Providing Data Samples for Free: Free Samples Strictly Beat Selling in One Round When the Seller-Side Drift of the Buyer's Bayes Risk Is Initially PositiveResearch Paper
Why give data away
Firms that own data increasingly sell it as a product: market research panels, consulting reports, datasets for training demand models. A common commercial practice is to hand out a free sample of the data before quoting a price for the rest. Under standard Bayesian reasoning this practice looks self-defeating. Every free data point reduces the buyer's uncertainty, which reduces what the remaining data are worth to her. This is a holdup problem: once information is revealed, it cannot be sold.
Drakopoulos and Makhdoumi (Providing Data Samples for Free, SSRN 3611003; Management Science, 2022, doi:10.1287/mnsc.2022.4534) identify when free samples nevertheless raise the seller's revenue. The mechanism is disagreement about the prior. When the seller believes the buyer's initial estimate is biased, she expects the free data to move the buyer's belief toward states in which the buyer values the remaining data more. The paper calls this the persuasion benefit, and it can outweigh the holdup cost. This mission formalizes the paper's main theorem, Theorem 1(a), together with the lemmas its proof rests on.
The model
An unknown real parameter determines a buyer's payoff from an action . The Buyer holds the prior with . The Seller believes is a biased estimate, with bias distributed as and . Her prior is with , and it is taken to be the correct one.
Data arrive continuously. The first samples are equivalent to the signal
where is a standard Brownian motion independent of and is the noise variance. Both parties agree on this law of the data given (they are concordant) and disagree only on the prior. The information after samples is .
The Buyer's posterior after samples is , with and . The Seller's posterior is given by the same formulas from her own prior. The Seller's estimate of the Buyer's error is , and .
With belief , the Buyer's best expected utility is . Her Bayes risk
is the value to her of learning exactly. Its second argument is a variance, and , and denote its partial derivatives.
A free-sample policy gives data for free up to a stopping amount , a stopping time of , and then sells the remainder. Once the free samples stop, the best price for the remainder is (Lemma 3). The Seller's expected revenue is therefore , computed under her prior. Selling in one round is , with revenue .
Formalization targets
Goal: Theorem 1(a)
If the Seller-side drift of the Bayes risk is positive at the start,
then some free-sample policy satisfies
The goal has no constants. It asserts only that the optimal free-sample policy strictly beats every one-round policy.
Milestones
- Proposition 1 (p. 13): the posteriors given the whole data path are the Gaussians above.
- Lemma 1(i)–(iii) (p. 14): the posterior variance decreases at rate . The Buyer's estimate has drift for the Buyer and for the Seller. Its squared increment is .
- Lemma 3 (p. 16): the Buyer pays at most for any partial release, and exactly for full release.
- Lemma 4(b) (p. 17): from the Seller's perspective, has initial slope .
- Lemma 4(a) (p. 17): from the Buyer's perspective, the same with replaced by .
- Theorem 1(b) (p. 18): if the Seller-side drift is non-positive for every posterior mean, misspecification, and positive variance, then no free-sample policy beats selling in one round.
Significance
Theorem 1 splits the drift of the Bayes risk from the Seller's viewpoint into a holdup cost, , which is the drift the Buyer herself expects, and a persuasion benefit, . Part (a) turns the sign of this drift at the start into a revenue comparison. In the paper's pricing example (unknown demand elasticity, ), condition (4) reduces to : a sufficiently biased Buyer should be given free data. In the estimation example () part (b) applies and one-round selling is optimal. The theorem is the basis of the paper's later results on myopic stopping rules and on the comparison with dynamic pricing.
The theorem is proved in the paper, in -notation and through Itô's lemma and the optional stopping theorem. It has not been machine-checked. A formal proof requires Gaussian conjugacy with respect to a Brownian filtration, moment computations for the posterior mean, an Itô-type expansion for a function of the belief, and control of the integrability of the stopped Bayes risk. Each of these is reusable for other continuous-time Bayesian learning models.
Difficulty
The informal argument reads off Lemma 4 that is a Seller-submartingale near the start, and then stops it. The -identities of Lemmas 1 and 4 are statements about conditional expectations at every time. Made rigorous, they require integrability of the Bayes risk and its derivatives along the belief path, and an exchange of differentiation and expectation. Neither is given by the paper's hypotheses on . The Gaussian conjugacy itself must also be established for conditioning on the whole path , not only on .
Formalization scope
All objects are defined in one file, FreeSamples.Revenue.Setting, on top of Mathlib's gaussianReal, IsBrownianReal, Filtration.natural and IsStoppingTime. Committed conventions:
- Variances are real numbers, and is
gaussianReal m v.toNNReal. and take the variance, not the standard deviation, as their second argument. - A model with prior is a probability space carrying measurable and a Brownian motion independent of . The Seller's and the Buyer's measures are the two instances, which makes concordance hold by construction. Every revenue is an expectation under the Seller's measure.
- The filtration is the natural filtration of without augmentation. Free-sample policies are bounded stopping times. The paper requires only measurability of , but its own construction is bounded by a large constant .
- Standing hypotheses on , all disclosed pins: the maxima in and exist and are attained, with all expectations integrable (HasMax); Assumption 1 is read as ; and and its partial derivatives grow at most like for variances in .
- The -statements of Lemmas 1 and 4 are posed as one-sided derivatives at time of plain expectations, for arbitrary parameters. The time- versions follow by restarting from the posterior state and are not posed.
- Lemma 4's printed factor is formalized as , as Lemma 1 gives. Condition (5) of Theorem 1(b) keeps the page's universal quantifiers over the posterior mean, misspecification and positive variance. Quantification over all forces ; the paper's application on p. 33 checks only the realized , so it does not establish the printed condition for that example.
Trivializing formalizations are ruled out. Every revenue in a conclusion is asserted integrable, so a junk-zero integral cannot satisfy it. The maxima in and are assumed attained, so no real supremum takes its junk value. The goal is stated for the Gaussian–Brownian model and its posterior map, not for an arbitrary process with a postulated drift. Its conclusion exhibits a policy instead of comparing a supremum over policies.
Not posed: the stochastic differential equation of Lemma 1, Lemma 2, Proposition 2 (its free boundary is part of the hypothesis), Corollaries 1–3, and Appendix B. Contributions are welcome on the conjugacy computation (Proposition 1), on the Gaussian moment estimates (Lemma 1), and on a reusable Itô-type expansion of for functions of exponential growth.
Selected references
- K. Drakopoulos and A. Makhdoumi, Providing Data Samples for Free, SSRN 3611003; Management Science, 2022. https://ssrn.com/abstract=3611003, https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2022.4534
- S. Morris, Trade with Heterogeneous Prior Beliefs and Asymmetric Information, Econometrica 62(6), 1994. https://doi.org/10.2307/2951755
- R. J. Aumann, Agreeing to Disagree, Annals of Statistics 4(6), 1976. https://doi.org/10.1214/aos/1176343654
- J. M. Steele, Stochastic Calculus and Financial Applications, Springer, 2001. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4684-9305-4