\hat\nu_a(t)=\hat\nu_{a,N_a(t)}ν^a​(t)=ν^a,Na​(t)​.

The minimal divergence is

Kinf⁡(ν,μ)=inf⁡{KL(ν,ν′):ν′∈F, E(ν′)>μ}∈[0,+∞],\mathcal K_{\inf}(\nu,\mu)=\inf\bigl\{\mathrm{KL}(\nu,\nu'):\nu'\in\mathcal F,\ \mathrm E(\nu')>\mu\bigr\}\in[0,+\infty],Kinf​(ν,μ)=inf{KL(ν,ν′):ν′∈F, E(ν′)>μ}∈[0,+∞],

the smallest Kullback–Leibler divergence from ν\nuν to a distribution of the model whose mean exceeds μ\muμ.

Empirical KL-UCB (Algorithm 3) pulls each arm once, then for t=K,K+1,…t=K,K+1,\dotst=K,K+1,… pulls an arm maximizing

Ua(t)=sup⁡{E(ν):ν∈M1(Supp(ν^a(t))∪{1}), KL(ν^a(t),ν)≤f(t)Na(t)},U_a(t)=\sup\Bigl\{\mathrm E(\nu):\nu\in\mathfrak M_1\bigl(\mathrm{Supp}(\hat\nu_a(t))\cup\{1\}\bigr),\ \mathrm{KL}(\hat\nu_a(t),\nu)\le\frac{f(t)}{N_a(t)}\Bigr\},Ua​(t)=sup{E(ν):ν∈M1​(Supp(ν^a​(t))∪{1}), KL(ν^a​(t),ν)≤Na​(t)f(t)​},

where M1(A)\mathfrak M_1(A)M1​(A) is the set of probability distributions carried by AAA and f(t)=log⁡t+log⁡log⁡tf(t)=\log t+\log\log tf(t)=logt+loglogt. The added point 111 is essential: without it the index is the empirical-likelihood bound, which equals the empirical mean when every observation is 000.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 2 (pp. 15–16)

Assume μa>0\mu_a>0μa​>0 for all arms and μ⋆<1\mu^\star<1μ⋆<1. There is a constant M(νa,μ⋆)>0M(\nu_a,\mu^\star)>0M(νa​,μ⋆)>0 depending only on νa\nu_aνa​ and μ⋆\mu^\starμ⋆ such that, for every suboptimal arm aaa and all T≥3T\ge3T≥3,

E[Na(T)]≤log⁡TKinf⁡(νa,μ⋆)+36(μ⋆)4(log⁡T)4/5log⁡log⁡T+(72(μ⋆)4+2μ⋆(1−μ⋆)Kinf⁡(νa,μ⋆)2)(log⁡T)4/5+(1−μ⋆)2M(νa,μ⋆)2(μ⋆)2(log⁡T)2/5+log⁡log⁡TKinf⁡(νa,μ⋆)+2μ⋆(1−μ⋆)Kinf⁡(νa,μ⋆)2+4.\begin{aligned}\mathbb E[N_a(T)]\le{}&\frac{\log T}{\mathcal K_{\inf}(\nu_a,\mu^\star)}+\frac{36}{(\mu^\star)^4}(\log T)^{4/5}\log\log T+\Bigl(\frac{72}{(\mu^\star)^4}+\frac{2\mu^\star}{(1-\mu^\star)\mathcal K_{\inf}(\nu_a,\mu^\star)^2}\Bigr)(\log T)^{4/5}\\&+\frac{(1-\mu^\star)^2M(\nu_a,\mu^\star)}{2(\mu^\star)^2}(\log T)^{2/5}+\frac{\log\log T}{\mathcal K_{\inf}(\nu_a,\mu^\star)}+\frac{2\mu^\star}{(1-\mu^\star)\mathcal K_{\inf}(\nu_a,\mu^\star)^2}+4.\end{aligned}E[Na​(T)]≤​Kinf​(νa​,μ⋆)logT​+(μ⋆)436​(logT)4/5loglogT+((μ⋆)472​+(1−μ⋆)Kinf​(νa​,μ⋆)22μ⋆​)(logT)4/5+2(μ⋆)2(1−μ⋆)2M(νa​,μ⋆)​(logT)2/5+Kinf​(νa​,μ⋆)loglogT​+(1−μ⋆)Kinf​(νa​,μ⋆)22μ⋆​+4.​

The constants are the paper's. MMM is the one quantity the main text does not give; it is existentially quantified, before the bandit, so it may depend on nothing but (νa,μ⋆)(\nu_a,\mu^\star)(νa​,μ⋆).

Milestones

  1. (7), p. 9: the sets Cμ,γ={ν:∃ν′∈F, E(ν′)>μ, KL(ν,ν′)≤γ}\mathcal C_{\mu,\gamma}=\{\nu:\exists\nu'\in\mathcal F,\ \mathrm E(\nu')>\mu,\ \mathrm{KL}(\nu,\nu')\le\gamma\}Cμ,γ​={ν:∃ν′∈F, E(ν′)>μ, KL(ν,ν′)≤γ} satisfy Cμ,γ⊆{ν:Kinf⁡(ν,μ)≤γ}\mathcal C_{\mu,\gamma}\subseteq\{\nu:\mathcal K_{\inf}(\nu,\mu)\le\gamma\}Cμ,γ​⊆{ν:Kinf​(ν,μ)≤γ}.
  2. (5), p. 9: the decomposition {At+1=a}⊆{μ†≥Ua⋆(t)}∪{μ†<Ua(t), At+1=a}\{A_{t+1}=a\}\subseteq\{\mu^\dagger\ge U_{a^\star}(t)\}\cup\{\mu^\dagger<U_a(t),\ A_{t+1}=a\}{At+1​=a}⊆{μ†≥Ua⋆​(t)}∪{μ†<Ua​(t), At+1​=a}.
  3. The display after (7), p. 9: E[Na(T)]≤1+∑t=KT−1P{μ†≥Ua⋆(t)}+∑t=KT−1P{ν^a,Na(t)∈Cμ†,f(t)/Na(t), At+1=a}\mathbb E[N_a(T)]\le1+\sum_{t=K}^{T-1}\mathbb P\{\mu^\dagger\ge U_{a^\star}(t)\}+\sum_{t=K}^{T-1}\mathbb P\{\hat\nu_{a,N_a(t)}\in\mathcal C_{\mu^\dagger,f(t)/N_a(t)},\ A_{t+1}=a\}E[Na​(T)]≤1+∑t=KT−1​P{μ†≥Ua⋆​(t)}+∑t=KT−1​P{ν^a,Na​(t)​∈Cμ†,f(t)/Na​(t)​, At+1​=a}.
  4. (8), p. 10: the second sum is at most ∑n=1T−KP{ν^a,n∈Cμ†,f(T)/n}\sum_{n=1}^{T-K}\mathbb P\{\hat\nu_{a,n}\in\mathcal C_{\mu^\dagger,f(T)/n}\}∑n=1T−K​P{ν^a,n​∈Cμ†,f(T)/n​}.
  5. (9)–(10), p. 10: E[Na(T)]≤f(T)/Kinf⁡(νa,μ⋆)+∑n>n0P{ν^a,n∈Cμ†,f(T)/n}+∑tP{μ†≥Ua⋆(t)}+2\mathbb E[N_a(T)]\le f(T)/\mathcal K_{\inf}(\nu_a,\mu^\star)+\sum_{n>n_0}\mathbb P\{\hat\nu_{a,n}\in\mathcal C_{\mu^\dagger,f(T)/n}\}+\sum_t\mathbb P\{\mu^\dagger\ge U_{a^\star}(t)\}+2E[Na​(T)]≤f(T)/Kinf​(νa​,μ⋆)+∑n>n0​​P{ν^a,n​∈Cμ†,f(T)/n​}+∑t​P{μ†≥Ua⋆​(t)}+2 with n0=⌈f(T)/Kinf⁡(νa,μ⋆)⌉n_0=\lceil f(T)/\mathcal K_{\inf}(\nu_a,\mu^\star)\rceiln0​=⌈f(T)/Kinf​(νa​,μ⋆)⌉.
  6. p. 15: the supremum defining Ua(t)U_a(t)Ua​(t) over F\mathcal FF equals the supremum over M1(Supp(ν^a(t))∪{1})\mathfrak M_1(\mathrm{Supp}(\hat\nu_a(t))\cup\{1\})M1​(Supp(ν^a​(t))∪{1}).
  7. Implicit in Theorem 2: 0<Kinf⁡(ν,μ)<∞0<\mathcal K_{\inf}(\nu,\mu)<\infty0<Kinf​(ν,μ)<∞ for ν∈F\nu\in\mathcal Fν∈F and E(ν)<μ<1\mathrm E(\nu)<\mu<1E(ν)<μ<1.
  8. Proposition 1, p. 20: for nnn i.i.d. observations from any ν0\nu_0ν0​ on [0,1][0,1][0,1] with E(ν0)∈(0,1)\mathrm E(\nu_0)\in(0,1)E(ν0​)∈(0,1) and every ε>0\varepsilon>0ε>0,
P{U(ν^n,ε)≤E(ν0)}≤P{Kinf⁡(ν^n,E(ν0))≥ε}≤e(n+2)exp⁡(−nε).\mathbb P\{U(\hat\nu_n,\varepsilon)\le\mathrm E(\nu_0)\}\le\mathbb P\{\mathcal K_{\inf}(\hat\nu_n,\mathrm E(\nu_0))\ge\varepsilon\}\le e(n+2)\exp(-n\varepsilon).P{U(ν^n​,ε)≤E(ν0​)}≤P{Kinf​(ν^n​,E(ν0​))≥ε}≤e(n+2)exp(−nε).

Significance

Theorem 2 gives a finite-time bound whose leading term, log⁡T/Kinf⁡(νa,μ⋆)\log T/\mathcal K_{\inf}(\nu_a,\mu^\star)logT/Kinf​(νa​,μ⋆), equals the Burnetas–Katehakis lower bound for the model F\mathcal FF. Hence empirical KL-UCB is asymptotically optimal among all strategies for finitely supported rewards in [0,1][0,1][0,1], and the regret ∑a(μ⋆−μa)E[Na(T)]\sum_a(\mu^\star-\mu_a)\mathbb E[N_a(T)]∑a​(μ⋆−μa​)E[Na​(T)] inherits the optimal constant. Since Kinf⁡(νa,μ⋆)\mathcal K_{\inf}(\nu_a,\mu^\star)Kinf​(νa​,μ⋆) is at least the Bernoulli divergence of the means, and usually larger, the bound improves on kl-UCB and UCB for the same rewards. Proposition 1 is a non-asymptotic coverage bound for the empirical-likelihood upper confidence bound with the point 111 added, valid for every law on [0,1][0,1][0,1], not only finitely supported ones.

The proofs of Theorem 2 and Proposition 1 are in the paper's supplemental article (Appendix B), not in the main text; no machine-checked proof of either exists. The mission produces formal statements of the theorem and of the proof skeleton (5)–(10) that the paper shares with Theorem 1, and of the two facts about Kinf⁡\mathcal K_{\inf}Kinf​ that the bound needs. A formal proof would supply an explicit M(νa,μ⋆)M(\nu_a,\mu^\star)M(νa​,μ⋆), which the paper defines only inside the supplement.

Difficulty

The skeleton (5)–(10) is elementary bookkeeping; the difficulty lies in the two sums it leaves, both of which must be shown to be o(log⁡T)o(\log T)o(logT) with explicit constants. The second, ∑nP{ν^a,n∈Cμ†,f(T)/n}\sum_n\mathbb P\{\hat\nu_{a,n}\in\mathcal C_{\mu^\dagger,f(T)/n}\}∑n​P{ν^a,n​∈Cμ†,f(T)/n​}, needs a deviation estimate for the empirical Kinf⁡\mathcal K_{\inf}Kinf​ of a suboptimal arm that is precise enough to keep the leading constant 1/Kinf⁡(νa,μ⋆)1/\mathcal K_{\inf}(\nu_a,\mu^\star)1/Kinf​(νa​,μ⋆): a bound that only controls the deviation of the empirical mean loses it, since Kinf⁡\mathcal K_{\inf}Kinf​ depends on the whole distribution. The first, ∑tP{μ†≥Ua⋆(t)}\sum_t\mathbb P\{\mu^\dagger\ge U_{a^\star}(t)\}∑t​P{μ†≥Ua⋆​(t)}, concerns the optimal arm after a random number of pulls Na⋆(t)N_{a^\star}(t)Na⋆​(t), which the algorithm itself determines, so fixed-sample bounds such as Proposition 1 do not apply directly. Both need regularity of Kinf⁡\mathcal K_{\inf}Kinf​ as a function of a distribution in an infinite-dimensional model, where none of the closed forms of the exponential-family case is available.

