Supply Chain Coordination with Contracts II: With Price-Dependent Demand the Price-Contingent Buy-Back Gives the Retailer λΠ(q, p), as Revenue Sharing Does, and Coordinates Price and QuantityTextbook
Motivation
A retailer who controls both inventory and price can respond to a supply contract in two ways. A contract that induces the right order quantity at a fixed price may change the retailer's incentive to raise or lower that price. For a one-season supply chain, Cachon's chapter compares familiar contracts under price-dependent demand and identifies a price-contingent buy-back, also called a price-discount contract, that aligns both decisions. The mission concerns §6.3 of the author's January 2003 third draft, on printed pages 33–38. Those page and equation numbers belong to the draft and may differ from the typeset chapter.
Setting
One risk-neutral supplier and one risk-neutral retailer have full information before a single selling season. The retailer chooses a nonnegative stocking quantity and a retail price from an admissible price set ; the price stays fixed during the season. Demand has a probability law that depends on . Write for its distribution function, for expected sales, and for mean demand. Demand is nonnegative, has a finite mean and, in the chapter's regular setting, its distribution function increases with demand level and has a positive price derivative at positive demand levels. Higher prices thus lower demand in the stochastic order used by the chapter. The price set is nonempty and open so an admissible price optimum has an interior first-order condition.
The supplier's unit cost is , the retailer's unit procurement cost is , and is total unit cost. Their goodwill penalties for unmet demand are and , with . An unsold unit has salvage value at the retailer. The integrated channel's expected profit is
A buy-back contract charges a wholesale price for each ordered unit and pays the retailer for each unsold unit. A revenue-sharing contract charges a wholesale price and gives the retailer a fraction of sales and salvage revenue. In this section the supplier offers the terms and the retailer chooses . The profit formulas use the chapter's convention that a positive transfer goes from retailer to supplier.
Formalization targets
The goal is the price-contingent buy-back on p. 35, with :
In the chapter's zero-goodwill case, , every feasible then gives the retailer and the supplier . The same retailer profit is obtained from revenue sharing with and . Thus every existing maximizer of the integrated profit maximizes each firm's profit under the contingent buy-back. At the retailer is indifferent; at the supplier is indifferent.
The milestones follow the chapter's printed claims in attack order:
- the integrated price condition (14), p. 34;
- the quantity-flexibility condition (15), p. 34: price coordination forces or ;
- the fixed buy-back condition (16), p. 35: price coordination forces and then ;
- the linear price-contingent terms derived from (5)–(6), p. 35;
- the p. 36 profit split , , valid for all goodwill penalties as an identity;
- the zero-goodwill revenue-sharing price claim following (17), p. 36 (the milestone quotes its restatement in §6.3.2, p. 38);
- the price-contingent revenue-sharing parameters, p. 37;
- the quantity discount , pp. 37–38: with it does not distort the price, and given it makes optimal for both firms.
Significance
The result identifies a contract schedule under which the same quantity-price pair is best for the integrated channel and for the two firms' reported profit functions. It also explains the relation between a buy-back whose terms vary with the chosen price and a revenue-sharing arrangement. In the zero-goodwill setting, both allocate every realized choice's expected channel profit in fixed shares. The general-goodwill identity shows the additional mean-demand terms that matter when the retailer controls price.
The source presents these results analytically; this mission asks for Lean proofs of the stated price and profit relationships. A published Prove2Me definition already supplies expected sales and mean demand for a single demand law, and the model here applies those functions to each price's law. The earlier open theorem RevShareCoord.Single.price_quantity_coordination (from Cachon and Lariviere's revenue-sharing paper) treats deterministic revenue and a simpler cost convention. It is an overlap in theme, but its statement does not include price-indexed demand, salvage value, retailer cost or the contingent buy-back terms, so it is not posed again here. The new model can support further price-dependent contract comparisons in the chapter.
Difficulty
The obstacle is that matching the retailer's quantity incentive at a fixed price can change the retailer's price incentive. The buy-back rate required by the fixed-price coordination equations depends on ; a fixed buy-back contract therefore does not generally align both choices. Revenue sharing with goodwill penalties has a similar price dependence. The integrated profit need not be concave or unimodal in , so a price first-order condition by itself does not establish coordination. The chapter assumes a finite integrated optimum exists and treats the price condition as necessary, not sufficient.
Formalization scope
Lean represents price-dependent demand as a family of probability measures on , one for each price in . Each admissible law is supported on nonnegative demand, has no atom at zero and has an integrable identity function, so is a genuine finite expectation. Sales are defined by , using the published SupplyChainTheory_contracts definition; they are not defined by the equivalent CDF integral. The admissible decisions are exactly and . Unit costs and goodwill penalties are nonnegative, each admissible price exceeds , and , as in the model of §6.2. The chapter's standing risk-neutrality and full-information conventions appear in the use of expected profit with the same demand laws available to both firms.
There is a material qualification. With price-dependent demand, may change with . The printed first-order condition (14) and the p. 36 inference from to a joint optimum omit that effect when goodwill penalties are positive. Price first-order and optimality statements here therefore use , a case explicitly discussed in the chapter; general-goodwill claims are limited to algebraic identities. The printed p. 36 equality of price derivatives under revenue sharing also misses its factor , which the formal statement restores. The contingent buy-back terms are defined by the chapter's linear formulas, not by a property that hard-codes coordination. The algebraic statement permits parameter values that may violate economic buy-back bounds such as ; those bounds need separate checks when selecting a contract.
Two first-order statements, (15) and (16), compare price derivatives; they take the derivative of expected sales in price as a hypothesis, and (15) also takes differentiation under the integral sign of as a disclosed regularity hypothesis. For the quantity discount, the statement claims what the page shows, undistorted prices for each and optimality of given , not joint optimality of for the retailer. The page's claim that revenue sharing with goodwill coordinates only with is not stated, for the mean-demand reason above.
A trivializing formalization is ruled out: no contract term is defined by the profit identity it should satisfy, the demand family cannot be replaced by a single law, and the optimal pair is a hypothesis about the integrated profit, not a chosen witness.
Reusable contributions include the price-indexed demand family, the expected-profit model with five contract types, and the price-maximizer statements. Proofs of the first-order milestones need Fermat's interior-extremum theorem on the open price set and, for (15), positivity of an interval integral; the identities need the expectation algebra of and , including .
Selected references
- Gérard P. Cachon, “Supply Chain Coordination with Contracts,” in Handbooks in Operations Research and Management Science, vol. 11, Supply Chain Management, North-Holland, 2003. DOI 10.1016/S0927-0507(03)11006-7. Formalization source: author's third draft, January 2003, §6.3, pp. 33–38.
- Fernando Bernstein and Awi Federgruen, “Decentralized supply chains with competing retailers under demand uncertainty,” Management Science 51(1), 2005 (the price-discount sharing contract; cited in the draft as a 2000 working paper). DOI 10.1287/mnsc.1040.0230
- Nicholas C. Petruzzi and Maqbool Dada, “Pricing and the newsvendor problem: a review with extensions,” Operations Research 47(2), 1999, 183–194. DOI 10.1287/opre.47.2.183