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🏆Completed
CombinatoricsOperations ResearchOptimization·Captain: mikedeng1

One-Processor Scheduling with Symmetric Earliness and Tardiness Penalties 3: For Maximum Discrepancy, Some Optimum Schedule Is in Standard Form and Has the Release Time PropertyResearch Paper

Motivation

In just-in-time scheduling each job has a preferred time, and finishing it early is as undesirable as finishing it late. Garey, Tarjan and Wilfong (Math. Oper. Res. 13 (1988), 330–348) study the one-processor version in which task TiT_iTi​ has a length li≥0l_i \ge 0li​≥0 and a preferred starting time ai≥0a_i \ge 0ai​≥0, and the discrepancy of a task started at time sis_isi​ is ∣si−ai∣|s_i - a_i|∣si​−ai​∣. The penalty is symmetric: earliness and tardiness cost the same. The paper shows that minimizing the total discrepancy is NP-complete, gives an O(Nlog⁡N)O(N \log N)O(NlogN) algorithm for a fixed task order, and, in §3, gives an efficient algorithm for minimizing the maximum discrepancy max⁡i∣si−ai∣\max_i |s_i - a_i|maxi​∣si​−ai​∣: a linear-time test for a given bound γ\gammaγ after an O(Nlog⁡N)O(N \log N)O(NlogN) sort, combined with a search over γ\gammaγ.

This mission formalizes the structural core of §3: the normal-form theorems (Theorem 4, Corollaries 1 and 2) on which the paper's algorithm for maximum discrepancy is built. The two companion missions of the series cover the NP-completeness result (THEOREM 1) and the fixed-order algorithm (THEOREMS 2 and 3).

Setting

Fix a bound γ≥0\gamma \ge 0γ≥0. A schedule has maximum discrepancy at most γ\gammaγ exactly when every task starts no earlier than its release time ri=max⁡{0,ai−γ}r_i = \max\{0, a_i - \gamma\}ri​=max{0,ai​−γ} and finishes no later than its deadline di=ai+li+γd_i = a_i + l_i + \gammadi​=ai​+li​+γ (p. 342). These release times and deadlines are in special form: with α=2γ\alpha = 2\gammaα=2γ, for every task

di−ri=li+αor(ri=0 and di<li+α).d_i - r_i = l_i + \alpha \quad\text{or}\quad \big(r_i = 0 \text{ and } d_i < l_i + \alpha\big).di​−ri​=li​+αor(ri​=0 and di​<li​+α).

From here on the data are arbitrary reals li≥0l_i \ge 0li​≥0, ri≥0r_i \ge 0ri​≥0, did_idi​ in special form for some α≥0\alpha \ge 0α≥0.

A schedule is an execution order σ\sigmaσ (σ(p)\sigma(p)σ(p) is the task in position ppp) with starting times sis_isi​, such that a task finishes no later than any later-positioned task starts: sσ(p)+lσ(p)≤sσ(q)s_{\sigma(p)} + l_{\sigma(p)} \le s_{\sigma(q)}sσ(p)​+lσ(p)​≤sσ(q)​ for p<qp < qp<q. It is feasible if ri≤sir_i \le s_iri​≤si​ and si+li≤dis_i + l_i \le d_isi​+li​≤di​ for every iii. Its makespan is max⁡i(si+li)\max_i (s_i + l_i)maxi​(si​+li​), and it is optimum if it is feasible and no feasible schedule has a smaller makespan.

Let TNT_NTN​ be a task of largest deadline. A schedule has the release time property if every task executed after TNT_NTN​ has release time strictly later than the starting time of TNT_NTN​. When the tasks are indexed with d1≤⋯≤dNd_1 \le \dots \le d_Nd1​≤⋯≤dN​, a schedule is in standard form with split index jjj, 0≤j≤N−10 \le j \le N-10≤j≤N−1, if it begins with an optimum schedule of T1,…,TjT_1, \dots, T_jT1​,…,Tj​, followed by TNT_NTN​ started at the maximum of rNr_NrN​ and the completion time of that first part, followed by Tj+1,…,TN−1T_{j+1}, \dots, T_{N-1}Tj+1​,…,TN−1​ in this order without idle time.

Formalization targets

Goal: Corollary 2 (p. 344)

∃ a feasible schedule  ⟹  ∃ an optimum schedule that is in standard form and has the release time property.\exists\ \text{a feasible schedule} \;\Longrightarrow\; \exists\ \text{an optimum schedule that is in standard form and has the release time property.}∃ a feasible schedule⟹∃ an optimum schedule that is in standard form and has the release time property.

Milestones

  1. Theorem 4 (pp. 342–343): if a feasible schedule exists, some optimum schedule has the release time property with respect to any task of largest deadline.
  2. The deadline split (proof of Corollary 1, p. 344): in every feasible schedule with the release time property, a task Ti≠TNT_i \neq T_NTi​=TN​ precedes TNT_NTN​ if and only if di≤sN+αd_i \le s_N + \alphadi​≤sN​+α.
  3. Corollary 1 (p. 344): some optimum schedule executes before TNT_NTN​ exactly the tasks of deadline at most β\betaβ, for some β≥0\beta \ge 0β≥0.
  4. Release before finish (p. 344): every task executed after TNT_NTN​ has ri≤sN+lNr_i \le s_N + l_Nri​≤sN​+lN​.
  5. Normalization after TNT_NTN​ (p. 344): an optimum schedule with the release time property can be changed, without moving TNT_NTN​ later and without touching the tasks before it, so that there is no idle time from the start of TNT_NTN​ on and the later tasks run in deadline order.

Two companion items state the reformulation of the maximum-discrepancy bound as release times and deadlines, and the special form with α=2γ\alpha = 2\gammaα=2γ.

Significance

Corollary 2 reduces the search for an optimum schedule of T1,…,TnT_1, \dots, T_nT1​,…,Tn​ to nnn candidates, one per split index, each assembled from an optimum schedule of a shorter prefix. This is the dynamic program of §3.2, which the paper implements in O(N)O(N)O(N) time after an O(Nlog⁡N)O(N \log N)O(NlogN) sort; combined with a search over γ\gammaγ it minimizes the maximum discrepancy. Without the special form, deciding whether one processor can meet arbitrary release times and deadlines is NP-complete (reference [4] of the paper, Garey and Johnson 1979), so the normal form is what separates the tractable case from the general one.

The results are proved in the paper; no machine-checked proof of them is known on Prove2Me. A formal proof of Corollary 2 would certify the correctness of the split-index recursion and, together with the companions, of the reduction from maximum discrepancy to this release-time/deadline problem.

Difficulty

The obvious argument fails in Theorem 4. Exchanging a straggler (a task after TNT_NTN​ released no later than TNT_NTN​ starts) with TNT_NTN​ shifts the tasks between them, and for general release times and deadlines those tasks can become infeasible. The paper's argument uses the special form at every step: a task released after TNT_NTN​ starts has ri>0r_i > 0ri​>0, hence di−ri=li+αd_i - r_i = l_i + \alphadi​−ri​=li​+α exactly, and this equality is what bounds how far tasks may move. It also needs an extremal choice of the optimum schedule (fewest tasks after TNT_NTN​, then fewest tasks between TNT_NTN​ and the first straggler), which requires showing that optimum schedules exist over the reals. The passage to standard form then combines this with an earliest-deadline exchange for the tasks after TNT_NTN​ and the replacement of the first part by an optimum sub-schedule without losing feasibility of the later tasks.

Formalization scope

Tasks are indexed by Fin N (0-based: the paper's T1,…,TNT_1, \dots, T_NT1​,…,TN​ are 0,…,N−10, \dots, N-10,…,N−1; the paper's TNT_NTN​ in Corollary 2 is the index N−1N-1N−1). All data are real. A schedule is a permutation σ : Fin N ≃ Fin N with starting times s : Fin N → ℝ; "executed before/after" refers to σ, not to a comparison of starting times, because zero-length tasks may share a starting time. Execution intervals meet at most at endpoints. The makespan is a supremum over Fin N; "optimum" quantifies over all feasible schedules, not only standard-form ones.

The standing hypotheses on every structural item are α≥0\alpha \ge 0α≥0, ri≥0r_i \ge 0ri​≥0, li≥0l_i \ge 0li​≥0 (from γ≥0\gamma \ge 0γ≥0, the max⁡{0,⋅}\max\{0, \cdot\}max{0,⋅} in rir_iri​, and nonnegative lengths); since si≥ris_i \ge r_isi​≥ri​, start times are nonnegative, as the paper assumes throughout. The special form is a hypothesis of every structural item and cannot be dropped. The paper's dummy task T0T_0T0​ (r0=d0=l0=0r_0 = d_0 = l_0 = 0r0​=d0​=l0​=0) is not a task; an empty first part completes at time 000. Corollary 1's "the set of all tasks with deadline β\betaβ or less" is read as excluding TNT_NTN​, the only reading under which it is true. The page's "(which can be assumed optimum)" is part of the standard form. The deadline-split and release-before-finish milestones are stated for every feasible schedule, as their arguments allow.

A trivializing formalization is excluded: the standard form pins TNT_NTN​'s start to max⁡(rN,C)\max(r_N, C)max(rN​,C) and the later tasks to consecutive positions in index order, so the goal is not Corollary 1 restated with an unconstrained split.

Running times (O(Nlog⁡N)O(N \log N)O(NlogN), O(N)O(N)O(N)) and the algorithm of §3.2 are out of scope. The development needs only finite permutations, finite suprema and the exchange arguments of §3.1; the existence of an optimum schedule (minimum makespan over finitely many orders, earliest-start schedules) is reusable for other single-machine problems with release times and deadlines. Proofs of any milestone, and a sorry-free proof of the existence of optimum schedules, are welcome.

Selected references

  • M. R. Garey, R. E. Tarjan, G. T. Wilfong, One-Processor Scheduling with Symmetric Earliness and Tardiness Penalties, Mathematics of Operations Research 13(2):330–348, 1988. https://doi.org/10.1287/moor.13.2.330
  • M. R. Garey, D. S. Johnson, Computers and Intractability: A Guide to the Theory of NP-Completeness, W. H. Freeman, 1979 (reference [4] of the paper, cited on p. 342 for the NP-completeness of one-processor scheduling with release times and deadlines). ISBN 0-7167-1045-5
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Operations ResearchProbabilityStatistics·Captain: mikedeng1

Residual Life Time at Great Age 4: α₁ ≤ tF′(t)/(1 − F(t)) ≤ α₂ for t ≥ t₀ Sandwiches P{(X − t)/t ≤ x | X > t} Between Γ_{α₁}(x) and Γ_{α₂}(x)Research Paper

Motivation

The residual life time of a lifetime XXX at age ttt is the remaining life X−tX - tX−t given survival past ttt. Its distribution at great age is a basic object in reliability, insurance and the statistics of extremes: excess-of-loss reinsurance prices the part of a claim above a retention level, and peaks-over-threshold methods fit a model to the observations exceeding a high level. Balkema and de Haan (Residual Life Time at Great Age, Ann. Probab. 2 (1974), 792–804, doi:10.1214/aop/1176996548) determined every possible limit law of the suitably normed residual life time as t→∞t \to \inftyt→∞ and the domains of attraction of these laws; Pickands (1975) obtained the continuous part of the same picture, which is the probabilistic basis of the generalized Pareto approximation used in practice.

Limit theorems describe the behaviour only as t→∞t \to \inftyt→∞. Section 4 of the paper gives approximation results for finite ttt. In extreme-value theory, von Mises (1936) gave a sufficient condition for attraction to the Fréchet law Φα\Phi_\alphaΦα​: tF′(t)/(1−F(t))→αtF'(t)/(1 - F(t)) \to \alphatF′(t)/(1−F(t))→α. Theorem 6 of the paper is a non-asymptotic, two-sided counterpart for the residual life time: two-sided bounds on the scaled hazard rate give two-sided bounds on the residual life distribution at every age past a threshold. This mission formalizes Theorem 6 (p. 801).

Setting

Let XXX be a real random variable with law μ\muμ and distribution function F(x)=P{X≤x}F(x) = P\{X \le x\}F(x)=P{X≤x}. For an age ttt with P{X>t}>0P\{X > t\} > 0P{X>t}>0, the residual life distribution function is

Ft(x)=P{X−t≤x∣X>t}=μ((t,t+x])μ((t,∞)),x∈R,F_t(x) = P\{X - t \le x \mid X > t\} = \frac{\mu((t, t + x])}{\mu((t, \infty))}, \qquad x \in \mathbb R,Ft​(x)=P{X−t≤x∣X>t}=μ((t,∞))μ((t,t+x])​,x∈R,

which is 000 for x<0x < 0x<0. For t>0t > 0t>0 the residual life scaled by the age has distribution function P{(X−t)/t≤x∣X>t}=Ft(xt)P\{(X - t)/t \le x \mid X > t\} = F_t(xt)P{(X−t)/t≤x∣X>t}=Ft​(xt).

For α>0\alpha > 0α>0 the Pareto-type law Γα\Gamma_\alphaΓα​ is

Γα(x)=1−(1+x)−α(x≥0),Γα(x)=0(x<0).\Gamma_\alpha(x) = 1 - (1 + x)^{-\alpha} \quad (x \ge 0), \qquad \Gamma_\alpha(x) = 0 \quad (x < 0).Γα​(x)=1−(1+x)−α(x≥0),Γα​(x)=0(x<0).

It is the law of Y−1Y - 1Y−1 when P{Y>y}=y−αP\{Y > y\} = y^{-\alpha}P{Y>y}=y−α for y≥1y \ge 1y≥1. FFF has a positive density F′F'F′ for t≥t0t \ge t_0t≥t0​ if FFF is differentiable at every t≥t0t \ge t_0t≥t0​ with derivative F′(t)>0F'(t) > 0F′(t)>0. The quantity F′(t)/(1−F(t))F'(t)/(1 - F(t))F′(t)/(1−F(t)) is the hazard rate of XXX at ttt, and tF′(t)/(1−F(t))tF'(t)/(1 - F(t))tF′(t)/(1−F(t)) is the hazard rate scaled by the age.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 6 (p. 801)

Let FFF have a positive density F′F'F′ for t≥t0t \ge t_0t≥t0​, and let α1,α2>0\alpha_1, \alpha_2 > 0α1​,α2​>0 satisfy α1≤tF′(t)/(1−F(t))≤α2\alpha_1 \le tF'(t)/(1 - F(t)) \le \alpha_2α1​≤tF′(t)/(1−F(t))≤α2​ for t≥t0t \ge t_0t≥t0​. Then for all t≥t0t \ge t_0t≥t0​ and all real xxx,

Γα1(x)  ≤  P{X−tt≤x  ∣  X>t}  ≤  Γα2(x).\Gamma_{\alpha_1}(x) \;\le\; P\Big\{\frac{X - t}{t} \le x \;\Big|\; X > t\Big\} \;\le\; \Gamma_{\alpha_2}(x).Γα1​​(x)≤P{tX−t​≤x​X>t}≤Γα2​​(x).

The smaller constant gives the lower bound: a smaller scaled hazard rate means a heavier tail and hence a larger chance that the remaining life is long. For a Pareto tail 1−F(t)=Ct−α1 - F(t) = Ct^{-\alpha}1−F(t)=Ct−α one may take α1=α2=α\alpha_1 = \alpha_2 = \alphaα1​=α2​=α, and both inequalities are equalities.

Milestone: the integrated hazard bounds (proof of Theorem 6, p. 801)

For t≥t0t \ge t_0t≥t0​ and x>0x > 0x>0,

α1∫t(1+x)tduu≤∫t(1+x)tF′(u)1−F(u) du≤α2∫t(1+x)tduu.\alpha_1 \int_t^{(1+x)t} \frac{du}{u} \le \int_t^{(1+x)t} \frac{F'(u)}{1 - F(u)}\,du \le \alpha_2 \int_t^{(1+x)t} \frac{du}{u}.α1​∫t(1+x)t​udu​≤∫t(1+x)t​1−F(u)F′(u)​du≤α2​∫t(1+x)t​udu​.

Significance

The theorem turns a pointwise condition on the hazard rate, which can be checked on a density, into a bound on the whole conditional distribution of the residual life, valid at every age t≥t0t \ge t_0t≥t0​ rather than only in the limit. If moreover tF′(t)/(1−F(t))→αtF'(t)/(1 - F(t)) \to \alphatF′(t)/(1−F(t))→α, then α1,α2\alpha_1, \alpha_2α1​,α2​ can be taken arbitrarily close to α\alphaα for large t0t_0t0​, which recovers the convergence P{(X−t)/t≤x∣X>t}→Γα(x)P\{(X - t)/t \le x \mid X > t\} \to \Gamma_\alpha(x)P{(X−t)/t≤x∣X>t}→Γα​(x) with an explicit error at finite ages. Such bounds are what a practitioner fitting a Pareto tail above a threshold needs to quantify the approximation.

The result is classical and its proof is short; it is not open. As far as is known, no machine-checked version exists, and Mathlib has no theory of residual life distributions or of the limit laws of Balkema and de Haan. A formal proof would provide reusable pieces: the identity between the integrated hazard rate and −log⁡(1−F)-\log(1 - F)−log(1−F) for a distribution function with a density, and the comparison of a residual life distribution with a Pareto law. The other missions of this series formalize the paper's limit theorems, for which this mission's objects (the residual life distribution and Γα\Gamma_\alphaΓα​) are shared.

Difficulty

The mathematics is elementary; the work lies in the regularity bookkeeping that the printed proof leaves implicit. The density is only assumed to exist pointwise, so the fundamental theorem of calculus must be applied to −log⁡(1−F)-\log(1 - F)−log(1−F) with a derivative that is not assumed continuous, and its integrability on [t,(1+x)t][t, (1+x)t][t,(1+x)t] has to come from the hazard bounds themselves. That 1−F1 - F1−F stays positive, that t0>0t_0 > 0t0​>0, and that the case x≤0x \le 0x≤0 is trivial all have to be derived from the hypotheses rather than assumed. Finally, the conditional probability must be identified with 1−R((1+x)t)/R(t)1 - R((1+x)t)/R(t)1−R((1+x)t)/R(t), where R=1−FR = 1 - FR=1−F, through the measure of intervals.

Formalization scope

The law of XXX is a probability measure μ\muμ on R\mathbb RR, and FFF is Mathlib's ProbabilityTheory.cdf μ. The probability P{(X−t)/t≤x∣X>t}P\{(X - t)/t \le x \mid X > t\}P{(X−t)/t≤x∣X>t} is residualLife μ t (x * t) =μ((t,t+xt])/μ((t,∞))= \mu((t, t + xt])/\mu((t, \infty))=μ((t,t+xt])/μ((t,∞)). Γα\Gamma_\alphaΓα​ is a real function defined by cases, with Real.rpow for the power. The density is an explicit function fff with FFF having derivative f(t)>0f(t) > 0f(t)>0 at every t≥t0t \ge t_0t≥t0​, the derivative taken within [t0,∞)[t_0, \infty)[t0​,∞). This is a right derivative at t0t_0t0​ and the ordinary derivative for t>t0t > t_0t>t0​. It is the weakest reading of "positive density F′F'F′ for t≥t0t \ge t_0t≥t0​", and it admits the exact Pareto law with t0=1t_0 = 1t0​=1, whose distribution function has no two-sided derivative at 111. The bounds are stated for t⋅f(t)/(1−F(t))t \cdot f(t)/(1 - F(t))t⋅f(t)/(1−F(t)) with Lean's real division.

No hypothesis is added to the printed theorem, and no printed slip was found. The conditions t0>0t_0 > 0t0​>0 and F(t)<1F(t) < 1F(t)<1 follow from the hypotheses: for t≤0t \le 0t≤0 the ratio is not ≥α1>0\ge \alpha_1 > 0≥α1​>0, and a positive derivative on [t0,∞)[t_0, \infty)[t0​,∞) makes FFF strictly increasing there. Lean's convention a/0=0a/0 = 0a/0=0 therefore never acts at the ages concerned. The conclusion is stated for all real xxx, as printed; for x≤0x \le 0x≤0 all three quantities are 000. The milestone does not assume the hazard rate integrable: it is bounded and measurable on [t,(1+x)t][t, (1+x)t][t,(1+x)t], and a non-integrable integrand would make the inequality false rather than trivially true. A formalization that dropped the density hypothesis, replaced F′F'F′ by deriv without differentiability, or let the bounds hold only on a set not containing every t≥t0t \ge t_0t≥t0​ would not be this theorem; all three are excluded by the statement.

A proof needs the fundamental theorem of calculus for derivatives within a half-line (in Mathlib), the identity ∫t(1+x)tdu/u=log⁡(1+x)\int_t^{(1+x)t} du/u = \log(1+x)∫t(1+x)t​du/u=log(1+x), and the chain rule for log⁡(1−F)\log(1 - F)log(1−F). Proofs of the milestone and the goal are welcome, as are sorry-free lemmas showing that Γα\Gamma_\alphaΓα​ is a distribution function and that the Pareto law satisfies the hypotheses with α1=α2\alpha_1 = \alpha_2α1​=α2​.

Selected references

  • A. A. Balkema, L. de Haan, Residual Life Time at Great Age, The Annals of Probability 2 (1974), no. 5, 792–804. https://doi.org/10.1214/aop/1176996548
  • J. Pickands III, Statistical Inference Using Extreme Order Statistics, The Annals of Statistics 3 (1975), no. 1, 119–131. https://doi.org/10.1214/aos/1176343003
  • R. von Mises, La distribution de la plus grande de n valeurs, Revue Mathématique de l'Union Interbalkanique 1 (1936), 141–160.
  • L. de Haan, A. Ferreira, Extreme Value Theory: An Introduction, Springer, 2006. https://doi.org/10.1007/0-387-34471-3
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Graph TheoryOperations ResearchProbability·Captain: mikedeng1

Expected Critical Path Lengths in PERT Networks: With Bundle-Independent Arc Lengths, the Mean-Length Estimate g, Fulkerson's Recursion f and the Expected Critical Path Length e Satisfy g ≤ f ≤ eResearch Paper

Motivation

PERT (Program Evaluation and Review Technique) and the critical path method model a project as a directed acyclic network whose arcs are jobs and whose nodes are events; the duration of the project is the length of a longest path from the origin to the terminal. When job durations are random, the quantity a planner wants is the expected duration. Computing it exactly requires solving one longest-path problem for every joint outcome of the job durations: with mmm jobs each taking two values, 2m2^m2m deterministic problems. Classical PERT practice replaced every random duration by its mean and reported the longest path for the mean durations. That figure is known to be optimistically biased.

D. R. Fulkerson, Expected Critical Path Lengths in PERT Networks (RAND Memorandum RM-3075-PR, 1962; Operations Research 10(6):808–817, 1962, doi:10.1287/opre.10.6.808), proposed a second estimate, computed node by node with work exponential only in the size of a single node's bundle of incoming arcs, and proved that it lies between the classical mean-length figure and the true expectation.

Setting

A project network has events 0,1,…,n0,1,\dots,n0,1,…,n with n≥1n\ge1n≥1, origin 000 and terminal nnn. Its arcs are ordered pairs (i,j)(i,j)(i,j) with i<ji<ji<j, at most one per pair, and every event lies on a directed path from the origin to the terminal. Fulkerson numbers his nodes 1,…,n1,\dots,n1,…,n; his node iii is event i−1i-1i−1 here. The bundle BjB_jBj​ of an event jjj is the set of arcs entering jjj, and pred⁡(j)\operatorname{pred}(j)pred(j) the set of their tails; the origin's bundle is empty.

For arc lengths ttt, let ℓi(t)\ell_i(t)ℓi​(t) be the length of a longest (critical) path from the origin to iii; equivalently ℓ0=0\ell_0=0ℓ0​=0 and ℓj=max⁡i∈pred⁡(j)(ℓi+tij)\ell_j=\max_{i\in\operatorname{pred}(j)}(\ell_i+t_{ij})ℓj​=maxi∈pred(j)​(ℓi​+tij​).

The lengths of the arcs of each bundle BjB_jBj​ form a random vector with a finite distribution: a finite set SjS_jSj​ of bundle vectors vvv, where viv_ivi​ is the length of arc (i,j)(i,j)(i,j), with probabilities pj(v)≥0p_j(v)\ge 0pj​(v)≥0 summing to 111. Arcs within a bundle may be correlated; distinct bundles are independent, so an assignment ω=(ωj)j\omega=(\omega_j)_jω=(ωj​)j​ of one bundle vector per event has probability p(ω)=∏jpj(ωj)p(\omega)=\prod_j p_j(\omega_j)p(ω)=∏j​pj​(ωj​). Three numbers are attached to each event iii:

  1. the expected critical path length ei=∑ωp(ω) ℓi(t(ω))e_i=\sum_\omega p(\omega)\,\ell_i(t(\omega))ei​=∑ω​p(ω)ℓi​(t(ω));
  2. the mean-length estimate gi=ℓi(tˉ)g_i=\ell_i(\bar t)gi​=ℓi​(tˉ), where tˉij=∑v∈Sjpj(v) vi\bar t_{ij}=\sum_{v\in S_j}p_j(v)\,v_itˉij​=∑v∈Sj​​pj​(v)vi​ is the expected length of arc (i,j)(i,j)(i,j);
  3. Fulkerson's numbers f0=0f_0=0f0​=0 and, for j≠0j\neq0j=0,
fj=∑v∈Sjpj(v) max⁡i∈pred⁡(j)(fi+vi).f_j=\sum_{v\in S_j}p_j(v)\,\max_{i\in\operatorname{pred}(j)}\bigl(f_i+v_i\bigr).fj​=v∈Sj​∑​pj​(v)i∈pred(j)max​(fi​+vi​).

Formalization targets

Goal: (4.4)

gi  ≤  fi  ≤  eifor every event i.g_i\;\le\;f_i\;\le\;e_i\qquad\text{for every event } i .gi​≤fi​≤ei​for every event i.

Milestones

In the order of Fulkerson's induction (pp. 10–12):

  1. the recursion for ℓ\ellℓ computes the greatest path length (§3, (3.6), and the display on p. 11);
  2. ℓi(t)\ell_i(t)ℓi​(t) depends only on the arcs of the bundles B0,…,BiB_0,\dots,B_iB0​,…,Bi​ (p. 6);
  3. (4.8): max⁡i∈pred⁡(j)(fi+tˉij)≤fj\max_{i\in\operatorname{pred}(j)}(f_i+\bar t_{ij})\le f_jmaxi∈pred(j)​(fi​+tˉij​)≤fj​;
  4. (4.5)/(4.9): if gk≤fkg_k\le f_kgk​≤fk​ for all k<jk<jk<j, then gj≤fjg_j\le f_jgj​≤fj​;
  5. (4.13): ∑v∈Sjpj(v)max⁡i∈pred⁡(j)(ei+vi)≤ej\sum_{v\in S_j}p_j(v)\max_{i\in\operatorname{pred}(j)}(e_i+v_i)\le e_j∑v∈Sj​​pj​(v)maxi∈pred(j)​(ei​+vi​)≤ej​;
  6. (4.10)/(4.14): if fk≤ekf_k\le e_kfk​≤ek​ for all k<jk<jk<j, then fj≤ejf_j\le e_jfj​≤ej​.

Companion statements

  • gi≤eig_i\le e_igi​≤ei​ under an arbitrary joint distribution of all arc lengths (remark, p. 12).
  • Fig. 4.2: with correlated bundles, e3=g3=1e_3=g_3=1e3​=g3​=1 but f3=5/4f_3=5/4f3​=5/4, so (4.4) fails without bundle independence.
  • (4.17): an independent example with g3=f3=1<e3=5/4g_3=f_3=1<e_3=5/4g3​=f3​=1<e3​=5/4.
  • Fig. 4.1: explicit values g4=3/2g_4=3/2g4​=3/2, f2=1/2f_2=1/2f2​=1/2, f3=9/8f_3=9/8f3​=9/8, f4=55/32f_4=55/32f4​=55/32, and fi=eif_i=e_ifi​=ei​.

Significance

The chain (4.4) says that the classical PERT estimate ggg never overstates the expected project duration, and that the numbers fff are a lower bound at least as tight. The fff computation visits each node once and sums over the support of that node's bundle only, so its cost grows exponentially with bundle size rather than with network size, while the exact expectation eee requires the whole product space. The Fig. 4.2 example shows that the bundle-independence hypothesis cannot be dropped for the upper inequality, while the lower inequality g≤eg\le eg≤e survives arbitrary dependence.

The result has a complete published proof. This mission seeks a machine-checked proof of (4.4) for finite distributions, with the longest-path characterisation of the earliest-event-time recursion and the locality of critical path lengths as reusable lemmas, and machine-checkable versions of the paper's numerical examples, including the counterexample showing the role of independence.

Difficulty

The left inequality compares an average of maxima with a maximum of averages. The right inequality requires more: fjf_jfj​ averages over the bundle entering jjj, while eje_jej​ averages over assignments to every bundle. Taking expectations in ℓj=max⁡i(ℓi+tij)\ell_j=\max_i(\ell_i+t_{ij})ℓj​=maxi​(ℓi​+tij​) yields ej≥max⁡i(ei+tˉij)e_j\ge\max_i(e_i+\bar t_{ij})ej​≥maxi​(ei​+tˉij​), which gives the weaker bound g≤eg\le eg≤e. Fig. 4.2 shows that f≤ef\le ef≤e can fail when the bundles are dependent. In Lean, eee is a sum over a dependent product of finite supports (Fintype.piFinset); its interaction with the local recurrence for fff is the central technical difficulty.

Formalization scope

  • Network: the published CriticalPath.Events.ProjectNetwork (Kelley–Walker 1959): events Fin (n + 1), arcs a Finset of ordered pairs with strictly increasing labels, origin preceding and terminal following every event. This requires n≥1n\ge1n≥1. Fulkerson's numbering condition "i≤ji\le ji≤j" on p. 3 is read as the strict i<ji<ji<j (arcs join distinct nodes of an acyclic network). There is one arc per ordered pair, Fulkerson's own convention in (3.13).
  • Critical path length: the published CriticalPath.Events.earliest, a recursion with Finset.sup' over the nonempty set of incoming arcs. This is the paper's convention that terms of missing arcs are ignored. Nothing uses a default value of 000 or −∞-\infty−∞.
  • Distributions: finite, given as data (a support Finset and a weight function per bundle) plus a predicate IsProb (nonnegative weights on the support, summing to 111, for every event including the origin). Bundle vectors are functions on all events, and coordinates outside pred⁡(j)\operatorname{pred}(j)pred(j) are never read.
  • Arc lengths are arbitrary reals. §3 assumes nonnegative lengths, but its footnote on p. 4 states that nonnegativity "is not essential in this or the following section"; the statements are given in this more general form.
  • No trivialization: eie_iei​ is the sum over every assignment of bundle vectors, weighted by the product probability (3.5). It is not defined by a recursion, and the goal assumes none of the milestones. fff at node jjj uses only the distribution of the bundle of jjj.

Infrastructure that a full development needs, and that is reusable elsewhere, includes the longest-path characterisation of the earliest-event-time recursion, the locality lemma, and the factorisation of sums over Fintype.piFinset along one coordinate. Proofs of any milestone or companion are welcome. Out of scope here: §5 (computational examples) and the general-network analogues of §6.