Formalization scope

Arms are Fin K, and arm aaa of the paper is index a−1a-1a−1. The bandit is the platform's stack-of-rewards model RegretBandits.Stochastic.IsStochasticBandit: Xa,kX_{a,k}Xa,k​ (indexed from 000) are independent, identically distributed within each arm, with mean μa\mu_aμa​. Pull counts and μ⋆\mu^\starμ⋆ are the platform's pullCount and bestMean. Added to the page, and disclosed in each statement: every reward lies in [0,1][0,1][0,1] pathwise (a representation of "νa\nu_aνa​ is carried by [0,1][0,1][0,1]"), every arm choice is measurable, and in the goal the strategy is non-anticipating (At+1A_{t+1}At+1​ is measurable with respect to the arms and rewards of rounds 1,…,t1,\dots,t1,…,t). A run of Algorithm 3 is a pathwise predicate: rounds 1,…,K1,\dots,K1,…,K pull distinct arms, and every later round pulls a maximizer of U⋅(t)U_\cdot(t)U⋅​(t), with ties broken by any rule. KL is Mathlib's InformationTheory.klDiv in [0,+∞][0,+\infty][0,+∞], with the empirical distribution as first argument. Kinf⁡\mathcal K_{\inf}Kinf​ is kept in [0,+∞][0,+\infty][0,+∞] and converted to a real number only in the final bounds, where it is finite and positive. Probabilities of events whose measurability is not asserted are outer probabilities. The page's ∑n≥n0+1\sum_{n\ge n_0+1}∑n≥n0​+1​ in (10) is stated as the finite sum over n0<n≤T−Kn_0<n\le T-Kn0​<n≤T−K that (8) produces. The probability space of Theorem 2 lies in Type.

Trivializing formalizations are ruled out. The index is a supremum over a set that is nonempty (it contains E(ν^a(t))\mathrm E(\hat\nu_a(t))E(ν^a​(t))) and bounded above, so it is never Lean's junk value. Kinf⁡\mathcal K_{\inf}Kinf​ and Cμ,γ\mathcal C_{\mu,\gamma}Cμ,γ​ range over F\mathcal FF, not over all measures. The run predicate has both the initialization and the argmax clause. MMM is quantified before the bandit and the horizon.

Reusable beyond this mission: Kinf⁡\mathcal K_{\inf}Kinf​ for F\mathcal FF, the empirical-likelihood bound UUU of (15), and Proposition 1, a concentration inequality for empirical Kinf⁡\mathcal K_{\inf}Kinf​ that applies to any bounded i.i.d. sample. Proofs of any milestone are welcome, as are proofs of the skeleton (5)–(10) that also apply to the companion kl-UCB mission.

Selected references

  • O. Cappé, A. Garivier, O.-A. Maillard, R. Munos, G. Stoltz, Kullback–Leibler upper confidence bounds for optimal sequential allocation, Ann. Statist. 41(3):1516–1541, 2013. arXiv:1210.1136v4, doi:10.1214/13-AOS1119; supplement doi:10.1214/13-AOS1119SUPP.
  • T. L. Lai, H. Robbins, Asymptotically efficient adaptive allocation rules, Adv. Appl. Math. 6(1):4–22, 1985. doi:10.1016/0196-8858(85)90002-8
  • A. N. Burnetas, M. N. Katehakis, Optimal adaptive policies for sequential allocation problems, Adv. Appl. Math. 17(2):122–142, 1996. doi:10.1006/aama.1996.0007
  • J. Honda, A. Takemura, An asymptotically optimal bandit algorithm for bounded support models, COLT 2010, 67–79.
  • P. Auer, N. Cesa-Bianchi, P. Fischer, Finite-time analysis of the multiarmed bandit problem, Mach. Learn. 47:235–256, 2002. doi:10.1023/A:1013689704352
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Algorithmic Game TheoryOperations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

Revenue Management with Forward-Looking Buyers: Under Weakly Decreasing Demand the Deterministic Optimal Cutoffs Fall over Time and Satisfy One-Period Look-AheadResearch Paper

Motivation

Retailers of seasonal goods (fashion, electronics, airline seats) sell a fixed stock over a finite season to customers who arrive over time, and those customers know that prices may fall. A customer who expects a markdown waits, and a seller who ignores this loses revenue. The classical revenue-management literature (Gallego and van Ryzin 1994; Talluri and van Ryzin 2004) models myopic customers who buy on arrival or leave; the literature on forward-looking (strategic) buyers, for instance Aviv and Pazgal (2008), studies particular price paths.

Board and Skrzypacz ask the mechanism-design question: among all selling schemes, which maximizes the seller's expected discounted revenue when buyers arrive over time, have private values and time their purchases strategically? Their answer, published in the Journal of Political Economy in 2016, is that the optimal mechanism has a simple structure: in every period the seller sells to the highest remaining buyer if and only if his value exceeds a cutoff that depends only on the period and the number of units left. When demand is weakly decreasing over time, the cutoffs are characterized by one-period indifference conditions, which in the continuous-time limit can be implemented by posted prices. The source used here is the authors' accepted manuscript of February 6, 2015; all page numbers refer to that manuscript.

Setting

A seller has units of a good and sells them over periods t∈{1,…,T}t\in\{1,\dots,T\}t∈{1,…,T}; unsold units are worth zero after period TTT. Payoffs are discounted by δ∈(0,1)\delta\in(0,1)δ∈(0,1). At the start of period ttt a random number NtN_tNt​ of buyers arrives, independently across periods, with a law that may depend on ttt. Each buyer wants one unit; his value is drawn independently from a distribution with continuous density fff, distribution function FFF and support [v‾,vˉ][\underline v,\bar v][v​,vˉ]. The marginal revenue of a buyer with value vvv is

m(v)=v−1−F(v)f(v),m(v)=v-\frac{1-F(v)}{f(v)},m(v)=v−f(v)1−F(v)​,

assumed strictly increasing and continuously differentiable, with m(v‾)<0m(\underline v)<0m(v​)<0.

By the standard mechanism-design reduction (§2.1, eq. (2.5)), the seller's problem is to choose when to serve each buyer so as to maximize the expected discounted sum of the served buyers' marginal revenues. The state in period ttt, after the period-ttt entrants have arrived, is the number kkk of units left and the values y1≥y2≥⋯y^1\ge y^2\ge\cdotsy1≥y2≥⋯ of the buyers present. The value Πtk\Pi^k_tΠtk​ and the pre-entry value Π~tk\tilde\Pi^k_{t}Π~tk​ satisfy the Bellman equation (4.3):

Πtk(y)=max⁡0≤j≤k[∑i=1jm(yi)+δ Π~t+1k−j(y−j)],Π~t+1k(y)=Et+1[Πt+1k(y∪vt+1)],\Pi^k_t(\mathbf y)=\max_{0\le j\le k}\Big[\sum_{i=1}^j m(y^i)+\delta\,\tilde\Pi^{k-j}_{t+1}(\mathbf y^{-j})\Big],\qquad \tilde\Pi^k_{t+1}(\mathbf y)=E_{t+1}\big[\Pi^k_{t+1}(\mathbf y\cup\mathbf v_{t+1})\big],Πtk​(y)=0≤j≤kmax​[i=1∑j​m(yi)+δΠ~t+1k−j​(y−j)],Π~t+1k​(y)=Et+1​[Πt+1k​(y∪vt+1​)],

where y−j\mathbf y^{-j}y−j is the set of buyers left after the jjj highest are served and vt+1\mathbf v_{t+1}vt+1​ the next period's entrants. Selling one unit to y1y^1y1 today rather than none gives the difference function

ΔΠtk(y1,y−1)=m(y1)+δΠ~t+1k−1(y−1)−δΠ~t+1k(y1,y−1),\Delta\Pi^k_t(y^1,\mathbf y^{-1})=m(y^1)+\delta\tilde\Pi^{k-1}_{t+1}(\mathbf y^{-1})-\delta\tilde\Pi^k_{t+1}(y^1,\mathbf y^{-1}),ΔΠtk​(y1,y−1)=m(y1)+δΠ~t+1k−1​(y−1)−δΠ~t+1k​(y1,y−1),

and the cutoff xtkx^k_txtk​ is the smallest y∈[v‾,vˉ]y\in[\underline v,\bar v]y∈[v​,vˉ] with ΔΠtk(y,∅)≥0\Delta\Pi^k_t(y,\varnothing)\ge 0ΔΠtk​(y,∅)≥0. Comparing selling to y1y^1y1 today with waiting and selling at least one unit tomorrow (to the best of y1y^1y1 and the entrants) gives DΠtk(y1)D\Pi^k_t(y^1)DΠtk​(y1) (p. 17). Demand is weakly decreasing in the usual stochastic order if P(Nt+1>x)≤P(Nt>x)P(N_{t+1}>x)\le P(N_t>x)P(Nt+1​>x)≤P(Nt​>x) for all xxx and ttt.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 2 (p. 17)

If NtN_tNt​ is weakly decreasing in the usual stochastic order then, for every k≥1k\ge 1k≥1,

xt+1k≤xtk(1≤t≤T−1),DΠtk(xtk)=0,x^k_{t+1}\le x^k_t\quad(1\le t\le T-1),\qquad D\Pi^k_t(x^k_t)=0,xt+1k​≤xtk​(1≤t≤T−1),DΠtk​(xtk​)=0,

and xtkx^k_txtk​ is the unique root of DΠtkD\Pi^k_tDΠtk​ in [v‾,vˉ][\underline v,\bar v][v​,vˉ] for t≤T−1t\le T-1t≤T−1: the seller is indifferent between selling to the cutoff type today and waiting one period to sell that unit tomorrow (the one-period-look-ahead property).

Central milestone: Theorem 1 (p. 15)

For every ttt and k≥1k\ge 1k≥1, the optimal rule sells to the highest buyer iff y1≥xtky^1\ge x^k_ty1≥xtk​, whatever the values of the lower buyers; xtk+1≤xtkx^{k+1}_t\le x^k_txtk+1​≤xtk​; and xtkx^k_txtk​ is the unique root of ΔΠtk\Delta\Pi^k_tΔΠtk​.

Milestones

In attack order:

  1. Lemma 1: allocations are monotone in values.
  2. Lemma 2: with cutoffs decreasing in the unit index, units can be treated one at a time.
  3. Equation (A.1): increasing differences of Π\PiΠ.
  4. Lemma 3: ΔΠ\Delta\PiΔΠ is independent of lower buyers, continuous and strictly increasing in y1y^1y1, and increasing in kkk.
  5. Footnote 12: the boundary values of ΔΠ\Delta\PiΔΠ.
  6. Theorem 1.
  7. Strict monotonicity of DΠD\PiDΠ in y1y^1y1 (p. 18).
  8. Lemma 4: DΠt+1k≥DΠtkD\Pi^k_{t+1}\ge D\Pi^k_tDΠt+1k​≥DΠtk​.

After the goal, (4.7) gives the period-(T−1)(T-1)(T−1) cutoff equation m(xT−1k)=δET[max⁡{m(xT−1k),m(vTk)}]m(x^k_{T-1})=\delta E_T[\max\{m(x^k_{T-1}),m(v^k_T)\}]m(xT−1k​)=δET​[max{m(xT−1k​),m(vTk​)}].

Significance

Theorem 1 says that the optimal allocation does not depend on how many buyers are present or what their values are, only on time and inventory. This is what makes the optimal mechanism implementable without eliciting values from buyers as they arrive. Theorem 2 turns the global dynamic program into local indifference conditions. In the continuous-time limit (§5 of the paper) these become differential equations, and the optimum is implemented by posted prices with an auction at the end of the season. Under weakly decreasing demand, therefore, the classical revenue-management practice of posting prices loses nothing against the best possible mechanism.

The paper's results are proved, in prose, with envelope-theorem and coupling arguments. They have not been machine-checked. A formal development would produce a verified backward-induction model of multi-unit dynamic allocation with random arrivals, with the structural results (monotonicity, deterministic cutoffs, monotone comparative statics in inventory and time) that recur across dynamic pricing and optimal stopping. Two printed gaps are recorded below: the positivity of m(vˉ)m(\bar v)m(vˉ), and the restriction of footnote 12 to t≤T−1t\le T-1t≤T−1.

Difficulty

The obvious argument fails at "deterministic". A priori the cutoff for the highest buyer depends on the values of the lower buyers, because selling a unit today changes which of them will be served later and when. Lemma 3(a) holds only under the induction hypothesis that all future cutoffs are already deterministic and decreasing in inventory, so Lemma 3, Theorem 1 and (A.1) form a single backward induction over periods and units, and none of them can be proved in isolation. The value function is an expectation, over a random number of i.i.d. entrants, of a maximum over sorted values, so continuity and strict monotonicity in y1y^1y1 (Lemma 3(b), and the same for DΠD\PiDΠ) are not available from general facts. The tempting argument for Theorem 2, that cutoffs fall over time simply because fewer buyers arrive later, is incomplete: Lemma 4 has to compare two periods with different arrival laws and different future cutoffs at once.

