A Supply Chain Theory of Factoring and Reverse Factoring 2: The Retailer's Optimal Reverse Factoring Payment ExtensionResearch Paper
Motivation
Large retailers pay their suppliers weeks or months after delivery, and small suppliers fill the gap with short-term finance. In factoring the supplier sells the receivable to a factor for immediate cash; in reverse factoring the retailer arranges the program with a bank, which pays the supplier early at a rate priced on the retailer's credit rating. Retailers commonly attach a condition: the supplier must accept a longer payment term. Wuttke et al. (Journal of Operations Management, 2019) report that buyers extended payment terms by 54 days on average on adopting reverse factoring and that many suppliers delayed adoption; Corsten (2010) reports suppliers resisting a program because of the demanded payment delay (both as cited by Kouvelis and Xu, pp. 6082–6083). How long an extension a retailer can demand, and what it gains by demanding it, is therefore a practical design question.
Kouvelis and Xu (Management Science 67(10), 2021) answer it inside a Stackelberg supply chain model with credit and liquidity risk. This mission formalizes their answer, Proposition 6 of §5.3: the retailer's optimal payment extension when she keeps the existing wholesale price.
Setting
Demand has density , distribution function and ; on with the upper end of the support, is continuous there, the mean is finite, and the failure rate is strictly increasing. Write for expected sales and .
A retailer (the leader) sets a wholesale price , and a capital-constrained supplier (the follower) chooses a production quantity ; the retail price exceeds the unit cost . Each firm has a credit rating , a default probability with strictly decreasing, and an interest premium with decreasing. The lead time is , the payment term , and are the liquidity risks.
Under a post-shipment scheme with coefficient the supplier earns
with (recourse factoring), (non-recourse factoring) and (reverse factoring with payment extension ). The retailer earns under factoring and
under reverse factoring, where is the supplier's best response. Its first-order condition is (Eq. (12)).
Before reverse factoring, the supplier uses the better of the two factoring schemes. By Proposition 4 this is non-recourse, with equilibrium , when , and recourse, with , when . The retailer keeps the existing wholesale price and solves problem (13): maximize over , subject to the supplier's acceptance (his reverse factoring profit is at least his existing one). is the rating at which , and .
Formalization targets
Goal: Proposition 6
(i) If , reverse factoring is dominated by recourse factoring. (ii) If , reverse factoring should be offered with
where with in the non-recourse case, and with in the recourse case.
Milestones, in attack order
- Eq. (12): the supplier's best response under reverse factoring.
- Proposition 4: which factoring scheme is in force before reverse factoring.
- §5.3, : acceptance holds exactly on .
- §5.3, : the retailer's unconstrained profit is unimodal around .
A follow-on item states Corollary 3(ii): the retailer's profit strictly increases, and the supplier's profit is unchanged when .
Significance
Proposition 6 is the paper's prescription for program design. It says which suppliers should be offered reverse factoring: every supplier below the indifference rating and above the non-recourse feasibility threshold. It also gives the extension in closed form, the unconstrained optimum clipped to the supplier's acceptance limit. Two consequences are drawn in the paper: non-recourse factoring is dominated once the extension is optimized, and reverse factoring may leave the supplier exactly as well off as before, so it is not necessarily a win-win (Corollary 3).
The proofs are in the paper's Online Appendix B and have not been machine-checked. A formal proof here produces a checked derivation of the projection formula from the model's primitives. It covers the strict-IFR analysis of the follower's response, the reduction of the acceptance constraint to an interval, and the unimodality of the retailer's objective. The same analysis of the pull game with an effective unit cost recurs across the supply chain finance literature.
Difficulty
The retailer's objective depends on through two opposing channels: the liquidity factor increases, while expected sales decrease because the supplier's effective cost rises. Neither factor is concave in , and the objective need not be concave. The natural move, to set the derivative to zero and call the root a maximum, proves nothing without a sign analysis. That analysis needs the monotonicity of along the implicitly defined response , which is where strict IFR enters. The acceptance constraint compares the supplier's profits in two different games (reverse factoring at against the existing equilibrium). Reducing it to requires the supplier's best-response profit as an explicit increasing function of his quantity. Identifying the existing equilibrium requires Proposition 4, whose "adopted" compares equilibrium profits of two Stackelberg games.
Formalization scope
The model is a single Lean structure SupplyChainFactoring.Extension.Model. Demand is a probability measure on with a density , and is an extended real. "Continuous p.d.f. with in " is read as continuity on , with outside the support. Credit functions are real functions constrained on . The finance derivations behind the profit functions (Eqs. (1), (5), (6), Lemma 1) are not formalized: the profit functions are the model.
Readings of informal words, each also recorded in the item's Formalization Note:
- Best response: a maximizer of the supplier's profit over ; equilibrium: a best response pair from which no nonnegative wholesale price with a best response gives the retailer more. Neither is defined through first-order conditions.
- Feasible: some with a best response gives the retailer positive profit; adopted (Proposition 4): feasible, with equilibrium supplier profit at least (non-recourse) or strictly above (recourse) the other feasible scheme's.
- Thresholds "the unique value of that satisfies …" are hypotheses in exactly that form; and are cross-multiplied because can be .
- In (13) is fixed at (§5.3's first sentence, footnote 23). is the supplier's best-response profit under reverse factoring at , and is his profit in the existing equilibrium.
- Dominated (Proposition 6(i)): at every and every , the supplier's reverse factoring best-response profit is at most his recourse one. Should be offered (6(ii)): solves (13) and the retailer's profit is at least her existing equilibrium profit.
- is a hypothesis: it and some solve the paper's two equations (the paper does not argue existence). Its optimality "without the nonnegativity constraint" is stated as unimodality of on the set of real with .
- Always increases (Corollary 3(ii)) is strict; may remain unchanged when is read as "is unchanged whenever ".
Three misprints of the paper are corrected: "if " is read as "if "; "the retailer's maximization problem in (16)" refers to (13); the middle line of the display on p. 6082 carries a stray factor , and the last line is used.
The hypotheses on cannot be met when , and the goal then says nothing about the case, as in the paper. The existing equilibrium, and are never free parameters: is the paper's explicit formula, and the reduction of acceptance to is a milestone to be proved, not an assumption. Every logarithm is applied to a quantity the hypotheses force positive. A formalization that assumed acceptance equivalent to or assumed unimodality would be trivial and is excluded.
The pull game with an effective cost has the same structure as Cachon's pull contract without salvage value (platform items CachonPushPull.*), but those items assume IGFR demand with a salvage value, so they are not reused. Reusable infrastructure welcome: the strict-IFR lemmas (, and increasing) and the explicit best response of a newsvendor-type follower.
Selected references
- P. Kouvelis, F. Xu, A Supply Chain Theory of Factoring and Reverse Factoring, Management Science 67(10):6071–6088, 2021. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2020.3788
- G. P. Cachon, The Allocation of Inventory Risk in a Supply Chain: Push, Pull, and Advance-Purchase Discount Contracts, Management Science 50(2):222–238, 2004. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.1030.0190
- D. A. Wuttke, E. S. Rosenzweig, H. S. Heese, An Empirical Analysis of Supply Chain Finance Adoption, Journal of Operations Management 65(3):242–261, 2019. https://doi.org/10.1002/joom.1023