Selected references

  • D. R. Fulkerson, Expected Critical Path Lengths in PERT Networks, RAND Memorandum RM-3075-PR, March 1962; published in Operations Research 10(6):808–817, 1962. doi:10.1287/opre.10.6.808
  • J. E. Kelley Jr. and M. R. Walker, Critical-Path Planning and Scheduling, Proceedings of the Eastern Joint Computer Conference, 1959, pp. 160–173. doi:10.1145/1460299.1460318
  • D. G. Malcolm, J. H. Roseboom, C. E. Clark and W. Fazar, Application of a Technique for Research and Development Program Evaluation, Operations Research 7(5):646–669, 1959. doi:10.1287/opre.7.5.646
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CombinatoricsOperations ResearchOptimization·Captain: mikedeng1

One-Processor Scheduling with Symmetric Earliness and Tardiness Penalties 2: For a Fixed Task Order, the Block-Shifting Algorithm Minimizes the Total DiscrepancyResearch Paper

Motivation

A task may have a preferred execution time because a material delivery, external event, or downstream operation is timed to it. Starting early can be as costly as starting late. Garey, Tarjan, and Wilfong study this situation on one processor, where tasks cannot overlap but idle time between tasks is permitted. Their total-discrepancy problem is hard when the execution order is free; fixing the order leaves a substantial timing problem because each start can still move and can force changes to earlier starts. The paper gives an explicit scheduling procedure for that case and proves that it minimizes the sum of deviations from preferred starts (Garey, Tarjan, and Wilfong, 1988, §§1–2).

This mission targets that procedure and its correctness theorem. It also records the paper's equal-length result: when task lengths are identical, a minimum-cost schedule exists in preferred-start order, so the fixed-order procedure applies after sorting. These are two precise claims about total discrepancy, distinct from the paper's separate maximum-discrepancy problem.

Setting

There are nnn tasks, indexed i=0,…,n−1i=0,\ldots,n-1i=0,…,n−1. Task iii has a nonnegative length lil_ili​, a nonnegative preferred starting time aia_iai​, and an actual starting time sis_isi​. Once started, it occupies the one processor until si+lis_i+l_isi​+li​. Each start must be nonnegative. For the fixed-order problem, task iii must finish before task i+1i+1i+1 starts, so si+li≤si+1s_i+l_i\le s_{i+1}si​+li​≤si+1​. This permits idle time when the inequality is strict. The task's discrepancy is ∣si−ai∣|s_i-a_i|∣si​−ai​∣; because its preferred completion is ai+lia_i+l_iai​+li​, this is also its absolute completion-time discrepancy. The total discrepancy is

cost⁡n(s)=∑i=0n−1∣si−ai∣.\operatorname{cost}_n(s)=\sum_{i=0}^{n-1}|s_i-a_i|.costn​(s)=i=0∑n−1​∣si​−ai​∣.

A block is a maximal consecutive set of tasks with no idle time between neighboring tasks. Within a block, Decrease counts tasks whose actual starts are later than preferred, and Increase counts tasks whose actual starts are no later than preferred. These names describe the effect of moving the entire block earlier: the discrepancy of a Decrease task falls initially, whereas that of an Increase task rises. The algorithm's state is a schedule SnS_nSn​ for the first nnn tasks. It inserts the next task at its preferred start when the previous task has finished, and at that finish time otherwise. In the latter case it may move the final block earlier until one of the paper's stopping events occurs: the block reaches time zero, a late task reaches its preferred start, or the block meets its predecessor (§2.2, p. 337).

For the equal-length result, schedules may execute tasks in any order. Two distinct tasks are feasible together when one completes before the other starts; meeting at endpoints is allowed. The objective remains the same sum of absolute discrepancies.

Formalization targets

Fixed-order optimality

The main target is the paper's Theorem 2. For all nonnegative task data and every nnn, the actual schedule SnS_nSn​ produced by the block-shifting algorithm is feasible and satisfies

cost⁡n(Sn)≤cost⁡n(s)for every feasible fixed-order schedule s.\operatorname{cost}_n(S_n)\le\operatorname{cost}_n(s) \qquad\text{for every feasible fixed-order schedule }s.costn​(Sn​)≤costn​(s)for every feasible fixed-order schedule s.

This includes the empty schedule and schedules with idle time. The milestone list follows the paper's own assertions: a balanced final block can move earlier without changing cost; every block of SnS_nSn​ has more Increase tasks than Decrease tasks or begins at zero (Lemma 7); and the two claims in Case 2 of the proof record the cost of adding a late task and the comparison with schedules that place it earlier (Theorem 2 and Lemma 7, p. 338).

Equal-length schedules

The companion target is Theorem 3. If every task has a common length L≥0L\ge0L≥0 and the preferred starts are indexed so that ai≤ai+1a_i\le a_{i+1}ai​≤ai+1​, then among all feasible schedules, including those with another task order, at least one minimum-cost schedule starts the tasks in index order:

∃s  [cost⁡n(s)≤cost⁡n(t) for every feasible t]with si≤si+1 whenever i+1<n.\exists s\;\bigl[ \operatorname{cost}_n(s)\le\operatorname{cost}_n(t) \text{ for every feasible }t \bigr] \quad\text{with }s_i\le s_{i+1}\text{ whenever }i+1<n.∃s[costn​(s)≤costn​(t) for every feasible t]with si​≤si+1​ whenever i+1<n.

The paper uses this statement to connect free-order equal-length scheduling to its fixed-order procedure (Theorem 3, p. 340).

Significance

Theorem 2 certifies an explicit schedule, not just the existence of an optimum. It fixes the objective value for a prescribed execution order and gives a baseline against which any other legal timing of the same tasks can be compared. Theorem 3 supplies the ordering fact needed to use that result when all lengths agree. Together they explain why a problem that is difficult for unrestricted task lengths still has these structured solvable cases (Garey, Tarjan, and Wilfong, 1988, abstract and §2.5).

The paper proves both theorems on paper. The work here is to formalize its schedule construction, cost, block boundaries, and comparison classes in Lean, then obtain machine-checked proofs of the stated targets. The draft theorem declarations compile with proof placeholders; this proposal does not claim that they are already machine-checked results. A completed development would make the model and the algorithm available for later formal work on scheduling with idle time and symmetric earliness and tardiness penalties.

Difficulty

Moving a task closer to its preferred start can move neighboring tasks farther from theirs. A simple task-by-task choice therefore does not establish global optimality. Nor does a count of late and early tasks in one block, by itself, justify arbitrary earlier movements of individual tasks. The difficult comparison in the paper is between the algorithm's schedule and a competing feasible schedule whose new task starts earlier: the whole final block and its constrained relative movements matter. The proof also has to account for the boundary at time zero and for blocks that merge when shifted. These are the reasons the explicit procedure and its block invariant need careful statements (§§2.2–2.3, pp. 337–338).

Formalization scope

The Lean development represents task data and starts as functions from natural-number indices to real numbers; only indices below nnn count. Task iii in Lean is the paper's Ti+1T_{i+1}Ti+1​. Preferred times, lengths, and legal starting times are nonnegative. The start-time condition is a standing convention used by the paper's algorithm, especially its zero-boundary stopping rule. Fixed-order feasibility requires successive tasks to be separated by at least the earlier task's length; unrestricted feasibility uses pairwise nonoverlap. An empty schedule is legal and has cost zero. The representation allows zero-length tasks, as does the paper's li≥0l_i\ge0li​≥0 model.

The algorithm is defined by its stated insertion and single-block-shift operations. Defining SnS_nSn​ as a chosen minimizer would erase the content of Theorem 2; the goal also explicitly asserts feasibility so that an illegal low-cost function cannot qualify. Theorem 3 compares with every feasible unrestricted-order schedule, not just schedules already in preferred-start order. The core definitions, the block invariant, and the cost comparisons are useful beyond this particular proof. Formalizing the paper's running-time bounds and heap implementation is outside this mission.

Selected references

  • Michael R. Garey, Robert E. Tarjan, and Gordon T. Wilfong, One-Processor Scheduling with Symmetric Earliness and Tardiness Penalties, Mathematics of Operations Research 13(2), 330–348, 1988. DOI: 10.1287/moor.13.2.330.
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CombinatoricsTheoretical Computer Science·Captain: marwahaha

Truly Subquadratic 3SUM on a Word RAMResearch Paper

3SUM asks whether three distinct positions in a list of integers contain values summing to zero. It is a central problem in fine-grained complexity.

This mission formalizes a deterministic O(n1.9992)O(n^{1.9992})O(n1.9992) algorithm for 3SUM on nnn polynomially bounded integers, on a word RAM with O(log⁡n)O(\log n)O(logn)-bit words. Alman and Vassilevska Williams's 2026 breakthrough gives a truly subquadratic bound, refuting the integer 3SUM hypothesis in this model.

The mission uses the accompanying Lean specification and shares the Exact Triangle milestone with Truly Subcubic APSP on a Word RAM.

References

  1. Josh Alman and Virginia Vassilevska Williams, Truly Subquadratic 3SUM and Truly Subcubic APSP via Triangles in Sparse Lopsided Graphs, 2026, Theorem 22.
  2. Anthropic, formal-math / 3sum-apsp: accompanying Lean formalization, Theorem_22_3SUM.
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CombinatoricsOperations ResearchTheoretical Computer Science·Captain: mikedeng1

Fibonacci Heaps and Their Uses in Improved Network Optimization Algorithms: O(log n) Amortized Time for Delete Min and Delete, O(1) for Every Other F-Heap OperationResearch Paper

Why priority queues with cheap decrease key matter

Many network optimization algorithms spend most of their time in a heap (priority queue): a set of items with real keys that supports inserting an item, finding and deleting an item of minimum key, melding two heaps, decreasing the key of an item, and deleting an arbitrary item. Dijkstra's shortest-path algorithm performs at most one delete min per vertex and may perform a decrease key for each edge, so on a graph with nnn vertices and mmm edges its running time is governed by how cheap decrease key is. Binomial queues support the heap operations in O(log⁡n)O(\log n)O(logn) worst-case time.

Fredman and Tarjan (J. ACM 34 (1987)) introduced Fibonacci heaps (F-heaps), in which delete min and delete take O(log⁡n)O(\log n)O(logn) amortized time and every other operation, decrease key included, takes O(1)O(1)O(1) amortized time. This brings Dijkstra's algorithm to O(nlog⁡n+m)O(n \log n + m)O(nlogn+m) and improves the best bounds then known for all-pairs shortest paths, weighted bipartite matching (the assignment problem) and minimum spanning trees. F-heaps descend from the binomial queues of Vuillemin (1978) and use the potential technique of amortized analysis of Sleator and Tarjan. This mission formalizes the paper's §2 analysis, culminating in THEOREM 1 on p. 604.

Setting

An F-heap is a list of heap-ordered rooted trees: every child's key is at least its parent's key. Each node holds an item, the item's real key and a mark bit; the children of a node are kept in the order in which they were linked to it, earliest first. The rank r(x)r(x)r(x) of a node is its number of children. A collection is a list of heaps, named by position; a run starts with no heaps.

Linking two trees with roots xxx and yyy makes yyy the last child of xxx if the key of xxx is smaller, and otherwise makes xxx the last child of yyy; the root that becomes a child is unmarked. The operations act as follows:

  • make heap adds an empty heap; find min acts on a nonempty heap and returns a root of minimum key; insert adds a one-node tree for a new item; meld concatenates two root lists.
  • delete min removes a root xxx of minimum key, adds the children of xxx to the roots, then repeats the linking step, "find any two trees whose roots have the same rank, and link them", in any order, until all root ranks are distinct.
  • decrease key (Δ,i,h)(\Delta, i, h)(Δ,i,h), Δ≥0\Delta \ge 0Δ≥0, lowers the key of iii and, if the node xxx of iii is not a root, cuts xxx from its parent, making its subtree a new tree. delete (i,h)(i, h)(i,h) cuts xxx the same way, destroys it and adds its children to the roots; a minimum root is deleted as in delete min.
  • After every cut of a child of ppp, if ppp is not a root it is marked if unmarked and cut from its own parent if marked: a cascading cut, which may repeat upwards.

The actual time of an operation is one unit, plus one per linking step, plus one per cut, plus for delete min the scan of the rank array (the largest rank involved). The potential Φ\PhiΦ of a collection is the number of trees plus twice the number of marked nonroot nodes, and the amortized time of an operation is its actual time plus the increase of Φ\PhiΦ.

Formalization targets

Goal: THEOREM 1 (p. 604)

There is an absolute constant C>0C > 0C>0 such that for every sequence of TTT operations started from no heaps, with ntn_tnt​ the number of items in the heap that operation ttt acts on, just before it acts,

∑t<Tcostt  ≤  ∑t<Tbt,bt={C(log⁡2nt+1)delete min or delete,Cotherwise.\sum_{t<T} \mathrm{cost}_t \;\le\; \sum_{t<T} b_t, \qquad b_t = \begin{cases} C(\log_2 n_t + 1) & \text{delete min or delete},\\ C & \text{otherwise.}\end{cases}t<T∑​costt​≤t<T∑​bt​,bt​={C(log2​nt​+1)C​delete min or delete,otherwise.​

The paper's wording is "the total time is at most the total amortized time, where the amortized time is O(log⁡n)O(\log n)O(logn) for each delete min or delete operation and O(1)O(1)O(1) for each of the other operations"; the goal pins the O(⋅)O(\cdot)O(⋅) to one constant and does not name the potential.

Milestones

  1. LEMMA 1: the iiith child of a node, in linking order, has rank at least i−2i - 2i−2.
  2. Fk+2≥φkF_{k+2} \ge \varphi^kFk+2​≥φk, with FkF_kFk​ the Fibonacci numbers and φ=(1+5)/2\varphi = (1+\sqrt5)/2φ=(1+5​)/2.
  3. COROLLARY 1: a node of rank kkk has at least Fk+2≥φkF_{k+2} \ge \varphi^kFk+2​≥φk descendants, itself included.
  4. A node of rank kkk in an nnn-item heap has φk≤n\varphi^k \le nφk≤n, hence k≤log⁡n/log⁡φk \le \log n / \log\varphik≤logn/logφ.
  5. make heap, find min and meld leave Φ\PhiΦ unchanged; insert raises it by one.
  6. delete min raises Φ\PhiΦ by at most log⁡n/log⁡φ\log n / \log \varphilogn/logφ minus the number of linking steps.
  7. decrease key raises Φ\PhiΦ by at most three minus the number of cascading cuts.
  8. From no heaps, the total amortized time bounds the total actual time.

Significance

THEOREM 1 is the data-structure fact behind the paper's algorithmic results: Dijkstra's algorithm in O(nlog⁡n+m)O(n\log n + m)O(nlogn+m), all-pairs shortest paths and the assignment problem in O(n2log⁡n+nm)O(n^2 \log n + nm)O(n2logn+nm), and minimum spanning trees in O(m β(m,n))O(m\,\beta(m,n))O(mβ(m,n)).

The result has been proved since 1987. What the mission adds is a machine-checked version of the paper's own analysis on an operational model with arbitrary linking order, unmarking on link, marking or cascading on every cut, and the paper's unit costs. The proposal states the theorem and its supporting claims; their proofs remain to be formalized.

Difficulty

The obvious argument, that every tree is a binomial tree and so every rank is at most log⁡2n\log_2 nlog2​n, fails as soon as cuts are allowed: decrease key and delete remove subtrees arbitrarily, and the trees of an F-heap need not be binomial. The rank bound has to come from an invariant of the whole history (LEMMA 1), which only holds because a node loses at most one child before it is cut itself; without cascading cuts a node of rank kkk can be left with only k+1k+1k+1 descendants, and no logarithmic rank bound holds. A second difficulty is that the actual cost of one decrease key is unbounded, since a single operation may trigger arbitrarily many cascading cuts; a per-operation worst-case argument cannot give THEOREM 1, and the bound holds only for whole sequences started from no heaps.

Formalization scope

All declarations sit in the namespace FibHeap.Amort. Trees are a nested inductive FTree with item ℕ, key ℝ, a mark bit and a list of children in linking order; a heap is List FTree (its roots) and a collection is List Heap. Operations are a step relation Step s op s' d whose data d records linking steps, cuts, cascading cuts and the scan, so that cost d = 1 + links + cuts + scan is determined by what the operation did. The linking loop allows every order of linking; a link tie makes the first root a child of the second, while delete min may choose any minimum-key root. Runs start from no heaps; reachable collections consist of heap-ordered trees with each item in at most one heap. LEMMA 1, COROLLARY 1 and the delete-min bound are stated for reachable collections only, as the paper's "a node in an F-heap" intends. The paper's standing assumption that an item is in only one heap at a time is enforced by the precondition of insert and is not a hypothesis. The minimum pointer and returned items are not stored in the step relation; find min is a state-preserving step charged one unit. A heap destroyed by meld remains as an empty heap at its index.

Logarithms in the goal are base 2 (footnote 1, p. 600), with a +1+1+1 so that one-item heaps have positive budget. The paper's constant "≤1.4404log⁡n\le 1.4404 \log n≤1.4404logn" on p. 604 is a rounding slip (1/log⁡2φ=1.44042…1/\log_2 \varphi = 1.44042\ldots1/log2​φ=1.44042…); milestones use the exact log⁡φn\log_\varphi nlogφ​n.

The goal is not trivialized: the cost counts every linking step and every cut as fixed by the step relation, CCC is quantified before the run, and a companion theorem (step_exists) shows that every valid operation can be performed, so runs containing delete min, decrease key and cascading cuts exist. A further supporting statement gives an explicit form of the delete potential bound. A complete development needs facts about the nested inductive (sizes, subtree lists, marked counts under list edits), an invariant for LEMMA 1 recording when each child was linked, and the Fibonacci inequality; contributions of any of these as separate lemmas are welcome.

Selected references

  • M. L. Fredman and R. E. Tarjan, Fibonacci heaps and their uses in improved network optimization algorithms, J. ACM 34(3):596–615, 1987. https://doi.org/10.1145/28869.28874
  • J. Vuillemin, A data structure for manipulating priority queues, Comm. ACM 21(4):309–315, 1978. https://doi.org/10.1145/359460.359478
  • R. E. Tarjan, Amortized computational complexity, SIAM J. Algebraic Discrete Methods 6(2):306–318, 1985. https://doi.org/10.1137/0606031
  • E. W. Dijkstra, A note on two problems in connexion with graphs, Numer. Math. 1:269–271, 1959. https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01386390
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CombinatoricsGraph TheoryOperations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

Matching, Euler Tours and the Chinese Postman II: The Parity Problem Is a Minimum 1-Matching of the Odd Nodes under Shortest-Path LengthsResearch Paper

Motivation

A postal route that must traverse every street and return to its starting point is a Chinese postman tour. In a street network, crossings are nodes, streets are edges, and the cost of a route is the sum of the lengths of the streets it traverses, counted with repetition. The practical question is which streets must be repeated, and how often. Edmonds and Johnson's 1973 paper separates that question from constructing the resulting tour: choose the repeated edges first, then find an Euler tour of the resulting multigraph. This mission concerns their reduction of the first question to a minimum-weight matching of the odd-degree nodes.

The reduction matters because it turns a route problem with arbitrary repeated edge traversals into a finite pairing problem. The graph of odd nodes is complete, with the weight of a pair given by its shortest-path distance in the original network. A matching chooses which odd nodes to pair, and paths realizing those pairs identify edges to repeat. The paper also explains why overlapping paths can be replaced so that no edge needs to be repeated by this construction more than once (§3, pp. 92–93).

Setting

A graph G=(N,E)G=(N,E)G=(N,E) has finite node and edge sets. Each edge has two distinct endpoints. Different edges may join the same pair of nodes, so parallel streets remain distinct. The graph is connected when every pair of nodes is joined by an edge-labelled walk. A walk records both its node sequence and its edge sequence; a tour is a closed walk. An Euler tour uses each edge exactly once, while a postman tour uses each edge at least once. Edge lengths cec_ece​ are real and nonnegative, as in §2, p. 89.

The degree of vvv is the number of named edges meeting it. Let TTT be the set of nodes of odd degree. For every edge eee, let xe∈Nx_e\in\mathbb Nxe​∈N be the number of additional traversals. The parity equations require a nonnegative integer wvw_vwv​ at each node such that

∑e∋vxe=2wv+bv,bv={1v∈T,0v∉T.\sum_{e\ni v}x_e=2w_v+b_v,\qquad b_v=\begin{cases}1&v\in T,\\0&v\notin T.\end{cases}e∋v∑​xe​=2wv​+bv​,bv​={10​v∈T,v∈/T.​

Their objective is z(x)=∑e∈Ecexez(x)=\sum_{e\in E}c_ex_ez(x)=∑e∈E​ce​xe​. These are the paper's (3.1)–(3.4), with natural-number values encoding integrality and nonnegativity (§3, pp. 90–91). The equations express the even-degree condition after adding xex_exe​ copies of each original edge.

For nodes u,vu,vu,v, write d(u,v)d(u,v)d(u,v) for the length of a shortest path in GGG. This distance is backed by an attaining edge-simple path and is a lower bound on the length of every walk from uuu to vvv. Connectivity and nonnegative edge lengths make that specification meaningful. Let GpG_pGp​ be the complete graph on TTT, with edge {u,v}\{u,v\}{u,v} of weight d(u,v)d(u,v)d(u,v). A 1-matching MMM pairs every node of TTT with exactly one distinct node. Its length is L(M)=∑{u,v}∈Md(u,v)L(M)=\sum_{\{u,v\}\in M}d(u,v)L(M)=∑{u,v}∈M​d(u,v), equivalently half the sum of d(v,f(v))d(v,f(v))d(v,f(v)) over v∈Tv\in Tv∈T for the pairing involution fff (§3, p. 92).

Formalization targets

Odd-node matching reduction

The goal asserts the existence of a 1-matching of the odd nodes and both directions of the cost comparison:

∀M  ∃x satisfying the parity equations:xe∈{0,1}, z(x)≤L(M),\forall M\;\exists x\text{ satisfying the parity equations}:\quad x_e\in\{0,1\},\ z(x)\le L(M),∀M∃x satisfying the parity equations:xe​∈{0,1}, z(x)≤L(M), ∀x satisfying the parity equations  ∃M:L(M)≤z(x).\forall x\text{ satisfying the parity equations}\;\exists M:\quad L(M)\le z(x).∀x satisfying the parity equations∃M:L(M)≤z(x).

The existence conclusion and these comparisons identify the two attained minimum values. The goal does not prescribe a particular matching algorithm. Its supporting targets are the paper's uncrossing of overlapping shortest paths, parity of their union, reduction of multiplicities to zero or one, and decomposition of a parity solution into paths between odd nodes (§3, pp. 92–93).

Postman-tour reduction

The companion target relates a tour's edge counts to the parity equations. A postman tour traverses edge eee exactly 1+xe1+x_e1+xe​ times, and its length is

∑e∈Ece(1+xe)=∑e∈Ece+z(x).\sum_{e\in E}c_e(1+x_e) =\sum_{e\in E}c_e+z(x).e∈E∑​ce​(1+xe​)=e∈E∑​ce​+z(x).

Conversely, positive integer edge counts with even incidence at every node can be ordered into a postman tour of a connected graph. The supporting Euler theorem handles a connected even multigraph (§2, p. 89).

Significance

The matching result characterizes the optimal additional cost of an undirected postman route. It says that the parity correction can be chosen from paths pairing odd nodes, and that no feasible choice of repeated traversals can beat the best such pairing. The companion identifies how that correction becomes an actual tour. The distinction is useful when one wants to change the matching method while retaining the mathematical guarantee on route length.

A formal development would provide a reusable account of finite multigraph walks whose edge names distinguish parallel edges, of shortest-path distances with explicit attainment, and of parity subgraphs decomposed into odd-to-odd paths and even-degree residual tours. These pieces support later formal work on route inspection, TTT-joins, and matching-based graph algorithms. The paper proves the mathematical result. The exact multigraph and cost statements drafted here are open formalization targets; the local prior-art search found related results for simple graphs and metric traveling-salesman models, but no published statement with this paper's objects and conclusion.

Difficulty

A direct shortest-path construction can assign the same original edge to two matching pairs. Simply setting xe=1x_e=1xe​=1 for the union then loses the additivity of path lengths, and setting xe=2x_e=2xe​=2 loses the promised zero-or-one form. The uncrossing claim must control both the matching cost and the number of times each original edge appears. In the converse direction, an arbitrary feasible xxx may contain repeated edges and cycles; the argument must account for these without assuming that every supported edge belongs to a path between odd nodes (§3, pp. 92–93).

Formalization scope

Lean uses the published EdmondsMatching65.Polyhedron.Graph for GGG: finite node and edge types and an endpoint map into unordered node pairs. A proof field excludes loops; distinct edge names may have identical endpoints. Walks use lists of nodes and named edges with zero-based indices, and the one-node, zero-edge walk is allowed. Edge multiplicities and parity witnesses are natural numbers. Costs and shortest-path lengths are real. The distance relation requires both an attaining edge-simple path and a bound against all walks; no real infimum over a possibly empty family is used. The matching is a fixed-point-free involution on the odd nodes, extended by the identity elsewhere, and each pair contributes half of its two directed distance terms.

The goal assumes a connected graph and nonnegative edge lengths, exactly as the section does. The tour-only results require a nonempty node type because a list-based tour must have a starting node; without it an edgeless graph on no nodes would satisfy connectivity and even degree vacuously. The path-decomposition statement permits unused even-degree cycles. No independent set of “odd nodes” is accepted as input: it is computed from the degree of GGG.

The development needs finite multigraph incidence, edge-labelled walks, shortest paths, finite matchings, parity arithmetic, path uncrossing, and Euler tours. Proofs or useful intermediate results for these objects are welcome, including results applicable to multigraphs beyond the postman setting.

Selected references

  • Jack Edmonds and Ellis L. Johnson, Matching, Euler tours and the Chinese postman, Mathematical Programming 5 (1973), 88–124. DOI: 10.1007/BF01580113.
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CombinatoricsGraph Theory·Captain: mikedeng1

Matching, Euler Tours and the Chinese Postman III: Next-Node Lists Describe an Euler Tour iff Their Last-Exit Edges Form an ArborescenceResearch Paper

Motivation

The Chinese postman problem asks for a shortest closed walk in a graph that traverses every edge at least once. Edmonds and Johnson (Math. Programming 5 (1973) 88–124) reduce it to two subproblems: choosing, by matching, which edges to duplicate so that every node has even degree, and then actually finding an Euler tour of the resulting even graph, a closed walk using every edge exactly once. Euler's theorem guarantees such a tour exists in a connected even graph, but an algorithm has to produce one and represent it compactly.

Section 5 of the paper gives two such representations and two algorithms. This mission formalizes the next-node representation: for each node nnn, a list of the nodes the tour goes to when leaving nnn. Theorem 5.1, which the paper attributes to its reference [1] (van Aardenne-Ehrenfest and de Bruijn, 1951) and to Berge's textbook, characterises exactly which lists describe an Euler tour; Theorem 5.2 shows the paper's next-node algorithm produces such lists. The same correspondence between Euler tours and arborescences is the combinatorial core of the BEST theorem on counting Euler tours of directed graphs (van Aardenne-Ehrenfest and de Bruijn, 1951).

Setting

A graph GGG is a finite set of nodes and a finite set EEE of edges, each edge meeting two distinct nodes; several edges may meet the same pair of nodes. The degree deg⁡(n)\deg(n)deg(n) counts the edges meeting nnn, and #(n,m)\#(n,m)#(n,m) counts the edges meeting both nnn and mmm. A tour is an alternating sequence (n1,e1,n2,…,el,nl+1=n1)(n_1, e_1, n_2, \dots, e_l, n_{l+1} = n_1)(n1​,e1​,n2​,…,el​,nl+1​=n1​) in which eie_iei​ meets nin_ini​ and ni+1n_{i+1}ni+1​; an Euler tour contains every edge exactly once. GGG is connected when every two nodes are joined by such a sequence, and even when every degree is even.

Next-node lists assign to each node nnn a list Ln(1),…,Ln(kn)L_n(1), \dots, L_n(k_n)Ln​(1),…,Ln​(kn​) of nodes. Given a starting node rrr, the lists specify a walk: start at rrr; the first time a node nnn is reached (for rrr, at the start), leave it to Ln(kn)L_n(k_n)Ln​(kn​); the second time, to Ln(kn−1)L_n(k_n - 1)Ln​(kn​−1); and so on, so the lists are read from the last entry to the first. The walk stops at the first node whose list is used up. The lists describe an Euler tour when this walk uses every entry of every list and its node sequence is the node sequence of an Euler tour of GGG. With parallel edges, the lists name nodes only, and the edge used at each step is chosen so that every edge is used once.

An arborescence with root rrr is a tree whose edges are directed so that every node n≠rn \ne rn=r has exactly one edge directed away from it, and rrr has none.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 5.1 (p. 112)

For any node rrr of an even, connected graph GGG, next-node lists describe an Euler tour from rrr if and only if

(i) kn=12deg⁡(n)  ∀n,(ii) #(n,m)=∣{i:Lm(i)=n}∣+∣{i:Ln(i)=m}∣  ∀n,m,(iii) { n→Ln(1):n≠r } is an arborescence with root r.\text{(i)}\ k_n = \tfrac12\deg(n)\ \ \forall n,\qquad \text{(ii)}\ \#(n,m) = |\{i : L_m(i) = n\}| + |\{i : L_n(i) = m\}|\ \ \forall n, m,\qquad \text{(iii)}\ \{\,n \to L_n(1) : n \ne r\,\}\ \text{is an arborescence with root } r .(i) kn​=21​deg(n)  ∀n,(ii) #(n,m)=∣{i:Lm​(i)=n}∣+∣{i:Ln​(i)=m}∣  ∀n,m,(iii) {n→Ln​(1):n=r} is an arborescence with root r.

The printed condition (iii) names the edges (n,Ln(kn))(n, L_n(k_n))(n,Ln​(kn​)); the paper's own proofs of Theorems 5.1 and 5.2 use (n,Ln(1))(n, L_n(1))(n,Ln​(1)), the last exit from nnn, and the printed version is false on a five-edge example. The goal states Ln(1)L_n(1)Ln​(1).

Milestones

The proof on pp. 112–113 splits into five claims, each a milestone:

  1. an Euler tour's lists satisfy (i) and (ii);
  2. every node set SSS with r∉Sr \notin Sr∈/S has a last-exit edge n→Ln(1)n \to L_n(1)n→Ln​(1) leaving it;
  3. a map with one outgoing edge per node n≠rn \ne rn=r and an edge leaving every set avoiding rrr is an arborescence;
  4. under (i) and (ii) the walk from rrr returns to rrr having traversed every edge meeting rrr;
  5. at that point every node nnn incident to an untraversed edge differs from rrr and still has its last exit Ln(1)L_n(1)Ln​(1) unused.

Companion: Theorem 5.2 (p. 112)

The lists produced by any complete run of the next-node algorithm of §5.2 satisfy (i), (ii) and (iii); together with Theorem 5.1, they describe an Euler tour.

Significance

Theorem 5.1 replaces a global property, that a walk uses each edge exactly once, by three local checks: list lengths, pair counts, and a tree condition on one distinguished entry per node. That is what makes the next-node representation usable. An algorithm only has to build lists with (i)–(iii), and Theorem 5.2 shows the paper's algorithm does so for every nondeterministic choice it makes. The same arborescence condition counts Euler tours in the BEST theorem: each arborescence and each ordering of the remaining exits gives a distinct tour.

The results have been proved since 1951. What this mission proposes is a Lean formalization on multigraphs with parallel edges, which is the setting the Chinese postman reduction needs, since duplicated edges are parallel. A search of Mathlib and of the platform finds no formalization of Theorem 5.1, of next-node lists, or of arborescences in this form. Mathlib has Eulerian walks only for simple graphs, and the existing platform statements of Euler's theorem (for example SupplyChainTheory.euler_tour_iff) are about simple graphs and existence only.

Difficulty

The necessity of (i) and (ii) is counting. The substance is in two places.

First, necessity of (iii): the last exits must be shown to leave every set avoiding rrr. The tempting choice of the first exits Ln(kn)L_n(k_n)Ln​(kn​), which is what the theorem's printed text says, is wrong: on an Euler tour the first exits can form a cycle, so any argument that does not distinguish first from last exits cannot work.

Second, the converse: a walk that follows lists satisfying only (i) and (ii) can return to rrr early and leave edges untraversed, so (iii) is indispensable, and the statement depends on exactly which list entries have been used when the walk stops. Making that bookkeeping precise for a walk defined by a counter per node, and turning the used entries into an actual edge sequence in a multigraph, is the main formal work. For Theorem 5.2 the difficulty is the invariant of a nondeterministic algorithm: every trail it starts closes at its starting node because the graph is even.

