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Operations ResearchOptimizationStochastic Systems·Captain: mikedeng1

Pricing in On-Demand and One-Way Vehicle-Sharing Networks 1: Static Prices Earn at Least K/(N+K−1+Λ/μ) of the Fluid Optimum, via Increasingly Tight Availability BoundsResearch Paper

Why static prices in vehicle sharing

In one-way car sharing, bike sharing and ride hailing, a vehicle that serves a trip from location iii to location jjj ends up at jjj. Prices therefore do two jobs: they collect revenue and they steer the fleet. The best dynamic (state-dependent) pricing policy reacts to where every vehicle is, but computing it is a Markov decision problem over a state space that grows combinatorially with the fleet. A static policy, one fixed price per origin–destination pair, is easy to compute and to post, and the question is how much it gives up.

Waserhole and Jost (2016) bounded the loss when travel times are negligible. Banerjee, Freund and Lykouris (arXiv:1803.07841, Operations Research 2022) gave guarantees for large fleets. Benjaafar and Shen (SSRN 3998297; Operations Research Technical Note, 2023, doi:10.1287/opre.2023.2446) prove a bound valid for every fleet size KKK that accounts for travel times, and then a sequence of progressively tighter bounds. This mission formalizes that chain.

Setting

There is a finite set N\mathcal NN of NNN locations and K≥1K\ge 1K≥1 vehicles. Trip requests from iii to jjj arrive at rate Λij≥0\Lambda_{ij}\ge 0Λij​≥0; the pairs with positive demand form A={(i,j):Λij>0}\mathcal A=\{(i,j):\Lambda_{ij}>0\}A={(i,j):Λij​>0}, and the network (N,A)(\mathcal N,\mathcal A)(N,A) is strongly connected. A trip from iii to jjj lasts on average 1/μij1/\mu_{ij}1/μij​. A quantile policy q=(qij)q=(q_{ij})q=(qij​), qij∈[0,1]q_{ij}\in[0,1]qij​∈[0,1], is the fraction of requests that accept the posted price; the effective rates are λij=qijΛij\lambda_{ij}=q_{ij}\Lambda_{ij}λij​=qij​Λij​ and λi=∑jλij\lambda_i=\sum_j\lambda_{ij}λi​=∑j​λij​. Each served trip earns Iij(qij)I_{ij}(q_{ij})Iij​(qij​), and q↦qIij(q)q\mapsto qI_{ij}(q)q↦qIij​(q) is concave.

The fluid problem (2) is

max⁡q Rs(q)=∑(i,j)∈AΛijqijIij(qij)s.t.∑jΛijqij=∑jΛjiqji ∀i,∑(i,j)∈AΛijqijμij≤Δ,qij∈[0,1],\max_q\ R_s(q)=\sum_{(i,j)\in\mathcal A}\Lambda_{ij}q_{ij}I_{ij}(q_{ij})\quad\text{s.t.}\quad\sum_j\Lambda_{ij}q_{ij}=\sum_j\Lambda_{ji}q_{ji}\ \forall i,\quad \sum_{(i,j)\in\mathcal A}\frac{\Lambda_{ij}q_{ij}}{\mu_{ij}}\le\Delta,\quad q_{ij}\in[0,1],qmax​ Rs​(q)=(i,j)∈A∑​Λij​qij​Iij​(qij​)s.t.j∑​Λij​qij​=j∑​Λji​qji​ ∀i,(i,j)∈A∑​μij​Λij​qij​​≤Δ,qij​∈[0,1],

with Δ≥K\Delta\ge KΔ≥K. Its optimal solution qsq^sqs is the static policy; it is assumed to induce a strongly connected network. The value Rs(qs)R_s(q^s)Rs​(qs) is the fluid optimum.

Under a static policy the fleet moves through a closed queueing network: a single-server pick-up queue at each location, served at rate λi\lambda_iλi​, and an infinite-server transit queue for each pair, with mean time 1/μij1/\mu_{ij}1/μij​. The paper invokes the BCMP theorem for this network; the mission writes its stationary law as the product form. With rrr a positive solution of the traffic equations (9), ri=∑jrjλji/λjr_i=\sum_j r_j\lambda_{ji}/\lambda_jri​=∑j​rj​λji​/λj​, a state xxx (vehicle counts at locations and in transit, total KKK) has weight

w(x)=∏i(riλi)xi∏(i,j)1xij!(riλijλiμij)xij.w(x)=\prod_i\Bigl(\frac{r_i}{\lambda_i}\Bigr)^{x_i}\prod_{(i,j)}\frac{1}{x_{ij}!}\Bigl(\frac{r_i\lambda_{ij}}{\lambda_i\mu_{ij}}\Bigr)^{x_{ij}}.w(x)=i∏​(λi​ri​​)xi​(i,j)∏​xij​!1​(λi​μij​ri​λij​​)xij​.

The availability αi(K)\alpha_i(K)αi​(K) is the weight share of the states with xi≥1x_i\ge 1xi​≥1: the probability that a customer at iii finds a vehicle. The reward rate of the static policy is (3):

R(qs)=∑(i,j)∈Aαi ΛijqijsIij(qijs).R(q^s)=\sum_{(i,j)\in\mathcal A}\alpha_i\,\Lambda_{ij}q^s_{ij}I_{ij}(q^s_{ij}).R(qs)=(i,j)∈A∑​αi​Λij​qijs​Iij​(qijs​).

Finally Λ=∑AΛij\Lambda=\sum_{\mathcal A}\Lambda_{ij}Λ=∑A​Λij​, 1/μ=∑AΛij/(Λμij)1/\mu=\sum_{\mathcal A}\Lambda_{ij}/(\Lambda\mu_{ij})1/μ=∑A​Λij​/(Λμij​), and λ/μ=∑AΛijqijs/μij\lambda/\mu=\sum_{\mathcal A}\Lambda_{ij}q^s_{ij}/\mu_{ij}λ/μ=∑A​Λij​qijs​/μij​.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 2, static half (p. 9)

With B0j(qs)=B0j=0B^j_0(q^s)=B^j_0=0B0j​(qs)=B0j​=0 and, for 1≤i≤K1\le i\le K1≤i≤K,

BiK(qs)=KN+K−1+λμ(1−Bi−1K−1(qs)),BiK=KN+K−1+Λμ(1−Bi−1K−1),B^K_i(q^s)=\frac{K}{N+K-1+\frac{\lambda}{\mu}\bigl(1-B^{K-1}_{i-1}(q^s)\bigr)},\qquad B^K_i=\frac{K}{N+K-1+\frac{\Lambda}{\mu}\bigl(1-B^{K-1}_{i-1}\bigr)},BiK​(qs)=N+K−1+μλ​(1−Bi−1K−1​(qs))K​,BiK​=N+K−1+μΛ​(1−Bi−1K−1​)K​,

the goal is: for every i=1,…,Ki=1,\dots,Ki=1,…,K,

R(qs)Rs(qs) ≥ BiK(qs) ≥ BiK ≥ KN+K−1+Λ/μ,\frac{R(q^s)}{R_s(q^s)}\ \ge\ B^K_i(q^s)\ \ge\ B^K_i\ \ge\ \frac{K}{N+K-1+\Lambda/\mu},Rs​(qs)R(qs)​ ≥ BiK​(qs) ≥ BiK​ ≥ N+K−1+Λ/μK​,

and Bi+1K>BiKB^K_{i+1}>B^K_iBi+1K​>BiK​ for i=1,…,K−1i=1,\dots,K-1i=1,…,K−1.

The paper's Theorem 2 begins with one more inequality, R(qs)/R(q∗)≥R(qs)/Rs(qs)R(q^s)/R(q^*)\ge R(q^s)/R_s(q^s)R(qs)/R(q∗)≥R(qs)/Rs​(qs), where q∗q^*q∗ is the best state-dependent policy. That inequality is Proposition 1 (p. 6). Its proof needs the stationary behaviour of the network under an arbitrary state-dependent policy with matrix-exponential trip times, together with Jensen's inequality and Little's law; that model is not formalized here. Proposition 1 is not part of this mission. The goal is the remaining chain, and it implies the paper's theorem once Proposition 1 is available.

Milestones

  1. Equal availability under balanced flows (p. 7, Appendix p. 23): αi(K)=αj(K)\alpha_i(K)=\alpha_j(K)αi​(K)=αj​(K).
  2. The ratio equals the availability (pp. 7–8): R(qs)/Rs(qs)=αR(q^s)/R_s(q^s)=\alphaR(qs)/Rs​(qs)=α.
  3. Equation (5) (p. 8): α(K)=K/(K+N−1+λμ(1−α(K−1)))\alpha(K)=K/\bigl(K+N-1+\frac{\lambda}{\mu}(1-\alpha(K-1))\bigr)α(K)=K/(K+N−1+μλ​(1−α(K−1))).
  4. Theorem 1, static half (p. 7): R(qs)/Rs(qs)≥K/(K+N−1+Λ/μ)R(q^s)/R_s(q^s)\ge K/(K+N-1+\Lambda/\mu)R(qs)/Rs​(qs)≥K/(K+N−1+Λ/μ).
  5. Equation (6) and 0≤α(K−i)≤(K−i)/(N+K−i−1)0\le\alpha(K-i)\le(K-i)/(N+K-i-1)0≤α(K−i)≤(K−i)/(N+K−i−1) (p. 9).
  6. BKK(qs)=α(K)B^K_K(q^s)=\alpha(K)BKK​(qs)=α(K) (p. 10).
  7. Bi+1K(qs)>BiK(qs)B^K_{i+1}(q^s)>B^K_i(q^s)Bi+1K​(qs)>BiK​(qs) (p. 10).

Significance

The bound K/(N+K−1+Λ/μ)K/(N+K-1+\Lambda/\mu)K/(N+K−1+Λ/μ) holds for every fleet size, tends to 111 at rate O(1/K)O(1/K)O(1/K), and reduces to the Waserhole–Jost bound when travel times vanish. The sequence BiK(qs)B^K_i(q^s)BiK​(qs) gives a computable certificate between that bound and the exact ratio BKK(qs)=α(K)B^K_K(q^s)=\alpha(K)BKK​(qs)=α(K), which an operator can evaluate from NNN, KKK and the fluid solution alone. Equation (5), a one-step recursion in the fleet size for a network mixing single-server and infinite-server stations, is the reusable core: the two sibling missions (the demand-free bound of Theorem 3 and the split-network bound of Theorem 4) rest on the same recursion.

The results are proved in the paper; none is formalized elsewhere as far as a search of the platform shows. The platform has the multiclass BCMP framework and single-server closed Jackson networks, but not availability in networks with infinite-server stations, nor equation (5). This mission adds a product-form availability layer, the equal-availability lemma, the recursion (5), and the bound chain.

Difficulty

The paper derives (5) from the random observer (arrival) theorem and Little's law, and neither is available as a formal tool, so the recursion has to be obtained from the product form itself, as an identity between sums over the state spaces with KKK and K−1K-1K−1 vehicles. Equal availability needs uniqueness, up to scale, of the positive solution of the traffic equations on a strongly connected network (a Perron–Frobenius-type fact for an irreducible stochastic matrix). In the bound chain, BiK(qs)≥BiKB^K_i(q^s)\ge B^K_iBiK​(qs)≥BiK​ needs the recursion map to be monotone in both the workload and the previous value, which holds only once 0≤B≤10\le B\le 10≤B≤1 is established; strict monotonicity in iii is a double induction.

The obvious shortcut, defining α\alphaα by the recursion (5), makes Theorem 1 a one-line consequence of α(K−1)≥0\alpha(K-1)\ge 0α(K−1)≥0 and deletes the content of the first three milestones; the mission rules it out by defining α\alphaα as the product form.

Formalization scope

Locations form a Fintype with Nonempty; NNN is its cardinality. Demand, travel rates, rewards and policies are functions on all ordered pairs, self-pairs included; sums over A\mathcal AA are sums over all pairs, which agree because each summand carries Λij\Lambda_{ij}Λij​. Strong connectivity, of (N,A)(\mathcal N,\mathcal A)(N,A) and of the network induced by qsq^sqs, uses nonempty paths (Relation.TransGen), so every location has positive accepted demand and A≠∅\mathcal A\ne\emptysetA=∅. Every ordered pair has a transit queue; a pair with λij=0\lambda_{ij}=0λij​=0 has load 000 and stays empty (00=10^0=100=1). All arithmetic on KKK, NNN and iii is in R\mathbb RR; B(K,0)=0B(K,0)=0B(K,0)=0 for every K≥0K\ge 0K≥0, including the B00B^0_0B00​ that the paper's definition omits. Rs(qs)>0R_s(q^s)>0Rs​(qs)>0 is a hypothesis of the ratio statements, since otherwise the ratio is 0/00/00/0. The statements keep the paper's hypothesis that qsq^sqs is optimal for (2) with Δ≥K\Delta\ge KΔ≥K; the proofs use only feasibility and balanced flows, and the queueing milestones are stated for every balanced quantile policy inducing a strongly connected network.

The product form is a definition: the mission does not prove that it is the stationary law of the network's Markov chain (the BCMP theorem). The general closed product-form network (single-server and infinite-server stations on an arbitrary finite station set) is a separate definition and is reusable beyond this mission. Contributions welcome: proofs of (5) via normalizing constants, the traffic-equation uniqueness lemma, and the elementary bound-sequence inequalities.

Selected references

  • S. Benjaafar, X. Shen, Pricing in On-Demand (and One-Way) Vehicle Sharing Networks, SSRN abstract 3998297, version of 2023-01-10. https://ssrn.com/abstract=3998297 ; Technical Note, Operations Research, 2023. https://doi.org/10.1287/opre.2023.2446
  • F. Baskett, K. M. Chandy, R. R. Muntz, F. G. Palacios, Open, Closed, and Mixed Networks of Queues with Different Classes of Customers, J. ACM 22(2), 1975. https://doi.org/10.1145/321879.321887
  • S. Banerjee, D. Freund, T. Lykouris, Pricing and Optimization in Shared Vehicle Systems: An Approximation Framework, Operations Research 70(3), 2022. https://arxiv.org/abs/1803.07841
  • A. Waserhole, V. Jost, Pricing in Vehicle Sharing Systems: Optimization in Queuing Networks with Product Forms, EURO J. Transportation and Logistics 5, 2016. https://doi.org/10.1007/s13676-014-0054-4
  • D. K. George, C. H. Xia, Fleet-Sizing and Service Availability for a Vehicle Rental System via Closed Queueing Networks, European J. Operational Research 211(1), 2011. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ejor.2010.12.015
  • M. Reiser, S. S. Lavenberg, Mean-Value Analysis of Closed Multichain Queuing Networks, J. ACM 27(2), 1980. https://doi.org/10.1145/322186.322195
12 thms1 active userReviewed
Statistics·Captain: mikedeng1

Design and Analysis of Switchback Experiments 2: Under the Optimal Design the Horvitz–Thompson Estimator Is Asymptotically Normal as the Number of Epochs n → ∞Research Paper

Motivation

Online platforms such as ride-hailing, delivery and marketplace companies routinely test a new policy (a pricing rule, a dispatching algorithm) by switching it on and off over time on a single unit, a city or a market, rather than by randomizing over users. These switchback experiments avoid the interference that user-level randomization creates in two-sided markets, but they face a different problem: a treatment administered at one time keeps affecting outcomes for several periods afterwards (carryover effects). Bojinov, Simchi-Levi and Zhao, Design and Analysis of Switchback Experiments (arXiv:2009.00148, Management Science 69(7), 2023), derive the minimax-optimal design when the carryover lasts at most mmm periods, and then ask how to do inference with it. This mission formalizes the inference half: under the optimal design, the Horvitz–Thompson estimator of the lag-mmm effect is asymptotically normal as the number of epochs grows, which is what justifies the paper's normal-approximation test and confidence intervals.

The result is a finite-population central limit theorem: the potential outcomes are fixed, non-random numbers, and all randomness comes from the experimenter's coin flips. It belongs to the line of design-based limit theorems of Li and Ding (2017), Aronow et al. (2017) and Bojinov et al. (2021). Its probabilistic engine is the central limit theorem of Romano and Wolf (2000) for triangular arrays of ϕ\phiϕ-dependent random variables, which goes back to the mmm-dependent central limit theorem of Hoeffding and Robbins (1948).

Setting

There are TTT time periods t∈[T]={1,…,T}t\in[T]=\{1,\dots,T\}t∈[T]={1,…,T}. An assignment path w1:T∈{0,1}Tw_{1:T}\in\{0,1\}^Tw1:T​∈{0,1}T records treatment (wt=1w_t=1wt​=1) or control (wt=0w_t=0wt​=0) in each period. The potential outcomes are real numbers Yt(w1:T)Y_t(w_{1:T})Yt​(w1:T​). They are assumed non-anticipating (Assumption 1: YtY_tYt​ depends only on w1:tw_{1:t}w1:t​) and to have mmm-carryover effects (Assumption 2: for t>mt>mt>m, YtY_tYt​ does not depend on w1:t−m−1w_{1:t-m-1}w1:t−m−1​). Assumption 3 bounds them: ∣Yt(w1:T)∣≤B|Y_t(w_{1:T})|\le B∣Yt​(w1:T​)∣≤B. Write Yt(1m+1)Y_t(\mathbf 1_{m+1})Yt​(1m+1​) and Yt(0m+1)Y_t(\mathbf 0_{m+1})Yt​(0m+1​) for the outcome after m+1m+1m+1 consecutive treatments, respectively controls. The lag-mmm causal effect is

τm=1T−m∑t=m+1T[Yt(1m+1)−Yt(0m+1)].\tau_m=\frac1{T-m}\sum_{t=m+1}^{T}\big[Y_t(\mathbf 1_{m+1})-Y_t(\mathbf 0_{m+1})\big].τm​=T−m1​t=m+1∑T​[Yt​(1m+1​)−Yt​(0m+1​)].

A regular switchback design flips an independent coin with success probability qk∈(0,1)q_k\in(0,1)qk​∈(0,1) at each randomization point t0=1<t1<⋯<tKt_0=1<t_1<\dots<t_Kt0​=1<t1​<⋯<tK​, and every period copies the most recent coin. The Horvitz–Thompson estimator τ^m\hat\tau_mτ^m​ weights the observed outcome at time ttt by the inverse probability that the last m+1m+1m+1 assignments were all treatments (respectively all controls).

In the nnn-replica experiment T=nmT=nmT=nm, and the optimal design of the paper's Theorem 2 uses fair coins at

T∗={1,  2m+1,  3m+1,  …,  (n−2)m+1}.\mathbb T^*=\{1,\;2m+1,\;3m+1,\;\dots,\;(n-2)m+1\}.T∗={1,2m+1,3m+1,…,(n−2)m+1}.

The periods split into n−1n-1n−1 blocks {(k+1)m+1,…,(k+2)m}\{(k+1)m+1,\dots,(k+2)m\}{(k+1)m+1,…,(k+2)m}, k=0,…,n−2k=0,\dots,n-2k=0,…,n−2, with block sums Yˉk(1m+1)\bar Y_k(\mathbf 1_{m+1})Yˉk​(1m+1​), Yˉk(0m+1)\bar Y_k(\mathbf 0_{m+1})Yˉk​(0m+1​) and block errors 1ˉk\bar{\mathbb 1}_k1ˉk​, so that τ^m−τm=(T−m)−1∑k1ˉk\hat\tau_m-\tau_m=(T-m)^{-1}\sum_k\bar{\mathbb 1}_kτ^m​−τm​=(T−m)−1∑k​1ˉk​. Assumption 4 (non-negligible variance) requires Var(τ^m)≥c/n\mathrm{Var}(\hat\tau_m)\ge c/nVar(τ^m​)≥c/n for some c>0c>0c>0 and all large nnn.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 3 (asymptotic normality)

For fixed mmm, under Assumptions 1–2, Assumption 3 with one bound BBB for all nnn, and Assumption 4,

τ^m−τmVar(τ^m)→DN(0,1)(n→∞).\frac{\hat\tau_m-\tau_m}{\sqrt{\mathrm{Var}(\hat\tau_m)}}\xrightarrow{D}\mathcal N(0,1)\qquad(n\to\infty).Var(τ^m​)​τ^m​−τm​​D​N(0,1)(n→∞).

The statement fixes no rate and does not require Var(τ^m)\mathrm{Var}(\hat\tau_m)Var(τ^m​) to converge.

Milestones

  1. Block decomposition (EC.4.1–EC.4.2): τ^m−τm=(T−m)−1∑k=0n−21ˉk\hat\tau_m-\tau_m=(T-m)^{-1}\sum_{k=0}^{n-2}\bar{\mathbb 1}_kτ^m​−τm​=(T−m)−1∑k=0n−2​1ˉk​ with E1ˉk=0\mathbb E\bar{\mathbb 1}_k=0E1ˉk​=0.
  2. 1-dependence (proof of Theorem 3): the block errors 1ˉ0,…,1ˉn−2\bar{\mathbb 1}_0,\dots,\bar{\mathbb 1}_{n-2}1ˉ0​,…,1ˉn−2​ form a 1-dependent sequence.
  3. Lemma 2: the closed form (10) of Var(τ^m)\mathrm{Var}(\hat\tau_m)Var(τ^m​) in terms of the block sums.
  4. Block-variance bound (proof of Theorem 3): Bn,k,a2≤16kB2/(n−1)2B^2_{n,k,a}\le16kB^2/(n-1)^2Bn,k,a2​≤16kB2/(n−1)2 for the scaled partial sums.
  5. Lemma EC.1 (Romano–Wolf): the central limit theorem for ϕ\phiϕ-dependent triangular arrays.

Companions

Corollary 1, the conservative bound Var(τ^m)≤VarU(τ^m)\mathrm{Var}(\hat\tau_m)\le\mathrm{Var}^U(\hat\tau_m)Var(τ^m​)≤VarU(τ^m​) with the unbiased estimator σ^U2\hat\sigma^2_Uσ^U2​, and Corollary 2(i), that (10) still holds when the design is built for an overestimated order p>mp>mp>m.

Significance

Theorem 3 is what turns the optimal design into a usable inferential procedure: together with Corollary 1 it gives the test statistic ∣τ^m∣/σ^U2|\hat\tau_m|/\sqrt{\hat\sigma^2_U}∣τ^m​∣/σ^U2​​ and its normal ppp-value, a conservative large-sample test of the null of no lag-mmm effect that needs no model for the outcomes. Corollary 2 extends the guarantee to a misspecified carryover order p>mp>mp>m. Lemma EC.1 is a general tool, applicable to any statistic that decomposes into a sum of weakly dependent pieces, such as block designs, time-series bootstraps and spatial experiments.

The paper proves these results. None of them is formalized: Mathlib has the central limit theorem for i.i.d. sequences only, and no central limit theorem for dependent arrays exists on the platform. The work here is to formalize the known proof: the exact second-moment computations of the design, the 1-dependence of the blocks, and a proof of the Romano–Wolf theorem itself, which the paper takes from the literature.

Difficulty

The randomness is a finite set of coin flips and the outcomes change with nnn, so no i.i.d. structure is available: the block errors are neither independent nor identically distributed, and the classical Lindeberg–Lévy theorem does not apply. The obvious reduction, treating neighbouring blocks as independent, fails, because adjacent blocks share a coin. This is why the cross terms appear in (10), and why a dependent-array central limit theorem is needed. The variance normalisation is random-design specific and may oscillate in nnn, so the limit theorem has to be proved with a self-normalisation that does not converge. Lemma EC.1 is the main obstacle: a ϕ\phiϕ-dependent central limit theorem for triangular arrays with Lyapunov-type moment conditions, which is not in Mathlib.

Formalization scope

A path is a function ℕ → Bool of which only 1,…,T1,\dots,T1,…,T is read; potential outcomes are ℕ → Path → ℝ. The design law is encoded as independent coins at the randomization points, mapped to paths; in the nnn-replica experiment the probability space is the uniform measure on the coin vectors of T∗\mathbb T^*T∗. Row nnn of the sequence has T=nmT=nmT=nm and potential outcomes Y n. Rows n<4n<4n<4 exist in Lean but are degenerate and irrelevant to the limit. Convergence in distribution is Mathlib's TendstoInDistribution, and the limit is gaussianReal 0 1. Ω(n−1)\Omega(n^{-1})Ω(n−1) and O(1)O(1)O(1) are explicit constants with an eventual threshold. The estimand, estimator and variance in the goal are the model's definitions, not a hand-written formula in the coins.

Three hypotheses are added to the printed statements, each necessary and disclosed in the item's Formalization Note:

  • Theorem 3 assumes Assumption 3 with one BBB for all nnn. The page omits it, the proof uses it, and without it the statement is false.
  • Lemma EC.1 assumes dn→∞d_n\to\inftydn​→∞. This is Romano and Wolf's sixth condition for fixed ϕ\phiϕ, and without it the lemma fails with dn=1d_n=1dn​=1.
  • Lemma EC.1 assumes Ln>0L_n>0Ln​>0, which the ratios in its conditions 4–5 presuppose.

The goal does not assume 1-dependence, the variance formula or any condition of Lemma EC.1; those are milestones, so the goal cannot be discharged by a hypothesis.

A complete development needs:

  • finite-coin product measures and the independence of functions of disjoint coordinates;
  • exact second-moment computations for the design;
  • a ϕ\phiϕ-dependent central limit theorem for triangular arrays.

The last two, Lemma EC.1 and Definition EC.1, are reusable well beyond this mission. Contributions to any milestone, including alternative proofs of Lemma EC.1, are welcome.

Selected references

  • I. Bojinov, D. Simchi-Levi, J. Zhao, Design and Analysis of Switchback Experiments, Management Science 69(7), 2023. https://arxiv.org/abs/2009.00148 (v4)
  • J. P. Romano, M. Wolf, A more general central limit theorem for m-dependent random variables with unbounded m, Statistics & Probability Letters 47, 115–124, 2000.
  • W. Hoeffding, H. Robbins, The central limit theorem for dependent random variables, Duke Mathematical Journal 15(3), 773–780, 1948.
  • X. Li, P. Ding, General forms of finite population central limit theorems with applications to causal inference, Journal of the American Statistical Association 112, 1759–1769, 2017.
  • I. Bojinov, N. Shephard, Time series experiments and causal estimands: exact randomization tests and trading, Journal of the American Statistical Association 114, 1665–1682, 2019.
9 thms1 active userReviewed
Operations ResearchOptimizationStochastic Systems·Captain: mikedeng1

Pricing in On-Demand and One-Way Vehicle-Sharing Networks 2: With Workload Budget K, Static Prices Earn a Demand-Independent 1 − O(1/√K) Fraction of the Fluid OptimumResearch Paper

Motivation

One-way vehicle-sharing systems (car sharing, bike sharing, ride-hailing fleets) set a price for every origin–destination trip. Prices decide which trips are taken, and so they decide where vehicles end up. Pricing that depends on the current position of every vehicle is in principle optimal, but its state space grows combinatorially with the fleet. Practitioners therefore use static prices, which depend only on the origin and destination. The question is how much revenue, throughput or welfare such prices give up.

Benjaafar and Shen (SSRN 3998297; Technical Note, Operations Research, 2023, doi:10.1287/opre.2023.2446) answer this with explicit lower bounds on the performance ratio of the static policy obtained from a fluid relaxation. Banerjee, Freund and Lykouris (arXiv:1611.07624) proved the earlier guarantee, which requires the fleet size KKK to be at least 100100100 and the workload to be at most K−2Kln⁡KK-2\sqrt{K\ln K}K−2KlnK​. Benjaafar and Shen give two bounds that hold for every KKK. The first is K/(N+K−1+Λ/μ)K/(N+K-1+\Lambda/\mu)K/(N+K−1+Λ/μ) (their Theorems 1–2), and it degrades when total demand Λ\LambdaΛ grows with KKK. The second, Theorem 3, does not depend on demand or travel times at all. This mission is about Theorem 3.

Setting

There is a finite set N\mathcal NN of NNN locations and KKK vehicles. Trip requests from iii to jjj arrive as a Poisson process of rate Λij≥0\Lambda_{ij}\ge0Λij​≥0, and A={(i,j):Λij>0}\mathcal A=\{(i,j):\Lambda_{ij}>0\}A={(i,j):Λij​>0} is the set of pairs with demand. The graph (N,A)(\mathcal N,\mathcal A)(N,A) is strongly connected. A trip from iii to jjj lasts a random time with mean 1/μij1/\mu_{ij}1/μij​. A static policy is a matrix q=(qij)q=(q_{ij})q=(qij​) of quantiles: qij∈[0,1]q_{ij}\in[0,1]qij​∈[0,1] is the fraction of (i,j)(i,j)(i,j) customers who accept the posted price. Each accepted trip earns a reward Iij(qij)I_{ij}(q_{ij})Iij​(qij​), and q↦q Iij(q)q\mapsto q\,I_{ij}(q)q↦qIij​(q) is concave. A customer who finds no vehicle at the origin is lost.

Problem (2) is the fluid relaxation, in which vehicles are always available:

max⁡q Rs(q)=∑(i,j)∈AΛijqijIij(qij)s.t.∑jΛijqij=∑jΛjiqji,∑(i,j)∈AΛijqijμij≤Δ,qij∈[0,1].\max_q\ R_s(q)=\sum_{(i,j)\in\mathcal A}\Lambda_{ij}q_{ij}I_{ij}(q_{ij}) \quad\text{s.t.}\quad \sum_j\Lambda_{ij}q_{ij}=\sum_j\Lambda_{ji}q_{ji},\quad \sum_{(i,j)\in\mathcal A}\frac{\Lambda_{ij}q_{ij}}{\mu_{ij}}\le\Delta,\quad q_{ij}\in[0,1].qmax​ Rs​(q)=(i,j)∈A∑​Λij​qij​Iij​(qij​)s.t.j∑​Λij​qij​=j∑​Λji​qji​,(i,j)∈A∑​μij​Λij​qij​​≤Δ,qij​∈[0,1].

The first constraint balances the flows, and the second caps the workload λ/μ=∑Λijqij/μij\lambda/\mu=\sum\Lambda_{ij}q_{ij}/\mu_{ij}λ/μ=∑Λij​qij​/μij​ (the mean number of vehicles in transit) by a budget Δ\DeltaΔ. Let qsq^sqs be an optimal solution that induces a strongly connected network.

Under a static policy the vehicles move in a closed queueing network. Each location has a single-server pick-up queue with service rate λi=∑jΛijqij\lambda_i=\sum_j\Lambda_{ij}q_{ij}λi​=∑j​Λij​qij​. Each pair has an infinite-server transit queue with mean service time 1/μij1/\mu_{ij}1/μij​. This network is of BCMP type, so its stationary law has product form. With rrr a positive solution of the traffic equations (9), a state with xix_ixi​ vehicles at location iii and xijx_{ij}xij​ in transit from iii to jjj has weight ∏i(ri/λi)xi∏(i,j)(riλij/(λiμij))xij/xij!\prod_i(r_i/\lambda_i)^{x_i}\prod_{(i,j)}(r_i\lambda_{ij}/(\lambda_i\mu_{ij}))^{x_{ij}}/x_{ij}!∏i​(ri​/λi​)xi​∏(i,j)​(ri​λij​/(λi​μij​))xij​/xij​!. The availability αi(K)\alpha_i(K)αi​(K) is the stationary probability that location iii holds at least one vehicle. The reward rate of the policy is Equation (3):

R(q)=∑(i,j)∈Aαi ΛijqijIij(qij).R(q)=\sum_{(i,j)\in\mathcal A}\alpha_i\,\Lambda_{ij}q_{ij}I_{ij}(q_{ij}).R(q)=(i,j)∈A∑​αi​Λij​qij​Iij​(qij​).

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 3, static half

For K≥1K\ge1K≥1, Δ=K\Delta=KΔ=K, qsq^sqs optimal for (2), inducing a strongly connected network, with Rs(qs)>0R_s(q^s)>0Rs​(qs)>0:

R(qs)Rs(qs) ≥ 1−((N−12K+12(N+K)+1)2−1−(N−12K+12(N+K))).\frac{R(q^s)}{R_s(q^s)}\ \ge\ 1-\left(\sqrt{\Bigl(\tfrac{N-1}{2K}+\tfrac{1}{2(N+K)}+1\Bigr)^2-1}-\Bigl(\tfrac{N-1}{2K}+\tfrac{1}{2(N+K)}\Bigr)\right).Rs​(qs)R(qs)​ ≥ 1−((2KN−1​+2(N+K)1​+1)2−1​−(2KN−1​+2(N+K)1​)).

The paper states the bound for R(qs)/R(q∗)R(q^s)/R(q^*)R(qs)/R(q∗), where q∗q^*q∗ is the optimal dynamic policy. It passes from one ratio to the other with Proposition 1, R(q∗)≤Rs(qs)R(q^*)\le R_s(q^s)R(q∗)≤Rs​(qs) (p. 6), whose proof needs the stationary analysis of arbitrary state-dependent policies. Proposition 1 is not part of this mission. The goal implies the paper's Theorem 3 once Proposition 1 is available.

Milestones

  1. Equal availability (pp. 7, 23): under balanced flows, αi(K)=αj(K)\alpha_i(K)=\alpha_j(K)αi​(K)=αj​(K) for all i,ji,ji,j.
  2. R(qs)/Rs(qs)=αR(q^s)/R_s(q^s)=\alphaR(qs)/Rs​(qs)=α (pp. 7–8).
  3. Equation (5) (p. 8): α(K)=K/(K+N−1+(λ/μ)(1−α(K−1)))\alpha(K)=K/\bigl(K+N-1+(\lambda/\mu)(1-\alpha(K-1))\bigr)α(K)=K/(K+N−1+(λ/μ)(1−α(K−1))).
  4. β(K)=K/(N+K−1+Δ(1−β(K−1)))\beta(K)=K/(N+K-1+\Delta(1-\beta(K-1)))β(K)=K/(N+K−1+Δ(1−β(K−1))), β(0)=0\beta(0)=0β(0)=0, is non-decreasing and concave (p. 10).
  5. α(K)≥β(K)\alpha(K)\ge\beta(K)α(K)≥β(K) for K≥1K\ge1K≥1 when λ/μ≤Δ\lambda/\mu\le\Deltaλ/μ≤Δ (p. 11).
  6. β(K)−β(K−1)≤β(1)=1/(N+Δ)\beta(K)-\beta(K-1)\le\beta(1)=1/(N+\Delta)β(K)−β(K−1)≤β(1)=1/(N+Δ) (p. 11).
  7. β(K)≥(bK−bK2−4KΔ)/(2Δ)\beta(K)\ge\bigl(b_K-\sqrt{b_K^2-4K\Delta}\bigr)/(2\Delta)β(K)≥(bK​−bK2​−4KΔ​)/(2Δ) with bK=N+K−1+Δ+Δ/(N+Δ)b_K=N+K-1+\Delta+\Delta/(N+\Delta)bK​=N+K−1+Δ+Δ/(N+Δ) (p. 11).

Significance

The bound tends to 111 at rate 1−O(1/K)1-O(1/\sqrt K)1−O(1/K​), uniformly in demand rates, travel times and the reward functions. It is the regime-free counterpart of the K/(N+K−1+Λ/μ)K/(N+K-1+\Lambda/\mu)K/(N+K−1+Λ/μ) bound: that bound is better for light demand, this one for heavy demand (Remark 7). Remark 6 reports that it is also numerically tighter than the guarantee of Banerjee et al., and unlike that guarantee it applies to every fleet size.

Formalizing it adds several things to the platform. The first is availability in closed networks of single-server and infinite-server stations, defined from the product form. Two classical facts about this model follow: availability is equal across locations under balanced flows, and it satisfies the mean-value recursion (5). Milestone 4 is a concavity statement about the throughput of a closed network in its population, and for N=1N=1N=1 it contains the concavity of the Erlang-B carried load in the number of servers. The paper does not prove it; it cites George and Xia (2011) and Shanthikumar and Yao (1988). None of these results is formalized anywhere that this mission is aware of, so the mission formalizes a proved result, not an open problem.

Difficulty

The algebra at the end (milestones 6–7 and the substitution Δ=K\Delta=KΔ=K) is elementary. Two steps are not.

Equation (5) is stated as a relation between availabilities, but its content is an identity between normalizing constants G(K−1)/G(K)G(K-1)/G(K)G(K−1)/G(K) of the product form. The paper derives it from the arrival theorem and Little's law, and neither is available. A direct proof has to compute G(K)G(K)G(K) under balanced flows, which takes a counting argument over the state space. Equal availability likewise needs the positive solution of (9) to be unique up to scale on a strongly connected network.

Concavity of β\betaβ is the hard milestone. A natural first attempt is induction on the recursion: if β(K)−β(K−1)\beta(K)-\beta(K-1)β(K)−β(K−1) is non-increasing up to KKK, show that the next increment is no larger. The map β(K−1)↦β(K)\beta(K-1)\mapsto\beta(K)β(K−1)↦β(K) is increasing and convex in its argument, and convexity points the wrong way, so increments do not propagate directly. The published proofs go through the closed-network interpretation, not through the recursion.

Formalization scope

The Lean development lives in VehicleSharePricing.DemandFree. Locations are a Fintype with Nonempty, and NNN is its cardinality. Λ, μ, q are real matrices on all pairs, and entries outside A\mathcal AA enter only multiplied by Λij=0\Lambda_{ij}=0Λij​=0. Strong connectivity is the transitive closure of the positive-flow relation (Relation.TransGen). This guarantees λi>0\lambda_i>0λi​>0 at every location, even for N=1N=1N=1. Availability is the product-form busy probability of the general definition ProductFormNetwork, applied to the induced network. That law is a definition that records the paper's appeal to BCMP (p. 6), not a theorem of this mission. Theorems quantify over every positive solution rrr of (9). R(q)R(q)R(q) is Equation (3) with per-location availabilities. The sequence β\betaβ is defined by its recursion, which is correct because it is a proof device, not the availability of qsq^sqs. All arithmetic is in R\mathbb RR, and K−1K-1K−1 appears only under K≥1K\ge1K≥1.

Two trivializations are ruled out. Defining α\alphaα by the recursion (5) would make milestones 1–3 empty, and defining R(q)R(q)R(q) as αRs(q)\alpha R_s(q)αRs​(q) would make milestone 1 empty. The hypothesis Rs(qs)>0R_s(q^s)>0Rs​(qs)>0 is added because the ratio is otherwise 0/00/00/0.

The proof of the goal uses only feasibility of qsq^sqs and the strong connectivity of the induced network; optimality is kept because it is the paper's hypothesis. Contributions are welcome on any milestone. A library for normalizing constants of closed product-form networks, and the concavity of throughput in the population, would be reusable well beyond this paper.

Selected references

  • S. Benjaafar, X. Shen, Pricing in On-Demand (and One-Way) Vehicle Sharing Networks, SSRN abstract 3998297, version of 2023-01-10; Technical Note, Operations Research, 2023. https://ssrn.com/abstract=3998297, https://doi.org/10.1287/opre.2023.2446
  • S. Banerjee, D. Freund, T. Lykouris, Pricing and Optimization in Shared Vehicle Systems: An Approximation Framework, Operations Research, 2022 (cited by the paper as forthcoming); arXiv:1611.07624. https://arxiv.org/abs/1611.07624
  • F. Baskett, K. M. Chandy, R. R. Muntz, F. G. Palacios, Open, Closed, and Mixed Networks of Queues with Different Classes of Customers, Journal of the ACM 22(2), 1975. https://doi.org/10.1145/321879.321887
  • D. K. George, C. H. Xia, Fleet-Sizing and Service Availability for a Vehicle Rental System via Closed Queueing Networks, European Journal of Operational Research 211(1), 2011. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ejor.2010.12.015
  • J. G. Shanthikumar, D. D. Yao, Second-Order Properties of the Throughput of a Closed Queueing Network, Mathematics of Operations Research 13(3), 1988. https://doi.org/10.1287/moor.13.3.524
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Pricing in On-Demand and One-Way Vehicle-Sharing Networks 3: The K/(N+K−1+Λ/μ) Guarantee Holds When Static Prices Split the Network into ComponentsResearch Paper

Motivation

One-way vehicle-sharing systems (car sharing, bike sharing, on-demand fleets) move a fixed fleet of KKK vehicles among NNN locations. Customers take a vehicle at one location and leave it at another, so prices shape both revenue and where the fleet ends up. The optimal dynamic pricing policy, which reacts to the current position of every vehicle, solves a dynamic program whose state space grows combinatorially in NNN and KKK. Static policies, with one fixed price per origin–destination pair, are simple to compute and to operate, and the question is how much they lose.