Formalization scope

Periods are natural numbers 1,…,T1,\dots,T1,…,T with T≥1T\ge1T≥1, and units are natural numbers. Values, marginal revenues and profits are real numbers. The buyers present form a finite multiset of reals, and an absent buyer is absent, never a value 000. The value law is the measure with density fff; the density is positive and continuous on [v‾,vˉ][\underline v,\bar v][v​,vˉ] and zero outside, and mmm is defined from fff and FFF. Expectations over a cohort are lower Lebesgue integrals against ∑nP(Nt=n) μ⊗n\sum_n P(N_t=n)\,\mu^{\otimes n}∑n​P(Nt​=n)μ⊗n of nonnegative bounded quantities, so no non-measurable or non-integrable integrand can silently become 000. The value function is defined by the Bellman equation (4.3), with ΠT+1≡0\Pi_{T+1}\equiv0ΠT+1​≡0. The sequence problem (4.1) over purchase times is not formalized; the paper says either may be used (footnote 16).

Standing assumptions and handled gaps:

  • δ∈(0,1)\delta\in(0,1)δ∈(0,1);
  • NtN_tNt​ independent across periods (only the marginal laws enter);
  • mmm strictly increasing and C1C^1C1 on [v‾,vˉ][\underline v,\bar v][v​,vˉ] with m(v‾)<0m(\underline v)<0m(v​)<0;
  • added: m(vˉ)>0m(\bar v)>0m(vˉ)>0, which footnote 12 uses without stating; without it no unit is ever sold and no cutoff exists;
  • added: f>0f>0f>0 on the closed support, needed for mmm to be defined there;
  • footnote 12's equality ΔΠtk(vˉ)=(1−δ)m(vˉ)\Delta\Pi^k_t(\bar v)=(1-\delta)m(\bar v)ΔΠtk​(vˉ)=(1−δ)m(vˉ) is stated for t≤T−1t\le T-1t≤T−1 only, since ΔΠTk=m\Delta\Pi^k_T=mΔΠTk​=m;
  • DΠtkD\Pi^k_tDΠtk​ is used only for t≤T−1t\le T-1t≤T−1, and Lemma 4 needs t+1≤T−1t+1\le T-1t+1≤T−1;
  • "decreasing" and "increasing" are weak except in Lemma 3(b) and for DΠD\PiDΠ;
  • at y1=xtky^1=x^k_ty1=xtk​ both selling and waiting are optimal.

The cutoff is defined from ΔΠ\Delta\PiΔΠ, never as the threshold of an optimal policy, and "optimal" always means maximal in (4.3) over every number of units sold. A formalization that postulates a threshold policy, replaces the random cohort by its mean, or sets absent buyers to value 000 would trivialize or change the statements and is ruled out. The mechanism-design reduction (IC/IR to (2.5)) and the continuous-time results of §5 are out of scope.

The usual stochastic order is the published platform definition StochasticOrders.Usual.UsualOrder. A complete development needs finite-horizon dynamic programming over multisets, expectations of functions of sorted i.i.d. samples, envelope arguments, and monotone coupling for the usual stochastic order on N\mathbb NN; these parts are reusable beyond this mission. Proofs of any milestone are welcome, as is a proof that (4.3) agrees with the sequence problem (4.1).

Selected references

  • S. Board and A. Skrzypacz, Revenue Management with Forward-Looking Buyers, Journal of Political Economy 124(4), 2016. https://doi.org/10.1086/686713
  • R. B. Myerson, Optimal Auction Design, Mathematics of Operations Research 6(1), 1981. https://doi.org/10.1287/moor.6.1.58
  • G. Gallego and G. van Ryzin, Optimal Dynamic Pricing of Inventories with Stochastic Demand over Finite Horizons, Management Science 40(8), 1994. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.40.8.999
  • Y. Aviv and A. Pazgal, Optimal Pricing of Seasonal Products in the Presence of Forward-Looking Consumers, Manufacturing & Service Operations Management 10(3), 2008. https://doi.org/10.1287/msom.1070.0183
  • K. T. Talluri and G. J. van Ryzin, The Theory and Practice of Revenue Management, Springer, 2004. https://doi.org/10.1007/b139000
  • M. Shaked and J. G. Shanthikumar, Stochastic Orders, Springer, 2007. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-0-387-34675-5
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Operations ResearchOptimization·Captain: mikedeng1

On the Power of Robust Solutions in Two-Stage Stochastic and Adaptive Optimization Problems 1: For Symmetric Right-Hand-Side Uncertainty, the Robust Optimum Is at Most Twice the Stochastic OptimumResearch Paper

Motivation

Many planning problems are made in two stages: a first decision xxx (capacity, inventory, a network design) is fixed before an uncertain demand is revealed, and a second decision yyy (recourse, routing, overtime) is taken afterwards. Two-stage stochastic optimization models the demand as random and minimizes expected cost; its second stage is a whole policy ω↦y(ω)\omega\mapsto y(\omega)ω↦y(ω), and the problem is intractable in general, especially with integer variables (Dyer and Stougie, 2006). Robust optimization instead picks one static pair (x,y)(x,y)(x,y) that is feasible for every possible demand and minimizes its worst-case cost; it is a single deterministic mixed-integer program and needs no knowledge of the distribution (Ben-Tal and Nemirovski, 2002; Bertsimas and Sim, 2004).

The question this mission addresses is how much is lost by solving the robust problem in place of the stochastic one. Bertsimas and Goyal (Math. Oper. Res. 2010) show that when only the right-hand side is uncertain, the uncertainty set is symmetric and the distribution is centred at its point of symmetry, the loss is at most a factor of two, and that this factor is tight.

Setting

Fix A∈Rm×n1A\in\mathbb R^{m\times n_1}A∈Rm×n1​, B∈Rm×n2B\in\mathbb R^{m\times n_2}B∈Rm×n2​ and nonnegative costs c∈R+n1c\in\mathbb R^{n_1}_+c∈R+n1​​, d∈R+n2d\in\mathbb R^{n_2}_+d∈R+n2​​. A set Ω\OmegaΩ of scenarios carries a probability measure μ\muμ, and each scenario ω\omegaω has a right-hand side b(ω)∈R+mb(\omega)\in\mathbb R^m_+b(ω)∈R+m​. The uncertainty set is Ib(Ω)={b(ω):ω∈Ω}\mathcal I_b(\Omega)=\{b(\omega):\omega\in\Omega\}Ib​(Ω)={b(ω):ω∈Ω}. First-stage variables are nonnegative, with integer values on a designated set of coordinates; second-stage variables are nonnegative reals (p2=0p_2=0p2​=0).

The stochastic problem ΠStoch(b)\Pi_{\mathrm{Stoch}}(b)ΠStoch​(b), (1.1), chooses xxx and a policy y(⋅)y(\cdot)y(⋅):

zStoch(b)=inf⁡ cTx+Eμ[dTy(ω)]s.t.Ax+By(ω)≥b(ω)  ∀ω∈Ω.z_{\mathrm{Stoch}}(b)=\inf\ c^Tx+\mathbb E_\mu[d^Ty(\omega)]\quad\text{s.t.}\quad Ax+By(\omega)\ge b(\omega)\ \ \forall\omega\in\Omega .zStoch​(b)=inf cTx+Eμ​[dTy(ω)]s.t.Ax+By(ω)≥b(ω)  ∀ω∈Ω.

The robust problem ΠRob(b)\Pi_{\mathrm{Rob}}(b)ΠRob​(b), (1.2), chooses one yyy for all scenarios:

zRob(b)=inf⁡ cTx+dTys.t.Ax+By≥b(ω)  ∀ω∈Ω.z_{\mathrm{Rob}}(b)=\inf\ c^Tx+d^Ty\quad\text{s.t.}\quad Ax+By\ge b(\omega)\ \ \forall\omega\in\Omega .zRob​(b)=inf cTx+dTys.t.Ax+By≥b(ω)  ∀ω∈Ω.

A set PPP is symmetric (Definition 1.2) if there is u0∈Pu^0\in Pu0∈P with u0+z∈P  ⟺  u0−z∈Pu^0+z\in P\iff u^0-z\in Pu0+z∈P⟺u0−z∈P for all zzz; u0u^0u0 is its point of symmetry. Hypercubes, ellipsoids and norm balls are symmetric. A probability measure on a symmetric set is symmetric (Definition 1.4) if it gives a set and its reflection {2u0−x}\{2u^0-x\}{2u0−x} the same mass.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 2.1 (p. 10)

If Ib(Ω)\mathcal I_b(\Omega)Ib​(Ω) is symmetric with point of symmetry b(ω0)b(\omega^0)b(ω0), p2=0p_2=0p2​=0, and μ\muμ satisfies

Eμ[b(ω)] ≥ b(ω0)(2.1)\mathbb E_\mu[b(\omega)]\ \ge\ b(\omega^0)\qquad(2.1)Eμ​[b(ω)] ≥ b(ω0)(2.1)

then

zRob(b) ≤ 2⋅zStoch(b).z_{\mathrm{Rob}}(b)\ \le\ 2\cdot z_{\mathrm{Stoch}}(b).zRob​(b) ≤ 2⋅zStoch​(b).

Milestones on the way

  • Lemma 2.2 (p. 12): the coordinatewise bounding box HHH of a symmetric set SSS is the smallest hypercube containing SSS.
  • Lemma 2.3 (p. 12): the centre x0x^0x0 of HHH is the point of symmetry of SSS, and x≤2x0x\le 2x^0x≤2x0 on SSS when S⊆R+nS\subseteq\mathbb R^n_+S⊆R+n​.
  • Eqs. (2.9)–(2.10) (p. 13): if (x,y)(x,y)(x,y) covers b(ω0)b(\omega^0)b(ω0) then (2x,2y)(2x,2y)(2x,2y) covers every b(ω)b(\omega)b(ω), so it is robust feasible.
  • p. 14 display: under (2.1), the mean second-stage decision Eμ[y(ω)]\mathbb E_\mu[y(\omega)]Eμ​[y(ω)] covers b(ω0)b(\omega^0)b(ω0).
  • Lemma 2.1 (p. 11): a symmetric probability measure has mean u0u^0u0, so it satisfies (2.1).
  • Theorem 2.7 (p. 21): the same bound zRob(b)≤2 zStoch(b)z_{\mathrm{Rob}}(b)\le 2\,z_{\mathrm{Stoch}}(b)zRob​(b)≤2zStoch​(b) when Ib(Ω)\mathcal I_b(\Omega)Ib​(Ω) is convex and positive (contained in a symmetric subset of R+m\mathbb R^m_+R+m​ whose centre lies in Ib(Ω)\mathcal I_b(\Omega)Ib​(Ω)).

Significance

The result. The robust problem is one mixed-integer program, independent of μ\muμ; the stochastic problem optimizes over policies and requires the distribution. Theorem 2.1 says that under symmetry the static robust solution (x,y)(x,y)(x,y) used in every scenario is a 2-approximation of the optimal expected cost, for every centred distribution at once. The companion results of the paper show the hypotheses matter: the bound is tight for symmetric sets, the gap is unbounded (at least n+1n+1n+1) on the non-symmetric simplex (Theorem 2.6), and unbounded when costs are uncertain as well (Theorem 3.1). The theorem also underlies later work on the power of static and affine policies in adaptive optimization (Bertsimas and Goyal, 2012).

Formalizing it. The theorem and its proof are published; nothing in this mission is open mathematics. To our knowledge none of these statements has a machine-checked proof. The mission produces a reusable Lean model of two-stage stochastic and robust mixed-integer covering problems with arbitrary scenario spaces, extended-real optimal values and genuine expectations, together with the elementary geometry of point-symmetric sets. The same objects are used by the other missions of this series (the simplex and cost-uncertainty gaps, and the adaptability gap).

Difficulty

Each step of the published argument is short; the difficulty is in stating it at the right generality. The paper begins "consider an optimal solution" of ΠStoch(b)\Pi_{\mathrm{Stoch}}(b)ΠStoch​(b); optimal policies need not exist for an arbitrary scenario space, so the statement is about infima and every step must work for an arbitrary feasible pair. Passing from "Ax+By(ω)≥b(ω)Ax+By(\omega)\ge b(\omega)Ax+By(ω)≥b(ω) for all ω\omegaω" to "Ax+B Eμ[y]≥Eμ[b]Ax+B\,\mathbb E_\mu[y]\ge\mathbb E_\mu[b]Ax+BEμ​[y]≥Eμ​[b]" needs integrability of the policy and of bbb and linearity of the Bochner integral through a matrix. The bound b(ω)≤2b(ω0)b(\omega)\le 2b(\omega^0)b(ω)≤2b(ω0) uses symmetry together with nonnegativity of the uncertainty set; symmetry alone does not give it. Integrality of the second stage breaks the argument, since Eμ[y(ω)]\mathbb E_\mu[y(\omega)]Eμ​[y(ω)] need not be integral.