Formalization scope

All declarations live in the namespace ChinesePostman.NextNode. A graph is a local ChinesePostman.NextNode.Graph V E structure on finite types: ends : E → Sym2 V and a proof that no edge is a loop, so parallel edges are distinct elements of E with the same ends. Walks are pairs of a node list and an edge list. A list LnL_nLn​ is a Lean List V, so Ln(i)L_n(i)Ln​(i) is the entry at index i−1i-1i−1 and knk_nkn​ is the length. The walk specified by the lists is computed by follow L r, a fuel-bounded iteration whose state is the current node and the number of departures made from each node. It returns the node sequence and the final counters. DescribesEulerTour G r L requires every counter to reach the list length and some edge list to make the node sequence an Euler tour. Condition (ii) is quantified over all pairs including n=mn = mn=m, where it forbids a node in its own list. Condition (iii) requires every list of a node n≠rn \ne rn=r to be nonempty, its chosen exit to be an edge of GGG, and requires the iterates of the parent map n↦Ln(1)n \mapsto L_n(1)n↦Ln​(1) (with r↦rr \mapsto rr↦r) to reach rrr from every node. The next-node algorithm is an inductive step relation on states, and "produced" means reachable termination from the Step 0 state.

Added hypotheses: Theorem 5.2 and its corollary assume an edge e0e_0e0​ meeting rrr, which Step 0 needs; a one-node graph without edges satisfies Theorem 5.1 trivially and is not excluded. Milestones drop the hypotheses their claims do not use (connectivity, evenness), which makes them stronger.

A trivializing formalization is ruled out explicitly: the lists are read backwards, from Ln(kn)L_n(k_n)Ln​(kn​) to Ln(1)L_n(1)Ln​(1), and must all be used up. Reading them forwards, dropping the "uses every entry" clause, or stating (iii) with an empty-list default for the parent would each make a different, and in some cases false, statement.

The development needs walks on multigraphs, counting arguments for closed walks (in-degree equals out-degree along the walk), and a finite pigeonhole/orbit argument for the arborescence. The arborescence lemma (milestone 3) is graph-free and reusable. Proofs of any milestone, and of the multigraph walk lemmas they need, are welcome.

Selected references

  • J. Edmonds and E. L. Johnson, Matching, Euler tours and the Chinese postman, Mathematical Programming 5 (1973) 88–124. https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01580113
  • T. van Aardenne-Ehrenfest and N. G. de Bruijn, Circuits and trees in oriented linear graphs, Simon Stevin 28 (1951) 203–217 (reference [1] of the paper, cited there as "Circuits and trees in oriented graphs").
  • C. Berge, The Theory of Graphs and its Applications, Wiley, New York, 1962 (reference [3] of the paper).
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CombinatoricsOptimization·Captain: mikedeng1

Minimum Partition of a Matroid Into Independent Subsets: A Matroid Splits Into k Independent Sets Iff Every Subset A Has |A| ≤ k·r(A)Research Paper

Motivation

A matroid abstracts the dependence structure of the columns of a matrix: which sets of columns are linearly independent, forgetting the numbers themselves. Graphs are the special case of incidence matrices over the integers mod 2, where a set of edges is independent exactly when it contains no cycle. A natural combinatorial question in this setting is the minimum partition (or covering) problem: how few independent sets are needed to cover all the elements? For a graph this is the least number of forests that cover its edges, its arboricity.

J. Edmonds answered this question for every finite matroid in Minimum partition of a matroid into independent subsets (J. Res. NBS 69B, 1965, doi:10.6028/jres.069b.004). The answer is a good characterization in Edmonds's sense: there is a short certificate both that a partition into kkk independent sets exists (the partition itself) and that it does not (a single subset that is too large for its rank). The paper is also the source of the matroid partition algorithm, which together with matroid intersection became a basic tool of combinatorial optimization.

Timeline:

  • 1935 — H. Whitney introduces matroids through rank and independence postulates (doi:10.2307/2371182).
  • 1961–1964 — C. St. J. A. Nash-Williams and W. T. Tutte characterize graphs whose edges split into kkk forests, and graphs containing kkk edge-disjoint spanning trees (doi:10.1112/jlms/s1-39.1.12).
  • 1965 — Edmonds proves the partition theorem for all matroids, with Nash-Williams's forest theorem as a corollary; the companion paper "Lehman's switching game and a theorem of Tutte and Nash-Williams" treats the packing side.

Setting

Let MMM be a finite set of elements and call some subsets of MMM independent. Edmonds's two axioms are:

  • Axiom 1. Every subset of an independent set is independent. (A system satisfying this is an independence system.)
  • Axiom 2. For any subset AAA of the elements, all maximal independent sets contained in AAA contain the same number of elements.

A matroid is a system satisfying both. The rank r(A)r(A)r(A) of A⊆MA\subseteq MA⊆M is the largest cardinality of an independent subset of AAA; in a matroid every maximal independent subset of AAA has exactly r(A)r(A)r(A) elements.

A circuit is a minimal dependent set. A span (closed set) is a set SSS such that no circuit has exactly one element outside SSS, and the span S(A)S(A)S(A) of AAA is the minimal span containing AAA. A partition into kkk independent sets is a family I1,…,IkI_1,\dots,I_kI1​,…,Ik​ of mutually disjoint independent sets whose union is MMM; any number of the IiI_iIi​ may be empty.

Formalization targets

Goal: THEOREM 1 (p. 69)

For every finite matroid MMM and every integer k≥0k\ge 0k≥0, the elements of MMM can be partitioned into kkk independent sets if and only if there is no A⊆MA\subseteq MA⊆M with

∣A∣>k⋅r(A).|A|>k\cdot r(A).∣A∣>k⋅r(A).

The condition ranges over all subsets AAA of MMM, as printed.

Milestones

The milestones follow the paper's own lemmas and the claims of its main proof, in order.

  1. PROPOSITION 1. Axioms 1 and 2 are equivalent to Axioms 1 and 2', where Axiom 2' says that the union of an independent set and one element contains at most one circuit.
  2. PROPOSITION 2. Axioms 1 and 2' are equivalent to the circuit axioms 1c (no circuit contains another) and 2c (if distinct circuits C1,C2C_1,C_2C1​,C2​ share eee, then C1∪C2−eC_1\cup C_2-eC1​∪C2​−e contains a circuit).
  3. PROPOSITION 3 (Lehman). If e∈C1∩C2e\in C_1\cap C_2e∈C1​∩C2​ and a∈C1−C2a\in C_1-C_2a∈C1​−C2​ for circuits C1,C2C_1,C_2C1​,C2​, some circuit CCC satisfies a∈C⊆C1∪C2−ea\in C\subseteq C_1\cup C_2-ea∈C⊆C1​∪C2​−e.
  4. PROPOSITION 4. e∈S(A)e\in S(A)e∈S(A) if and only if e∈Ae\in Ae∈A or some circuit CCC has C−A={e}C-A=\{e\}C−A={e}.
  5. PROPOSITION 5. S(A)S(A)S(A) is the unique maximal set containing AAA with rank r(A)r(A)r(A); in particular r(S(I))=∣I∣r(S(I))=|I|r(S(I))=∣I∣ for independent III.
  6. "Only if" (§1.3). For any independence system, a partition into kkk independent sets gives ∣A∣≤k⋅r(A)|A|\le k\cdot r(A)∣A∣≤k⋅r(A) for all AAA.
  7. Counting step (§1.6). If xxx lies in none of kkk disjoint sets IiI_iIi​, and x∈Sx\in Sx∈S with ∣S∣≤k r(S)|S|\le k\,r(S)∣S∣≤kr(S), then some IiI_iIi​ has ∣Ii∩S∣<r(S)|I_i\cap S|<r(S)∣Ii​∩S∣<r(S).
  8. Rank drop (§1.6). For a span SSS and an independent III with ∣I∩S∣<r(S)|I\cap S|<r(S)∣I∩S∣<r(S): S(I∩S)⊆SS(I\cap S)\subseteq SS(I∩S)⊆S and r(S(I∩S))<r(S)r(S(I\cap S))<r(S)r(S(I∩S))<r(S).
  9. One-element augmentation (§1.6). If ∣S∣≤k r(S)|S|\le k\,r(S)∣S∣≤kr(S) for every span SSS, any kkk disjoint independent sets missing xxx can be rearranged into kkk disjoint independent sets covering exactly the old elements and xxx.
  10. "If" from spans (§1.6). If ∣S∣≤k⋅r(S)|S|\le k\cdot r(S)∣S∣≤k⋅r(S) holds for every span SSS, then MMM partitions into kkk independent sets.

A further item states the paper's COROLLARY (Nash-Williams): the edges of a loopless finite graph GGG can be colored with kkk colors so that no circuit is one color if and only if no nonempty node set UUU has ∣EU∣>k(∣U∣−1)|E_U|>k(|U|-1)∣EU​∣>k(∣U∣−1), where EUE_UEU​ is the set of edges with both ends in UUU.

Significance

THEOREM 1 is the base case of matroid union: the sets coverable by kkk independent sets form a matroid whose rank is min⁡A(∣M∖A∣+k r(A))\min_{A}\bigl(|M\setminus A|+k\,r(A)\bigr)minA​(∣M∖A∣+kr(A)), and the paper's proof is the origin of the polynomial-time matroid partition algorithm and of Edmonds's later matroid intersection theory. Its graphic case gives the arboricity formula of Nash-Williams, used for sparse-graph decompositions and orientation problems. The criterion is a certificate: a single set AAA with ∣A∣>k r(A)|A|>k\,r(A)∣A∣>kr(A) proves that no partition exists.

The theorem has been proved since 1965 and appears in every matroid textbook. As far as the platform and Mathlib record, it has no machine-checked proof: Mathlib has matroids, circuits, closure and strong circuit elimination for its own Matroid structure, but no matroid union or partition theorem. This mission produces a formal proof from Edmonds's own axioms (Axiom 2 as an equal-cardinality condition, not an exchange axiom), together with the equivalences between his axiom systems, which are themselves standard results.

Difficulty

The "only if" direction is a three-line count. The difficulty lies in the converse: a greedy procedure that fills the kkk sets one after another fails even for matroids, so an element xxx that fits in no current set must be accommodated by moving other elements between sets. Such a chain of exchanges must keep all kkk sets independent and disjoint at every step and must terminate; stating it with sets whose contents change while their labels persist is the part that needs careful bookkeeping in a formal proof. A second, smaller difficulty is the translation between the paper's equal-cardinality Axiom 2 and the circuit and span language its proof uses (PROPOSITIONS 1–5).

Formalization scope

  • Elements. A finite type α\alphaα with decidable equality; MMM is Finset.univ, subsets are Finset α, and the independent sets are a predicate Indep : Finset α → Prop.
  • Axiom 1 and the rank are the published Whitney definitions IndepI1 and rankOfIndep (WhitneyMatroid.RankIndep.Postulates). The rank is integer-valued, and every inequality ∣A∣|A|∣A∣ versus k r(A)k\,r(A)kr(A) is compared in Z\mathbb ZZ with k∈Nk\in\mathbb Nk∈N.
  • Axiom 2 is stated exactly as printed: maximal independent subsets of each AAA have equal cardinality. It is not replaced by an augmentation axiom or by Mathlib's Matroid.
  • Added hypothesis. Every matroid statement assumes that ∅\emptyset∅ is independent. The paper's rank presupposes it; for the empty family Axioms 1 and 2 hold vacuously and THEOREM 1 fails (an empty ground set and k=1k=1k=1).
  • Spans are formalized from the paper's words, ∣C∖S∣≠1|C\setminus S|\ne1∣C∖S∣=1 for every circuit CCC; the formula printed beside them, ∣S∩C∣≠1|S\cap C|\ne1∣S∩C∣=1, is a misprint. S(A)S(A)S(A) is the intersection of all spans containing AAA.
  • Partitions are indexed families Fin k → Finset α of pairwise disjoint independent sets covering MMM, with empty parts allowed and k=0k=0k=0 included.
  • The COROLLARY uses a graph given by ends : E → Sym2 V (parallel edges allowed, loops excluded), with independence as linear independence of incidence columns over Z/2Z\mathbb Z/2\mathbb ZZ/2Z. It quantifies over nonempty UUU: as printed, U=∅U=\emptysetU=∅ makes the statement false.
  • Not a trivialization. The goal mentions neither spans nor circuits and quantifies over all subsets AAA; the spans-only condition is a separate milestone, and the augmentation step requires the new family to cover exactly the old elements plus xxx.

Contributions welcome: proofs of the axiom equivalences (reusable for any work with Edmonds-style or circuit-axiom matroids), the span lemmas, the augmentation step, and bridges to Mathlib's Matroid that would let its circuit and closure library be reused.

Selected references

  • J. Edmonds, Minimum partition of a matroid into independent subsets, J. Res. Nat. Bur. Standards 69B (1965), 67–72. doi:10.6028/jres.069b.004
  • J. Edmonds, Lehman's switching game and a theorem of Tutte and Nash-Williams, J. Res. Nat. Bur. Standards 69B (1965), 73–77. doi:10.6028/jres.069b.005
  • C. St. J. A. Nash-Williams, Decomposition of finite graphs into forests, J. London Math. Soc. 39 (1964), 12. doi:10.1112/jlms/s1-39.1.12
  • H. Whitney, On the abstract properties of linear dependence, Amer. J. Math. 57 (1935), 509–533. doi:10.2307/2371182
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Linear algebraNumerical AnalysisOptimization·Captain: mikedeng1

Truncated-Newton Algorithms for Large-Scale Unconstrained Optimization 2: Exact CG Meets Nonpositive Curvature Unless g Is Orthogonal to the Nonpositive Eigenspaces of HResearch Paper

Motivation

Truncated-Newton methods minimize a smooth function f:Rn→Rf:\mathbb{R}^n\to\mathbb{R}f:Rn→R by taking, at each iterate xkx_kxk​, a search direction obtained by solving the Newton equation H(xk)p=−g(xk)H(x_k)p=-g(x_k)H(xk​)p=−g(xk​) only approximately, with the linear conjugate gradient (CG) method. Here ggg is the gradient and HHH the Hessian of fff. The approach was analysed by Dembo and Steihaug (Math. Programming 26, 1983), building on the inexact Newton framework of Dembo, Eisenstat and Steihaug (SIAM J. Numer. Anal. 19, 1982), and Newton–CG with curvature tests remains a standard large-scale method (Nocedal and Wright, Numerical Optimization, Ch. 7).

Away from a minimizer the Hessian need not be positive definite, and CG on an indefinite system can produce directions along which fff curves downward. The Dembo–Steihaug method stops CG when it meets such a direction. A practical question follows: started at or near a stationary point that is not a local minimizer, will the method ever notice the nonpositive curvature? Theorem 2.4 of the paper answers it for exact CG: it does, except in a degenerate case described by the eigenspaces of HHH.

Setting

Fix a symmetric linear operator HHH on Rn\mathbb{R}^nRn, with the Euclidean inner product uTvu^{\mathsf T}vuTv and norm ∥⋅∥\|\cdot\|∥⋅∥, and a vector g∈Rng\in\mathbb{R}^ng∈Rn. In the paper these are H(xk)H(x_k)H(xk​) and g(xk)g(x_k)g(xk​) at the current iterate.

The TNCG minor iteration (p. 194) runs CG on Hp=−gHp=-gHp=−g from p0=0p_0=0p0​=0. Its state at iteration iii is (pi,ri,di,δi)(p_i,r_i,d_i,\delta_i)(pi​,ri​,di​,δi​):

p0=0,r0=−g,d0=r0,δ0=r0Tr0,p_0=0,\quad r_0=-g,\quad d_0=r_0,\quad \delta_0=r_0^{\mathsf T}r_0,p0​=0,r0​=−g,d0​=r0​,δ0​=r0T​r0​,

and, writing qi=Hdiq_i=Hd_iqi​=Hdi​,

αi=riTridiTqi,  pi+1=pi+αidi,  ri+1=ri−αiqi,  βi=ri+1Tri+1riTri,  di+1=ri+1+βidi,  δi+1=ri+1Tri+1+βi2δi.\alpha_i=\frac{r_i^{\mathsf T}r_i}{d_i^{\mathsf T}q_i},\ \ p_{i+1}=p_i+\alpha_id_i,\ \ r_{i+1}=r_i-\alpha_iq_i,\ \ \beta_i=\frac{r_{i+1}^{\mathsf T}r_{i+1}}{r_i^{\mathsf T}r_i},\ \ d_{i+1}=r_{i+1}+\beta_id_i,\ \ \delta_{i+1}=r_{i+1}^{\mathsf T}r_{i+1}+\beta_i^2\delta_i .αi​=diT​qi​riT​ri​​,  pi+1​=pi​+αi​di​,  ri+1​=ri​−αi​qi​,  βi​=riT​ri​ri+1T​ri+1​​,  di+1​=ri+1​+βi​di​,  δi+1​=ri+1T​ri+1​+βi2​δi​.

At iteration iii the method first applies the curvature test (2.1), diTHdi≤ε δid_i^{\mathsf T}Hd_i\le\varepsilon\,\delta_idiT​Hdi​≤εδi​, and stops if it holds; otherwise it computes ri+1r_{i+1}ri+1​ and applies the truncation test (2.2), ∥ri+1∥/∥g∥≤η\|r_{i+1}\|/\|g\|\le\eta∥ri+1​∥/∥g∥≤η, and stops if it holds. With ε=η=0\varepsilon=\eta=0ε=η=0, (2.1) reads diTHdi≤0d_i^{\mathsf T}Hd_i\le0diT​Hdi​≤0 and (2.2) reads ri+1=0r_{i+1}=0ri+1​=0. The method exits through (2.1) at iii when no test fired at any iteration j<ij<ij<i and (2.1) holds at iii.

For μ∈R\mu\in\mathbb{R}μ∈R the eigenspace is E(μ,H)={v:Hv=μv}E(\mu,H)=\{v: Hv=\mu v\}E(μ,H)={v:Hv=μv} (A.21). The span of vectors v1,…,vmv_1,\dots,v_mv1​,…,vm​ is written [v1,…,vm][v_1,\dots,v_m][v1​,…,vm​]; the Krylov space of ggg is [g,Hg,…,Hmg][g,Hg,\dots,H^{m}g][g,Hg,…,Hmg].

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 2.4 (p. 197)

Let ηk=ε=0\eta_k=\varepsilon=0ηk​=ε=0. If HHH is not positive definite, then either the minor iteration exits through (2.1) at some iteration iii, so that

diTHdi≤0at an iteration i the method reaches,d_i^{\mathsf T}Hd_i\le 0 \quad\text{at an iteration } i \text{ the method reaches},diT​Hdi​≤0at an iteration i the method reaches,

or

gTv=0for every v with Hv=μv, μ≤0.g^{\mathsf T}v=0\quad\text{for every } v \text{ with } Hv=\mu v,\ \mu\le0 .gTv=0for every v with Hv=μv, μ≤0.

Milestones

  1. Theorem A.1, (A.2) and (A.5), at ε=0\varepsilon=0ε=0 (p. 206). If diTHdi>0d_i^{\mathsf T}Hd_i>0diT​Hdi​>0 for i=0,…,ki=0,\dots,ki=0,…,k, then diTHdj=0d_i^{\mathsf T}Hd_j=0diT​Hdj​=0 for i≠j≤ki\ne j\le ki=j≤k, and [d0,…,dk]=[g,Hg,…,Hkg][d_0,\dots,d_k]=[g,Hg,\dots,H^kg][d0​,…,dk​]=[g,Hg,…,Hkg].
  2. Theorem A.5 (p. 210). If ggg has a nonzero projection on each eigenspace of HHH, kkk is the number of distinct eigenvalues, and vectors d0,…,dk−1d_0,\dots,d_{k-1}d0​,…,dk−1​ are HHH-conjugate with (di,Hdi)>0(d_i,Hd_i)>0(di​,Hdi​)>0 and span [g,…,Hk−1g][g,\dots,H^{k-1}g][g,…,Hk−1g], then HHH is positive definite.
  3. The first sentence of the proof of Theorem 2.4 (p. 211). If ggg is not orthogonal to any eigenspace of HHH, and exact CG passes the curvature test up to iteration iii and ends with ri+1=0r_{i+1}=0ri+1​=0, then HHH is positive definite.

Significance

The theorem is the theoretical justification, given in the paper on p. 197, for using the direction of negative curvature did_idi​ produced in case (ii) of the minor iteration: with exact arithmetic and no truncation, CG either produces a direction of nonpositive curvature or the gradient lies entirely in the span of eigenvectors with positive eigenvalues. The paper draws the consequence that if xk→x∗x_k\to x^*xk​→x∗ and the method terminates through (2.2), then, outside this rare case, x∗x^*x∗ is a strong local minimizer. Theorem A.5 is a self-contained statement about conjugate families in Krylov spaces, usable in any analysis of CG on indefinite systems.

The result is proved in the paper (Appendix, pp. 206–211), with the CG relations of Theorem A.1 cited from Hestenes and Stiefel. No machine-checked proof of these statements is known to this mission. Formalizing them produces a Lean development of CG on a symmetric, possibly indefinite operator, with its conjugacy and Krylov-span relations, which classical treatments state only for positive definite systems.

Difficulty

The CG relations of Theorem A.1 are usually proved for positive definite HHH, where every denominator is positive. Here HHH is indefinite, and the relations hold only as long as the curvature along the directions has stayed positive; the induction must carry that hypothesis and must also show the residuals do not vanish early. The passage from "CG ended with r=0r=0r=0" to a statement about all eigenspaces is the second obstacle: the CG run sees only the Krylov space of ggg, so one must relate that space to the eigenspaces that ggg meets, using symmetry of HHH and a count of distinct eigenvalues. A direct argument via "the directions span Rn\mathbb{R}^nRn" fails, because when ggg misses an eigenspace the Krylov space is a proper subspace.

Formalization scope

Rn\mathbb{R}^nRn is EuclideanSpace ℝ (Fin n); HHH is a continuous linear map that is self-adjoint (IsSelfAdjoint H), as the paper's HHH is a Hessian. Positive definiteness is vTHv>0v^{\mathsf T}Hv>0vTHv>0 for all v≠0v\ne0v=0. The CG recursion is total and carries no stopping test; division by zero returns 000 in Lean, so states after a would-be stop are junk, and the statements read the iteration only through first-exit predicates. The test (2.2) is encoded in the product form ∥ri+1∥≤η∥g∥\|r_{i+1}\|\le\eta\|g\|∥ri+1​∥≤η∥g∥.

Theorem 2.4 is stated for an arbitrary symmetric HHH and vector ggg rather than at an iterate of a run of the full algorithm. It uses nothing else about fff or the run, and every such pair occurs as the Hessian and gradient of an admissible objective. The paper's (A.5) prints Hk−1gH^{k-1}gHk−1g as the last Krylov vector; the correct HkgH^kgHkg is used.

A trivializing formalization exists and is ruled out: the first alternative is not "diTHdi≤0d_i^{\mathsf T}Hd_i\le0diT​Hdi​≤0 for some iii" over the unstopped recursion, which holds automatically once a residual vanishes (the recursion then continues with d=0d=0d=0); it requires that iteration iii is reached with no earlier exit. The goal does not assume conjugacy, the Krylov span identity, or the hypotheses of Theorem A.5.

A complete development needs the spectral theorem for self-adjoint operators on finite-dimensional spaces (in Mathlib), finiteness of the set of eigenvalues, and the CG invariants. The CG lemmas are reusable for any Newton–CG or trust-region CG analysis. Proofs of the milestones, and of auxiliary CG invariants such as (A.3)–(A.4), are welcome.

Selected references

  • R. S. Dembo and T. Steihaug, Truncated-Newton algorithms for large-scale unconstrained optimization, Mathematical Programming 26 (1983) 190–212. https://doi.org/10.1007/BF02592055
  • R. S. Dembo, S. C. Eisenstat and T. Steihaug, Inexact Newton methods, SIAM Journal on Numerical Analysis 19 (1982) 400–408. https://doi.org/10.1137/0719025
  • M. R. Hestenes and E. Stiefel, Methods of conjugate gradients for solving linear systems, Journal of Research of the National Bureau of Standards 49 (1952) 409–436. https://doi.org/10.6028/jres.049.044
  • T. Steihaug, The conjugate gradient method and trust regions in large scale optimization, SIAM Journal on Numerical Analysis 20 (1983) 626–637. https://doi.org/10.1137/0720042
  • J. Nocedal and S. J. Wright, Numerical Optimization, 2nd ed., Springer, 2006. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-0-387-40065-5
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The Complexity of Markov Decision Processes II: The Optimal Average Cost of a Deterministic Process Is the Least Mean Cost of a Cycle Reachable from the Initial StateResearch Paper

Motivation

A Markov decision process describes repeated choices whose costs and subsequent states depend on the current state. Such models are used when a decision affects both today's expense and the options available tomorrow. Papadimitriou and Tsitsiklis studied how the computational difficulty of finding an optimal policy changes between stochastic and deterministic transitions. Their general finite-state problems are P-complete, while their deterministic cases admit highly parallel algorithms Papadimitriou and Tsitsiklis, 1987. The contrast makes the deterministic case a useful setting in which to isolate the precise graph problem hidden inside long-run optimization.

This mission concerns their infinite-horizon average-cost case. When transitions are certain, every decision is an arc in a directed graph. The long-run cost of a policy can be related to the mean cost of a cycle reachable from the initial state. That relation is the mathematical claim supporting the algorithm in the paper's Theorem 3, whose headline says that the deterministic average-cost problem is in NC Papadimitriou and Tsitsiklis, p. 446.

Setting

Let SSS be a finite set of states and s0∈Ss_0\in Ss0​∈S the initial state. At each s∈Ss\in Ss∈S there is a finite, nonempty decision set DsD_sDs​. A decision d∈Dsd\in D_sd∈Ds​ has a real cost c(s,d)c(s,d)c(s,d) and moves the process with certainty to next⁡(s,d)∈S\operatorname{next}(s,d)\in Snext(s,d)∈S. All of these data are stationary: they do not change with time. A policy δ(s,t)\delta(s,t)δ(s,t) chooses a decision for each state and each time t=0,1,2,…t=0,1,2,\ldotst=0,1,2,…. It generates a trajectory by st+1=next⁡(st,δ(st,t))s_{t+1}=\operatorname{next}(s_t,\delta(s_t,t))st+1​=next(st​,δ(st​,t)). The corresponding directed graph has a state for each node and a decision for each arc. It may contain loops and parallel arcs, since different decisions can lead to the same next state.

The paper prints the finite average with T+1T+1T+1 cost terms and denominator TTT:

aTδ(s0)=1T∑t=0Tc(st,δ(st,t)).a_T^\delta(s_0)=\frac{1}{T}\sum_{t=0}^{T}c(s_t,\delta(s_t,t)).aTδ​(s0​)=T1​t=0∑T​c(st​,δ(st​,t)).

A time-dependent policy's averages may fail to converge. We use the upper limit gδ(s0)=lim sup⁡T→∞aTδ(s0)g^\delta(s_0)=\limsup_{T\to\infty}a_T^\delta(s_0)gδ(s0​)=limsupT→∞​aTδ​(s0​) and optimize over all policies, g∗(s0)=inf⁡δgδ(s0)g^*(s_0)=\inf_\delta g^\delta(s_0)g∗(s0​)=infδ​gδ(s0​). A state uuu is reachable if some finite walk of decision arcs goes from s0s_0s0​ to uuu. A simple cycle CCC is a positive-length closed sequence of decision arcs with distinct states before it returns to its start; its mean cost is mean⁡(C)=c(C)/∣C∣\operatorname{mean}(C)=c(C)/|C|mean(C)=c(C)/∣C∣. A loop is a one-arc simple cycle.

For states u,vu,vu,v, the min-plus adjacency entry AuvA_{uv}Auv​ is the least cost of a decision arc from uuu to vvv, or +∞+\infty+∞ when no such arc exists. A min-plus product uses addition in place of multiplication and minimum in place of addition. Thus (Ak)uv(A^k)_{uv}(Ak)uv​ represents the least cost of a kkk-arc walk from uuu to vvv, when such a walk exists Papadimitriou and Tsitsiklis, pp. 445–446.

Formalization targets

Reachable cycles

The first target identifies the value of the original policy optimization problem:

g∗(s0)=min⁡C simple cycleC reachable from s0mean⁡(C).g^*(s_0)=\min_{\substack{C\text{ simple cycle}\\C\text{ reachable from }s_0}}\operatorname{mean}(C).g∗(s0​)=C simple cycleC reachable from s0​​min​mean(C).

It also states that a policy attains this value with convergent finite averages. The milestone for following a reachable cycle gives the attainable direction; the milestone saying that no policy can improve the least mean gives the reverse direction. The latter is formulated with lim inf⁡\liminfliminf, so it applies even when a policy's averages oscillate.

Min-plus calculation

The second target identifies the finite graph calculation used in the paper:

g∗(s0)=min⁡u reachable from s01≤k≤∣S∣(Ak)uu<+∞(Ak)uuk.g^*(s_0)=\min_{\substack{u\text{ reachable from }s_0\\1\leq k\leq |S|\\(A^k)_{uu}<+\infty}}\frac{(A^k)_{uu}}{k}.g∗(s0​)=u reachable from s0​1≤k≤∣S∣(Ak)uu​<+∞​min​k(Ak)uu​​.

The milestones establish what a min-plus power says about decision walks and why closed walks of lengths from 111 through ∣S∣|S|∣S∣ recover the least simple-cycle mean. The restriction to reachable uuu is essential: a cheap cycle in a disconnected component cannot be used from s0s_0s0​.

Significance

The result reduces optimization over infinitely many decision times and all state-and-time policies to finitely many closed-walk calculations. It also guarantees that an optimal long-run value is realized by a trajectory with a genuine limiting average, despite the nonconvergence possible for other policies. The finite formula lets one determine the value by comparing graph quantities indexed by states and lengths; it is the correctness statement beneath the paper's parallel algorithm Papadimitriou and Tsitsiklis, p. 446.

Formalizing the identity creates a reusable bridge between deterministic decision processes, weighted directed walks and min-plus powers. Related proved tropical-algebra results on maximum cycle means use dense matrices and a max-plus convention, rather than the reachable, possibly missing-arc, minimum-cost process here; for example, the platform's TropicalLA.tpow_isGreatest concerns greatest walk weights. The present mission keeps the policy optimum and reachability explicit. The paper proves the result mathematically; these Lean statements are open proof targets in the proposal.

Difficulty

An arbitrary policy can keep changing its choices at repeated visits to the same state. Its averages can oscillate, so one cannot simply assume that its infinite trajectory becomes periodic or that its printed limit exists. The lower-bound claim must apply to every such trajectory. There is a second distinction between a closed walk and a simple cycle: a diagonal min-plus entry allows repeated states, whereas the cycle characterization is stated using simple cycles. Finally, an unrestricted matrix calculation would include cycles unreachable from the chosen initial state.

Formalization scope

Lean represents the general finite stationary deterministic process in its own definition, then defines policies, finite walks, simple cycles, average costs and min-plus powers on top of it. Decisions are arcs, so parallel arcs remain distinguishable; AuvA_{uv}Auv​ takes their least cost and uses WithTop ℝ for a missing arc. Decision sets are explicitly nonempty because a policy has to make a choice at every state. The finite state set is automatically nonempty once s0s_0s0​ is supplied. Policy time starts at zero. The printed T+1T+1T+1 terms divided by TTT are retained; Lean's T=0T=0T=0 quotient is zero and has no effect on the limit. The optimum is the infimum over all policies δ(s,t)\delta(s,t)δ(s,t), not a quantity defined by cycles or by stationary policies. Finite states and finite decision sets bound the one-step costs and hence the averages; this gives real limsup and infimum their intended values.

