Distributed 3D Printing of Spare Parts via IP Licensing: Optimal Standard License, OEM Profit and Channel Selection for Two Nonidentical BuyersResearch Paper
Motivation
Spare parts for capital goods (aircraft, defence systems, industrial machinery) are slow-moving and expensive to stock, and an unplanned stock-out idles the equipment they serve. Industrial additive manufacturing (3D printing) lets a part be produced close to where it is used, with short lead times and small batches. An original equipment manufacturer (OEM) that owns the design can therefore sell an IP license to its buyers instead of the parts themselves, letting each buyer print locally through a third-party printing service provider. The US Army's directive on advanced manufacturing (Department of Defense 2019) and commercial digital-inventory platforms are examples of this practice.
Zhang, Westerweel, Basten and Song (MSOM 2022) model the OEM's choice of license terms when buyers decide rationally between the two channels. The license has two classical components from the licensing literature (Kamien and Tauman 1986): a fixed annual fee and a per-unit royalty. The paper's main finding is about a single standard license offered to buyers of different sizes. A positive royalty can then be optimal under symmetric information, and all three supply chain configurations arise: centralized, decentralized and hybrid.
Setting
There are buyers . Buyer has Poisson demand with annual rate . All buyers share a holding-cost rate and a safety factor .
Traditional channel. The buyer orders from the OEM at wholesale price , with fixed ordering cost and lead time . Its expected annual cost is
The OEM produces at unit cost and earns from this buyer.
Licensing channel. Under a license with fixed fee and royalty , the buyer prints at price , with fixed ordering cost and lead time . Its expected annual cost is
and the OEM earns from it.
Surplus and choice. The surplus of buyer is , and its maximum surplus is . The licensees are ; the others stay in the traditional channel. The OEM's profit is
For two buyers with and , two kinds of royalty matter. The maximum royalty fees solve . The equalizing royalty solves .
Formalization targets
Goal: Proposition 3 with Table 1
Let be the least upper bound of . In each of the three cases of Table 1, is the largest profit in that case's column:
Each listed license realizes its profit and channel selection. Row iv of Case I is reached only as a limit . Any license that leaves both buyers with negative surplus earns . The optimal value is nondecreasing in .
Milestones
In the paper's order, the milestones are:
- Lemma 1(ii)–(iv), (vi): the shape of in , , , and ;
- Corollary 1: existence and uniqueness of and ;
- Corollary 2: the bound ;
- Proposition 2: the identical-buyer case, where under the stated sign conditions;
- Lemma 2: existence of and the sign of .
Significance
The result gives a closed characterization of the optimal standard license for two nonidentical buyers. Three features follow from it. A royalty-only or mixed license can beat a fixed fee, unlike the identical-buyer case. The larger buyer can be deliberately kept in the traditional channel. The OEM's optimal profit rises with the wholesale price. These are the paper's managerial conclusions about distributed 3D printing, and the numerical study in §5 builds on them.
The result is proved in the paper (appendix, pp. 2699–2701), with several steps described as straightforward and Cases II and III left to the reader. As far as is known, none of it has been formalized. A machine-checked proof would supply the omitted cases and pin down the boundary behaviour. On the boundary, two entries of Table 1's channel-selection column need strict inequalities that the table does not print. The formalization adds the platform's first IP-licensing model, built on closed-form inventory costs.
Difficulty
The surplus is an explicit function, but the optimization is over a two-dimensional license space. The licensee set changes discontinuously across the curves and . One might reduce the problem to comparing a handful of candidate licenses evaluated at their formulas. That reduction is exactly what has to be proved: every license must be shown to be dominated by one of the candidates, region by region. In one region the supremum is approached and never attained, so no maximizer exists. The single-crossing property behind depends on a sign of a mixed derivative that fails without . The final claim, monotonicity of in , must hold across changes of case as moves, while itself moves with .
Formalization scope
- Representation. Buyers are
Fin n. For two buyers, the paper's Buyer 1 is index0and Buyer 2 is index1. All parameters are real. - Costs. The cost formulas (3) and (5) are taken as definitions. Their derivation from an policy under a normal approximation (Online Appendix B) is not formalized.
- Licenses. A valid license has and , and ties go to the license ( means licensing).
- Standing assumptions. , , , and . The last is added: the paper prints for , and its experiments use . The unit cost carries no sign assumption.
- Optimal value and royalties. The optimal profit is stated as a least upper bound (
IsLUB), never throughsSup, whose value on an unbounded set is a junk . The royalties , and are bound by their defining equations, not left free. "" means any license under which every buyer has negative surplus. - Proposition 2. It adds , for (i), and for the efficacy.
- Corrected rows. The realizations of row i (Cases I–II) and row iv (Case I) carry the strict inequalities and . They are labelled as corrections.
- Ruled out. A goal asserting only that "some license of Table 1 is optimal", without the case values and the monotonicity in , does not count as the goal.
- Not formalized. Lemma 1(i), (v), (vii), (viii); Proposition 1; Corollaries 3–4; Proposition 4; the numerical study.
- Infrastructure. One-variable calculus of square-root expressions, and dominance arguments over finite buyer sets. Proofs of the milestones, and of the goal case by case, are welcome.
Selected references
- Y. Zhang, B. Westerweel, R. Basten, J.-S. Song, Distributed 3D Printing of Spare Parts via IP Licensing, Manufacturing & Service Operations Management 24(5):2685–2702, 2022. https://doi.org/10.1287/msom.2022.1117
- M. I. Kamien, Y. Tauman, Fees versus royalties and the private value of a patent, Quarterly Journal of Economics 101(3):471–491, 1986. https://doi.org/10.2307/1885693
- P. H. Zipkin, Foundations of Inventory Management, McGraw-Hill, 2000.
- Department of Defense, Army Directive 2019-29 (Enabling Readiness and Modernization Through Advanced Manufacturing), 2019. https://armypubs.army.mil/epubs/DR_pubs/DR_a/pdf/web/ARN19451_AD2019-29_Web_Final.pdf