Formalization scope

  • Vectors are Fin k → ℝ with the componentwise order, products A *ᵥ x and inner products c ⬝ᵥ x. The mixed-integer domain is "nonnegative with integer values on a set III of coordinates", which is the paper's R+n−p×Z+p\mathbb R^{n-p}_+\times\mathbb Z^p_+R+n−p​×Z+p​ up to relabelling.
  • Ω\OmegaΩ is an arbitrary measurable space with a probability measure; Ib(Ω)\mathcal I_b(\Omega)Ib​(Ω) is Set.range b. Constraints hold for every scenario, not almost surely.
  • Second-stage policies are μ\muμ-integrable, and bbb is μ\muμ-integrable in every statement that uses (2.1). Without these, Lean's integral of a non-integrable function is 000 and (2.1) would degenerate.
  • zStochz_{\mathrm{Stoch}}zStoch​ and zRobz_{\mathrm{Rob}}zRob​ are infima in EReal, equal to +∞+\infty+∞ when infeasible; no attainment is assumed. A real-valued infimum would return 000 on an infeasible robust problem and make the goal trivial; that formalization is ruled out.
  • The bounding box of (2.5)–(2.7) uses suprema and infima, with boundedness assumed where needed.
  • Corrections to the page: Lemma 2.3's inequality x≤2x0x\le 2x^0x≤2x0 is stated under S⊆R+nS\subseteq\mathbb R^n_+S⊆R+n​, which its proof uses and which holds in every application; Lemma 2.1 assumes the measure has a mean; Theorem 2.7 carries the standing assumption p2=0p_2=0p2​=0 of §2.

Contributions welcome: proofs of the milestones and the goal, and general lemmas on point-symmetric sets and on interchanging Bochner integrals with matrix–vector products, both reusable outside this mission.

Selected references

  • D. Bertsimas, V. Goyal, On the power of robust solutions in two-stage stochastic and adaptive optimization problems, Mathematics of Operations Research 35(2), 2010. https://doi.org/10.1287/moor.1090.0440 (cited from the authors' manuscript, MIT DSpace)
  • A. Ben-Tal, A. Nemirovski, Robust optimization — methodology and applications, Mathematical Programming 92, 2002. https://doi.org/10.1007/s101070100286
  • D. Bertsimas, M. Sim, The price of robustness, Operations Research 52(1), 2004. https://doi.org/10.1287/opre.1030.0065
  • M. Dyer, L. Stougie, Computational complexity of stochastic programming problems, Mathematical Programming 106, 2006. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10107-005-0578-0
  • D. Bertsimas, V. Goyal, On the power and limitations of affine policies in two-stage adaptive optimization, Mathematical Programming 134, 2012. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10107-011-0444-4
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Operations ResearchOptimization·Captain: mikedeng1

Airline Seat Allocation with Multiple Nested Fare Classes 1: Protection Levels Solving f₁Pr[X₁ > p₁ ∩ … ∩ X₁ + … + X_k > p_k] = f_{k+1} Maximize Expected RevenueResearch Paper

Motivation

An airline sells the seats of one flight leg at several fares. Cheaper fares are booked earlier, so the airline must decide, while low-fare requests arrive, how many seats to hold back for later and more valuable passengers. In nested booking control a seat that could be sold at a low fare is always available to a higher fare. The airline therefore chooses protection levels: pkp_kpk​ seats are reserved for the kkk most expensive classes together, and a request of class k+1k+1k+1 is accepted only while more than pkp_kpk​ seats remain.

For two classes the optimal protection level was found by Littlewood (1972): protect p1p_1p1​ seats, where f1Pr⁡[X1>p1]=f2f_1 \Pr[X_1 > p_1] = f_2f1​Pr[X1​>p1​]=f2​. For more classes the industry used the EMSRa heuristic of Belobaba (1987, 1989), which applies Littlewood's rule to each pair of classes separately and adds the results. Brumelle and McGill (1993) gave the exact optimality conditions for any number of nested classes and showed that EMSRa is in general not optimal. Their conditions are part of the standard theory of single-leg revenue management, as presented in Talluri and van Ryzin (2004).

Setting

There are fare classes k=1,2,…k = 1, 2, \dotsk=1,2,…, numbered from the highest fare. Class kkk has fare fkf_kfk​ and random demand Xk≥0X_k \ge 0Xk​≥0. The standing assumptions (pp. 128–129) are: the demands are mutually independent random variables on a probability space (Ω,F,P)(\Omega, \mathcal F, P)(Ω,F,P), and the fares are strictly decreasing, f1>f2>⋯f_1 > f_2 > \cdotsf1​>f2​>⋯. Demands arrive in order of increasing fare: all of class k+1k+1k+1 before any of class kkk. There are no cancellations or no-shows, and the decision to close a class depends only on the number of current bookings.

A protection-level policy is a vector p=(p1,p2,… )p = (p_1, p_2, \dots)p=(p1​,p2​,…) with pk≥0p_k \ge 0pk​≥0; the dummy p0=0p_0 = 0p0​=0. The revenue Rk[s;p;x]R_k[s; p; x]Rk​[s;p;x] of the kkk highest classes with sss seats available and demand vector xxx is defined recursively by (8)–(9), p. 130:

R1[s;p;x]=f1min⁡(s,x1),R_1[s; p; x] = f_1 \min(s, x_1),R1​[s;p;x]=f1​min(s,x1​), Rk+1[s;p;x]={Rk[s;p;x]0≤s<pk,(s−pk)fk+1+Rk[pk;p;x]pk≤s<pk+xk+1,xk+1fk+1+Rk[s−xk+1;p;x]pk+xk+1≤s.R_{k+1}[s; p; x] = \begin{cases} R_k[s; p; x] & 0 \le s < p_k, \\ (s - p_k) f_{k+1} + R_k[p_k; p; x] & p_k \le s < p_k + x_{k+1}, \\ x_{k+1} f_{k+1} + R_k[s - x_{k+1}; p; x] & p_k + x_{k+1} \le s. \end{cases}Rk+1​[s;p;x]=⎩⎨⎧​Rk​[s;p;x](s−pk​)fk+1​+Rk​[pk​;p;x]xk+1​fk+1​+Rk​[s−xk+1​;p;x]​0≤s<pk​,pk​≤s<pk​+xk+1​,pk​+xk+1​≤s.​

The expected revenue is ERk[s;p;X]=E Rk[s;p;X]ER_k[s; p; X] = E\,R_k[s; p; X]ERk​[s;p;X]=ERk​[s;p;X]. A policy ppp is optimal if ERk[s;q;X]≤ERk[s;p;X]ER_k[s; q; X] \le ER_k[s; p; X]ERk​[s;q;X]≤ERk​[s;p;X] for every policy qqq, every k≥1k \ge 1k≥1 and every s≥0s \ge 0s≥0.

For g:R→Rg : \mathbb R \to \mathbb Rg:R→R, δ+g[s]\delta_+ g[s]δ+​g[s] and δ−g[s]\delta_- g[s]δ−​g[s] denote the right and left derivatives, and the subdifferential δg[s]\delta g[s]δg[s] is the interval [δ+g[s],δ−g[s]][\delta_+ g[s], \delta_- g[s]][δ+​g[s],δ−​g[s]], with δ−g[0]=+∞\delta_- g[0] = +\inftyδ−​g[0]=+∞ (p. 131).

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 3 (p. 134)

If the protection levels satisfy

f1Pr⁡[X1>p1∩X1+X2>p2∩⋯∩X1+⋯+Xk>pk]=fk+1for all k≥1,(31)f_1 \Pr[X_1 > p_1 \cap X_1 + X_2 > p_2 \cap \dots \cap X_1 + \dots + X_k > p_k] = f_{k+1} \quad \text{for all } k \ge 1, \tag{31}f1​Pr[X1​>p1​∩X1​+X2​>p2​∩⋯∩X1​+⋯+Xk​>pk​]=fk+1​for all k≥1,(31)

then ppp is optimal.

Milestones

  1. (27), p. 132: ER1ER_1ER1​ is concave, and δER1[s;p;X]=[f1Pr⁡[X1>s],f1Pr⁡[X1≥s]]\delta ER_1[s; p; X] = [f_1 \Pr[X_1 > s], f_1 \Pr[X_1 \ge s]]δER1​[s;p;X]=[f1​Pr[X1​>s],f1​Pr[X1​≥s]].
  2. Lemma 1, p. 131: if ERk[ ⋅ ;p;X]ER_k[\,\cdot\,; p; X]ERk​[⋅;p;X] is concave on s≥0s \ge 0s≥0 and fk+1∈δERk[pk;p;X]f_{k+1} \in \delta ER_k[p_k; p; X]fk+1​∈δERk​[pk​;p;X], then E{Rk+1[s;p;X]∣Xk+1}E\{R_{k+1}[s; p; X] \mid X_{k+1}\}E{Rk+1​[s;p;X]∣Xk+1​} is concave in sss.
  3. Corollary 1, p. 131: under the same conditions ERk+1[ ⋅ ;p;X]ER_{k+1}[\,\cdot\,; p; X]ERk+1​[⋅;p;X] is concave on s≥0s \ge 0s≥0.
  4. Theorem 1, p. 131: if fk+1∈δERk[pk;p;X]f_{k+1} \in \delta ER_k[p_k; p; X]fk+1​∈δERk​[pk​;p;X] for every kkk (condition (20)), then ppp is optimal.
  5. Lemma 2, p. 134: under (31), for s≥pks \ge p_ks≥pk​,
δ+E{Rk+1[s;p;X]∣Xk+1}=f1Pr⁡[X1>p1∩⋯∩X1+⋯+Xk>pk∩X1+⋯+Xk+1>s∣Xk+1].\delta_+ E\{R_{k+1}[s; p; X] \mid X_{k+1}\} = f_1 \Pr[X_1 > p_1 \cap \dots \cap X_1 + \dots + X_k > p_k \cap X_1 + \dots + X_{k+1} > s \mid X_{k+1}].δ+​E{Rk+1​[s;p;X]∣Xk+1​}=f1​Pr[X1​>p1​∩⋯∩X1​+⋯+Xk​>pk​∩X1​+⋯+Xk+1​>s∣Xk+1​].
  1. Corollary 2, p. 134: the unconditional version (37) of Lemma 2 for δ+ERk+1[s;p;X]\delta_+ ER_{k+1}[s; p; X]δ+​ERk+1​[s;p;X].

Significance

Theorem 3 turns the optimal nested protection levels into a sequence of equations in the joint distribution of the cumulative demands X1+⋯+XjX_1 + \dots + X_jX1​+⋯+Xj​. For k=1k = 1k=1 it is Littlewood's rule. For k≥2k \ge 2k≥2 it identifies exactly what EMSRa approximates: EMSRa replaces the joint event in (31) by separate pairwise comparisons, and the paper shows (§4) that EMSRa can both over- and underestimate the optimal protection levels. The conditions are also the input of numerical methods: given demand forecasts, the levels p1,p2,…p_1, p_2, \dotsp1​,p2​,… are found one after another by solving (31), and §3.3 notes that a continuous joint demand distribution guarantees a solution exists.

The results are proved in the paper. As far as is known they have no machine-checked proof. Related platform items cover the two-class, integer-seat case from Belobaba (1987) (SeatInventory.Nested.emsr_protection_level_optimal) and the integer marginal-seat-revenue analogue of (27). They use a different model: two classes, natural-number seats and first differences. This mission formalizes the multi-class statement with real-valued seats and one-sided derivatives. A sister mission of the series proves the existence of optimal integer policies for integer-valued demand (Theorem 2).

Difficulty

The expected revenue is not differentiable: for discrete demand it is piecewise linear, so first-order conditions must be stated with one-sided derivatives and subdifferentials. The natural approach, to optimize each protection level separately with the others fixed, fails without concavity, and concavity of ERk+1ER_{k+1}ERk+1​ in sss is not automatic. It holds only when the lower protection levels already satisfy the first-order conditions. Concavity and optimality must therefore be carried through one joint induction over the classes. Passing from (31) to (20) requires computing the right derivative of the expected revenue in closed form for every s≥pks \ge p_ks≥pk​. This involves exchanging differentiation with expectation and conditioning on one class's demand at a time.

Formalization scope

  • Classes are indexed by N\mathbb NN from 111; fares, demands and protection levels are sequences N→R\mathbb N \to \mathbb RN→R, with no bound on the number of classes. Seats and protection levels are real numbers.
  • Expectation is the Bochner integral on a probability space. The standing assumptions are a single predicate: probability measure, measurable nonnegative demands, mutual independence (iIndepFun), strictly decreasing fares.
  • E{⋅∣Xk}E\{\cdot \mid X_k\}E{⋅∣Xk​} evaluated at Xk=yX_k = yXk​=y is the integral with the kkk-th demand frozen at yyy. Because the demands are independent this is a version of the conditional expectation, and "with probability 1" becomes "for every y≥0y \ge 0y≥0", which is stronger.
  • One-sided derivatives are HasDerivWithinAt on half-lines and must exist; derivWithin, which returns 000 where no derivative exists, is not used. δ−g[0]=+∞\delta_- g[0] = +\inftyδ−​g[0]=+∞ is encoded as a disjunct.
  • Optimality is global: ppp beats every policy qqq at every level kkk and every s≥0s \ge 0s≥0. The page's proof of Theorem 1 shows coordinatewise optimality of pkp_kpk​, and the global form follows by induction on kkk.
  • Fares are not assumed positive in the model: under (20) or (31) with strictly decreasing fares, f1>0f_1 > 0f1​>0 follows. The milestone (27), stated with only the hypotheses on X1X_1X1​ that it needs, assumes X1≥0X_1 \ge 0X1​≥0 and f1≥0f_1 \ge 0f1​≥0, without which ER1ER_1ER1​ is not concave.
  • No continuity of the demand distribution is assumed. Theorem 3 is conditional on a solution of (31).
  • The page's hypothesis of Lemma 1 has the misprint "(p0,…,pk+1)(p_0, \dots, p_{k+1})(p0​,…,pk+1​)" for (p0,…,pk−1)(p_0, \dots, p_{k-1})(p0​,…,pk−1​). The formal statement uses the latter.