Benjaafar and Shen (SSRN 3998297; Operations Research, 2023, doi:10.1287/opre.2023.2446) take the static policy qsq^sqs that solves a fluid relaxation, Problem (2), and bound its performance ratio. When qsq^sqs induces a strongly connected network, Theorem 1 gives the ratio K/(N+K−1+Λ/μ)K/(N+K-1+\Lambda/\mu)K/(N+K−1+Λ/μ). Waserhole and Jost (2016) observed that the best static policy may deliberately disconnect the network: prices that make some trips unattractive can leave two or more separate networks. The fleet then has to be split among the pieces, and Theorem 1 no longer applies. This mission formalizes Theorem 4 of the paper (§6, p. 18), which shows that the same guarantee holds in that case, provided the vehicles are allocated optimally among the networks.

Setting

There are NNN locations and KKK vehicles. Trip requests from location iii to jjj arrive at rate Λij≥0\Lambda_{ij}\ge0Λij​≥0, and A={(i,j):Λij>0}\mathcal A=\{(i,j):\Lambda_{ij}>0\}A={(i,j):Λij​>0} is strongly connected. A trip on (i,j)(i,j)(i,j) lasts on average 1/μij1/\mu_{ij}1/μij​. A static policy is a vector of quantiles qij∈[0,1]q_{ij}\in[0,1]qij​∈[0,1] (the fraction of customers who accept the price), and earns Iij(qij)I_{ij}(q_{ij})Iij​(qij​) per trip, with q↦qIij(q)q\mapsto qI_{ij}(q)q↦qIij​(q) concave.

Problem (2) maximises the fluid reward Rs(q)=∑AΛijqijIij(qij)R_s(q)=\sum_{\mathcal A}\Lambda_{ij}q_{ij}I_{ij}(q_{ij})Rs​(q)=∑A​Λij​qij​Iij​(qij​) over balanced flows (∑jΛijqij=∑jΛjiqji\sum_j\Lambda_{ij}q_{ij}=\sum_j\Lambda_{ji}q_{ji}∑j​Λij​qij​=∑j​Λji​qji​ at every location) with workload ∑AΛijqij/μij≤Δ\sum_{\mathcal A}\Lambda_{ij}q_{ij}/\mu_{ij}\le\Delta∑A​Λij​qij​/μij​≤Δ, where Δ≥K\Delta\ge KΔ≥K. Let qsq^sqs be an optimal solution.

The policy qsq^sqs splits the locations into networks ccc with location sets Nc\mathcal N_cNc​ (Nc=∣Nc∣N_c=|\mathcal N_c|Nc​=∣Nc​∣) and pair sets Ac\mathcal A_cAc​: accepted demand Λijqijs>0\Lambda_{ij}q^s_{ij}>0Λij​qijs​>0 only joins locations of the same network, and within each network it is strongly connected. With KcK_cKc​ vehicles, network ccc is a closed queueing network: a single-server pick-up queue at each location (rate λi=∑jΛijqijs\lambda_i=\sum_j\Lambda_{ij}q^s_{ij}λi​=∑j​Λij​qijs​) and an infinite-server transit queue on each pair. Its stationary law is the BCMP product form, with loads computed from a positive solution rrr of the traffic equations (9). The availability α(qs,Kc,Nc)\alpha(q^s,K_c,N_c)α(qs,Kc​,Nc​) is the stationary probability that a location of network ccc has a vehicle.

An allocation K=(Kc)\mathbf K=(K_c)K=(Kc​) with ∑cKc=K\sum_cK_c=K∑c​Kc​=K earns R(qs,K)=∑AαiΛijqijsIij(qijs)R(q^s,\mathbf K)=\sum_{\mathcal A}\alpha_i\Lambda_{ij}q^s_{ij}I_{ij}(q^s_{ij})R(qs,K)=∑A​αi​Λij​qijs​Iij​(qijs​) (Equation (3)), and Problem (8) chooses K∗\mathbf K^*K∗ to maximise it. Write Mc=∑AcΛijqijs/μijM_c=\sum_{\mathcal A_c}\Lambda_{ij}q^s_{ij}/\mu_{ij}Mc​=∑Ac​​Λij​qijs​/μij​, pcp_cpc​ for network ccc's share of Rs(qs)R_s(q^s)Rs​(qs), Λ=∑AΛij\Lambda=\sum_{\mathcal A}\Lambda_{ij}Λ=∑A​Λij​ and 1/μ=∑AΛij/(Λμij)1/\mu=\sum_{\mathcal A}\Lambda_{ij}/(\Lambda\mu_{ij})1/μ=∑A​Λij​/(Λμij​).

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 4, static half (p. 18)

R(qs,K∗)Rs(qs) ≥ KN+K−1+Λ/μ.\frac{R(q^s,\mathbf K^*)}{R_s(q^s)}\ \ge\ \frac{K}{N+K-1+\Lambda/\mu}.Rs​(qs)R(qs,K∗)​ ≥ N+K−1+Λ/μK​.

The paper's Theorem 4 opens with R(qs,K∗)/R(q∗)≥R(qs,K∗)/Rs(qs)R(q^s,\mathbf K^*)/R(q^*)\ge R(q^s,\mathbf K^*)/R_s(q^s)R(qs,K∗)/R(q∗)≥R(qs,K∗)/Rs​(qs), where R(q∗)R(q^*)R(q∗) is the reward of the optimal dynamic policy. That inequality is Proposition 1 (R(q∗)≤Rs(qs)R(q^*)\le R_s(q^s)R(q∗)≤Rs​(qs), p. 6). It needs the stationary distribution of the network under an arbitrary state-dependent policy, a controlled-Markov-chain development that is not part of this mission. The goal is the rest of the chain, and it implies the paper's theorem once Proposition 1 is available.

Milestones (p. 18–19)

  1. The recursion (5) on each network: α(qs,Kc,Nc)=Kc/(Nc+Kc−1+(1−α(qs,Kc−1,Nc))Mc)\alpha(q^s,K_c,N_c)=K_c/(N_c+K_c-1+(1-\alpha(q^s,K_c-1,N_c))M_c)α(qs,Kc​,Nc​)=Kc​/(Nc​+Kc​−1+(1−α(qs,Kc​−1,Nc​))Mc​).
  2. The mixture identity R(qs,K)/Rs(qs)=∑cα(qs,Kc,Nc)pcR(q^s,\mathbf K)/R_s(q^s)=\sum_c\alpha(q^s,K_c,N_c)p_cR(qs,K)/Rs​(qs)=∑c​α(qs,Kc​,Nc​)pc​, with ∑cpc=1\sum_cp_c=1∑c​pc​=1.
  3. The per-network bound pcKc/(Nc+Kc−1+Mc(1−α(qs,Kc−1,Nc)))≥pcKc/(Nc+Kc−1+Mc)p_cK_c/(N_c+K_c-1+M_c(1-\alpha(q^s,K_c-1,N_c)))\ge p_cK_c/(N_c+K_c-1+M_c)pc​Kc​/(Nc​+Kc​−1+Mc​(1−α(qs,Kc​−1,Nc​)))≥pc​Kc​/(Nc​+Kc​−1+Mc​).
  4. The reduction R(qs,K∗)/Rs(qs)≥max⁡∑Kc=K∑cpcKc/(Nc+Kc−1+Mc)R(q^s,\mathbf K^*)/R_s(q^s)\ge\max_{\sum K_c=K}\sum_cp_cK_c/(N_c+K_c-1+M_c)R(qs,K∗)/Rs​(qs)≥max∑Kc​=K​∑c​pc​Kc​/(Nc​+Kc​−1+Mc​).
  5. The Chu–Vandermonde identity ∑K1=0K(K+T−K1−T1−1K−K1)(T1+K1−1K1)=(K+T−1K)\sum_{K_1=0}^K\binom{K+T-K_1-T_1-1}{K-K_1}\binom{T_1+K_1-1}{K_1}=\binom{K+T-1}{K}∑K1​=0K​(K−K1​K+T−K1​−T1​−1​)(K1​T1​+K1​−1​)=(KK+T−1​) for real T1,T2>0T_1,T_2>0T1​,T2​>0.
  6. The reduced inequality for C=2C=2C=2: max⁡K1+K2=K∑i=12piKi/(Ni+Ki−1+Mi)≥K/(N+K−1+M)\max_{K_1+K_2=K}\sum_{i=1}^2p_iK_i/(N_i+K_i-1+M_i)\ge K/(N+K-1+M)maxK1​+K2​=K​∑i=12​pi​Ki​/(Ni​+Ki​−1+Mi​)≥K/(N+K−1+M).
  7. The same for any number of networks, the case C>2C>2C>2.

Significance

The result. Theorem 4 removes the connectivity assumption from Theorem 1. A static policy chosen by the fluid relaxation may disconnect the network, and it then still earns at least K/(N+K−1+Λ/μ)K/(N+K-1+\Lambda/\mu)K/(N+K−1+Λ/μ) of the fluid optimum, uniformly in the demand and reward data. The bound tends to 111 as K→∞K\to\inftyK→∞ for fixed NNN and Λ/μ\Lambda/\muΛ/μ. Milestones 6–7 hold for arbitrary weights, location counts and workloads, so they apply to any separable allocation problem whose pieces satisfy recursion (5).

Formalizing it. The result is proved in the paper; nothing here is open. No part of it is machine-checked so far. The mission adds closed-network availability on a disconnected network, the mixture decomposition of the performance ratio, a real-argument Vandermonde identity in the paper's own notation, and a discrete allocation inequality proved by an averaging argument. The companion missions of this series formalize Theorems 1–3 of the same paper.

Difficulty

The obvious argument applies Theorem 1 to each network: α(qs,Kc,Nc)≥Kc/(Nc+Kc−1+Mc)\alpha(q^s,K_c,N_c)\ge K_c/(N_c+K_c-1+M_c)α(qs,Kc​,Nc​)≥Kc​/(Nc​+Kc​−1+Mc​). This leaves a maximisation over allocations, and no single allocation obviously beats K/(N+K−1+M)K/(N+K-1+M)K/(N+K−1+M). Proportional splitting fails because Nc+Kc−1N_c+K_c-1Nc​+Kc​−1 does not scale with KcK_cKc​, and the best allocation depends on all of pcp_cpc​, NcN_cNc​ and McM_cMc​. The paper does not exhibit a good allocation. It averages the objective against probability weights from the Chu–Vandermonde identity, which needs binomial coefficients with real upper arguments. It then passes from two networks to many by an induction that merges networks. The recursion (5) itself rests on a computation with the normalising constants of a product form that has both single-server and infinite-server stations.

Formalization scope

Locations form a finite type. A\mathcal AA is the set of pairs with Λij>0\Lambda_{ij}>0Λij​>0, and its strong connectivity is a transitive closure. The split is a surjective map from locations onto a finite index type of networks. Every pair with positive accepted demand stays inside one class, and each class is strongly connected under accepted demand, again as a transitive closure. So every location has positive accepted demand. The paper's C>1C>1C>1 is relaxed to C≥1C\ge1C≥1.

Availability is the BCMP product form of each network on its own, with loads ri/λir_i/\lambda_iri​/λi​ (pick-up) and riΛijqij/(λiμij)r_i\Lambda_{ij}q_{ij}/(\lambda_i\mu_{ij})ri​Λij​qij​/(λi​μij​) (transit), and rrr a positive solution of (9). This is a disclosed definition, since the paper invokes the BCMP class without writing it. Availability is defined per location; its equality across a network follows from milestone 1. R(qs,K)R(q^s,\mathbf K)R(qs,K) is Equation (3) with per-location availabilities. Problem (8) is an explicit maximisation over the finite set of allocations. All ratios are real numbers, Rs(qs)>0R_s(q^s)>0Rs​(qs)>0 is assumed so that the ratio is defined, and N+K−1N+K-1N+K−1 is computed in R\mathbb RR.

Defining availability by the recursion (5), or RRR as α⋅Rs\alpha\cdot R_sα⋅Rs​, would make milestones 1–2 trivial and is ruled out.

A complete development needs:

  • the product-form computation behind (5);
  • equal availability within a network;
  • the Vandermonde identity for generalized binomials (Mathlib's Ring.add_choose_eq);
  • the averaging argument and the induction.

The closed-network definitions and milestones 5–7 are reusable beyond this mission. Proofs of any milestone are welcome, and so is a proof of Proposition 1.

Selected references

  • S. Benjaafar, X. Shen, Pricing in On-Demand (and One-Way) Vehicle Sharing Networks, SSRN abstract 3998297, version of 2023-01-10. https://ssrn.com/abstract=3998297 ; published as a Technical Note in Operations Research, 2023. https://doi.org/10.1287/opre.2023.2446
  • F. Baskett, K. M. Chandy, R. R. Muntz, F. G. Palacios, Open, Closed, and Mixed Networks of Queues with Different Classes of Customers, J. ACM 22(2), 1975, 248–260. https://doi.org/10.1145/321879.321887
  • A. Waserhole, V. Jost, Pricing in Vehicle Sharing Systems: Optimization in Queuing Networks with Product Forms, EURO J. Transportation and Logistics 5(3), 2016, 293–320. https://doi.org/10.1007/s13676-014-0054-4
  • D. K. George, C. H. Xia, Fleet-Sizing and Service Availability for a Vehicle Rental System via Closed Queueing Networks, European J. Operational Research 211(1), 2011, 198–207. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ejor.2010.12.015
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Dynamic Matching: Characterizing and Achieving Constant Regret I: Under General Position the Exhaustive Resolving Policy Has Regret at Most Γ/ϵ at All TimesResearch Paper

Motivation

Centralized matching markets (kidney exchange, ride hailing, freight and labor platforms) repeatedly decide which waiting participants to match now and which to hold for a better opportunity later. Matching early collects value sooner; waiting lets the platform see more arrivals and avoid matches that later turn out to be wasteful. A natural yardstick is the best set of matches that could have been made with hindsight from all arrivals up to a given time, and the question is how far an online policy, which cannot see the future, must fall behind that yardstick.

Kerimov, Ashlagi and Gurvich (SSRN 3824407, September 2022; Management Science 2023, doi:10.1287/mnsc.2021.01215) answer this for multi-way matching networks with patient agents. They identify a single parameter of the fluid relaxation, the general position gap ϵ\epsilonϵ, and show that the regret against the hindsight benchmark can be kept at order ϵ−1\epsilon^{-1}ϵ−1 at all times, and that no policy does better in order on non-trivial networks. This mission formalizes the upper bound. The paper places itself next to constant-regret results for online packing (Bumpensanti and Wang 2020; Vera and Banerjee 2021), where resolving a linear program at each arrival achieves bounded regret.

Setting

There are nnn agent types and ddd matches. Match mmm is a set A(m)\mathcal A(m)A(m) of at least two types, every type belongs to some match, and the matching matrix M∈{0,1}n×dM\in\{0,1\}^{n\times d}M∈{0,1}n×d has Mim=1M_{im}=1Mim​=1 iff i∈A(m)i\in\mathcal A(m)i∈A(m). Performing match mmm uses one agent of each type in A(m)\mathcal A(m)A(m) and earns rm>0r_m>0rm​>0. Time is discrete; at each time t=1,2,…t=1,2,\dotst=1,2,… one agent arrives, of type iii with probability λi>0\lambda_i>0λi​>0, ∑iλi=1\sum_i\lambda_i=1∑i​λi​=1, independently over time. AitA^t_iAit​ counts the type-iii arrivals by time ttt.

A matching policy records DmtD^t_mDmt​, the number of times match mmm has been performed by time ttt. It is admissible when it is non-anticipative and only matches agents present: MDt≤AtMD^t\le A^tMDt≤At. The pre-match queue is Qt=At−MDt−1Q^t=A^t-MD^{t-1}Qt=At−MDt−1, the value collected is RD,t=E[r⋅Dt]\mathcal R^{D,t}=\mathbb E[r\cdot D^t]RD,t=E[r⋅Dt], and the hindsight benchmark is

R∗,t=E[max⁡{r⋅y:My≤At, y∈Z≥0d}].\mathcal R^{*,t}=\mathbb E\big[\max\{r\cdot y: My\le A^t,\ y\in\mathbb Z^d_{\ge0}\}\big].R∗,t=E[max{r⋅y:My≤At, y∈Z≥0d​}].

The static-planning problem is the linear program

(SPP)max⁡ r⋅zs.t.Mz+s=λ, z≥0, s≥0.\text{(SPP)}\qquad \max\ r\cdot z\quad\text{s.t.}\quad Mz+s=\lambda,\ z\ge0,\ s\ge0.(SPP)max r⋅zs.t.Mz+s=λ, z≥0, s≥0.

For an optimal (z∗,s∗)(z^*,s^*)(z∗,s∗) let M+={m:zm∗>0}\mathcal M_+=\{m:z^*_m>0\}M+​={m:zm∗​>0} (active matches), M0\mathcal M_0M0​ the rest (redundant matches), Q+={j:sj∗>0}\mathcal Q_+=\{j:s^*_j>0\}Q+​={j:sj∗​>0} (under-demanded types) and Q0\mathcal Q_0Q0​ the rest (over-demanded types). The network satisfies general position (GP) if (SPP) has a unique optimal solution and it is non-degenerate, ∣M+∣+∣Q+∣=n|\mathcal M_+|+|\mathcal Q_+|=n∣M+​∣+∣Q+​∣=n. The general position gap is the smallest positive basic value,

ϵ=min⁡m∈M+zm∗ ∧ min⁡j∈Q+sj∗.\epsilon=\min_{m\in\mathcal M_+}z^*_m\ \wedge\ \min_{j\in\mathcal Q_+}s^*_j .ϵ=m∈M+​min​zm∗​ ∧ j∈Q+​min​sj∗​.

The exhaustive resolving policy with inter-action delay τ\tauτ acts only at the epochs tk=kτt_k=k\tautk​=kτ. There it performs an optimal solution of the integer program max⁡{r⋅z:Mz≤Qtk, z∈Z≥0d}\max\{r\cdot z: Mz\le Q^{t_k},\ z\in\mathbb Z^d_{\ge0}\}max{r⋅z:Mz≤Qtk​, z∈Z≥0d​} with the redundant matches removed, and then discards the leftover agents of the under-demanded types.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 3.1 (Upper bound), p. 14

There are constants κ,Γ>0\kappa,\Gamma>0κ,Γ>0 depending only on n,d,M,rn,d,M,rn,d,M,r such that, under GP, the exhaustive resolving policy with τ=⌈κϵ−1⌉\tau=\lceil\kappa\epsilon^{-1}\rceilτ=⌈κϵ−1⌉ (any tie-breaking) is admissible and

R∗,t−RD,t≤Γ ϵ−1for all t≥1.\mathcal R^{*,t}-\mathcal R^{D,t}\le\Gamma\,\epsilon^{-1}\qquad\text{for all }t\ge1 .R∗,t−RD,t≤Γϵ−1for all t≥1.

The constants are not fixed, so the goal survives any improvement of them.

Milestones

  1. §2, p. 8: R∗,t=max⁡DRD,t\mathcal R^{*,t}=\max_{D}\mathcal R^{D,t}R∗,t=maxD​RD,t, attained by the ultimate batching policy.
  2. §4.2, (4), p. 20: under GP the optimal basis B\mathcal BB is invertible, (zM+∗,sQ+∗)=B−1λ(z^*_{\mathcal M_+},s^*_{\mathcal Q_+})=\mathcal B^{-1}\lambda(zM+​∗​,sQ+​∗​)=B−1λ, and the entries of B−1\mathcal B^{-1}B−1 are bounded by a constant of the topology.
  3. §4.2, p. 20: θ=∑m∈M+rmym\theta=\sum_{m\in\mathcal M_+}r_my^mθ=∑m∈M+​​rm​ym is the optimal dual of (SPP), θ≥0\theta\ge0θ≥0, and θi>0\theta_i>0θi​>0 on Q0\mathcal Q_0Q0​.
  4. Lemma 4.1, p. 19 (optimality test): a policy without redundant matches whose over-demanded queues have mean O(ϵ−1)O(\epsilon^{-1})O(ϵ−1) has regret O(ϵ−1)O(\epsilon^{-1})O(ϵ−1).
  5. Lemma 4.2, p. 21: a Foster–Lyapunov drift condition bounds stationary means (Glynn and Zeevi 2008).
  6. (11), p. 23: Eπ[h∗(Q0)]=O(ϵ−1)\mathbb E_\pi[h^*(Q^0)]=O(\epsilon^{-1})Eπ​[h∗(Q0)]=O(ϵ−1) for the stationary law of the epoch chain.
  7. App. D, p. 49: E0[h∗(Qtk)]=O(ϵ−1)\mathbb E_{\mathbf 0}[h^*(Q^{t_k})]=O(\epsilon^{-1})E0​[h∗(Qtk​)]=O(ϵ−1) for all k≥1k\ge1k≥1.

Here h∗(u)h^*(u)h∗(u) is the θ\thetaθ-weighted leftover in Q0\mathcal Q_0Q0​ after an optimal integer matching of uuu (display (7)).

Significance

The upper bound says that, under GP, hindsight-optimal performance up to an additive constant is achievable at every time simultaneously, not just at a known horizon. Long-run average optimality and near-optimality under discounting follow (Remark 2.1). The bound also quantifies the cost of acting often: the delay τ\tauτ and the regret both scale with ϵ−1\epsilon^{-1}ϵ−1, so networks close to degeneracy force batching. Combined with the paper's lower bound, ϵ−1\epsilon^{-1}ϵ−1 is the right order on non-trivial networks.

The result has a printed proof (§4, Appendices B and D) but no machine-checked one. Several intermediate statements of the printed proof do not hold as stated and are not posed here. The goal and the stated displays (11) and App. D are posed as the paper states them, so a formal proof requires a correct argument for the uniform-in-λ\lambdaλ bound on the over-demanded queues. Lemma 4.1, the basis and duality facts and Lemma 4.2 are self-contained and checkable on their own.

Difficulty

The obvious approach compares the policy's realized matches with the fluid optimum t z∗t\,z^*tz∗ and controls the deviation with concentration bounds. That gives errors of order t\sqrt tt​, not a constant. The constant comes from showing that the over-demanded queues stay of order ϵ−1\epsilon^{-1}ϵ−1 uniformly in time and in λ\lambdaλ. Between epochs these queues behave like a multidimensional reflected random walk whose drift toward zero is only of order ϵτ\epsilon\tauϵτ, while its fluctuations over an epoch are of order τ\sqrt\tauτ​. The delay τ≍ϵ−1\tau\asymp\epsilon^{-1}τ≍ϵ−1 balances the two, but the queue state enters through the integer program (3), whose solution changes discontinuously with the queues, and the quantities that measure the drift are signed combinations of arrival counts, to which the usual one-sided concentration bounds for nonnegative sums do not apply. On top of this every constant must be independent of λ\lambdaλ.

Formalization scope

  • Types are Fin n and matches Fin d (0-based); the topology with its two standing assumptions (∣A(m)∣≥2|\mathcal A(m)|\ge2∣A(m)∣≥2, every type in a match) is a structure, and λ>0\lambda>0λ>0 with ∑λi=1\sum\lambda_i=1∑λi​=1 and r>0r>0r>0 are hypotheses.
  • Time is N\mathbb NN; "for all t>0t>0t>0" is t≥1t\ge1t≥1. The arrival at time s+1s+1s+1 is the sss-th entry of a path ω:N→\omega:\mathbb N\toω:N→ Fin n. Expectations at horizon ttt are finite sums over the first ttt arrivals weighted by ∏λωs\prod\lambda_{\omega_s}∏λωs​​, so no expectation is a default value.
  • Admissible policies are non-anticipative cumulative counts with MDt≤AtMD^t\le A^tMDt≤At and no rejections. The resolving policy's removal of under-demanded leftovers acts on its own virtual queue, which agrees with the actual queue on Q0\mathcal Q_0Q0​; its matches are feasible without removals, so it is admissible.
  • (3) is solved with the redundant matches set to zero, and statements quantify over every tie-breaking selection. A selection exists (a sanity file exhibits one), so these statements are not vacuous.
  • GP is a hypothesis on an explicit pair (z∗,s∗)(z^*,s^*)(z∗,s∗); ϵ\epsilonϵ is the minimum of the positive basic values. The basis inverse is never a matrix-inverse function: statements assert the existence of a two-sided inverse.
  • h∗h^*h∗ is defined in the form min⁡{∑Q0θisi:Mz+s=u, zM0=0}\min\{\sum_{\mathcal Q_0}\theta_is_i: Mz+s=u,\ z_{\mathcal M_0}=0\}min{∑Q0​​θi​si​:Mz+s=u, zM0​​=0}, equivalent to (7) under the paper's reduction M0=∅\mathcal M_0=\emptysetM0​=∅; θ\thetaθ is any solution of the complementary-slackness system, which is unique under GP.
  • Every O(⋅)O(\cdot)O(⋅) is an explicit constant, quantified after the topology and rrr and before λ\lambdaλ. Placing it after λ\lambdaλ would turn the theorem into a per-instance boundedness statement and is ruled out.
  • A trivializing formalization (some unspecified policy, a τ\tauτ independent of ϵ\epsilonϵ, or GP replaced by an unsatisfiable condition) is ruled out: the policy is constructed, τ=⌈κ/ϵ⌉\tau=\lceil\kappa/\epsilon\rceilτ=⌈κ/ϵ⌉, and a sanity file proves GP for the Figure 1 network with ϵ=1/5\epsilon=1/5ϵ=1/5.
  • Not posed: the lower bound of Theorem 3.1, Proposition 4.1 (8)–(9), Lemmas B.1–B.2, Proposition B.1 and displays (21)–(22), which do not hold as printed; Theorem 5.2 and §6.

Contributions welcome: proofs of the LP facts (milestones 2–3) and Lemma 4.1, a Mathlib-ready proof of Lemma 4.2, and any correct argument for the epoch bounds.

Selected references

  • S. Kerimov, I. Ashlagi, I. Gurvich, Dynamic Matching: Characterizing and Achieving Constant Regret, SSRN 3824407 (version of Sep 14, 2022); Management Science, 2023. https://ssrn.com/abstract=3824407, https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2021.01215
  • P. W. Glynn, A. Zeevi, Bounding stationary expectations of Markov processes, in Markov Processes and Related Topics, IMS Collections 4, 2008. https://doi.org/10.1214/074921708000000381
  • P. Bumpensanti, H. Wang, A re-solving heuristic with uniformly bounded loss for network revenue management, Management Science 66, 2020. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2019.3365
  • D. Bertsimas, J. N. Tsitsiklis, Introduction to Linear Optimization, Athena Scientific, 1997.
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Offline Multi-Action Policy Learning: Generalization and Optimization 1: Cross-Fitted AIPW Policy Learning Has Regret O_p(κ(Π)√(V*/n)) Even with Slowly Converging Nuisance EstimatesResearch Paper

Learning treatment policies from logged data

Many decisions are made by assigning one of several actions to an individual on the basis of observed features: which of ddd drugs to prescribe, which of several promotions to show, which job-training programme to offer. Experimentation is often costly or unethical, while historical records of past assignments and their outcomes are plentiful. Offline policy learning asks for a rule that maps features to actions, chosen from such observational records, whose expected outcome is close to that of the best rule in a prescribed class. The binary-action case was settled by Kitagawa and Tetenov (2018) with known propensities and by Athey and Wager (2021) with estimated ones; Zhou, Athey and Wager extend the doubly robust approach to d≥2d \ge 2d≥2 actions. This mission formalizes the statistical half of that paper: the regret guarantee of its cross-fitted learner.

Timeline. Robins, Rotnitzky and Zhao (1994) introduced augmented inverse-propensity weighting (AIPW). Dudík, Langford and Li (2011) used doubly robust scores for multi-action policy evaluation and optimization. Chernozhukov et al. (2018) showed that cross-fitting removes the bias of flexible nuisance estimates in semiparametric estimation. Athey and Wager proved n\sqrt nn​-rate regret for binary actions with VC classes. Zhou, Athey and Wager (arXiv 2018; Operations Research, 2023) treat ddd actions with a Hamming entropy integral as the complexity measure.

Setting

There are ddd actions, written 1,…,d1,\dots,d1,…,d and identified with the standard basis vectors of Rd\mathbb R^dRd, so that for γ∈Rd\gamma\in\mathbb R^dγ∈Rd the inner product ⟨π(x),γ⟩\langle\pi(x),\gamma\rangle⟨π(x),γ⟩ is the coordinate γπ(x)\gamma_{\pi(x)}γπ(x)​. A draw consists of features X∈XX\in\mathcal XX∈X, potential outcomes (Y(1),…,Y(d))(Y(1),\dots,Y(d))(Y(1),…,Y(d)) and a logged action AAA; only the triple (X,A,Y)(X,A,Y)(X,A,Y) with Y=Y(A)Y=Y(A)Y=Y(A) is observed. The data are nnn iid draws.

The model consists of a law PXP_XPX​ of the features and two conditional laws given X=xX=xX=x: one for the outcome vector, one for the action. Given XXX the two are independent (unconfoundedness). The propensity is ea(x)=P(A=a∣X=x)e_a(x)=P(A=a\mid X=x)ea​(x)=P(A=a∣X=x) and the mean reward is μa(x)=E[Y(a)∣X=x]\mu_a(x)=\mathbb E[Y(a)\mid X=x]μa​(x)=E[Y(a)∣X=x]. A policy is a map π:X→{1,…,d}\pi:\mathcal X\to\{1,\dots,d\}π:X→{1,…,d} from a class Π\PiΠ. Its value is Q(π)=E[Y(π(X))]Q(\pi)=\mathbb E[Y(\pi(X))]Q(π)=E[Y(π(X))] and its regret is R(π)=sup⁡π′∈ΠQ(π′)−Q(π)R(\pi)=\sup_{\pi'\in\Pi}Q(\pi')-Q(\pi)R(π)=supπ′∈Π​Q(π′)−Q(π).

The learner, CAIPWL (Algorithm 1), divides the sample into K≥2K\ge2K≥2 evenly sized folds. For each fold kkk it fits estimators μ^a−k\hat\mu^{-k}_aμ^​a−k​, e^a−k\hat e^{-k}_ae^a−k​ on the observed data outside fold kkk, forms the cross-fitted AIPW score

Γ^i,j=μ^j−k(i)(Xi)+1{Ai=j}Yi−μ^Ai−k(i)(Xi)e^Ai−k(i)(Xi),\hat\Gamma_{i,j}=\hat\mu^{-k(i)}_j(X_i)+\mathbf 1\{A_i=j\}\frac{Y_i-\hat\mu^{-k(i)}_{A_i}(X_i)}{\hat e^{-k(i)}_{A_i}(X_i)},Γ^i,j​=μ^​j−k(i)​(Xi​)+1{Ai​=j}e^Ai​−k(i)​(Xi​)Yi​−μ^​Ai​−k(i)​(Xi​)​,

and returns a maximizer π^CAIPWL\hat\pi_{CAIPWL}π^CAIPWL​ over Π\PiΠ of Q^CAIPWL(π)=1n∑iΓ^i,π(Xi)\hat Q_{CAIPWL}(\pi)=\frac1n\sum_i\hat\Gamma_{i,\pi(X_i)}Q^​CAIPWL​(π)=n1​∑i​Γ^i,π(Xi​)​. The oracle score Γi\Gamma_iΓi​ is the same expression with the true μ\muμ and eee; it gives Q~(π)=1n∑iΓi,π(Xi)\tilde Q(\pi)=\frac1n\sum_i\Gamma_{i,\pi(X_i)}Q~​(π)=n1​∑i​Γi,π(Xi​)​. Write Δ\DeltaΔ, Δ~\tilde\DeltaΔ~, Δ^\hat\DeltaΔ^ for the differences Q(π1)−Q(π2)Q(\pi_1)-Q(\pi_2)Q(π1​)−Q(π2​), Q~(π1)−Q~(π2)\tilde Q(\pi_1)-\tilde Q(\pi_2)Q~​(π1​)−Q~​(π2​), Q^(π1)−Q^(π2)\hat Q(\pi_1)-\hat Q(\pi_2)Q^​(π1​)−Q^​(π2​), and

V∗=sup⁡πa,πb∈ΠE[(Γπa(X)−Γπb(X))2].V_*=\sup_{\pi_a,\pi_b\in\Pi}\mathbb E\big[(\Gamma_{\pi_a(X)}-\Gamma_{\pi_b(X)})^2\big].V∗​=πa​,πb​∈Πsup​E[(Γπa​(X)​−Γπb​(X)​)2].

The complexity of Π\PiΠ is measured through the Hamming distance H(π1,π2)=1m#{j:π1(xj)≠π2(xj)}H(\pi_1,\pi_2)=\frac1m\#\{j:\pi_1(x_j)\ne\pi_2(x_j)\}H(π1​,π2​)=m1​#{j:π1​(xj​)=π2​(xj​)} on points x1,…,xmx_1,\dots,x_mx1​,…,xm​. The covering number NH(ε,Π)N_H(\varepsilon,\Pi)NH​(ε,Π) is the supremum over all finite point sequences of the least number of policies of Π\PiΠ that ε\varepsilonε-cover Π\PiΠ in HHH. The entropy integral is κ(Π)=∫01log⁡NH(ε2,Π) dε\kappa(\Pi)=\int_0^1\sqrt{\log N_H(\varepsilon^2,\Pi)}\,d\varepsilonκ(Π)=∫01​logNH​(ε2,Π)​dε.

The assumptions are: overlap, ea(x)≥η>0e_a(x)\ge\eta>0ea​(x)≥η>0; bounded rewards, ∣Y(a)∣≤B|Y(a)|\le B∣Y(a)∣≤B; Assumption 2, E[(μ^a−k−μa)2]⋅E[(e^a−k−ea)2]=o(1)/n\mathbb E[(\hat\mu^{-k}_a-\mu_a)^2]\cdot\mathbb E[(\hat e^{-k}_a-e_a)^2]=o(1)/nE[(μ^​a−k​−μa​)2]⋅E[(e^a−k​−ea​)2]=o(1)/n; and Assumption 3, NH(ε,Π)≤Cexp⁡(Dε−ω)N_H(\varepsilon,\Pi)\le C\exp(D\varepsilon^{-\omega})NH​(ε,Π)≤Cexp(Dε−ω) with 0<ω<1/20<\omega<1/20<ω<1/2.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 3 in the form of Remark 8, (18), p. 22

R(π^CAIPWL)=Op(κ(Π)V∗n),R(\hat\pi_{CAIPWL})=O_p\Big(\kappa(\Pi)\sqrt{\tfrac{V_*}{n}}\Big),R(π^CAIPWL​)=Op​(κ(Π)nV∗​​​),

read per nnn: for every ε>0\varepsilon>0ε>0 there are M>0M>0M>0 and NNN with P(R(π^CAIPWL)>Mκ(Π)V∗/n)≤ε\mathbb P\big(R(\hat\pi_{CAIPWL})>M\kappa(\Pi)\sqrt{V_*/n}\big)\le\varepsilonP(R(π^CAIPWL​)>Mκ(Π)V∗​/n​)≤ε for all n≥Nn\ge Nn≥N. This is the paper's own "simpler way of stating the regret bound in Theorem 3". It fixes the rate and the dependence on κ(Π)\kappa(\Pi)κ(Π) and V∗V_*V∗​, but no constants.

Milestones

  1. Lemma 1 (1): the inner product distance IΓI_\GammaIΓ​ satisfies the triangle inequality.
  2. (48): E[Q~(π)]=Q(π)\mathbb E[\tilde Q(\pi)]=Q(\pi)E[Q~​(π)]=Q(π).
  3. (17): Δ^−Δ~=∑j(S1j+S2j+S3j)\hat\Delta-\tilde\Delta=\sum_j(S^j_1+S^j_2+S^j_3)Δ^−Δ~=∑j​(S1j​+S2j​+S3j​), the algebraic split into error terms.
  4. Lemma 3 (pinned): sup⁡π1,π2∈Π∣Δ^−Δ~∣=op(n−1/2)\sup_{\pi_1,\pi_2\in\Pi}|\hat\Delta-\tilde\Delta|=o_p(n^{-1/2})supπ1​,π2​∈Π​∣Δ^−Δ~∣=op​(n−1/2).
  5. Oracle concentration (Lemma 2 as used in (18), pinned): sup⁡π1,π2∈Π∣Δ~−Δ∣=Op(n−1/2)\sup_{\pi_1,\pi_2\in\Pi}|\tilde\Delta-\Delta|=O_p(n^{-1/2})supπ1​,π2​∈Π​∣Δ~−Δ∣=Op​(n−1/2).
  6. (18): R(π^)≤sup⁡π1,π2∈Π∣Δ^−Δ∣R(\hat\pi)\le\sup_{\pi_1,\pi_2\in\Pi}|\hat\Delta-\Delta|R(π^)≤supπ1​,π2​∈Π​∣Δ^−Δ∣ for every empirical maximizer.

Printed statements not posed

  • Theorem 3's explicit display, R≤(54.42κ(Π)+435.2+2log⁡(1/δ))V∗/nR\le(54.4\sqrt2\kappa(\Pi)+435.2+\sqrt{2\log(1/\delta)})\sqrt{V_*/n}R≤(54.42​κ(Π)+435.2+2log(1/δ)​)V∗​/n​, together with Theorem 1, Lemma 2 (11) and Theorem 2, is not posed. Lemma 1(2), which the proof of Theorem 1 uses, is false. With three points, d=2d=2d=2, π0≡1\pi_0\equiv1π0​≡1, πk\pi_kπk​ switching to action 2 at the point kkk only, and γi=(1,0)\gamma_i=(1,0)γi​=(1,0), one gets NIΓ(0.7)=4>3≥NH(0.49)N_{I_\Gamma}(0.7)=4>3\ge N_H(0.49)NIΓ​​(0.7)=4>3≥NH​(0.49).
  • The V∗\sqrt{V_*}V∗​​ scaling of Theorem 1 fails for interval-switching classes, where κ(Π)\kappa(\Pi)κ(Π) stays bounded, V∗=2pV_*=2pV∗​=2p, and the Rademacher complexity is of order plog⁡(1/p)\sqrt{p\log(1/p)}plog(1/p)​.
  • 54.42(κ+8)54.4\sqrt2(\kappa+8)54.42​(κ+8) equals 54.42κ+435.2254.4\sqrt2\kappa+435.2\sqrt254.42​κ+435.22​, not 54.42κ+435.254.4\sqrt2\kappa+435.254.42​κ+435.2.
  • The o(1/n)o(1/\sqrt n)o(1/n​) and op(1/n)o_p(1/\sqrt n)op​(1/n​) remainders cannot be absorbed into one explicit constant at a fixed probability.
  • Lemma 1(2) is not posed, being false.

Significance

The theorem shows that a learner can use flexible machine-learning estimates of the propensities and outcome regressions, each converging more slowly than n−1/2n^{-1/2}n−1/2, and still attain the regret rate of an oracle that knows them, provided the product of their errors is o(n−1/2)o(n^{-1/2})o(n−1/2). This doubly robust rate condition is what makes cross-fitted AIPW scores usable for policy learning with random forests, boosting or neural-network nuisances. The dependence on Π\PiΠ only through κ(Π)\kappa(\Pi)κ(Π) covers the multi-action classes the paper uses later, such as depth-LLL decision trees.

On formalization: the result is proved on paper, with explicit constants that are not established as printed. No machine-checked proof of any part of it is known. A complete development would give a checked doubly robust policy-learning guarantee with the hypotheses a correct proof needs, stated explicitly. It would also deliver, as by-products, a checked uniform-entropy bound for empirical processes indexed by policy differences and a cross-fitting lemma with fold-wise conditional independence.