The paper's Theorem 3 asserts membership in NC. This mission formalizes the exact optimization identity that makes that algorithm correct. Its processor count and parallel-time bound are outside the scope, as are membership in P, log-space computability of reductions, PSPACE membership and the paper's Corollaries 1–2. Contributions to the finite-walk and min-plus lemmas, the lower bound for arbitrary policy paths, and the cycle-attainment statement are all needed; the graph definitions can be reused in other deterministic control problems.

Selected references

  • Christos H. Papadimitriou and John N. Tsitsiklis, The Complexity of Markov Decision Processes, Mathematics of Operations Research 12(3), 1987, pp. 441–450. DOI.
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Truly Subcubic APSP on a Word RAMResearch Paper

All-pairs shortest paths (APSP) computes the shortest distance between every pair of vertices in a weighted graph. It is a fundamental problem in graph algorithms and a fundamental problem in fine-grained complexity.

This mission formalizes a deterministic O(n2.99942)O(n^{2.99942})O(n2.99942) algorithm for APSP on directed nnn-vertex graphs with polynomially bounded integer edge weights and no negative cycles, on a word RAM with O(log⁡n)O(\log n)O(logn)-bit words. This is a truly subcubic bound and refutes the integer-weight APSP hypothesis in this model.

References:

  1. Josh Alman and Virginia Vassilevska Williams, Truly Subquadratic 3SUM and Truly Subcubic APSP via Triangles in Sparse Lopsided Graphs, 2026, Theorem 22.
  2. Anthropic, formal-math / 3sum-apsp: accompanying Lean formalization, Theorem_22_APSP.
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CombinatoricsOperations ResearchTheoretical Computer Science·Captain: mikedeng1

Approximation Algorithms for Scheduling Unrelated Parallel Machines 3: On the 3-Dimensional Matching Instances, a Schedule within ρ < 3/2 of Optimal Has Makespan ≤ 2 Iff a Matching ExistsResearch Paper

Motivation

Minimum makespan scheduling on unrelated parallel machines, written R ∣∣ Cmax⁡R\,||\,C_{\max}R∣∣Cmax​, is one of the basic models of scheduling theory: nnn jobs must each be run on one of mmm machines, and the time a job takes depends arbitrarily on the machine. Lenstra, Shmoys and Tardos (CWI Report OS-R8714, 1987; journal version Math. Programming 46, 1990) gave a polynomial 2-approximation algorithm for this problem and, in the same paper, a matching limit from below: no polynomial algorithm can guarantee a factor smaller than 3/23/23/2 unless P=NPP = NPP=NP (their Corollary 2).

The two bounds have stood for more than three decades. Closing the gap between 3/23/23/2 and 222 for R ∣∣ Cmax⁡R\,||\,C_{\max}R∣∣Cmax​ is listed among the central open problems of approximation algorithms (Williamson and Shmoys, The Design of Approximation Algorithms, 2011, open problem on unrelated machines; Schuurman and Woeginger, Polynomial time approximation algorithms for machine scheduling: ten open problems, J. Scheduling 1999). The lower bound of 3/23/23/2 is the subject of this mission.

Timeline:

  • 1979: Graham, Lawler, Lenstra and Rinnooy Kan introduce the classification R ∣∣ Cmax⁡R\,||\,C_{\max}R∣∣Cmax​.
  • 1987/1990: Lenstra, Shmoys and Tardos prove NP-completeness of deciding makespan at most 3 (Theorem 4, giving the bound 4/34/34/3) and at most 2 (Theorem 5, giving 3/23/23/2), both by reduction from 3-dimensional matching.
  • Since then: the 3/23/23/2 hardness bound has not been improved for general R ∣∣ Cmax⁡R\,||\,C_{\max}R∣∣Cmax​; progress has concentrated on special cases such as the restricted-assignment problem.

Setting

3-dimensional matching. There are three disjoint sets A={a1,…,an}A = \{a_1,\dots,a_n\}A={a1​,…,an​}, B={b1,…,bn}B = \{b_1,\dots,b_n\}B={b1​,…,bn​}, C={c1,…,cn}C = \{c_1,\dots,c_n\}C={c1​,…,cn​} and a family F={T1,…,Tm}F = \{T_1,\dots,T_m\}F={T1​,…,Tm​} of triples, each with one element of AAA, one of BBB and one of CCC. A matching is a subfamily F′F'F′ with ∣F′∣=n|F'| = n∣F′∣=n whose union is A∪B∪CA \cup B \cup CA∪B∪C. In Lean an instance is a map T:Fin m→Fin n×Fin n×Fin nT : \mathrm{Fin}\,m \to \mathrm{Fin}\,n \times \mathrm{Fin}\,n \times \mathrm{Fin}\,nT:Finm→Finn×Finn×Finn, and HasMatching T says that a matching exists.

The scheduling model. Machines are Fin m\mathrm{Fin}\,mFinm, jobs are Fin N\mathrm{Fin}\,NFinN, and pijp_{ij}pij​ is the positive integer processing time of job jjj on machine iii. A schedule σ\sigmaσ assigns each job to one machine; the load of machine iii is ∑j:σ(j)=ipij\sum_{j:\sigma(j)=i} p_{ij}∑j:σ(j)=i​pij​ and the makespan Cmax⁡(σ)C_{\max}(\sigma)Cmax​(σ) is the largest load. These are the published definitions MatousekLP.Scheduling.load and makespan.

The instance of Theorem 5. The triples containing aja_jaj​ are the triples of type jjj; let tjt_jtj​ be their number. From TTT the paper builds a scheduling instance with mmm machines, machine iii corresponding to TiT_iTi​, and with

  1. 2n2n2n element jobs, one for each bkb_kbk​ and each clc_lcl​;
  2. tj−1t_j - 1tj​−1 dummy jobs of type jjj, for each jjj.

If Ti=(aj,bk,cl)T_i = (a_j, b_k, c_l)Ti​=(aj​,bk​,cl​), machine iii processes the element jobs of bkb_kbk​ and clc_lcl​ in time 111, each dummy job of type jjj in time 222, and every other job in time 333. In Lean the processing-time matrix is P T.

A ρ\rhoρ-approximate schedule of an instance is a schedule σ\sigmaσ with Cmax⁡(σ)≤ρ Cmax⁡(τ)C_{\max}(\sigma) \le \rho\, C_{\max}(\tau)Cmax​(σ)≤ρCmax​(τ) for every schedule τ\tauτ of the same instance.

Formalization targets

Goal: Corollary 2 (p. 8)

For every instance TTT, every ρ<3/2\rho < 3/2ρ<3/2, and every ρ\rhoρ-approximate schedule σ\sigmaσ of the instance of Theorem 5 built from TTT,

Cmax⁡(σ)≤2  ⟺  T has a matching.C_{\max}(\sigma) \le 2 \iff T \text{ has a matching}.Cmax​(σ)≤2⟺T has a matching.

This is the mathematical content of "for every ρ<3/2\rho < 3/2ρ<3/2 there is no polynomial ρ\rhoρ-approximation algorithm unless P=NPP = NPP=NP": a ρ\rhoρ-approximate answer on the reduced instance decides 3-dimensional matching.

Theorem 5 (p. 7)

For every instance TTT,

∃ σ: Cmax⁡(σ)≤2  ⟺  T has a matching.\exists\,\sigma:\ C_{\max}(\sigma) \le 2 \iff T \text{ has a matching}.∃σ: Cmax​(σ)≤2⟺T has a matching.

Milestones from the proof of Theorem 5 (pp. 7–8)

  1. If every tj≥1t_j \ge 1tj​≥1, then ∑j(tj−1)+n=m\sum_j (t_j - 1) + n = m∑j​(tj​−1)+n=m: there are m−nm - nm−n dummy jobs.
  2. A matching yields a schedule with makespan at most 222.
  3. A schedule with makespan at most 222 yields a matching.

Significance

The result. Theorem 5 shows that R ∣∣ Cmax⁡R\,||\,C_{\max}R∣∣Cmax​ is NP-hard already when every processing time lies in {1,2,3}\{1,2,3\}{1,2,3} and the target makespan is 222. Corollary 2 turns this into the best known inapproximability bound for the problem, 3/23/23/2, which sits opposite the paper's own factor-2 algorithm. The same reduction pattern (machines as triples, dummy jobs that pin machines down) is reused in many later hardness proofs for scheduling and assignment problems.

Formalizing it. The result is proved on paper; no machine-checked version is known to exist. A formal proof requires the full combinatorial argument behind the reduction, including the counting of machines per type and the case where some element of AAA lies in no triple, which the paper does not discuss. Together with mission 1 of this series (the factor-2 algorithm), it fixes both ends of the [3/2,2][3/2, 2][3/2,2] gap in one formal library.

Difficulty

The construction is short, but the converse direction carries the weight: from an arbitrary schedule with makespan at most 222 one must recover a matching, although nothing in the schedule singles out the triples that form it. The obvious first idea, to read the matching off the machines that receive unit-time jobs, fails as it stands: a machine may receive one unit-time job or none, and the argument must exclude this for every schedule, including the degenerate instances in which some aja_jaj​ lies in no triple or triples repeat. For Corollary 2, the passage from the real-valued approximation guarantee to the threshold 222 depends on the strict inequality ρ<3/2\rho < 3/2ρ<3/2; at ρ=3/2\rho = 3/2ρ=3/2 the statement is no longer implied by Theorem 5.

Formalization scope

  • Machines are Fin m; 3DM elements are Fin n; a 3DM instance is T : Fin m → Fin n × Fin n × Fin n, so a triple may repeat. A matching is a set of nnn triple indices covering every aja_jaj​, bkb_kbk​, clc_lcl​ (the covering form of the paper's definition, which forces disjointness).
  • The jobs of the reduced instance are the sum type Fin n⊕Fin n⊕Σj Fin(tj−1)\mathrm{Fin}\,n \oplus \mathrm{Fin}\,n \oplus \Sigma_j\,\mathrm{Fin}(t_j - 1)Finn⊕Finn⊕Σj​Fin(tj​−1). They are enumerated by a fixed bijection with Fin N\mathrm{Fin}\,NFinN so that the published MatousekLP.Scheduling.makespan applies. All statements quantify over every schedule, so the choice of bijection is irrelevant.
  • tj−1t_j - 1tj​−1 is natural-number subtraction. When some tj=0t_j = 0tj​=0 (a case the paper leaves aside), type jjj has no dummy job; the reduced instance then has neither a matching nor a schedule of makespan at most 222, so Theorem 5 and Corollary 2 hold as stated, with no hypothesis tj≥1t_j \ge 1tj​≥1. Only the dummy-count milestone assumes tj≥1t_j \ge 1tj​≥1.
  • Processing times are natural numbers cast to R\mathbb RR; makespans are real.
  • Not formalized: "polynomial" (running time of an algorithm and of the reduction), membership in NP, "NP-complete" and "unless P=NPP = NPP=NP". Theorem 5 is stated as the reduction's equivalence; Corollary 2 is stated as the fact that any ρ\rhoρ-approximate schedule of the reduced instance, ρ<3/2\rho < 3/2ρ<3/2, decides 3-dimensional matching. The reduction is evidently polynomial, but this is not stated.
  • The approximation hypothesis compares σ\sigmaσ with every schedule τ\tauτ of the same reduced instance; a goal in which σ\sigmaσ is an arbitrary schedule, or is bounded against an unrelated quantity, would be a different statement. The strict inequality ρ<3/2\rho < 3/2ρ<3/2 is essential and kept.
  • Contributions welcome: proofs of the three milestones, of Theorem 5 from them, and of Corollary 2; reusable lemmas about integer-valued makespans and about sum-type job sets.

Selected references

  • J. K. Lenstra, D. B. Shmoys, É. Tardos, Approximation algorithms for scheduling unrelated parallel machines, CWI Report OS-R8714, Centre for Mathematics and Computer Science, Amsterdam, 1987 (FOCS 1987); the version cited for every theorem number in this mission.
  • J. K. Lenstra, D. B. Shmoys, É. Tardos, Approximation algorithms for scheduling unrelated parallel machines, Mathematical Programming 46 (1990) 259–271. https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01585745
  • R. L. Graham, E. L. Lawler, J. K. Lenstra, A. H. G. Rinnooy Kan, Optimization and approximation in deterministic sequencing and scheduling: a survey, Annals of Discrete Mathematics 5 (1979) 287–326. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0167-5060(08)70356-X
  • M. R. Garey, D. S. Johnson, Computers and Intractability: A Guide to the Theory of NP-Completeness, Freeman, 1979 (3-dimensional matching, problem [SP1]).
  • P. Schuurman, G. J. Woeginger, Polynomial time approximation algorithms for machine scheduling: ten open problems, Journal of Scheduling 2 (1999) 203–213. https://doi.org/10.1002/(SICI)1099-1425(199909/10)2:5<203::AID-JOS26>3.0.CO;2-5
  • D. P. Williamson, D. B. Shmoys, The Design of Approximation Algorithms, Cambridge University Press, 2011. https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511921735
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Linear OptimizationOperations ResearchStatistics·Captain: mikedeng1

Optimal Estimation of Executive Compensation by Linear Programming I: Least Absolute Deviations under Ranking Constraints Equal a Linear ProgramResearch Paper

Motivation

A firm may know salary bounds and the ranking of positions without having a reliable sample of individual salaries suitable for least-squares estimation. Charnes, Cooper and Ferguson used that kind of partial information to estimate a salary formula from ratings assigned to job factors. Their 1955 paper gives a model in which weights respect the job hierarchy while the implied salaries approach specified salary levels as closely as possible. It then turns the sum of absolute deviations into a linear program that can be handled by the methods available for constrained optimization. The setting and transformation are in §§4–6 of the published paper.

The question here is a precise one: does the transformed program have the same optimal value and the same optimal salary weights as the original absolute-deviation problem? This matters because a linear-program solution should answer the compensation-estimation problem stated before the transformation, even though the transformed program has additional variables and a different feasible set. The mission also records the paper's seven-position numerical example, where the reported salary formula can be checked directly against the table of factor ratings.

Setting

There are nnn rated factors and L≥1L\ge1L≥1 job levels ordered from highest to lowest. The rating xikx_{ik}xik​ is the amount of factor iii required at level kkk, and aia_iai​ is the nonnegative weight assigned to that factor. The estimated salary at level kkk is

Sk(a)=∑i=1naixik.S_k(a)=\sum_{i=1}^{n}a_i x_{ik}.Sk​(a)=i=1∑n​ai​xik​.

The salary formula applied to a person's factor amounts yiy_iyi​ is s=∑iaiyis=\sum_i a_i y_is=∑i​ai​yi​. For the ranked positions, feasible weights satisfy the four parts of the paper's system (2): each ai≥0a_i\ge0ai​≥0; the top-level salary is at most the ceiling sMs_MsM​; successive salaries descend, Sk+1(a)≤Sk(a)S_{k+1}(a)\le S_k(a)Sk+1​(a)≤Sk​(a); and the bottom-level salary is at least the floor sms_msm​. These are one-sided ceiling and floor bounds. They do not force the fitted salaries to equal the bounds.

The firm specifies target salaries sks_ksk​ at a finite set KKK of levels, which includes the ceiling and floor levels in the examples and may include intermediate levels. The absolute-deviation objective of (3) is

D(a)=∑k∈K∣Sk(a)−sk∣.D(a)=\sum_{k\in K}|S_k(a)-s_k|.D(a)=k∈K∑​∣Sk​(a)−sk​∣.

The original problem minimizes DDD over the feasible weights. At a specified level, let wk=Sk(a)−skw_k=S_k(a)-s_kwk​=Sk​(a)−sk​. The split-variable program of (4)–(5) introduces uk,vk≥0u_k,v_k\ge0uk​,vk​≥0 with wk=uk−vkw_k=u_k-v_kwk​=uk​−vk​ and minimizes P(u,v)=∑k∈K(uk+vk)P(u,v)=\sum_{k\in K}(u_k+v_k)P(u,v)=∑k∈K​(uk​+vk​). The split variables are constrained only for levels in KKK. The salary constraints (2) continue to apply to aaa. This is the paper's transformed linear program, with a feasible set that contains many choices of (u,v)(u,v)(u,v) above the same weight vector Charnes, Cooper and Ferguson, §§4–5.

Formalization targets

Equivalence of the two programs

The main target is the paper's claim that the two problems have equal minimal values and that minimizers correspond §6, p. 143. In the formal statement, equal values are expressed by equality of attainable objective thresholds:

∀t∈R,[∃a feasible:D(a)≤t]⟺[∃(a,u,v) LP-feasible:P(u,v)≤t].\forall t\in\mathbb R,\qquad [\exists a\text{ feasible}:D(a)\le t] \quad\Longleftrightarrow\quad [\exists(a,u,v)\text{ LP-feasible}:P(u,v)\le t].∀t∈R,[∃a feasible:D(a)≤t]⟺[∃(a,u,v) LP-feasible:P(u,v)≤t].

The goal also says that aaa minimizes DDD exactly when the triple formed from aaa and the positive and negative parts of www minimizes PPP. Every LP minimizer projects to a minimizer of DDD. These clauses give the value and solution correspondence the authors use when they call the two problems equivalent.

Supporting claims and numerical result

Three milestones follow the paper's exposition. First, every feasible weight vector has a split-variable lift with the same objective. Second, every transformed feasible point projects to an original feasible weight vector with no larger original objective. Third, the minimal values agree §§5–6, pp. 141–143. Each is recorded under the unnumbered sentence from which it was extracted; the paper has no numbered lemmas.

Two companion statements record other claims: opposite coefficient columns cannot both occur among selected independent simplex columns, and the Table I data have the reported optimum. For the latter, targets are 16 at R1R_1R1​, 10 at R5R_5R5​, and 4 at R7R_7R7​, measured in thousands of dollars. Equation (7) assigns weights (4,0,0,16,0,4,0,28,0)/11(4,0,0,16,0,4,0,28,0)/11(4,0,0,16,0,4,0,28,0)/11, yielding the minimum deviation 14/1114/1114/11 §7, pp. 145–148. A further companion checks the redundant R2≤R1R_2\le R_1R2​≤R1​ ranking row.

Significance

The equivalence justifies using a linear-program output as an estimate for the earlier salary problem: the transformed objective reaches the same value, and its optimal weight vectors solve the original problem. The numerical claim supplies a fully specified instance with seven job levels and nine factors, including the exact fitted salaries. Without the correspondence, optimizing the enlarged variable set could give no assurance that its weights minimize the deviations the firm intended to measure.

The mathematical result was argued in the 1955 paper; this mission asks for a machine-checked formulation and proof of that known result. The statements compile as open Lean theorems, so compilation alone does not establish their truth. Closing them would add a reusable treatment of absolute-deviation objectives under finite linear inequalities and an exact certificate for the paper's worked example. The consistency claim in the appendix is a separate mission because it concerns perturbations of another linear program, not this transformation.

Difficulty

The split-variable program permits uku_kuk​ and vkv_kvk​ to be simultaneously positive even when their difference is fixed. Consequently, simply identifying the two feasible sets would misstate the transformation: one has extra degrees of freedom. A proof must relate their objective values and then account for optimal solutions on both sides. The numerical example has a separate difficulty. Substituting the reported weights verifies a feasible objective of 14/1114/1114/11, but does not by itself rule out another feasible weight vector with a smaller deviation. The global lower bound is part of the companion theorem.

Formalization scope

The Lean development represents factor and level vectors by functions on Fin n and Fin L, and sums explicitly over finite indices. Paper level 1 is Lean index 0; paper level LLL is the final Fin L index. The assumption L≥1L\ge1L≥1 is explicit because both the top and bottom level are named. No sign, monotonicity, or boundedness assumptions are imposed on the ratings beyond what the paper states. The weights are componentwise nonnegative. Intermediate target salaries enter the objectives through KKK but add no constraints to (2), matching the paper's treatment of R5R_5R5​.

A minimizer is a feasible point whose objective is no larger than that of every feasible point. The equality of minimal values uses the threshold formula above, so an empty feasible set cannot inherit a spurious real infimum. The transformed feasible set is exactly the split-variable system of (4)–(5); defining it as only the image of a chosen lift would make the principal comparison empty of content. The Table I constants are exact rational values in units of 1,0001{,}0001,000. The paper rounds some displayed salaries, while Lean records their exact fractions. The generic column-independence companion is stated for an arbitrary finite matrix, with the basis and zero nonbasic coordinates explicit.

The shared definition module provides the salary map, feasibility predicates, objectives, minimizers, and example data. A full development can contribute proofs of the three milestones, the main equivalence, the column claim, the numerical lower bound, and the redundant-row fact. The finite absolute-deviation and split-variable statements can also serve later formalizations with other linear constraints.

Selected references

  • A. Charnes, W. W. Cooper, and R. O. Ferguson, Optimal Estimation of Executive Compensation by Linear Programming, Management Science 1(2), 138–151, 1955. DOI 10.1287/mnsc.1.2.138.
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CombinatoricsOperations ResearchTheoretical Computer Science·Captain: mikedeng1

Approximation Algorithms for Scheduling Unrelated Parallel Machines 4: With Times in {p, q} and gcd(p, q) = 1, a q-Dimensional Matching Exists Iff a Schedule Has Makespan ≤ pqResearch Paper

Motivation

Minimum makespan scheduling on unrelated parallel machines asks for an assignment of nnn jobs to mmm machines, where job jjj takes pijp_{ij}pij​ time units on machine iii, so that the largest machine load is as small as possible. In the three-field notation of Graham, Lawler, Lenstra and Rinnooy Kan (1979) it is R ∥ Cmax⁡R\,\|\,C_{\max}R∥Cmax​. It models load balancing across heterogeneous processors, workers or production lines, and it is a standard test case for linear-programming rounding.

Lenstra, Shmoys and Tardos (FOCS 1987; CWI Report OS-R8714; Mathematical Programming 46, 1990) gave a polynomial 2-approximation algorithm for R ∥ Cmax⁡R\,\|\,C_{\max}R∥Cmax​ and showed that no polynomial algorithm achieves a ratio below 3/23/23/2 unless P = NP. They also asked which restrictions on the processing times keep the problem hard. Their Section 5 answers this when only two distinct processing times occur:

  • all pij=1p_{ij}=1pij​=1: trivial;
  • all pij∈{1,∞}p_{ij}\in\{1,\infty\}pij​∈{1,∞}: bipartite cardinality matching;
  • all pij∈{1,2}p_{ij}\in\{1,2\}pij​∈{1,2}: polynomial by matching techniques (Theorem 6);
  • all pij∈{p,q}p_{ij}\in\{p,q\}pij​∈{p,q} with p<qp<qp<q, 2p≠q2p\ne q2p=q: NP-hard (Theorem 7).

Theorem 7 is the paper's last result and closes this classification. Its proof generalizes the reduction of Theorem 4, which handles the case {1,3}\{1,3\}{1,3}, from 3-dimensional matching to qqq-dimensional matching.

Setting

Machines are indexed by i∈{1,…,m}i\in\{1,\dots,m\}i∈{1,…,m} and jobs by jjj. A schedule σ\sigmaσ assigns every job to exactly one machine. The load of machine iii is ∑j:σ(j)=ipij\sum_{j:\sigma(j)=i}p_{ij}∑j:σ(j)=i​pij​, and the makespan Cmax⁡(σ)C_{\max}(\sigma)Cmax​(σ) is the largest load.

qqq-dimensional matching. An instance is a ground set UUU of qnqnqn elements and a family S1,…,SmS_1,\dots,S_mS1​,…,Sm​ of qqq-element subsets of UUU. A matching is a subfamily F′⊆{1,…,m}F'\subseteq\{1,\dots,m\}F′⊆{1,…,m} with ∣F′∣=n|F'|=n∣F′∣=n and ⋃i∈F′Si=U\bigcup_{i\in F'}S_i=U⋃i∈F′​Si​=U; its members are then pairwise disjoint.

The instance of Theorem 7. Fix natural numbers 0<p<q0<p<q0<p<q that are relatively prime. Build a scheduling instance with mmm machines, machine iii corresponding to SiS_iSi​, and two kinds of jobs:

  • qnqnqn element jobs, one per u∈Uu\in Uu∈U, with piu=pp_{iu}=ppiu​=p if u∈Siu\in S_iu∈Si​ and piu=qp_{iu}=qpiu​=q otherwise;
  • p(m−n)p(m-n)p(m−n) dummy jobs, each taking qqq time units on every machine.

Every processing time lies in {p,q}\{p,q\}{p,q}.

The instance of Theorem 4. For disjoint sets A={a1,…,an}A=\{a_1,\dots,a_n\}A={a1​,…,an​}, BBB, CCC of the same size and triples Ti=(aj,bk,cl)T_i=(a_j,b_k,c_l)Ti​=(aj​,bk​,cl​), i=1,…,mi=1,\dots,mi=1,…,m, there are 3n3n3n element jobs, one per element of A∪B∪CA\cup B\cup CA∪B∪C, and m−nm-nm−n dummy jobs. Machine iii processes the element jobs of aja_jaj​, bkb_kbk​, clc_lcl​ in one time unit and every other job in three time units. A 3-dimensional matching is a subfamily of nnn triples covering A∪B∪CA\cup B\cup CA∪B∪C.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 7 (p. 8; proof pp. 8–9)

For relatively prime 0<p<q0<p<q0<p<q and a family of qqq-subsets S1,…,SmS_1,\dots,S_mS1​,…,Sm​ of a qnqnqn-element set, the instance above has all processing times in {p,q}\{p,q\}{p,q}, and

∃ σ: Cmax⁡(σ)≤pq⟺∃ F′⊆{1,…,m}: ∣F′∣=n, ⋃i∈F′Si=U.\exists\,\sigma:\ C_{\max}(\sigma)\le pq \quad\Longleftrightarrow\quad \exists\,F'\subseteq\{1,\dots,m\}:\ |F'|=n,\ \bigcup_{i\in F'}S_i=U .∃σ: Cmax​(σ)≤pq⟺∃F′⊆{1,…,m}: ∣F′∣=n, i∈F′⋃​Si​=U.

Milestones

  1. Theorem 4 (p. 7): on the 3-dimensional matching instance with times in {1,3}\{1,3\}{1,3}, a schedule with makespan at most 333 exists iff a matching exists.
  2. Matching gives a schedule (pp. 8–9): if SSS has a matching, some schedule has Cmax⁡≤pqC_{\max}\le pqCmax​≤pq.
  3. No idle time, two kinds of machine (p. 9): in every schedule with Cmax⁡≤pqC_{\max}\le pqCmax​≤pq, three things hold. Every load equals pqpqpq. Every element job runs at length ppp, on a machine whose tuple contains it. Each machine processes either exactly qqq element jobs and no dummy job, or exactly ppp dummy jobs and no element job.

Significance

The result. Theorems 6 and 7 together say exactly which two-valued restrictions of R ∥ Cmax⁡R\,\|\,C_{\max}R∥Cmax​ are tractable. Up to scaling, the polynomial case is {1,2}\{1,2\}{1,2}, and every other pair {p,q}\{p,q\}{p,q} with p<qp<qp<q is NP-hard. Theorem 4 is the base case. It also yields Corollary 1 of the paper: no polynomial ρ\rhoρ-approximation with ρ<4/3\rho<4/3ρ<4/3 exists unless P = NP. Reductions of this "no idle time" kind are a standard template for hardness of restricted-assignment and two-value scheduling, a line still active in the study of the restricted assignment problem and of the "graph balancing" special case.

Formalizing it. The result is proved, in two short paragraphs. The proof leaves to the reader the construction of the schedule from a matching and the "easy number theoretic argument" behind the converse, and both become explicit here. The development also produces reusable pieces: a qqq-dimensional matching definition over an arbitrary family of qqq-sets, and two reduction instances built on the published load and makespan of MatousekLP.Scheduling.Schedule. To our knowledge no machine-checked proof of these reductions exists.

Difficulty

The forward direction is a direct construction. The converse is where care is needed. A schedule with makespan at most pqpqpq may a priori place an element job on a machine whose tuple does not contain it, at length qqq, and may mix element and dummy jobs on one machine. Looking at one machine at a time does not exclude either: a single machine can carry such a mixed load below pqpqpq. What excludes them is a property of the whole schedule together with the arithmetic of ppp and qqq. The hypotheses are sharp for this step: for p>qp>qp>q element jobs are cheaper on foreign machines, and for gcd⁡(p,q)>1\gcd(p,q)>1gcd(p,q)>1 a load ap+bq=pqap+bq=pqap+bq=pq with a,b>0a,b>0a,b>0 becomes possible.

Formalization scope

  • Model. Machines are Fin m. Schedules are maps from jobs to machines. Load and makespan are those of the published MatousekLP.Scheduling.Schedule, with natural-number processing times cast to R\mathbb RR. The jobs are enumerated as Fin (q * n + p * (m - n)) (Theorem 7) and Fin (3 * n + (m - n)) (Theorem 4), element jobs first, through finSumFinEquiv.
  • Ground set and family. The ground set is Fin (q * n) and the family is indexed by machines, so repeated tuples are allowed. The qqq-partite structure of qqq-dimensional matching is not imposed: the reduction does not use it, and statements over all families of qqq-sets contain the qqq-partite case. Theorem 4 keeps the tripartite structure, with triples of indices in Fin n × Fin n × Fin n.
  • Threshold. The thresholds are exactly pqpqpq and 333, with "makespan at most".
  • Complexity wording not formalized. "NP-hard" (Theorem 7) and "NP-complete" (Theorem 4) are not formalized: membership in NP, polynomial size of the reductions, and the hardness of the matching problems are not stated. What is stated is the equivalence each reduction establishes.
  • Hypotheses. Theorem 7's goal assumes 0<p<q0<p<q0<p<q, gcd⁡(p,q)=1\gcd(p,q)=1gcd(p,q)=1 and ∣Si∣=q|S_i|=q∣Si​∣=q. The paper's general case gcd⁡(p,q)=g>1\gcd(p,q)=g>1gcd(p,q)=g>1 is its stated "without loss of generality": divide all times by ggg, which divides every makespan by ggg. It is not part of the formal statement. The paper's hypothesis 2p≠q2p\ne q2p=q is dropped because the reduction does not use it. With coprime p<qp<qp<q it excludes only (p,q)=(1,2)(p,q)=(1,2)(p,q)=(1,2), where the equivalence still holds but the source problem is bipartite matching. The formal goal is therefore stronger than the paper's.
  • Edge cases. For m<nm<nm<n, natural-number subtraction gives no dummy jobs; both sides of each equivalence are false when n≥1n\ge1n≥1. This stands in for the paper's "trivial 'no' instance". For n=0n=0n=0 the empty family is a matching and the dummy jobs fill the machines exactly.
  • No trivialization. The goal is an equivalence about a constructed instance whose processing times are given by explicit definitions. Neither side is assumed, the schedule is quantified over all maps from jobs to machines, and the instance is not a free parameter pinned by hypotheses.
  • Welcome contributions. Besides the milestones: counting lemmas relating a machine's load to the numbers of jobs of each length on it, and lemmas on the makespan of MatousekLP.Scheduling.Schedule (it bounds every load; it is attained when m≥1m\ge1m≥1), which are reusable across scheduling reductions.