The goal assumes only the standing assumptions, p≥0p \ge 0p≥0, and (31). It does not assume concavity, condition (20) or any derivative formula: those are milestones. A formalization that quantified optimality over one level, one value of sss, or policies differing from ppp in one coordinate would be weaker than the paper and is excluded.

A complete development needs one-sided derivatives of integrals of piecewise-linear functions (dominated convergence for difference quotients), concavity of piecewise functions glued at points where the slopes decrease, and the independence calculus that turns E[E{⋅∣Xk+1}]E[E\{\cdot \mid X_{k+1}\}]E[E{⋅∣Xk+1​}] into an iterated integral. These pieces are reusable for other newsvendor-type and revenue-management models. Proofs of any milestone, and alternative arguments for Theorem 1, are welcome.

Selected references

  • S. L. Brumelle and J. I. McGill, Airline Seat Allocation with Multiple Nested Fare Classes, Operations Research 41(1), 127–137, 1993. https://doi.org/10.1287/opre.41.1.127
  • K. Littlewood, Forecasting and Control of Passenger Bookings, AGIFORS Symposium Proceedings 12, 95–117, 1972; reprinted in Journal of Revenue and Pricing Management 4(2), 2005. https://doi.org/10.1057/palgrave.rpm.5170134
  • P. P. Belobaba, Air Travel Demand and Airline Seat Inventory Management, PhD thesis, MIT, 1987. http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/68077
  • P. P. Belobaba, Application of a Probabilistic Decision Model to Airline Seat Inventory Control, Operations Research 37(2), 183–197, 1989. https://doi.org/10.1287/opre.37.2.183
  • K. T. Talluri and G. J. van Ryzin, The Theory and Practice of Revenue Management, Springer, 2004. https://doi.org/10.1007/b139000
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Bandit AlgorithmsOperations ResearchStatistics·Captain: mikedeng1

Dynamic Pricing Without Knowing the Demand Function: Risk Bounds and Near-Optimal Algorithms III: With One Unknown Parameter, Staged Re-estimation Has Regret O((log log n)(log n)^{1/2}/n^{1/2})Research Paper

Motivation

A seller with a fixed stock of a single product and a finite selling season must post prices without knowing how demand responds to price. Revenue management treats this as a constrained stochastic control problem; with the demand curve known, the problem was solved by Gallego and van Ryzin (Management Science, 1994). When the curve is unknown, every price posted also serves as an experiment, so the seller faces an exploration–exploitation trade-off. Unlike a multi-armed bandit, this problem has a continuum of actions and a hard inventory constraint.

Besbes and Zeevi (Operations Research, 2009) measure a pricing policy by its worst-case relative revenue loss against a full-information benchmark, in an asymptotic regime where inventory and demand grow together. They give three upper bounds. This mission takes the third, Proposition 5: when the demand model has a single unknown scalar parameter, a policy that keeps re-estimating that parameter in stages of growing length has regret O((log⁡log⁡n)(log⁡n)1/2/n1/2)O\big((\log\log n)(\log n)^{1/2}/n^{1/2}\big)O((loglogn)(logn)1/2/n1/2). The paper's lower bound for parametric families (Proposition 4) is of order n−1/2n^{-1/2}n−1/2, so the rate is optimal up to logarithmic factors.

Setting

Market. Prices lie in [p‾,p‾]∪{p∞}[\underline p,\overline p]\cup\{p_\infty\}[p​,p​]∪{p∞​} with 0<p‾<p‾<p∞0<\underline p<\overline p<p_\infty0<p​<p​<p∞​. Posting the off price p∞p_\inftyp∞​ stops demand. The seller starts with inventory x>0x>0x>0 and sells over the horizon [0,T][0,T][0,T], T>0T>0T>0.

Demand. A demand function λ\lambdaλ maps a price to a demand rate. The class L(M,K‾,K‾,m)\mathcal L(M,\underline K,\overline K,m)L(M,K​,K,m) consists of the functions that are non-increasing with an inverse γ\gammaγ on [p‾,p‾][\underline p,\overline p][p​,p​], have a concave revenue rate r(l)=lγ(l)r(l)=l\gamma(l)r(l)=lγ(l), are bounded by MMM, are K‾\overline KK-Lipschitz with a K‾−1\underline K^{-1}K​−1-Lipschitz inverse, and attain a revenue rate max⁡ppλ(p)≥m\max_p p\lambda(p)\ge mmaxp​pλ(p)≥m. The parametric family is λ(p;θ)\lambda(p;\theta)λ(p;θ), θ∈Θ=[θlo,θhi]\theta\in\Theta=[\theta_{\mathrm{lo}},\theta_{\mathrm{hi}}]θ∈Θ=[θlo​,θhi​], with every member in the class (Assumption 1). Assumption 2 adds a test price p1p_1p1​, differentiability of λ(p1;⋅)\sqrt{\lambda(p_1;\cdot)}λ(p1​;⋅)​ and the Lipschitz bound ∣λ(p;θ)−λ(p;θ′)∣≤K‾2∣θ−θ′∣|\lambda(p;\theta)-\lambda(p;\theta')|\le\overline K_2|\theta-\theta'|∣λ(p;θ)−λ(p;θ′)∣≤K2​∣θ−θ′∣. Assumption 3 requires inf⁡p,θλ(p;θ)>l0>0\inf_{p,\theta}\lambda(p;\theta)>l_0>0infp,θ​λ(p;θ)>l0​>0 and an α\alphaα-Lipschitz solution map d↦g(p,d)d\mapsto g(p,d)d↦g(p,d) of the equation λ(p;⋅)=d\lambda(p;\cdot)=dλ(p;⋅)=d.

Demand process. Let NNN be a unit-rate Poisson process. Under a price path p(⋅)p(\cdot)p(⋅) and parameter θ∗\theta^*θ∗, the cumulative demand up to time ttt is N(∫0tλ(p(s);θ∗) ds)N\big(\int_0^t\lambda(p(s);\theta^*)\,ds\big)N(∫0t​λ(p(s);θ∗)ds). Sales stop when the inventory runs out.

Benchmark and regret. The deterministic relaxation JD(x,T∣θ)J^D(x,T\mid\theta)JD(x,T∣θ) is the supremum of ∫0Tp(s)λ(p(s);θ) ds\int_0^T p(s)\lambda(p(s);\theta)\,ds∫0T​p(s)λ(p(s);θ)ds over price paths with ∫0Tλ(p(s);θ) ds≤x\int_0^T\lambda(p(s);\theta)\,ds\le x∫0T​λ(p(s);θ)ds≤x. In the market of size nnn the inventory is nxnxnx and the demand nλn\lambdanλ. If Jnπ(x,T;θ)J^\pi_n(x,T;\theta)Jnπ​(x,T;θ) is the expected revenue of a policy π\piπ, its regret is Rnπ=1−Jnπ/JnD\mathcal R^\pi_n=1-J^\pi_n/J^D_nRnπ​=1−Jnπ​/JnD​.

Algorithm 3. Start from p^1=p1\hat p_1=p_1p^​1​=p1​ and use stages of lengths Δn(1),…,Δn(ℓn)\Delta^{(1)}_n,\dots,\Delta^{(\ell_n)}_nΔn(1)​,…,Δn(ℓn​)​ summing to TTT. Stage iii applies p^i\hat p_ip^​i​, estimates the demand rate d^i\hat d_id^i​ from the stage's demand, solves for θ^i=g(p^i,d^i)\hat\theta_i=g(\hat p_i,\hat d_i)θ^i​=g(p^​i​,d^i​), and sets p^i+1=max⁡{pu(θ^i),pc(θ^i)}\hat p_{i+1}=\max\{p^u(\hat\theta_i),p^c(\hat\theta_i)\}p^​i+1​=max{pu(θ^i​),pc(θ^i​)}. Here pu(θ)p^u(\theta)pu(θ) maximizes pλ(p;θ)p\lambda(p;\theta)pλ(p;θ) and pc(θ)p^c(\theta)pc(θ) minimizes ∣λ(p;θ)−x/T∣|\lambda(p;\theta)-x/T|∣λ(p;θ)−x/T∣. The tuning (19)–(20) is ℓn=(log⁡2)−1log⁡log⁡n\ell_n=(\log2)^{-1}\log\log nℓn​=(log2)−1loglogn stages with Δn(m)=βnn(aℓn/am)−1\Delta^{(m)}_n=\beta_n n^{(a_{\ell_n}/a_m)-1}Δn(m)​=βn​n(aℓn​​/am​)−1 and am=2m−1/(2m−1)a_m=2^{m-1}/(2^m-1)am​=2m−1/(2m−1).

Formalization targets

Goal: Proposition 5

∃ C>0, ∃ n0,∀n≥n0, ∀θ∈Θ:Rnπn(x,T;θ)≤C (log⁡log⁡n)(log⁡n)1/2n1/2.\exists\,C>0,\ \exists\,n_0,\quad \forall n\ge n_0,\ \forall\theta\in\Theta:\qquad \mathcal R^{\pi_n}_n(x,T;\theta)\le C\,\frac{(\log\log n)(\log n)^{1/2}}{n^{1/2}} .∃C>0, ∃n0​,∀n≥n0​, ∀θ∈Θ:Rnπn​​(x,T;θ)≤Cn1/2(loglogn)(logn)1/2​.

The constants are uniform in θ\thetaθ and nnn. This is the paper's (21): sup⁡θRnπ=O(⋅)\sup_\theta\mathcal R^{\pi}_n=O(\cdot)supθ​Rnπ​=O(⋅).

Milestones, in proof order

  1. Fact 1: JnD=nJDJ^D_n=nJ^DJnD​=nJD and JD≥mmin⁡{T,x/M}J^D\ge m\min\{T,x/M\}JD≥mmin{T,x/M} on the class.
  2. Lemma 1: the deterministic relaxation is solved by the fixed price pD=max⁡{pu,pc}p^D=\max\{p^u,p^c\}pD=max{pu,pc}.
  3. Lemma 2: Poisson deviation bounds at scale (log⁡n/rn)1/2(\log n/r_n)^{1/2}(logn/rn​)1/2.
  4. (A-27): a revenue lower bound that splits the loss into stage-wise terms and an overflow term.
  5. The per-stage revenue gap r(pD)−E r(p^i)≤C2(nΔn(i−1))−1/2r(p^D)-\mathbb E\,r(\hat p_i)\le C_2(n\Delta^{(i-1)}_n)^{-1/2}r(pD)−Er(p^​i​)≤C2​(nΔn(i−1)​)−1/2.
  6. (A-30): the stage-iii demand rate rarely exceeds the run-out rate.
  7. The overflow bound E[(Yn−nx)+]≤nC8(log⁡n)1/2naℓn−1\mathbb E[(Y_n-nx)^+]\le nC_8(\log n)^{1/2}n^{a_{\ell_n}-1}E[(Yn​−nx)+]≤nC8​(logn)1/2naℓn​​−1.
  8. (A-31): the revenue ratio before the exponents are evaluated.
  9. The rate estimate naℓn−1≤e n−1/2n^{a_{\ell_n}-1}\le e\,n^{-1/2}naℓn​​−1≤en−1/2.

Milestones 6–8 hold in the case λ(p‾;θ∗)≤x/T\lambda(\overline p;\theta^*)\le x/Tλ(p​;θ∗)≤x/T, the only case the paper's proof treats in detail.

Significance

Proposition 5 shows that with one unknown parameter, learning while earning reaches the n−1/2n^{-1/2}n−1/2 rate, up to logarithms. The learn-then-price policies of Propositions 1 and 3 stop learning after an initial phase and reach only n−1/4n^{-1/4}n−1/4 and n−1/3n^{-1/3}n−1/3. The paper leaves open whether the multi-parameter case attains the lower bound.

The analysis combines a continuous-time controlled Poisson model, an inventory constraint and a staged estimator, which also appear in later work on dynamic pricing with learning. A formal development would provide a time-changed Poisson demand model with random stage boundaries, a deterministic-relaxation benchmark, and concentration bounds stated for the scales this literature uses.