Difficulty

Two parts are hard. The oracle concentration needs a chaining (Dudley-type) bound for the empirical process {Δ~(π1,π2)−Δ(π1,π2)}\{\tilde\Delta(\pi_1,\pi_2)-\Delta(\pi_1,\pi_2)\}{Δ~(π1​,π2​)−Δ(π1​,π2​)}, indexed by pairs of policies, in which the covering numbers are uniform over point sets and the entropy integrand uses ε2\varepsilon^2ε2. Bounding one fixed pair by a central limit theorem is not enough, because the supremum over Π×Π\Pi\times\PiΠ×Π is the whole point. Lemma 3 needs the conditional independence that cross-fitting creates: given the data outside fold kkk, the terms of fold kkk are iid with conditional mean zero in the first two error terms of (17). The uniform op(n−1/2)o_p(n^{-1/2})op​(n−1/2) bound then comes from a localized chaining argument whose radius shrinks with the nuisance errors. A naive argument conditioning on all the data at once loses the mean-zero structure.

Formalization scope

Actions are Fin d; policies are deterministic maps X → Fin d (endnote 3, p. 45), and a class is Pol : Set (X → Fin d). The model is a probability measure PX with two Markov kernels κY, κA, and the joint law is PX ⊗ₘ (κY ×ₖ κA). This builds unconfoundedness into the law. The sample of size nnn is the product measure on Fin n → Draw X d. Estimators of fold kkk are functions of the observed triples indexed by {i // fold n i ≠ k}, so they cannot see fold kkk or unobserved potential outcomes. The regret uses sup⁡π′∈ΠQ(π′)\sup_{\pi'\in\Pi}Q(\pi')supπ′∈Π​Q(π′) in place of Q(π∗)Q(\pi^*)Q(π∗). κ(Π)\kappa(\Pi)κ(Π) is an ℝ≥0∞ lower integral, finite under Assumption 3. OpO_pOp​ and opo_pop​ are read for each nnn separately: Definition 8's "∀n≥N\forall n\ge N∀n≥N with probability 1−ε1-\varepsilon1−ε" presupposes one probability space for all nnn. Bounded support is stated for each xxx under κY x.

Hypotheses added to the printed ones:

  • (i) both mean-squared errors tend to 000 separately, in addition to (3). The proof of Lemma 3 uses separate rates, and with μ^≡0\hat\mu\equiv0μ^​≡0, e^=e\hat e=ee^=e, condition (3) holds while the first term of (17) has exact order n−1/2n^{-1/2}n−1/2.
  • (ii) ∣μ^∣≤B^|\hat\mu|\le\hat B∣μ^​∣≤B^, e^≥η^>0\hat e\ge\hat\eta>0e^≥η^​>0, and both estimators are measurable.
  • (iii) the policies are measurable, and the class is permissible: for each mmm and action pattern, the set of point sequences on which some policy realizes the pattern is measurable.

Without (ii) and (iii), Lean's integrals of non-measurable functions are 000 and Assumption 2 would be vacuous. The hypotheses are satisfiable: the oracle estimators μ^=μ\hat\mu=\muμ^​=μ, e^=e\hat e=ee^=e meet every estimator condition, and a finite class of constant policies meets Assumption 3 and permissibility. The degenerate cases κ(Π)=0\kappa(\Pi)=0κ(Π)=0 or V∗=0V_*=0V∗​=0 force zero regret, so the goal is not trivialized there.

Needed infrastructure: product measures and kernels (Mathlib), and Hamming covering numbers (local, Definition 4). Still to build: uniform-entropy chaining for bounded classes, and Talagrand/Bousquet-type concentration. Contributions are welcome on the chaining bound, the cross-fitting conditional-independence lemma, and the elementary items (48), (17) and Lemma 1(1). These are reusable in any doubly robust estimation mission.

Selected references

  • Z. Zhou, S. Athey, S. Wager, Offline Multi-Action Policy Learning: Generalization and Optimization, arXiv:1810.04778v2, 2018; Operations Research 71(1), 2023. https://arxiv.org/abs/1810.04778
  • S. Athey, S. Wager, Policy Learning with Observational Data, Econometrica 89(1), 2021. https://arxiv.org/abs/1702.02896
  • T. Kitagawa, A. Tetenov, Who Should Be Treated? Empirical Welfare Maximization Methods for Treatment Choice, Econometrica 86(2), 2018. https://doi.org/10.3982/ECTA13288
  • V. Chernozhukov et al., Double/Debiased Machine Learning for Treatment and Structural Parameters, The Econometrics Journal 21(1), 2018. https://arxiv.org/abs/1608.00060
  • M. Dudík, J. Langford, L. Li, Doubly Robust Policy Evaluation and Learning, ICML 2011. https://arxiv.org/abs/1103.4601
  • J. Robins, A. Rotnitzky, L. P. Zhao, Estimation of Regression Coefficients When Some Regressors Are Not Always Observed, JASA 89(427), 1994. https://doi.org/10.1080/01621459.1994.10476818
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EconomicsOperations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

Operational Risk Management: Optimal Inspection Policy I: Periodic Inspection Beats Random Inspection Below an Inspection-Cost Threshold and Loses Above ItResearch Paper

Why inspection timing matters

A firm that relies on employees to process transactions can lose money when errors remain undetected. Inspection catches errors, but each inspection costs money, and employees may change their care when they know when an inspection will occur. These effects make the timing of inspections part of a contract design problem, not just a scheduling choice. Kim and Xu study that problem in a continuous-time principal–agent model of operational risk. Their SSRN preprint proves that the ranking of two common inspection policies changes with the cost of inspection: periodic inspection is better at low cost, while random inspection is better at high cost (Proposition 4, p. 17). This mission targets that result in the authors' July 2023 preprint, whose numbering is used throughout.

The comparison matters because neither inspection policy has an unconditional advantage in the model. A periodic schedule fixes the time until the next inspection; a random schedule makes that time uncertain. The agent responds to the schedule through effort, while the firm pays both for inspections and for errors left unresolved. Choosing a policy by its inspection frequency alone therefore misses a change in the agent's response and in the duration of losses. The paper develops both policies' optimal contracts before comparing their payoffs Kim and Xu, §§3–4.

The model

The principal is a firm and the agent is an employee. The firm earns base profit at rate μ>0\mu>0μ>0. The agent chooses a nonnegative effort path a(t)a(t)a(t), where ttt is time since the last inspection, at unit cost c>0c>0c>0. Errors arrive at aggregate rate λe−a(t)\lambda e^{-a(t)}λe−a(t), with λ>0\lambda>0λ>0. Each unresolved error causes expected loss L>0L>0L>0 per unit time until the next inspection finds and corrects it. The paper begins with several error classes, then uses their aggregate arrival rate λ\lambdaλ and rate-weighted mean loss LLL for the remainder of the analysis (7), p. 10.

The firm chooses an inspection frequency vvv, a penalty PPP charged to the employee per error found, and a wage www. Under the random policy RRR, the time τ\tauτ between inspections is exponentially distributed with rate vvv; under the periodic policy DDD, it equals 1/v1/v1/v. The employee chooses a best response to the announced policy and contract. The employee must receive at least the reservation payoff πˉ>0\bar\pi>0πˉ>0. Both parties discount future payoffs at rate r>0r>0r>0. An inspection costs the firm K>0K>0K>0 per cycle. Equations (1) and (3) specify their discounted payoffs; equation (6) gives the firm's reduced payoff when participation binds §3, pp. 8–10.

The standing Assumption 1 is c<Lλ/rc<L\lambda/rc<Lλ/r and Lλ/r<μˉL\lambda/r<\bar\muLλ/r<μˉ​, with μˉ=μ−rπˉ\bar\mu=\mu-r\bar\piμˉ​=μ−rπˉ. The first inequality excludes the paper's degenerate no-effort regime; the second ensures that the adjusted base profit exceeds the expected operational loss of the uninspected benchmark (7), p. 10. In the formalization, all six parameters r,c,λ,L,μ,πˉr,c,\lambda,L,\mu,\bar\pir,c,λ,L,μ,πˉ are also positive, as stated in §3.

Formalization targets

The goal is Proposition 4. For fixed model parameters there is one inspection-cost threshold KRDK_{RD}KRD​, independent of the particular positive cost KKK, such that

0<K<KRD⟹ΠR(SR∗)<ΠD(SD∗),0<K<K_{RD}\quad\Longrightarrow\quad \Pi_R(S_R^*)<\Pi_D(S_D^*),0<K<KRD​⟹ΠR​(SR∗​)<ΠD​(SD∗​), 0<K and K>KRD⟹ΠD(SD∗)<ΠR(SR∗).0<K\ \text{and}\ K>K_{RD}\quad\Longrightarrow\quad \Pi_D(S_D^*)<\Pi_R(S_R^*).0<K and K>KRD​⟹ΠD​(SD∗​)<ΠR​(SR∗​).

Here SR∗S_R^*SR∗​ and SD∗S_D^*SD∗​ are optimal feasible strategies under the respective inspection laws. The paper does not specify which policy is better at K=KRDK=K_{RD}K=KRD​, and the formal goal does not add an equality claim there Proposition 4, p. 17.

The milestones first connect binding participation to the firm's reduced payoff in (6). Lemma 3 identifies constant optimal effort under random inspections and its threshold v‾R\underline v_Rv​R​; Lemma 4 identifies the time-dependent effort under periodic inspections and its threshold v‾D\underline v_Dv​D​. The two statements in §4.2 then express the firm's reduced payoff through the explicit random branches VˉR,VR0\bar V_R,V_R^0VˉR​,VR0​ of (EC.2) and periodic branches VˉD,V‾D,VD0\bar V_D,\underline V_D,V_D^0VˉD​,V​D​,VD0​ of (EC.4) pp. 10, 13–14 and ec5–ec6. These targets fix the model and its regime changes before solvers address the policy-level optimization.

What the result establishes

The result distinguishes regimes in which a predictable inspection date pays off from regimes in which an uncertain one pays off, after each policy's frequency, penalty, wage and induced effort are optimized. It is a claim about the principal's optimal payoff under complete contracts in the paper's model. It does not assert that either schedule dominates for every fixed frequency or penalty. The strict comparisons matter: they identify a genuine reversal rather than a weak inclusion of one policy's feasible strategies in another's Proposition 4, p. 17.

Kim and Xu proved this proposition in the cited preprint; the open work in this mission is to give its stated model, supporting results and comparison a machine-checked Lean proof. The definitions of inspection laws, achievable payoffs and discounted cycle quantities can also support the paper's separate hybrid-policy comparison and future formal work on continuous-time inspection contracts. The closed-form payoff branches provide testable interfaces between the economic model and the optimization results. The mission does not claim that any of these proofs is already machine checked.

Where the difficulty lies

The direct intuition that unpredictable inspections should always restrain delayed effort fails as a policy comparison. Under a periodic schedule, the employee can increase effort near the known inspection time, but earlier inspection also shortens the time that errors remain costly. The relative effect depends on KKK and on which effort regime is optimal. An argument based only on the employee's response at a fixed (v,P)(v,P)(v,P) cannot determine the ranking of the principal's optimized payoffs. The paper's characterization of each policy includes both effort inducement and error correction modes, with different closed forms and cost thresholds §4.2, pp. 14–15; proof of Proposition 4, pp. ec30–ec33.

Formalization scope

Lean represents an effort path as a real-valued function of time since the last inspection. It is measurable, nonnegative and bounded. The last condition is a disclosed modelling pin: it ensures that the real-valued expected effort and error terms do not acquire Lean's default zero value for a nonintegrable function. The random interval law is Mathlib's exponential measure; the periodic law is a Dirac measure at 1/v1/v1/v. The error classes are aggregated using λ\lambdaλ and LLL, and expected errors are λ∫0te−a(s)ds\lambda\int_0^t e^{-a(s)}dsλ∫0t​e−a(s)ds. This starts at the discounted cycle payoff equations (1) and (3), rather than reconstructing the underlying Poisson and Brownian processes §3 and Appendix EC.4.1.

Feasible principal strategies require v>0v>0v>0, P,w≥0P,w\ge0P,w≥0, a best-responding agent and the participation constraint. This makes the 1/v1/v1/v formulas meaningful. The agent's best-response test sets w=0w=0w=0, because wage enters payoff additively and cannot change which effort is optimal. A policy comparison uses achievable payoffs: it asserts an achievable payoff for the better policy exceeding every achievable payoff of the worse policy. That formulation avoids default values of a real supremum over an empty or unbounded set. It also prevents an empty feasible set from satisfying a comparison vacuously. The threshold KRDK_{RD}KRD​ is quantified before KKK, and the source does not explicitly require it to be positive. Formulas dividing by PPP are invoked only when P>c/λP>c/\lambdaP>c/λ; the zero-penalty case has a separate statement.

This initial mission includes the model, the effort lemmas, the two payoff-regime statements and Proposition 4. Characterizing the globally optimal random and periodic contracts and their comparisons remains welcome solver work; their long closed-form optimization results have not been weakened into easier draft milestones. Reusable contributions include integration facts for the exponential and Dirac laws, best-response characterizations up to almost-everywhere equality, and analytic properties of the payoff branches.

Selected references

  • Y. Kim and Y. Xu, Operational Risk Management: Optimal Inspection Policy, SSRN preprint 3491006, version compiled July 2023, SSRN. Published in Management Science, DOI 10.1287/mnsc.2021.00322. The mission cites the preprint's page and result numbering.
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Graph TheoryInformation TheoryStatistics·Captain: mikedeng1

Partial Recovery in the Graph Alignment Problem I: If D(P‖Q)/α = o(log n/n), No Algorithm Recovers a Fraction α of a Correlated Erdős–Rényi AlignmentResearch Paper

Motivation

Graph alignment asks for the correspondence between the vertices of two graphs that are noisy copies of each other with hidden labels. It arises in the de-anonymization of social networks, where an anonymized friendship graph is matched against a public one (Narayanan–Shmatikov 2009), and in computational biology, where protein–protein interaction networks of related species are aligned. The standard random model is the correlated Erdős–Rényi model of Pedarsani–Grossglauser 2011, for which exact recovery thresholds are known (Cullina–Kiyavash 2016) and almost-exact recovery is known to be impossible when nqs=O(1)nqs=O(1)nqs=O(1) (Cullina–Kiyavash–Mittal–Poor 2018).

Hall and Massoulié (arXiv:2007.00533) study the weaker goal of partial recovery: output a permutation that agrees with the hidden one on a constant fraction α\alphaα of the vertices. This mission formalizes their impossibility theorem; a companion mission (II) formalizes their possibility theorem.

Setting

Fix nnn and scalars 0≤q<s≤10\le q<s\le10≤q<s≤1. A parent graph G∼G(n,q/s)G\sim G(n,q/s)G∼G(n,q/s) is copied twice and each copy keeps every edge independently with probability sss, giving graphs GAG_AGA​ and GB′G_{B'}GB′​ with adjacency matrices AAA and B′B'B′. Every unordered pair {i,j}\{i,j\}{i,j} of distinct vertices independently carries the pair (Aij,Bij′)∈{0,1}2(A_{ij},B'_{ij})\in\{0,1\}^2(Aij​,Bij′​)∈{0,1}2 with law PPP (equation (3)):

p00=1−2q+qs,p01=p10=q(1−s),p11=qs.p_{00}=1-2q+qs,\qquad p_{01}=p_{10}=q(1-s),\qquad p_{11}=qs .p00​=1−2q+qs,p01​=p10​=q(1−s),p11​=qs.

Two independent edges of G(n,q)G(n,q)G(n,q) have law QQQ (equation (4)):

q00=1−2q+q2,q01=q10=q(1−q),q11=q2.q_{00}=1-2q+q^2,\qquad q_{01}=q_{10}=q(1-q),\qquad q_{11}=q^2 .q00​=1−2q+q2,q01​=q10​=q(1−q),q11​=q2.

The Kullback–Leibler divergence is D(P∥Q)=∑x∈{0,1}2P(x)log⁡P(x)Q(x)D(P\|Q)=\sum_{x\in\{0,1\}^2}P(x)\log\frac{P(x)}{Q(x)}D(P∥Q)=∑x∈{0,1}2​P(x)logQ(x)P(x)​.

A hidden permutation π∗\pi^*π∗ of the vertices, drawn uniformly from the n!n!n! permutations, relabels GB′G_{B'}GB′​ into GBG_BGB​: Bπ∗(i)π∗(j)=Bij′B_{\pi^*(i)\pi^*(j)}=B'_{ij}Bπ∗(i)π∗(j)​=Bij′​. An algorithm sees only (A,B)(A,B)(A,B) and returns a permutation π^\hat\piπ^, possibly at random. Its quality is the overlap

β(π^,π∗)=1n∑i=1n1π^(i)=π∗(i).\beta(\hat\pi,\pi^*)=\frac1n\sum_{i=1}^n\mathbf 1_{\hat\pi(i)=\pi^*(i)} .β(π^,π∗)=n1​i=1∑n​1π^(i)=π∗(i)​.

The mutual information I(π∗;(A,B))I(\pi^*;(A,B))I(π∗;(A,B)) is that of the joint law of π∗\pi^*π∗ and the observation, and Mα=max⁡π∗∣{π∣β(π,π∗)≥α}∣M_\alpha=\max_{\pi^*}|\{\pi\mid\beta(\pi,\pi^*)\ge\alpha\}|Mα​=maxπ∗​∣{π∣β(π,π∗)≥α}∣ counts the permutations that are α\alphaα-close to a given one, out of M=n!M=n!M=n!.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 2.1 (p. 8)

Let αn∈(0,1)\alpha_n\in(0,1)αn​∈(0,1), bounded below by a constant c>0c>0c>0 for large nnn. If

D(P∥Q)αn=o(log⁡nn),\frac{D(P\|Q)}{\alpha_n}=o\Big(\frac{\log n}{n}\Big),αn​D(P∥Q)​=o(nlogn​),

then for every sequence of algorithms,

P[β(π^,π∗)<αn]→1(n→∞).\mathbb P\big[\beta(\hat\pi,\pi^*)<\alpha_n\big]\to1\qquad(n\to\infty).P[β(π^,π∗)<αn​]→1(n→∞).

Milestones

  1. Theorem 3.1 (generalized Fano inequality): P[d(Z^,Z)>d]≥1−I(Z;X^)+1log⁡(M/Md)\mathbb P[d(\hat Z,Z)>d]\ge1-\frac{I(Z;\hat X)+1}{\log(M/M_d)}P[d(Z^,Z)>d]≥1−log(M/Md​)I(Z;X^)+1​ for any Markov chain Z→X^→Z^Z\to\hat X\to\hat ZZ→X^→Z^ with ZZZ uniform.
  2. Corollary 3.2: P(β(π^,π∗)<α)≥1−I(π∗;(A,B))+1log⁡(M/Mα)\mathbb P(\beta(\hat\pi,\pi^*)<\alpha)\ge1-\frac{I(\pi^*;(A,B))+1}{\log(M/M_\alpha)}P(β(π^,π∗)<α)≥1−log(M/Mα​)I(π∗;(A,B))+1​.
  3. Proposition 3.3: M/Mα=Ω(⌈nα⌉!)M/M_\alpha=\Omega(\lceil n\alpha\rceil!)M/Mα​=Ω(⌈nα⌉!).
  4. Inequality (8): I(π∗;(A,B))≤Eπ∗[D(P((A,B)=⋅∣π∗) ∥ Q)]I(\pi^*;(A,B))\le\mathbb E_{\pi^*}\big[D(\mathbb P((A,B)=\cdot\mid\pi^*)\,\|\,\mathcal Q)\big]I(π∗;(A,B))≤Eπ∗​[D(P((A,B)=⋅∣π∗)∥Q)], with Q\mathcal QQ the law of two independent G(n,q)G(n,q)G(n,q) graphs.
  5. The display after (8), p. 13: I(π∗;(A,B))≤(n2)D(P∥Q)I(\pi^*;(A,B))\le\binom n2D(P\|Q)I(π∗;(A,B))≤(2n​)D(P∥Q).

Significance

The theorem gives a sufficient condition, in terms of a single per-pair divergence, under which no algorithm (efficient or not) recovers even a fraction α\alphaα of the alignment. Together with the companion possibility result (Theorem 2.3: partial recovery is possible when nqsnqsnqs exceeds an explicit constant under sparsity conditions), it brackets the partial-recovery threshold; the paper's Corollary 2.2 specializes it to nqs=o(1)nqs=o(1)nqs=o(1) in the regime n−k≤q=o(n−1/2)n^{-k}\le q=o(n^{-1/2})n−k≤q=o(n−1/2).

On the formal side, the mission produces a finite, self-contained model of correlated random graphs with a planted permutation, a generalized Fano inequality for finite hypothesis classes with an arbitrary distance, and the bound of mutual information by a product divergence. The Fano inequality and the mutual-information bounds are reusable for other information-theoretic lower bounds (community detection, planted matching, testing). The paper proves the results on paper; none of them is formalized, and no Fano inequality is proved on the platform.

Difficulty

The Fano inequality (Theorem 3.1) is cited from Lemma 20 of Banerjee–Hegde–Massoulié (2012) and not proved in the paper, and the entropy calculus it rests on is not in Mathlib in a finite, real-valued form. The counting step (Proposition 3.3) concerns rencontres numbers; the paper uses the asymptotic Dn,k∼e−1n!/k!D_{n,k}\sim e^{-1}n!/k!Dn,k​∼e−1n!/k!, which is valid only for fixed kkk, while the statement needs control uniform in kkk. Bounding I(π∗;(A,B))I(\pi^*;(A,B))I(π∗;(A,B)) requires relating the conditional law of the observation, a relabelled product law, to the unlabelled reference law Q\mathcal QQ on a space of 4n24^{n^2}4n2 matrix pairs, most of which have probability zero.

A natural first idea for the goal, taking α\alphaα arbitrary as printed, fails: if αn=1/n\alpha_n=1/nαn​=1/n, the identity algorithm succeeds whenever π∗\pi^*π∗ has a fixed point, with probability tending to 1−e−11-e^{-1}1−e−1, even when the divergence condition holds. The argument needs log⁡(M/Mα)\log(M/M_\alpha)log(M/Mα​) to grow like nαnlog⁡nn\alpha_n\log nnαn​logn, which needs αn\alpha_nαn​ bounded below.

Formalization scope

Vertices are Fin n; a vertex pair is an off-diagonal element of Sym2 (Fin n); an edge state is a Bool × Bool with first coordinate AAA, second B′B'B′. The probability of a configuration is the product of PPP over pairs, and BBB is computed through π∗−1\pi^{*-1}π∗−1. Every probability is a finite sum; logarithms are natural. Standing assumptions on the parameters are 0≤q<s≤10\le q<s\le10≤q<s≤1 (pp. 5 and 7); the remark "we assume s<1s<1s<1" of p. 6 is not used and not imposed.

Algorithms are real stochastic kernels from the observed pair (A,B)(A,B)(A,B) to permutations, so randomized algorithms are included and deterministic ones are the 0/1 kernels. The algorithm's argument is the observation only: it does not see π∗\pi^*π∗ or GB′G_{B'}GB′​. Mutual information and Kullback–Leibler divergence are defined as finite sums (Lean's 0⋅log⁡0=00\cdot\log 0=00⋅log0=0).

Hypotheses added relative to the page, each disclosed in the item's note:

  • Theorem 2.1: αn≥c>0\alpha_n\ge c>0αn​≥c>0 for large nnn (the printed statement is false for αn→0\alpha_n\to0αn​→0 fast).
  • Theorem 3.1 and Corollary 3.2: Md<MM_d<MMd​<M (resp. Mα<n!M_\alpha<n!Mα​<n!), without which log⁡(M/Md)=0\log(M/M_d)=0log(M/Md​)=0 and the bound is meaningless.
  • Theorem 3.1: the observation space is finite; no metric axioms on ddd are assumed.

Proposition 3.3 reads (nα)!(n\alpha)!(nα)! as ⌈nα⌉!\lceil n\alpha\rceil!⌈nα⌉!.

Trivializing formalizations are ruled out: the algorithm cannot be given π∗\pi^*π∗ (an oracle wins) or nothing (the statement becomes empty); the little-ooo hypothesis is a limit of a ratio, not an inequality; the configuration law is built from (3) and sums to 1, not chosen by the solver.

Infrastructure a complete development needs: finite entropy and mutual information with the chain rule and data processing; Gibbs' inequality; derangement and rencontres counts (numDerangements in Mathlib); Stirling-type lower bounds on log⁡k!\log k!logk!. Contributions are welcome on each milestone independently; the Fano inequality is the piece with the widest reuse.

The source is the arXiv preprint v5 (13 Jan 2022); its numbering is used throughout.

Selected references

  • G. Hall, L. Massoulié, Partial Recovery in the Graph Alignment Problem, arXiv:2007.00533v5, 2022; Operations Research, 2023. https://arxiv.org/abs/2007.00533
  • P. Pedarsani, M. Grossglauser, On the privacy of anonymized networks, KDD 2011. https://doi.org/10.1145/2020408.2020596
  • D. Cullina, N. Kiyavash, Improved achievability and converse bounds for Erdős–Rényi graph matching, SIGMETRICS 2016. https://arxiv.org/abs/1602.01042
  • D. Cullina, N. Kiyavash, P. Mittal, H. V. Poor, Partial recovery of Erdős–Rényi graph alignment via k-core alignment, arXiv:1809.03553, 2018. https://arxiv.org/abs/1809.03553
  • S. Banerjee, N. Hegde, L. Massoulié, The price of privacy in untrusted recommendation engines, Allerton 2012, pp. 920–927 (Lemma 20: the generalized Fano inequality); cited as [3] in the paper.
  • A. Narayanan, V. Shmatikov, De-anonymizing social networks, IEEE S&P 2009. https://doi.org/10.1109/SP.2009.22
  • T. M. Cover, J. A. Thomas, Elements of Information Theory, 2nd ed., Wiley, 2006. https://doi.org/10.1002/047174882X
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CombinatoricsGraph TheoryStatistics·Captain: mikedeng1

Partial Recovery in the Graph Alignment Problem II: Under Explicit Sparsity Conditions with nqs Above a Constant, Some Algorithm Recovers a Fraction α of the AlignmentResearch Paper

Motivation

Graph alignment asks for the correspondence between the vertex sets of two graphs that are noisy copies of each other. It underlies the de-anonymisation of social networks, where an anonymised graph is matched to a public one (Narayanan, Shmatikov 2009), the comparison of protein–protein interaction networks across species, and matching problems in computer vision. The standard random model for studying when alignment is possible is the correlated Erdős–Rényi model (Pedarsani, Grossglauser 2011).

In that model, exact recovery of the hidden correspondence and almost exact recovery (all but a vanishing fraction of vertices) have sharp thresholds: exact recovery by Cullina, Kiyavash 2016 and 2017; almost exact recovery when nqs=ω(1)nqs = \omega(1)nqs=ω(1) by Cullina, Kiyavash, Mittal and Poor (arXiv:1809.03553). Hall and Massoulié (arXiv:2007.00533v5, Operations Research 2023) study partial recovery, the recovery of a constant fraction α\alphaα of the correspondence, in the sparse regime nqs=Θ(1)nqs = \Theta(1)nqs=Θ(1), where almost exact recovery is impossible. This mission formalizes their possibility result, Theorem 2.3. Its companion mission (Partial Recovery in the Graph Alignment Problem I) formalizes the impossibility result, Theorem 2.1.

Setting

Fix n≥1n \ge 1n≥1 and parameters q,sq, sq,s with 0≤q<s≤10 \le q < s \le 10≤q<s≤1. A parent graph on {1,…,n}\{1, \dots, n\}{1,…,n} includes each edge independently with probability q/sq/sq/s. Two copies are made, and each copy keeps every edge independently with probability sss. The resulting graphs GAG_AGA​ and GB′G_{B'}GB′​ have adjacency matrices AAA and B′B'B′. For each unordered pair {i,j}\{i, j\}{i,j} of distinct vertices, (Aij,Bij′)(A_{ij}, B'_{ij})(Aij​,Bij′​) has the law PPP of display (3):

p00=1−2q+qs,p01=p10=q(1−s),p11=qs,p_{00} = 1 - 2q + qs, \qquad p_{01} = p_{10} = q(1-s), \qquad p_{11} = qs,p00​=1−2q+qs,p01​=p10​=q(1−s),p11​=qs,

independently over the (n2)\binom n2(2n​) pairs. The covariance of AijA_{ij}Aij​ and Bij′B'_{ij}Bij′​ is σ2=q(s−q)\sigma^2 = q(s-q)σ2=q(s−q) (display (2)), which is positive when q>0q > 0q>0.

A planted permutation π∗\pi^*π∗ relabels GB′G_{B'}GB′​ into the observed graph GBG_BGB​: Bπ∗(i)π∗(j)=Bij′B_{\pi^*(i)\pi^*(j)} = B'_{ij}Bπ∗(i)π∗(j)​=Bij′​. An algorithm sees (A,B)(A, B)(A,B) and returns a permutation π^\hat\piπ^. Its quality is the overlap

β(π^,π∗)=1n∑i=1n1{π^(i)=π∗(i)}.\beta(\hat\pi, \pi^*) = \frac1n \sum_{i=1}^n \mathbf 1\{\hat\pi(i) = \pi^*(i)\}.β(π^,π∗)=n1​i=1∑n​1{π^(i)=π∗(i)}.

For 0<α<10 < \alpha < 10<α<1, a permutation π\piπ is good (Definition 2) if at least n(1+α)/2n(1+\alpha)/2n(1+α)/2 vertices iii have degree at least nqs/2nqs/2nqs/2 in the intersection of GAG_AGA​ with GBG_BGB​ relabelled by π\piπ:

∑i=1n1{∑j≠iAijBπ(i)π(j)≥nqs2}≥n⋅1+α2.\sum_{i=1}^n \mathbf 1\Big\{\sum_{j \ne i} A_{ij} B_{\pi(i)\pi(j)} \ge \frac{nqs}{2}\Big\} \ge n\cdot\frac{1+\alpha}{2}.i=1∑n​1{j=i∑​Aij​Bπ(i)π(j)​≥2nqs​}≥n⋅21+α​.

In Lean, these objects are pLaw, Config, cfgProb, prob, A, B', B, overlap, good and Cond6 in GraphAlignment.Possible.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 2.3 (pp. 8–9)

Let 0<α<10 < \alpha < 10<α<1 and let q=qnq = q_nq=qn​, s=sns = s_ns=sn​ be sequences. Suppose there exist β,γ>0\beta, \gamma > 0β,γ>0 such that, for all large nnn,

nqs≥max⁡{20, 84log⁡21−α, 16min⁡(γ,β)(1−α)},s>8q1−α,2q(1−s2)s≤n−β,qs≤n−2γ.(6)nqs \ge \max\Big\{20,\ 84\log\frac{2}{1-\alpha},\ \frac{16}{\min(\gamma,\beta)(1-\alpha)}\Big\}, \quad s > \frac{8q}{1-\alpha}, \quad \frac{2q(1-s^2)}{s} \le n^{-\beta}, \quad qs \le n^{-2\gamma}. \tag{6}nqs≥max{20, 84log1−α2​, min(γ,β)(1−α)16​},s>1−α8q​,s2q(1−s2)​≤n−β,qs≤n−2γ.(6)

Then some algorithm returns π^\hat\piπ^ with

P[β(π^,π∗)≥α]→1(n→∞).\mathbb P\big[\beta(\hat\pi, \pi^*) \ge \alpha\big] \to 1 \qquad (n \to \infty).P[β(π^,π∗)≥α]→1(n→∞).

Milestones

  1. Lemma B.3: Mn=αnM−βIα−β+βnM−αIβ−αM^n = \alpha^n \frac{M - \beta I}{\alpha - \beta} + \beta^n \frac{M - \alpha I}{\beta - \alpha}Mn=αnα−βM−βI​+βnβ−αM−αI​ for a 2×22 \times 22×2 matrix with distinct eigenvalues α,β\alpha, \betaα,β.
  2. Lemma B.2: for n+1n+1n+1 independent pairs with law PPP and W=A0B1+⋯+AnB0W = A_0B_1 + \dots + A_nB_0W=A0​B1​+⋯+An​B0​,
E[etW]=(T+T2−4D2)n+1+(T−T2−4D2)n+1,T=p11(et−1)+1, D=σ2(et−1).\mathbb E[e^{tW}] = \Big(\tfrac{T + \sqrt{T^2 - 4D}}{2}\Big)^{n+1} + \Big(\tfrac{T - \sqrt{T^2 - 4D}}{2}\Big)^{n+1}, \quad T = p_{11}(e^t - 1) + 1,\ D = \sigma^2(e^t - 1).E[etW]=(2T+T2−4D​​)n+1+(2T−T2−4D​​)n+1,T=p11​(et−1)+1, D=σ2(et−1).
  1. Lemma B.1: (αk+βk)n/k≤(α2+β2)n/2(\alpha^k + \beta^k)^{n/k} \le (\alpha^2 + \beta^2)^{n/2}(αk+βk)n/k≤(α2+β2)n/2 for 2≤k≤n2 \le k \le n2≤k≤n and α,β>0\alpha, \beta > 0α,β>0.
  2. Lemma 4.3: min⁡z>0z−τeq2(z2−1)+q1(z−1)≤ζτ\min_{z > 0} z^{-\tau} e^{q_2(z^2-1) + q_1(z-1)} \le \zeta^\tauminz>0​z−τeq2​(z2−1)+q1​(z−1)≤ζτ, with ζ=max⁡{2eq1/τ, 4e(q2/τ)1/2}\zeta = \max\{\sqrt2 e q_1/\tau,\ 4e(q_2/\tau)^{1/2}\}ζ=max{2​eq1​/τ, 4e(q2​/τ)1/2}, and the minimizer satisfies z∗2=(τ−q1z∗)/(2q2)≤τ/(2q2)z^{*2} = (\tau - q_1 z^*)/(2q_2) \le \tau/(2q_2)z∗2=(τ−q1​z∗)/(2q2​)≤τ/(2q2​).
  3. Display (10): for a permutation ppp with a fraction ϵ\epsilonϵ of fixed points, ∣S21∣≤n(1−ϵ)|S^1_2| \le n(1-\epsilon)∣S21​∣≤n(1−ϵ) and ∣Sˉ22∣≤(n2)−(nϵ2)≤n22(1−ϵ2)|\bar S^2_2| \le \binom n2 - \binom{n\epsilon}2 \le \frac{n^2}2(1-\epsilon^2)∣Sˉ22​∣≤(2n​)−(2nϵ​)≤2n2​(1−ϵ2).
  4. Lemma A.2, in particular: P(Po(2λ/3)≥λ/2−1)≥0.7\mathbb P(\mathrm{Po}(2\lambda/3) \ge \lambda/2 - 1) \ge 0.7P(Po(2λ/3)≥λ/2−1)≥0.7 for λ≥20\lambda \ge 20λ≥20.
  5. Proposition 4.2: under (6), π∗\pi^*π∗ is good with probability tending to 1.
  6. Proposition 4.4: under (6), P(∀π, [π good⇒β(π,π∗)>α])→1\mathbb P(\forall \pi,\ [\pi \text{ good} \Rightarrow \beta(\pi, \pi^*) > \alpha]) \to 1P(∀π, [π good⇒β(π,π∗)>α])→1.

Significance

The result. Theorem 2.3 shows that partial alignment is information-theoretically achievable in the sparse regime nqs=Θ(1)nqs = \Theta(1)nqs=Θ(1), provided nqsnqsnqs is above an explicit constant depending on α\alphaα. Together with Theorem 2.1, it locates partial recovery between a necessary condition stated through the divergence D(P∥Q)D(P\|Q)D(P∥Q) and a sufficient condition stated through nqsnqsnqs. It complements the almost-exact-recovery results for nqs=ω(1)nqs = \omega(1)nqs=ω(1), which do not apply when nqsnqsnqs stays bounded. The moment generating function computation of Lemma B.2 and the inequality of Lemma B.1 were reused for the sharp exact-recovery threshold by Wu, Xu, Yu (p. 9 of the source).

Formalizing it. The theorem is proved on paper; no part of it is machine-checked. The paper's route to Proposition 4.2 applies a kkk-core theorem for G(n,λ/n)G(n, \lambda/n)G(n,λ/n) with λ\lambdaλ fixed and kkk an integer, at λ=nqs\lambda = nqsλ=nqs and k=nqs/2k = nqs/2k=nqs/2, which vary with nnn and need not be integers. The statement of Proposition 4.2 remains true, but a formal proof needs a different argument. Proposition 4.4's union bound contains two repairable gaps: an infimum taken over z>0z > 0z>0 instead of z>1z > 1z>1, and the bound n!≤nlog⁡nn! \le n^{\log n}n!≤nlogn. A formal development would settle the theorem under exactly the conditions (6).

Difficulty

The natural first step is to compute P(π good)\mathbb P(\pi \text{ good})P(π good) for a fixed wrong permutation π\piπ and take a union bound over all n!n!n! permutations. The difficulty is that for π≠π∗\pi \ne \pi^*π=π∗ the terms AijBp(i)p(j)′A_{ij} B'_{p(i)p(j)}Aij​Bp(i)p(j)′​ are not independent: an edge variable enters several terms along the cycles that ppp induces on vertex pairs. A Chernoff bound therefore needs the moment generating function of a sum over each cycle of pairs. That is a transfer-matrix computation, and the per-cycle bounds must then be recombined uniformly in the cycle lengths. The resulting exponent must beat log⁡n!≈nlog⁡n\log n! \approx n \log nlogn!≈nlogn. This is where the sparsity conditions 2q(1−s2)/s≤n−β2q(1-s^2)/s \le n^{-\beta}2q(1−s2)/s≤n−β and qs≤n−2γqs \le n^{-2\gamma}qs≤n−2γ, and the constant 16/(min⁡(γ,β)(1−α))16/(\min(\gamma,\beta)(1-\alpha))16/(min(γ,β)(1−α)), enter. Proposition 4.2 is a concentration statement for the number of vertices of degree at least nqs/2nqs/2nqs/2 in the intersection graph, an Erdős–Rényi graph G(n,qs)G(n, qs)G(n,qs), when nqsnqsnqs is only a large constant.

Formalization scope

Everything is finite. Vertices are Fin n and permutations are Equiv.Perm (Fin n). A configuration assigns (Aij,Bij′)∈(A_{ij}, B'_{ij}) \in(Aij​,Bij′​)∈ Bool × Bool to each non-diagonal element of Sym2 (Fin n), and probabilities are finite sums of the product weights. They are not taken against a free measure, so the model is a genuine probability space whenever 0≤q<s≤10 \le q < s \le 10≤q<s≤1. The standing assumptions 0≤qn<sn≤10 \le q_n < s_n \le 10≤qn​<sn​≤1 for every nnn (p. 5 and the running assumption s>qs > qs>q on p. 7) are hypotheses of the asymptotic statements. The paper's remark "we assume s<1s < 1s<1" (p. 6) is used by neither result and is not imposed. Logarithms are natural, "→1\to 1→1" is a limit along n→∞n \to \inftyn→∞, and the thresholds nqs/2nqs/2nqs/2 and n(1+α)/2n(1+\alpha)/2n(1+α)/2 are real numbers, not floored.

In the goal, an algorithm is a family of maps from the observed pair (A,B)(A, B)(A,B) to a permutation. It is chosen before the planted permutations and may depend on nnn, qnq_nqn​, sns_nsn​, α\alphaα, but never on π∗\pi^*π∗. This rules out the trivial algorithm "output π∗\pi^*π∗". The theorem does not say how π∗\pi^*π∗ is drawn, so the limit is required for every sequence of planted permutations, which covers the uniform case. "Exponential time" is not formalized.