Selected references

  • J. K. Lenstra, D. B. Shmoys, É. Tardos, Approximation algorithms for scheduling unrelated parallel machines, CWI Report OS-R8714, Amsterdam, 1987 (the version formalized here); journal version in Mathematical Programming 46 (1990) 259–271. https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01585745
  • M. R. Garey, D. S. Johnson, Computers and Intractability: A Guide to the Theory of NP-Completeness, Freeman, 1979 (3-dimensional matching, problem SP1).
  • R. L. Graham, E. L. Lawler, J. K. Lenstra, A. H. G. Rinnooy Kan, Optimization and approximation in deterministic sequencing and scheduling: a survey, Annals of Discrete Mathematics 5 (1979) 287–326. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0167-5060(08)70356-X
  • J. Matoušek, B. Gärtner, Understanding and Using Linear Programming, Springer, 2007, §8.3 (the schedule, load and makespan definitions reused here). https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-30717-4
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Algorithmic Game TheoryOperations ResearchProbability·Captain: mikedeng1

Supply Chain Coordination with Contracts X: Under Forced Compliance, Options Contracts with Shares λ_l and min{λ_h, λ̂_h} Separate the Two Demand Types and Coordinate CapacityTextbook

Motivation

A manufacturer launching a new product often depends on a single supplier for a critical component, and the supplier must build capacity before demand is known. The manufacturer usually knows more about demand than the supplier does: her sales force, market research and order history give her a forecast the supplier cannot verify, and she has a reason to inflate it, since more capacity costs her nothing if the supplier pays for it. Whether contracts can make forecast sharing credible, and at what cost to the supply chain, is the subject of Cachon and Lariviere, "Contracting to assure supply: how to share demand forecasts in a supply chain" (Management Science 47(5), 2001, doi:10.1287/mnsc.47.5.629.10486). Section 6.10 of G. P. Cachon's survey chapter Supply Chain Coordination with Contracts (Handbooks in OR & MS, Vol. 11, 2003) presents a simplified version of that model, and this mission formalizes it from the author's January 2003 draft.

The section separates two regimes. Under forced compliance the supplier must build exactly the capacity the contract specifies; under voluntary compliance he may build less. The section's conclusion is that forced compliance allows both coordination and credible forecast sharing, while voluntary compliance allows forecast sharing only at the price of under-investment in capacity.

Setting

Demand DθD_\thetaDθ​ has one of two types θ∈{h,l}\theta \in \{h, l\}θ∈{h,l} with distribution function Fθ(x)=F(x∣θ)F_\theta(x) = F(x\mid\theta)Fθ​(x)=F(x∣θ). The page assumes Fθ(x)=0F_\theta(x) = 0Fθ​(x)=0 for x<0x < 0x<0, Fθ(x)>0F_\theta(x) > 0Fθ​(x)>0 for x≥0x \ge 0x≥0 (so demand has an atom at 000), FθF_\thetaFθ​ increasing and differentiable, and stochastic dominance Fh(x)<Fl(x)F_h(x) < F_l(x)Fh​(x)<Fl​(x) for all x≥0x \ge 0x≥0. The supplier SSS builds capacity kkk at cost ck>0c_k > 0ck​>0 per unit; after demand is observed he produces min⁡{Dθ,k}\min\{D_\theta, k\}min{Dθ​,k} at cost cp>0c_p > 0cp​>0 per unit; the manufacturer MMM earns r>cp+ckr > c_p + c_kr>cp​+ck​ per unit of demand satisfied; unused capacity is worth nothing.

Expected sales with xxx units of capacity are Sθ(x)=x−E[(x−Dθ)+]S_\theta(x) = x - E[(x - D_\theta)^+]Sθ​(x)=x−E[(x−Dθ​)+], and the supply chain's expected profit is

Ωθ(k)=(r−cp)Sθ(k)−ckk.\Omega_\theta(k) = (r - c_p)S_\theta(k) - c_k k .Ωθ​(k)=(r−cp​)Sθ​(k)−ck​k.

An optimal capacity kθok_\theta^okθo​ maximizes Ωθ\Omega_\thetaΩθ​ over k≥0k \ge 0k≥0, and Ωθo=Ωθ(kθo)\Omega_\theta^o = \Omega_\theta(k_\theta^o)Ωθo​=Ωθ​(kθo​).

In an options contract MMM buys qiq_iqi​ options at wow_owo​ each and pays wew_ewe​ for each option exercised. With k=qik = q_ik=qi​ her profit is Πθ(qi)=(r−we)Sθ(qi)−woqi\Pi_\theta(q_i) = (r - w_e)S_\theta(q_i) - w_o q_iΠθ​(qi​)=(r−we​)Sθ​(qi​)−wo​qi​ and the supplier's is (we−cp)Sθ(qi)+woqi−ckqi(w_e - c_p)S_\theta(q_i) + w_o q_i - c_k q_i(we​−cp​)Sθ​(qi​)+wo​qi​−ck​qi​. The contract with share λ\lambdaλ sets r−we=λ(r−cp)r - w_e = \lambda(r - c_p)r−we​=λ(r−cp​) and wo=λckw_o = \lambda c_kwo​=λck​. Under a wholesale price contract with price www the supplier earns πθ(k)=(w−cp)Sθ(k)−ckk\pi_\theta(k) = (w - c_p)S_\theta(k) - c_k kπθ​(k)=(w−cp​)Sθ​(k)−ck​k; the price inducing capacity kkk is wθ(k)=ck/Fˉθ(k)+cpw_\theta(k) = c_k/\bar F_\theta(k) + c_pwθ​(k)=ck​/Fˉθ​(k)+cp​ with Fˉθ=1−Fθ\bar F_\theta = 1 - F_\thetaFˉθ​=1−Fθ​, and the manufacturer then earns Πθ(k)=(r−wθ(k))Sθ(k)\Pi_\theta(k) = (r - w_\theta(k))S_\theta(k)Πθ​(k)=(r−wθ​(k))Sθ​(k).

With asymmetric information only MMM observes θ\thetaθ. Let π^\hat\piπ^ be the supplier's minimum acceptable profit, and define the shares

λl=1−π^Ωlo,λh=1−π^Ωho,λ^h=Ωlo−π^Ωl(kho),λH=min⁡{λh,λ^h}.\lambda_l = 1 - \frac{\hat\pi}{\Omega_l^o},\qquad \lambda_h = 1 - \frac{\hat\pi}{\Omega_h^o},\qquad \hat\lambda_h = \frac{\Omega_l^o - \hat\pi}{\Omega_l(k_h^o)},\qquad \lambda_H = \min\{\lambda_h, \hat\lambda_h\}.λl​=1−Ωlo​π^​,λh​=1−Ωho​π^​,λ^h​=Ωl​(kho​)Ωlo​−π^​,λH​=min{λh​,λ^h​}.

Formalization targets

Goal: forced-compliance separating contracts (§6.10.3, pp. 103–104)

The low type offers the options contract with share λl\lambda_lλl​ and initial order klok_l^oklo​, the high type the one with share λH\lambda_HλH​ and initial order khok_h^okho​. Assuming 0<π^<Ωlo0 < \hat\pi < \Omega_l^o0<π^<Ωlo​ and Ωl(kho)>0\Omega_l(k_h^o) > 0Ωl​(kho​)>0:

0<λl<λH<1,λl Ωh(klo)<λH Ωho,λH Ωl(kho)≤Ωlo−π^,0 < \lambda_l < \lambda_H < 1,\qquad \lambda_l\,\Omega_h(k_l^o) < \lambda_H\,\Omega_h^o,\qquad \lambda_H\,\Omega_l(k_h^o) \le \Omega_l^o - \hat\pi,0<λl​<λH​<1,λl​Ωh​(klo​)<λH​Ωho​,λH​Ωl​(kho​)≤Ωlo​−π^,

the supplier earns π^\hat\piπ^ from the low type and at least π^\hat\piπ^ from the high type, and each initial order kθok_\theta^okθo​ maximizes both firms' profits. The profit comparisons are stated between the contract profit functions, not between shares.

Milestones

  1. Sθ(x)=x−∫0xFθS_\theta(x) = x - \int_0^x F_\thetaSθ​(x)=x−∫0x​Fθ​ (p. 98).
  2. Ωθ\Omega_\thetaΩθ​ is concave, and k>0k > 0k>0 is optimal iff Fˉθ(k)=ck/(r−cp)\bar F_\theta(k) = c_k/(r - c_p)Fˉθ​(k)=ck​/(r−cp​) (p. 99).
  3. Ωl(k)<Ωh(k)\Omega_l(k) < \Omega_h(k)Ωl​(k)<Ωh​(k) for k>0k > 0k>0, hence Ωlo<Ωho\Omega_l^o < \Omega_h^oΩlo​<Ωho​ (implicit on p. 104).
  4. The options contract with share λ∈[0,1]\lambda \in [0,1]λ∈[0,1] gives Πθ=λΩθ\Pi_\theta = \lambda\Omega_\thetaΠθ​=λΩθ​ and the supplier (1−λ)Ωθ(1-\lambda)\Omega_\theta(1−λ)Ωθ​, so it coordinates (pp. 99–100).
  5. Under voluntary compliance, ∂π(kθo,kθo,θ)/∂k<0\partial\pi(k_\theta^o, k_\theta^o, \theta)/\partial k < 0∂π(kθo​,kθo​,θ)/∂k<0 (p. 100).
  6. A capacity k>0k > 0k>0 is optimal for the supplier under a wholesale price www iff w=wθ(k)w = w_\theta(k)w=wθ​(k) (p. 101).
  7. A stationary point k∗k^*k∗ of Πθ\Pi_\thetaΠθ​ satisfies Fˉθ(k∗)=Fˉθ(kθo)(1+fθ(k∗)Sθ(k∗)/Fˉθ(k∗)2)\bar F_\theta(k^*) = \bar F_\theta(k_\theta^o)\bigl(1 + f_\theta(k^*)S_\theta(k^*)/\bar F_\theta(k^*)^2\bigr)Fˉθ​(k∗)=Fˉθ​(kθo​)(1+fθ​(k∗)Sθ​(k∗)/Fˉθ​(k∗)2), so k∗<kθok^* < k_\theta^ok∗<kθo​ (p. 102).

Significance

The goal shows that with forced compliance a high-demand manufacturer can share her forecast credibly through the terms of a coordinating contract rather than its form: both types use the same contract family, the supply chain is coordinated in every state, and the only cost of asymmetric information is that the high type may be unable to push the supplier down to his reservation profit. The voluntary-compliance milestones show the other side: once the supplier may under-build, only the wholesale price affects his capacity, and the resulting capacity is strictly below the integrated optimum. Together they explain why compliance regimes matter in capacity contracting.

The results are established on the page with short arguments; none has a machine-checked proof. Formalizing them requires the derivative of expected sales for a distribution with an atom, the first-order characterization of a concave maximizer on a half-line, and careful bookkeeping of the incentive constraints. The demand and profit definitions are reusable for other capacity-procurement and newsvendor-type models.

Difficulty

The incentive constraints look like arithmetic on shares, but the strict inequality λl<λ^h\lambda_l < \hat\lambda_hλl​<λ^h​ needs Ωl(kho)<Ωlo\Omega_l(k_h^o) < \Omega_l^oΩl​(kho​)<Ωlo​: the low type's chain profit at the high type's capacity must be strictly below its optimum. The obvious argument via uniqueness of the maximizer is not available, because the page does not assume FθF_\thetaFθ​ strictly increasing, so Ωl\Omega_lΩl​ need not be strictly concave and may have a whole interval of maximizers. Likewise Ωlo<Ωho\Omega_l^o < \Omega_h^oΩlo​<Ωho​ needs a strict comparison of integrals of distribution functions. In the voluntary-compliance part, the derivative of wθ(k)w_\theta(k)wθ​(k) needs the density at k∗k^*k∗, and k∗<kθok^* < k_\theta^ok∗<kθo​ fails when that density is 000.

Formalization scope

Each demand law is a probability measure on R\mathbb RR and FθF_\thetaFθ​ is Mathlib's cdf. FθF_\thetaFθ​ is required to be differentiable only on (0,∞)(0,\infty)(0,∞), because the page's Fθ(0)>0F_\theta(0) > 0Fθ​(0)>0 makes it jump at 000. SθS_\thetaSθ​ is defined by the expectation x−E[(x−Dθ)+]x - E[(x - D_\theta)^+]x−E[(x−Dθ​)+], whose integrand is integrable because Dθ≥0D_\theta \ge 0Dθ​≥0 almost surely. Optimal capacities are passed as arguments characterized as maximizers over [0,∞)[0,\infty)[0,∞), never chosen; kθo>0k_\theta^o > 0kθo​>0 is footnote 46's assumption. Derivatives are HasDerivAt statements.

Hypotheses added relative to the page, all disclosed in the items: 0<π^<Ωlo0 < \hat\pi < \Omega_l^o0<π^<Ωlo​ and Ωl(kho)>0\Omega_l(k_h^o) > 0Ωl​(kho​)>0 in the goal (the page divides by Ωl(kho)\Omega_l(k_h^o)Ωl​(kho​) and needs λl∈(0,1)\lambda_l \in (0,1)λl​∈(0,1)); λ>0\lambda > 0λ>0 for the voluntary-compliance derivative (at λ=0\lambda = 0λ=0 it vanishes); Fˉθ(k∗)>0\bar F_\theta(k^*) > 0Fˉθ​(k∗)>0 and fθ(k∗)>0f_\theta(k^*) > 0fθ​(k∗)>0 for the non-coordination result. The page's assumption wθ′′>0w''_\theta > 0wθ′′​>0 is not needed and not imposed; its strict-concavity claim on p. 101 is not stated, because it would need FθF_\thetaFθ​ strictly increasing. The prior Pr⁡(θ=h)=ρ\Pr(\theta = h) = \rhoPr(θ=h)=ρ does not enter any statement. The page's "separating equilibrium" is formalized by its defining incentive and participation conditions, not by a general signalling-game solution concept; a predicate that holds by construction of λ^h\hat\lambda_hλ^h​ (for example λH≤λ^h\lambda_H \le \hat\lambda_hλH​≤λ^h​) is not an acceptable substitute for the profit inequalities. The fixed-fee condition of p. 105 is pure algebra on four numbers and is not included.

All definitions are local to the namespace CachonCoord.CapacityForecast. No platform theorem formalizes this model; the Snyder–Shen newsvendor definitions (SupplyChainTheory_contracts) and the revenue-sharing model of Cachon–Lariviere 2005 (RevShareCoord.*) concern different games and are not reused. Proofs of any milestone, and a sanity instance showing the model's hypotheses are satisfiable (for example demand with an atom pθp_\thetapθ​ at 000 and an exponential tail, ph<plp_h < p_lph​<pl​), are welcome.

Selected references

  • G. P. Cachon, Supply Chain Coordination with Contracts, in S. Graves and T. de Kok (eds.), Handbooks in Operations Research and Management Science, Vol. 11: Supply Chain Management, North-Holland, 2003, Ch. 6. doi:10.1016/S0927-0507(03)11006-7 (formalized from the author's 3rd draft, January 2003).
  • G. P. Cachon and M. A. Lariviere, Contracting to assure supply: how to share demand forecasts in a supply chain, Management Science 47(5), 629–646, 2001. doi:10.1287/mnsc.47.5.629.10486
  • R. E. Barlow and F. Proschan, Mathematical Theory of Reliability, Wiley, 1965 (increasing failure rate distributions, cited on p. 102).
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Supply Chain Coordination with Contracts IX: An Internal Market at the Shadow Price w(α, Q) Allocates Output Optimally, and Paying Its Expectation per Unit Induces the Optimal Effort e°Textbook

Motivation

In most contracts of the supply chain coordination literature the transfer payments are fixed when the contract is signed: a wholesale price www, a buy-back rate bbb, a revenue share ϕ\phiϕ. Some settings need payments that respond to information arriving after signing, such as realized demand at several retailers and realized production output. Fixing the per-unit price in advance then fails twice: for some output realizations the retailers do not buy everything that was produced, and for others they want more than exists, so the supplier must ration, which invites strategic ordering and misallocation (Cachon and Lariviere, 1999).

Section 6.9 of Cachon's survey chapter Supply Chain Coordination with Contracts (Handbooks in OR & MS, vol. 11, 2003) studies an alternative after Kouvelis and Lariviere (2000): the supplier commits to hold an internal market for output after demand is observed, and pays her own production manager a fixed amount per unit of realized output. The model is a variant of Porteus and Whang (1991), who studied incentives between manufacturing and marketing managers in a firm. The section shows that this pair of mechanisms coordinates both the production decision and the allocation decision without the supplier observing either the demand shocks or the manager's effort.

This mission is part IX of a series formalizing the capstone results of that chapter.

Setting

One supplier employs a production manager and sells to two independent retailers. The constant demand elasticity is η>1\eta>1η>1.

  1. The manager chooses a production input level e≥0e\ge0e≥0. The output is Q=YeQ=YeQ=Ye, where Y∈[0,1]Y\in[0,1]Y∈[0,1] is a random variable. The manager incurs the cost c(e)c(e)c(e), strictly convex and increasing, with derivative c′c'c′.
  2. Retailer i∈{1,2}i\in\{1,2\}i∈{1,2} observes the realization αi\alpha_iαi​ of a random variable Ai>0A_i>0Ai​>0.
  3. The supplier allocates qiq_iqi​ units to retailer iii with q1+q2≤Qq_1+q_2\le Qq1​+q2​≤Q. Retailer iii earns revenue qipi(qi)q_ip_i(q_i)qi​pi​(qi​) with the inverse demand pi(qi)=αiqi−1/ηp_i(q_i)=\alpha_iq_i^{-1/\eta}pi​(qi​)=αi​qi−1/η​, that is, αiqi(η−1)/η\alpha_iq_i^{(\eta-1)/\eta}αi​qi(η−1)/η​.

If retailer one receives the share γ\gammaγ of QQQ, total retailer revenue is

π(γ,α,Q)=(α1γ(η−1)/η+α2(1−γ)(η−1)/η)Q(η−1)/η.\pi(\gamma,\alpha,Q)=\big(\alpha_1\gamma^{(\eta-1)/\eta}+\alpha_2(1-\gamma)^{(\eta-1)/\eta}\big)Q^{(\eta-1)/\eta}.π(γ,α,Q)=(α1​γ(η−1)/η+α2​(1−γ)(η−1)/η)Q(η−1)/η.

The optimal share is γo(α)=α1η/(α1η+α2η)\gamma^o(\alpha)=\alpha_1^\eta/(\alpha_1^\eta+\alpha_2^\eta)γo(α)=α1η​/(α1η​+α2η​) (Eq. (44)), and π(α,Q)=π(γo(α),α,Q)\pi(\alpha,Q)=\pi(\gamma^o(\alpha),\alpha,Q)π(α,Q)=π(γo(α),α,Q) is revenue under it. The expected supply chain profit is Π(e)=E[π(A,Ye)]−c(e)\Pi(e)=E[\pi(A,Ye)]-c(e)Π(e)=E[π(A,Ye)]−c(e), and the optimal effort eoe^oeo solves the first-order condition (45).

In the decentralized system, if the per-unit price is www, retailer iii's profit is πi(qi,w)=αiqi(η−1)/η−wqi\pi_i(q_i,w)=\alpha_iq_i^{(\eta-1)/\eta}-wq_iπi​(qi​,w)=αi​qi(η−1)/η​−wqi​. The contingent price is

w(α,Q)=(η−1η)(α1η+α2η)1/ηQ−1/η.w(\alpha,Q)=\Big(\frac{\eta-1}{\eta}\Big)(\alpha_1^\eta+\alpha_2^\eta)^{1/\eta}Q^{-1/\eta}.w(α,Q)=(ηη−1​)(α1η​+α2η​)1/ηQ−1/η.

The manager is paid a fixed amount per unit of realized output. With K=E[(A1η+A2η)1/ηY(η−1)/η]K=E\big[(A_1^\eta+A_2^\eta)^{1/\eta}Y^{(\eta-1)/\eta}\big]K=E[(A1η​+A2η​)1/ηY(η−1)/η], the payment is

(η−1η)(eo)−1/ηK/E[Y](46),\Big(\frac{\eta-1}{\eta}\Big)(e^o)^{-1/\eta}K/E[Y]\qquad(46),(ηη−1​)(eo)−1/ηK/E[Y](46),

and his expected utility is u(e)=(payment)⋅E[Ye]−c(e)u(e)=(\text{payment})\cdot E[Ye]-c(e)u(e)=(payment)⋅E[Ye]−c(e).

Formalization targets

Goal

The goal has two parts.

  1. For every realization α1,α2>0\alpha_1,\alpha_2>0α1​,α2​>0 and output Q>0Q>0Q>0, at the price w(α,Q)w(\alpha,Q)w(α,Q) retailer one's unique optimal order is γo(α)Q\gamma^o(\alpha)Qγo(α)Q and retailer two's is (1−γo(α))Q(1-\gamma^o(\alpha))Q(1−γo(α))Q. So the retailers order exactly QQQ, the allocation maximizes revenue over all feasible allocations, and
∂π(α,Q)∂Q=w(α,Q).\frac{\partial\pi(\alpha,Q)}{\partial Q}=w(\alpha,Q).∂Q∂π(α,Q)​=w(α,Q).
  1. If eo>0e^o>0eo>0 satisfies (45), then under the payment (46) the manager's unique optimal effort is eoe^oeo. The payment equals E[Qw(A,Q)∣eo]/E[Q∣eo]E[Qw(A,Q)\mid e^o]/E[Q\mid e^o]E[Qw(A,Q)∣eo]/E[Q∣eo], and the supplier's expected profit from the market is zero.

Milestones

  • (44): revenue is strictly concave in γ\gammaγ, and γo(α)\gamma^o(\alpha)γo(α) is the unique optimal share.
  • The closed form π(α,Q)=(α1η+α2η)1/ηQ(η−1)/η\pi(\alpha,Q)=(\alpha_1^\eta+\alpha_2^\eta)^{1/\eta}Q^{(\eta-1)/\eta}π(α,Q)=(α1η​+α2η​)1/ηQ(η−1)/η.
  • (45): Π(e)=Ke(η−1)/η−c(e)\Pi(e)=Ke^{(\eta-1)/\eta}-c(e)Π(e)=Ke(η−1)/η−c(e) is strictly concave, and an interior eoe^oeo is optimal if and only if ((η−1)/η)(eo)−1/ηK−c′(eo)=0((\eta-1)/\eta)(e^o)^{-1/\eta}K-c'(e^o)=0((η−1)/η)(eo)−1/ηK−c′(eo)=0.
  • The retailers' first-order condition, and the market allocation at w(α,Q)w(\alpha,Q)w(α,Q).
  • ∂π(α,Q)/∂Q=w(α,Q)\partial\pi(\alpha,Q)/\partial Q=w(\alpha,Q)∂π(α,Q)/∂Q=w(α,Q).
  • The identity (46).
  • The manager's optimal effort and the supplier's zero expected profit.

Significance

The result shows that one mechanism handles two separate information problems. The market price w(α,Q)w(\alpha,Q)w(α,Q) is the shadow price of output. Charging it makes the retailers' independent orders add up to exactly the output and split it as the integrated firm would, and the supplier never needs to observe AAA. Paying the manager the output-weighted expectation of that shadow price, a single number fixed in advance, aligns his marginal incentive with the supply chain's, and the supplier does not need to observe eee. The supplier breaks even on the market. Kouvelis and Lariviere (2000) show that in more general settings she breaks even or loses money, so any profit must come from fixed fees. The section therefore illustrates a general design principle: market-based transfer prices inside a firm, combined with linear output-based pay.

The derivations are short calculus on the page. Formalizing them pins down what the page leaves implicit: the range of efforts and allocations; the role of E[Y]>0E[Y]>0E[Y]>0 and of the integrability of the shock; the fact that each retailer's problem has a unique interior optimum only at a positive price; and how the realized output Q=0Q=0Q=0 enters the expectation E[Qw(A,Q)]E[Qw(A,Q)]E[Qw(A,Q)]. To our knowledge none of these statements has been machine-checked before.

Difficulty

The deterministic part requires real-power calculus with a non-integer exponent (η−1)/η∈(0,1)(\eta-1)/\eta\in(0,1)(η−1)/η∈(0,1). Strict concavity of γ↦γ(η−1)/η\gamma\mapsto\gamma^{(\eta-1)/\eta}γ↦γ(η−1)/η has to be used on the closed interval [0,1][0,1][0,1], where the derivative blows up at the endpoints. The retailer's optimum has to be shown to be interior even though the profit at q=0q=0q=0 is defined.

The stochastic part requires pulling the effort out of the expectation, E[π(A,Ye)]=Ke(η−1)/ηE[\pi(A,Ye)]=Ke^{(\eta-1)/\eta}E[π(A,Ye)]=Ke(η−1)/η, pointwise in the shock, including at realizations with Y=0Y=0Y=0. The natural first idea, to differentiate under the expectation sign, is unnecessary but tempting. The obstacle it hides is that w(α,Ye)w(\alpha,Ye)w(α,Ye) is undefined where Y=0Y=0Y=0, so the identity (46) only holds once Qw(A,Q)Qw(A,Q)Qw(A,Q) is read as its limit 000 at Q=0Q=0Q=0. Uniqueness of the manager's optimum depends on strict convexity of ccc alone, since his payment is linear in eee.

Formalization scope

All objects live in the namespace CachonCoord.InternalMarket. The deterministic file Revenue defines π(γ,α,Q)\pi(\gamma,\alpha,Q)π(γ,α,Q), γo(α)\gamma^o(\alpha)γo(α) (as the printed formula, not as an argmax), π(α,Q)\pi(\alpha,Q)π(α,Q), πi(qi,w)\pi_i(q_i,w)πi​(qi​,w) and w(α,Q)w(\alpha,Q)w(α,Q) with real powers (Real.rpow). The file Model bundles a probability space with measurable A1,A2>0A_1,A_2>0A1​,A2​>0 and Y∈[0,1]Y\in[0,1]Y∈[0,1], the elasticity η>1\eta>1η>1, and the cost ccc. The cost is strictly convex and increasing on [0,∞)[0,\infty)[0,∞) and has derivative c′c'c′ at every e>0e>0e>0. On top of these, Model defines Π\PiΠ, KKK, the payment (46) (by its printed left side, not as the ratio it is claimed to equal), expected output and market revenue, and the manager's utility (from the payment scheme, not by the printed formula). Derivatives are HasDerivAt statements and optima are IsMaxOn over [0,1][0,1][0,1] or [0,∞)[0,\infty)[0,∞).

The standing assumptions are those of the model paragraph on p. 92: risk neutrality and the distributional assumptions above. Added hypotheses, each disclosed in the item's Formalization Note:

  • E[Y]>0E[Y]>0E[Y]>0, because (46) divides by it.
  • Integrability of (A1η+A2η)1/ηY(η−1)/η(A_1^\eta+A_2^\eta)^{1/\eta}Y^{(\eta-1)/\eta}(A1η​+A2η​)1/ηY(η−1)/η.
  • A positive price in the retailer's first-order condition.
  • Differentiability of ccc only on (0,∞)(0,\infty)(0,∞).

The existence of an effort satisfying (45) is a hypothesis, as on the page. Clauses 1 of the goal are stated for fixed realizations, not as random variables.

A trivializing formalization would define γo(α)\gamma^o(\alpha)γo(α) as an argmax, or define the payment (46) as E[Qw]/E[Q]E[Qw]/E[Q]E[Qw]/E[Q]; neither is done here. Outside γ∈[0,1]\gamma\in[0,1]γ∈[0,1] and Q>0Q>0Q>0, Lean's real power returns junk values, and every statement restricts to that range. The companion claim that w(α,Q)w(\alpha,Q)w(α,Q) is the unique market-clearing price is not posed.

The formalization needs no infrastructure beyond Mathlib's real powers, convexity and Bochner integral. The concavity and first-order-condition lemmas for x↦axr−bxx\mapsto ax^{r}-bxx↦axr−bx with 0<r<10<r<10<r<1 may be reused for other constant-elasticity models. Contributions are welcome at any milestone; each is independent of the others except through the closed forms.

Selected references

  • G. P. Cachon, Supply Chain Coordination with Contracts, in S. Graves and T. de Kok (eds.), Handbooks in Operations Research and Management Science, Vol. 11: Supply Chain Management, North-Holland, 2003, Ch. 6, §6.9. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0927-0507(03)11006-7 (formalized from the author's 3rd draft, January 2003).
  • P. Kouvelis and M. A. Lariviere, Decentralizing cross-functional decisions: Coordination through internal markets, Management Science 46(8), 2000, 1049–1058. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.46.8.1049.12025
  • E. L. Porteus and S. Whang, On manufacturing/marketing incentives, Management Science 37(9), 1991, 1166–1181. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.37.9.1166
  • G. P. Cachon and M. A. Lariviere, Capacity choice and allocation: strategic behavior and supply chain performance, Management Science 45(8), 1999, 1091–1108. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.45.8.1091
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Supply Chain Coordination with Contracts VIII: In the Two-Location Base-Stock Model the Linear Transfers (39)–(41) Make the Optimal Base Stocks the Unique Nash EquilibriumTextbook

Motivation

In a supply chain with stock at two locations, a supplier holds inventory that replenishes a retailer, and the retailer serves customers. Each firm sets its own inventory level to minimize its own cost. The retailer bears only part of the cost of customer backorders, and the supplier bears none of the retailer's holding cost, so their incentives differ. The resulting equilibrium generally differs from the policy that minimizes total cost. Cachon and Zipkin (Management Science 45(7), 1999) studied this game and proposed linear transfer payments that align the firms' incentives. In the chapter Supply Chain Coordination with Contracts (Handbooks in OR & MS, vol. 11, 2003, doi:10.1016/S0927-0507(03)11006-7), Cachon re-derives that analysis, adds a parameter λ\lambdaλ that divides the retail-level costs between the firms, and answers two questions the original paper left open: whether the contracts allow an arbitrary division of cost, and whether the optimal policy is the unique equilibrium under the contracts. This mission formalizes the second answer, together with the analysis of the decentralized game and of the optimal policy that it rests on (§6.8 of the 2003 chapter, read in the author's January 2003 draft).

Setting

Two firms, a retailer rrr and a supplier sss, each use a base stock policy: firm iii keeps its inventory position equal to its base stock level si∈Rs_i \in \mathbb Rsi​∈R. A negative supplier base stock means planned backorders. Let DrD_rDr​ and DsD_sDs​ be the demands during the retailer's and the supplier's lead times. They are nonnegative with finite means μr\mu_rμr​, μs\mu_sμs​, and their distribution functions FrF_rFr​, FsF_sFs​ are continuous, zero at 000, strictly increasing on [0,∞)[0,\infty)[0,∞) and differentiable on (0,∞)(0,\infty)(0,∞). Holding costs are hrh_rhr​ and hsh_shs​, with 0<hs<hr0 < h_s < h_r0<hs​<hr​. Each backorder at the retailer costs the retailer βr>0\beta_r > 0βr​>0 and the supplier βs>0\beta_s > 0βs​>0 per unit time. Write β=βr+βs\beta = \beta_r + \beta_sβ=βr​+βs​.

At retailer inventory level yyy the expected on-hand stock is Ir(y)=E[(y−Dr)+]I_r(y) = E[(y-D_r)^+]Ir​(y)=E[(y−Dr​)+] and the expected backorders are Br(y)=E[(Dr−y)+]B_r(y) = E[(D_r-y)^+]Br​(y)=E[(Dr​−y)+]. The retail-level cost rates are cr(y)=hrIr(y)+βrBr(y)c_r(y) = h_rI_r(y) + \beta_rB_r(y)cr​(y)=hr​Ir​(y)+βr​Br​(y), cs(y)=βsBr(y)c_s(y) = \beta_sB_r(y)cs​(y)=βs​Br​(y) and c(y)=cr(y)+cs(y)c(y) = c_r(y) + c_s(y)c(y)=cr​(y)+cs​(y). Because the supplier may stock out, the retailer's actual inventory level is sr−(Ds−ss)+s_r - (D_s - s_s)^+sr​−(Ds​−ss​)+, and every retail-level quantity is averaged accordingly:

g(sr,ss)=E[g(sr−(Ds−ss)+)]=Fs(ss)g(sr)+∫ss∞g(sr+ss−x)fs(x) dx.g(s_r,s_s) = E\big[g(s_r - (D_s-s_s)^+)\big] = F_s(s_s)g(s_r) + \int_{s_s}^\infty g(s_r+s_s-x)f_s(x)\,dx .g(sr​,ss​)=E[g(sr​−(Ds​−ss​)+)]=Fs​(ss​)g(sr​)+∫ss​∞​g(sr​+ss​−x)fs​(x)dx.