The result is proved in the paper, but parts of the proof are only sketched. The case λ(p‾;θ∗)>x/T\lambda(\overline p;\theta^*)>x/Tλ(p​;θ∗)>x/T is dismissed with "a similar result holds". The per-stage gap is obtained "by parallel reasoning". Display (A-30) has a typographical error in its threshold. To our knowledge, none of these results has been machine-checked.

Difficulty

The naive argument conditions each stage on its start time, as if that time were deterministic. It is not: the stage boundaries Λi=∑j≤inλ(p^j;θ∗)Δn(j)\Lambda_i=\sum_{j\le i}n\lambda(\hat p_j;\theta^*)\Delta^{(j)}_nΛi​=∑j≤i​nλ(p^​j​;θ∗)Δn(j)​ depend on all earlier observations, so every per-stage estimate needs the strong Markov property of the Poisson process at a random time. The inventory constraint makes the revenue a nonlinear function of the whole demand path. Bounding the loss therefore means controlling estimation error and overflow at the same time. The geometric stage lengths (20) are chosen so that the stage losses Δn(i)/(nΔn(i−1))1/2\Delta^{(i)}_n/(n\Delta^{(i-1)}_n)^{1/2}Δn(i)​/(nΔn(i−1)​)1/2 are all of the same order. That balance has to be checked exactly, including the rounding of ℓn\ell_nℓn​ to an integer.

Formalization scope

  • Poisson process. A structure on an arbitrary probability space: N(0)=0N(0)=0N(0)=0, monotone right-continuous paths, measurable marginals, Poisson increments, and independent increments over finite partitions. No process is published on the platform.
  • Class and family. Conditions on λ\lambdaλ are imposed on [p‾,p‾]∪{p∞}[\underline p,\overline p]\cup\{p_\infty\}[p​,p​]∪{p∞​}, the only prices a path uses. The inverse γ\gammaγ is Function.invFunOn. Θ\ThetaΘ is a nonempty closed interval of R\mathbb RR.
  • Assumption 3. As printed it cannot hold for d>sup⁡θλ(p;θ)d>\sup_\theta\lambda(p;\theta)d>supθ​λ(p;θ). It is read as an α\alphaα-Lipschitz map g(p,⋅):[0,∞)→Θg(p,\cdot):[0,\infty)\to\Thetag(p,⋅):[0,∞)→Θ that inverts λ(p;⋅)\lambda(p;\cdot)λ(p;⋅) on Θ\ThetaΘ. ggg is jointly measurable, so that estimates at random prices are random variables.
  • Selections. pu,pcp^u,p^cpu,pc are any measurable selections of the maximizer and minimizer; the statements hold for each.
  • Inventory. The inventory is ⌊nx⌋\lfloor nx\rfloor⌊nx⌋ units, and sales are capped cumulative counts.
  • Time change. Eq. (1) is applied stage by stage with random stage boundaries.
  • Typos. In Algorithm 3, "λ(pi,θ)\lambda(p_i,\theta)λ(pi​,θ)" is read as λ(p^i;θ)\lambda(\hat p_i;\theta)λ(p^​i​;θ) and "x/tx/tx/t" as x/Tx/Tx/T.
  • Stages. ℓn=⌈log⁡2log⁡n⌉\ell_n=\lceil\log_2\log n\rceilℓn​=⌈log2​logn⌉.
  • Integrals. Expectations are lower Lebesgue integrals of nonnegative quantities, converted to reals. The relaxation is a real supremum over measurable paths.
  • Asymptotics. The O(⋅)O(\cdot)O(⋅) is rendered with an explicit n0n_0n0​. The clause "asymptotically optimal" is omitted, since it needs the second half of Lemma 1.
  • Ruled out. Each of the following would trivialize the statement: removing the inventory cap, replacing the random stage boundaries by deterministic ones, fixing θ\thetaθ, letting CCC depend on θ\thetaθ, or using a non-measurable selection (whose expectation would be a junk value).

Contributions are welcome on every milestone. The Poisson process structure, its strong Markov property at stage boundaries, and Lemma 2 can be reused in other Poisson-demand pricing and queueing missions. Lemma 1 and Fact 1 are deterministic, and the rate estimate already has a local proof.

Selected references

  • O. Besbes and A. Zeevi, Dynamic Pricing Without Knowing the Demand Function: Risk Bounds and Near-Optimal Algorithms, Operations Research 57(6):1407–1420, 2009. https://doi.org/10.1287/opre.1080.0640
  • G. Gallego and G. van Ryzin, Optimal Dynamic Pricing of Inventories with Stochastic Demand over Finite Horizons, Management Science 40(8):999–1020, 1994. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.40.8.999
  • K. Talluri and G. van Ryzin, The Theory and Practice of Revenue Management, Springer, 2005. https://doi.org/10.1007/b139000
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Dynamic Pricing Without Knowing the Demand Function: Risk Bounds and Near-Optimal Algorithms II: The Parametric Learn-then-Price Policy Has Regret at Most C(log n)^{1/2}/n^{1/3}Research Paper

Why learn demand while pricing?

A seller with a fixed inventory must choose prices before knowing how customers respond to them. A price that earns a high margin can sell too slowly; a price that sells quickly can exhaust stock before the selling season ends. Learning demand uses time and inventory, so the seller must account for the cost of its own experiments. This mission formalizes the parametric policy and regret bound of Besbes and Zeevi (2009), Proposition 3. Their setting differs from a finite-arm bandit: the permitted ordinary prices form an interval, customer arrivals are random, and the available stock caps total sales.

The paper first analyzes a nonparametric class with a slower upper bound in Proposition 1, then imposes a known finite-dimensional form on the unknown demand curve in Section 5. Proposition 3 shows how that additional information improves the regret rate for its Algorithm 2. The authors also prove a lower bound for a suitable parametric family in Proposition 4; that result is outside this mission's capstone, which concerns the performance guarantee of the concrete policy.

Market, demand, and policy

The selling horizon has length T>0T>0T>0, and the initial stock is x>0x>0x>0. An ordinary price ppp lies in [p‾,p‾][\underline p,\overline p][p​,p​], with 0<p‾<p‾0<\underline p<\overline p0<p​<p​. The special price p∞>0p_\infty>0p∞​>0 stops demand. At parameter θ∈Θ⊆Rk\theta\in\Theta\subseteq\mathbb R^kθ∈Θ⊆Rk, the demand rate is λ(p;θ)≥0\lambda(p;\theta)\ge0λ(p;θ)≥0. The parameter set Θ\ThetaΘ is nonempty, compact, and convex; kkk is positive. The seller knows the family λ(⋅;θ)\lambda(\cdot;\theta)λ(⋅;θ) but does not know the true parameter θ∗\theta^*θ∗.

For each parameter, demand is nonincreasing in the price and has an inverse γ(⋅;θ)\gamma(\cdot;\theta)γ(⋅;θ) on the attainable rate interval. The rate revenue is r(ℓ;θ)=ℓγ(ℓ;θ)r(\ell;\theta)=\ell\gamma(\ell;\theta)r(ℓ;θ)=ℓγ(ℓ;θ), a concave function of the rate. Every member of the family satisfies Assumption 1 with the same positive constants M,K‾,K‾,mM,\underline K,\overline K,mM,K​,K,m: demand is at most MMM, its price variation is at most K‾\overline KK times the price difference, its inverse is K‾−1\underline K^{-1}K​−1-Lipschitz, and some ordinary price earns revenue rate at least mmm. These conditions define the class in which the bound is uniform. See §§3–4.2 of the source.

Customer requests follow a unit-rate Poisson process NNN run on a demand-dependent clock. Under price p(t)p(t)p(t), cumulative requests at time ttt equal N(∫0tλ(p(s);θ∗) ds)N(\int_0^t\lambda(p(s);\theta^*)\,ds)N(∫0t​λ(p(s);θ∗)ds). The market of size nnn has stock nxnxnx and rate nλn\lambdanλ. Sales stop when stock runs out. The deterministic relaxation JnDJ_n^DJnD​ is the best integrated rate revenue over measurable price paths satisfying the expected-demand stock constraint, with the same scaling. The policy revenue JnπJ_n^\piJnπ​ is its expected sales revenue, and its relative regret is Rnπ=1−Jnπ/JnDR_n^\pi=1-J_n^\pi/J_n^DRnπ​=1−Jnπ​/JnD​. Fact 1 states JnD=nJDJ_n^D=nJ^DJnD​=nJD and gives a positive uniform lower bound on JDJ^DJD.

Assumption 2 selects kkk distinct ordinary test prices. Their mean rates identify the parameter through a Lipschitz inverse map ggg, and demand changes at most K‾2∥θ−θ′∥∞\overline K_2\|\theta-\theta'\|_\inftyK2​∥θ−θ′∥∞​ as the parameter varies. The square root of each test-price rate is differentiable on Θ\ThetaΘ. Algorithm 2 spends τn\tau_nτn​ time units testing these prices in equal subintervals, estimates each rate from its Poisson count increment, and sets θ^=g(d^)\widehat\theta=g(\widehat d)θ=g(d). It then posts p^=max⁡{pu(θ^),pc(θ^)}\widehat p=\max\{p^u(\widehat\theta),p^c(\widehat\theta)\}p​=max{pu(θ),pc(θ)}, where pup^upu maximizes revenue rate and pcp^cpc minimizes the distance of demand to x/Tx/Tx/T. It keeps that price until time TTT or stock-out. See §5.1–5.2.

Formalization targets

The capstone is the uniform bound in Proposition 3, equation (17). With τn≍n−1/3\tau_n\asymp n^{-1/3}τn​≍n−1/3, the mission asks for one constant C>0C>0C>0, independent of nnn, θ∗\theta^*θ∗, the optimizer choices, and the probability space, such that

∀θ∗∈Θ,Rnπ(x,T;θ∗)≤Clog⁡nn1/3(n≥2).\forall\theta^*\in\Theta,\qquad R_n^\pi(x,T;\theta^*)\le C\frac{\sqrt{\log n}}{n^{1/3}}\quad(n\ge2).∀θ∗∈Θ,Rnπ​(x,T;θ∗)≤Cn1/3logn​​(n≥2).

The intermediate quantitative target is equation (A-25), which retains the learning time:

Rnπ≤C3mD(τn+log⁡nnτn),mD=mmin⁡{T,x/M}.R_n^\pi\le\frac{C_3}{m^D}\left(\tau_n+\frac{\sqrt{\log n}}{\sqrt{n\tau_n}}\right),\qquad m^D=m\min\{T,x/M\}.Rnπ​≤mDC3​​(τn​+nτn​​logn​​),mD=mmin{T,x/M}.

The milestone list also carries Fact 1, the optimal deterministic price path and value from the first assertion of Lemma 1, both Poisson tails of Lemma 2, the pricing-phase revenue bound (A-17), the deterministic stability bounds (A-19), (A-22), and (A-23), and the parameter-estimation bound of Lemma 6. The paper's assertion that the policy is “asymptotically optimal” follows from the displayed regret estimate together with nonnegative regret; the displayed numerical estimate is the formal goal.

What the result provides

A finite-dimensional demand model lets the seller learn from a fixed set of kkk prices rather than probing an increasingly fine price grid. Proposition 3 quantifies the resulting revenue loss at O(log⁡n n−1/3)O(\sqrt{\log n}\,n^{-1/3})O(logn​n−1/3), compared with the paper's O(log⁡n n−1/4)O(\sqrt{\log n}\,n^{-1/4})O(logn​n−1/4) upper bound for its nonparametric learn-then-price policy. Both guarantees compare actual expected revenue with the full-information deterministic benchmark, including stock-out. These rates are proved in the article; the mission seeks machine-checked Lean proofs of the stated model, auxiliary bounds, and capstone. No such proof is claimed here.

The formalization would also provide reusable interfaces for a unit-rate Poisson counting process, deterministic inventory-constrained revenue optimization, measurable price selectors, and a random price chosen from normalized count observations. The later single-parameter policy in the paper uses related ideas but is a separate mission with different stages and a different rate.

Main difficulty

A rate estimate can be close to the true rate while the selected price changes between two different optimizers: the unconstrained revenue maximizer and the price that matches inventory to expected demand. A bound for only one optimizer does not control the maximum of the two. The learning price is random, and the number of requests in the pricing phase is evaluated at a random Poisson clock. Stock-out further couples the learning phase to the amount available for later sales. These features prevent a direct substitution of an ordinary parameter-estimation bound into the final revenue formula.

Formalization scope

Lean uses Fin(k)→R\mathrm{Fin}(k)\to\mathbb RFin(k)→R with its sup norm for parameter vectors, a finite positive off price, and a Poisson process on an arbitrary probability space. Each demand curve is defined on all real prices but is constrained on [p‾,p‾][\underline p,\overline p][p​,p​] and at p∞p_\inftyp∞​; the inverse and concavity conditions apply on the attainable rate interval. The deterministic benchmark is a real supremum over measurable, integrable admissible price paths. The class assumptions make its value nonempty and bounded. Policy revenue uses a nonnegative integral of pathwise revenue, avoiding a default zero from a nonintegrable signed expectation.