Three statements are posed in a corrected reading, each disclosed in its Formalization Note. In Lemma 4.3, τ,q2>0\tau, q_2 > 0τ,q2​>0 and z>0z > 0z>0: the paper allows τ=q2=0\tau = q_2 = 0τ=q2​=0 and z=0z = 0z=0, where ζ\zetaζ and (13) are undefined, and Lean's convention 0−τ=00^{-\tau} = 00−τ=0 would make the bound trivial. Display (10) is stated for an arbitrary permutation ppp. Only the "in particular" clause of Lemma A.2 is stated, because the paper's proof of the general normal-approximation bound does not hold as written. Lemma 4.1 (a kkk-core theorem of Pittel, Spencer and Wormald) is not posed.

A complete development needs: Chernoff bounds for finite sums of dependent Bernoulli variables via the transfer-matrix formula, binomial and Poisson tail estimates, and the cycle decomposition of the action of a permutation on unordered pairs. Lemmas B.1, B.3 and 4.3 are general-purpose and reusable. Proofs of any milestone, and alternative proofs of Proposition 4.2 that avoid kkk-cores, are welcome.

The source is the arXiv preprint v5, whose appendices contain the proofs that the main text defers to an electronic companion.

Selected references

  • G. Hall, L. Massoulié, Partial Recovery in the Graph Alignment Problem, Operations Research, 2023; preprint arXiv:2007.00533v5, 2022. https://arxiv.org/abs/2007.00533
  • D. Cullina, N. Kiyavash, P. Mittal, H. V. Poor, Partial Recovery of Erdős–Rényi Graph Alignment via k-Core Alignment, arXiv preprint, 2018. https://arxiv.org/abs/1809.03553
  • D. Cullina, N. Kiyavash, Exact Alignment Recovery for Correlated Erdős–Rényi Graphs, arXiv preprint, 2017. https://arxiv.org/abs/1711.06783
  • D. Cullina, N. Kiyavash, Improved Achievability and Converse Bounds for Erdős–Rényi Graph Matching, SIGMETRICS, 2016. https://arxiv.org/abs/1602.01042
  • B. Pittel, J. Spencer, N. Wormald, Sudden Emergence of a Giant k-Core in a Random Graph, J. Combin. Theory Ser. B, 1996. https://doi.org/10.1006/jctb.1996.0036
  • Y. Wu, J. Xu, S. H. Yu, Settling the Sharp Reconstruction Thresholds of Random Graph Matching, arXiv preprint, 2021. https://arxiv.org/abs/2102.00082
  • A. Narayanan, V. Shmatikov, De-anonymizing Social Networks, IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy, 2009. https://doi.org/10.1109/SP.2009.22
  • P. Pedarsani, M. Grossglauser, On the Privacy of Anonymized Networks, KDD, 2011. https://doi.org/10.1145/2020408.2020596
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Secretaries with Advice 1: Under Non-Filtering and History-Irrelevance, an Optimal Stopping Policy Is MemorylessResearch Paper

Motivation

In the classical secretary problem, nnn candidates arrive one at a time in random order; at each arrival the decision maker sees only how the current candidate compares with the earlier ones, and must irrevocably hire or pass. The goal is to hire the best candidate, and the optimal rule (wait for about n/en/en/e arrivals, then take the first candidate better than all before) succeeds with probability about 1/e1/e1/e.

In many applications the decision maker also receives advice about each candidate: a noisy score, a prediction from a machine-learned classifier, or samples from the same distribution. Dütting, Lattanzi, Paes Leme and Vassilvitskii (arXiv:2011.06726, Mathematics of Operations Research, 2024) propose a single model covering these cases: each secretary carries a signal, ranks and signals have an arbitrary known joint distribution, and the question is which policies are optimal. Their first structural result says that, under two natural conditions on the distribution, the optimal policy can ignore almost all of the history: it needs only the current signal and whether the current secretary is the best so far. Such memoryless policies are simpler, store less, and are relevant where data retention is restricted.

Timeline. Dynkin (1963) gave the 1/e1/e1/e rule for the advice-free problem. Gilbert and Mosteller (1966) studied the full-information version, where the advice is the candidate's value drawn from a known distribution. Buchbinder, Jain and Singh (2014) wrote secretary problems as linear programs. Dütting et al. (arXiv 2020) extended this LP to general advice and proved Theorem 8, the result of this mission.

Setting

There are nnn secretaries, arriving in the order 1,…,n1,\dots,n1,…,n, and a finite signal space S\mathcal SS. An outcome consists of ranks r1,…,rn∈[n]r_1,\dots,r_n\in[n]r1​,…,rn​∈[n] (ties allowed) and signals s1,…,sn∈Ss_1,\dots,s_n\in\mathcal Ss1​,…,sn​∈S. A signaling structure is a known probability distribution P\mathbb PP over outcomes such that, almost surely, some secretary has the top rank ri=nr_i=nri​=n.

At round iii the algorithm sees the information (⪯1..i,s1,…,si)(\preceq_{1..i},s_1,\dots,s_i)(⪯1..i​,s1​,…,si​): the relative order of the first iii arrivals and their signals, not the ranks themselves. A policy qqq assigns to every round iii and every information value a stopping probability in [0,1][0,1][0,1]. The policy stops at iii with probability qi∏j<i(1−qj)q_i\prod_{j<i}(1-q_j)qi​∏j<i​(1−qj​), and its winning probability is the probability that it stops at some iii with ri=nr_i=nri​=n.

The best-so-far event is Ti={ri≥rj ∀j<i}T_i=\{r_i\ge r_j\ \forall j<i\}Ti​={ri​≥rj​ ∀j<i}. A policy is memoryless if its stopping probability at round iii depends only on iii, on whether TiT_iTi​ holds, and on sis_isi​.

Two properties of P\mathbb PP are assumed. Non-Filtering (NF): for j<ij<ij<i, the conditional law of (⪯1..j,s1,…,sj)(\preceq_{1..j},s_1,\dots,s_j)(⪯1..j​,s1​,…,sj​) given (Tj,sj)(T_j,s_j)(Tj​,sj​) is unchanged by additionally conditioning on (Ti,si)(T_i,s_i)(Ti​,si​). History-Irrelevance (HI): conditioned on (Ti,si)(T_i,s_i)(Ti​,si​), the information at round iii is independent of the event ri=nr_i=nri​=n.

For i∈[n]i\in[n]i∈[n], s,s′∈Ss,s'\in\mathcal Ss,s′∈S and j<ij<ij<i let a(i,s)=P[ri=n, si=s]a(i,s)=\mathbb P[r_i=n,\,s_i=s]a(i,s)=P[ri​=n,si​=s] and c(i,s,j,s′)=P[Tj, sj=s′∣Ti, si=s]c(i,s,j,s')=\mathbb P[T_j,\,s_j=s'\mid T_i,\,s_i=s]c(i,s,j,s′)=P[Tj​,sj​=s′∣Ti​,si​=s]. The LP of §3 has variables z(i,s)≥0z(i,s)\ge0z(i,s)≥0, constraint

z(i,s)≤1−∑j<i∑s′∈Sz(j,s′) c(i,s,j,s′),(4)z(i,s)\le 1-\sum_{j<i}\sum_{s'\in\mathcal S}z(j,s')\,c(i,s,j,s'),\tag{4}z(i,s)≤1−j<i∑​s′∈S∑​z(j,s′)c(i,s,j,s′),(4)

and objective Obj=∑i∑sz(i,s) a(i,s)\mathsf{Obj}=\sum_i\sum_s z(i,s)\,a(i,s)Obj=∑i​∑s​z(i,s)a(i,s) (5).

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 8

If P\mathbb PP satisfies NF and HI, then there is a memoryless policy mmm with

P[m wins] ≥ P[q wins]for every policy q.\mathbb P[m\text{ wins}]\ \ge\ \mathbb P[q\text{ wins}]\qquad\text{for every policy } q.P[m wins] ≥ P[q wins]for every policy q.

Milestones

  1. Best-so-far reduction (§2, p. 6): every policy is dominated by one that stops only on best-so-far rounds.
  2. Equation (2) (p. 8): under HI, P[ri=n∣≺1..i,s1,…,si]=P[ri=n∣Ti,si]\mathbb P[r_i=n\mid\prec_{1..i},s_1,\dots,s_i]=\mathbb P[r_i=n\mid T_i,s_i]P[ri​=n∣≺1..i​,s1​,…,si​]=P[ri​=n∣Ti​,si​].
  3. Equation (3) (p. 9): under HI, P[X∣si,ri=n]=P[X∣Ti,si]\mathbb P[X\mid s_i,r_i=n]=\mathbb P[X\mid T_i,s_i]P[X∣si​,ri​=n]=P[X∣Ti​,si​] for every event XXX of the round-iii information.
  4. Proposition 9 (p. 10): under NF and HI, every policy yields z≥0z\ge0z≥0 satisfying (4) whose objective (5) is its winning probability.
  5. Reconstruction claim (proof of Proposition 10, p. 11): for feasible zzz, the policy (6) satisfies P[i is picked∣Ti,si=s]=z(i,s)\mathbb P[i\text{ is picked}\mid T_i,s_i=s]=z(i,s)P[i is picked∣Ti​,si​=s]=z(i,s).
  6. Proposition 10 (p. 10): under NF and HI, every feasible zzz is realized by a memoryless policy with winning probability Obj\mathsf{Obj}Obj.

Significance

Theorem 8 reduces the search for an optimal policy from functions of the entire history, whose number grows exponentially in nnn, to n⋅2⋅∣S∣n\cdot 2\cdot|\mathcal S|n⋅2⋅∣S∣ numbers, and with Propositions 9 and 10 it turns the problem into a linear program of polynomial size. The later sections of the paper build on it: threshold policies (§4), secretaries with samples (§5) and binary-classifier advice (§6) are all analysed through this LP. The examples satisfying NF and HI include the classical problem, the full-information problem, samples, and noisy classifier advice.

The paper gives a complete proof. As far as is known, none of it has been machine-checked, and Prove2Me has no formal model of secretary problems with advice. A formal development makes precise the parts the paper's argument leaves informal: the handling of conditioning on null events, of randomized policies, and of the existence of an optimum.

Difficulty

The obvious argument replaces a general policy by its conditional stopping probability given (Ti,si)(T_i,s_i)(Ti​,si​). This fails directly: the probability of reaching round iii depends on the whole history, so averaging the decision at round iii changes the distribution of the earlier stopping events, and the winning probability with it. The paper therefore goes through the LP. The variables z(i,s)z(i,s)z(i,s) summarize a policy, NF is what makes constraint (4) depend only on the distribution and not on the policy, and HI is what makes the objective linear in zzz. The reverse direction, Proposition 10, rebuilds a policy from zzz through an induction over rounds in which the survival probability must be tracked exactly.

Formalization scope

  • Finite outcome space. Secretaries and ranks are Fin n, 0-based: Lean secretary iii is the paper's i+1i+1i+1, and Lean rank n−1n-1n−1 is the paper's top rank nnn. The signal space SSS is a finite type, so every probability is a finite sum. Continuous signals (the paper's Example 2, S=R\mathcal S=\mathbb RS=R) and the non-NF Example 11 are out of scope. Ties are allowed, as in §2.
  • Information and policies. The information at round iii is the comparison table ra≤rbr_a\le r_bra​≤rb​ for a,b≤ia,b\le ia,b≤i together with the signals s0,…,sis_0,\dots,s_is0​,…,si​. A policy is a function of this information only and never sees the outcome. Policies are randomized, with values in [0,1][0,1][0,1]; the competitors in Theorem 8 range over all of them.
  • Conditioning. NF, HI, (2), (3) and the reconstruction claim are written cross-multiplied, so a null conditioning event imposes nothing. c(i,s,j,s′)c(i,s,j,s')c(i,s,j,s′) is a quotient that Lean sets to 000 when P[Ti,si=s]=0\mathbb P[T_i,s_i=s]=0P[Ti​,si​=s]=0; there a(i,s)=0a(i,s)=0a(i,s)=0, so the objective is unaffected.
  • Optimality is stated as existence of a valid memoryless policy that beats every valid policy, not as a supremum. The paper presupposes that an optimum exists; with SSS finite it does.
  • Departures from the page. Proposition 10 additionally asserts that the realizing policy is memoryless; this is the proof of Theorem 8's own observation about the policy (6). Proposition 9 is stated for every policy, as printed.
  • Not trivial. A Memoryless predicate that allowed dependence on the whole information, or a winning probability without the survival product, would make the goal empty. Neither is used here: a memoryless policy is a function of (i,1Ti,si)(i,\mathbf 1_{T_i},s_i)(i,1Ti​​,si​) only, and the winning probability includes ∏j<i(1−qj)\prod_{j<i}(1-q_j)∏j<i​(1−qj​).
  • Welcome contributions. Lemmas on the finite probability calculus (prob, expectOn, cross-multiplied conditioning) and the identity ∏j<i(1−qj)=1−∑j<iqj∏k<j(1−qk)\prod_{j<i}(1-q_j)=1-\sum_{j<i}q_j\prod_{k<j}(1-q_k)∏j<i​(1−qj​)=1−∑j<i​qj​∏k<j​(1−qk​) are reusable well beyond this mission. Proving the milestones in the order listed follows the paper's proof. The running time of the LP and the paper's plots are out of scope.

Selected references

  • P. Dütting, S. Lattanzi, R. Paes Leme, S. Vassilvitskii, Secretaries with Advice, arXiv:2011.06726v1, 2020; Mathematics of Operations Research, 2024. https://arxiv.org/abs/2011.06726
  • E. B. Dynkin, The optimum choice of the instant for stopping a Markov process, Soviet Mathematics Doklady 4, 1963.
  • J. P. Gilbert, F. Mosteller, Recognizing the maximum of a sequence, Journal of the American Statistical Association 61, 1966. https://doi.org/10.1080/01621459.1966.10502008
  • N. Buchbinder, K. Jain, M. Singh, Secretary problems via linear programming, Mathematics of Operations Research 39(1), 2014. https://doi.org/10.1287/moor.2013.0604
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Secretaries with Advice 4: With Advice from a Binary Classifier, a Threshold Policy Is OptimalResearch Paper

Why binary advice matters

The classical secretary problem asks a decision maker to choose the best of nnn candidates arriving in random order. A decision must be made when each candidate arrives, before later candidates are seen. In the classical model the decision maker sees only comparisons with earlier candidates. In hiring and selection, a prediction system may also classify an arriving candidate as promising or unpromising. The question is then whether the entire history of comparisons and predictions must be retained to make an optimal decision. Dütting, Lattanzi, Paes Leme, and Vassilvitskii study this question for several advice models in Secretaries with Advice. This mission concerns their binary-classifier model and the structural conclusion of Theorem 19: two signal-dependent time thresholds suffice.

The no-information secretary problem is a special case in which the signal says YYY and NNN with equal probability regardless of candidate quality. A separate classical cutoff-rule problem on Prove2Me addresses a deterministic rule for that special case; the present target covers informative and uninformative classifiers and compares with randomized policies that may use all observed history. The result is known mathematically in the cited paper. The task here is to give its probability model and the structural theorem precise, checkable statements in Lean.

Setting

There are n≥1n\geq1n≥1 candidates. Their ranks are a uniformly random permutation of {1,…,n}\{1,\ldots,n\}{1,…,n}, with rank nnn uniquely best. At round iii, the decision maker learns how candidate iii compares with all earlier candidates and receives a binary signal si∈{Y,N}s_i\in\{Y,N\}si​∈{Y,N}. The classifier has recall ppp: the best candidate receives YYY with probability ppp. It has specificity p′p'p′: every other candidate receives NNN with probability p′p'p′. Both parameters lie in [1/2,1][1/2,1][1/2,1]. Conditional on the ranks, signals across candidates are independent, as used by the paper's calculation of the signal-history distribution in Example 5 and Section 2.2. The decision maker never observes absolute ranks.

A policy assigns a stopping probability between zero and one to every possible information state at every round. Its information consists of all relative comparisons among candidates seen so far and all signals seen so far. Once it stops, it cannot act again. It wins if it stops at the unique candidate of rank nnn. The winning probability therefore includes the probability of continuing through all earlier rounds. A candidate is best so far when its rank is at least that of every previously seen candidate.

A threshold policy chooses two rounds tY,tN∈{1,…,n}t_Y,t_N\in\{1,\ldots,n\}tY​,tN​∈{1,…,n}. It accepts the first best-so-far candidate arriving at or after tYt_YtY​ if the current signal is YYY, or at or after tNt_NtN​ if it is NNN. A policy can finish without selecting anyone; that outcome loses. Thresholds govern when a signal becomes acceptable, while the best-so-far condition still depends on the observed comparisons.

Formalization targets

The goal is Theorem 19. For every positive nnn and every p,p′∈[1/2,1]p,p'\in[1/2,1]p,p′∈[1/2,1], there are thresholds tY,tNt_Y,t_NtY​,tN​ such that, for every valid randomized history-dependent policy qqq,

\Pr(\text{win under }q) \leq \Pr(\text{win under threshold}$t_Y,t_N$).

The thresholds are chosen once for the model, before the competing policy qqq. Their order is not constrained by this theorem. The later asymptotic result, Theorem 20, studies the positions and relative order of thresholds and belongs to a separate mission.

The supporting targets follow the paper's route to this conclusion. Section 2.2 computes the chance that the current candidate is globally best after an observed information state. Section 6 identifies the binary model's factor-revealing linear program. Appendix C asserts that its backward-defined dual vector is monotone in time and optimal among dual-feasible vectors. Proposition 12 converts those dual properties into an optimal threshold policy. Each statement concerns the same (n,p,p′)(n,p,p')(n,p,p′) model fixed above.

What the result supplies

The theorem reduces an optimization over policies that can use every past comparison and signal to a search over two time thresholds. It says that remembering the earlier signals and relative-order pattern cannot increase the achievable chance of selecting the best candidate once the two thresholds are chosen. This is a structural result about policy form; it does not give the numerical values of the best thresholds or their large-nnn performance. The paper treats those questions separately in Theorem 20.

A formal development would also give reusable finite objects: a joint rank-and-signal probability model, the information available to an online policy, an exact winning-probability expression, and the primal and dual programs for binary advice. The target theorems in this proposal are open Lean statements with sorry; compilation checks their types, not their proofs. The paper supplies mathematical arguments, while the machine-checked proofs remain work for solvers. The local published uniform-average definition for rank permutations is relevant prior art, but this model uses its own weighted outcome sum because it also averages over the dependent signal law.

Where the difficulty lies

The available history is much larger than a pair of thresholds: it includes all earlier classifier outputs and the complete relative order observed so far. A direct comparison of a given policy with a threshold policy must account for the chance that the policy would already have stopped at an earlier round. Simply comparing the current stopping probabilities does not preserve the winning probability. The paper organizes those reach probabilities through a finite linear program and examines a dual vector defined backward from the last round. The remaining difficulty is to connect the properties of that vector to a policy with the claimed stopping behavior, including parameter values where some constraints are tight at equality.

Formalization scope

Lean uses Fin n for rounds and ranks. Its index zero is the paper's round one; formulas containing (1/i) use a natural round number in {1,…,n}\{1,\ldots,n\}{1,…,n}. Bool.true represents YYY. Every rank order is a permutation, so there are no ties. Each outcome weight is (1/n!) times the product of the conditional signal likelihoods. All expectations and event masses are finite sums, and conditional-probability claims are stated by cross-multiplying event masses, including at information states of zero probability. The LP is indexed only by positive rounds, so its divisions by iii and nnn have the intended values.

The universal competitor in Theorem 19 is a randomized policy whose input contains only observed comparisons and signals. Its winning probability has an explicit product of continuation probabilities over earlier rounds. This restriction and product prevent the result from becoming trivial by allowing the policy to see the future, identify the global best rank, or stop more than once. The parameter interval and n≥1n\geq1n≥1 are explicit hypotheses. The printed conditional-probability fractions in Section 2.2 omit a factor of the current round iii; the formal milestone uses the corrected value and records the discrepancy. The classifier's ppp is recall as defined in Example 5, despite a later use of the word “precision” in Section 6.

The scope includes the finite probability model, its LP coefficients, the greedy dual vector, and the optimality bridge. Solvers can contribute proofs of the event identities, dual feasibility and optimality, and the threshold conclusion. Running-time claims for an LP algorithm, plots, and Theorem 20's asymptotic limit are outside this mission.

Selected references

  • Paul Dütting, Silvio Lattanzi, Renato Paes Leme, and Sergei Vassilvitskii, Secretaries with Advice, arXiv preprint arXiv:2011.06726v1, 2020; later published in Mathematics of Operations Research, 2024. Pinned preprint.
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Balancing Optimal Large Deviations in Ranking and Selection: The BOLD Allocation Learns the Large Deviations Optimality Conditions With Probability OneResearch Paper

Motivation

Ranking and selection asks which of MMM simulated alternatives has the largest mean, when each simulation run returns one noisy sample and the simulation budget is limited. A large literature allocates the budget using the large-deviations analysis of Glynn and Juneja (2004): for a static allocation in which alternative xxx receives a fixed fraction αx\alpha_xαx​ of the samples, the probability of incorrect selection decays exponentially, and the allocation that maximizes the decay rate is characterized by a system of nonlinear optimality conditions. Those conditions depend on the unknown means, so practical procedures plug in estimates and solve the system repeatedly, which is costly and comes with few guarantees.

Chen and Ryzhov (Proc. 2019 Winter Simulation Conference) propose Balancing Optimal Large Deviations (BOLD), a sequential rule that never solves the optimality conditions: at each step it evaluates the two sides of one condition at plug-in estimates and samples whichever alternative appears to be falling behind. It has no tuning parameters and applies to any sampling distribution whose rate function can be evaluated. The paper states that BOLD learns the optimality conditions with probability 1; the full proofs are in the companion article (Chen and Ryzhov, Management Science, 2023).

Setting

There are M>2M > 2M>2 alternatives with distinct means μ1,…,μM\mu_1,\dots,\mu_Mμ1​,…,μM​; the best is x∗=arg⁡max⁡xμxx^* = \arg\max_x \mu_xx∗=argmaxx​μx​. Alternative xxx produces independent samples from a law FxF_xFx​ with mean μx\mu_xμx​, a member of a distributional family {Fx(θ)}\{F_x(\theta)\}{Fx​(θ)} indexed by its mean θ\thetaθ. The families may differ between alternatives.

The rate function of the member with mean θ\thetaθ is the Fenchel–Legendre transform of its log-moment generating function,

Ix(u;θ)=sup⁡γ(γu−log⁡E eγW),W∼Fx(θ),I_x(u;\theta) = \sup_{\gamma}\big(\gamma u - \log \mathbb E\,e^{\gamma W}\big),\qquad W \sim F_x(\theta),Ix​(u;θ)=γsup​(γu−logEeγW),W∼Fx​(θ),

with values in [0,∞][0,\infty][0,∞], and Dx(u;θ)=∂Ix(u;θ)/∂uD_x(u;\theta) = \partial I_x(u;\theta)/\partial uDx​(u;θ)=∂Ix​(u;θ)/∂u. For a normal law with variance λx2\lambda_x^2λx2​, Ix(u;θ)=(u−θ)2/(2λx2)I_x(u;\theta) = (u-\theta)^2/(2\lambda_x^2)Ix​(u;θ)=(u−θ)2/(2λx2​).

An allocation chooses alternative xnx^nxn at stage n=0,1,…n = 0,1,\dotsn=0,1,…. Write NxnN^n_xNxn​ for the number of samples of xxx among stages 0,…,n−10,\dots,n-10,…,n−1 and θxn\theta^n_xθxn​ for their mean (an arbitrary θx0\theta^0_xθx0​ while Nxn=0N^n_x = 0Nxn​=0). The plug-in rate is Ixn(⋅)=Ix(⋅;θxn)I^n_x(\cdot) = I_x(\cdot;\theta^n_x)Ixn​(⋅)=Ix​(⋅;θxn​), likewise DxnD^n_xDxn​. For x≠yx \ne yx=y, ux,ynu^n_{x,y}ux,yn​ is the solution of

NxnDxn(u)+NynDyn(u)=0(10)N^n_x D^n_x(u) + N^n_y D^n_y(u) = 0 \qquad (10)Nxn​Dxn​(u)+Nyn​Dyn​(u)=0(10)

and Γx,yn=NxnIxn(ux,yn)+NynIyn(ux,yn)\Gamma^n_{x,y} = N^n_x I^n_x(u^n_{x,y}) + N^n_y I^n_y(u^n_{x,y})Γx,yn​=Nxn​Ixn​(ux,yn​)+Nyn​Iyn​(ux,yn​) (11).

BOLD (Figure 1 of the paper): let x∗,nx^{*,n}x∗,n be the leader, an alternative with the largest θxn\theta^n_xθxn​. If the leader is not unique, sample the tied leader with the fewest samples. Otherwise sample the leader if

∑x≠x∗,nIx∗,nn(ux∗,n,xn)Ixn(ux∗,n,xn)>1,(12)\sum_{x\ne x^{*,n}} \frac{I^n_{x^{*,n}}(u^n_{x^{*,n},x})}{I^n_x(u^n_{x^{*,n},x})} > 1, \qquad (12)x=x∗,n∑​Ixn​(ux∗,n,xn​)Ix∗,nn​(ux∗,n,xn​)​>1,(12)

and if not, sample the x≠x∗,nx \ne x^{*,n}x=x∗,n minimizing Γx∗,n,xn\Gamma^n_{x^{*,n},x}Γx∗,n,xn​ (13). Remaining ties are broken arbitrarily.

Formalization targets

Goal: BOLD learns the optimality conditions

Under Assumptions 1–4 of the paper, with probability 1,

lim⁡n→∞∑x≠x∗Ix∗n(ux∗,xn)Ixn(ux∗,xn)=1andlim⁡n→∞Γx∗,ynΓx∗,zn=1  for all y,z≠x∗.\lim_{n\to\infty}\sum_{x\ne x^*}\frac{I^n_{x^*}(u^n_{x^*,x})}{I^n_x(u^n_{x^*,x})} = 1 \quad\text{and}\quad \lim_{n\to\infty}\frac{\Gamma^n_{x^*,y}}{\Gamma^n_{x^*,z}} = 1 \ \text{ for all } y,z\ne x^*.n→∞lim​x=x∗∑​Ixn​(ux∗,xn​)Ix∗n​(ux∗,xn​)​=1andn→∞lim​Γx∗,zn​Γx∗,yn​​=1  for all y,z=x∗.

These are the plug-in forms of the total balance condition (5) and the individual balance conditions (6), which together characterize the optimal static allocation. The paper states them as Theorems 3 and 4; the goal is their conjunction.

Milestones

  1. Theorem 1 (consistency). Under Assumptions 1–3, Nxn→∞N^n_x \to \inftyNxn​→∞ for every xxx, almost surely.
  2. Theorem 2. Under Assumptions 1–3, lim sup⁡nNxn/Nyn<∞\limsup_n N^n_x/N^n_y < \inftylimsupn​Nxn​/Nyn​<∞ for all x,yx, yx,y, almost surely.
  3. Theorem 3. The total balance limit above.
  4. Theorem 4. The individual balance limit above.

Significance

The result. Convergence of BOLD to the optimality conditions shows that the static optimum of Glynn and Juneja can be learned by a cheap sequential rule without knowing the proportion of the budget the best alternative should receive. Top-two methods require that proportion as an input. The paper claims the guarantee for any sampling distributions satisfying four regularity assumptions, not only normal ones. As the paper notes, convergence to the static optimum does not by itself transfer the static exponential rate to the adaptive procedure; the result concerns learning the conditions.

The formalization. The WSC paper gives proof outlines only, and the complete argument lives in a long journal article. No part of it has been machine-checked. A formal proof would check a strong-law argument for an adaptive procedure with two interleaved decision criteria and would yield a reusable formal model of sequential sampling for ranking and selection with general rate functions.

Difficulty

The obvious argument is "sample means converge, hence the plug-in conditions converge". It fails because the sample means converge only if every alternative is sampled infinitely often, and BOLD gives no forced exploration: an alternative is sampled only when (12) or (13) selects it. Consistency must therefore come from the structure of the rule itself. Even with consistency, the limits in Theorems 3–4 are not continuity statements: the plug-in quantities depend on the sample sizes as well as the sample means, and they oscillate around the level 1 as (12) alternately holds and fails, so convergence requires quantitative control of how long the rule can neglect any one alternative. Discrete sampling laws add ties among sample means and a sample mean that can coincide with another alternative's true mean (Assumption 3).

Formalization scope

  • Model. Alternatives are Fin M with 2 < M (indexed from 0). The family is Fam : Fin M → ℝ → Measure ℝ of probability measures, with true law Fam x (μ x). Samples form an observation array W x k (the (k+1)(k+1)(k+1)-th sample of xxx), mutually independent, with W x k ∼ Fam x (μ x); this gives the same law of the sample path as the paper's sequential sampling.
  • Rate function. Ix(u;θ)I_x(u;\theta)Ix​(u;θ) is the extended-real Legendre transform of the extended-real log-MGF, from the published BellWilliams2001.ThresholdPolicy.LargeDeviation, so +∞+\infty+∞ is a genuine value. DxD_xDx​ is the derivative of its real part. Conditions on DxD_xDx​ are imposed on the effective domain Dx\mathcal D_xDx​, where IxI_xIx​ is finite nearby.
  • Parameter space. For each xxx there is an open interval Θx⊇Hx\Theta_x \supseteq H_xΘx​⊇Hx​ that contains the samples almost surely, on which Fx(θ)F_x(\theta)Fx​(θ) has mean θ\thetaθ and Ix(⋅;θ)I_x(\cdot;\theta)Ix​(⋅;θ) is finite between any two parameters. The initial means lie in Θx\Theta_xΘx​. These conditions are not printed, but without them the plug-in rule can starve an alternative forever: a law with Ix(⋅;θ)=+∞I_x(\cdot;\theta) = +\inftyIx​(⋅;θ)=+∞ off one point gives Γ=+∞\Gamma = +\inftyΓ=+∞. Bernoulli laws, whose sample means reach 000 or 111, fall outside this convention, although the paper says they are covered.
  • Assumptions. The interval HHH of Assumptions 1–2 is one fixed interval Hx=[ax,bx]H_x = [a_x,b_x]Hx​=[ax​,bx​] per alternative with μx\mu_xμx​ in its interior. Assumption 3 is written without division. Assumption 4 is joint C1C^1C1 on Dx\mathcal D_xDx​.
  • Algorithm. BOLD is a predicate IsBOLD on allocation sequences, so every tie-breaking rule is covered. The initial means θ0\theta^0θ0 are arbitrary. The solution of (10) is a chosen solution between the two sample means; its uniqueness is the paper's claim, not a hypothesis.
  • Conventions. Ratios and Γ\GammaΓ are in [0,∞][0,\infty][0,∞], with a/0=∞a/0 = \inftya/0=∞ for a>0a > 0a>0, so a never-sampled leader triggers (12) as in the paper. Theorem 2's limsup is taken in [0,∞][0,\infty][0,∞]. Every theorem is an almost-sure statement, with "probability 1" taken from §4.
  • Ruled out. The theorems are not vacuous: a BOLD run exists on every realization (a local check proves this). The rate function is the Legendre transform of the actual family, not an unconstrained function. The family is not fixed to the normal or any single parametric case.

The development needs strong laws of large numbers along adaptively chosen sample counts, properties of Legendre transforms of log-moment generating functions (convexity, a unique zero at the mean), and law-of-the-iterated-logarithm-type rates for sample means. Lemmas on Legendre transforms of log-MGFs and the observation-array model are reusable for other large-deviations allocation rules. Contributions toward any milestone are welcome. Statements specialized to normal families are not substitutes for the general milestones.

Selected references

  • Y. Chen and I. O. Ryzhov, Balancing Optimal Large Deviations in Ranking and Selection, Proc. 2019 Winter Simulation Conference, pp. 3368–3379, IEEE.
  • Y. Chen and I. O. Ryzhov, Balancing Optimal Large Deviations in Sequential Selection, Management Science, 2023. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2022.4527
  • P. Glynn and S. Juneja, A Large Deviations Perspective on Ordinal Optimization, Proc. 2004 Winter Simulation Conference, pp. 577–585, IEEE.
  • A. Dembo and O. Zeitouni, Large Deviations Techniques and Applications, 2nd ed., Springer, 2009. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-03311-7
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Linear OptimizationOperations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

Secretaries with Advice 2: With k Samples, a Threshold Policy Is Optimal for Selecting the Best of n SecretariesResearch Paper

Motivation

In the classical secretary problem, nnn candidates with distinct qualities arrive in uniformly random order; after each arrival one sees only how the current candidate compares with those already seen, and must irrevocably accept or reject. The goal is to accept the best candidate. Dynkin's rule (skip roughly n/en/en/e candidates, then accept the first one better than all before it) succeeds with probability about 1/e1/e1/e, and nothing does better.

A natural question in online decision-making with data is how much prior samples help. Kaplan, Naori and Raz (SODA 2020) introduced a model in which an adversary writes down n+kn+kn+k numbers, a uniformly random kkk of them are revealed in advance as samples, and the remaining nnn arrive online in random order. Correa et al. (SODA 2021) studied the probability of selecting the maximum in a related independent-sampling model. Dütting, Lattanzi, Paes Leme and Vassilvitskii (arXiv:2011.06726, Mathematics of Operations Research 2024) place this model inside a general framework of secretaries with advice, where each arrival carries a signal, and prove that with kkk samples the optimal policy has a simple threshold form.

Timeline:

  • 1963: Dynkin, optimal rule for the classical problem (the case k=0k=0k=0).
  • 1966: Gilbert and Mosteller (JASA), full-information variants and threshold rules depending on the observed value.
  • 2014: Buchbinder, Jain and Singh (Math. Oper. Res.), a linear program whose value is the optimal success probability of secretary problems.
  • 2020: Kaplan, Naori and Raz, the sample model used here; Dütting et al., Theorem 16: threshold policies are optimal for every nnn and kkk.

Setting

Fix integers n≥1n\ge1n≥1 and k≥0k\ge0k≥0. Only the relative order of the n+kn+kn+k numbers matters, so an outcome is a uniformly random permutation σ\sigmaσ of k+nk+nk+n positions, read as position ↦\mapsto↦ value rank. The first kkk positions are the samples; position k+ik+ik+i holds the secretary of round iii.

  • The signal si∈S={0,1,…,k}s_i\in\mathcal S=\{0,1,\dots,k\}si​∈S={0,1,…,k} is the number of samples worse than secretary iii.
  • The best-so-far event TiT_iTi​ says that secretary iii beats every earlier secretary.
  • The event ri=nr_i=nri​=n says that secretary iii is the best of the nnn secretaries (samples do not count).
  • The information at round iii is the relative order of the samples and secretaries 1,…,i1,\dots,i1,…,i.
  • A policy qqq gives, in each round, a stopping probability qi(x)∈[0,1]q_i(x)\in[0,1]qi​(x)∈[0,1] that is a function of the information xxx only. Its winning probability is
win(q)=E[∑i=1n1[ri=n] qi(xi)∏j<i(1−qj(xj))].\mathrm{win}(q)=\mathbb E\Big[\sum_{i=1}^n \mathbf 1[r_i=n]\,q_i(x_i)\prod_{j<i}\big(1-q_j(x_j)\big)\Big].win(q)=E[i=1∑n​1[ri​=n]qi​(xi​)j<i∏​(1−qj​(xj​))].
  • A threshold policy is given by t:S→[n]t:\mathcal S\to[n]t:S→[n]: stop at τ=min⁡{i:Ti and i≥t(si)}\tau=\min\{i: T_i \text{ and } i\ge t(s_i)\}τ=min{i:Ti​ and i≥t(si​)}.

The proof passes through a linear program with variables z(i,s)z(i,s)z(i,s) and coefficients

a(i,s)=1k+1∏t=1n−1s+tk+t+1,c(i,s,j,s′)=1s+1∏t=1j−1s′+ts+t+1  (s′≤s),a(i,s)=\frac{1}{k+1}\prod_{t=1}^{n-1}\frac{s+t}{k+t+1},\qquad c(i,s,j,s')=\frac{1}{s+1}\prod_{t=1}^{j-1}\frac{s'+t}{s+t+1}\ \ (s'\le s),a(i,s)=k+11​t=1∏n−1​k+t+1s+t​,c(i,s,j,s′)=s+11​t=1∏j−1​s+t+1s′+t​  (s′≤s),

its dual with variables u(i,s)u(i,s)u(i,s), and the greedy dual solution (8), computed backwards from u(n,s)=a(n,s)u(n,s)=a(n,s)u(n,s)=a(n,s).

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 16

∀n≥1, ∀k,∃ t:{0,…,k}→[n],∀q valid,win(q)≤win(τt).\forall n\ge1,\ \forall k,\quad \exists\, t:\{0,\dots,k\}\to[n],\quad \forall q\ \text{valid},\quad \mathrm{win}(q)\le \mathrm{win}(\tau_t).∀n≥1, ∀k,∃t:{0,…,k}→[n],∀q valid,win(q)≤win(τt​).

The goal asserts only the shape of the optimal policy, not the thresholds' values or the optimal winning probability. The milestones follow the paper's proof:

  1. The samples model satisfies Non-Filtering and History-Irrelevance (Definitions 6–7), and the LP coefficients aaa and ccc have the closed forms above (§5).
  2. Policies and LP solutions correspond (Propositions 9 and 10 for this model, together with the remark that only best-so-far stops matter).
  3. Lemma 15, a discrete integration identity for rising products.
  4. Claims (i) and (ii) of the proof of Theorem 16 about the perturbation Δ\DeltaΔ and its cumulative effect RiR_iRi​.
  5. The greedy dual solution is optimal and non-decreasing in iii.
  6. Proposition 12 for the samples LP: these two facts give a primal optimum of threshold shape.

Significance

The result. Theorem 16 reduces an optimal stopping problem over all history-dependent randomized policies, whose information is a full relative order of up to n+kn+kn+k items, to choosing k+1k+1k+1 integers. The greedy dual recursion computes them in polynomial time, which makes the optimal success probability computable for every nnn and kkk and underlies the numerical curves of the paper. For k=0k=0k=0 the theorem recovers the optimality of Dynkin-type cutoff rules.

Formalizing it. The theorem is proved in the paper (main text plus Appendix A), but no machine-checked version exists. A formalization produces a verified LP characterization of a secretary problem with signals, a reusable discrete-integration lemma, and a checked instance of the general principle "greedy dual optimal and monotone implies threshold optimal". The classical special case is posed separately on the platform as the open item ClassicalSecretary.exists_optimal_cutoffRule (deterministic rank-only rules, k=0k=0k=0). This mission does not restate it.

Difficulty

The obvious approach is backward induction over information states: compute the value of continuing and compare it with the probability that the current secretary is best. The difficulty is that the information is a relative order of the samples and all secretaries seen so far, and showing that the stop region is an upper set in iii for each signal requires controlling continuation values across exponentially many states. The paper avoids this through a linear program. The hard steps are the exact probability computations behind aaa and ccc (and behind Non-Filtering and History-Irrelevance) and the optimality of the greedy dual. The perturbation argument for that optimality needs the closed form of Δ\DeltaΔ and a telescoping sum (Lemma 15). Monotonicity of the greedy solution does not follow from monotonicity of the coefficients alone, because the recursion subtracts a sum over later rounds.