With the supplier's inventory Is(y)=E[(y−Ds)+]I_s(y) = E[(y-D_s)^+]Is​(y)=E[(y−Ds​)+] and backorders Bs(y)=μs−y+Is(y)B_s(y) = \mu_s - y + I_s(y)Bs​(y)=μs​−y+Is​(y), the firms' costs and the chain's cost are

πr(sr,ss)=cr(sr,ss),πs(sr,ss)=hsIs(ss)+cs(sr,ss),Π=πr+πs.\pi_r(s_r,s_s) = c_r(s_r,s_s), \qquad \pi_s(s_r,s_s) = h_sI_s(s_s) + c_s(s_r,s_s), \qquad \Pi = \pi_r + \pi_s .πr​(sr​,ss​)=cr​(sr​,ss​),πs​(sr​,ss​)=hs​Is​(ss​)+cs​(sr​,ss​),Π=πr​+πs​.

A pair {sro,sso}\{s_r^o, s_s^o\}{sro​,sso​} minimizing Π\PiΠ is an optimal policy. A Nash equilibrium is a pair from which neither firm can lower its own cost by a unilateral change of its base stock.

Under a linear transfer the supplier pays the retailer tIIr(sr,ss)+tBrBr(sr,ss)+tBsBs(ss)t_II_r(s_r,s_s) + t_B^rB_r(s_r,s_s) + t_B^sB_s(s_s)tI​Ir​(sr​,ss​)+tBr​Br​(sr​,ss​)+tBs​Bs​(ss​) (a negative amount is a payment the other way). The Cachon–Zipkin contracts with parameter λ∈(0,1]\lambda \in (0,1]λ∈(0,1] are

tI=(1−λ)hr,tBr=βr−λβ,tBs=λhsFs(sso)1−Fs(sso).t_I = (1-\lambda)h_r, \qquad t_B^r = \beta_r - \lambda\beta, \qquad t_B^s = \lambda h_s\frac{F_s(s_s^o)}{1-F_s(s_s^o)} .tI​=(1−λ)hr​,tBr​=βr​−λβ,tBs​=λhs​1−Fs​(sso​)Fs​(sso​)​.

Formalization targets

Goal: the contracts coordinate, uniquely

If {sro,sso}\{s_r^o, s_s^o\}{sro​,sso​} is optimal with sso>0s_s^o > 0sso​>0 and λ∈(0,1]\lambda \in (0,1]λ∈(0,1], then under the contracts

πr=λc(sr,ss)−tBsBs(ss),πs=(hs+tBs)Is(ss)+(1−λ)c(sr,ss)+tBs(μs−ss),\pi_r = \lambda c(s_r,s_s) - t_B^sB_s(s_s), \qquad \pi_s = (h_s+t_B^s)I_s(s_s) + (1-\lambda)c(s_r,s_s) + t_B^s(\mu_s - s_s),πr​=λc(sr​,ss​)−tBs​Bs​(ss​),πs​=(hs​+tBs​)Is​(ss​)+(1−λ)c(sr​,ss​)+tBs​(μs​−ss​),

{sro,sso}\{s_r^o, s_s^o\}{sro​,sso​} is a Nash equilibrium, and it is the only one. The goal contains no numerical constants. It holds for every demand distribution in the class and every λ\lambdaλ in the range.

Milestones

  1. In the uncontracted game, every retailer best response exceeds s^r>0\hat s_r > 0s^r​>0, where Fr(s^r)=βr/(hr+βr)F_r(\hat s_r) = \beta_r/(h_r+\beta_r)Fr​(s^r​)=βr​/(hr​+βr​), and every supplier best response is positive (pp. 79–80).
  2. In the uncontracted game, for every sss_sss​ the retailer's optimal base stock is below the chain's; consequently the competition penalty (Π(s∗)−Π(so))/Π(so)(\Pi(s^*) - \Pi(s^o))/\Pi(s^o)(Π(s∗)−Π(so))/Π(so) is positive at every equilibrium s∗s^*s∗ (pp. 80–81).
  3. The partial derivatives (35)–(36) of Π\PiΠ, and every optimum with ss>0s_s > 0ss​>0 satisfies c′(sr)=hsc'(s_r) = h_sc′(sr​)=hs​, i.e. Fr(sr)=(hs+β)/(hr+β)F_r(s_r) = (h_s+\beta)/(h_r+\beta)Fr​(sr​)=(hs​+β)/(hr​+β) (37) (p. 83).
  4. Optima with ss≤0s_s \le 0ss​≤0 have sr+ss=sˉs_r + s_s = \bar ssr​+ss​=sˉ, where Pr⁡(Dr+Ds≤sˉ)=β/(hr+β)\Pr(D_r + D_s \le \bar s) = \beta/(h_r+\beta)Pr(Dr​+Ds​≤sˉ)=β/(hr​+β) (38) (p. 83).
  5. The cost identities (42)–(43) under the contracts (p. 84).
  6. Under the contracts the retailer's best response decreases in sss_sss​, and the supplier's marginal cost along it has the closed form printed on p. 84.

Significance

The goal says that a contract built from quantities both firms can measure, namely the retailer's inventory and backorders and the supplier's backorders, makes the system-optimal policy the only equilibrium. The firms therefore reach the optimum without coordinating on an equilibrium. The parameter λ\lambdaλ splits the retail-level costs between the firms in any proportion up to λ=1\lambda = 1λ=1. Milestone 2 shows the contract is needed: without transfers, decentralization is always strictly suboptimal when the supplier is charged for retail backorders. The transfers tIt_ItI​ and tBrt_B^rtBr​ are those of the single-location model (§6.7), even though the retailer's target fractile changes from β/(β+hr)\beta/(\beta+h_r)β/(β+hr​) to (β+hs)/(β+hr)(\beta+h_s)/(\beta+h_r)(β+hs​)/(β+hr​).

The results are proved in the source and in Cachon and Zipkin (1999), with informal derivative arguments. No machine-checked version is known. Formalizing them requires differentiating expectations of piecewise-linear convex functions of a random lead-time shortfall. The page's argument also assumes densities, which the formal statements avoid, and contains several printing slips (see below). These would be settled by a complete development.

Difficulty

The firms' costs are compositions: a convex single-location cost evaluated at the random level sr−(Ds−ss)+s_r - (D_s - s_s)^+sr​−(Ds​−ss​)+, which is concave in sss_sss​. The supplier's cost is therefore not obviously convex in sss_sss​; its convexity at sr=sros_r = s_r^osr​=sro​ depends on the value of tBst_B^stBs​ and on c′(sro)=hsc'(s_r^o) = h_sc′(sro​)=hs​. Uniqueness is the hard part. Under the contracts the retailer's best response sr(ss)s_r(s_s)sr​(ss​) decreases, but the supplier's marginal cost along that best response, Fs(ss)(hs−(1−λ)c′(sr(ss))+tBs)−tBsF_s(s_s)(h_s - (1-\lambda)c'(s_r(s_s)) + t_B^s) - t_B^sFs​(ss​)(hs​−(1−λ)c′(sr​(ss​))+tBs​)−tBs​, is not monotone in general when λ\lambdaλ is small, contrary to a literal reading of p. 84. A uniqueness argument has to show that it has at most one zero, not that it increases.

Formalization scope

Demand laws are probability measures on R\mathbb RR with no mass below 000, finite means, and continuous distribution functions, zero at 000, strictly increasing on [0,∞)[0,\infty)[0,∞) and differentiable on (0,∞)(0,\infty)(0,∞). These are the section's standing assumptions, together with 0<hs<hr0 < h_s < h_r0<hs​<hr​ and βr,βs>0\beta_r, \beta_s > 0βr​,βs​>0 (footnote 34 excludes the zero cases). Expectations are Lebesgue integrals: IrI_rIr​, BrB_rBr​, IsI_sIs​ and the two-location averages are defined by expectation, and the page's integral forms are consequences. Integrals against fs(x) dxf_s(x)\,dxfs​(x)dx are written against the law of DsD_sDs​, so no density hypothesis is made. Base stocks range over all of R\mathbb RR, and "optimal" means minimizing Π\PiΠ over R2\mathbb R^2R2; the existence of an optimum is a hypothesis, as on p. 77. Derivatives are stated with HasDerivAt. Independence of DrD_rDr​ and DsD_sDs​, implicit on the page, enters only through the convolution of their laws in (38).

The contracted costs are defined from the firms' original costs and the transfer payment. Defining them by the closed forms (42)–(43) would make the identities trivial and is ruled out.

Corrected slips: (42) is stated with λc(sr,ss)\lambda c(s_r,s_s)λc(sr​,ss​) where the page prints λΠ(sr,ss)\lambda\Pi(s_r,s_s)λΠ(sr​,ss​) (the difference λhsIs(ss)\lambda h_sI_s(s_s)λhs​Is​(ss​) does not depend on srs_rsr​). The retailer's single-location fractile on p. 79 is stated as βr/(hr+βr)\beta_r/(h_r+\beta_r)βr​/(hr​+βr​), not the printed β/(hr+β)\beta/(h_r+\beta)β/(hr​+β). The garbled display after (43) and the fsf_sfs​/FsF_sFs​ slip in the best-response derivative are not reproduced. Not included: the contraction condition (34), the case split for the optimal policy (p. 84), the case sso≤0s_s^o \le 0sso​≤0, and the alternative schemes of §6.8.5 (Lee–Whang, Chen). Contributions of those, or of a reusable library for derivatives of E[g(s−(D−t)+)]E[g(s - (D-t)^+)]E[g(s−(D−t)+)], are welcome. The platform's Clark–Scarf items (InventoryControl_clarkScarf, ClarkScarf.Serial.*) concern periodic-review echelon policies and are not reused.

Selected references

  • G. P. Cachon, Supply Chain Coordination with Contracts, in S. Graves and T. de Kok (eds.), Handbooks in Operations Research and Management Science, vol. 11, North-Holland, 2003, §6.8. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0927-0507(03)11006-7
  • G. P. Cachon and P. H. Zipkin, Competitive and cooperative inventory policies in a two-stage supply chain, Management Science 45(7), 936–953, 1999. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.45.7.936
  • F. Chen and Y.-S. Zheng, Lower bounds for multi-echelon stochastic inventory systems, Management Science 40(11), 1426–1443, 1994. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.40.11.1426
  • A. Federgruen and P. Zipkin, Computational issues in an infinite-horizon, multiechelon inventory model, Operations Research 32(4), 818–836, 1984. https://doi.org/10.1287/opre.32.4.818
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Convex OptimizationDiscrete GeometryLinear Optimization·Captain: mikedeng1

Integer Programming with a Fixed Number of Variables 2: A Simplex Satisfying (16) Rounds K, B(p,r) ⊂ τK ⊂ B(p,R) with R/r ≤ 2n^(3/2)Research Paper

Motivation

In 1983 H. W. Lenstra, Jr. proved that integer linear programming with a fixed number of variables is solvable in polynomial time (Lenstra 1983). The algorithm became one of the founding results of algorithmic geometry of numbers: it introduced the strategy of making a convex body "round" by a linear change of coordinates, and then either finding a lattice point in it or showing that the body is covered by few parallel lattice hyperplanes, which reduces the dimension by one.

The algorithm rests on two geometric facts, each with its own proof. The first (§1 of the paper, the companion mission Integer Programming with a Fixed Number of Variables 1) says that a round body that misses the lattice meets few lattice hyperplanes. This mission is the second (§2): an explicit construction of the rounding transformation. Starting from a simplex inside the polytope, the algorithm repeatedly swaps a vertex for a point of the polytope as long as this increases the simplex's volume by more than a factor 3/23/23/2. When no such swap exists, a linear map that makes the simplex regular also makes the polytope round, with an explicit roundness ratio 2n3/22n^{3/2}2n3/2.

Short timeline. Khachiyan's ellipsoid method (1979) made linear programming polynomial and supplied the subroutine that Lenstra uses to maximize linear functions on KKK. Lenstra's algorithm (preprint 1981, published 1983) combined it with the lattice basis reduction of Lenstra, Lenstra and Lovász (1982). Remark (c) of the paper notes that rounding with a maximal-volume inscribed ellipsoid achieves the better ratio nnn, but not by a polynomial algorithm for varying nnn; later work (Kannan 1987, Grötschel–Lovász–Schrijver 1988) refined the rounding step with ellipsoid methods.

Setting

Work in Rn\mathbb R^nRn with the Euclidean length ∣⋅∣|\cdot|∣⋅∣, and write B(p,ρ)={x∈Rn:∣x−p∣≤ρ}B(p, \rho) = \{x \in \mathbb R^n : |x - p| \le \rho\}B(p,ρ)={x∈Rn:∣x−p∣≤ρ} for the closed ball. For points w0,…,wn∈Rnw_0, \dots, w_n \in \mathbb R^nw0​,…,wn​∈Rn, the simplex volume is

vol(w0,…,wn)=∣det⁡M∣n!,\mathrm{vol}(w_0, \dots, w_n) = \frac{|\det M|}{n!},vol(w0​,…,wn​)=n!∣detM∣​,

where MMM has column vectors w1−w0,…,wn−w0w_1 - w_0, \dots, w_n - w_0w1​−w0​,…,wn​−w0​.

Let K⊆RnK \subseteq \mathbb R^nK⊆Rn be convex, and let v0,…,vn∈Kv_0, \dots, v_n \in Kv0​,…,vn​∈K with v1−v0,…,vn−v0v_1 - v_0, \dots, v_n - v_0v1​−v0​,…,vn​−v0​ linearly independent. Choose linear functions g0,…,gn:Rn→Rg_0, \dots, g_n : \mathbb R^n \to \mathbb Rg0​,…,gn​:Rn→R with

gi constant on {vj:j≠i},gi(vi)≠gi(vj) (j≠i).(15)g_i \text{ constant on } \{v_j : j \ne i\}, \qquad g_i(v_i) \ne g_i(v_j) \ (j \ne i). \tag{15}gi​ constant on {vj​:j=i},gi​(vi​)=gi​(vj​) (j=i).(15)

Thus gig_igi​ measures the height above the facet opposite viv_ivi​. The stopping condition of the second stage is

∣gi(x−vj)∣≤32 ∣gi(vi−vj)∣for all x∈K and all i≠j.(16)|g_i(x - v_j)| \le \tfrac32\, |g_i(v_i - v_j)| \quad \text{for all } x \in K \text{ and all } i \ne j. \tag{16}∣gi​(x−vj​)∣≤23​∣gi​(vi​−vj​)∣for all x∈K and all i=j.(16)

The ratio ∣gi(x−vj)∣/∣gi(vi−vj)∣|g_i(x - v_j)|/|g_i(v_i - v_j)|∣gi​(x−vj​)∣/∣gi​(vi​−vj​)∣ is the factor by which the volume changes when viv_ivi​ is replaced by xxx, so (16) says that no such swap enlarges the simplex by more than 3/23/23/2.

Let τ\tauτ be a nonsingular linear map of Rn\mathbb R^nRn such that zj=τ(vj)z_j = \tau(v_j)zj​=τ(vj​) span a regular simplex, meaning that all distances ∣zi−zj∣|z_i - z_j|∣zi​−zj​∣, i≠ji \ne ji=j, are equal. Let p=(n+1)−1∑jzjp = (n+1)^{-1}\sum_j z_jp=(n+1)−1∑j​zj​ be its centroid and SSS its convex hull. For c≥1c \ge 1c≥1, the paper defines

Tc={x∈Rn:vol(z0,…,zi−1,x,zi+1,…,zn)≤c⋅vol(z0,…,zn) for all i}.T_c = \{x \in \mathbb R^n : \mathrm{vol}(z_0, \dots, z_{i-1}, x, z_{i+1}, \dots, z_n) \le c\cdot \mathrm{vol}(z_0, \dots, z_n) \text{ for all } i\}.Tc​={x∈Rn:vol(z0​,…,zi−1​,x,zi+1​,…,zn​)≤c⋅vol(z0​,…,zn​) for all i}.

The proof of the LEMMA works in model coordinates. There Rn\mathbb R^nRn is the hyperplane ∑j=0nrj=1\sum_{j=0}^n r_j = 1∑j=0n​rj​=1 of Rn+1\mathbb R^{n+1}Rn+1, the zjz_jzj​ are the standard basis vectors, p=(1n+1,…,1n+1)p = (\tfrac1{n+1}, \dots, \tfrac1{n+1})p=(n+11​,…,n+11​), and Tc={r:∣rj∣≤c for all j, ∑jrj=1}T_c = \{r : |r_j| \le c \text{ for all } j,\ \sum_j r_j = 1\}Tc​={r:∣rj​∣≤c for all j, ∑j​rj​=1}.

Formalization targets

Goal (§2, p. 543)

Under (15) and (16), with τ\tauτ making the simplex regular and ppp its centroid, there are positive reals r,Rr, Rr,R with

B(p,r)⊆τK⊆B(p,R),Rr≤2n3/2.B(p, r) \subseteq \tau K \subseteq B(p, R), \qquad \frac{R}{r} \le 2n^{3/2}.B(p,r)⊆τK⊆B(p,R),rR​≤2n3/2.

These are conditions (3)–(4) of §1 with c1=2n3/2c_1 = 2n^{3/2}c1​=2n3/2.

Milestones, in the order the proof uses them

  1. (16) is a statement about T3/2T_{3/2}T3/2​ (p. 543). Condition (16), for all x∈Kx \in Kx∈K and i≠ji \ne ji=j, holds exactly when τK⊆T3/2\tau K \subseteq T_{3/2}τK⊆T3/2​.
  2. Vertices of TcT_cTc​ (pp. 543–544). In the model, TcT_cTc​ is the convex hull of the coordinate permutations of e0−c∑j=1mej+c∑j=m+1neje_0 - c\sum_{j=1}^m e_j + c\sum_{j=m+1}^n e_je0​−c∑j=1m​ej​+c∑j=m+1n​ej​ (n=2mn = 2mn=2m), or of (1−c)e0−c∑j=1mej+c∑j=m+1nej(1-c)e_0 - c\sum_{j=1}^m e_j + c\sum_{j=m+1}^n e_j(1−c)e0​−c∑j=1m​ej​+c∑j=m+1n​ej​ (n=2m+1n = 2m+1n=2m+1).
  3. Outer radius (p. 544). Tc⊆B(p,R)T_c \subseteq B(p, R)Tc​⊆B(p,R) with R2=nc2+nn+1R^2 = nc^2 + \tfrac{n}{n+1}R2=nc2+n+1n​ (nnn even) or (n+1)c2−2c+nn+1(n+1)c^2 - 2c + \tfrac{n}{n+1}(n+1)c2−2c+n+1n​ (nnn odd).
  4. Inner radius (p. 544). B(p,r)⊆SB(p, r) \subseteq SB(p,r)⊆S inside the hyperplane, with r2=1n(n+1)r^2 = \tfrac{1}{n(n+1)}r2=n(n+1)1​.
  5. LEMMA (p. 543). For c≥1c \ge 1c≥1 and any regular simplex, B(p,r)⊆S⊆Tc⊆B(p,R)B(p, r) \subseteq S \subseteq T_c \subseteq B(p, R)B(p,r)⊆S⊆Tc​⊆B(p,R) for positive r,Rr, Rr,R with
(Rr)2={c2n3+(c2+1)n2n even,c2n3+(2c2−2c+1)n2+(c2−2c)nn odd.\Big(\frac Rr\Big)^2 = \begin{cases} c^2n^3 + (c^2+1)n^2 & n \text{ even},\\ c^2n^3 + (2c^2 - 2c + 1)n^2 + (c^2 - 2c)n & n \text{ odd}.\end{cases}(rR​)2={c2n3+(c2+1)n2c2n3+(2c2−2c+1)n2+(c2−2c)n​n even,n odd.​

The paper's own proof derives the goal from milestone 1 and the LEMMA at c=3/2c = 3/2c=3/2. At n=1n = 1n=1 the constant 2n3/22n^{3/2}2n3/2 cannot be improved by this argument.

Significance

The result. The theorem is the only place in the paper where the roundness constant c1c_1c1​ is computed, and c1c_1c1​ enters the bound 1+c1c2n1 + c_1c_2\sqrt n1+c1​c2​n​ on the number of lattice hyperplanes that the algorithm branches over. Remark (c) of the paper uses the exact LEMMA for other values of ccc to obtain c1=((1+ϵ)(n3+2n2))1/2c_1 = ((1+\epsilon)(n^3 + 2n^2))^{1/2}c1​=((1+ϵ)(n3+2n2))1/2 (nnn even) and ((1+ϵ)(n3+n2−n))1/2((1+\epsilon)(n^3+n^2-n))^{1/2}((1+ϵ)(n3+n2−n))1/2 (nnn odd). The LEMMA itself is a self-contained fact about the regular simplex. In Euclidean geometry it says how far the "volume-ccc neighbourhood" TcT_cTc​ of a regular simplex extends.

The formalization. The result is classical and proved in the paper. Nothing in it has been machine-checked: there is no regular simplex in Mathlib, and no formal result relates simplex volumes to barycentric coordinates in this form. The platform has the related ellipsoid rounding ConvexOptimization.lowner_john_polytope_rounding (the John-ellipsoid version with factor nnn, by Shuze Chen) and its definition ConvexOptimization_IsLownerJohn. That is the alternative construction of Remark (c). It has a different constant and is not used here. This mission and its companion together give a formal account of the geometry behind Lenstra's algorithm. The algorithm itself is not formalized: its running time needs a machine model and an encoding that the paper does not fix.

Difficulty

There are two separate difficulties. The first is the translation in milestone 1. It needs the volume of a simplex with one vertex replaced to be identified with a barycentric coordinate, through a determinant identity, and it needs this identification to survive the linear map τ\tauτ. The second is the transfer to the model. The paper's "similarity transformation" identifies Rn\mathbb R^nRn with a hyperplane of Rn+1\mathbb R^{n+1}Rn+1 and sends the regular simplex to the standard one. In Lean the vertex description (milestone 2), the radii (milestones 3–4) and TcT_cTc​ must all be carried across this isometry up to scaling. The LEMMA is stated in Rn\mathbb R^nRn, not in the model. The "straightforward analysis" behind milestone 2 is a vertex enumeration of a cube cut by a hyperplane, and its parity split is where sign errors appear.

Formalization scope

  • Rn\mathbb R^nRn is EuclideanSpace ℝ (Fin n) and the model Rn+1\mathbb R^{n+1}Rn+1 is EuclideanSpace ℝ (Fin (n+1)). Distances are Euclidean, never the sup norm. Vertices are indexed by Fin (n+1), matching 0,…,n0, \dots, n0,…,n.
  • The volume keeps the paper's normalisation ∣det⁡M∣/n!|\det M|/n!∣detM∣/n!. TcT_cTc​ is defined from volumes exactly as on p. 543, not from barycentric coordinates.
  • Readings of loose phrases. "Nonsingular endomorphism" is a linear equivalence. "Span a regular nnn-simplex" means all pairwise distances are equal and positive. "Certain/two positive real numbers r,Rr, Rr,R" is an existential with 0<r0 < r0<r and 0<R0 < R0<R in the conclusion; without them, R/rR/rR/r with r=0r = 0r=0 would be 000 in Lean. The LEMMA keeps the printed equality for (R/r)2(R/r)^2(R/r)2. (15) is two hypotheses on ggg, and (16) is quantified over all x∈Kx \in Kx∈K and all pairs i≠ji \ne ji=j.
  • Generalizations, all harmless. The paper's KKK is a bounded polyhedron and the vjv_jvj​ are vertices; the claim is stated for any convex KKK and any points vj∈Kv_j \in Kvj​∈K, and boundedness of KKK follows from (16). Milestone 1 holds for any set KKK. The LEMMA is stated for any regular simplex, since τ\tauτ plays no role in it.
  • n≥1n \ge 1n≥1 throughout. In the model, the ball of milestone 4 is intersected with the hyperplane ∑jxj=1\sum_j x_j = 1∑j​xj​=1, the paper's Rn\mathbb R^nRn. The full ball of Rn+1\mathbb R^{n+1}Rn+1 is not inside SSS.
  • No trivializing formalization is possible: the hypotheses are satisfiable (checked at n=1n = 1n=1, K=[0,1]K = [0,1]K=[0,1]), the radii are positive, and the sets are computed from the data rather than assumed.
  • Useful infrastructure, reusable beyond this mission: the volume of a simplex with one vertex replaced, as a multiple of a barycentric coordinate; existence and properties of regular simplices in Rn\mathbb R^nRn; the isometric embedding of a regular simplex onto the standard simplex. Contributions of any of these as separate lemmas are welcome.

Selected references

  • H. W. Lenstra, Jr., Integer programming with a fixed number of variables, Mathematics of Operations Research 8(4) (1983) 538–548. https://doi.org/10.1287/moor.8.4.538
  • A. K. Lenstra, H. W. Lenstra, Jr., L. Lovász, Factoring polynomials with rational coefficients, Mathematische Annalen 261 (1982) 515–534. https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01457454
  • L. G. Khachiyan, A polynomial algorithm in linear programming, Soviet Math. Doklady 20 (1979) 191–194.
  • R. Kannan, Minkowski's convex body theorem and integer programming, Mathematics of Operations Research 12(3) (1987) 415–440. https://doi.org/10.1287/moor.12.3.415
  • M. Grötschel, L. Lovász, A. Schrijver, Geometric Algorithms and Combinatorial Optimization, Springer, 1988. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-97881-4
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Algorithmic Game TheoryOperations ResearchOptimization·Captain: mikedeng1

Supply Chain Coordination with Contracts V: With Market-Clearing Prices the Best Wholesale Price Earns θ/(2(1 + θ)) or θ/8, Below the (1 + θ)/8 a Full-Refund Buy-Back AttainsTextbook

Motivation

A supplier that sells through many competing retailers usually worries that competition among them pushes orders too high, because each retailer ignores the demand it takes from the others. Deneckere, Marvel and Peck (1997) identified the opposite failure. When the retail price is set by the market after demand is realized, retailers who hold too much stock in a weak market bid the price down, and anticipating this, perfectly competitive retailers order too little. The supplier then needs a contract that raises orders, and the classical justification for resale price maintenance (a price floor imposed on retailers) comes out of this model. G. P. Cachon's survey chapter Supply Chain Coordination with Contracts (Handbooks in OR & MS, Vol. 11, 2003) presents the model in §6.5.2 as a closed-form example. In it the supplier's best wholesale price contract is computed explicitly and compared with two contracts that recover the monopoly profit: resale price maintenance and a full-refund buy-back.

This mission is volume V of a series that formalizes the section capstones of that chapter, read in the author's 3rd draft (January 2003), pp. 53–58.

Setting

Fix θ>1\theta>1θ>1. Industry demand is low or high, each with probability 1/21/21/2. If the retailers hold a total stock qqq, the market clearing price is

pl(q)=(1−q)+ (low state),ph(q)=(1−qθ)+ (high state).p_l(q)=(1-q)^+\ \text{(low state)},\qquad p_h(q)=\Big(1-\frac q\theta\Big)^+\ \text{(high state)}.pl​(q)=(1−q)+ (low state),ph​(q)=(1−θq​)+ (high state).

Leftover inventory has no salvage value, and the supplier's production cost is zero.

  • Monopolist benchmark. A single firm orders a stock QQQ, observes the state, and sells xl≤Qx_l\le Qxl​≤Q (low) or xh≤Qx_h\le Qxh​≤Q (high) at the market clearing price. Its expected profit is 12pl(xl)xl+12ph(xh)xh\tfrac12p_l(x_l)x_l+\tfrac12p_h(x_h)x_h21​pl​(xl​)xl​+21​ph​(xh​)xh​, and Πo\Pi^oΠo is the maximum of this.
  • Wholesale price contract. The supplier charges www per unit. A continuum of retailers orders before demand is known and sells everything at the market clearing price. Their aggregate expected profit is
π(q)=12pl(q)q+12ph(q)q−wq.\pi(q)=\tfrac12p_l(q)q+\tfrac12p_h(q)q-wq .π(q)=21​pl​(q)q+21​ph​(q)q−wq.

Perfect competition means the retailers keep ordering until expected profit is zero. The competitive order is the q>0q>0q>0 with π(q)=0\pi(q)=0π(q)=0 and π>0\pi>0π>0 on (0,q)(0,q)(0,q). The supplier earns wqwqwq.

  • Resale price maintenance (pˉ,w)(\bar p,w)(pˉ​,w): retailers may not sell below pˉ\bar ppˉ​. When the clearing price would fall below pˉ\bar ppˉ​, only the demand at pˉ\bar ppˉ​ is sold, allocated in proportion to stock.
  • Buy-back (w,b)(w,b)(w,b): the supplier pays bbb per unsold unit. The market price then cannot fall below bbb, and retailers sell at most 1−b1-b1−b units (low) and θ(1−b)\theta(1-b)θ(1−b) units (high).

The page's notation q1(w)=2θ1+θ(1−w)q_1(w)=\frac{2\theta}{1+\theta}(1-w)q1​(w)=1+θ2θ​(1−w), q2(w)=θ(1−2w)q_2(w)=\theta(1-2w)q2​(w)=θ(1−2w), πs(w)\pi_s(w)πs​(w) and w∗(θ)w^*(\theta)w∗(θ) is kept in Lean under the names q1, q2, supplierProfit, wStar.

Formalization targets

Goal (pp. 55, 57)

With

πs∗={θ2(1+θ)θ≤3,θ8θ>3,\pi_s^*=\begin{cases}\dfrac{\theta}{2(1+\theta)}&\theta\le3,\\[4pt]\dfrac\theta8&\theta>3,\end{cases}πs∗​=⎩⎨⎧​2(1+θ)θ​8θ​​θ≤3,θ>3,​

the goal states four things:

  1. πs∗\pi_s^*πs∗​ is the greatest supplier profit wqwqwq over all wholesale prices and their competitive orders.
  2. w∗(θ)w^*(\theta)w∗(θ) attains it.
  3. The monopolist's maximum is Πo=(1+θ)/8\Pi^o=(1+\theta)/8Πo=(1+θ)/8, and πs∗<Πo\pi_s^*<\Pi^oπs∗​<Πo.
  4. Under the buy-back b=w=1/2b=w=1/2b=w=1/2 the competitive order is θ/2\theta/2θ/2 and the supplier earns exactly Πo\Pi^oΠo.

Milestones

  1. Πo=(1+θ)/8\Pi^o=(1+\theta)/8Πo=(1+θ)/8 (p. 54).
  2. The competitive order is q1(w)q_1(w)q1​(w) if w≥12−12θw\ge\tfrac12-\tfrac1{2\theta}w≥21​−2θ1​ and q2(w)q_2(w)q2​(w) otherwise, for 0≤w<10\le w<10≤w<1 (p. 55).
  3. w∗(θ)w^*(\theta)w∗(θ) maximizes πs\pi_sπs​ on [0,1)[0,1)[0,1), with the value πs∗\pi_s^*πs∗​ (p. 55).
  4. The orders and market clearing prices at w∗(θ)w^*(\theta)w∗(θ) (p. 55).
  5. Under resale price maintenance with pˉ=1/2\bar p=1/2pˉ​=1/2 and total stock θ/2\theta/2θ/2, πr(t)=q(t)(1+θ4θ−w)\pi_r(t)=q(t)\big(\frac{1+\theta}{4\theta}-w\big)πr​(t)=q(t)(4θ1+θ​−w) (p. 56).
  6. Under (pˉ,wˉ)(\bar p,\bar w)(pˉ​,wˉ) the competitive order is θ/2\theta/2θ/2 and the supplier earns Πo\Pi^oΠo (p. 57).
  7. Under the buy-back b=1/2b=1/2b=1/2 the retailers' profit is q(34−w−q2θ)q\big(\frac34-w-\frac q{2\theta}\big)q(43​−w−2θq​) for 1/2<q<θ/21/2<q<\theta/21/2<q<θ/2 (p. 57).
  8. 1/2>(1+θ)/(4θ)1/2>(1+\theta)/(4\theta)1/2>(1+θ)/(4θ) (p. 57).