Inventory is measured in whole units, so the cap is ⌊nx⌋\lfloor nx\rfloor⌊nx⌋, equal to the paper's nxnxnx when that quantity is integral. Test-price observations remain uncapped in the formula for d^\widehat dd; if stock runs out during learning, capped later sales are already zero. The continuous optimizer choices are measurable selections satisfying the actual max/min properties for every member of Θ\ThetaΘ. The bound is uniform over these choices and over all unit-rate Poisson processes.

The printed Assumption 2(i)b asks for a solution to the test-rate equations for every vector in Rk\mathbb R^kRk. Such a solution cannot always lie in compact Θ\ThetaΘ, although the proof applies Assumption 2(ii) to θ^\widehat\thetaθ. Here ggg is a Lipschitz map into Θ\ThetaΘ that recovers each true parameter from its test-rate vector; it can be viewed as the unconstrained inverse followed by a nonexpansive projection in the paper's box example. This explicit convention is required to make the estimate and subsequent use of Assumption 2(ii) coherent. It is an interpretive repair of the printed condition.

The paper prints the regret bound for n≥1n\ge1n≥1, where log⁡1=0\sqrt{\log1}=0log1​=0. The exploration policy can lose revenue at n=1n=1n=1, so the formal theorem starts at n≥2n\ge2n≥2. The comparison τn≍n−1/3\tau_n\asymp n^{-1/3}τn​≍n−1/3 is encoded by positive lower and upper multipliers after a fixed threshold, with 0<τn≤T0<\tau_n\le T0<τn​≤T for all relevant market sizes. This admits the usual finite initial adjustments and leaves the bound uniform over the sequence. No fixed demand curve, known parameter, finite price grid, or uncapped sales model can satisfy this target by substitution.

Selected references

  • Omar Besbes and Assaf Zeevi, Dynamic Pricing Without Knowing the Demand Function: Risk Bounds and Near-Optimal Algorithms, Operations Research 57(6), 2009, authors' final manuscript revised December 16, 2007. DOI: 10.1287/opre.1080.0640.
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Data-Driven Robust Optimization II: With Known Finite Support, the χ² and G Uncertainty Sets Bound the Worst-Case Value at Risk over Their Confidence RegionsResearch Paper

Motivation

Robust optimization replaces uncertain data by a set of possible values and requires a decision to work for every value in that set. A central question is how to choose the set from data so that robust feasibility also gives a specified chance of satisfying the original constraint. Bertsimas, Gupta, and Kallus study this question for several sampling models in Data-Driven Robust Optimization. Their finite-support construction addresses a practical case: the uncertain vector can take one of finitely many known outcomes, while their probabilities must be inferred from observations. The resulting sets use classical goodness-of-fit tests to account for uncertainty in those probabilities. Bertsimas, Gupta, and Kallus, §§2–4, pp. 2–13.

In this case the support vectors are known in advance, so the problem is not to discover which outcomes are possible. The question is how much confidence to place in their estimated frequencies and how to turn that confidence region into a set of uncertain vectors suitable for a robust constraint. The paper gives two answers, one based on Pearson's chi-square statistic and one based on the likelihood-ratio, or G, statistic. Both answers are meant to work at every requested risk level 0<ϵ<10<\epsilon<10<ϵ<1 for the same observed sample. Bertsimas, Gupta, and Kallus, Theorem 4, p. 13.

Setting

Let a0,…,an−1∈Rda_0,\ldots,a_{n-1}\in\mathbb R^da0​,…,an−1​∈Rd be the listed possible outcomes. A probability vector p=(pj)p=(p_j)p=(pj​) belongs to the simplex Δn\Delta_nΔn​ when all pjp_jpj​ are nonnegative and ∑jpj=1\sum_jp_j=1∑j​pj​=1. It determines the finite-support law Pp=∑jpjδajP_p=\sum_jp_j\delta_{a_j}Pp​=∑j​pj​δaj​​. From a sample one obtains the empirical frequencies p^∈Δn\hat p\in\Delta_np^​∈Δn​. A nonnegative number ρ\rhoρ records the test threshold; in the paper it is χn−1,1−α2/(2N)\chi^2_{n-1,1-\alpha}/(2N)χn−1,1−α2​/(2N), where NNN is sample size and α\alphaα is the test's significance level. Bertsimas, Gupta, and Kallus, (10), p. 12.

The Pearson confidence region Pχ2\mathcal P^{\chi^2}Pχ2 contains candidates p∈Δnp\in\Delta_np∈Δn​ satisfying ∑j(pj−p^j)2/(2pj)≤ρ\sum_j(p_j-\hat p_j)^2/(2p_j)\le\rho∑j​(pj​−p^​j​)2/(2pj​)≤ρ. The G confidence region PG\mathcal P^GPG instead requires D(p^,p)≤ρD(\hat p,p)\le\rhoD(p^​,p)≤ρ, with relative entropy D(r,p)=∑jrjlog⁡(rj/pj)D(r,p)=\sum_jr_j\log(r_j/p_j)D(r,p)=∑j​rj​log(rj​/pj​). In either region, a candidate pj=0p_j=0pj​=0 is excluded when p^j>0\hat p_j>0p^​j​>0: the source's divergence is then infinite. If both entries are zero, that coordinate contributes zero. These conventions matter because ordinary real division and logarithm in Lean have total values at zero. Bertsimas, Gupta, and Kallus, (10), p. 12.

For a direction v∈Rdv\in\mathbb R^dv∈Rd, value at risk VaR⁡ϵPp(v)\operatorname{VaR}^{P_p}_\epsilon(v)VaRϵPp​​(v) is the lower 1−ϵ1-\epsilon1−ϵ quantile of the scalar loss uTvu^{\mathsf T}vuTv. Conditional value at risk is the minimum over real ttt of t+ϵ−1∑jpj(ajTv−t)+t+\epsilon^{-1}\sum_jp_j(a_j^{\mathsf T}v-t)^+t+ϵ−1∑j​pj​(ajT​v−t)+. The paper's auxiliary set UϵCVaR⁡PpU^{\operatorname{CVaR}_{P_p}}_\epsilonUϵCVaRPp​​​ reweights the outcomes with another probability vector qqq constrained by qj≤pj/ϵq_j\le p_j/\epsilonqj​≤pj​/ϵ. The two data-driven uncertainty sets Uϵχ2U^{\chi^2}_\epsilonUϵχ2​ and UϵGU^G_\epsilonUϵG​ allow such a reweighting for some ppp in the corresponding confidence region. Their support function δ∗(v∣U)\delta^*(v\mid U)δ∗(v∣U) is the largest uTvu^{\mathsf T}vuTv over u∈Uu\in Uu∈U. Bertsimas, Gupta, and Kallus, (11)–(13), pp. 12–13; Theorem EC.1, p. ec2.

Formalization targets

The first target is the paper's finite-support CVaR identity and the comparison between the two risk measures:

VaR⁡ϵPp(v)≤CVaR⁡ϵPp(v)=δ∗(v∣UϵCVaR⁡Pp).\operatorname{VaR}^{P_p}_\epsilon(v) \le \operatorname{CVaR}^{P_p}_\epsilon(v) =\delta^*(v\mid U^{\operatorname{CVaR}_{P_p}}_\epsilon).VaRϵPp​​(v)≤CVaRϵPp​​(v)=δ∗(v∣UϵCVaRPp​​​).

The goal is Theorem 4's deterministic claim, simultaneously for all 0<ϵ<10<\epsilon<10<ϵ<1. For each ppp in the relevant confidence region, it asks for both bounds

VaR⁡ϵPp(v)≤δ∗(v∣Uϵχ2),VaR⁡ϵPp(v)≤δ∗(v∣UϵG)\operatorname{VaR}^{P_p}_\epsilon(v)\le\delta^*(v\mid U^{\chi^2}_\epsilon), \qquad \operatorname{VaR}^{P_p}_\epsilon(v)\le\delta^*(v\mid U^G_\epsilon)VaRϵPp​​(v)≤δ∗(v∣Uϵχ2​),VaRϵPp​​(v)≤δ∗(v∣UϵG​)

for every vvv, with each uncertainty set nonempty, convex, and compact. A supporting milestone identifies each support function as the supremum of CVaR over its confidence region. The paper also displays conic optimization programs for these support functions in (14) and (15); those programs are outside this mission's drafted statements. Bertsimas, Gupta, and Kallus, Theorem 4, p. 13; proof, p. ec2.

Significance

The bounds give a way to certify the directional risk of every candidate distribution accepted by a goodness-of-fit test. For a nonempty convex compact uncertainty set, the paper's Theorem 1 turns this directional condition into a probabilistic guarantee for every constraint concave in the uncertain vector. Theorem 4 adds the sampling claim through coverage of the confidence region: when the true finite-support distribution belongs to that region, the whole family indexed by ϵ\epsilonϵ receives the guarantee. The statistical tests use chi-square approximations, so their advertised coverage is asymptotic rather than an exact finite-sample result. Bertsimas, Gupta, and Kallus, Theorems 1–4, pp. 10–13.

The paper proves the mathematical result. This mission asks for machine-checked proofs of its finite-dimensional definitions, the CVaR identity, the worst-case support identities, and the deterministic risk bounds. The drafted Lean statements are open goals. A completed development would also give reusable facts about finite-support risk measures and support functions under divergence-constrained probabilities. It would leave the test coverage calculation and the explicit programs (14)–(15) for separate work.

Difficulty

The risk comparison alone does not identify a robust uncertainty set: the support function must agree with the worst-case CVaR over an entire region of probability vectors. This brings a finite-dimensional optimization identity into the formal proof, including attainment and the relationship between reweightings and distributions. Boundary coordinates create another difficulty. The Pearson expression divides by pjp_jpj​, and the G expression contains log⁡(p^j/pj)\log(\hat p_j/p_j)log(p^​j​/pj​); silently accepting Lean's values at zero would enlarge the regions and change the theorem. The support function and CVaR are real infima or suprema, so their nonempty, bounded domains must also be established. Bertsimas, Gupta, and Kallus, (10)–(13), pp. 12–13; proof, p. ec2.

Formalization scope

Lean represents outcomes and probability vectors as functions on Fin d and Fin n; indices start at zero. The simplex is Mathlib's stdSimplex. The law is a finite sum of point masses. If two listed vectors coincide, their point masses aggregate; the paper's notation pj=Pp(u~=aj)p_j=P_p(\tilde u=a_j)pj​=Pp​(u~=aj​) is recovered with the intended distinct listing. Value at risk and the support function reuse published Prove2Me definitions; the finite-vector relative entropy also reuses a published definition, guarded at zero in this mission's G region. CVaR uses a real sInf, equal to the paper's minimum for a simplex law and 0<ϵ<10<\epsilon<10<ϵ<1. No statement applies it outside that domain.

The goal assumes p^∈Δn\hat p\in\Delta_np^​∈Δn​ and ρ≥0\rho\ge0ρ≥0. These express, respectively, that the center is an empirical probability vector and that the chi-square threshold is nonnegative. It quantifies over every 0<ϵ<10<\epsilon<10<ϵ<1, with the same confidence regions for all levels. The paper's sample size, chi-square quantile, and significance level are compressed into ρ\rhoρ; coverage of the true distribution by the test is a separate statistical premise and is not formalized here. The source's P∗\mathbb P^*P∗ is represented by Pp∗P_{p^*}Pp∗​ for a supported probability vector p∗p^*p∗. The draft does not treat an arbitrary unsupported law as a member of the confidence region.

The nonempty and compact conclusions rule out a zero returned by a support function on an empty or unbounded set. The zero-denominator guards rule out candidates the paper assigns infinite divergence. Contributions needed to close the mission include finite-simplex geometry, the finite-support CVaR identity, continuity of the divergence regions at boundary coordinates, and the risk-bound theorem. Those facts can be reused in later data-driven robust optimization developments.

Selected references

  • Dimitris Bertsimas, Vishal Gupta, and Nathan Kallus, Data-Driven Robust Optimization, arXiv:1401.0212v2, 2014; revised version in Mathematical Programming 167 (2018), 235–292. Preprint.
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Operations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

Optimal Dynamic Pricing of Inventories with Stochastic Demand over Finite Horizons 3: With a Discrete Price Set the Two-Price Stopping-Time Heuristic Is Asymptotically OptimalResearch Paper

Motivation

Airlines, hotels and cruise lines rarely change prices continuously. They sell a fixed product (seats on one flight, rooms on one night) over a finite selling season, and they sell it at a small set of fares, opening and closing fare classes as the season unfolds. Gallego and van Ryzin, in Optimal Dynamic Pricing of Inventories with Stochastic Demand over Finite Horizons (Management Science 40(8), 1994, doi:10.1287/mnsc.40.8.999), model this as the sale of nnn items over a horizon of length ttt, with Poisson demand whose rate depends on the current price. Section 4 of the paper restricts the price to a finite menu and asks how much is lost by using a simple rule that charges only two adjacent prices and switches once. The answer, Theorem 5, gives one explanation of fixed-fare-class yield management: with two fares and one well-timed switch, a seller earns asymptotically the best revenue any policy over the menu can earn. The source of this mission is the published 1994 article.