Formalization scope

  • Outcomes are permutations Equiv.Perm (Fin (k + n)), read as position ↦ value rank, with the uniform distribution. Probabilities are finite counts divided by (k+n)!(k+n)!(k+n)!, never integrals. The adversary's numbers are taken distinct.
  • Rounds are 0-based in Lean (Fin n): Lean round iii is the paper's round i+1i+1i+1. The LP and its objects use 1-based natural indices i∈[1,n]i\in[1,n]i∈[1,n] and signals s∈{0,…,k}s\in\{0,\dots,k\}s∈{0,…,k}, as printed.
  • Information at round iii is the full table of comparisons among the first k+i+1k+i+1k+i+1 positions. Policies are typed on it, not on the outcome. A policy that could read the outcome could stop at the maximum and would trivialize the goal.
  • Policies are randomized (values in [0,1][0,1][0,1]) and history-dependent. Competitors are not restricted to deterministic or memoryless rules; the threshold function satisfies 1≤t(s)≤n1\le t(s)\le n1≤t(s)≤n.
  • Winning probability includes the survival product ∏j<i(1−qj)\prod_{j<i}(1-q_j)∏j<i​(1−qj​), so stopping happens at most once.
  • Conditional probabilities (Non-Filtering, History-Irrelevance, ccc) are stated cross-multiplied, so no quotient by a null probability occurs.
  • Disclosed additions: n≥1n\ge1n≥1 in Theorem 16 and Proposition 12; i∗≥2i^*\ge2i∗≥2 and δ≥0\delta\ge0δ≥0 in claim (ii); in Proposition 9, the policy stops only on best-so-far rounds, which the separate reduction item shows is without loss. Proposition 10 carries a second part: a threshold-shaped LP solution is achieved by the threshold policy itself.
  • Out of scope: the polynomial-time algorithm remark (p. 17), Figure 2, Corollary 18, and the explicit dual solution of Theorem 17, which is a separate mission of this series.
  • The definitions needed are elementary: permutations, finite sums and products, well-founded recursion for the greedy solution and for Δ\DeltaΔ. Lemma 15 and the LP-level claims are reusable beyond this mission. Contributions to any milestone are welcome. The LP-level milestones (Lemma 15, claims (i)–(ii), greedy optimality and monotonicity) do not depend on the probabilistic model.

Selected references

  • P. Dütting, S. Lattanzi, R. Paes Leme, S. Vassilvitskii, Secretaries with Advice, arXiv:2011.06726v1, 2020; Mathematics of Operations Research, 2024. https://arxiv.org/abs/2011.06726
  • H. Kaplan, D. Naori, D. Raz, Competitive Analysis with a Sample and the Secretary Problem, SODA 2020. https://arxiv.org/abs/1907.05350
  • J. Correa, A. Cristi, L. Feuilloley, T. Oosterwijk, A. Tsigonias-Dimitriadis, The Secretary Problem with Independent Sampling, SODA 2021. https://arxiv.org/abs/2011.07869
  • N. Buchbinder, K. Jain, M. Singh, Secretary Problems via Linear Programming, Mathematics of Operations Research 39(1):190–206, 2014. https://doi.org/10.1287/moor.2013.0604
  • J. P. Gilbert, F. Mosteller, Recognizing the Maximum of a Sequence, Journal of the American Statistical Association 61:35–73, 1966. https://doi.org/10.1080/01621459.1966.10502008
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Algorithmic Game TheoryConvex Optimization·Captain: mikedeng1

Persuading Risk-Conscious Agents: A Geometric Approach I: The Sender's Persuasion Problem Is Solved by a Convex Program over Conv(P_a ∪ {0})Research Paper

Motivation

Bayesian persuasion studies a sender who observes a state of the world and commits in advance to a randomized disclosure rule, in order to influence the action of a receiver who updates her belief by Bayes' rule. Since Kamenica and Gentzkow (2011) the model has been applied to platform design, recommendation systems, queue information and rating systems. Almost all of this theory assumes the receiver is an expected-utility maximizer, so that her payoff from each action is linear in her belief.

Many receivers are not. A customer who joins a queue only if the mean of her waiting time plus a multiple of its standard deviation is below a threshold has a utility that is nonlinear in her belief. Anunrojwong, Iyer and Lingenbrink (2023) call such receivers risk-conscious and show that, for them, the standard revelation-principle reduction to action recommendations fails. Their first main result replaces it with a convex program over the joint distribution of state and action. This mission formalizes that result and the lemmas leading to it.

Setting

Let Ω\OmegaΩ be a finite set of states and Δ(Ω)⊆RΩ\Delta(\Omega) \subseteq \mathbb{R}^{\Omega}Δ(Ω)⊆RΩ the simplex of beliefs, with the Euclidean topology. Sender and receiver share a prior μ∗∈Δ(Ω)\mu^* \in \Delta(\Omega)μ∗∈Δ(Ω). The receiver chooses an action from a finite nonempty set AAA. Her utility is an arbitrary function ρ:Δ(Ω)×A→R\rho : \Delta(\Omega) \times A \to \mathbb{R}ρ:Δ(Ω)×A→R; the sender's utility is v:Ω×A→Rv : \Omega \times A \to \mathbb{R}v:Ω×A→R.

For each action aaa, the beliefs at which aaa is optimal for the receiver form the set

Pa={μ∈Δ(Ω):a∈arg⁡max⁡a′∈Aρ(μ,a′)}.P_a = \{\mu \in \Delta(\Omega) : a \in \arg\max_{a' \in A} \rho(\mu, a')\}.Pa​={μ∈Δ(Ω):a∈arga′∈Amax​ρ(μ,a′)}.

The paper assumes throughout (Assumption 1) that every PaP_aPa​ is closed.

A signaling scheme consists of a measurable signal space SSS and a probability measure π\piπ on Ω×S\Omega \times SΩ×S whose Ω\OmegaΩ-marginal is μ∗\mu^*μ∗. After signal sss the receiver holds the posterior μs∈Δ(Ω)\mu_s \in \Delta(\Omega)μs​∈Δ(Ω) given by Bayes' rule, and plays an optimal strategy a(⋅)a(\cdot)a(⋅), with a(s)∈arg⁡max⁡aρ(μs,a)a(s) \in \arg\max_a \rho(\mu_s, a)a(s)∈argmaxa​ρ(μs​,a), that is μs∈Pa(s)\mu_s \in P_{a(s)}μs​∈Pa(s)​. The sender's persuasion problem (3) is to maximize Eπ[v(ωˉ,a(sˉ))]\mathbb{E}_\pi[v(\bar\omega, a(\bar s))]Eπ​[v(ωˉ,a(sˉ))] over signal spaces, schemes and optimal receiver strategies; when the receiver is indifferent, the sender picks the strategy she prefers.

A probability measure η\etaη on Δ(Ω)\Delta(\Omega)Δ(Ω) is Bayes-plausible if its mean is the prior: Eη[sˉ]=μ∗\mathbb{E}_\eta[\bar s] = \mu^*Eη​[sˉ]=μ∗.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 1

The sender's problem (3) can be optimized by solving the convex program

max⁡{ta:a∈A}∑ω∈Ω∑a∈Ata(ω) v(ω,a)s.t.∑a∈Ata(ω)=μ∗(ω) (ω∈Ω),ta∈Conv⁡(Pa∪{0}) (a∈A).(7)\max_{\{t_a : a \in A\}} \sum_{\omega \in \Omega} \sum_{a \in A} t_a(\omega)\, v(\omega,a) \quad \text{s.t.} \quad \sum_{a \in A} t_a(\omega) = \mu^*(\omega)\ (\omega \in \Omega), \qquad t_a \in \operatorname{Conv}(P_a \cup \{0\})\ (a \in A). \qquad (7){ta​:a∈A}max​ω∈Ω∑​a∈A∑​ta​(ω)v(ω,a)s.t.a∈A∑​ta​(ω)=μ∗(ω) (ω∈Ω),ta​∈Conv(Pa​∪{0}) (a∈A).(7)

It is formalized as an equality of sets: the values achievable in (3) are exactly the objective values of feasible points of (7). This says that every scheme yields a feasible point of (7) with the same value, and every feasible point is realized by a scheme. In particular the supremum of (3) equals the maximum of (7), and an optimal solution of (7) gives an optimal scheme.

Milestones

  1. Lemma 1 (Aumann–Maschler, Kamenica–Gentzkow): schemes whose signals are beliefs and satisfy μs=s\mu_s = sμs​=s correspond to Bayes-plausible measures.
  2. Lemma 5: the belief-recommendation problem (4) is equivalent to problem (14) over Bayes-plausible measures.
  3. Lemma 2: a Bayes-plausible measure and an optimal strategy give action probabilities ba∈[0,1]b_a \in [0,1]ba​∈[0,1] and mean-posteriors ma∈Conv⁡(Pa)m_a \in \operatorname{Conv}(P_a)ma​∈Conv(Pa​) with ∑abama=μ∗\sum_a b_a m_a = \mu^*∑a​ba​ma​=μ∗ and the same sender value; the converse also holds.

Further result: Theorem 2

Let Υa\Upsilon_aΥa​ be the states at which aaa is sender-optimal, assume these sets partition Ω\OmegaΩ, and set ta∗=μ∗1Υat^*_a = \mu^* \mathbb{1}_{\Upsilon_a}ta∗​=μ∗1Υa​​. Then the sender can fully persuade the receiver (almost surely, the receiver takes a sender-optimal action) if and only if t∗t^*t∗ is feasible for (7), i.e. ta∗∈Conv⁡(Pa∪{0})t^*_a \in \operatorname{Conv}(P_a \cup \{0\})ta∗​∈Conv(Pa​∪{0}) for all aaa.

Significance

The result. Problem (3) optimizes over arbitrary signal spaces and joint distributions, so it is not finite-dimensional. Program (7) has ∣A∣|A|∣A∣ vector variables in RΩ\mathbb{R}^{\Omega}RΩ, each in a convex set that depends only on the receiver's utility. Its variable ta(ω)t_a(\omega)ta​(ω) is the joint probability of state ω\omegaω and action aaa. The program gives the paper's bound on the number of signals needed (Proposition 1), its characterization of when persuasion helps (Proposition 2), the full-persuasion criterion (Theorem 2) and, after replacing Conv⁡(Pa∪{0})\operatorname{Conv}(P_a \cup \{0\})Conv(Pa​∪{0}) by a polytope, the linear program for binary persuasion (Theorem 3, the companion mission). For expected-utility receivers each PaP_aPa​ is convex, and (7) reduces to the familiar obedience-constrained linear program.

Formalizing it. The results are proved in the paper; none is formalized. A formal development fixes what "can be optimized by solving" means as a set equality and handles general measurable signal spaces with posteriors defined only almost everywhere. It also exposes two places where the printed lemmas need correction (see the scope section).

Difficulty

The usual revelation-principle shortcut would merge all signals that lead to the same action. For a risk-conscious receiver this can change the response: averaging posteriors in PaP_aPa​ can produce a belief outside PaP_aPa​, since PaP_aPa​ need not be convex. The central geometric difficulty is relating a distribution of posteriors supported on a closed, potentially nonconvex PaP_aPa​ to a finite-dimensional variable in Conv⁡(Pa∪{0})\operatorname{Conv}(P_a \cup \{0\})Conv(Pa​∪{0}). The converse must preserve both Bayes plausibility and receiver optimality. With general signal spaces, the posterior is determined only almost everywhere, while the stated strategy condition applies at every signal.

Formalization scope

  • Representation. Ω\OmegaΩ and AAA are Fintypes, AAA nonempty, and Ω\OmegaΩ carries a measurable space in which singletons are measurable. Beliefs are functions Ω→R\Omega \to \mathbb{R}Ω→R in stdSimplex ℝ Ω, Belief Ω is the simplex as a subtype, Conv⁡\operatorname{Conv}Conv is convexHull ℝ, and 000 is the zero function. ρ\rhoρ is a function on RΩ\mathbb{R}^{\Omega}RΩ, used only on the simplex.
  • Signal spaces in (3) range over all measurable types. A scheme is a probability measure on Ω×S\Omega \times SΩ×S with π({ω}×S)=μ∗(ω)\pi(\{\omega\} \times S) = \mu^*(\omega)π({ω}×S)=μ∗(ω).
  • Posteriors are any version of Bayes' rule: simplex-valued for every signal, measurable, and satisfying π({ω}×B)=∫Bμs(ω) πS(ds)\pi(\{\omega\} \times B) = \int_B \mu_s(\omega)\,\pi_S(ds)π({ω}×B)=∫B​μs​(ω)πS​(ds). Quotients π(ω,s)/∑ω′π(ω′,s)\pi(\omega,s)/\sum_{\omega'} \pi(\omega',s)π(ω,s)/∑ω′​π(ω′,s) with Lean's x/0=0x/0 = 0x/0=0 are not used. "μs=s\mu_s = sμs​=s" (Lemmas 1 and 5) means the identity is such a version, an almost-sure statement; the paper's "for all sss" in Lemma 1's converse is proved only almost surely.
  • Strategies are measurable (each event {a(sˉ)=b}\{a(\bar s) = b\}{a(sˉ)=b} is measurable) and optimal at every signal. The sender's value is not computed with a fixed tie-breaking rule, so sender-preferred selection is kept.
  • Assumption 1 is a hypothesis of every statement that involves ρ\rhoρ.
  • Corrections to Lemma 2. If some PaP_aPa​ is empty, Conv⁡(Pa)\operatorname{Conv}(P_a)Conv(Pa​) is empty and the printed forward direction fails, so mam_ama​ is left free there; then ba=0b_a = 0ba​=0 necessarily. The printed converse fails for pure strategies when two actions must share a posterior, so it is stated for optimal mixed strategies, which the paper allows on p. 11.
  • Ruled out: quantifying (3) only over belief signals with μs=s\mu_s = sμs​=s would turn Theorem 1 into Lemmas 5 and 2 and drop the coalescence step. The goal therefore quantifies over arbitrary signal spaces. Stating only "the optimal values are equal" through a real supremum would also be weaker, and is not done.
  • Infrastructure needed: means of probability measures on compact sets in Rn\mathbb{R}^nRn lying in the convex hull (Convex.integral_mem, compactness of convex hulls of compact sets), Carathéodory's theorem (convexHull_eq_union), finite discrete measures on Ω×S\Omega \times SΩ×S, and conditional densities with respect to the signal marginal. The Bayes-plausibility and splitting lemmas are reusable in any persuasion development. Proofs of the milestones, of the goal, and of Theorem 2 are all welcome.

Selected references

  • J. Anunrojwong, K. Iyer, D. Lingenbrink, Persuading Risk-Conscious Agents: A Geometric Approach, arXiv:2208.03758v3, 2023; Operations Research, 2024. https://arxiv.org/abs/2208.03758v3
  • E. Kamenica, M. Gentzkow, Bayesian Persuasion, American Economic Review 101(6), 2011. https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.101.6.2590
  • D. Bergemann, S. Morris, Bayes Correlated Equilibrium and the Comparison of Information Structures in Games, Theoretical Economics 11(2), 2016. https://doi.org/10.3982/TE1808
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EconomicsOperations ResearchStochastic Systems·Captain: mikedeng1

Providing Data Samples for Free: Free Samples Strictly Beat Selling in One Round When the Seller-Side Drift of the Buyer's Bayes Risk Is Initially PositiveResearch Paper

Why give data away

Firms that own data increasingly sell it as a product: market research panels, consulting reports, datasets for training demand models. A common commercial practice is to hand out a free sample of the data before quoting a price for the rest. Under standard Bayesian reasoning this practice looks self-defeating. Every free data point reduces the buyer's uncertainty, which reduces what the remaining data are worth to her. This is a holdup problem: once information is revealed, it cannot be sold.

Drakopoulos and Makhdoumi (Providing Data Samples for Free, SSRN 3611003; Management Science, 2022, doi:10.1287/mnsc.2022.4534) identify when free samples nevertheless raise the seller's revenue. The mechanism is disagreement about the prior. When the seller believes the buyer's initial estimate is biased, she expects the free data to move the buyer's belief toward states in which the buyer values the remaining data more. The paper calls this the persuasion benefit, and it can outweigh the holdup cost. This mission formalizes the paper's main theorem, Theorem 1(a), together with the lemmas its proof rests on.

The model

An unknown real parameter θ\thetaθ determines a buyer's payoff u(a,θ)u(a,\theta)u(a,θ) from an action a∈Ra\in\mathbb Ra∈R. The Buyer holds the prior N(θ0,σ02)\mathcal N(\theta_0,\sigma_0^2)N(θ0​,σ02​) with σ02>0\sigma_0^2>0σ02​>0. The Seller believes θ0\theta_0θ0​ is a biased estimate, with bias distributed as N(μb,σb2)\mathcal N(\mu_b,\sigma_b^2)N(μb​,σb2​) and σb2≥0\sigma_b^2\ge0σb2​≥0. Her prior is N(θ0+μb,σs2)\mathcal N(\theta_0+\mu_b,\sigma_s^2)N(θ0​+μb​,σs2​) with σs2=σ02+σb2\sigma_s^2=\sigma_0^2+\sigma_b^2σs2​=σ02​+σb2​, and it is taken to be the correct one.

Data arrive continuously. The first t≥0t\ge0t≥0 samples are equivalent to the signal

Yt=θt+σBt,Y_t=\theta t+\sigma B_t,Yt​=θt+σBt​,

where BBB is a standard Brownian motion independent of θ\thetaθ and σ2>0\sigma^2>0σ2>0 is the noise variance. Both parties agree on this law of the data given θ\thetaθ (they are concordant) and disagree only on the prior. The information after ttt samples is Ft=σ(Ys:s≤t)\mathcal F_t=\sigma(Y_s:s\le t)Ft​=σ(Ys​:s≤t).

The Buyer's posterior after ttt samples is N(θt,σt2)\mathcal N(\theta_t,\sigma_t^2)N(θt​,σt2​), with σt2=σ02σ2/(σ02t+σ2)\sigma_t^2=\sigma_0^2\sigma^2/(\sigma_0^2t+\sigma^2)σt2​=σ02​σ2/(σ02​t+σ2) and θt=(σt2/σ02)θ0+(σt2/σ2)Yt\theta_t=(\sigma_t^2/\sigma_0^2)\theta_0+(\sigma_t^2/\sigma^2)Y_tθt​=(σt2​/σ02​)θ0​+(σt2​/σ2)Yt​. The Seller's posterior N(θ~t,σ~t2)\mathcal N(\tilde\theta_t,\tilde\sigma_t^2)N(θ~t​,σ~t2​) is given by the same formulas from her own prior. The Seller's estimate of the Buyer's error is gt=θ~t−θtg_t=\tilde\theta_t-\theta_tgt​=θ~t​−θt​, and g0=μbg_0=\mu_bg0​=μb​.

With belief N(θ,v)\mathcal N(\theta,v)N(θ,v), the Buyer's best expected utility is U(θ,v)=max⁡aEN(θ,v)[u(a,⋅)]U(\theta,v)=\max_a\mathbb E_{\mathcal N(\theta,v)}[u(a,\cdot)]U(θ,v)=maxa​EN(θ,v)​[u(a,⋅)]. Her Bayes risk

BR(θ,v)=EN(θ,v)[max⁡au(a,⋅)]−U(θ,v)BR(\theta,v)=\mathbb E_{\mathcal N(\theta,v)}\big[\max_a u(a,\cdot)\big]-U(\theta,v)BR(θ,v)=EN(θ,v)​[amax​u(a,⋅)]−U(θ,v)

is the value to her of learning θ\thetaθ exactly. Its second argument is a variance, and BRθBR_\thetaBRθ​, BRθθBR_{\theta\theta}BRθθ​ and BRσ2BR_{\sigma^2}BRσ2​ denote its partial derivatives.

A free-sample policy gives data for free up to a stopping amount TTT, a stopping time of (Ft)(\mathcal F_t)(Ft​), and then sells the remainder. Once the free samples stop, the best price for the remainder is BR(θT,σT2)BR(\theta_T,\sigma_T^2)BR(θT​,σT2​) (Lemma 3). The Seller's expected revenue is therefore E0S[BR(θT,σT2)]\mathbb E^S_0[BR(\theta_T,\sigma_T^2)]E0S​[BR(θT​,σT2​)], computed under her prior. Selling in one round is T=0T=0T=0, with revenue BR(θ0,σ02)BR(\theta_0,\sigma_0^2)BR(θ0​,σ02​).

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 1(a)

If the Seller-side drift of the Bayes risk is positive at the start,

12BRθθ(θ0,σ02)−BRσ2(θ0,σ02)+μbσ02BRθ(θ0,σ02)>0,(4)\tfrac12 BR_{\theta\theta}(\theta_0,\sigma_0^2)-BR_{\sigma^2}(\theta_0,\sigma_0^2)+\frac{\mu_b}{\sigma_0^2}BR_\theta(\theta_0,\sigma_0^2)>0, \tag{4}21​BRθθ​(θ0​,σ02​)−BRσ2​(θ0​,σ02​)+σ02​μb​​BRθ​(θ0​,σ02​)>0,(4)

then some free-sample policy TTT satisfies

E0S[BR(θT,σT2)]>BR(θ0,σ02).\mathbb E^S_0\big[BR(\theta_T,\sigma_T^2)\big]>BR(\theta_0,\sigma_0^2).E0S​[BR(θT​,σT2​)]>BR(θ0​,σ02​).

The goal has no constants. It asserts only that the optimal free-sample policy strictly beats every one-round policy.

Milestones

  • Proposition 1 (p. 13): the posteriors given the whole data path are the Gaussians above.
  • Lemma 1(i)–(iii) (p. 14): the posterior variance decreases at rate σt4/σ2\sigma_t^4/\sigma^2σt4​/σ2. The Buyer's estimate has drift 000 for the Buyer and gtσt2/σ2g_t\sigma_t^2/\sigma^2gt​σt2​/σ2 for the Seller. Its squared increment is σt4/σ2 dt+O(dt3/2)\sigma_t^4/\sigma^2\,dt+O(dt^{3/2})σt4​/σ2dt+O(dt3/2).
  • Lemma 3 (p. 16): the Buyer pays at most BRBRBR for any partial release, and exactly BRBRBR for full release.
  • Lemma 4(b) (p. 17): from the Seller's perspective, ES[BR(θh,σh2)]\mathbb E^S[BR(\theta_h,\sigma_h^2)]ES[BR(θh​,σh2​)] has initial slope (12BRθθ−BRσ2+μbσ02BRθ)σ04/σ2\big(\tfrac12BR_{\theta\theta}-BR_{\sigma^2}+\tfrac{\mu_b}{\sigma_0^2}BR_\theta\big)\sigma_0^4/\sigma^2(21​BRθθ​−BRσ2​+σ02​μb​​BRθ​)σ04​/σ2.
  • Lemma 4(a) (p. 17): from the Buyer's perspective, the same with μb\mu_bμb​ replaced by 000.
  • Theorem 1(b) (p. 18): if the Seller-side drift is non-positive for every posterior mean, misspecification, and positive variance, then no free-sample policy beats selling in one round.

Significance

Theorem 1 splits the drift of the Bayes risk from the Seller's viewpoint into a holdup cost, 12BRθθ−BRσ2\tfrac12BR_{\theta\theta}-BR_{\sigma^2}21​BRθθ​−BRσ2​, which is the drift the Buyer herself expects, and a persuasion benefit, (gt/σt2)BRθ(g_t/\sigma_t^2)BR_\theta(gt​/σt2​)BRθ​. Part (a) turns the sign of this drift at the start into a revenue comparison. In the paper's pricing example (unknown demand elasticity, BR(θ,v)=14e−θ(ev/2−e−v/2)BR(\theta,v)=\tfrac14e^{-\theta}(e^{v/2}-e^{-v/2})BR(θ,v)=41​e−θ(ev/2−e−v/2)), condition (4) reduces to μb<σ02/(1−eσ02)\mu_b<\sigma_0^2/(1-e^{\sigma_0^2})μb​<σ02​/(1−eσ02​): a sufficiently biased Buyer should be given free data. In the estimation example (BR=σt2BR=\sigma_t^2BR=σt2​) part (b) applies and one-round selling is optimal. The theorem is the basis of the paper's later results on myopic stopping rules and on the comparison with dynamic pricing.

The theorem is proved in the paper, in dtdtdt-notation and through Itô's lemma and the optional stopping theorem. It has not been machine-checked. A formal proof requires Gaussian conjugacy with respect to a Brownian filtration, moment computations for the posterior mean, an Itô-type expansion for a C2C^2C2 function of the belief, and control of the integrability of the stopped Bayes risk. Each of these is reusable for other continuous-time Bayesian learning models.

Difficulty

The informal argument reads off Lemma 4 that BR(θt,σt2)BR(\theta_t,\sigma_t^2)BR(θt​,σt2​) is a Seller-submartingale near the start, and then stops it. The dtdtdt-identities of Lemmas 1 and 4 are statements about conditional expectations at every time. Made rigorous, they require integrability of the Bayes risk and its derivatives along the belief path, and an exchange of differentiation and expectation. Neither is given by the paper's hypotheses on uuu. The Gaussian conjugacy itself must also be established for conditioning on the whole path (Ys)s≤t(Y_s)_{s\le t}(Ys​)s≤t​, not only on YtY_tYt​.

Formalization scope

All objects are defined in one file, FreeSamples.Revenue.Setting, on top of Mathlib's gaussianReal, IsBrownianReal, Filtration.natural and IsStoppingTime. Committed conventions:

  • Variances are real numbers, and N(m,v)\mathcal N(m,v)N(m,v) is gaussianReal m v.toNNReal. BRBRBR and UUU take the variance, not the standard deviation, as their second argument.
  • A model with prior N(m,v)\mathcal N(m,v)N(m,v) is a probability space carrying measurable θ∼N(m,v)\theta\sim\mathcal N(m,v)θ∼N(m,v) and a Brownian motion BBB independent of θ\thetaθ. The Seller's and the Buyer's measures are the two instances, which makes concordance hold by construction. Every revenue is an expectation under the Seller's measure.
  • The filtration is the natural filtration of YYY without augmentation. Free-sample policies are bounded stopping times. The paper requires only measurability of TTT, but its own construction is bounded by a large constant MMM.
  • Standing hypotheses on uuu, all disclosed pins: the maxima in UUU and BRBRBR exist and are attained, with all expectations integrable (HasMax); Assumption 1 is read as U,BR∈C2(R×(0,∞))U,BR\in C^2(\mathbb R\times(0,\infty))U,BR∈C2(R×(0,∞)); and BRBRBR and its partial derivatives grow at most like Cec∣θ∣Ce^{c|\theta|}Cec∣θ∣ for variances in (0,σ02](0,\sigma_0^2](0,σ02​].
  • The dtdtdt-statements of Lemmas 1 and 4 are posed as one-sided derivatives at time 000 of plain expectations, for arbitrary parameters. The time-ttt versions follow by restarting from the posterior state and are not posed.
  • Lemma 4's printed factor σt4/σ02\sigma_t^4/\sigma_0^2σt4​/σ02​ is formalized as σt4/σ2\sigma_t^4/\sigma^2σt4​/σ2, as Lemma 1 gives. Condition (5) of Theorem 1(b) keeps the page's universal quantifiers over the posterior mean, misspecification and positive variance. Quantification over all gtg_tgt​ forces BRθ≡0BR_\theta\equiv0BRθ​≡0; the paper's application on p. 33 checks only the realized gtg_tgt​, so it does not establish the printed condition for that example.

Trivializing formalizations are ruled out. Every revenue in a conclusion is asserted integrable, so a junk-zero integral cannot satisfy it. The maxima in UUU and BRBRBR are assumed attained, so no real supremum takes its junk value. The goal is stated for the Gaussian–Brownian model and its posterior map, not for an arbitrary process with a postulated drift. Its conclusion exhibits a policy instead of comparing a supremum over policies.

Not posed: the stochastic differential equation of Lemma 1, Lemma 2, Proposition 2 (its free boundary is part of the hypothesis), Corollaries 1–3, and Appendix B. Contributions are welcome on the conjugacy computation (Proposition 1), on the Gaussian moment estimates (Lemma 1), and on a reusable Itô-type expansion of h↦E[F(mh,vh)]h\mapsto\mathbb E[F(m_h,v_h)]h↦E[F(mh​,vh​)] for C2C^2C2 functions of exponential growth.

Selected references

  • K. Drakopoulos and A. Makhdoumi, Providing Data Samples for Free, SSRN 3611003; Management Science, 2022. https://ssrn.com/abstract=3611003, https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2022.4534
  • S. Morris, Trade with Heterogeneous Prior Beliefs and Asymmetric Information, Econometrica 62(6), 1994. https://doi.org/10.2307/2951755
  • R. J. Aumann, Agreeing to Disagree, Annals of Statistics 4(6), 1976. https://doi.org/10.1214/aos/1176343654
  • J. M. Steele, Stochastic Calculus and Financial Applications, Springer, 2001. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4684-9305-4
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Machine LearningReinforcement LearningStatistics·Captain: mikedeng1

Optimistic Posterior Sampling for Reinforcement Learning: Worst-Case Regret Bounds II: Along Any h, the Empirical Transition Vector Is within 2√(log(n/ρ)Σγᵢcᵢ²/n) + 3D log(2/ρ)/n of the TruthResearch Paper

Motivation

Model-based reinforcement learning algorithms for Markov decision processes estimate each transition distribution Ps,aP_{s,a}Ps,a​ from the transitions they have observed out of the state–action pair (s,a)(s,a)(s,a). Their regret analyses then need to know how far the empirical distribution p^\hat pp^​ can be from the true one ppp. The standard tool is an ℓ1\ell_1ℓ1​ bound on p^−p\hat p-pp^​−p, as in UCRL2 (Jaksch, Ortner and Auer, 2010), which costs a factor of order S\sqrt SS​ in the number of states SSS. What the analysis actually uses, however, is the deviation along one direction: the projection (p^−p)Th(\hat p-p)^Th(p^​−p)Th onto a bias (or value) vector hhh whose entries differ by at most the MDP's diameter DDD.

S. Agrawal and R. Jia (arXiv:1705.07041v3, published in Mathematics of Operations Research, 2023, as Optimistic Posterior Sampling for Reinforcement Learning: Worst-Case Regret Bounds) prove a worst-case regret bound of order O~(DSAT)\tilde O(D\sqrt{SAT})O~(DSAT​) for an optimistic variant of posterior sampling. One ingredient of that analysis is their Proposition 5.2: a Bernstein-type bound on (p^−p)Th(\hat p-p)^Th(p^​−p)Th whose leading term is governed by a variance of hhh under ppp, written in stick-breaking form. This mission formalizes that proposition and the steps of its proof.

Setting

Fix a number of states SSS and order them 1,…,S1,\dots,S1,…,S. A probability vector p∈ΔSp\in\Delta^Sp∈ΔS has pi≥0p_i\ge0pi​≥0 and ∑ipi=1\sum_ip_i=1∑i​pi​=1. A multinoulli trial with parameter ppp is a random state XXX with P(X=i)=pi\mathbb P(X=i)=p_iP(X=i)=pi​. Draw nnn independent trials X1,…,XnX_1,\dots,X_nX1​,…,Xn​ and let

p^i=#{t:Xt=i}n\hat p_i=\frac{\#\{t: X_t=i\}}{n}p^​i​=n#{t:Xt​=i}​

be the empirical probability vector, the average of the one-hot outcomes. For ppp and a vector h∈RSh\in\mathbb R^Sh∈RS define the stick-breaking quantities

γi=pi(pi+1+⋯+pS)pi+⋯+pS,Hi+1=1∑j=i+1Spj∑j=i+1Shjpj,ci=hi−Hi+1.\gamma_i=\frac{p_i(p_{i+1}+\cdots+p_S)}{p_i+\cdots+p_S},\qquad H_{i+1}=\frac{1}{\sum_{j=i+1}^Sp_j}\sum_{j=i+1}^Sh_jp_j,\qquad c_i=h_i-H_{i+1}.γi​=pi​+⋯+pS​pi​(pi+1​+⋯+pS​)​,Hi+1​=∑j=i+1S​pj​1​j=i+1∑S​hj​pj​,ci​=hi​−Hi+1​.

Thus Hi+1H_{i+1}Hi+1​ is the mean of hhh under ppp conditioned on the states after iii, and cic_ici​ compares hih_ihi​ with it. The sum ∑i<Sγici2\sum_{i<S}\gamma_ic_i^2∑i<S​γi​ci2​ equals the variance of h(X)h(X)h(X) for X∼pX\sim pX∼p. In Lean these objects are gammaCoef p i, Hnext p h i, cCoef p h i, phat ω i, the law of one trial is cat p and the law of nnn trials is trialsLaw n p, all in the namespace OptimisticPSRL.Concentration.

Formalization targets

Goal: Proposition 5.2 (p. 9)

Let h∈RSh\in\mathbb R^Sh∈RS satisfy ∣hi−hi′∣≤D|h_i-h_{i'}|\le D∣hi​−hi′​∣≤D for all i,i′i,i'i,i′, let n≥96n\ge96n≥96 and ρ∈(0,1)\rho\in(0,1)ρ∈(0,1). Then, with probability at least 1−ρ1-\rho1−ρ,

∣(p^−p)Th∣≤2log⁡(n/ρ)∑i<Sγici2n+3D log⁡(2/ρ)n.\big|(\hat p-p)^Th\big|\le2\sqrt{\log(n/\rho)\sum_{i<S}\frac{\gamma_ic_i^2}{n}}+3D\,\frac{\log(2/\rho)}{n}.​(p^​−p)Th​≤2log(n/ρ)i<S∑​nγi​ci2​​​+3Dnlog(2/ρ)​.

Milestones

  1. Fact 1 (p. 17), a deterministic identity: for probability vectors p~,pˉ\tilde p,\bar pp~​,pˉ​ with stick-breaking ratios y~i=p~i/(p~i+⋯+p~S)\tilde y_i=\tilde p_i/(\tilde p_i+\cdots+\tilde p_S)y~​i​=p~​i​/(p~​i​+⋯+p~​S​) and yˉi\bar y_iyˉ​i​,
(p~−pˉ)Th=∑i(y~i−yˉi)(hi−H~i+1)(pˉi+⋯+pˉS)=∑i(y~i−yˉi)(hi−Hˉi+1)(p~i+⋯+p~S).(\tilde p-\bar p)^Th=\sum_i(\tilde y_i-\bar y_i)(h_i-\tilde H_{i+1})(\bar p_i+\cdots+\bar p_S)=\sum_i(\tilde y_i-\bar y_i)(h_i-\bar H_{i+1})(\tilde p_i+\cdots+\tilde p_S).(p~​−pˉ​)Th=i∑​(y~​i​−yˉ​i​)(hi​−H~i+1​)(pˉ​i​+⋯+pˉ​S​)=i∑​(y~​i​−yˉ​i​)(hi​−Hˉi+1​)(p~​i​+⋯+p~​S​).
  1. The projection as a sum of martingale differences (proof, p. 21): with Zt,i=ci1(Xt=i)−cipipi+⋯+pS1(Xt≥i)Z_{t,i}=c_i\mathbb 1(X_t=i)-c_i\frac{p_i}{p_i+\cdots+p_S}\mathbb 1(X_t\ge i)Zt,i​=ci​1(Xt​=i)−ci​pi​+⋯+pS​pi​​1(Xt​≥i) and Zt=∑iZt,iZ_t=\sum_iZ_{t,i}Zt​=∑i​Zt,i​,
1n∑t=1nZt=(p^−p)Th,\frac1n\sum_{t=1}^nZ_t=(\hat p-p)^Th,n1​t=1∑n​Zt​=(p^​−p)Th,

together with the two intermediate expressions of the page. 3. Uncorrelated coordinates (proof, p. 21): E[Zt,iZt,j]=0\mathbb E[Z_{t,i}Z_{t,j}]=0E[Zt,i​Zt,j​]=0 for i≠ji\ne ji=j. 4. The predictable variance (proof, p. 21): ∑t=1nE[Zt2]=∑ici2 n γi\sum_{t=1}^n\mathbb E[Z_t^2]=\sum_ic_i^2\,n\,\gamma_i∑t=1n​E[Zt2​]=∑i​ci2​nγi​. 5. Corollary B.1 (p. 26), Bernstein's inequality for bounded martingale differences with random predictable variance VnV_nVn​: for n≥96n\ge96n≥96, δ∈(0,1)\delta\in(0,1)δ∈(0,1), with probability greater than 1−δ1-\delta1−δ,

∣Mn∣≤2Vnln⁡(n/δ)+3Kln⁡(n/δ).|M_n|\le2\sqrt{V_n\ln(n/\delta)}+3K\ln(n/\delta).∣Mn​∣≤2Vn​ln(n/δ)​+3Kln(n/δ).

Significance

The result. Proposition 5.2 is the concentration half of the optimism step of the paper (Lemma 5.3): combined with an anti-concentration bound for Dirichlet samples along the same direction (Proposition 5.1), it shows that some posterior sample is optimistic along hhh with constant probability. Because the bound is stated along a single direction and is weighted by the variance of hhh rather than by DDD alone, it avoids the S\sqrt SS​ loss that an ℓ1\ell_1ℓ1​ bound would incur, which is part of how the paper's regret bound improves on UCRL2's O~(DSAT)\tilde O(DS\sqrt{AT})O~(DSAT​). The stick-breaking form of the variance is what lets the same quantity appear on both sides of the optimism argument, in the Dirichlet bound and in the empirical bound.

Formalizing it. The proposition and its proof steps are proved on paper; none of them has a machine-checked proof. The regret theorem of the paper (Theorem 1) is not posed: its constants are hidden in O(⋅)O(\cdot)O(⋅) and its algorithm's parameters are given as Θ(⋅)\Theta(\cdot)Θ(⋅). Proposition 5.2, by contrast, is fully explicit. Corollary B.1 is a reusable martingale inequality with explicit constants. The predictable-variance identity and Fact 1 are exact identities about stick-breaking coordinates that recur in analyses of Dirichlet and categorical models.

Difficulty

Two steps resist the obvious approach. First, the statement carries the variance in stick-breaking form, not as Varp(h)\mathrm{Var}_p(h)Varp​(h); linking the two needs the decomposition of Fact 1 and the identity for the predictable variance, which are exact algebraic identities whose bookkeeping of tails and empty tails is error-prone. Second, the paper's own route goes through Corollary B.1, a martingale Bernstein inequality with a random variance, which rests on a peeling argument over a grid of variance levels (Seldin et al., 2012); Mathlib has neither this inequality nor a Bernstein inequality with explicit constants for bounded variables.

A known subtlety: the paper's proof, through Corollary B.1, yields the second term 3Dlog⁡(n/ρ)/n3D\log(n/\rho)/n3Dlog(n/ρ)/n, while the statement prints the smaller 3Dlog⁡(2/ρ)/n3D\log(2/\rho)/n3Dlog(2/ρ)/n. The printed statement is still true for nnn iid trials (the classical Bernstein inequality gives a bound below it), so the goal is posed as printed. The paper's own proof therefore does not establish the printed constant.

Formalization scope

  • States are Fin S with its natural order, 0-based; the paper's range i<Si<Si<S is every state but the last (belowLast S). Fact 1 holds for every ordering; the natural order covers this since states are labels.
  • Probability vectors are p : Fin S → ℝ with IsProbVec p (nonnegative, summing to one). Zero entries are allowed. A ratio whose denominator is zero evaluates to 000 (Lean's convention), which gives the values the identities need; no positivity of ppp is assumed.
  • One trial has law cat p =∑ipiδi=\sum_ip_i\delta_i=∑i​pi​δi​; nnn trials have the product law trialsLaw n p === Measure.pi. The empirical vector phat ω is computed from the sample ω : Fin n → Fin S. "With probability 1−ρ1-\rho1−ρ" is ENNReal.ofReal (1 - ρ) ≤ trialsLaw n p {good event}; Corollary B.1's "greater than 1−δ1-\delta1−δ" is strict. log⁡\loglog is Real.log.
  • The proof displays (milestones 2–4) are stated in the iid reading of the proposition: the paper writes them for transitions of an MDP out of a fixed (s,a)(s,a)(s,a), with an indicator 1(st−1=s,at−1=a)\mathbb 1(s_{t-1}=s,a_{t-1}=a)1(st−1​=s,at−1​=a) and a random count τ\tauτ; here the indicator is one and τ=n\tau=nτ=n, and the conditional expectations are expectations under one draw of law ppp. Milestone 2 assumes every drawn state has positive probability (true almost surely), which the page's intermediate sum over i≤S−1i\le S-1i≤S−1 needs.
  • Corollary B.1 is posed for a general filtered probability space, with ZiZ_iZi​ Fi\mathcal F_iFi​-measurable, ∣Zi∣≤K|Z_i|\le K∣Zi​∣≤K almost surely and E[Zi∣Fi−1]=0\mathbb E[Z_i\mid\mathcal F_{i-1}]=0E[Zi​∣Fi−1​]=0.