Significance

The goal shows that in this model a wholesale price contract always falls short of the integrated profit, whatever θ\thetaθ. It also shows where the shortfall comes from: at the optimal wholesale price the low-state market price falls below the monopoly price 1/21/21/2 (milestone 4). Restoring the monopoly profit therefore requires a mechanism that holds the low-state price at 1/21/21/2. Resale price maintenance and a full-refund buy-back both do this, so the section gives a closed-form efficiency argument for vertical restraints that are often treated as anticompetitive. The section also contrasts the buy-back with revenue sharing, which coordinates the single newsvendor (§6.2) but not this model.

The results are proved on the printed pages by elementary algebra. None of them has a machine-checked proof, and nothing on Prove2Me covers this model. The mission produces checked versions of the case analysis, including the θ=3\theta=3θ=3 tie and the two regimes of the competitive order. It also adds a reusable encoding of "perfect competition" as the first zero of aggregate expected profit.

Difficulty

Every statement reduces to one-variable inequalities, but the case structure is easy to get wrong.

  • The retailers' profit is piecewise (prices hit zero at q=1q=1q=1 in the low state and at q=θq=\thetaq=θ in the high state). The competitive order lies on either side of q=1q=1q=1 depending on www.
  • The supplier's profit πs\pi_sπs​ is piecewise in www, and its second branch peaks at w=1/4w=1/4w=1/4 only when θ>2\theta>2θ>2.
  • The global optimum switches at θ=3\theta=3θ=3, where both prices are optimal.
  • A statement "the competitive order is q1(w)q_1(w)q1​(w)" needs the order to exist, to be unique, and to have positive profit everywhere below it. Exhibiting a root is not enough.
  • The buy-back profit is identically zero for q≥θ/2q\ge\theta/2q≥θ/2 when b=w=1/2b=w=1/2b=w=1/2. Only the "first zero" reading of perfect competition pins the order at θ/2\theta/2θ/2.

Formalization scope

All quantities are real numbers and θ>1\theta>1θ>1 throughout. The continuum of retailers enters only through the total order. No measure space of retailers is formalized, and footnote 26's multiplicity of individual equilibria is not stated. The sales rules under resale price maintenance (proportional allocation) and under the buy-back (price floor bbb) are written into the contract definitions, as the page describes them in words. The theorems use only pˉ=b=1/2\bar p=b=1/2pˉ​=b=1/2.

The formulas q1q_1q1​, q2q_2q2​, πs\pi_sπs​ and w∗w^*w∗ are definitions transcribed from the page. That they are the competitive order and the optimum is the content of the theorems. Defining Πo\Pi^oΠo or the competitive order by its closed form would trivialize the mission, so the competitive order is defined only by the zero-profit property and Πo\Pi^oΠo as a greatest element of the monopolist's feasible profits. The goal is stated over all real wholesale prices, so it also rules out profitable prices outside [0,1)[0,1)[0,1). Uniqueness of w∗(θ)w^*(\theta)w∗(θ) is not asserted at θ=3\theta=3θ=3.

The chapter's standing assumptions used here are risk neutrality and full information, together with the model paragraph of pp. 53–54 (two equally likely states, zero salvage value, zero production cost). No platform definition is referenced: no published item formalizes this model.

Selected references

  • G. P. Cachon, Supply Chain Coordination with Contracts, in S. Graves, T. de Kok (eds.), Handbooks in Operations Research and Management Science, Vol. 11: Supply Chain Management, North-Holland, 2003, §6.5.2 (3rd draft, January 2003, pp. 53–58). https://doi.org/10.1016/S0927-0507(03)11006-7
  • R. Deneckere, H. P. Marvel, J. Peck, Demand Uncertainty and Price Maintenance: Markdowns as Destructive Competition, American Economic Review 87(4), 619–641, 1997. https://www.jstor.org/stable/2951366
  • R. Deneckere, H. P. Marvel, J. Peck, Demand Uncertainty, Inventories, and Resale Price Maintenance, Quarterly Journal of Economics 111(3), 885–913, 1996. https://doi.org/10.2307/2946675
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Operations ResearchOptimizationProbability·Captain: mikedeng1

Supply Chain Coordination with Contracts III: With Effort-Dependent Demand, Buy-Backs, Quantity Flexibility and Revenue Sharing Under-Reward Effort, While a Quantity Discount Gives λΠ(q, e°)Textbook

Why effort breaks the standard coordinating contracts

A supplier selling through a retailer earns more when the retailer works harder at selling. Examples are a better shelf position, more knowledgeable sales staff, local advertising and keeping the display in order. These activities cost the retailer, raise demand, and usually cannot be observed or verified by the supplier, so no contract can be written on them directly. Chapter 6 of the Handbook of Operations Research and Management Science, Vol. 11: Supply Chain Management (G. P. Cachon, Supply Chain Coordination with Contracts, 2003) surveys contracts that align a retailer's decisions with the interest of the whole supply chain. Its §6.4 asks which of these contracts survive when the retailer also chooses such an unverifiable effort level.

The question goes back to the marketing literature on retail effort (Chu and Desai 1995, Desai and Srinivasan 1995, Desiraju and Moorthy 1997, Lal 1990, Lariviere and Padmanabhan 1997). It was taken up for newsvendor contracts by Taylor (2000), who showed that a sales rebate combined with a buy back restores coordination, and by Krishnan, Kapuscinski and Butz (2001), who let effort be chosen after demand is observed. This mission is the third in a series that formalizes the chapter's section capstones. It covers §6.4.1.

The newsvendor with effort-dependent demand

One supplier sells to one retailer for a single selling season. Before the season the retailer chooses an order quantity q≥0q \ge 0q≥0 and an effort level e≥0e \ge 0e≥0. Effort costs him g(e)g(e)g(e), where g(0)=0g(0) = 0g(0)=0, g′>0g' > 0g′>0 and g′′>0g'' > 0g′′>0. Demand DDD given effort eee has distribution function F(⋅∣e)F(\cdot \mid e)F(⋅∣e) on [0,∞)[0, \infty)[0,∞), with F(0∣e)=0F(0 \mid e) = 0F(0∣e)=0 and F(⋅∣e)F(\cdot \mid e)F(⋅∣e) strictly increasing. Demand is stochastically increasing in effort: ∂F(y∣e)/∂e<0\partial F(y \mid e)/\partial e < 0∂F(y∣e)/∂e<0 for y>0y > 0y>0. Units sell at the retail price ppp and cost c<pc < pc<p to produce. Goodwill costs, the salvage value and the retailer's own unit cost are zero. Expected sales and the integrated channel's profit are

S(q,e)=E[min⁡(q,D)]=q−∫0qF(y∣e) dy,Π(q,e)=pS(q,e)−cq−g(e).S(q, e) = \mathbb E[\min(q, D)] = q - \int_0^q F(y \mid e)\,dy, \qquad \Pi(q, e) = pS(q, e) - cq - g(e).S(q,e)=E[min(q,D)]=q−∫0q​F(y∣e)dy,Π(q,e)=pS(q,e)−cq−g(e).

Let (qo,eo)(q^o, e^o)(qo,eo) maximize Π\PiΠ. A contract fixes the transfer the retailer pays the supplier, as a function of what the supplier can verify: the order and, for some contracts, sales or leftover units, but never effort. The contracts compared are the buy back {wb,b}\{w_b, b\}{wb​,b}, quantity flexibility {wq,δ}\{w_q, \delta\}{wq​,δ}, revenue sharing {wr,ϕ}\{w_r, \phi\}{wr​,ϕ}, the sales rebate {ws,r,t}\{w_s, r, t\}{ws​,r,t} and the quantity discount wd(q)w_d(q)wd​(q). Under each, the retailer's profit πr(q,e)\pi_r(q, e)πr​(q,e) is his revenue pS(q,e)pS(q, e)pS(q,e) less the transfer and g(e)g(e)g(e).

Formalization targets

Goal

The goal combines the section's negative and positive results.

  1. Buy backs distort effort (Eq. (19)). For every b>0b > 0b>0, q>0q > 0q>0 and e>0e > 0e>0,
∂πr(q,e,wb,b)∂e<∂Π(q,e)∂e.\frac{\partial \pi_r(q, e, w_b, b)}{\partial e} < \frac{\partial \Pi(q, e)}{\partial e}.∂e∂πr​(q,e,wb​,b)​<∂e∂Π(q,e)​.
  1. The quantity discount aligns effort and splits profit. With
wd(q)=(1−λ)p S(q,eo)q+λc−(1−λ)g(eo)q,λ∈[0,1],w_d(q) = (1 - \lambda)p\,\frac{S(q, e^o)}{q} + \lambda c - (1 - \lambda)\frac{g(e^o)}{q}, \qquad \lambda \in [0, 1],wd​(q)=(1−λ)pqS(q,eo)​+λc−(1−λ)qg(eo)​,λ∈[0,1],

the following hold for every q>0q > 0q>0. The retailer earns πr(q,eo)=λΠ(q,eo)\pi_r(q, e^o) = \lambda\Pi(q, e^o)πr​(q,eo)=λΠ(q,eo) and the supplier earns (1−λ)Π(q,eo)(1 - \lambda)\Pi(q, e^o)(1−λ)Π(q,eo). The retailer's marginal profit of effort equals the channel's. His optimal efforts are the channel's. 3. The optimal order. If (qo,eo)(q^o, e^o)(qo,eo) maximizes Π\PiΠ, both firms' profits at effort eoe^oeo are maximized by qoq^oqo.

Milestones

The milestones follow the section's own claims: the integral form of SSS (p. 41); the first-order condition (18) for the chain-optimal effort; (19); the analogous strict inequalities for quantity flexibility (δ>0\delta > 0δ>0) and revenue sharing (ϕ<1\phi < 1ϕ<1), and the reverse inequality for the sales rebate (r>0r > 0r>0, q>tq > tq>t); the two displays of πr\pi_rπr​ under the quantity discount; and the fact that S(q,e)/qS(q, e)/qS(q,e)/q decreases in qqq.

Significance

The result separates two jobs a contract does. To coordinate the order quantity, buy backs, quantity flexibility and revenue sharing all shield the retailer from part of the demand risk or take part of his revenue. The same shield dulls his incentive to raise demand, so each one leads him to under-invest in effort. The sales rebate pushes the other way, toward too much effort. The quantity discount works because the retailer keeps every unit of realized revenue and bears all of his own effort cost. The schedule then prices the order against expected revenue at the optimal effort, so the order is coordinated without touching the effort incentive. Because πr(q,eo)=λΠ(q,eo)\pi_r(q, e^o) = \lambda\Pi(q, e^o)πr​(q,eo)=λΠ(q,eo) with λ\lambdaλ free in [0,1][0, 1][0,1], any split of the channel's optimal profit is attainable. The chapter extends this observation to retailers that also set price (p. 43).

The section's claims are proved on the page only in outline; several are introduced with "it can be shown". To our knowledge none has a machine-checked proof. Formalizing them requires differentiating expected sales in a parameter of the demand law. That step recurs throughout stochastic inventory and pricing models.

Difficulty

Most of the algebra is short. The substance is in the derivatives. ∂S(q,e)/∂e=−∫0q∂F(y∣e)/∂e dy\partial S(q, e)/\partial e = -\int_0^q \partial F(y \mid e)/\partial e\,dy∂S(q,e)/∂e=−∫0q​∂F(y∣e)/∂edy is a differentiation under the integral sign. The strict inequalities need this integral to be strictly negative. That in turn needs ∂F/∂e\partial F/\partial e∂F/∂e to be integrable and negative on a set of positive length, which is why q>0q > 0q>0 (and q>t≥0q > t \ge 0q>t≥0 for the sales rebate) matters.

The natural reading "the quantity discount makes (qo,eo)(q^o, e^o)(qo,eo) the retailer's joint optimum" is not what the page shows, and it fails in general. The page gives two partial statements: for each fixed qqq the retailer's effort incentive is the chain's, and at e=eoe = e^oe=eo his best order is qoq^oqo. Since πr(q,e)=Π(q,e)−(1−λ)Π(q,eo)\pi_r(q, e) = \Pi(q, e) - (1 - \lambda)\Pi(q, e^o)πr​(q,e)=Π(q,e)−(1−λ)Π(q,eo), the retailer can gain by moving qqq and eee together when λ\lambdaλ is small. The goal states exactly the two partial claims.

Formalization scope

The Lean namespace is CachonCoord.EffortNewsvendor. A structure Model collects the data: ppp and ccc with 0≤c<p0 \le c < p0≤c<p; a family of demand laws indexed by effort (probability measures on [0,∞)[0, \infty)[0,∞) with finite mean, no atom at 000, strictly increasing distribution function); the effort derivative ∂F(y∣e)/∂e\partial F(y \mid e)/\partial e∂F(y∣e)/∂e, negative for y>0y > 0y>0, e>0e > 0e>0; and ggg with g(0)=0g(0) = 0g(0)=0 and positive first and second derivatives for e>0e > 0e>0. SSS is defined as an expectation, and its integral form is a milestone. Derivative claims are HasDerivAt statements at interior efforts e>0e > 0e>0. The inequalities assert that both derivatives exist.

The following hypotheses are standing assumptions or disclosed additions:

  • the chapter's model paragraph (p. 7) and the zeros gr=gs=v=cr=0g_r = g_s = v = c_r = 0gr​=gs​=v=cr​=0 of p. 41;
  • as regularity, differentiation of e↦∫abF(y∣e) dye \mapsto \int_a^b F(y \mid e)\,dye↦∫ab​F(y∣e)dy under the integral sign, with interval-integrable ∂F/∂e\partial F/\partial e∂F/∂e;
  • 0≤c0 \le c0≤c (a production cost);
  • wq>0w_q > 0wq​>0 and δ≤1\delta \le 1δ≤1 for quantity flexibility (the contract's range, p. 24);
  • t≥0t \ge 0t≥0 for the sales rebate threshold;
  • q>0q > 0q>0 wherever wdw_dwd​, which divides by qqq, is used.

Revenue sharing and the sales rebate use §6.2's profit functions (pp. 21, 27) with this section's zeros, less g(e)g(e)g(e).

The page prints the last term of wdw_dwd​ as +(1−λ)g(eo)/q+(1 - \lambda)g(e^o)/q+(1−λ)g(eo)/q. With that sign the page's own displays πr(q,eo)=λΠ(q,eo)\pi_r(q, e^o) = \lambda\Pi(q, e^o)πr​(q,eo)=λΠ(q,eo) and πr(q,e)\pi_r(q, e)πr​(q,e) fail by 2(1−λ)g(eo)2(1 - \lambda)g(e^o)2(1−λ)g(eo). The formalization uses −(1−λ)g(eo)/q-(1 - \lambda)g(e^o)/q−(1−λ)g(eo)/q, under which both hold. wdw_dwd​ is the explicit printed schedule with this correction. It is not defined as "a schedule with πr=λΠ\pi_r = \lambda\Piπr​=λΠ", which would make the goal empty.

Not covered: the price-and-effort schedule at the bottom of p. 43, for which the page gives no argument. The cachon-2005 revenue-sharing effort results (RevShareCoord.Effort.*, deterministic revenue R(q,e)R(q, e)R(q,e)) are a different model and are not referenced. Proofs of any milestone, and a reusable library for differentiating newsvendor expectations in a parameter, are welcome.

Selected references

  • G. P. Cachon, Supply Chain Coordination with Contracts, in S. Graves and T. de Kok (eds.), Handbooks in Operations Research and Management Science, Vol. 11: Supply Chain Management, North-Holland, 2003, Ch. 6. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0927-0507(03)11006-7 (read in the author's 3rd draft, January 2003).
  • T. A. Taylor, Supply Chain Coordination under Channel Rebates with Sales Effort Effects, Management Science 48(8), 2002, 992–1007. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.48.8.992.168
  • H. Krishnan, R. Kapuscinski, D. A. Butz, Coordinating Contracts for Decentralized Supply Chains with Retailer Promotional Effort, Management Science 50(1), 2004, 48–63. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.1030.0154
  • G. P. Cachon, M. A. Lariviere, Supply Chain Coordination with Revenue-Sharing Contracts: Strengths and Limitations, Management Science 51(1), 2005, 30–44. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.1040.0215
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Convex OptimizationOperations ResearchOptimization·Captain: mikedeng1

A Numerically Stable Dual Method for Solving Strictly Convex Quadratic Programs: The Dual Algorithm Solves the QP or Detects Its Infeasibility in Finitely Many StepsResearch Paper

Motivation

Strictly convex quadratic programs — minimize a positive definite quadratic subject to linear inequalities — are the subproblems solved at every iteration of successive quadratic programming (SQP) methods for nonlinear optimization, and they arise directly in least-squares estimation with constraints, portfolio selection and model predictive control. In SQP the unconstrained minimizer of the quadratic model is available at no cost, while a feasible point is not.

D. Goldfarb and A. Idnani (Math. Programming 27 (1983) 1–33) proposed a dual active-set method that exploits this asymmetry. It starts at the unconstrained minimizer, which is optimal for the problem with all constraints removed, and adds violated constraints one at a time while keeping the current point optimal for the subproblem defined by the current active set. No phase 1 is needed. The method, usually called the Goldfarb–Idnani algorithm, is the basis of widely used solvers (for example the quadprog package in R and QuadProg++), and the paper proves that it terminates finitely with a correct answer.

Earlier dual methods for quadratic programming include the modified-simplex methods of Lemke (Management Science 8 (1962) 442–453) and of Van de Panne and Whinston (1964), which the paper compares with its own in Section 7.

Setting

Fix n,m∈Nn, m \in \mathbb Nn,m∈N, a vector a∈Rna \in \mathbb R^na∈Rn, a symmetric positive definite n×nn\times nn×n matrix GGG, an n×mn\times mn×m matrix CCC with columns n1,…,nmn_1,\dots,n_mn1​,…,nm​, and b∈Rmb \in \mathbb R^mb∈Rm. The quadratic program (1.1) is

min⁡x f(x)=aTx+12xTGxsubject tosi(x)=niTx−bi≥0,i∈K={1,…,m}.\min_x\ f(x) = a^{\mathsf T}x + \tfrac12 x^{\mathsf T}Gx \quad\text{subject to}\quad s_i(x) = n_i^{\mathsf T}x - b_i \ge 0,\quad i \in K = \{1,\dots,m\}.xmin​ f(x)=aTx+21​xTGxsubject tosi​(x)=niT​x−bi​≥0,i∈K={1,…,m}.

The gradient is g(x)=Gx+ag(x) = Gx + ag(x)=Gx+a. For J⊆KJ \subseteq KJ⊆K, the subproblem P(J)P(J)P(J) keeps only the constraints indexed by JJJ; P(∅)P(\emptyset)P(∅) is solved by x0=−G−1ax^0 = -G^{-1}ax0=−G−1a. A set A⊆KA \subseteq KA⊆K is linearly independent if the normals nin_ini​, i∈Ai\in Ai∈A, are.

For an independent AAA, let NNN be the matrix with columns nin_ini​, i∈Ai\in Ai∈A, and define

N∗=(NTG−1N)−1NTG−1,H=G−1−G−1N(NTG−1N)−1NTG−1.N^* = (N^{\mathsf T}G^{-1}N)^{-1}N^{\mathsf T}G^{-1},\qquad H = G^{-1} - G^{-1}N(N^{\mathsf T}G^{-1}N)^{-1}N^{\mathsf T}G^{-1}.N∗=(NTG−1N)−1NTG−1,H=G−1−G−1N(NTG−1N)−1NTG−1.

The multipliers are u(x)=N∗g(x)u(x) = N^*g(x)u(x)=N∗g(x); for a constraint p∉Ap \notin Ap∈/A with normal n+=npn^+ = n_pn+=np​ the infeasibility multipliers are r=N∗n+r = N^*n^+r=N∗n+; a superscript +++ denotes the same objects for A+=A∪{p}A^+ = A\cup\{p\}A+=A∪{p}.

An S-pair (x,A)(x, A)(x,A) is an independent active set AAA with si(x)=0s_i(x) = 0si​(x)=0 for i∈Ai\in Ai∈A and xxx optimal for P(A)P(A)P(A). A V-triple (x,A,p)(x, A, p)(x,A,p) has p∉Ap\notin Ap∈/A, A+A^+A+ independent, sp(x)<0s_p(x) < 0sp​(x)<0, si(x)=0s_i(x) = 0si​(x)=0 for i∈Ai \in Ai∈A, H+g(x)=0H^+g(x) = 0H+g(x)=0 and u+(x)=(N+)∗g(x)≥0u^+(x) = (N^+)^*g(x) \ge 0u+(x)=(N+)∗g(x)≥0.

The dual algorithm starts from (x0,∅)(x^0, \emptyset)(x0,∅). In Step 1 it stops if xxx is feasible; otherwise it picks any violated constraint ppp. In Step 2 it moves along the primal direction z=Hn+z = Hn^+z=Hn+ and the dual direction (−r;1)(-r; 1)(−r;1) with step t=min⁡{t1,t2}t = \min\{t_1, t_2\}t=min{t1​,t2​}, where t1t_1t1​ is the largest step that keeps the multipliers nonnegative and t2=−sp(x)/zTn+t_2 = -s_p(x)/z^{\mathsf T}n^+t2​=−sp​(x)/zTn+ makes constraint ppp active. If both are infinite it reports infeasibility. A full step (t=t2t = t_2t=t2​) adds ppp and returns to Step 1. A partial step (t=t1<t2t = t_1 < t_2t=t1​<t2​), or a dual step (z=0z = 0z=0), drops a constraint kkk attaining t1t_1t1​ and repeats Step 2.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 3 (p. 11)

For every choice of the violated constraint ppp and of the dropped constraint kkk:

no run from (x0,∅) is infinite, and every run that cannot continue ends in {STOP at an optimal x of (1.1), orSTOP with {x:CTx≥b}=∅.\text{no run from } (x^0,\emptyset) \text{ is infinite, and every run that cannot continue ends in } \begin{cases}\text{STOP at an optimal } x \text{ of (1.1)}, \text{ or}\\ \text{STOP with } \{x : C^{\mathsf T}x \ge b\} = \emptyset.\end{cases}no run from (x0,∅) is infinite, and every run that cannot continue ends in {STOP at an optimal x of (1.1), orSTOP with {x:CTx≥b}=∅.​

Milestones, in attack order

  1. Properties (2.6)–(2.9) (p. 5): Hw=0  ⟺  w∈range⁡NHw = 0 \iff w \in \operatorname{range} NHw=0⟺w∈rangeN; H⪰0H \succeq 0H⪰0; HGH=HHGH = HHGH=H; N∗GH=0N^*GH = 0N∗GH=0.
  2. Optimality conditions (2.3)–(2.4) (p. 5): on the manifold of AAA, xxx solves P(A)P(A)P(A) iff N∗g(x)≥0N^*g(x) \ge 0N∗g(x)≥0 and Hg(x)=0Hg(x) = 0Hg(x)=0.
  3. Lemma 1 (p. 8): along xˉ=x+tHn+\bar x = x + tHn^+xˉ=x+tHn+ from a V-triple, H+g(xˉ)=0H^+g(\bar x) = 0H+g(xˉ)=0, the constraints of AAA stay active, u+(xˉ)=u+(x)+t(−r;1)u^+(\bar x) = u^+(x) + t(-r;1)u+(xˉ)=u+(x)+t(−r;1) and sp(xˉ)=sp(x)+t zTn+s_p(\bar x) = s_p(x) + t\,z^{\mathsf T}n^+sp​(xˉ)=sp​(x)+tzTn+.
  4. Theorem 1 (pp. 8–9): the step t=min⁡{t1,t2}t = \min\{t_1,t_2\}t=min{t1​,t2​} increases sps_psp​ and fff; a partial step yields a V-triple, a full step an S-pair.
  5. Theorem 2 (p. 10): if np=Nrn_p = Nrnp​=Nr and sp(x)<0s_p(x) < 0sp​(x)<0 at an S-pair, then r≤0r \le 0r≤0 means P(A∪{p})P(A\cup\{p\})P(A∪{p}) is infeasible; otherwise dropping a minimizing kkk gives a V-triple.
  6. One round of Step 2 (p. 11): from an S-pair and a violated ppp, at most ∣A∣|A|∣A∣ partial or dual steps and one final step end either in infeasibility of (1.1) or in a new S-pair (xˉ,Aˉ∪{p})(\bar x, \bar A \cup\{p\})(xˉ,Aˉ∪{p}) with Aˉ⊆A\bar A\subseteq AAˉ⊆A and f(xˉ)>f(x)f(\bar x) > f(x)f(xˉ)>f(x).

Significance

Theorem 3 is the correctness certificate of the Goldfarb–Idnani method: whatever rule an implementation uses to choose the entering and leaving constraints, it cannot cycle and its answer is right. In particular the infeasibility verdict is a proof that (1.1) has no feasible point, which matters in SQP where infeasible subproblems trigger a different branch of the outer method. The intermediate results (the operator identities, Lemma 1, Theorems 1–2) are the standard analysis of dual active-set methods for quadratic programming.

The result is proved in the paper; to our knowledge it has not been machine-checked. A formal development produces verified projector identities for N∗N^*N∗ and HHH, a verified KKT characterization for equality-active subproblems, and a verified finite-termination proof for a nondeterministic algorithm with an explicit step relation. The platform already has a proved KKT sufficiency theorem for general convex programs (ConvexOptimization.kkt_sufficient_for_convex), stated over EuclideanSpace with general convex functions and gradient fields; it can serve as background for the sufficiency half of milestone 2, but it is not stated in this mission's matrix objects.

Difficulty

The obvious termination argument is that fff increases strictly at every iteration and there are finitely many active sets. It fails as stated: partial steps may leave xxx unchanged (the dual steps of Step 2(c)(ii)), so fff is only nondecreasing between consecutive states. A termination proof therefore needs a measure that also decreases along steps that do not move xxx. Any such argument relies on invariants (independence of A+A^+A+, nonnegativity of the multipliers, sp<0s_p < 0sp​<0 along partial steps) that hold only on reachable states, and the operators N∗N^*N∗ and HHH are meaningful only while those invariants hold. Correctness of the infeasibility verdict requires the dependent case (Theorem 2), not only Theorem 1.

Formalization scope

Vectors are Fin n → ℝ, GGG is Matrix (Fin n) (Fin n) ℝ with G.PosDef, CCC is Matrix (Fin n) (Fin m) ℝ, and active sets are Finset (Fin m). Multiplier vectors are indexed by constraint index (Fin m → ℝ, zero off the active set), not by position in AAA. Lean's matrix inverse returns 000 for singular matrices, so every statement about N∗N^*N∗ and HHH assumes G≻0G \succ 0G≻0 and an independent active set (directly, or through an S-pair or V-triple).

The algorithm is the inductive relation Step on states step1 x A u, step2 x A p u⁺, stopOptimal x, stopInfeasible, with one transition per admissible choice of ppp and kkk. Infinite step lengths are separate transitions; a tie t1=t2t_1 = t_2t1​=t2​ takes the full step, as the paper tests t=t2t = t_2t=t2​ first. The running value of fff and the factorizations of Section 4 are not part of the state.

Explicit readings of the paper's words:

  • "solves the QPP or indicates infeasibility in a finite number of steps" is: no infinite sequence of Step transitions from the Step-0 state, and every reachable state without a successor is a STOP whose verdict is correct (optimal for (1.1), or (1.1) infeasible);
  • "S-pair" is: AAA independent and active at xxx, with xxx optimal for P(A)P(A)P(A) (the reading every use in the paper needs);
  • in Theorem 1 the partial-step clause carries t<t2t < t_2t<t2​ (as in its proof), and the multiplier printed uj+1+u^+_{j+1}uj+1+​ in (3.16) is uq+1+u^+_{q+1}uq+1+​, the entry belonging to ppp;
  • "an S-pair can never reoccur" is expressed as the strict increase f(xˉ)>f(x)f(\bar x) > f(x)f(xˉ)>f(x) in milestone 6.

Property (2.10), printed HH+=H+HH^+ = H^+HH+=H+, is false unless G=IG = IG=I and is not formalized. Equality constraints (1.2), Section 4 (numerically stable implementation), Sections 5–6 (computations), Section 7 (comparisons) and the Appendix example are out of scope.

A trivializing formalization is ruled out: the goal quantifies over every run of the relation (not one selection rule, not "some run terminates"), the infeasibility verdict is about (1.1) itself, and the algorithm is a relation that always has a successor until a STOP, so correctness cannot hold because a run gets stuck.

Needed infrastructure: Schur-complement and projector identities for N∗N^*N∗ and HHH; first-order optimality for convex quadratics on affine subspaces with inequality multipliers; well-foundedness arguments for a nondeterministic relation. The operator identities and the KKT characterization are reusable for other active-set and SQP analyses. Contributions of proofs of any milestone, and of reusable lemmas about N∗N^*N∗ and HHH, are welcome.

Selected references

  • D. Goldfarb and A. Idnani, A numerically stable dual method for solving strictly convex quadratic programs, Mathematical Programming 27 (1983) 1–33. https://doi.org/10.1007/BF02591962
  • C. E. Lemke, A method of solution for quadratic programs, Management Science 8 (1962) 442–453. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.8.4.442
  • J. Nocedal and S. J. Wright, Numerical Optimization, 2nd ed., Springer, 2006, Chapter 16. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-0-387-40065-5
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Graph TheoryLinear OptimizationOperations Research+1·Captain: mikedeng1

Finding Minimum-Cost Circulations by Successive Approximation I: The Generic Refine Subroutine Stops Within 3n(n − 1) + 3nm + 3n²(m + n) Update Operations at an ε-Optimal CirculationResearch Paper

Motivation

Minimum-cost circulation asks how to route flow around a directed network without accumulating flow at any vertex, while minimizing the total cost of the routed units. It is a basic network optimization problem: lower-bound and demand constraints in many flow models can be converted into circulation form. Goldberg and Tarjan's 1987 technical report develops a successive-approximation approach in which a local repair subroutine, refine, improves an approximately optimal circulation. The report was followed by a 1990 journal article; all theorem numbers and page citations in this mission refer to the 1987 report.

The mission isolates the generic form of refine, where an implementation may choose any applicable update at each step. Its question is whether every such choice sequence finishes after a controlled number of operations and returns a circulation with a stronger optimality certificate. The related Goldberg–Tarjan maximum-flow algorithm uses push and relabel operations with distance labels; here the labels are real-valued prices tied to arc costs. The authors' cycle-canceling work uses the same circulation network model and supplies published definitions reused in this development.

Setting

A circulation network has a finite vertex set VVV and a symmetric set EEE of directed arcs: whenever (v,w)(v,w)(v,w) is an arc, so is (w,v)(w,v)(w,v). Let n=∣V∣n=|V|n=∣V∣ and m=∣E∣m=|E|m=∣E∣, counting both orientations. Each arc has a real capacity u(v,w)u(v,w)u(v,w) and cost c(v,w)c(v,w)c(v,w), with c(v,w)=−c(w,v)c(v,w)=-c(w,v)c(v,w)=−c(w,v). A pseudoflow fff respects capacities and the paired-arc relation f(v,w)=−f(w,v)f(v,w)=-f(w,v)f(v,w)=−f(w,v). Its excess ef(v)e_f(v)ef​(v) is the sum of flow entering vvv. A circulation is a pseudoflow with zero excess everywhere. The already published CycleCanceling.MinMean.Network supplies this network, its circulation predicate, and residual capacity uf(v,w)=u(v,w)−f(v,w)u_f(v,w)=u(v,w)-f(v,w)uf​(v,w)=u(v,w)−f(v,w). An arc is residual when this capacity is positive.