The paper is the starting point of a long line of work on fluid (deterministic) approximations in revenue management, including Feng and Gallego (1995) on optimal switching times between two prices and later re-solving and bid-price analyses, all of which compare stochastic policies to the value of a deterministic problem in the same way.

Setting

A menu consists of K≥2K\ge2K≥2 prices p1<p2<⋯<pKp_1<p_2<\dots<p_Kp1​<p2​<⋯<pK​ and Poisson demand rates λ1>λ2>⋯>λK>0\lambda_1>\lambda_2>\dots>\lambda_K>0λ1​>λ2​>⋯>λK​>0; the firm may also charge the null price p∞p_\inftyp∞​, at which demand is 000. The revenue rates rk=pkλkr_k=p_k\lambda_krk​=pk​λk​ satisfy r1>r2>⋯>rKr_1>r_2>\dots>r_Kr1​>r2​>⋯>rK​, and the points (λk,rk)(\lambda_k,r_k)(λk​,rk​) lie on a concave function on [0,∞)[0,\infty)[0,∞) vanishing at 000.

The deterministic problem replaces random demand by its rate. If tk≥0t_k\ge0tk​≥0 is the time spent at price pkp_kpk​, the problem is the linear program

JD(n,t)=sup⁡{∑krktk: ∑ktk≤t, ∑kλktk≤n, tk≥0}.J^D(n,t)=\sup\Big\{\sum_k r_k t_k:\ \sum_k t_k\le t,\ \sum_k\lambda_k t_k\le n,\ t_k\ge0\Big\}.JD(n,t)=sup{k∑​rk​tk​: k∑​tk​≤t, k∑​λk​tk​≤n, tk​≥0}.

Given n∈Nn\in\mathbb Nn∈N and t>0t>0t>0, let k=k∗k=k^*k=k∗ be the index with λkt≥n>λk+1t\lambda_k t\ge n>\lambda_{k+1}tλk​t≥n>λk+1​t, and put

tk=n−λk+1tλk−λk+1,m=⌈λktk⌉,tm=mλk.t_k=\frac{n-\lambda_{k+1}t}{\lambda_k-\lambda_{k+1}},\qquad m=\lceil\lambda_k t_k\rceil,\qquad t_m=\frac{m}{\lambda_k}.tk​=λk​−λk+1​n−λk+1​t​,m=⌈λk​tk​⌉,tm​=λk​m​.

The stopping-time (ST) heuristic starts at price pkp_kpk​ and switches to pk+1p_{k+1}pk+1​ at the random time τ=min⁡(Tm,tm)\tau=\min(T_m,t_m)τ=min(Tm​,tm​), where TmT_mTm​ is the time of the mmm-th demand. Sales stop when the nnn items are gone or at time ttt. JST(n,t)J^{ST}(n,t)JST(n,t) is its expected revenue.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 5

For a fixed index kkk with 1≤k≤K−11\le k\le K-11≤k≤K−1 and any sequences nj∈Nn_j\in\mathbb Nnj​∈N, tj→∞t_j\to\inftytj​→∞ with λktj≥nj>λk+1tj\lambda_k t_j\ge n_j>\lambda_{k+1}t_jλk​tj​≥nj​>λk+1​tj​,

lim⁡j→∞JST(nj,tj)JD(nj,tj)=1.\lim_{j\to\infty}\frac{J^{ST}(n_j,t_j)}{J^D(n_j,t_j)}=1.j→∞lim​JD(nj​,tj​)JST(nj​,tj​)​=1.

No rate of convergence is fixed in the goal, and the ratio nj/tjn_j/t_jnj​/tj​ may vary along the sequence.

Milestones

  1. Proposition 4. The LP is solved by pricing at pk∗p_{k^*}pk∗​ for time tk∗t_{k^*}tk∗​ and at pk∗+1p_{k^*+1}pk∗+1​ for time tk∗+1=(λk∗t−n)/(λk∗−λk∗+1)t_{k^*+1}=(\lambda_{k^*}t-n)/(\lambda_{k^*}-\lambda_{k^*+1})tk∗+1​=(λk∗​t−n)/(λk∗​−λk∗+1​), together with the edge cases k∗=0k^*=0k∗=0 and k∗=Kk^*=Kk∗=K.
  2. The wasteful heuristic is a lower bound: JW(n,t)≤JST(n,t)J^W(n,t)\le J^{ST}(n,t)JW(n,t)≤JST(n,t), where the wasteful heuristic offers mmm units at pkp_kpk​ during [0,tm][0,t_m][0,tm​] and n−mn-mn−m units at pk+1p_{k+1}pk+1​ afterwards.
  3. Equation (28): the shrunk horizon t′=tm+(n−m)/λk+1t'=t_m+(n-m)/\lambda_{k+1}t′=tm​+(n−m)/λk+1​ satisfies t−(λk−λk+1)/(λkλk+1)<t′≤tt-(\lambda_k-\lambda_{k+1})/(\lambda_k\lambda_{k+1})<t'\le tt−(λk​−λk+1​)/(λk​λk+1​)<t′≤t.
  4. The closed form of JDJ^DJD and JD(n,t)<JD(n,t′)+(pk+1−pk)J^D(n,t)<J^D(n,t')+(p_{k+1}-p_k)JD(n,t)<JD(n,t′)+(pk+1​−pk​).
  5. Equation (29): JST(n,t)/JD(n,t)≥JW(n,t)/JD(n,t)≥JW(n,t′)/(JD(n,t′)+(pk+1−pk))J^{ST}(n,t)/J^D(n,t)\ge J^W(n,t)/J^D(n,t)\ge J^W(n,t')/(J^D(n,t')+(p_{k+1}-p_k))JST(n,t)/JD(n,t)≥JW(n,t)/JD(n,t)≥JW(n,t′)/(JD(n,t′)+(pk+1​−pk​)).
  6. The wasteful bound: JW(n,t′)≥pk[m−12m]+pk+1[(n−m)−12n−m]J^W(n,t')\ge p_k[m-\tfrac12\sqrt m]+p_{k+1}[(n-m)-\tfrac12\sqrt{n-m}]JW(n,t′)≥pk​[m−21​m​]+pk+1​[(n−m)−21​n−m​] and JW(n,t′)/JD(n,t′)≥1−12(1/m+1/n−m)J^W(n,t')/J^D(n,t')\ge1-\tfrac12(1/\sqrt m+1/\sqrt{n-m})JW(n,t′)/JD(n,t′)≥1−21​(1/m​+1/n−m​).

Significance

Theorem 5 says that a policy with one price change, chosen from the deterministic solution, loses a vanishing fraction of the deterministic revenue. Since JDJ^DJD bounds the optimal expected revenue over all non-anticipating policies with prices in the menu (§4.0.1 of the paper), the ST heuristic is asymptotically optimal, and the optimal policy, which solves a Hamilton–Jacobi–Bellman system with no closed form, can be replaced by a rule that is computed by hand. The result also shows that a finite menu, together with dynamic allocation of capacity between two neighbouring prices, can realize the effective price of a continuous demand curve.

The theorem is proved in the paper. As far as the platform's index shows, neither this result nor the controlled Poisson sales process it needs has been formalized; Mathlib has the exponential and Poisson distributions but no counting process with a policy-dependent intensity. The mission produces a machine-checked version of the paper's proof chain: the LP solution, the coupling inequality between two heuristics, the deterministic horizon estimate (28), and the Poisson overflow estimate built on Gallego's bound (inequality (18) of the paper, already proved on the platform as PricingRM.DetHeuristic.gallego_bound).

Difficulty

The deterministic parts (Proposition 4, (28), the closed form of JDJ^DJD) are finite-dimensional linear algebra. The difficulty sits in the stochastic comparison JW≤JSTJ^W\le J^{ST}JW≤JST. The ST heuristic's switching time depends on the sales process, and after the switch the remaining stock and the remaining time are both random. The obvious attempt, writing JSTJ^{ST}JST as a sum of two independent Poisson terms, is wrong: the two phases are dependent through τ\tauτ. Any comparison has to handle a second phase whose starting stock and starting time are both random, which brings in the behaviour of the sales process after a random time determined by the process itself. The limit step then needs the overflow bound uniformly along sequences whose ratio n/tn/tn/t is not fixed.

Formalization scope

All declarations live in the namespace GVRPricing.StoppingTime. The committed conventions are:

  • Indices are 0-based (Fin K): Lean index kkk is the paper's price number k+1k+1k+1, and lamN, pN, rN extend the sequences by 000 beyond KKK, matching the paper's λK+1=rK+1=0\lambda_{K+1}=r_{K+1}=0λK+1​=rK+1​=0.
  • The menu carries the printed conditions plus an added concavity condition: the points (λk,rk)(\lambda_k,r_k)(λk​,rk​) lie on a concave function vanishing at 000. This is the reading of §4's "corresponding to price pkp_kpk​, we have a known demand rate λk\lambda_kλk​" for a regular demand function with concave revenue rate. Without it Proposition 4 and Theorem 5 are false: the menu λ=(3,2,1)\lambda=(3,2,1)λ=(3,2,1), p=(1,1.01,1.5)p=(1,1.01,1.5)p=(1,1.01,1.5) meets every printed condition, but at t=1t=1t=1, n=1.5n=1.5n=1.5 Proposition 4's allocation earns 1.761.761.76 while a feasible mix of p1p_1p1​ and p3p_3p3​ earns 1.8751.8751.875, and the ST ratio tends to about 0.9390.9390.939.
  • JDJ^DJD is defined directly as the LP value; the reduction from the rate-path problem (11) is the paper's assertion and is not formalized.
  • The sales process is built from nnn i.i.d. standard exponential clocks by the time change of the ST policy's cumulative intensity, so at most nnn items are sold. Time is elapsed time from 000. JSTJ^{ST}JST is the expectation of the sum of prices charged at sales in [0,t][0,t][0,t], a lower Lebesgue integral of a bounded nonnegative function.
  • JWJ^WJW is the paper's two-Poisson formula of p. 1018.
  • J∗J^*J∗ is not defined, so the left ratio of (29) uses JDJ^DJD in place of J∗J^*J∗ (a stronger inequality, since J∗≤JDJ^*\le J^DJ∗≤JD), and the §4.0.1 upper bound J∗≤JDJ^*\le J^DJ∗≤JD is not a milestone.
  • Corrected slips: the page prints tn−m≐n−m/λk+1t_{n-m}\doteq n-m/\lambda_{k+1}tn−m​≐n−m/λk+1​ for (n−m)/λk+1(n-m)/\lambda_{k+1}(n−m)/λk+1​; the wasteful bound is stated at the shrunk horizon t′t't′, where its integrality assumptions hold exactly, instead of along the paper's subsequence; the ratio bound assumes m<nm<nm<n, since 1/n−m1/\sqrt{n-m}1/n−m​ is undefined otherwise. Proposition 4 is stated as optimality, without the uniqueness that fails when three menu points are collinear.
  • Excluded: the edge cases k∗=0k^*=0k∗=0 and k∗=Kk^*=Kk∗=K of Theorem 5, treated on the page only in an unproved remark.

A trivializing formalization would define JSTJ^{ST}JST through the wasteful formula, or by a closed-form expression, which makes the goal the wasteful bound; here JSTJ^{ST}JST is the expected revenue of the switching rule τ=min⁡(Tm,tm)\tau=\min(T_m,t_m)τ=min(Tm​,tm​) on the sales process. Likewise the limit is taken along sequences with tj→∞t_j\to\inftytj​→∞, not at a single (n,t)(n,t)(n,t).

Useful infrastructure, reusable beyond this mission: the exponential-clock construction of a Poisson process with piecewise-constant intensity, the strong Markov property at a stopping time of the clocks, and the expected Poisson overflow E(Nμ−μ)+\mathbb E(N_\mu-\mu)^+E(Nμ​−μ)+. Contributions to any milestone, and alternative proofs of JW≤JSTJ^W\le J^{ST}JW≤JST, are welcome.

Selected references

  • G. Gallego, G. van Ryzin, Optimal Dynamic Pricing of Inventories with Stochastic Demand over Finite Horizons, Management Science 40(8), 999–1020, 1994. doi:10.1287/mnsc.40.8.999
  • G. Gallego, A Minmax Distribution Free Procedure for the (Q, R) Inventory Model, Operations Research Letters 11, 55–60, 1992 (the source of inequality (18)).
  • Y. Feng, G. Gallego, Optimal Starting Times for End-of-Season Sales and Optimal Stopping Times for Promotional Fares, Management Science 41(8), 1995.
  • P. Brémaud, Point Processes and Queues: Martingale Dynamics, Springer-Verlag, New York, 1980 (as cited in the source).
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