The Assignment Game I: The Core 1: The Core Is the Set of Optimal Solutions of the Dual Assignment LPResearch Paper
Motivation
A two-sided market in which each participant trades with at most one partner on the other side — houses and buyers, workers and firms, producers and consumers under exclusive bilateral contracts — is the setting of L. S. Shapley and M. Shubik's assignment game (Int. J. Game Theory 1 (1971) 111–130). Money is transferable, so the natural solution concept is cooperative: a division of the total gain that no coalition of traders can improve upon. The question the paper answers first is whether such a division exists and how to find it, given that a market with sellers and buyers has coalitions.
The answer, Theorem 2 of the paper, connects the core of the game with the dual of the linear-programming relaxation of the optimal assignment problem. It is the starting point of the literature on two-sided matching markets with transfers: the lattice structure of the core (Theorem 3 of the same paper), the ascending auctions of Demange, Gale and Sotomayor (J. Polit. Econ. 94 (1986)), and the equivalence of core outcomes with competitive equilibrium prices. The same LP pairing reappears in stable matching with transfers and in the VCG analysis of multi-item auctions with unit demand.
Setting
Let be a finite set of sellers and a finite set of buyers; either may be empty and their sizes need not agree. A matrix of nonnegative reals records the profit that the partnership of seller and buyer can realise (in the real-estate reading, with buyer 's valuation of house and its owner's reservation value).
A coalition is described by its sellers and buyers . A matching inside is a set of seller–buyer pairs from in which no player appears twice. The characteristic function (2.6) assigns to its worth
the maximum over matchings inside . One-sided coalitions and singletons are worth .
A payoff vector is a pair with , (the paper uses both for the characteristic function and for buyers' payoffs; the formal development calls the former worth). The core is the set of payoff vectors with
The assignment LP (3.1)–(3.2) maximises over with for each and for each . Its dual (3.3)–(3.4) minimises over , with for all . The optimal values are and .
Formalization targets
Goal: Theorem 2 (p. 118)
The statement holds for every finite , and every , with no constants to fix.
Milestones, in the order the paper's argument uses them
- Eq. (3.6), p. 118: every dual-feasible gives every coalition at least its worth.
- Sec. 3.1, p. 117 (quoting Dantzig, p. 318): the assignment LP attains its maximum at a point, and .
- Sec. 3.1, p. 118 (quoting Dantzig, p. 129): both LPs have optima and .
- Eq. (3.5), p. 118: every dual minimiser satisfies .
Further results on the same definitions
- Sec. 3.2, p. 118: the core is nonempty.
- Sec. 3.2, p. 119: for in the core, for every buyer — at the seller prices , buyer 's best net gain is exactly .
Significance
Theorem 2 replaces the coalition constraints of the core with the constraints of a linear program. Consequences stated in the paper: the core is never empty; its points are exactly the dual optimal solutions, so the core is a polytope computable by linear programming without evaluating the worth of any coalition other than the grand one; and dual variables are prices — a seller's core payoff determines a price at which every buyer's best purchase yields that buyer's core payoff. The lattice and corner results of Sec. 3.3 build on this identification.
The paper's proof is short but leans on two results quoted from Dantzig's Linear Programming and Extensions: the integrality of the rectangular assignment polytope and the LP duality theorem. A formalization makes these dependencies explicit for the inequality-constrained rectangular case with possibly unequal sides. To our knowledge Theorem 2 has no machine-checked proof. On Prove2Me, general LP strong duality is formalized (LinearOptimization.lp_strong_duality, SmaleNinth.lp_strong_duality), and integrality of the square doubly stochastic assignment LP (UnderstandingML.assignment_lp_integral, FamousTheorems.birkhoff_von_neumann); neither is the specialised statement here, but both are natural substrate.
Difficulty
The inclusion "dual optimal ⊆ core" needs the value of the dual to equal the combinatorial worth , which is not a statement about linear programming alone: it needs both LP duality and the integrality of the assignment polytope. The integrality needed is for the polytope cut out by inequalities on a possibly non-square matrix, which is not the Birkhoff polytope of doubly stochastic matrices already on the platform; the gap between the two must be bridged.
The converse, "core ⊆ dual optimal", is dismissed as "clearly" in the paper, but the core is defined through the worth of every coalition, a maximum over exponentially many matchings, while dual optimality is a comparison with every dual-feasible vector. Neither side mentions the other's objects, and the naive reading "the core is the dual feasible set" is false: large payoffs are dual feasible and violate (3.5).
Formalization scope
Lean represents sellers and buyers as types M, N with [Fintype M] [Fintype N]; no nonemptiness is assumed, so markets with an empty side are included (there the core is ). The matrix is a : M → N → ℝ with the standing hypothesis ∀ i j, 0 ≤ a i j on every theorem. A coalition is a pair (A, B) : Finset M × Finset N. A matching is a Finset (M × N) inside A ×ˢ B with no repeated seller and no repeated buyer. The worth is Finset.sup' over the finite, nonempty set of matchings (the empty matching is always present), so there is no junk value. The paper's (2.6) takes exactly pairs; the formal definition takes all partial matchings, which gives the same maximum because .
Payoff vectors are pairs (M → ℝ) × (N → ℝ). The core is defined by (3.5) and (3.6) for all coalitions; nonnegativity is not a separate clause since it follows from singleton coalitions. The dual LP keeps the nonnegativity of and that (3.3) imposes, and "solutions of the LP dual" is read as optimal solutions (DualOptimal: dual feasible and of minimal objective among dual-feasible vectors), as the text preceding Theorem 2 does.
The worth is the combinatorial maximum, not the LP value, and the core is defined by coalitions, not through the dual; defining either through the other would make Theorem 2 true by unfolding, and such a formalization is ruled out. Likewise the goal is not the weaker "core = dual feasible set", which is false.
Contributions welcome: integrality of the rectangular inequality-form assignment polytope, a specialisation of general LP duality to this pair, and the coalitional inequality (3.6). The first two are reusable for any bipartite matching model.
Selected references
- L. S. Shapley and M. Shubik, The Assignment Game I: The Core, International Journal of Game Theory 1 (1971), 111–130. https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01753437
- G. B. Dantzig, Linear Programming and Extensions, Princeton University Press, 1963. https://doi.org/10.1515/9781400884179
- L. S. Shapley, Complements and substitutes in the optimal assignment problem, Naval Research Logistics Quarterly 9 (1962), 45–48. https://doi.org/10.1002/nav.3800090106
- G. Demange, D. Gale and M. Sotomayor, Multi-Item Auctions, Journal of Political Economy 94 (1986), 863–872. https://doi.org/10.1086/261393