Motivation
Electric vehicle adoption depends on both the number of drivers willing to buy a vehicle and the availability of places to charge it. These decisions reinforce one another: an additional charging pile reduces expected search cost, while an additional vehicle increases demand for charging. A city may subsidize the vehicle purchase, each charging session, or the construction of a pile. The instruments can have different effects even when the public spending they require is equal. Zhang and Dou study these tradeoffs in a two location market with different pile costs and charging inconvenience. Their 2021 paper gives conditions under which one subsidy has a greater marginal effect on gross social surplus than another.
The target here is the paper's Theorem 3. It addresses a local comparison of policy instruments at a given policy mix. It does not claim that a policy satisfying a condition is globally optimal or that the same ranking holds after a large change in subsidy.
Setting
There are two locations, A and B. A fraction η of potential drivers resides at A and the remainder at B. Driver type z≥0 measures the annual benefit of using an electric vehicle. In the base model it has distribution H(z)=1−e−az for z≥0, with a>0. A vehicle costs p per year, and each driver needs one charging session every T years. A session occupies a pile for time τ.
At location i, a session has regulated fee f, waiting cost ciτ, and expected search cost si/(1−ρi) when expected pile utilization is ρi. Drivers at A charge at A. Drivers at B choose between the locations using the paper's logit probabilities ϕA(ρ) and ϕB(ρ); their expected cost is a log sum of the two location costs. The purchase threshold is zi∗(ρ)=p−γ+uie(ρ)/T, where γ is the vehicle purchase subsidy. These thresholds, the purchase probabilities 1−H(zi∗), and the choice probabilities determine the arrival rates λA and λB.
Charging service providers choose piles mA,mB per provider to maximize annual profit, taking expected utilization as fixed. The number of providers is n; a pile at i costs ki annually. A policy ω=(αA,αB,β,γ) pays αi per pile and β per session, in addition to γ per vehicle purchase. A rational expectations equilibrium matches each expected utilization ξi with the actual ratio τλi/(nmi), while the provider's pile choices maximize profit. The mission uses the positive pile regime of the paper's equilibrium analysis. In it, Theorem 1 determines ξi=(ki−αi)τ/(β+f).
Gross social surplus, denoted GSS, has three components in equation (8): the external benefit θT(λA+λB), the integral of driver surplus above each purchase threshold, and provider surplus. The total subsidy value S(ω) and the government's objective UG=GSS−(1+δ)S are represented separately. The goal compares derivatives of GSS per equal increment in subsidy value, following the normalization in the proof of Theorem 3.
Formalization targets
Equilibrium and surplus identities
Theorem 1 asserts existence and uniqueness of the positive pile equilibrium. The proof of Theorem 3 also states that provider break even makes its gross social surplus equal to
GSS(ω)=(θT+aT)(λA+λB).
This is a theorem about the surplus defined by equation (8), not its definition. The milestone list also records the purchase subsidy derivative and bounds on the usage and pile subsidy derivatives given in the paper's technical proof.
Marginal subsidy comparison
The goal is Theorem 3. Write kAsA≥kBsB. For a pile subsidy mix (αA,αB,γ), a sufficient condition for the purchase subsidy to yield at least as much additional gross social surplus as the paper's pile subsidy direction at equal marginal spending, when the pair is balanced and the subsidies are nonnegative, is
i∈{A,B}maxki[f−(ki−αi)τ]2(ki−αi)2siτ≤μ.
For a nonnegative usage subsidy mix (β,γ), a sufficient condition for usage subsidy to yield at least as much is
(β+f−kBτ)2kBsBτ≥μ.
Here μ is the efficiency of the vehicle purchase subsidy relative to subsidies paid to providers. The inequalities are local sufficient conditions; they make no claim about large policy changes.
Significance
The two conditions connect the subsidy ranking to pile cost, search cost, charging time, and subsidy efficiency. They identify parameter regimes in which a city can increase gross social surplus more through charging side support, or more through vehicle purchase support, at equal marginal subsidy value. This gives a precise comparison within the paper's model, complementing its separate results on spatial mismatch and policy optima. The source result and its proof are published in the authors' version; this mission asks for a machine checked formalization of that known result.
A complete development would also supply reusable results on the exponential tail integral, derivatives of logit choice probabilities, and the relationship between a profit maximizing provider choice and equilibrium utilization. Those statements are useful for other two sided adoption and infrastructure models that combine provider investment with consumer choice.
Difficulty
Changing a subsidy changes more than the direct transfer. It changes utilization, search costs, the logit split of B's charging sessions, vehicle purchase thresholds, and both arrival rates. A comparison that looks only at the direct increase in purchases misses the displacement of charging activity between A and B. The pile subsidy comparison is especially sensitive to the direction in which the two pile subsidies change: equal changes in αA and αB do not have equal marginal effects or equal costs. The equilibrium quantities must also be connected to the derivatives of the actual surplus expression rather than to an assumed closed form.
Formalization scope
The Lean model uses real valued parameters, policies, utilizations, arrival rates, and pile counts, with two explicit locations. It fixes fA=fB=f, as the base model does. The standing assumptions are 0<η<1, a,T,τ,f,n>0, 0<sA≤sB, 0≤cA≤cB, 0<kB<kA, 0<μ≤1, and δ≥0. It also requires θ≥0: the externality is described as a benefit, and the derivative comparisons use its nonnegative contribution. The interior regime is αi<ki and (ki−αi)τ<β+f at both locations. Positive purchase thresholds are required at derivative evaluation points because the exponential distribution has a boundary at zero.
Equation (10) is expressed by ξinmi=τλi, with utilization constrained below one. This excludes a division by zero that would otherwise create a false zero pile equilibrium in Lean. The distribution function is zero below zero. The subsidy value is S=∑iαinmi+(β+Tγ/μ)∑iλi, read from the proof's displayed derivatives on p. S10 and its treatment of pile subsidies on p. S9. The goal quantifies over every equilibrium selection on the interior regime and asserts such a selection exists. Its marginal comparisons use dγ/dβ=μ/T and the pile subsidy direction dαi=(ki−αi)2/(fki)dC. A pile subsidy pair is balanced if no feasible nonnegative pair with the same equilibrium subsidy value yields higher gross social surplus. The goal requires this condition for the pile subsidy comparison and requires nonnegative subsidies at each policy mix.
The formalization must retain equation (8)'s driver surplus integral and provider surplus. Defining GSS by the break even closed form would make the goal circular. Contributions on the source's integral, equilibrium existence, derivative bounds, and the connection to the selected equilibrium are within scope.
Selected references
- W. Zhang and Y. Dou, Coping with Spatial Mismatch: Subsidy Design for Electric Vehicle and Charging Markets, authors' SSRN version, 2021, pp. 7–19 and Online Supplement pp. S5–S11. SSRN 3336398.
- W. Zhang and Y. Dou, Coping with Spatial Mismatch: Subsidy Design for Electric Vehicle and Charging Markets, Manufacturing & Service Operations Management, 2021. DOI:10.1287/msom.2021.1017.