The goal cannot be satisfied by a degenerate reading: p^\hat pp^​ is built from the sample, the measure is the nnn-fold product of the categorical law ppp, the event is the good event itself (not a complement bound), and the variance term is not identically zero (for S=2S=2S=2, p=(12,12)p=(\tfrac12,\tfrac12)p=(21​,21​) it equals (h1−h2)2/4(h_1-h_2)^2/4(h1​−h2​)2/4).

Needed infrastructure: finite-sum manipulations over tails of Fin S; a Bernstein or Freedman inequality with explicit constants (for iid bounded variables for the goal, for martingale differences for Corollary B.1). Contributions of either inequality are reusable well beyond this mission and are welcome, as are alternative proofs of the goal that bypass Corollary B.1.

Selected references

  • S. Agrawal and R. Jia, Posterior sampling for reinforcement learning: worst-case regret bounds, arXiv:1705.07041v3, 2020; published as Optimistic Posterior Sampling for Reinforcement Learning: Worst-Case Regret Bounds, Mathematics of Operations Research, 2023. https://arxiv.org/abs/1705.07041
  • T. Jaksch, R. Ortner and P. Auer, Near-optimal regret bounds for reinforcement learning, Journal of Machine Learning Research 11, 2010. https://www.jmlr.org/papers/v11/jaksch10a.html
  • Y. Seldin, F. Laviolette, N. Cesa-Bianchi, J. Shawe-Taylor and P. Auer, PAC-Bayesian inequalities for martingales, IEEE Transactions on Information Theory 58(12), 2012. https://doi.org/10.1109/TIT.2012.2211334
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Operations ResearchOptimization·Captain: mikedeng1

A Faster Cutting Plane Method and its Implications for Combinatorial and Convex Optimization I: The Largest-Coordinate Strategy Keeps the Stochastic Chasing 0 Game within 2(c+R)log(4mk²/p)Research Paper

Motivation

Cutting plane methods minimize a convex function, or find a point in a convex set, using only a separation oracle: a routine that, given a query point, either certifies it is good or returns a halfspace containing the target. Lee, Sidford and Wong (arXiv:1508.04874, FOCS 2015) gave a cutting plane method for a convex set in Rn\mathbb R^nRn inside a box of radius RRR that uses an expected O(nlog⁡(nR/ϵ))O(n\log(nR/\epsilon))O(nlog(nR/ϵ)) oracle calls and O(n3log⁡O(1)(nR/ϵ))O(n^3\log^{O(1)}(nR/\epsilon))O(n3logO(1)(nR/ϵ)) additional time, improving on the O(nω+1log⁡(nR/ϵ))O(n^{\omega+1}\log(nR/\epsilon))O(nω+1log(nR/ϵ)) additional time of Vaidya's method from over 25 years earlier, and derived from it faster algorithms for submodular function minimization, matroid intersection and submodular flow.

The speed-up depends on not recomputing the leverage scores of the current constraint matrix from scratch at every step. The algorithm maintains approximations and refreshes a few of them per step. Section 7.2 of the paper isolates the bookkeeping question this raises as a two-player game, the stochastic chasing 0⃗\vec 00 game, and shows that a simple greedy strategy keeps the accumulated error small. The game is self-contained and has nothing to do with convexity: it is a statement about a random walk in Rm\mathbb R^mRm that is partially reset at every step.

Setting

Fix a dimension m≥1m\ge1m≥1 and constants c>0c>0c>0, R>0R>0R>0. For v⃗∈Rm\vec v\in\mathbb R^mv∈Rm, ∥v⃗∥∞=max⁡i∣vi∣\|\vec v\|_\infty=\max_i|v_i|∥v∥∞​=maxi​∣vi​∣ and ∥v⃗∥2=(∑ivi2)1/2\|\vec v\|_2=(\sum_iv_i^2)^{1/2}∥v∥2​=(∑i​vi2​)1/2.

A point starts at x⃗(1)=0⃗\vec x^{(1)}=\vec 0x(1)=0. Each round k=1,2,…k=1,2,\dotsk=1,2,… runs as follows (Algorithm 4).

  1. A stochastic adversary chooses a probability distribution D(k)\mathcal D^{(k)}D(k) on Rm\mathbb R^mRm with mean 0⃗\vec 00 and ∥Δ⃗∥2≤c\|\vec\Delta\|_2\le c∥Δ∥2​≤c for every Δ⃗\vec\DeltaΔ in its support.
  2. The adversary chooses an observation y⃗(k)\vec y^{(k)}y​(k) with ∥y⃗(k)−x⃗(k)∥∞≤R\|\vec y^{(k)}-\vec x^{(k)}\|_\infty\le R∥y​(k)−x(k)∥∞​≤R.
  3. The player chooses a coordinate i(k)i^{(k)}i(k), knowing only y⃗(k)\vec y^{(k)}y​(k): neither x⃗(k)\vec x^{(k)}x(k), nor D(k)\mathcal D^{(k)}D(k), nor the step.
  4. A step Δ⃗(k)\vec\Delta^{(k)}Δ(k) is drawn from D(k)\mathcal D^{(k)}D(k) and the point moves to
xi(k)(k+1)=0,xj(k+1)=xj(k)+Δj(k)(j≠i(k)).x^{(k+1)}_{i^{(k)}}=0,\qquad x^{(k+1)}_j=x^{(k)}_j+\Delta^{(k)}_j\quad(j\ne i^{(k)}).xi(k)(k+1)​=0,xj(k+1)​=xj(k)​+Δj(k)​(j=i(k)).

The adversary may use everything that has happened so far to make its choices. The player wants to keep x⃗(k)\vec x^{(k)}x(k) near 0⃗\vec 00 in ∥⋅∥∞\|\cdot\|_\infty∥⋅∥∞​; the adversary wants to push it away. The largest-coordinate strategy is i(k)=argmax⁡i∣yi(k)∣i^{(k)}=\operatorname{argmax}_i|y^{(k)}_i|i(k)=argmaxi​∣yi(k)​∣: reset the coordinate that looks largest.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 34

If the player uses the largest-coordinate strategy, then for every p∈(0,1]p\in(0,1]p∈(0,1], with probability at least 1−p1-p1−p,

∥x⃗(k)∥∞≤2(c+R)log⁡(4mk2/p)for all k≥1.\|\vec x^{(k)}\|_\infty\le2(c+R)\log\big(4mk^2/p\big)\qquad\text{for all }k\ge1.∥x(k)∥∞​≤2(c+R)log(4mk2/p)for all k≥1.

The bound holds simultaneously for all rounds, against every adaptive adversary, and grows only logarithmically in kkk, in mmm and in 1/p1/p1/p.

Milestones

The milestones are the steps that the paper's proof of Theorem 34 (pp. 43–44) displays:

  1. the exponential inequality ex≤1+x+x22e∣x∣e^x\le1+x+\tfrac{x^2}{2}e^{|x|}ex≤1+x+2x2​e∣x∣ and its consequence eαx+αδ≤eαx+αδeαx+12α2δ2eαx+∣α∣ce^{\alpha x+\alpha\delta}\le e^{\alpha x}+\alpha\delta e^{\alpha x}+\tfrac12\alpha^2\delta^2e^{\alpha x+|\alpha|c}eαx+αδ≤eαx+αδeαx+21​α2δ2eαx+∣α∣c for ∣δ∣≤c|\delta|\le c∣δ∣≤c;
  2. the one-step drift bound for the potential Φ(x⃗)=∑ieαxi+∑ie−αxi\Phi(\vec x)=\sum_ie^{\alpha x_i}+\sum_ie^{-\alpha x_i}Φ(x)=∑i​eαxi​+∑i​e−αxi​:
EΔ⃗∼D Φ(x⃗+Δ⃗)≤Φ(x⃗)+α2eαcc2η,η=max⁡(max⁡ieαxi,max⁡ie−αxi);\mathbb E_{\vec\Delta\sim\mathcal D}\,\Phi(\vec x+\vec\Delta)\le\Phi(\vec x)+\alpha^2e^{\alpha c}c^2\eta,\qquad\eta=\max\big(\max_ie^{\alpha x_i},\max_ie^{-\alpha x_i}\big);EΔ∼D​Φ(x+Δ)≤Φ(x)+α2eαcc2η,η=max(imax​eαxi​,imax​e−αxi​);
  1. the choice α=1/(2(c+R))\alpha=1/(2(c+R))α=1/(2(c+R)), for which e2α(c+R)(α(c+R))2≤1e^{2\alpha(c+R)}(\alpha(c+R))^2\le1e2α(c+R)(α(c+R))2≤1 and α2eαcc2≤e−α(R+c)\alpha^2e^{\alpha c}c^2\le e^{-\alpha(R+c)}α2eαcc2≤e−α(R+c);
  2. the union-bound arithmetic 1−∑k≥12m/λk=1−∑k≥1p/(2k2)≥1−p1-\sum_{k\ge1}2m/\lambda_k=1-\sum_{k\ge1}p/(2k^2)\ge1-p1−∑k≥1​2m/λk​=1−∑k≥1​p/(2k2)≥1−p for λk=4mk2/p\lambda_k=4mk^2/pλk​=4mk2/p.

Significance

Within the paper, Theorem 34 is what lets the cutting plane method keep its leverage-score estimates within a bounded multiplicative error while refreshing only one estimate per step; this is one of the ingredients behind the O(n3log⁡O(1)(nR/ϵ))O(n^3\log^{O(1)}(nR/\epsilon))O(n3logO(1)(nR/ϵ)) additional time. The game reappears whenever an algorithm tracks many slowly drifting quantities with noisy observations and can afford to recompute only a few of them exactly per step, which makes the statement useful beyond this paper.

None of the statements in this mission has a machine-checked proof. The theorem is published with a proof. The mission asks for a formal proof of the statement exactly as published, with the constant 444 inside the logarithm. A formal proof of the milestones alone would already give a reusable exponential-potential toolkit for adaptive random processes in Rm\mathbb R^mRm.

Difficulty

The point process is not a martingale: the player's resets depend on a noisy observation, the adversary is adaptive, and the reset can hit a coordinate that is up to 2R2R2R smaller in absolute value than the largest one. Per-coordinate tail bounds do not suffice, because the adversary may concentrate its moves on whichever coordinates the player is not resetting. A bound that holds for all kkk at once, with only logarithmic dependence on kkk, has to control all coordinates jointly. Establishing such joint control, with the specific constant 444 inside the logarithm, against the most adversarial interaction between the observation error RRR and the step size ccc, is where the work lies.

Formalization scope

  • Probability model. The randomness is a probability space (Ω,μ)(\Omega,\mu)(Ω,μ) with a filtration (Fk)k≥0(\mathcal F_k)_{k\ge0}(Fk​)k≥0​. The adversary's adaptive choice of D(k)\mathcal D^{(k)}D(k) is modelled by the conditional law of the step: each coordinate of the step has conditional mean 000 given the past, the step is measurable with respect to the next σ\sigmaσ-algebra, and ∑iΔi2≤c2\sum_i\Delta_i^2\le c^2∑i​Δi2​≤c2 holds everywhere. The observation y⃗(k)\vec y^{(k)}y​(k) is measurable with respect to the current σ\sigmaσ-algebra, so it is fixed before the step is drawn, and ∥y⃗(k)−x⃗(k)∥∞≤R\|\vec y^{(k)}-\vec x^{(k)}\|_\infty\le R∥y​(k)−x(k)∥∞​≤R holds on the actual trajectory.
  • Indexing. Coordinates are Fin m (0-based), with m≥1m\ge1m≥1. Lean round k∈Nk\in\mathbb Nk∈N is the paper's round k+1k+1k+1, so the goal's bound reads log⁡(4m(k+1)2/p)\log(4m(k+1)^2/p)log(4m(k+1)2/p); at Lean round 000 the point is 0⃗\vec 00.
  • Norms. ∥⋅∥∞\|\cdot\|_\infty∥⋅∥∞​ is Lean's sup norm on Fin m → ℝ. The step bound ∥Δ⃗∥2≤c\|\vec\Delta\|_2\le c∥Δ∥2​≤c is written as ∑iΔi2≤c2\sum_i\Delta_i^2\le c^2∑i​Δi2​≤c2, never as a sup-norm bound. The paper's prose once writes ∥Δ⃗∥22≤c\|\vec\Delta\|_2^2\le c∥Δ∥22​≤c; Algorithm 4 and the proof use ∥Δ⃗∥2≤c\|\vec\Delta\|_2\le c∥Δ∥2​≤c, which is what is formalized.
  • Tie rule. argmax⁡i∣yi∣\operatorname{argmax}_i|y_i|argmaxi​∣yi​∣ breaks ties by the least index; the paper's theorem is claimed for any tie rule.
  • Constants. c>0c>0c>0, R>0R>0R>0 (Algorithm 4), 0<p≤10<p\le10<p≤1, natural logarithm. The drift milestone adds α≥0\alpha\ge0α≥0.
  • Not trivial by construction. The hypotheses are satisfiable by genuinely random adversaries (a fair-coin step of size ccc is one), and the conclusion is a probability lower bound on an event, not a statement that holds vacuously; a formalization in which the observation could depend on the step, or in which the step bound were a sup-norm bound, would not be the paper's theorem.
  • Out of scope. Running time, the leverage-score application (Section 7.1, Theorem 31) and the rest of the cutting plane method.
  • Infrastructure. Conditional expectation with respect to a filtration, Markov's inequality and countable union bounds are in Mathlib. Supermartingale lemmas for nonnegative adapted processes, and the passage from a per-step drift inequality to a bound on the expected potential, are reusable well beyond this mission. Proofs of individual milestones are welcome independently of the goal.

Selected references

  • Y. T. Lee, A. Sidford, S. C. Wong, A Faster Cutting Plane Method and its Implications for Combinatorial and Convex Optimization, FOCS 2015; arXiv:1508.04874v2, 2015. https://arxiv.org/abs/1508.04874
  • P. M. Vaidya, A new algorithm for minimizing convex functions over convex sets, FOCS 1989; Mathematical Programming 73 (1996) 291–341. https://doi.org/10.1007/BF02592216
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Operations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

Stall Economy: The Value of Mobility in Retail on Wheels II: Closed-Form Mean and Variance of the Within-Radius Repositioning Trip Length, Increasing in R and Decreasing in rResearch Paper

Motivation

Mobile retail stalls (self-driving or driver-operated vending vehicles that move to customers who order through a phone app) are studied by Cao and Qi in Stall Economy: The Value of Mobility in Retail on Wheels (Operations Research, 2022; the mission cites the authors' SSRN manuscript 3711896). A retailer partitions a city into service zones, one stall per zone, and must decide how densely to deploy stalls. That decision is made by continuous approximation: each zone is modelled as a small queueing system whose service time includes the stall's travel to the next customer. The mean and variance of that travel distance enter the Pollaczek–Khinchine waiting-time formula of an M/G/1 queue (the paper's equations (1a)–(2), p. 18), so closed forms for them are the input of the paper's whole deployment and pricing analysis (§4).

The paper considers two on-demand modes. In the door-to-door mode the stall drives to each customer's doorstep. In the within-radius mode each customer walks up to a distance rrr toward the stall, and the stall only moves until the two are rrr apart. This mission formalizes the travel-distance moments of both modes: Proposition 1 (door-to-door, p. 11) and Proposition 3 (within-radius, p. 18), whose proofs are in the paper's Appendix B (pp. 44–45 and 49–51).

Setting

All distances are Manhattan (ℓ1\ell_1ℓ1​) distances (p. 9): ∣A−B∣=∣a1−b1∣+∣a2−b2∣|A-B| = |a_1-b_1| + |a_2-b_2|∣A−B∣=∣a1​−b1​∣+∣a2​−b2​∣. A service zone is a square rotated by 45∘45^\circ45∘, a diamond, of Euclidean edge length R>0R>0R>0; the paper sets R=R(ρ)=1/ρR = R(\rho) = 1/\sqrt\rhoR=R(ρ)=1/ρ​ for a stall density ρ\rhoρ (p. 11). In Manhattan coordinates centred at the zone's centre,

ZR={(x,y):∣x∣+∣y∣≤R/2},\mathcal Z_R = \{(x,y) : |x|+|y| \le R/\sqrt2\},ZR​={(x,y):∣x∣+∣y∣≤R/2​},

which has area R2R^2R2. Customers arrive uniformly on ZR\mathcal Z_RZR​.

Fix a walking radius 0≤r≤R/20\le r\le R/\sqrt20≤r≤R/2​. The inner diamond IR,r={∣x∣+∣y∣≤R/2−r}\mathcal I_{R,r} = \{|x|+|y|\le R/\sqrt2-r\}IR,r​={∣x∣+∣y∣≤R/2​−r} lies rrr inward from the boundary and has edge length R−2rR-\sqrt2 rR−2​r. The paper's model for the stall's position when a new customer arrives (proof of Proposition 3, p. 49) is: the stall AAA is uniform on IR,r\mathcal I_{R,r}IR,r​, the customer BBB is uniform on ZR\mathcal Z_RZR​, and the two are independent. The repositioning trip length is

Lr=max⁡{∣A−B∣−r, 0},L_r = \max\{|A-B| - r,\ 0\},Lr​=max{∣A−B∣−r, 0},

and L0′=∣A−B∣L_0' = |A-B|L0′​=∣A−B∣ denotes the untruncated distance. In the door-to-door case r=0r=0r=0, both points are uniform on the zone and L0=∣A−B∣L_0 = |A-B|L0​=∣A−B∣. The variance is Var⁡(Lr)=E[Lr2]−E[Lr]2\operatorname{Var}(L_r) = \mathbb E[L_r^2]-\mathbb E[L_r]^2Var(Lr​)=E[Lr2​]−E[Lr​]2.

The uniform law of the stall is the paper's Theorem 1 (the subject of the companion mission I), read in a continuum limit that the paper states informally (p. 17). This mission takes the uniform law as its model and does not depend on that limit.

Formalization targets

Goal: Proposition 3 (p. 18)

For all R>0R>0R>0 and 0≤r≤R/20\le r\le R/\sqrt20≤r≤R/2​,

E[Lr]=72R3−22R2r+22Rr2+12r315R2,\mathbb E[L_r] = \frac{7\sqrt2R^3-22R^2r+2\sqrt2Rr^2+12r^3}{15R^2},E[Lr​]=15R272​R3−22R2r+22​Rr2+12r3​, Var⁡(Lr)=22R6−222R5r−1402R3r3+400R2r4−482Rr5−144r6225R4,\operatorname{Var}(L_r) = \frac{22R^6-22\sqrt2R^5r-140\sqrt2R^3r^3+400R^2r^4-48\sqrt2Rr^5-144r^6}{225R^4},Var(Lr​)=225R422R6−222​R5r−1402​R3r3+400R2r4−482​Rr5−144r6​,

and both are non-decreasing in RRR (on {R:r≤R/2}\{R : r\le R/\sqrt2\}{R:r≤R/2​}) and non-increasing in rrr (on [0,R/2][0,R/\sqrt2][0,R/2​]).

Milestones, in the order of the proof

  1. Proposition 1 (p. 11): E[L0]=72R/15\mathbb E[L_0] = 7\sqrt2R/15E[L0​]=72​R/15 and Var⁡(L0)=22R2/225\operatorname{Var}(L_0) = 22R^2/225Var(L0​)=22R2/225.
  2. E[L0′]=72R15−7r15+22r215R+2r315R2\mathbb E[L_0'] = \tfrac{7\sqrt2R}{15}-\tfrac{7r}{15}+\tfrac{2\sqrt2r^2}{15R}+\tfrac{2r^3}{15R^2}E[L0′​]=1572​R​−157r​+15R22​r2​+15R22r3​ (p. 49).
  3. P(L0′≤r)=2r2/R2\mathbb P(L_0'\le r) = 2r^2/R^2P(L0′​≤r)=2r2/R2 and E[L0′ 1{L0′≤r}]=23r⋅2r2/R2\mathbb E[L_0'\,\mathbf 1\{L_0'\le r\}] = \tfrac23r\cdot 2r^2/R^2E[L0′​1{L0′​≤r}]=32​r⋅2r2/R2 (p. 50).
  4. E[X2]=(R2−2Rr+r2)/6\mathbb E[X^2] = (R^2-\sqrt2Rr+r^2)/6E[X2]=(R2−2​Rr+r2)/6 for the horizontal component XXX of ∣A−B∣|A-B|∣A−B∣ (p. 50).
  5. E[(L0′)2]=(8R4−82R3r+7R2r2+r4)/(15R2)\mathbb E[(L_0')^2] = (8R^4-8\sqrt2R^3r+7R^2r^2+r^4)/(15R^2)E[(L0′​)2]=(8R4−82​R3r+7R2r2+r4)/(15R2) (p. 51).
  6. E[(L0′)2 1{L0′≤r}]=12r2⋅2r2/R2\mathbb E[(L_0')^2\,\mathbf 1\{L_0'\le r\}] = \tfrac12r^2\cdot 2r^2/R^2E[(L0′​)21{L0′​≤r}]=21​r2⋅2r2/R2 (p. 51).
  7. Proposition 3(I) and 8. Proposition 3(II) on their own.

A supporting theorem, E[XY]=(3R4−32R3r+2R2r2+r4)/(30R2)\mathbb E[XY] = (3R^4-3\sqrt2R^3r+2R^2r^2+r^4)/(30R^2)E[XY]=(3R4−32​R3r+2R2r2+r4)/(30R2) (p. 50), is posed as well.

Significance

The result. With Proposition 3 the service time of the within-radius mode has explicit first and second moments, so the M/G/1 waiting time, the stall's daily travel, and the profit density of §4 are explicit functions of (ρ,r)(\rho, r)(ρ,r). Part (III) is the qualitative content the paper calls the first effect of avoiding the "last 100 meters": a longer customer walk shortens the stall's repositioning, and a larger zone lengthens it. Proposition 1 is the r=0r=0r=0 benchmark against which that saving is measured.

Formalizing it. The results are proved in the paper by direct integration; none is machine-checked. The proofs split the domain into several regions by the signs of coordinate differences and assert the values of the resulting polynomial integrals "by calculation". A formal proof checks every one of those integrals, the use of conditional expectations given the event {L0′≤r}\{L_0'\le r\}{L0′​≤r}, and the derivative signs behind part (III), which the paper states without verification on the whole range. The intermediate moments are useful on their own for other models with uniform demand on diamonds under the Manhattan metric.

Difficulty

The obvious route rotates the diamond by 45∘45^\circ45∘, where the ℓ1\ell_1ℓ1​ distance becomes an ℓ∞\ell_\inftyℓ∞​ distance and the zone a square, and then integrates. For r=0r=0r=0 this works cleanly. For r>0r>0r>0 the stall's square is smaller than the customer's, and max⁡{⋅}\max\{\cdot\}max{⋅} of two coordinate differences over two squares of different sizes splits into many polynomial pieces. The paper instead stays in the original coordinates and splits into six regions for E[XY]\mathbb E[XY]E[XY]. Either way, the truncation at rrr is the delicate step: it requires that the whole ℓ1\ell_1ℓ1​ ball of radius rrr around the stall lies in the zone, which is exactly why the stall is confined to the inner diamond. Part (III) is not a consequence of (I) and (II) by inspection: the derivative in RRR of the mean vanishes at the boundary r=R/2r = R/\sqrt2r=R/2​, so the sign argument must be done on the closed range.

Formalization scope

Points are elements of ℝ × ℝ with Lebesgue measure. The definition StallEconomy.TripLength.Setting provides zone R, innerZone R r, the scale factor shrink R r = 1 − √2 r / R, the Manhattan distance l1, the trip length Lr r, the expectation E R r F, meanL R r and varL R r. The stall's uniform law is realised as A=s UA = s\,UA=sU with s=1−2r/R∈[0,1]s = 1-\sqrt2r/R \in [0,1]s=1−2​r/R∈[0,1] and UUU uniform on ZR\mathcal Z_RZR​, which is the uniform law on IR,r\mathcal I_{R,r}IR,r​; it covers the endpoint r=R/2r=R/\sqrt2r=R/2​, where the inner diamond is a single point, without dividing by (R−2r)2(R-\sqrt2r)^2(R−2​r)2. Thus

E[F(A,B)]=R−4∫ZR∫ZRF(s u,b) db du.\mathbb E[F(A,B)] = R^{-4}\int_{\mathcal Z_R}\int_{\mathcal Z_R} F(s\,u, b)\,db\,du.E[F(A,B)]=R−4∫ZR​​∫ZR​​F(su,b)dbdu.

Standing conventions and deviations from the page:

  • every statement assumes R>0R>0R>0, and the within-radius statements 0≤r≤R/20\le r\le R/\sqrt20≤r≤R/2​, the paper's range;
  • RRR is the edge length itself, not 1/ρ1/\sqrt\rho1/ρ​;
  • the conditional expectations given {L0′≤r}\{L_0'\le r\}{L0′​≤r} of pp. 50–51 are stated as truncated expectations E[ ⋅ 1{L0′≤r}]\mathbb E[\,\cdot\,\mathbf 1\{L_0'\le r\}]E[⋅1{L0′​≤r}], since the conditioning event has probability 000 at r=0r=0r=0;
  • the printed slips "P(L0>r)\mathbb P(L_0>r)P(L0​>r)" (p. 50, L0′L_0'L0′​ meant) and the conditioning event "L0′2≤rL_0'^2\le rL0′2​≤r" (p. 51, L0′≤rL_0'\le rL0′​≤r meant) are corrected;
  • "increasing/decreasing" in part (III) is weak monotonicity.

Formalizations that would trivialize the goal are ruled out: meanL and varL are integrals, not the closed forms; part (III) is stated about those integrals, not about the polynomials; and nothing is restricted to r=0r=0r=0 or to a fixed RRR.

A complete development needs iterated set integrals of piecewise polynomials over diamonds in ℝ × ℝ (Fubini on zone R, the change of variables u↦suu\mapsto suu↦su), and elementary calculus for part (III). Contributions of any of the moments, of a reusable lemma computing integrals of polynomials over diamonds, and of the monotonicity of the closed forms are all welcome. Proposition 2 of the paper, which is false as printed, is not claimed here.

Selected references

  • J. Cao and W. Qi, Stall Economy: The Value of Mobility in Retail on Wheels, Operations Research, 2022 (articles in advance). https://doi.org/10.1287/opre.2022.2404 ; manuscript: SSRN 3711896, https://ssrn.com/abstract=3711896
  • G. F. Newell, Dispatching policies for a transportation route, Transportation Science 5(1) 91–105, 1971 (origin of continuous approximation). https://doi.org/10.1287/trsc.5.1.91
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Algorithmic Game TheoryEconomicsOperations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

Economics of Permissioned Blockchain Adoption II: A Self-Financing Consumer Access Fee Sustains Full Blockchain Adoption for Large Horizontal DifferentiationResearch Paper

Motivation

A permissioned blockchain is a shared ledger to which only approved participants may write. In supply chains it is proposed as a way to make product information (origin, quality, which supplier fulfilled an order) verifiable to buyers. Iyengar, Saleh, Sethuraman and Wang (SSRN 3602376; Management Science 2023, doi:10.1287/mnsc.2022.4532) ask who gains from such adoption and who pays for it.

Their first main result (Proposition 4.8, the subject of the companion mission I) identifies an adoption failure: when products differ strongly in how well they match consumers' tastes, full adoption raises total welfare, yet no manufacturer adopts, because price competition leaves manufacturers no profit with which to recover the adoption cost while the information gain accrues to consumers. Their second main result, Proposition 4.9, the goal of this mission, shows that a simple self-financing mechanism removes the failure: charge consumers a fee for access to the blockchain's information and pass the proceeds to the manufacturers.

Setting

There are 4m4m4m manufacturers, m≥2m\ge 2m≥2. Manufacturer iii has a horizontal type qi∈{A,B}q_i\in\{A,B\}qi​∈{A,B} and a vertical type ξi∈{h,l}\xi_i\in\{h,l\}ξi​∈{h,l}; each of the four type classes has exactly mmm members. Joining the blockchain costs manufacturer iii an amount χi>0\chi_i>0χi​>0; ai∈{0,1}a_i\in\{0,1\}ai​∈{0,1} records the decision. A unit mass of consumers values a matching product at HHH and a mismatched one at LLL, with 0≤L<H0\le L<H0≤L<H, plus a vendor quality h>l≥0h>l\ge 0h>l≥0; the high-quality vendor has marginal cost γ>0\gamma>0γ>0. Each consumer kkk also has an outside option ϕk\phi_kϕk​, drawn from a continuous distribution GGG supported on [0,∞)[0,\infty)[0,∞). The parameter of interest is the horizontal differentiation Δ=H−L\Delta=H-LΔ=H−L; LLL is held fixed and H=L+ΔH=L+\DeltaH=L+Δ.

Under full adoption, a consumer who has access to the blockchain's information finds a best product utility Δ+L+h−γ\Delta+L+h-\gammaΔ+L+h−γ; without access, only Δ/2+L+h−γ\Delta/2+L+h-\gammaΔ/2+L+h−γ. A system of transfers (κ,{τi}i∈M)(\kappa,\{\tau_i\}_{i\in M})(κ,{τi​}i∈M​) charges each consumer who wants access a fee κ\kappaκ and pays manufacturer iii an amount τi≥0\tau_i\ge 0τi​≥0. A consumer pays (bk=1b_k=1bk​=1) when

max⁡{Δ+L+h−γ,ϕk}−κ ≥ max⁡{Δ2+L+h−γ,ϕk},\max\{\Delta+L+h-\gamma,\phi_k\}-\kappa\ \ge\ \max\Big\{\tfrac{\Delta}{2}+L+h-\gamma,\phi_k\Big\},max{Δ+L+h−γ,ϕk​}−κ ≥ max{2Δ​+L+h−γ,ϕk​},

and μκ\mu_\kappaμκ​ denotes the mass of paying consumers. The system is self-financing if

κ⋅μκ=∑i∈Mτi.(14)\kappa\cdot\mu_\kappa=\sum_{i\in M}\tau_i. \tag{14}κ⋅μκ​=i∈M∑​τi​.(14)

Manufacturer iii earns Π(ai,a−i)−χiai+τiai\Pi(a_i,a_{-i})-\chi_i a_i+\tau_i a_iΠ(ai​,a−i​)−χi​ai​+τi​ai​ (15), where the gross profit Π\PiΠ is zero because of price competition. The system overcomes adoption failures if full adoption (ai=1a_i=1ai​=1 for all iii) is an equilibrium of this game.

The proof of Proposition 4.9 uses the fee κ=∑iχi/G(ϕ)\kappa=\sum_i\chi_i/G(\phi)κ=∑i​χi​/G(ϕ) and the gain from access

h(ϕk;ϕ)=max⁡{Δ+L+h−γ,ϕk}−∑i∈MχiG(ϕ)−max⁡{Δ2+L+h−γ,ϕk}.h(\phi_k;\phi)=\max\{\Delta+L+h-\gamma,\phi_k\}-\frac{\sum_{i\in M}\chi_i}{G(\phi)}-\max\Big\{\frac{\Delta}{2}+L+h-\gamma,\phi_k\Big\}.h(ϕk​;ϕ)=max{Δ+L+h−γ,ϕk​}−G(ϕ)∑i∈M​χi​​−max{2Δ​+L+h−γ,ϕk​}.

Formalization targets

Goal: Proposition 4.9 (p. 21)

∃ Δ0 ∀ Δ>Δ0 ∃ κ,{τi}:τi≥0,κ⋅μκ=∑i∈Mτi,a≡1 is an equilibrium of (15).\exists\,\Delta_0\ \forall\,\Delta>\Delta_0\ \exists\,\kappa,\{\tau_i\}:\quad \tau_i\ge 0,\quad \kappa\cdot\mu_\kappa=\sum_{i\in M}\tau_i,\quad a\equiv 1\ \text{is an equilibrium of (15)}.∃Δ0​ ∀Δ>Δ0​ ∃κ,{τi​}:τi​≥0,κ⋅μκ​=i∈M∑​τi​,a≡1 is an equilibrium of (15).

The goal asserts the existence of a working scheme, as printed; it does not fix the scheme.

Milestones: Lemma B.1 (p. 38)

(a) For Δ>0\Delta>0Δ>0 and every ϕ\phiϕ, ϕk↦h(ϕk;ϕ)\phi_k\mapsto h(\phi_k;\phi)ϕk​↦h(ϕk​;ϕ) is continuous and weakly decreasing on [0,∞)[0,\infty)[0,∞).

(b) For all sufficiently large Δ\DeltaΔ there is ϕ∗≥0\phi^*\ge 0ϕ∗≥0 with

h(ϕ∗;ϕ∗)=0,h(ϕk;ϕ∗)≥0  ⟺  ϕk≤ϕ∗(ϕk≥0),h(\phi^*;\phi^*)=0,\qquad h(\phi_k;\phi^*)\ge 0\iff \phi_k\le\phi^*\quad(\phi_k\ge 0),h(ϕ∗;ϕ∗)=0,h(ϕk​;ϕ∗)≥0⟺ϕk​≤ϕ∗(ϕk​≥0),

so that at the fee ∑iχi/G(ϕ∗)\sum_i\chi_i/G(\phi^*)∑i​χi​/G(ϕ∗) exactly the consumers with ϕk≤ϕ∗\phi_k\le\phi^*ϕk​≤ϕ∗ pay.

Significance

Proposition 4.9 is the constructive half of the paper's message: an adoption failure driven by the split between who bears the cost and who reaps the benefit can be repaired without outside funding, by a fee on the side that benefits. The paper's scheme (τi=χi\tau_i=\chi_iτi​=χi​, κ=∑iχi/G(ϕ∗)\kappa=\sum_i\chi_i/G(\phi^*)κ=∑i​χi​/G(ϕ∗)) exactly reimburses adoption costs and is financed by a threshold set of consumers; Lemma B.1(b) is the fixed-point statement that makes this calibration consistent.

The result is proved in the paper (App. A.2, pp. 36–38, and App. B, pp. 38–41). It has no machine-checked proof. This mission produces one: a formal model of the access-fee mechanism in the reduced form the paper's proofs use, the threshold lemma, and the main proposition. The goal can be attacked through Lemma B.1(b) as in the paper, or by any other scheme meeting the definition.

Difficulty

The calibration is circular: the fee depends on the mass of paying consumers, and the mass of paying consumers depends on the fee. Lemma B.1(b) resolves this with a one-dimensional fixed point h(ϕ∗;ϕ∗)=0h(\phi^*;\phi^*)=0h(ϕ∗;ϕ∗)=0, and the delicate points are positivity of GGG at the relevant arguments (so that the fee is finite), the three-piece shape of h(⋅;ϕ)h(\cdot;\phi)h(⋅;ϕ), and choosing Δ\DeltaΔ large enough that the sign change happens inside the strictly decreasing piece. For the goal, the point to check is that the self-financing identity uses the actual mass of payers at the chosen fee: a fee too high drives the payers' mass, and with it the revenue, towards zero.

Formalization scope

  • Reduced form. The paper's full model is a signal game with Bertrand pricing whose equilibrium concept is not defined precisely; its proofs work with the closed-form outcome of Proposition A.1. The formalization does the same: consumer utilities are those computed in the proof of 4.9 (Δ+L+h−γ\Delta+L+h-\gammaΔ+L+h−γ with access, Δ/2+L+h−γ\Delta/2+L+h-\gammaΔ/2+L+h−γ without), gross profit Π\PiΠ is the constant 000 in every profile (pp. 37–38, also for a deviating manufacturer), and "equilibrium" is a pure Nash equilibrium over unilateral switches of ai∈{0,1}a_i\in\{0,1\}ai​∈{0,1}. Signal accuracy is α=1/2\alpha=1/2α=1/2, as in the paper's main text.
  • Encoding. Manufacturers are Fin 2 × Bool × Fin m; adoption profiles are Bool-valued. GGG is ProbabilityTheory.cdf μ for a measure μ on ℝ. Δ\DeltaΔ is an argument of every object, with H=L+ΔH=L+\DeltaH=L+Δ.
  • Standing assumptions (one predicate Model.Standing): m≥2m\ge 2m≥2, 0≤L0\le L0≤L, 0≤l<h0\le l<h0≤l<h, γ>0\gamma>0γ>0, χi>0\chi_i>0χi​>0; μ\muμ a probability measure without atoms, μ((−∞,0))=0\mu((-\infty,0))=0μ((−∞,0))=0, and μ((a,b))>0\mu((a,b))>0μ((a,b))>0 for 0≤a<b0\le a<b0≤a<b (support [0,∞)[0,\infty)[0,∞)). No cost function clc_lcl​, no Assumption 1 and no finite mean are needed or assumed. Lemma B.1(a) additionally assumes Δ>0\Delta>0Δ>0, the model's L<HL<HL<H.
  • Ties in the access decision go to paying, as in the proof's "bk=1b_k=1bk​=1 iff h≥0h\ge 0h≥0".
  • Ruled out. μκ\mu_\kappaμκ​ is the μ\muμ-measure of the paying consumers, not a free number in [0,1][0,1][0,1]; the equilibrium predicate and Π\PiΠ are defined, not assumed; transfers are nonnegative; and no statement relies on Lean's value 000 for a division by G(ϕ)=0G(\phi)=0G(ϕ)=0.
  • Not formalized. The non-uniqueness clause of Lemma B.1(b) and Example B.1 (p. 40); the purchase-stage claims of the proof of 4.9 (market shares under transfers); Appendix C's symmetric-cost variant.
  • Infrastructure. Only Mathlib's measure theory and ProbabilityTheory.cdf; no new library is needed. Lemmas on CDFs of atomless, fully supported laws on [0,∞)[0,\infty)[0,∞) are reusable beyond this mission. Proofs of the milestones and of the goal are welcome; the goal may be proved by any route.

Selected references

  • G. Iyengar, F. Saleh, J. Sethuraman, W. Wang, Economics of Permissioned Blockchain Adoption, SSRN 3602376, version of 2022-08-19. https://ssrn.com/abstract=3602376
  • G. Iyengar, F. Saleh, J. Sethuraman, W. Wang, Economics of Permissioned Blockchain Adoption, Management Science, 2023. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2022.4532
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EconomicsOperations ResearchOptimization·Captain: mikedeng1

Gathering Information before Negotiation II: Under a Uniform Prior and Linear Information Cost, the Seller's Expected Payoff Jumps Down at θs = 1 − θ̃, Up at c = c_l and Down at c = c_hResearch Paper

Motivation

In many trades the buyer does not know how much the good is worth to it, and can find out before negotiating: a firm commissions due diligence before an acquisition, a hospital pilots a device before negotiating its price, a household inspects a house before making an offer. Such information has two effects. It makes the trade decision better informed, which enlarges the total surplus, and it is paid for by the buyer alone, while the surplus it creates is shared through bargaining.

L. Guo, Gathering Information before Negotiation (SSRN 3930651; Management Science, doi:10.1287/mnsc.2022.4360), studies how this interaction shapes the seller's payoff. Its headline is a reversal: a seller with more bargaining power, or with a more valuable outside option, can be worse off, and a seller with a higher production cost can be better off. The reason is that the buyer's information choice reacts to these parameters, and the reaction can outweigh their direct effect. This mission formalizes that reversal for the paper's worked example, the uniform prior with a linear information cost.

Setting

A seller and a buyer negotiate over one unit of a good. The seller's cost is c∈(0,1)c\in(0,1)c∈(0,1). The buyer's value uuu is unknown to both parties; the common prior is the uniform distribution F(u)=uF(u)=uF(u)=u on [0,1][0,1][0,1], with mean u^=1/2\hat u=1/2u^=1/2. The bargaining powers are θb∈(0,1)\theta_b\in(0,1)θb​∈(0,1) for the buyer and θs=1−θb\theta_s=1-\theta_bθs​=1−θb​ for the seller.