A price function p:V→Rp:V\to\mathbb Rp:V→R changes an arc's reduced cost to cp(v,w)=c(v,w)−p(v)+p(w)c_p(v,w)=c(v,w)-p(v)+p(w)cp​(v,w)=c(v,w)−p(v)+p(w). A pseudoflow is ε\varepsilonε-optimal with respect to ppp when every residual arc has reduced cost at least −ε-\varepsilon−ε. A vertex is active when its excess is positive. An admissible arc is a residual arc of negative reduced cost. Refine takes an input circulation that is 2ε2\varepsilon2ε-optimal, saturates every arc whose reduced cost is negative, and then repeatedly applies an available update. A push sends flow from an active vertex along an admissible arc. A relabel raises the price of an active vertex with no outgoing admissible arc to the largest value permitted by ε\varepsilonε-optimality. These rules are Figures 4 and 5, printed pages 18–19.

Formalization targets

The supporting targets are the paper's progress and correctness results, its price bound, and the three operation counts. For any generic refine run from a 2ε2\varepsilon2ε-optimal circulation, Lemma 5.8 bounds each vertex's price increase by 3nε3n\varepsilon3nε. Lemmas 5.9–5.11 bound the numbers R,S,TR,S,TR,S,T of relabelings, saturating pushes, and nonsaturating pushes:

R≤3n(n−1),S≤3nm,T≤3n2(m+n).R\leq 3n(n-1),\qquad S\leq 3nm,\qquad T\leq 3n^2(m+n).R≤3n(n−1),S≤3nm,T≤3n2(m+n).

The goal combines the resulting bound on the number KKK of updates with progress and correctness:

K≤3n(n−1)+3nm+3n2(m+n).K\leq 3n(n-1)+3nm+3n^2(m+n).K≤3n(n−1)+3nm+3n2(m+n).

If the final state has an active vertex, another update exists. If no update applies, the final pseudoflow is a circulation and is ε\varepsilonε-optimal with respect to its final prices. This is the explicit operation-count content behind the generic subroutine's analysis in Section 5. It does not claim a bound for a particular data structure or a complete minimum-cost algorithm.

Significance

The theorem gives an order-independent finite bound: the choice of which applicable push or relabel to perform cannot cause generic refine to run forever or stop with an active vertex. Its output is a circulation whose approximate-optimality tolerance has been halved. That output can serve as the next input in the successive-approximation framework. For integral costs, the report's Theorem 2.3 later turns a sufficiently small tolerance into exact minimum cost; that outer-loop result is outside this mission.

This mission specifies the generic cost-scaling state machine in Lean and poses its quantitative analysis as open formalization targets. The shared network and circulation definitions from the published Goldberg–Tarjan 1989 series are available, and a related generic maximum-flow theorem in the 1988 series has a machine-checked proof. Those results do not prove refine's price-based bounds. Contributions that establish the paper's progress, price, or counting statements for this state machine, and reusable facts about finite residual networks, advance the open goal.

Difficulty

A push respects a capacity, but it can create activity at another vertex; a relabel changes which arcs are admissible. Thus checking a single update does not bound an arbitrary sequence. The price bound also depends on the circulation and prices supplied at entry, not merely on the current pseudoflow being ε\varepsilonε-optimal. Finally, a vertex with no admissible outgoing arc may appear to be stuck when the relabel minimum is over an empty set. Feasibility of the original circulation network is needed to establish that an active vertex still has a genuine next update. The operation bound requires accounting for the three update types across every possible choice sequence.

Formalization scope

Vertices form a finite type, and capacities, costs, flows, and prices are real-valued functions. The network has symmetric ordered arcs and antisymmetric costs. There is no separate nonnegativity assumption on capacities; feasibility is supplied by the input circulation. The new ε\varepsilonε is positive, so the entry circulation is 2ε2\varepsilon2ε-optimal before Figure 4 halves the error parameter. The run starts from the resulting saturated pseudoflow and records one applicable push or relabel per index k<Kk<Kk<K. Counts classify those actual steps by the selected arc's residual capacity after a push. Termination is the negation of the paper's loop guard, not a definition that assumes zero excess.

The reduced-cost sign is c−p(v)+p(w)c-p(v)+p(w)c−p(v)+p(w), and relabel raises p(v)p(v)p(v). This differs from the published 1989 epsilon-optimality definition, so only its network model is imported. The relabel relation requires an attained minimum over a nonempty set of outgoing residual arcs; it assigns no default value to an empty minimum. Loops may occur in the reused network model, but cost antisymmetry makes their reduced cost zero, so they cannot be push arcs. The explicit constants are the report's 3nε3n\varepsilon3nε, 3n(n−1)3n(n-1)3n(n−1), 3nm3nm3nm, and 3n2(m+n)3n^2(m+n)3n2(m+n); the goal sums the last three. The report's RAM-model O(⋅)O(\cdot)O(⋅) running times are outside the formal statements. A definition that makes termination equivalent to conservation or assigns an arbitrary relabel price at an empty set would miss the target.

Selected references

  • Andrew V. Goldberg and Robert E. Tarjan, Finding Minimum-Cost Circulations by Successive Approximation, MIT/LCS/TM-333, July 1987. Technical report.
  • Andrew V. Goldberg and Robert E. Tarjan, Finding Minimum-Cost Circulations by Successive Approximation, Mathematics of Operations Research 15(3), 1990, pp. 430–466. DOI. The report above supplies this mission's numbering.
  • Andrew V. Goldberg and Robert E. Tarjan, A New Approach to the Maximum-Flow Problem, Journal of the ACM 35(4), 1988. DOI.
  • Andrew V. Goldberg and Robert E. Tarjan, Finding Minimum-Cost Circulations by Canceling Negative Cycles, Journal of the ACM 36(4), 1989. DOI.
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CombinatoricsOperations ResearchOptimization+1·Captain: mikedeng1

Assortment Optimisation Under a General Discrete Choice Model: A Tight Analysis of Revenue-Ordered Assortments III: The Three Revenue-Ordered Approximation Bounds Are TightResearch Paper

Motivation

A retailer or an airline chooses which products to offer, and customers choose among what is offered, or buy nothing. Choosing the offer set that maximizes expected revenue is the assortment problem, central to revenue management (Talluri and van Ryzin, 2004). It is NP-hard even for simple mixtures of logit models, so practice relies on heuristics. The most common one is the revenue-ordered assortments strategy: offer the products whose price is above a threshold, and pick the best threshold.

Berbeglia and Joret (arXiv:1606.01371) analyse this heuristic under every regular choice model, the broad class in which enlarging the offer set never raises the probability of choosing any given alternative, including not buying. They prove three approximation guarantees, then show that none of the three can be improved. This mission formalizes that last result, Theorem 3.4.

Timeline:

  • Talluri and van Ryzin (2004) showed that revenue-ordered assortments are optimal under the multinomial logit model.
  • Rusmevichientong, Shmoys, Tong and Topaloglu (2014) showed the problem NP-hard under a mixture of two logit models, and proved that revenue-ordered assortments earn at least OPT/(e(1+ln⁡(rk/r1)))\mathrm{OPT}/(e(1+\ln(r_k/r_1)))OPT/(e(1+ln(rk​/r1​))) under mixed logit.
  • Aouad, Farias, Levi and Segev (2018) proved an Ω(1/ln⁡(rk/r1))\Omega(1/\ln(r_k/r_1))Ω(1/ln(rk​/r1​)) guarantee under random utility models, and that the assortment problem there is NP-hard to approximate within Ω(1/n1−ϵ)\Omega(1/n^{1-\epsilon})Ω(1/n1−ϵ) and Ω(1/log⁡1−ϵ(rk/r1))\Omega(1/\log^{1-\epsilon}(r_k/r_1))Ω(1/log1−ϵ(rk​/r1​)).
  • Berbeglia and Joret (2016–2020, Algorithmica) proved the guarantees 1/k1/k1/k, 1/∑i(ri−ri−1)/ri≥1/(1+ln⁡(rk/r1))1/\sum_{i}(r_i-r_{i-1})/r_i\ge1/(1+\ln(r_k/r_1))1/∑i​(ri​−ri−1​)/ri​≥1/(1+ln(rk​/r1​)) and a purchase-probability bound under any regular model, and an instance on which all three, in their sum forms, are attained in the limit.

Setting

The products form a finite set C\mathcal CC. A system of choice probabilities gives, for every offer set S⊆CS\subseteq\mathcal CS⊆C and product xxx, the probability P(x,S)\mathcal P(x,S)P(x,S) that a customer buys xxx. The no-purchase probability is P(0,S)=1−∑x∈SP(x,S)\mathcal P(0,S)=1-\sum_{x\in S}\mathcal P(x,S)P(0,S)=1−∑x∈S​P(x,S). The model is regular if

  1. P(x,S)≥0\mathcal P(x,S)\ge0P(x,S)≥0 for x∈C∪{0}x\in\mathcal C\cup\{0\}x∈C∪{0};
  2. P(x,S)=0\mathcal P(x,S)=0P(x,S)=0 for x∉Sx\notin Sx∈/S;
  3. ∑x∈SP(x,S)≤1\sum_{x\in S}\mathcal P(x,S)\le1∑x∈S​P(x,S)≤1;
  4. P(x,S)≥P(x,S′)\mathcal P(x,S)\ge\mathcal P(x,S')P(x,S)≥P(x,S′) for S⊆S′S\subseteq S'S⊆S′ and every x∈S∪{0}x\in S\cup\{0\}x∈S∪{0}.

Each product has a revenue r(x)>0r(x)>0r(x)>0. Offering SSS earns rev(S)=∑x∈SP(x,S) r(x)\mathrm{rev}(S)=\sum_{x\in S}\mathcal P(x,S)\,r(x)rev(S)=∑x∈S​P(x,S)r(x), and OPT=max⁡S⊆Crev(S)\mathrm{OPT}=\max_{S\subseteq\mathcal C}\mathrm{rev}(S)OPT=maxS⊆C​rev(S).

Let r1<⋯<rkr_1<\dots<r_kr1​<⋯<rk​ be the distinct revenues, with r0:=0r_0:=0r0​:=0, and Si={x:r(x)≥ri}S_i=\{x: r(x)\ge r_i\}Si​={x:r(x)≥ri​}. The heuristic earns

RO=max⁡i∈[k]rev(Si).\mathrm{RO}=\max_{i\in[k]}\mathrm{rev}(S_i).RO=i∈[k]max​rev(Si​).

For an optimal S∗S^*S∗ let Ni=∑x∈S∗, r(x)≥riP(x,S∗)N_i=\sum_{x\in S^*,\,r(x)\ge r_i}\mathcal P(x,S^*)Ni​=∑x∈S∗,r(x)≥ri​​P(x,S∗), Nk+1=0N_{k+1}=0Nk+1​=0, and ℓ\ellℓ the largest index with Nℓ>0N_\ell>0Nℓ​>0. Section 3 of the paper proves

  • (A) OPT≤k⋅RO\mathrm{OPT}\le k\cdot\mathrm{RO}OPT≤k⋅RO (Theorem 3.1);
  • (B) OPT≤Dr⋅RO\mathrm{OPT}\le D_r\cdot\mathrm{RO}OPT≤Dr​⋅RO, with Dr=∑i=1kri−ri−1ri≤1+ln⁡(rk/r1)D_r=\sum_{i=1}^{k}\frac{r_i-r_{i-1}}{r_i}\le 1+\ln(r_k/r_1)Dr​=∑i=1k​ri​ri​−ri−1​​≤1+ln(rk​/r1​) (Theorem 3.2);
  • (C) OPT≤DN(S∗)⋅RO\mathrm{OPT}\le D_N(S^*)\cdot\mathrm{RO}OPT≤DN​(S∗)⋅RO, with DN(S∗)=∑i=1ℓNi−Ni+1Ni≤1+ln⁡(N1/Nℓ)D_N(S^*)=\sum_{i=1}^{\ell}\frac{N_i-N_{i+1}}{N_i}\le 1+\ln(N_1/N_\ell)DN​(S∗)=∑i=1ℓ​Ni​Ni​−Ni+1​​≤1+ln(N1​/Nℓ​) (Theorem 3.3).

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 3.4

For every k≥1k\ge1k≥1 and every δ>0\delta>0δ>0 there are a finite nonempty product set, a regular P\mathcal PP, revenues r>0r>0r>0 with exactly kkk distinct values, and an optimal S∗S^*S∗ with N1>0N_1>0N1​>0, such that

k⋅RO<(1+δ) OPT,Dr⋅RO<(1+δ) OPT,DN(S∗)⋅RO<(1+δ) OPT.k\cdot\mathrm{RO}<(1+\delta)\,\mathrm{OPT},\qquad D_r\cdot\mathrm{RO}<(1+\delta)\,\mathrm{OPT},\qquad D_N(S^*)\cdot\mathrm{RO}<(1+\delta)\,\mathrm{OPT}.k⋅RO<(1+δ)OPT,Dr​⋅RO<(1+δ)OPT,DN​(S∗)⋅RO<(1+δ)OPT.

So none of the bounds (A), (B), (C) stays true when multiplied by 1+δ1+\delta1+δ, for any number kkk of distinct revenues.

The tight instance (milestones)

The paper's witness has products (i,j)(i,j)(i,j) with i∈[k]i\in[k]i∈[k] and j∈[i]j\in[i]j∈[i]. Product (i,j)(i,j)(i,j) has revenue ε−j\varepsilon^{-j}ε−j, and P((i,j),S)=εi\mathcal P((i,j),S)=\varepsilon^iP((i,j),S)=εi when (i,j)∈S(i,j)\in S(i,j)∈S and (i,1),…,(i,j−1)∉S(i,1),\dots,(i,j-1)\notin S(i,1),…,(i,j−1)∈/S, and 000 otherwise, for 0<ε≤120<\varepsilon\le\tfrac120<ε≤21​. The milestones follow the proof on pp. 10–11:

  • the axiom (iii) bound;
  • (7);
  • (8);
  • (9);
  • regularity;
  • the distinct revenues ri=ε−ir_i=\varepsilon^{-i}ri​=ε−i;
  • RO=rev(C)<1/(1−ε)\mathrm{RO}=\mathrm{rev}(\mathcal C)<1/(1-\varepsilon)RO=rev(C)<1/(1−ε);
  • OPT=k\mathrm{OPT}=kOPT=k, attained by {(i,i)}\{(i,i)\}{(i,i)};
  • the limits OPT/RO→k\mathrm{OPT}/\mathrm{RO}\to kOPT/RO→k and Dr→kD_r\to kDr​→k;
  • Ni=εi+⋯+εkN_i=\varepsilon^i+\dots+\varepsilon^kNi​=εi+⋯+εk and DN→kD_N\to kDN​→k as ε→0+\varepsilon\to0^+ε→0+.

Significance

With Theorems 3.1–3.3, Theorem 3.4 closes the analysis: in terms of the parameters kkk, DrD_rDr​ and DND_NDN​, revenue-ordered assortments are understood exactly under regular choice. It complements the hardness results of Aouad et al., which already show that no efficient strategy can do much better than (A) and (B) in general; Theorem 3.4 shows that the analysis of this particular heuristic is exact. The instance is also a concrete regular choice model in which the optimal offer set is far from every nested one.

On the formal side, the mission produces a reusable formal definition of regular discrete choice models, revenue-ordered assortments and the three bound quantities. These are shared, under other sub-namespaces, with the companion missions on Theorems 3.2 and 3.3. The result is proved in the paper. As far as is known it has not been machine-checked anywhere; the remaining work is formalizing the paper's proof, including the steps it leaves to the reader.

Difficulty

The proof is a construction, and the paper verifies most of it in a sentence each. The work lies in those sentences:

  • the regularity of the instance at the no-purchase option, (9), which needs the row decomposition (8);
  • the claim that {(i,i)}\{(i,i)\}{(i,i)} is optimal among all 2k(k+1)/22^{k(k+1)/2}2k(k+1)/2 offer sets, asserted without proof;
  • the claim that the full set is the best threshold set;
  • the evaluation of DN(S∗)D_N(S^*)DN​(S∗), which needs ℓ=k\ell=kℓ=k.

The naive witness, one instance per bound, does not help: the goal asks for one instance with exactly kkk revenues on which all three bounds are nearly attained, for every kkk.

Formalization scope

  • Products are an arbitrary finite type C. The no-purchase option is not a product: P(0,S)\mathcal P(0,S)P(0,S) is the derived quantity noPurchase P S. Offer sets are Finset C.
  • IsRegular carries axioms (i)–(iv), with (i) and (iv) stated both for products and for the no-purchase option. Regularity at x=0x=0x=0 is essential: without it the guarantees fail.
  • OPT\mathrm{OPT}OPT is Finset.sup' over all subsets, including ∅\emptyset∅. RO\mathrm{RO}RO is Finset.sup' over the kkk threshold sets only, and needs Nonempty C.
  • The distinct revenues are the sorted image of r, indexed by Fin k from 000: the Lean index iii is the paper's i+1i+1i+1, and r0=0r_0=0r0​=0 is a separate case. ℓ\ellℓ lives in WithBot (Fin k).
  • Bounds are multiplicative (OPT≤D⋅RO\mathrm{OPT}\le D\cdot\mathrm{RO}OPT≤D⋅RO); there is no ratio RO/OPT\mathrm{RO}/\mathrm{OPT}RO/OPT in the goal. Limits are along 𝓝[>] 0.
  • The tight instance keeps the paper's 1-based pairs (i,j)(i,j)(i,j) as a subtype of Fin (k+1) × Fin (k+1). Its regularity is a theorem to prove, never a field assumed.

Ruled out:

  • a fixed kkk, since "for every kkk" is the content;
  • tightness of the logarithmic forms 1/(1+ln⁡(rk/r1))1/(1+\ln(r_k/r_1))1/(1+ln(rk​/r1​)) and 1/(1+ln⁡ν)1/(1+\ln\nu)1/(1+lnν), which this instance does not show (there 1+ln⁡(rk/r1)→∞1+\ln(r_k/r_1)\to\infty1+ln(rk​/r1​)→∞ while OPT/RO→k\mathrm{OPT}/\mathrm{RO}\to kOPT/RO→k), so only the sum forms are claimed tight;
  • an instance whose regularity is assumed;
  • a heuristic maximizing over all subsets.

Contributions welcome: proofs of the milestones, especially (8), (9) and the optimality of {(i,i)}\{(i,i)\}{(i,i)}, and general lemmas on sorted distinct values of a finite function.

Selected references

  • G. Berbeglia and G. Joret, Assortment Optimisation Under a General Discrete Choice Model: A Tight Analysis of Revenue-Ordered Assortments, arXiv:1606.01371v3, 2019; published in Algorithmica, 2020. https://arxiv.org/abs/1606.01371
  • K. Talluri and G. van Ryzin, Revenue Management Under a General Discrete Choice Model of Consumer Behavior, Management Science 50(1), 2004. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.1030.0147
  • P. Rusmevichientong, D. Shmoys, C. Tong and H. Topaloglu, Assortment Optimization under the Multinomial Logit Model with Random Choice Parameters, Production and Operations Management 23(11), 2014. https://doi.org/10.1111/poms.12191
  • A. Aouad, V. Farias, R. Levi and D. Segev, The Approximability of Assortment Optimization Under Ranking Preferences, Operations Research 66(6), 2018. https://doi.org/10.1287/opre.2018.1724
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Operations ResearchOptimizationTheoretical Computer Science·Captain: mikedeng1

Assortment Optimisation Under a General Discrete Choice Model: A Tight Analysis of Revenue-Ordered Assortments II: Revenue-Ordered Assortments Earn OPT/(1 + ln ν), ν the Optimum's Purchase RatioResearch Paper

Motivation

A retailer that can display only some of its products must choose an assortment: the set of products offered to an arriving customer. Customers substitute: whether a given product is bought depends on what else is on the shelf. The assortment problem asks for the offer set that maximises expected revenue under a model of this substitution behaviour. It is a core problem of revenue management (Talluri and van Ryzin, Management Science 2004), and it is NP-hard already for a mixture of two multinomial logit models (Rusmevichientong, Shmoys, Tong and Topaloglu, POMS 2014).

The heuristic used most widely in practice is revenue-ordered assortments: sort the products by price and offer, for some threshold, every product priced at least that threshold. It is optimal under the multinomial logit model (Talluri and van Ryzin 2004) but not in general. Berbeglia and Joret (arXiv:1606.01371v3, 2019; Algorithmica 2020) give a tight analysis of its approximation ratio for every regular discrete choice model, a class that includes all random utility models. They prove three incomparable guarantees. This mission formalizes the third, Theorem 3.3, whose ratio depends on the purchase behaviour of an optimal assortment rather than on the prices. Companion missions in this series cover the price-ratio bound (Theorem 3.2) and the tightness of all three bounds (Theorem 3.4).

Setting

Let C\mathcal CC be a finite nonempty set of products. A system of choice probabilities gives, for every offer set S⊆CS\subseteq\mathcal CS⊆C and product xxx, the probability P(x,S)\mathcal P(x,S)P(x,S) that a customer offered SSS buys xxx. Buying nothing is the option 000, with P(0,S)=1−∑x∈SP(x,S)\mathcal P(0,S)=1-\sum_{x\in S}\mathcal P(x,S)P(0,S)=1−∑x∈S​P(x,S). The model is regular when

  1. P(x,S)≥0\mathcal P(x,S)\ge0P(x,S)≥0 for products and for x=0x=0x=0;
  2. P(x,S)=0\mathcal P(x,S)=0P(x,S)=0 for x∉Sx\notin Sx∈/S;
  3. ∑x∈SP(x,S)≤1\sum_{x\in S}\mathcal P(x,S)\le1∑x∈S​P(x,S)≤1;
  4. P(x,S)≥P(x,S′)\mathcal P(x,S)\ge\mathcal P(x,S')P(x,S)≥P(x,S′) whenever S⊆S′S\subseteq S'S⊆S′ and x∈S∪{0}x\in S\cup\{0\}x∈S∪{0}.

Axiom 4 at x=0x=0x=0 says that enlarging the offer set never makes buying nothing more likely.

Prices are a function r:C→R>0r:\mathcal C\to\mathbb R_{>0}r:C→R>0​. Offering SSS earns rev(S)=∑x∈SP(x,S) r(x)\mathrm{rev}(S)=\sum_{x\in S}\mathcal P(x,S)\,r(x)rev(S)=∑x∈S​P(x,S)r(x), and OPT=max⁡S⊆Crev(S)\mathrm{OPT}=\max_{S\subseteq\mathcal C}\mathrm{rev}(S)OPT=maxS⊆C​rev(S). Let r1<⋯<rkr_1<\dots<r_kr1​<⋯<rk​ be the distinct values of rrr, and let Si={x:r(x)≥ri}S_i=\{x:r(x)\ge r_i\}Si​={x:r(x)≥ri​} for i∈[k]i\in[k]i∈[k]. The revenue-ordered strategy earns

RO=max⁡1≤i≤krev(Si).\mathrm{RO}=\max_{1\le i\le k}\mathrm{rev}(S_i).RO=1≤i≤kmax​rev(Si​).

For an assortment S∗S^*S∗, the purchase profile is

Ni=∑x∈S∗, r(x)≥riP(x,S∗)(i∈[k]),Nk+1:=0,N_i=\sum_{x\in S^*,\ r(x)\ge r_i}\mathcal P(x,S^*)\qquad(i\in[k]),\qquad N_{k+1}:=0,Ni​=x∈S∗, r(x)≥ri​∑​P(x,S∗)(i∈[k]),Nk+1​:=0,

the probability that a customer offered S∗S^*S∗ buys something priced at least rir_iri​. It is non-increasing in iii.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 3.3 (p. 9)

Let S∗S^*S∗ be optimal, rev(S∗)=OPT\mathrm{rev}(S^*)=\mathrm{OPT}rev(S∗)=OPT, suppose N1>0N_1>0N1​>0, and let ℓ∈[k]\ell\in[k]ℓ∈[k] be maximum with Nℓ>0N_\ell>0Nℓ​>0. Then

OPT≤(∑i=1ℓNi−Ni+1Ni)ROand∑i=1ℓNi−Ni+1Ni≤1+ln⁡ν,ν=N1Nℓ.\mathrm{OPT}\le\Big(\sum_{i=1}^{\ell}\frac{N_i-N_{i+1}}{N_i}\Big)\mathrm{RO} \qquad\text{and}\qquad \sum_{i=1}^{\ell}\frac{N_i-N_{i+1}}{N_i}\le1+\ln\nu,\quad\nu=\frac{N_1}{N_\ell}.OPT≤(i=1∑ℓ​Ni​Ni​−Ni+1​​)ROandi=1∑ℓ​Ni​Ni​−Ni+1​​≤1+lnν,ν=Nℓ​N1​​.

The first inequality is the paper's sum-form factor, the bound that Theorem 3.4 shows to be tight. The second is the closed form 1/(1+ln⁡ν)1/(1+\ln\nu)1/(1+lnν).

Milestones (in proof order)

  • Lemma 2.1 (p. 6): ∑x∈SP(x,S)≤∑x∈S′P(x,S′)\sum_{x\in S}\mathcal P(x,S)\le\sum_{x\in S'}\mathcal P(x,S')∑x∈S​P(x,S)≤∑x∈S′​P(x,S′) for S⊆S′S\subseteq S'S⊆S′.
  • First observation of the proof (p. 9): Ni≤∑x∈SiP(x,Si)N_i\le\sum_{x\in S_i}\mathcal P(x,S_i)Ni​≤∑x∈Si​​P(x,Si​) and Niri≤∑x∈SiP(x,Si)riN_ir_i\le\sum_{x\in S_i}\mathcal P(x,S_i)r_iNi​ri​≤∑x∈Si​​P(x,Si​)ri​.
  • Inequality (6) (p. 9): Niri≤RON_ir_i\le\mathrm{RO}Ni​ri​≤RO for every i∈[k]i\in[k]i∈[k].
  • Revenue identity (p. 9): rev(S∗)=∑i=1ℓ(Ni−Ni+1)ri=∑i=1ℓNi−Ni+1NiNiri\mathrm{rev}(S^*)=\sum_{i=1}^{\ell}(N_i-N_{i+1})r_i=\sum_{i=1}^{\ell}\frac{N_i-N_{i+1}}{N_i}N_ir_irev(S∗)=∑i=1ℓ​(Ni​−Ni+1​)ri​=∑i=1ℓ​Ni​Ni​−Ni+1​​Ni​ri​.
  • Logarithmic step (p. 9, the comparison 1/∑≥1/(1+ln⁡ν)1/\sum\ge1/(1+\ln\nu)1/∑≥1/(1+lnν) in Theorem 3.3, used in the last inequality of the proof): for N1≥⋯≥Nℓ>0N_1\ge\dots\ge N_\ell>0N1​≥⋯≥Nℓ​>0 and Nℓ+1=0N_{\ell+1}=0Nℓ+1​=0, ∑i=1ℓ(Ni−Ni+1)/Ni≤1+ln⁡(N1/Nℓ)\sum_{i=1}^{\ell}(N_i-N_{i+1})/N_i\le1+\ln(N_1/N_\ell)∑i=1ℓ​(Ni​−Ni+1​)/Ni​≤1+ln(N1​/Nℓ​). The paper states this step without proof.

Significance

Theorem 3.3 gives a guarantee that is independent of prices. The bound 1+ln⁡(rk/r1)1+\ln(r_k/r_1)1+ln(rk​/r1​) of Theorem 3.2 grows when prices are spread out. The bound 1+ln⁡ν1+\ln\nu1+lnν is small whenever an optimal assortment sells its expensive products with probability comparable to its overall purchase probability. In §4 the paper combines it with a reduction from unit-demand pricing to derive, for example, the 1/(1+ln⁡m)1/(1+\ln m)1/(1+lnm) guarantee of uniform pricing for the unit-demand min-pricing problem (Corollary 4.8, originally due to Aggarwal et al.). Together with Theorems 3.1 and 3.2, it describes the performance of the most common assortment heuristic over the whole class of regular models, with no parametric assumption on customer behaviour.

The theorem is proved on paper. To our knowledge it has no machine-checked proof, and no regular choice model has been formalized on the platform. This mission produces the regular model as a reusable definition, a statement of Theorem 3.3 in which every hypothesis is explicit, and formal versions of the proof's identities and inequalities. The logarithmic step is asserted without proof in the source, so a formal proof of it completes the paper's argument.

Difficulty

Each step is elementary. The difficulty is bookkeeping. The revenue of S∗S^*S∗ has to be regrouped by distinct price levels rather than by products: several products may share a price, and kkk counts values. The regrouping uses an Abel-type rearrangement with the boundary convention Nk+1=0N_{k+1}=0Nk+1​=0. Comparing NiN_iNi​ with the purchase probability of SiS_iSi​ needs regularity twice. First, axiom 4 for products passes from S∗S^*S∗ to S∗∩SiS^*\cap S_iS∗∩Si​. Then the no-purchase case passes from S∗∩SiS^*\cap S_iS∗∩Si​ to SiS_iSi​. A proof that uses axiom 4 only for products fails at the second step, and the claim is false without it.

Formalization scope

  • Products form a finite type C with [Fintype C] [DecidableEq C]. The goal adds [Nonempty C], the paper's k≥1k\ge1k≥1. Offer sets are Finset C, and P\mathcal PP is P : C → Finset C → ℝ. The no-purchase option is not a product: P(0,S)\mathcal P(0,S)P(0,S) is the derived quantity noPurchase P S. IsRegular P carries axioms 1–4, including both no-purchase cases.
  • OPT\mathrm{OPT}OPT is Finset.sup' over all subsets. RO\mathrm{RO}RO is Finset.sup' over the indices 1,…,k1,\dots,k1,…,k of the threshold sets only.
  • Indices are 1-based natural numbers. level r i is rir_iri​ for 1≤i≤k1\le i\le k1≤i≤k. purchaseProfile P r S i is NiN_iNi​ for 1≤i≤k1\le i\le k1≤i≤k and 000 otherwise, which builds in Nk+1=0N_{k+1}=0Nk+1​=0.
  • Optimality is the hypothesis rev(S∗)=OPT\mathrm{rev}(S^*)=\mathrm{OPT}rev(S∗)=OPT. The index ℓ\ellℓ is a variable with hypotheses 1≤ℓ≤k1\le\ell\le k1≤ℓ≤k, Nℓ>0N_\ell>0Nℓ​>0, and Ni≯0N_i\not>0Ni​>0 for ℓ<i≤k\ell<i\le kℓ<i≤k. N1>0N_1>0N1​>0 is kept as in the paper.
  • The approximation factor is stated in product form, OPT≤D⋅RO\mathrm{OPT}\le D\cdot\mathrm{RO}OPT≤D⋅RO, never as a ratio. Both the sum form and the logarithmic form are stated. ln⁡\lnln is Real.log, applied to ν≥1\nu\ge1ν≥1.
  • The milestones other than the goal are stated for an arbitrary S∗S^*S∗, because the proof does not use optimality there.

The following statements are trivial or false and are not this mission: a maximum over all subsets in place of RO\mathrm{RO}RO; regularity without its no-purchase case; a purchase profile taken from a non-optimal set while rev(S∗)\mathrm{rev}(S^*)rev(S∗) is still called the optimum; the logarithmic form alone; a specific choice model (MNL, Markov chain) in place of an arbitrary regular P\mathcal PP.

A complete development needs finite sums regrouped by the values of a function and an elementary logarithm inequality. The regular choice model and the revenue-ordered sets are shared with the other missions of this series and are reusable for any analysis of assortment heuristics. Proofs of any milestone are welcome. So are alternative arguments for the logarithmic step and a proof that NNN is non-increasing.

Selected references

  • G. Berbeglia and G. Joret, Assortment Optimisation Under a General Discrete Choice Model: A Tight Analysis of Revenue-Ordered Assortments, arXiv:1606.01371v3, 2019; Algorithmica 82, 2020. https://arxiv.org/abs/1606.01371v3
  • K. Talluri and G. van Ryzin, Revenue Management Under a General Discrete Choice Model of Consumer Behavior, Management Science 50(1), 2004. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.1030.0147
  • P. Rusmevichientong, D. Shmoys, C. Tong and H. Topaloglu, Assortment Optimization under the Multinomial Logit Model with Random Choice Parameters, Production and Operations Management 23(11), 2014. https://doi.org/10.1111/poms.12191
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