Before negotiating, the buyer chooses an informativeness α∈[α‾,αˉ]\alpha\in[\underline\alpha,\bar\alpha]α∈[α​,αˉ], with 0<α‾<αˉ<10<\underline\alpha<\bar\alpha<10<α​<αˉ<1. It then observes a truth-or-noise signal www: with probability α\alphaα it equals uuu, and otherwise it is an independent draw from the prior. The buyer's posterior mean is v=αw+(1−α)u^v=\alpha w+(1-\alpha)\hat uv=αw+(1−α)u^. The information cost is linear,

k(α)=kˉ α−α‾αˉ−α‾,kˉ>0.k(\alpha)=\bar k\,\frac{\alpha-\underline\alpha}{\bar\alpha-\underline\alpha},\qquad \bar k>0 .k(α)=kˉαˉ−α​α−α​​,kˉ>0.

If v>cv>cv>c the parties trade and split the net surplus v−cv-cv−c in the proportions θs:θb\theta_s:\theta_bθs​:θb​; otherwise they do not trade. The total ex ante surplus is

A(α,c)=E[(v−c)+]=∫01max⁡{αw+1−α2−c,  0} dw,A(\alpha,c)=\mathbb E\big[(v-c)^+\big]=\int_0^1\max\Big\{\alpha w+\frac{1-\alpha}{2}-c,\;0\Big\}\,dw ,A(α,c)=E[(v−c)+]=∫01​max{αw+21−α​−c,0}dw,

and the buyer chooses α\alphaα to maximise

Ub(α)=θb A(α,c)−k(α).U_b(\alpha)=\theta_b\,A(\alpha,c)-k(\alpha).Ub​(α)=θb​A(α,c)−k(α).

The optimal set α∗\alpha^*α∗ is the set of maximisers of UbU_bUb​ on [α‾,αˉ][\underline\alpha,\bar\alpha][α​,αˉ]. The seller's equilibrium expected payoff is

Us∗=θs A(α∗,c)(material cost),Vs∗=c+θs A(α∗,c)(opportunity cost).U_s^*=\theta_s\,A(\alpha^*,c)\quad\text{(material cost)},\qquad V_s^*=c+\theta_s\,A(\alpha^*,c)\quad\text{(opportunity cost)}.Us∗​=θs​A(α∗,c)(material cost),Vs∗​=c+θs​A(α∗,c)(opportunity cost).

Write Δ(c)=A(αˉ,c)−A(α‾,c)\Delta(c)=A(\bar\alpha,c)-A(\underline\alpha,c)Δ(c)=A(αˉ,c)−A(α​,c) for the surplus gain of maximal information, and θ~=kˉ/Δ(c)\tilde\theta=\bar k/\Delta(c)θ~=kˉ/Δ(c) when Δ(c)>kˉ\Delta(c)>\bar kΔ(c)>kˉ, θ~=1\tilde\theta=1θ~=1 otherwise. For fixed θb\theta_bθb​, the cost thresholds cl≤1/2≤chc_l\le 1/2\le c_hcl​≤1/2≤ch​ are the endpoints of the set of costs at which θbΔ(c)>kˉ\theta_b\Delta(c)>\bar kθb​Δ(c)>kˉ.

Formalization targets

Goal: Proposition 2 (p. 14), uniform prior

For every selection of optimal information levels:

  1. θs↦Us∗\theta_s\mapsto U_s^*θs​↦Us∗​ and θs↦Vs∗\theta_s\mapsto V_s^*θs​↦Vs∗​ are nondecreasing on (0,1−θ~)(0,1-\tilde\theta)(0,1−θ~) and on (1−θ~,1)(1-\tilde\theta,1)(1−θ~,1), and, if θ~<1\tilde\theta<1θ~<1, drop strictly at θs=1−θ~\theta_s=1-\tilde\thetaθs​=1−θ~;
  2. c↦Us∗c\mapsto U_s^*c↦Us∗​ is nonincreasing on (0,cl)(0,c_l)(0,cl​) and on (cl,1)(c_l,1)(cl​,1), and, if cl<chc_l<c_hcl​<ch​, jumps up strictly at c=clc=c_lc=cl​;
  3. c↦Vs∗c\mapsto V_s^*c↦Vs∗​ is nondecreasing on (0,ch)(0,c_h)(0,ch​) and on (ch,1)(c_h,1)(ch​,1), and, if cl<chc_l<c_hcl​<ch​, drops strictly at c=chc=c_hc=ch​.

A drop at t0t_0t0​ means: for some ε>0\varepsilon>0ε>0, every value just to the right of t0t_0t0​ is strictly below every value just to the left.

Milestones

A(α,c)={max⁡{1/2−c,0},α≤∣1−2c∣,[(1+α)/2−c]2/(2α),α≥∣1−2c∣,A(\alpha,c)=\begin{cases}\max\{1/2-c,0\},&\alpha\le|1-2c|,\\ [(1+\alpha)/2-c]^2/(2\alpha),&\alpha\ge|1-2c|,\end{cases}A(α,c)={max{1/2−c,0},[(1+α)/2−c]2/(2α),​α≤∣1−2c∣,α≥∣1−2c∣,​

the uniform display of p. 13. The proof of Corollary 1 (p. 30) then contributes three steps: A(⋅,c)A(\cdot,c)A(⋅,c) is constant and then increasing, and convex; the optimum is a corner, α∗∈{α‾,αˉ}\alpha^*\in\{\underline\alpha,\bar\alpha\}α∗∈{α​,αˉ}; and Δ\DeltaΔ vanishes for extreme costs, rises and then falls in ccc, and peaks at Δ(1/2)=(αˉ−α‾)/8\Delta(1/2)=(\bar\alpha-\underline\alpha)/8Δ(1/2)=(αˉ−α​)/8. Corollary 1 (p. 13) gives the two threshold rules: (i) α∗=α‾\alpha^*=\underline\alphaα∗=α​ for θb≤θ~\theta_b\le\tilde\thetaθb​≤θ~ and α∗=αˉ\alpha^*=\bar\alphaα∗=αˉ for θb>θ~\theta_b>\tilde\thetaθb​>θ~; (ii) α∗=αˉ\alpha^*=\bar\alphaα∗=αˉ exactly for cl<c<chc_l<c<c_hcl​<c<ch​.

Significance

The result. Without information acquisition, the seller's payoff is increasing in its bargaining power and in its outside option and decreasing in its material cost: these are the direct effects. Proposition 2 shows that each of them can be reversed by a discontinuous jump. The mechanism is that the buyer stops gathering information when its own share of the surplus becomes too small (high θs\theta_sθs​) or the trade decision becomes clear-cut (extreme ccc). The result bears on when a seller should prefer to commit to a weaker bargaining position, and on why cost increases need not hurt a seller facing an uninformed buyer.

Formalizing it. The paper calls Proposition 2 an immediate consequence of Corollary 1. That corollary rests on a short appendix argument whose printed version contains slips: the peak of Δ\DeltaΔ is printed as θb(αˉ−α‾)/8\theta_b(\bar\alpha-\underline\alpha)/8θb​(αˉ−α​)/8, strictness is claimed on a closed interval at whose endpoints Δ=0\Delta=0Δ=0, and "α∗∈{α‾,αˉ}\alpha^*\in\{\underline\alpha,\bar\alpha\}α∗∈{α​,αˉ}" fails at c=1/2c=1/2c=1/2 when the two corners tie. A machine-checked development settles exactly which form of each claim is true. The result has been proved informally in the paper; it has not been formalized before.

Difficulty

The obvious argument treats α∗\alpha^*α∗ as a function and differentiates Us∗U_s^*Us∗​. That does not work here. At the thresholds α∗\alpha^*α∗ is not single-valued, and between them it is constant, so the whole content lies in the jumps. A jump statement must hold whichever optimal level is selected at each parameter, and it must compare values on both sides of a threshold whose location depends on Δ\DeltaΔ. Showing that the thresholds are well placed requires the inverted-U shape of Δ\DeltaΔ, which comes from an explicit but piecewise integral. The corner property needs convexity of AAA across the kink at α=∣1−2c∣\alpha=|1-2c|α=∣1−2c∣, where the two branches of the closed form meet.

Formalization scope

All quantities are real numbers. AAA is the interval integral over the uniform prior after the change of variables v=αw+(1−α)u^v=\alpha w+(1-\alpha)\hat uv=αw+(1−α)u^; no density is assumed. The bargaining stage is not modelled; the payoffs are the paper's reduced forms (6) and θsA(α∗,c)\theta_sA(\alpha^*,c)θs​A(α∗,c). Conventions: c∈(0,1)c\in(0,1)c∈(0,1) (the paper's c∈(u‾,uˉ)c\in(\underline u,\bar u)c∈(u​,uˉ)); θb,θs∈(0,1)\theta_b,\theta_s\in(0,1)θb​,θs​∈(0,1) with θs=1−θb\theta_s=1-\theta_bθs​=1−θb​; [α‾,αˉ][\underline\alpha,\bar\alpha][α​,αˉ] non-degenerate; θ~=1\tilde\theta=1θ~=1 when Δ(c)≤kˉ\Delta(c)\le\bar kΔ(c)≤kˉ, which avoids kˉ/0\bar k/0kˉ/0 and keeps θ~∈(0,1]\tilde\theta\in(0,1]θ~∈(0,1]. Monotonicity is claimed on each side of the jump point, open at that point (and across the other cost threshold), and the jump whenever the threshold is interior. In (ii) and (iii), cl≤1/2≤chc_l\le1/2\le c_hcl​≤1/2≤ch​ are assumed to satisfy "cl<c<chc_l<c<c_hcl​<c<ch​ iff θbΔ(c)>kˉ\theta_b\Delta(c)>\bar kθb​Δ(c)>kˉ" for all c∈(0,1)c\in(0,1)c∈(0,1), which determines them; when the buyer never gathers information this forces cl=ch=1/2c_l=c_h=1/2cl​=ch​=1/2.

The paper states Corollary 1 and Proposition 2 for four focal priors (uniform, exponential, logistic, modified Pareto) but works out only the uniform one. This mission is pinned to the uniform prior and the linear cost.

A trivializing formalization is ruled out: AAA is not defined by its closed form (that closed form is a milestone), α∗\alpha^*α∗ is the set of maximisers of UbU_bUb​ and not a threshold rule, and the goal quantifies over every selection from that set, so neither Corollary 1 nor Proposition 2 holds by definition.

A complete development needs piecewise interval integrals of max⁡{⋅,0}\max\{\cdot,0\}max{⋅,0}, convexity of a function with a C1C^1C1 junction, and the fact that a convex function on a segment attains its maximum at an endpoint. All of these are general facts, reusable beyond this mission. Proofs of the milestones in any order are welcome; Proposition 3 and the other priors are not posed here.

Selected references

  • L. Guo, Gathering Information before Negotiation, SSRN 3930651, manuscript of 15 Feb 2022. https://ssrn.com/abstract=3930651
  • L. Guo, Gathering Information before Negotiation, Management Science (journal version of the manuscript above; its theorem numbering is not used here). https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2022.4360
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Operations ResearchOptimization·Captain: mikedeng1

Lightning Network Economics: Topology III: With Power-Law Channel-Cost Tails, a Random Lightning Network Is Hermetizable with High ProbabilityResearch Paper

Motivation

The Lightning Network is a payment layer built on top of Bitcoin: pairs of participants lock funds in a bilateral payment channel and then exchange payments off-chain, settling on the blockchain only occasionally. Keeping a channel open costs money, because it ties up capital and needs periodic rebalancing, and Guasoni, Huberman and Shikhelman (Lightning Network Economics: Channels, 2022, cited in the paper as [GHS22]) showed that this recurring cost depends on the channel's net flow and grows less than proportionally with it. Which network topology a population of payers and payees should use is therefore an economic question about subadditive costs on graphs.

Lightning Network Economics: Topology (SSRN 4439190; published version in Management Science, 2024, doi:10.1287/mnsc.2023.03872) answers this question in an axiomatic model. Its §3.2 introduces hermetization, which replaces the channels inside a group of nodes by channels to a new hub, and asks when this reduces cost. Theorem 3.8 gives a deterministic sufficient condition, a large average degree compared with the spread of channel sizes. Theorem 3.9, the subject of this mission, shows that the condition is typical: if channel sizes are random with thin, power-law-bounded cost tails, the network is hermetizable with high probability. The paper reads this as "cost reduction is the norm, not the exception", which is the economic argument for hubs in payment-channel networks.

Setting

Nodes form a finite set VVV. A Lightning Network (LN) is an anti-symmetric real matrix Λ=(λi,j)i,j∈V\Lambda=(\lambda_{i,j})_{i,j\in V}Λ=(λi,j​)i,j∈V​, λi,j=−λj,i\lambda_{i,j}=-\lambda_{j,i}λi,j​=−λj,i​, of net channel flows; λi,j=0\lambda_{i,j}=0λi,j​=0 means there is no channel between iii and jjj. A channel cost is a function c:R→R+c:\mathbb R\to\mathbb R_+c:R→R+​ with

  • (MO) c(x)>c(y)c(x)>c(y)c(x)>c(y) for x>y≥0x>y\ge 0x>y≥0; (SY) c(−x)=c(x)c(-x)=c(x)c(−x)=c(x); (CI) c(0)=0c(0)=0c(0)=0;
  • (SA) c(x+y)<c(x)+c(y)c(x+y)<c(x)+c(y)c(x+y)<c(x)+c(y) for x,y>0x,y>0x,y>0;
  • (SA+) for a strictly increasing g+:R+→R+g_+:\mathbb R_+\to\mathbb R_+g+​:R+​→R+​, c(kx)<kg+(k)c(x)c(kx)<\dfrac{k}{g_+(k)}c(x)c(kx)<g+​(k)k​c(x) for k>1k>1k>1, x>0x>0x>0.

The cost of the network is c(G)=12∑i,jc(λi,j)c(G)=\tfrac12\sum_{i,j}c(\lambda_{i,j})c(G)=21​∑i,j​c(λi,j​). For a node iii, d(i)d(i)d(i) is its number of channels, s(i)s(i)s(i) the smallest and S(i)S(i)S(i) the largest ∣λi,j∣|\lambda_{i,j}|∣λi,j​∣ over its channels.

The hermetization of a set of nodes UUU deletes all channels inside UUU, adds a new node v0v_0v0​, and joins each i∈Ui\in Ui∈U to v0v_0v0​ by a channel carrying ∑j∈Uλi,j\sum_{j\in U}\lambda_{i,j}∑j∈U​λi,j​, its net flow towards the rest of UUU. The set UUU is hermetizable if this strictly lowers the cost, and the LN is hermetizable if some UUU is.

In the random model a simple graph EEE on VVV fixes the channels, so d(i)d(i)d(i) is the degree of iii in EEE and is not random. On a probability space (Ω,P)(\Omega,\mathbb P)(Ω,P), the flows λi,j(ω)\lambda_{i,j}(\omega)λi,j​(ω) are random variables, nonzero exactly on the channels of EEE, and Λ(ω)\Lambda(\omega)Λ(ω) is an LN for every ω\omegaω.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 3.9

Let a>1a>1a>1, b>0b>0b>0, ε>0\varepsilon>0ε>0. There is k>0k>0k>0, depending only on (a,b,ε)(a,b,\varepsilon)(a,b,ε), such that for every finite EEE with at least one channel, every c,g+c,g_+c,g+​ satisfying (MO)–(SA+), and every random LN with, for all channels ij∈Eij\in Eij∈E,

(i)  P(c(λi,j)>x)<b x−a  (x>0),(ii)  P(c(λi,j)>ε)=1,\text{(i)}\ \ \mathbb P\big(c(\lambda_{i,j})>x\big)<b\,x^{-a}\ \ (x>0),\qquad \text{(ii)}\ \ \mathbb P\big(c(\lambda_{i,j})>\varepsilon\big)=1,(i)  P(c(λi,j​)>x)<bx−a  (x>0),(ii)  P(c(λi,j​)>ε)=1,

the LN is hermetizable with probability at least

1−k∑i∈Vd(i) (g+(d(i)))−a.1-k\sum_{i\in V}d(i)\,\big(g_+(d(i))\big)^{-a}.1−ki∈V∑​d(i)(g+​(d(i)))−a.

The constant is not fixed: any kkk uniform in the network and in c,g+c,g_+c,g+​ is a proof of the goal.

Milestones

  1. Lemma B.1. If every iii in a nonempty set UUU has a channel in UUU and g+(dU(i))>2c(SU(i))/c(sU(i))g_+(d_U(i))>2c(S_U(i))/c(s_U(i))g+​(dU​(i))>2c(SU​(i))/c(sU​(i)), with degrees and sizes in the subnetwork induced on UUU, then UUU is hermetizable.
  2. (8)–(10). P(hermetizable)≥1−∑i: d(i)≥1P(g+(d(i))≤2c(S(i))/c(s(i)))\mathbb P(\text{hermetizable})\ge 1-\sum_{i:\,d(i)\ge1}\mathbb P\big(g_+(d(i))\le 2c(S(i))/c(s(i))\big)P(hermetizable)≥1−∑i:d(i)≥1​P(g+​(d(i))≤2c(S(i))/c(s(i))).
  3. (11). Under (ii), P(g+(d(i))≤2c(S(i))/c(s(i)))≤P(ε2g+(d(i))≤c(S(i)))\mathbb P\big(g_+(d(i))\le 2c(S(i))/c(s(i))\big)\le\mathbb P\big(\tfrac{\varepsilon}{2}g_+(d(i))\le c(S(i))\big)P(g+​(d(i))≤2c(S(i))/c(s(i)))≤P(2ε​g+​(d(i))≤c(S(i))) for d(i)≥1d(i)\ge1d(i)≥1.
  4. (12)–(13). Under (i), P(c(S(i))≥x)≤d(i) b x−a\mathbb P\big(c(S(i))\ge x\big)\le d(i)\,b\,x^{-a}P(c(S(i))≥x)≤d(i)bx−a for every x>0x>0x>0.

The paper closes with "for some constant kkk, P(c(S(i))≥ε2g+(d(i)))≤k d(i) (g+(d(i)))−a\mathbb P\big(c(S(i))\ge\tfrac{\varepsilon}{2}g_+(d(i))\big)\le k\,d(i)\,(g_+(d(i)))^{-a}P(c(S(i))≥2ε​g+​(d(i)))≤kd(i)(g+​(d(i)))−a, whence the claim."

Significance

The theorem turns the deterministic criterion of Lemma B.1 into a statement about typical networks. When degrees grow, g+(d)−ag_+(d)^{-a}g+​(d)−a decays, and the probability that no hub can reduce cost vanishes for any law with a power-bounded cost tail and a positive cost floor. This is the paper's evidence that hub-and-spoke structures are the economically stable outcome; the companion results of the paper (Theorem 3.1 on local restructuring, Theorem 3.10 on the star topology) are treated in sibling missions of this series.

The result is proved in the paper, in about half a page. It has no machine-checked proof. Formalizing it makes the quantifier structure explicit, in particular that kkk does not depend on the network, settles the boundary cases the paper leaves implicit, and records corrected forms of two axioms that are unsatisfiable as printed. Lemma B.1 is shared with the mission on Theorem 3.8.

Difficulty

The probabilistic estimates are elementary; the obstacles are in the bookkeeping. Lemma B.1 compares two costs on different node sets (the hermetized network has one more node), and its degrees and channel sizes must be read in the subnetwork induced on UUU; with the degrees of the whole network the lemma is false. To apply it to a random network one must choose UUU: the set of all nodes fails when some node is isolated, because s(i)s(i)s(i) is then undefined. The step from the strict tail P(c>x)\mathbb P(c>x)P(c>x) of (i) to the weak tail P(c≥x)\mathbb P(c\ge x)P(c≥x) used in (12)–(13) is a limit the paper does not write out. The inverse g+−1g_+^{-1}g+−1​ that the paper uses need not exist, since g+g_+g+​ is not assumed onto.

Formalization scope

Nodes are an arbitrary finite type V; the LN is Λ : V → V → ℝ, anti-symmetric; the channel graph is E : SimpleGraph V, with λi,j(ω)≠0  ⟺  ij∈E\lambda_{i,j}(\omega)\ne0\iff ij\in Eλi,j​(ω)=0⟺ij∈E for every ω\omegaω, and d(i)d(i)d(i) is E.degree i. The cost is the 12∑i,j\tfrac12\sum_{i,j}21​∑i,j​ form. The hub v0v_0v0​ of a hermetization is none : Option V. Probabilities are toReal of a probability measure, and events are not assumed measurable. Each λi,j\lambda_{i,j}λi,j​ is assumed measurable in the goal. The conventions committed to:

  • (SA) is used for all x,y>0x,y>0x,y>0: as printed ("for x>y≥0x>y\ge0x>y≥0") it demands c(x)<c(x)c(x)<c(x)c(x)<c(x) at y=0y=0y=0. The corrected range is the one Appendix D verifies.
  • (SA+) is used for k>1k>1k>1, x>0x>0x>0: as printed (k∈R+k\in\mathbb R_+k∈R+​) it fails at x=0x=0x=0, and for k≤1k\le1k≤1 even for the paper's own example.
  • Every condition d>g+−1(y)d>g_+^{-1}(y)d>g+−1​(y) is written g+(d)>yg_+(d)>yg+​(d)>y.
  • In Lemma B.1, ddd, sss, SSS are those of the subnetwork induced on UUU; UUU is nonempty and each i∈Ui\in Ui∈U has a channel in UUU. For a node without a channel, sss and SSS take the junk value 000, which no statement uses.
  • The constants a,b,εa,b,\varepsilona,b,ε are common to all channels. Neither independence nor identical distribution of the flows is assumed: the theorem's hypotheses are only (i) and (ii).
  • The goal assumes at least one channel. With none, the printed bound is 111 but the cost 000 cannot be reduced.

The following formalizations are trivializing and are ruled out: a kkk allowed to depend on VVV, EEE, P\mathbb PP, Λ\LambdaΛ, ccc or g+g_+g+​ (take kkk large enough that the bound is ≤0\le0≤0); a specific law, such as a Pareto law, or a specific cost such as c(x)=∣x∣c(x)=\sqrt{|x|}c(x)=∣x∣​; replacing "the LN is hermetizable" by the event that every node satisfies Lemma B.1's inequality; an empty channel set; and the printed, unsatisfiable (SA) or (SA+), under which every statement is vacuous.

The development needs finite sums over Option V, a min/max over a node's channels, and union bounds for outer measures (Mathlib's measure_biUnion_finset_le). Contributions welcome: proofs of the milestones, a proof that the corrected axioms are satisfiable by c(x)=∣x∣c(x)=\sqrt{|x|}c(x)=∣x∣​, g+(k)=k1/4g_+(k)=k^{1/4}g+​(k)=k1/4, and a reusable statement of Lemma B.1 for the series.

Selected references

  • P. Guasoni, G. Huberman, C. Shikhelman, Lightning Network Economics: Topology, SSRN working paper 4439190, version of February 3, 2023. https://ssrn.com/abstract=4439190 ; published in Management Science, 2024, https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2023.03872
  • P. Guasoni, G. Huberman, C. Shikhelman, Lightning Network Economics: Channels, 2022 (cited in the paper as [GHS22]; reference list, p. 16 of SSRN 4439190).
  • J. Poon, T. Dryja, The Bitcoin Lightning Network: Scalable Off-Chain Instant Payments, 2016. https://lightning.network/lightning-network-paper.pdf
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Random Matrix TheoryStatistics·Captain: mikedeng1

Change-Point Detection in Dynamic Networks with Missing Links III: The Dyadic-Grid Matrix CUSUM Test Detects an Unknown Change Time Above Energy 4(1+ϵ)(6ω_n/T)^{1/2} + C log(4n log₂T/(α∧β))/√TResearch Paper

Detecting a change in a partially observed network

Many networks are recorded as a sequence of snapshots: contact networks in epidemiology, communication graphs, brain connectivity measured over time, trade or transport links. A basic statistical question is whether the law generating the snapshots changed at some point. Two features make the question hard in practice. The networks are often sparse, so each snapshot carries little information. And links are missing: a pair of vertices is observed only with some probability, so an absent edge may mean "no link" or "not sampled".

Enikeeva and Klopp (arXiv:2106.14470, Operations Research, 2025) give minimax bounds for this testing problem. They treat both a known change time (Theorems 1 and 2) and an unknown change time (Theorem 3). This mission formalizes the unknown-time case, where the test scans a dyadic grid of candidate times. Two companion missions formalize the known-time upper bound (Theorem 1) and the lower bound (Theorem 2).

Setting

There are nnn vertices and TTT time points. At time ttt the statistician observes a symmetric matrix Yt∈{0,1}n×nY^t\in\{0,1\}^{n\times n}Yt∈{0,1}n×n with zero diagonal, Yijt=ΩijtAijtY^t_{ij}=\Omega^t_{ij}A^t_{ij}Yijt​=Ωijt​Aijt​. Here AtA^tAt is the adjacency matrix of the network and Ωt\Omega^tΩt records which pairs were sampled. The entries YijtY^t_{ij}Yijt​, i<ji<ji<j, are independent over pairs and times, and

Yijt∼Bernoulli((Π⊙Θt)ij),Y^t_{ij}\sim\mathrm{Bernoulli}\big((\Pi\odot\Theta^t)_{ij}\big),Yijt​∼Bernoulli((Π⊙Θt)ij​),

where Θt∈[0,1]n×n\Theta^t\in[0,1]^{n\times n}Θt∈[0,1]n×n is the connection-probability matrix (symmetric, zero diagonal), Π\PiΠ is the sampling matrix (symmetric, entries in (0,1](0,1](0,1], unit diagonal), and ⊙\odot⊙ is the entrywise product.

The sparsity level ωn\omega_nωn​ bounds the expected observed degree: (Θ,Π)∈Sn(ωn)(\Theta,\Pi)\in\mathcal S_n(\omega_n)(Θ,Π)∈Sn​(ωn​) when ∥Π⊙Θ∥1,∞=max⁡j∑i∣(Π⊙Θ)ij∣≤ωn\|\Pi\odot\Theta\|_{1,\infty}=\max_j\sum_i|(\Pi\odot\Theta)_{ij}|\le\omega_n∥Π⊙Θ∥1,∞​=maxj​∑i​∣(Π⊙Θ)ij​∣≤ωn​.

Under the null hypothesis Θt=Θ0\Theta^t=\Theta^0Θt=Θ0 for all ttt. Under the alternative there is τ∈DT={1,…,T−1}\tau\in\mathcal D_T=\{1,\dots,T-1\}τ∈DT​={1,…,T−1} with Θt=Θ0\Theta^t=\Theta^0Θt=Θ0 for t≤τt\le\taut≤τ and Θt=Θ0+ΔΘτ\Theta^t=\Theta^0+\Delta\Theta^\tauΘt=Θ0+ΔΘτ for t>τt>\taut>τ. Both parameter pairs lie in Sn(ωn)\mathcal S_n(\omega_n)Sn​(ωn​), and the jump has energy at least RRR:

q(τ/T) ∥Π⊙ΔΘτ∥2→2≥R,q(x)=x(1−x),q(\tau/T)\,\|\Pi\odot\Delta\Theta^\tau\|_{2\to2}\ge R,\qquad q(x)=\sqrt{x(1-x)},q(τ/T)∥Π⊙ΔΘτ∥2→2​≥R,q(x)=x(1−x)​,

where ∥⋅∥2→2\|\cdot\|_{2\to2}∥⋅∥2→2​ is the spectral norm. A test ψ\psiψ maps the data to {0,1}\{0,1\}{0,1}. Its type I error α(ψ)\alpha(\psi)α(ψ) is the largest rejection probability over the null class. Its type II error β(ψ,R)\beta(\psi,R)β(ψ,R) is the largest acceptance probability over all τ∈DT\tau\in\mathcal D_Tτ∈DT​ and all alternatives of energy at least RRR.

The Matrix CUSUM at time ttt contrasts the averages before and after ttt:

ZT(t)=t(T−t)T(1t∑s=1tYs−1T−t∑s=t+1TYs),1≤t≤T−1.Z_T(t)=\sqrt{\frac{t(T-t)}{T}}\Big(\frac1t\sum_{s=1}^tY^s-\frac1{T-t}\sum_{s=t+1}^TY^s\Big),\qquad1\le t\le T-1.ZT​(t)=Tt(T−t)​​(t1​s=1∑t​Ys−T−t1​s=t+1∑T​Ys),1≤t≤T−1.

The dyadic grid is T={2k}∪{T−2k}\mathcal T=\{2^k\}\cup\{T-2^k\}T={2k}∪{T−2k}, 0≤k≤⌊log⁡2(T/2)⌋0\le k\le\lfloor\log_2(T/2)\rfloor0≤k≤⌊log2​(T/2)⌋. Fix ϵ∈(0,1/2]\epsilon\in(0,1/2]ϵ∈(0,1/2]. The test (14) of the paper rejects when

max⁡t∈T∥ZT(t)∥2→2>Hα,n,T=22(1+ϵ)ωn+Cϵlog⁡4nlog⁡2(T)α.\max_{t\in\mathcal T}\|Z_T(t)\|_{2\to2}>H_{\alpha,n,T}=2\sqrt2(1+\epsilon)\sqrt{\omega_n}+C_\epsilon\log\frac{4n\log_2(T)}{\alpha}.t∈Tmax​∥ZT​(t)∥2→2​>Hα,n,T​=22​(1+ϵ)ωn​​+Cϵ​logα4nlog2​(T)​.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 3

For every ϵ∈(0,1/2]\epsilon\in(0,1/2]ϵ∈(0,1/2] there are constants Cϵ>0C_\epsilon>0Cϵ​>0 and CCC, depending only on ϵ\epsilonϵ, such that for all n≥1n\ge1n≥1, T≥2T\ge2T≥2, ωn≥0\omega_n\ge0ωn​≥0 and α,β∈(0,1)\alpha,\beta\in(0,1)α,β∈(0,1): if

R ≥ 4(1+ϵ)(6ωnT)1/2+CTlog⁡(4nlog⁡2(T)α∧β),R\ \ge\ 4(1+\epsilon)\Big(\frac{6\omega_n}{T}\Big)^{1/2}+\frac{C}{\sqrt T}\log\Big(\frac{4n\log_2(T)}{\alpha\wedge\beta}\Big),R ≥ 4(1+ϵ)(T6ωn​​)1/2+T​C​log(α∧β4nlog2​(T)​),

then the grid test with threshold Hα,n,TH_{\alpha,n,T}Hα,n,T​ has α(ψn,T)≤α\alpha(\psi_{n,T})\le\alphaα(ψn,T​)≤α and β(ψn,T,R)≤β\beta(\psi_{n,T},R)\le\betaβ(ψn,T​,R)≤β.

Milestones

  • the signal-plus-noise decomposition ZT(t)=−μTτ(t) Π⊙ΔΘτ+ξ(t)Z_T(t)=-\mu^\tau_T(t)\,\Pi\odot\Delta\Theta^\tau+\xi(t)ZT​(t)=−μTτ​(t)Π⊙ΔΘτ+ξ(t) and the maximum μTτ(τ)=T q(τ/T)\mu^\tau_T(\tau)=\sqrt T\,q(\tau/T)μTτ​(τ)=T​q(τ/T), display (7);
  • the grid facts T⊆DT\mathcal T\subseteq\mathcal D_TT⊆DT​ and ∣T∣≤2log⁡2T|\mathcal T|\le2\log_2T∣T∣≤2log2​T;
  • the grid captures signal: for every τ∈DT\tau\in\mathcal D_Tτ∈DT​ some t∈Tt\in\mathcal Tt∈T has μTτ(t)≥T q(τ/T)/3\mu^\tau_T(t)\ge\sqrt T\,q(\tau/T)/\sqrt3μTτ​(t)≥T​q(τ/T)/3​;
  • Proposition 11, the Bandeira–van Handel bound for symmetric random matrices with independent bounded entries;
  • Lemma 12, the noise bound for the CUSUM at a fixed time;
  • Lemma 5 (level) and Lemma 6 (power above 46(1+ϵ)(ωn/T)1/2+3CϵT(log⁡4nlog⁡2Tα+log⁡2nβ)4\sqrt6(1+\epsilon)(\omega_n/T)^{1/2}+\frac{\sqrt3C_\epsilon}{\sqrt T}(\log\frac{4n\log_2T}\alpha+\log\frac{2n}\beta)46​(1+ϵ)(ωn​/T)1/2+T​3​Cϵ​​(logα4nlog2​T​+logβ2n​)).

Significance

Theorem 3 shows that not knowing the change time costs at most a constant factor and a log⁡log⁡T\log\log TloglogT term in the detection energy. Together with the lower bound of Theorem 2, which is of order (ωn/T)1/2(\omega_n/T)^{1/2}(ωn​/T)1/2, this makes the grid test rate-optimal when ωn\omega_nωn​ grows at least polylogarithmically in nnn (Remark 3 of the paper). The statistic depends on the data only through spectral norms of O(log⁡T)O(\log T)O(logT) CUSUM matrices, so it is cheap to compute. The threshold needs only the degree bound ωn\omega_nωn​, which can be estimated from the observed degrees.

The paper's proof is complete on paper apart from one step noted below. No part of it is machine-checked. Formalizing it produces a checked finite model of Bernoulli network data with missing links, a reusable Matrix CUSUM, and a precise statement of a Bandeira–van Handel type bound for symmetric matrices with independent bounded entries. That bound is a standard tool in random-matrix statistics and is not yet available in Mathlib or on the platform.

Difficulty

The level of the test is a union bound over the grid combined with a high-probability bound on ∥ξ(t)∥2→2\|\xi(t)\|_{2\to2}∥ξ(t)∥2→2​ at a fixed time. The hard part is that bound, Lemma 12. A matrix Bernstein inequality gives a leading term σlog⁡(n/δ)\sigma\sqrt{\log(n/\delta)}σlog(n/δ)​, which is too large. The statement needs the sharp form 22(1+ϵ)σ+Cϵlog⁡(2n/δ)2\sqrt2(1+\epsilon)\sigma+C_\epsilon\log(2n/\delta)22​(1+ϵ)σ+Cϵ​log(2n/δ), where the variance proxy σ\sigmaσ enters without a logarithmic factor. Proposition 11 supplies this only for matrices whose entries are bounded by σ∗\sigma_*σ∗​. The entries of ξ(t)\xi(t)ξ(t) are sums over time and are only bounded by about log⁡(n/δ)\sqrt{\log(n/\delta)}log(n/δ)​ with high probability. The paper applies Proposition 11 "given the event" {∥ξ(t)∥∞≤σ∗}\{\|\xi(t)\|_\infty\le\sigma_*\}{∥ξ(t)∥∞​≤σ∗​}, but conditioning on that event destroys centring and independence, so a truncation argument is missing there.

The power analysis is elementary once Lemma 12 is available. Its one subtlety is that the change time ranges over all of DT\mathcal D_TDT​, while the test inspects only the grid.

Formalization scope

  • Data and probability. Only YYY is modelled; the latent At,ΩtA^t,\Omega^tAt,Ωt are integrated out. An observation is a Boolean function of a 0-based time index and of a pair i<ji<ji<j. Probabilities are finite sums of products of Bernoulli weights, so every test is measurable and no measure theory enters the model. Proposition 11 is the only measure-theoretic statement.
  • Classes. The sampling class carries the paper's standing assumptions Πii=1\Pi_{ii}=1Πii​=1, Πij>0\Pi_{ij}>0Πij​>0. The errors are real suprema of sets of probabilities; an empty alternative has type II error 000.
  • Spectral norm. ∥⋅∥2→2\|\cdot\|_{2\to2}∥⋅∥2→2​ is the published HighDimProb.RandomMatrices.matrixOpNorm.
  • Grid and test. ⌊log⁡2(T/2)⌋\lfloor\log_2(T/2)\rfloor⌊log2​(T/2)⌋ is Nat.log 2 (T / 2). "max⁡t∈T∥ZT(t)∥>H\max_{t\in\mathcal T}\|Z_T(t)\|>Hmaxt∈T​∥ZT​(t)∥>H" is "∃t∈T\exists t\in\mathcal T∃t∈T, ∥ZT(t)∥>H\|Z_T(t)\|>H∥ZT​(t)∥>H". The threshold uses the real log⁡2T\log_2Tlog2​T.
  • Constants. CϵC_\epsilonCϵ​ and CCC are quantified existentially before n,T,ωn,α,β,Rn,T,\omega_n,\alpha,\beta,Rn,T,ωn​,α,β,R. A version with the constants chosen after nnn or TTT would be trivial, because huge constants silence the test or empty the alternative. The goal does not assume Lemma 12's conclusion. Lemmas 5 and 6 take it as a hypothesis, and Lemma 12 states that it is satisfiable. The test ranges over all functions of the data, and the alternative over all τ∈DT\tau\in\mathcal D_Tτ∈DT​.
  • Disclosed additions and corrections. The theorems assume n≥1n\ge1n≥1, T≥2T\ge2T≥2 and ωn≥0\omega_n\ge0ωn​≥0, which the paper leaves implicit. Proposition 11 assumes m≥1m\ge1m≥1 and cϵ>0c_\epsilon>0cϵ​>0. Independence in Proposition 11 and Lemma 12 refers to the entries with i≤ji\le ji≤j (i<ji<ji<j) of a symmetric matrix. The grid statement is the inequality ∣T∣≤2log⁡2T|\mathcal T|\le2\log_2T∣T∣≤2log2​T: the printed equality ∣T∣=2+2⌊log⁡2(T/2)⌋|\mathcal T|=2+2\lfloor\log_2(T/2)\rfloor∣T∣=2+2⌊log2​(T/2)⌋ fails when the two halves overlap, as at T=4T=4T=4. Lemma 5 is stated with "≤α\le\alpha≤α", as its proof concludes, rather than the printed "less than α\alphaα". The grid-signal milestone is stated as an existence claim, because the printed choice τ/2≤t∗<τ\tau/2\le t^*<\tauτ/2≤t∗<τ has no solution at τ=1\tau=1τ=1.

Welcome contributions: a proof of Proposition 11, or of any sharp spectral-norm bound that implies it; a rigorous proof of Lemma 12, repairing the conditioning step; and the elementary grid lemmas.

Selected references

  • F. Enikeeva and O. Klopp, Change-point detection in dynamic networks with missing links, Operations Research, 2025; arXiv:2106.14470v2. https://arxiv.org/abs/2106.14470
  • A. S. Bandeira and R. van Handel, Sharp nonasymptotic bounds on the norm of random matrices with independent entries, Annals of Probability 44(4), 2016. https://doi.org/10.1214/15-AOP1025
  • H. Liu, C. Gao and R. J. Samworth, Minimax rates in sparse, high-dimensional change point detection, Annals of Statistics 49(2), 2021. https://doi.org/10.1214/20-AOS1994
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Operations ResearchStochastic Systems·Captain: mikedeng1

Opinion Dynamics on Directed Complex Networks 3: On a Galton-Watson Limit, the Stationary Opinion with Memory Has Variance at Most That of the Proportional No-Memory RecursionResearch Paper

Motivation

Linear opinion models describe how individuals in a social network revise their views by averaging what their neighbours think, what external media tell them, and what they themselves believed a moment ago. The last ingredient, an autoregressive or memory term, appears in the Friedkin–Johnsen family of models and in its stochastic variants. Fraiman, Lin and Olvera-Cravioto (arXiv:2209.00969, Mathematics of Operations Research, 2025) study such a model on large directed random graphs with vertex attributes and random media signals. They show that the opinion of a typical vertex has a stationary law that is described, in the large-graph limit, by a recursion on a marked Galton–Watson tree.

A natural question is what the memory term does to that stationary law. Simulations in the paper (Section 5.4, Figures 6–7) suggest that memory smooths individual trajectories and makes the stationary opinion less dispersed. Proposition 6 turns this into a theorem: on a Galton–Watson limit, the stationary opinion with memory has variance at most that of a no-memory recursion that keeps the same relative weights of neighbours and media.

Setting

Nodes of the limiting tree are labelled by finite words i=(i1,…,ik)\mathbf i=(i_1,\dots,i_k)i=(i1​,…,ik​), the root being ∅\varnothing∅; (i,j)(\mathbf i,j)(i,j) is the jjj-th child of i\mathbf ii. Each node carries a mark Xi\mathcal X_{\mathbf i}Xi​, from which the model reads an in-degree Ni\mathcal N_{\mathbf i}Ni​, weights C(i,1),C(i,2),⋯∈[0,1]\mathcal C_{(\mathbf i,1)},\mathcal C_{(\mathbf i,2)},\dots\in[0,1]C(i,1)​,C(i,2)​,⋯∈[0,1] summing to ccc when Ni≥1\mathcal N_{\mathbf i}\ge1Ni​≥1, and an internal opinion Qi∈[−1,1]\mathcal Q_{\mathbf i}\in[-1,1]Qi​∈[−1,1]. Parameters satisfy c∈[0,1)c\in[0,1)c∈[0,1), d∈(0,1]d\in(0,1]d∈(0,1], c+d≤1c+d\le1c+d≤1. The tree is a delayed marked Galton–Watson tree: marks are independent, and all non-root marks have the same law.

Each node receives media signals Zi(k)∈[−1,1]\mathcal Z_{\mathbf i}^{(k)}\in[-1,1]Zi(k)​∈[−1,1], k≥0k\ge0k≥0, conditionally i.i.d. given its mark and conditionally independent across nodes, and the external signal

Wi(k)=d Zi(k)+Qi(c−∑j=1NiC(i,j)).\mathcal W_{\mathbf i}^{(k)}=d\,\mathcal Z_{\mathbf i}^{(k)}+\mathcal Q_{\mathbf i}\Big(c-\sum_{j=1}^{\mathcal N_{\mathbf i}}\mathcal C_{(\mathbf i,j)}\Big).Wi(k)​=dZi(k)​+Qi​(c−j=1∑Ni​​C(i,j)​).

The general recursion (8) and the no-memory recursion (9) are

Mi(k+1)=∑j=1NiC(i,j)M(i,j)(k)+Wi(k)+(1−c−d)Mi(k),Ri(k+1)=∑j=1NiC(i,j)c+dR(i,j)(k)+Wi(k)c+d.\mathcal M_{\mathbf i}^{(k+1)}=\sum_{j=1}^{\mathcal N_{\mathbf i}}\mathcal C_{(\mathbf i,j)}\mathcal M_{(\mathbf i,j)}^{(k)}+\mathcal W_{\mathbf i}^{(k)}+(1-c-d)\mathcal M_{\mathbf i}^{(k)},\qquad \mathcal R_{\mathbf i}^{(k+1)}=\sum_{j=1}^{\mathcal N_{\mathbf i}}\frac{\mathcal C_{(\mathbf i,j)}}{c+d}\mathcal R_{(\mathbf i,j)}^{(k)}+\frac{\mathcal W_{\mathbf i}^{(k)}}{c+d}.Mi(k+1)​=j=1∑Ni​​C(i,j)​M(i,j)(k)​+Wi(k)​+(1−c−d)Mi(k)​,Ri(k+1)​=j=1∑Ni​​c+dC(i,j)​​R(i,j)(k)​+c+dWi(k)​​.

Writing Δ\DeltaΔ for the linear map on the right-hand side without the signal, the limiting root opinion is the series ∑s≥0(ΔsW(s))(∅)\sum_{s\ge0}(\Delta^s\mathcal W^{(s)})(\varnothing)∑s≥0​(ΔsW(s))(∅); it is M∗\mathcal M^*M∗ for (8) and R∗\mathcal R^*R∗ for (9). The moments

ρ1∗=E[∑i=1N∅Ci],ρ1=E[∑i=1N1C(1,i)],ρ2∗=E[∑i=1N∅Ci2],ρ2=E[∑i=1N1C(1,i)2]\rho_1^*=E\Big[\sum_{i=1}^{\mathcal N_\varnothing}\mathcal C_i\Big],\quad \rho_1=E\Big[\sum_{i=1}^{\mathcal N_1}\mathcal C_{(1,i)}\Big],\quad \rho_2^*=E\Big[\sum_{i=1}^{\mathcal N_\varnothing}\mathcal C_i^2\Big],\quad \rho_2=E\Big[\sum_{i=1}^{\mathcal N_1}\mathcal C_{(1,i)}^2\Big]ρ1∗​=E[i=1∑N∅​​Ci​],ρ1​=E[i=1∑N1​​C(1,i)​],ρ2∗​=E[i=1∑N∅​​Ci2​],ρ2​=E[i=1∑N1​​C(1,i)2​]

and the series pm=∑s≥0(s+ms)2(1−c−d)2s(c+d)2(m+1)p_m=\sum_{s\ge0}\binom{s+m}{s}^2(1-c-d)^{2s}(c+d)^{2(m+1)}pm​=∑s≥0​(ss+m​)2(1−c−d)2s(c+d)2(m+1) enter every formula below.

Formalization targets

Goal: Proposition 6

If c,d>0c,d>0c,d>0, c+d<1c+d<1c+d<1 and P(N∅>0)=P(N1>0)=1P(\mathcal N_\varnothing>0)=P(\mathcal N_1>0)=1P(N∅​>0)=P(N1​>0)=1, then

Var(M∗)≤Var(R∗).\mathrm{Var}(\mathcal M^*)\le\mathrm{Var}(\mathcal R^*).Var(M∗)≤Var(R∗).

The goal asserts the comparison only, not the closed forms, so it is the weakest statement the paper's computation supports.

Milestones

  1. Theorem 8 (pp. 32–33): closed forms for EEE and Var\mathrm{Var}Var of the limiting opinions of the root and of a neighbour, in terms of ρ1∗,ρ1,ρ2∗,ρ2\rho_1^*,\rho_1,\rho_2^*,\rho_2ρ1∗​,ρ1​,ρ2∗​,ρ2​, Yi=E[Wi∣Xi]\mathcal Y_{\mathbf i}=E[\mathcal W_{\mathbf i}\mid\mathcal X_{\mathbf i}]Yi​=E[Wi​∣Xi​], Vi=Var(Wi∣Xi)\mathcal V_{\mathbf i}=\mathrm{Var}(\mathcal W_{\mathbf i}\mid\mathcal X_{\mathbf i})Vi​=Var(Wi​∣Xi​) and a Geometric expectation of pTp_TpT​.
  2. Remark 10.2 (pp. 33–34): the specialisation to the Section 5.1 signals with N∅,N1>0\mathcal N_\varnothing,\mathcal N_1>0N∅​,N1​>0 a.s.; it expresses Var(M∗)\mathrm{Var}(\mathcal M^*)Var(M∗) through Var(Z)\mathrm{Var}(\mathcal Z)Var(Z) and E[Var(Z∣X)]E[\mathrm{Var}(\mathcal Z\mid\mathcal X)]E[Var(Z∣X)].
  3. (15) (p. 31): Var(R∗)=d2(c+d)2Var(Z∅)+ρ2∗d2(c+d)2((c+d)2−ρ2)Var(Z1)\mathrm{Var}(\mathcal R^*)=\frac{d^2}{(c+d)^2}\mathrm{Var}(\mathcal Z_\varnothing)+\frac{\rho_2^*d^2}{(c+d)^2((c+d)^2-\rho_2)}\mathrm{Var}(\mathcal Z_1)Var(R∗)=(c+d)2d2​Var(Z∅​)+(c+d)2((c+d)2−ρ2​)ρ2∗​d2​Var(Z1​).
  4. Coefficient bound (pp. 31–32): pm∈(0,1)p_m\in(0,1)pm​∈(0,1) and 11−ρ2E[(c+d)−2(T+2)pT+1]≤1(c+d)2((c+d)2−ρ2)\frac{1}{1-\rho_2}E[(c+d)^{-2(T+2)}p_{T+1}]\le\frac{1}{(c+d)^2((c+d)^2-\rho_2)}1−ρ2​1​E[(c+d)−2(T+2)pT+1​]≤(c+d)2((c+d)2−ρ2​)1​, TTT Geometric with success probability 1−ρ21-\rho_21−ρ2​.

Additional item (not a milestone): Lemma 9 (p. 34), the mean and variance of R(k+1)\mathcal R^{(k+1)}R(k+1) for the general recursion with general signals, started from 000, at the root and at non-root nodes; it is the finite-time step behind Theorem 8.

Significance

The proposition isolates the effect of memory on dispersion: with the same proportional influence of neighbours and media, adding inertia never increases the variance of the stationary opinion of a typical individual. In the paper's interpretation, slower updating produces less polarised stationary opinions, which matters when the model is used to compare network interventions or media exposure. Theorem 8 and Lemma 9 go further and give exact first and second moments of the stationary opinion on Galton–Watson limits with possibly stubborn (in-degree zero) vertices and arbitrary mark-dependent signals; such closed forms are rare for models of this kind.

The results are proved in the paper. None of them has a machine-checked proof. Formalizing them produces a Lean development of moment computations for linear recursions on marked Galton–Watson trees (conditioning on independent subtrees, laws of total variance along generations, and negative-binomial series), which is reusable for other smoothing-transform and branching-recursion problems. Two printed slips are corrected along the way (see Formalization scope).

Difficulty

The difficulty is not the comparison itself but the exact variance of M∗\mathcal M^*M∗. With memory, a signal emitted at time sss by a node at depth lll reaches the root with coefficient (sl)(1−c−d)s−l\binom{s}{l}(1-c-d)^{s-l}(ls​)(1−c−d)s−l times the product of weights along the path, so its contributions spread over all later times. The variance then involves the squared coefficients ∑s(sl)2(1−c−d)2(s−l)\sum_s\binom{s}{l}^2(1-c-d)^{2(s-l)}∑s​(ls​)2(1−c−d)2(s−l), which do not factor as the coefficients do in the no-memory case. The obvious route, comparing the two recursions pathwise or coupling them, fails: the two root opinions are not ordered, and only their variances are. The comparison emerges only after the conditional variances of the media signals are separated from the variance of their conditional means, and after the Geometric average of pT+1p_{T+1}pT+1​ is bounded.

Formalization scope

  • Model. The tree is encoded with Ulam–Harris labels List ℕ (0-based children; the paper's node 111 is [0]), and marks are read through measurable maps N\mathcal NN, C\mathcal CC, Q\mathcal QQ on a measurable space MMM. The media signals are ζ(Xi,Ui(k))\zeta(\mathcal X_{\mathbf i},U_{\mathbf i}^{(k)})ζ(Xi​,Ui(k)​) with i.i.d. uniforms independent of the marks. This quantile representation is equivalent in law to the paper's conditional i.i.d. assumption and is the paper's own device (p. 25). The general signals of Theorem 8 and Lemma 9 are ξ(Xi,Ui(k))\xi(\mathcal X_{\mathbf i},U_{\mathbf i}^{(k)})ξ(Xi​,Ui(k)​) with ∣ξ∣≤d+c−∑jC(i,j)|\xi|\le d+c-\sum_j\mathcal C_{(\mathbf i,j)}∣ξ∣≤d+c−∑j​C(i,j)​.
  • Limit tree, not graph sequence. The paper's statements assume "the assumptions of Theorem 2" with the Galton–Watson tree as local limit. Those assumptions only identify the tree's root opinion with the large-graph typical opinion; every claim here is about the tree. All statements are made on the tree under the Section 5 standing assumptions, which is a generalization.
  • Conventions. Limiting opinions are the absolutely summable series ∑s(ΔsW(s))(i)\sum_s(\Delta^s\mathcal W^{(s)})(\mathbf i)∑s​(ΔsW(s))(i); EEE is the Bochner integral, Var/Cov are Mathlib's variance/covariance, conditional moments are condExp/condVar given σ(Xi)\sigma(\mathcal X_{\mathbf i})σ(Xi​); the Geometric expectation is the explicit series ∑kρk(1−ρ)g(k)\sum_k\rho^k(1-\rho)g(k)∑k​ρk(1−ρ)g(k).
  • Corrections. Remark 10.2's printed mean lacks a factor ddd; the corrected mean is stated. Lemma 9's root variance is stated for k≥1k\ge1k≥1 (it fails at k=0k=0k=0) and its root mean under ρ1>0\rho_1>0ρ1​>0. Equation (15) is Proposition 4 applied to recursion (9) after rescaling.
  • No trivialization. Every random variable involved is bounded, so no variance, integral or series takes a junk value; the denominators c+d−ρ1c+d-\rho_1c+d−ρ1​, (c+d)2−ρ2(c+d)^2-\rho_2(c+d)2−ρ2​, 1−ρ21-\rho_21−ρ2​ are positive under the standing assumptions, and the goal's hypotheses are satisfied by, e.g., the path tree (N≡1\mathcal N\equiv1N≡1, C≡c\mathcal C\equiv cC≡c), where both variances are positive.
  • Infrastructure. Useful contributions include: summability and boundedness of the opinion series; independence of subtrees in Ulam–Harris encodings; the law of total variance (integral_condVar_add_variance_condExp in Mathlib); the identities ∑s(sl)xs−l=(1−x)−(l+1)\sum_s\binom{s}{l}x^{s-l}=(1-x)^{-(l+1)}∑s​(ls​)xs−l=(1−x)−(l+1) and the negative-binomial bound pm<1p_m<1pm​<1.

Selected references

  • N. Fraiman, T.-C. Lin, M. Olvera-Cravioto, Opinion dynamics on directed complex networks, arXiv:2209.00969v2, 2024; Mathematics of Operations Research, 2025. https://arxiv.org/abs/2209.00969
  • N. E. Friedkin, E. C. Johnsen, Social influence and opinions, Journal of Mathematical Sociology 15(3–4), 1990. https://doi.org/10.1080/0022250X.1990.9990069
  • M. H. DeGroot, Reaching a consensus, Journal of the American Statistical Association 69(345), 1974. https://doi.org/10.1080/01621459.1974.10480137
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CombinatoricsOperations ResearchOptimization+1·Captain: mikedeng1

Improved Guarantees for Offline Stochastic Matching via New Ordered Contention Resolution Schemes III: Bipartite, Unit-Patience Side: Rounding Then Probing by Weight Earns ≥ (1 − 1/e)·Σ w_e p_e y_eResearch Paper

Motivation

Stochastic matching with patience models kidney exchange, online dating and labour platforms: every edge of a graph is present only with some probability, the only way to learn whether it is present is to probe it, and a probed edge that turns out to be present must be added to the matching. Each vertex vvv also has a patience tvt_vtv​, a limit on how many of its edges may be probed. The goal is a probing strategy whose expected matched weight is a large fraction of what the best adaptive strategy obtains. Since the best strategy is hard to compute, algorithms are compared with the value of a linear program (LP (3) below), which upper-bounds every probing strategy (Bansal, Gupta, Li, Mestre, Nagarajan, Rudra, Algorithmica 2012).

Bansal et al. gave a 1/31/31/3-approximation for stochastic bipartite matching. Brubach, Grammel, Ma, MacRury and Srinivasan (Mathematics of Operations Research, 2025; arXiv:2106.06892v3) single out the case in which one side of the bipartition has unit patience, tu=1t_u=1tu​=1 for every u∈V1u\in V_1u∈V1​. This case contains "Problem A" of Hikima et al. (AAAI 2021), whose approximation ratio transfers to their integrated two-stage problem ISPCB; Hikima et al. obtained 1/31/31/3 from the bound of Bansal et al. For the special case in which one side has arbitrary patience and the other unlimited patience, Borodin and MacRury had already obtained the same (1−1/e)(1-1/e)(1−1/e) guarantee through an online problem.

Setting

Let G=(V1∪V2,E)G=(V_1\cup V_2,E)G=(V1​∪V2​,E) be a finite bipartite graph; δ(x)\delta(x)δ(x) denotes the set of edges at a vertex xxx. Each edge eee has a weight we≥0w_e\ge 0we​≥0 and an activation probability pe∈[0,1]p_e\in[0,1]pe​∈[0,1], independently across edges. Every u∈V1u\in V_1u∈V1​ has patience 111; every v∈V2v\in V_2v∈V2​ has a patience tv∈N∪{∞}t_v\in\mathbb N\cup\{\infty\}tv​∈N∪{∞}.

LP (3). A vector (ye)e∈E(y_e)_{e\in E}(ye​)e∈E​ is feasible when 0≤ye≤10\le y_e\le 10≤ye​≤1 and, for every vertex xxx,

∑e∈δ(x)yepe≤1,∑e∈δ(x)ye≤tx.\sum_{e\in\delta(x)}y_ep_e\le 1,\qquad \sum_{e\in\delta(x)}y_e\le t_x .e∈δ(x)∑​ye​pe​≤1,e∈δ(x)∑​ye​≤tx​.

Write ze=yepez_e=y_ep_eze​=ye​pe​ and OPT(v)=∑e∈δ(v)weze\mathsf{OPT}(v)=\sum_{e\in\delta(v)}w_ez_eOPT(v)=∑e∈δ(v)​we​ze​.

The algorithm. A dependent rounding (Gandhi, Khuller, Parthasarathy, Srinivasan, J. ACM 2006) turns yyy into a random set E^={e:Ye=1}\hat E=\{e:Y_e=1\}E^={e:Ye​=1} of rounded edges with Pr⁡[Ye=1]=ye\Pr[Y_e=1]=y_ePr[Ye​=1]=ye​, at most one rounded edge at each u∈V1u\in V_1u∈V1​, at most tvt_vtv​ at each v∈V2v\in V_2v∈V2​, and the negative correlation property (2): for v∈V2v\in V_2v∈V2​, S⊆δ(v)S\subseteq\delta(v)S⊆δ(v) and b∈{0,1}b\in\{0,1\}b∈{0,1},

Pr⁡[⋂e∈S(Ye=b)]≤∏e∈SPr⁡[Ye=b].\Pr\Big[\bigcap_{e\in S}(Y_e=b)\Big]\le\prod_{e\in S}\Pr[Y_e=b].Pr[e∈S⋂​(Ye​=b)]≤e∈S∏​Pr[Ye​=b].

In the rounded graph every v∈V2v\in V_2v∈V2​ is the centre of a star. Each vvv probes its rounded edges in decreasing order of weight and is matched to the first active one; W(v)W(v)W(v) is the weight of that edge (000 if none), and E[ALG]=E[∑v∈V2W(v)]\mathbb E[\mathsf{ALG}]=\mathbb E[\sum_{v\in V_2}W(v)]E[ALG]=E[∑v∈V2​​W(v)].

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 2 (p. 18)

For every feasible yyy, every rounding with the properties above and every decreasing-weight probing order,

E[ALG] ≥ (1−1e)∑v∈V2∑e∈δ(v)wepeye.\mathbb E[\mathsf{ALG}]\ \ge\ \Big(1-\frac1e\Big)\sum_{v\in V_2}\sum_{e\in\delta(v)}w_ep_ey_e .E[ALG] ≥ (1−e1​)v∈V2​∑​e∈δ(v)∑​we​pe​ye​.

Milestones

  1. The proof of Lemma 7 (p. 17) expresses W(v)W(v)W(v) as E[∑iwiYiPi∏j<i(1−YjPj)]\mathbb E[\sum_i w_iY_iP_i\prod_{j<i}(1-Y_jP_j)]E[∑i​wi​Yi​Pi​∏j<i​(1−Yj​Pj​)] and bounds E[∏j≤i(1−YjPj)]≤∏j≤i(1−yjpj)\mathbb E[\prod_{j\le i}(1-Y_jP_j)]\le\prod_{j\le i}(1-y_jp_j)E[∏j≤i​(1−Yj​Pj​)]≤∏j≤i​(1−yj​pj​) using (2).
  2. Lemma 7 (p. 16): E[W(v)]≥∑i=1kwizi∏j=1i−1(1−zj)\mathbb E[W(v)]\ge\sum_{i=1}^k w_iz_i\prod_{j=1}^{i-1}(1-z_j)E[W(v)]≥∑i=1k​wi​zi​∏j=1i−1​(1−zj​) for the edges of δ(v)\delta(v)δ(v) labelled by decreasing weight.
  3. Eq. (29) (p. 18): the bound F(i)≥1−e−F∗(i)≥(1−1/e)F∗(i)F(i)\ge1-e^{-F^*(i)}\ge(1-1/e)F^*(i)F(i)≥1−e−F∗(i)≥(1−1/e)F∗(i). The summation-by-parts identity (27) on the same page is included as a supporting lemma.
  4. Lemma 8 (p. 17): ∑iwizi∏j<i(1−zj)≥(1−1/e)∑iwizi\sum_i w_iz_i\prod_{j<i}(1-z_j)\ge(1-1/e)\sum_iw_iz_i∑i​wi​zi​∏j<i​(1−zj​)≥(1−1/e)∑i​wi​zi​ when zi∈[0,1]z_i\in[0,1]zi​∈[0,1], ∑izi≤1\sum_iz_i\le1∑i​zi​≤1 and w1≥⋯≥wk≥0w_1\ge\cdots\ge w_k\ge0w1​≥⋯≥wk​≥0.
  5. Lemma 9 (p. 18): E[W(v)]≥(1−1/e) OPT(v)\mathbb E[W(v)]\ge(1-1/e)\,\mathsf{OPT}(v)E[W(v)]≥(1−1/e)OPT(v) for every v∈V2v\in V_2v∈V2​.

The paper's proofs are in §4, pp. 16–19.

Significance

Combined with the LP upper bound (Lemma 1 of the paper, from Bansal et al.), Theorem 2 is a (1−1/e)(1-1/e)(1−1/e)-approximation for stochastic matching on bipartite graphs with a unit-patience side, improving and generalizing the 1/31/31/3 guarantee of Hikima et al. for Problem A and, through their reduction, for ISPCB. By the paper's account (§1.1, p. 4), the guarantee rests on a new ingredient, a (1−1/e)(1-1/e)(1−1/e)-balanced ordered contention resolution scheme for rank-1 matroids under negative correlation, in which the algorithm chooses the order: the per-star bound of Lemmas 7 and 9 holds for every rounding satisfying (2), not only for independent activations.

The result is proved in the paper; none of it has been machine-checked. This mission formalizes the per-star analysis and the theorem for an abstract rounding described by its properties, which is reusable for any algorithm that probes stars after a negatively correlated rounding.

Difficulty

If the rounded indicators YeY_eYe​ at a vertex were independent, Lemma 7 would be an equality and the remaining work would be the deterministic inequality of Lemma 8. They are not: the rounding is dependent, and Example 1 (p. 19) shows that this dependence can raise the probability that a particular edge is blocked to 1/21/21/2, so that no correlation-agnostic contention resolution scheme is better than 1/21/21/2-balanced. A per-edge guarantee, of the kind a contention resolution scheme that ignores correlation provides, is therefore unavailable: the bound of Theorem 2 holds only for the total weight collected at each vvv, and the negative correlation property (2) is one-sided, so it can be used only in the direction in which it holds.

Formalization scope

  • All randomness is finite. The rounding is a probability vector μ\muμ on subsets of EEE; the activeness pattern P:E→{0,1}P:E\to\{0,1\}P:E→{0,1} is independent with product weights. Every expectation is an explicit finite sum.
  • The rounding of Gandhi et al. is represented by its properties: μ≥0\mu\ge0μ≥0, ∑μ=1\sum\mu=1∑μ=1, the marginals Pr⁡[Ye=1]=ye\Pr[Y_e=1]=y_ePr[Ye​=1]=ye​, at most one rounded edge at each u∈V1u\in V_1u∈V1​, at most tvt_vtv​ at each v∈V2v\in V_2v∈V2​, and (2) on the rounded indicators for every v∈V2v\in V_2v∈V2​, S⊆δ(v)S\subseteq\delta(v)S⊆δ(v), b∈{0,1}b\in\{0,1\}b∈{0,1}. The goal holds for every such μ\muμ, so it covers the paper's rounding; formalizing the rounding procedure itself is a separate project.
  • W(v)W(v)W(v) is defined from the run (the first active edge in vvv's probe list), not by the formula of Lemma 7; the identity between the two is a milestone.
  • Standing assumptions, disclosed: we≥0w_e\ge0we​≥0 (with a negative weight the bound fails), pe∈[0,1]p_e\in[0,1]pe​∈[0,1], patience ∞\infty∞ is allowed on V2V_2V2​, and parallel edges are allowed. The goal is stated for every feasible yyy, a stronger statement than the paper's "optimal" yyy, since the proof never uses optimality. The phrase "yielding a (1−1/e)(1-1/e)(1−1/e)-approximation" is not formalized: it needs Lemma 1 of Bansal et al.
  • Ruled out: defining W(v)W(v)W(v) as ∑iwiYiPi∏j<i(1−YjPj)\sum_iw_iY_iP_i\prod_{j<i}(1-Y_jP_j)∑i​wi​Yi​Pi​∏j<i​(1−Yj​Pj​), as the best active edge regardless of the rounding, or stating the goal for one specific (independent) rounding or "for some rounding" would each be a different, weaker theorem.
  • Useful infrastructure: finite expectations over product measures, a negative-correlation inequality for products, Abel summation (Finset.sum_range_by_parts), and 1−x≤e−x1-x\le e^{-x}1−x≤e−x. Proofs of any milestone, and of the theorem from the milestones, are welcome.

Selected references

  • B. Brubach, N. Grammel, W. Ma, C. MacRury, A. Srinivasan, Improved Guarantees for Offline Stochastic Matching via New Ordered Contention Resolution Schemes, Mathematics of Operations Research, 2025. arXiv:2106.06892v3. https://arxiv.org/abs/2106.06892
  • R. Gandhi, S. Khuller, S. Parthasarathy, A. Srinivasan, Dependent rounding and its applications to approximation algorithms, Journal of the ACM 53(3):324–360, 2006. https://doi.org/10.1145/1147954.1147956
  • N. Bansal, A. Gupta, J. Li, J. Mestre, V. Nagarajan, A. Rudra, When LP is the cure for your matching woes: improved bounds for stochastic matchings, Algorithmica 63(4):733–762, 2012. https://doi.org/10.1007/s00453-011-9511-8
  • Y. Hikima, Y. Akagi, H. Kim, M. Kohjima, T. Kurashima, H. Toda, Integrated optimization of bipartite matching and its stochastic behavior: new formulation and approximation algorithm via min-cost flow optimization, The Thirty-Fifth AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence (AAAI 2021) (reference [28] of the paper; no link).
  • A. Borodin, C. MacRury, Online bipartite matching in the probe-commit model, Mathematical Programming, 2025, pp. 1–54 (reference [9] of the paper; no link).
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Experimental DesignOperations ResearchStatistics·Captain: mikedeng1

Pigeonhole Design: Balancing Sequential Experiments from an Online Matching Perspective 3: For p ≥ 2 Continuous Covariates, Expected Discrepancy O(T^(1−φ) + T^((p−1)φ)), with (log T)^(3/2) at p = 2Research Paper

Motivation

Online platforms run randomized experiments on subjects (users, sessions, orders) that arrive one at a time and must be assigned to a control or a treatment group on arrival, before later subjects are seen. The precision of a treatment-effect estimate depends on how similar the two groups are in their observed covariates. When the groups are badly balanced, the estimator's variance grows, and a large literature on covariate balancing (blocking, rerandomization, matched pairs) addresses this for offline experiments, where all covariates are known in advance.

J. Zhao and Z. Zhou (arXiv:2201.12936, Management Science, 2025) cast the online problem as an online matching problem. The cost of an assignment is the discrepancy, the weight of a minimum-cost perfect matching between the two groups, and they compare three designs against an oblivious adversary that fixes the covariate sequence in advance:

  • the clairvoyant matched-pair design;
  • the completely randomized design;
  • their online pigeonhole design.

For one continuous covariate the pigeonhole design attains O(T1/4(log⁡T)1/2)O(T^{1/4}(\log T)^{1/2})O(T1/4(logT)1/2) against Θ(T1/2)\Theta(T^{1/2})Θ(T1/2) for complete randomization. This mission concerns the multi-dimensional result, Theorem 9.

Setting

TTT subjects arrive in order; TTT is even. Subject ttt carries a covariate vector xtx_txt​ with qqq discrete coordinates, the iii-th in a finite set Si⊆[0,1]S_i\subseteq[0,1]Si​⊆[0,1] of size mim_imi​, and p≥2p\ge2p≥2 continuous coordinates in [0,1][0,1][0,1]. Distances are Euclidean in Rq+p\mathbb R^{q+p}Rq+p. An assignment puts each subject in control (AAA) or treatment (BBB).

The discrepancy of a split with ∣A∣=∣B∣|A|=|B|∣A∣=∣B∣ is

dA,B=min⁡σ:A→B bijective ∑t∈A∥xt−xσ(t)∥2,d_{A,B}=\min_{\sigma:A\to B\text{ bijective}}\ \sum_{t\in A}\lVert x_t-x_{\sigma(t)}\rVert_2 ,dA,B​=σ:A→B bijectivemin​ t∈A∑​∥xt​−xσ(t)​∥2​,

the value of the assignment problem (1) of the paper.

The completely randomized design picks AAA uniformly among the (TT/2)\binom{T}{T/2}(T/2T​) subsets of size T/2T/2T/2; ALGC(x)\mathrm{ALG}^C(x)ALGC(x) is the mean of dA,Bd_{A,B}dA,B​.

A pigeonhole design fixes a partition of the covariate space into pigeonholes. When subject ttt arrives:

  1. if one group already has T/2T/2T/2 subjects, ttt joins the other group;
  2. otherwise ttt joins the group that has fewer subjects in its own pigeonhole, and on a tie a fair coin decides.

Theorem 9 uses the pigeonholes

P(S)=S1×⋯×Sq×{[0,c1/pT−φ), …, [1−c1/pT−φ,1]}p,\mathcal P(\mathcal S)=S_1\times\cdots\times S_q\times\Big\{[0,c^{1/p}T^{-\varphi}),\ \dots,\ [1-c^{1/p}T^{-\varphi},1]\Big\}^p ,P(S)=S1​×⋯×Sq​×{[0,c1/pT−φ), …, [1−c1/pT−φ,1]}p,

uniform cells of edge c1/pT−φc^{1/p}T^{-\varphi}c1/pT−φ on each continuous axis, for parameters φ∈(0,1)\varphi\in(0,1)φ∈(0,1) and c>1c>1c>1. The expected discrepancy is the mean of dA,Bd_{A,B}dA,B​ over the design's coins.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 9 (p. 26)

There are C>0C>0C>0 and T0T_0T0​, depending only on p,q,S1,…,Sq,φ,cp,q,S_1,\dots,S_q,\varphi,cp,q,S1​,…,Sq​,φ,c, such that for every even T≥T0T\ge T_0T≥T0​ and every admissible arrival sequence,

E[dA,B]≤C(T1−φ+T(p−1)φ λp(T)),λ2(T)=(log⁡T)3/2,λp(T)=1 (p≥3).\mathbb E[d_{A,B}]\le C\Big(T^{1-\varphi}+T^{(p-1)\varphi}\,\lambda_p(T)\Big),\qquad \lambda_2(T)=(\log T)^{3/2},\quad \lambda_p(T)=1\ (p\ge3).E[dA,B​]≤C(T1−φ+T(p−1)φλp​(T)),λ2​(T)=(logT)3/2,λp​(T)=1 (p≥3).

Milestones

  1. Lemma EC.1: Hoeffding for a binomial, Pr⁡(∣H(n)−pn∣≤nlog⁡n)≥1−2/n2\Pr(|H(n)-pn|\le\sqrt{n\log n})\ge1-2/n^2Pr(∣H(n)−pn∣≤nlogn​)≥1−2/n2.
  2. Lemma 5, p=2p=2p=2: if T=m2T=m^2T=m2 and the subjects occupy each cell of the m×mm\times mm×m grid exactly once, then ALGC(x)=O(T1/2log⁡T)\mathrm{ALG}^C(x)=O(T^{1/2}\log T)ALGC(x)=O(T1/2logT).
  3. Lemma 5, p≥3p\ge3p≥3: on the full grid of T=mpT=m^pT=mp cells, ALGC(x)=O(T(p−1)/p)\mathrm{ALG}^C(x)=O(T^{(p-1)/p})ALGC(x)=O(T(p−1)/p).
  4. Balance: every run of a pigeonhole design has ∣A∣=∣B∣=T/2|A|=|B|=T/2∣A∣=∣B∣=T/2.
  5. Component 1: the subjects paired within their pigeonhole before the stopping time τ\tauτ contribute at most 12c1/pp T1−φ\tfrac12c^{1/p}\sqrt p\,T^{1-\varphi}21​c1/pp​T1−φ, on every run.
  6. Unmatched subjects: at most one unmatched subject per pigeonhole, Hτ0+Hτ1H^0_\tau+H^1_\tauHτ0​+Hτ1​ at most the number of pigeonholes, and ∣Hτ0−Hτ1∣=T−τ|H^0_\tau-H^1_\tau|=T-\tau∣Hτ0​−Hτ1​∣=T−τ.
  7. Component 2: the remaining subjects contribute O(T(p−1)φλp(T))O(T^{(p-1)\varphi}\lambda_p(T))O(T(p−1)φλp​(T)) in expectation.

Corollary 2 (the case φ=1/p\varphi=1/pφ=1/p) is an extra theorem after the goal.

Significance

At φ=1/p\varphi=1/pφ=1/p Theorem 9 gives O(T(p−1)/p)O(T^{(p-1)/p})O(T(p−1)/p) for p≥3p\ge3p≥3. This is the order Θ(T(p−1)/p)\Theta(T^{(p-1)/p})Θ(T(p−1)/p) of the matched-pair design (Theorem 7), which sees all covariates in advance. An online design that commits to each assignment on arrival therefore loses at most a constant factor in dimension p≥3p\ge3p≥3, and at most a (log⁡T)3/2(\log T)^{3/2}(logT)3/2 factor at p=2p=2p=2. For the completely randomized design no comparable upper bound is known for general sequences (p. 21). Lemma 5 is the paper's bound for complete randomization on the special family of full grids, and is of independent interest as a random-labelling matching estimate.

The results are proved on paper; none of them has a machine-checked proof, and the platform holds no item on them. A formalization would close the gaps of the printed argument:

  • Lemma 5's induction for p=2p=2p=2 ends at T(log⁡T)3/2\sqrt T(\log T)^{3/2}T​(logT)3/2 rather than the stated Tlog⁡T\sqrt T\log TT​logT.
  • Component 2 applies Lemma 5 to unmatched subjects, which occupy distinct cells but do not fill the grid.
  • The case q≥1q\ge1q≥1 is argued per discrete support, although the balancing rule acts across supports.

Every statement in the mission is believed true.

Difficulty

The matched part (Component 1) is deterministic: paired subjects share a pigeonhole of diameter O(T−φ)O(T^{-\varphi})O(T−φ). The difficulty lies in the subjects left over: the unmatched ones and the subjects after τ\tauτ. Their labels come from coins, but which subjects end up unmatched, and when τ\tauτ occurs, depend on the same coins. So the leftover set is not a fixed set with independent fair labels, and the conditional binomial law used on p. ec22 does not hold literally.

A second obstacle is the random-matching estimate itself. Bounding the expected optimal matching between randomly labelled points of a grid at the rates T1/2log⁡TT^{1/2}\log TT1/2logT (p=2p=2p=2) and T(p−1)/pT^{(p-1)/p}T(p−1)/p (p≥3p\ge3p≥3) is a multi-scale problem of Ajtai–Komlós–Tusnády type. A single-scale count of imbalances per cell gives only T1/2T^{1/2}T1/2 times a power of TTT that is too large.

Formalization scope

  • Subjects are indexed 0,…,T−10,\dots,T-10,…,T−1; an assignment is a map to Bool (false = control). The covariate space is EuclideanSpace ℝ (Fin q ⊕ Fin p). Admissible sequences have discrete coordinates in SiS_iSi​ and continuous ones in [0,1][0,1][0,1], with Si⊆[0,1]S_i\subseteq[0,1]Si​⊆[0,1] (the paper's normalisation).
  • Discrepancy: an infimum over bijections between the groups. An unbalanced split has the junk value 000. The designs, the matched set and its complement are balanced on every run, so the junk is never reached.
  • Cells: the printed edge c1/pT−φc^{1/p}T^{-\varphi}c1/pT−φ gives a partition only when c−1/pTφc^{-1/p}T^{\varphi}c−1/pTφ is an integer. The formalization uses m=⌈c−1/pTφ⌉m=\lceil c^{-1/p}T^{\varphi}\rceilm=⌈c−1/pTφ⌉ cells per axis of edge 1/m≤c1/pT−φ1/m\le c^{1/p}T^{-\varphi}1/m≤c1/pT−φ, with the last cell closed. A pigeonhole is keyed by the exact discrete values and the cell index on each axis. The partition is the printed one, not a quantified family.
  • Randomness: the pigeonhole design uses one coin per subject, consulted only on a tie. Its expected discrepancy is the average over all 2T2^T2T coin vectors, which is exactly the paper's law. The completely randomized design averages over all (TT/2)\binom{T}{T/2}(T/2T​) control sets.
  • Asymptotics: O(f(T))O(f(T))O(f(T)) means ∃C>0,∃T0,∀T≥T0\exists C>0,\exists T_0,\forall T\ge T_0∃C>0,∃T0​,∀T≥T0​ even, ∀x\forall x∀x admissible. CCC and T0T_0T0​ are chosen before TTT and xxx and depend only on the fixed parameters. log⁡\loglog is the natural logarithm.
  • Lemma 5's family X\mathcal XX: T=mpT=m^pT=mp subjects in [0,1]p[0,1]^p[0,1]p, one per cell, stated as injectivity of the cell map.
  • Stopping objects: τ\tauτ is the first nnn at which a group holds T/2T/2T/2 subjects. Within a pigeonhole the subjects before τ\tauτ are paired in arrival order, and the last one is unmatched when their number is odd.
  • Corrections to the page: the second cell printed as [T−φ,2c1/pT−φ)[T^{-\varphi},2c^{1/p}T^{-\varphi})[T−φ,2c1/pT−φ) on p. ec21 is read as [c1/pT−φ,2c1/pT−φ)[c^{1/p}T^{-\varphi},2c^{1/p}T^{-\varphi})[c1/pT−φ,2c1/pT−φ). The family's xt′∉Xx'_t\notin\mathbb Xxt′​∈/X is read as xt′∉Xx_{t'}\notin\mathbb Xxt′​∈/X. The bound H≤1cTpφH\le\frac1cT^{p\varphi}H≤c1​Tpφ becomes H≤(∏imi) mpH\le(\prod_i m_i)\,m^pH≤(∏i​mi​)mp under the ceiling and the discrete supports.

The following formalizations would trivialize the mission and are ruled out:

  • a bound on the discrepancy of one run, or of the best run, instead of the average over all coin vectors;
  • constants that depend on TTT or xxx;
  • an unbalanced design that exploits the junk value 000;
  • an arbitrary partition in place of the printed grid.

A complete development needs a binomial Hoeffding bound and an exact analysis of the design's recursion (balance, alternation within a pigeonhole before τ\tauτ). It also needs a multi-scale bound on random bichromatic matchings of grid points. That bound is reusable for Lemma 5 and for matching estimators generally. Contributions on any milestone are welcome, as are proofs of Lemma 5 for arbitrary subsets of grid points, which is what Component 2 needs.

Selected references

  • J. Zhao and Z. Zhou, Pigeonhole Design: Balancing Sequential Experiments from an Online Matching Perspective, Management Science, 2025; arXiv:2201.12936v6, 2024. https://arxiv.org/abs/2201.12936
  • M. Ajtai, J. Komlós and G. Tusnády, On optimal matchings, Combinatorica 4 (1984) 259–264. https://doi.org/10.1007/BF02579135
  • N. Fournier and A. Guillin, On the rate of convergence in Wasserstein distance of the empirical measure, Probability Theory and Related Fields 162 (2015) 707–738. https://doi.org/10.1007/s00440-014-0583-7
  • W. Hoeffding, Probability inequalities for sums of bounded random variables, Journal of the American Statistical Association 58 (1963) 13–30. https://doi.org/10.1080/01621459.1963.10500830
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