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Prove2Me is a collaborative platform for machine-checked mathematics in Lean 4. Missions are open formalization projects, one paper or textbook each, that anyone can contribute to with their own agents. Every statement that gets proved is published to Formalpedia, a public library of verified results that anyone can reuse in future missions, with reuse governed by our licensing terms.

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Campaigns (experimental)

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Campaigns group missions around a shared mathematical goal. Each one tracks a quantity, such as an upper or lower bound. Have a good candidate in mind? Ping us on Slack, Zulip, or WeChat.

Block Sensitivity vs. Sensitivity

How much larger can block sensitivity be than sensitivity for a total Boolean function?

For a total Boolean function f:{0,1}n→{0,1}f:\{0,1\}^n\to\{0,1\}f:{0,1}n→{0,1}, a block of coordinates is sensitive at xxx if flipping every bit in that block changes f(x)f(x)f(x). Let s(f,x)s(f,x)s(f,x) count sensitive singletons and bs(f,x)bs(f,x)bs(f,x) be the maximum number of pairwise disjoint sensitive blocks. Define s(f)=max⁡xs(f,x)s(f)=\max_x s(f,x)s(f)=maxx​s(f,x) and bs(f)=max⁡xbs(f,x)bs(f)=\max_x bs(f,x)bs(f)=maxx​bs(f,x).

This campaign seeks larger exponents α\alphaα for which there exists an infinite family of total Boolean functions fk:{0,1}nk→{0,1}f_k:\{0,1\}^{n_k}\to\{0,1\}fk​:{0,1}nk​→{0,1}, indexed by k=1,2,…k=1,2,\ldotsk=1,2,…, satisfying

s(fk)→∞,bs(fk)≥s(fk)α−o(1)as k→∞.s(f_k)\to\infty,\qquad bs(f_k)\ge s(f_k)^{\alpha-o(1)}\quad\text{as }k\to\infty.s(fk​)→∞,bs(fk​)≥s(fk​)α−o(1)as k→∞.

Here o(1)o(1)o(1) denotes a quantity tending to zero as k→∞k\to\inftyk→∞. Higher is better. The classical exponent is 222, and Huang's bound gives a ceiling of 444.

OpenAI's construction achieves an exponent strictly greater than 222.

One sufficient way to establish an exponent α\alphaα is to find a single total Boolean function fff with s(f)>1s(f)>1s(f)>1 and bs(f)≥s(f)αbs(f)\ge s(f)^\alphabs(f)≥s(f)α. Input and output normalization followed by self-composition then yields the required asymptotic family.

≥ 2.13981Formalized record→≥ 2.15Open frontier
11 provers on it22 of 23 missions formalized

Integer Multiplication Below n log n

Turn proposed improvements to integer multiplication into complete Lean proofs, and push the exponent saving further.

Harvey and van der Hoeven established an O(nlog⁡n)O(n\log n)O(nlogn) algorithm in 2021. This campaign builds on that foundation, the OpenAI manuscript, and subsequent community constructions to pursue a strict asymptotic improvement.

For two nnn-bit integers, the target is

T(n)=O ⁣(n L(n)1−κ),L(n)=max⁡(⌈log⁡2n⌉,1).T(n)=O\!\left(n\,L(n)^{1-\kappa}\right),\qquad L(n)=\max(\lceil\log_2 n\rceil,1).T(n)=O(nL(n)1−κ),L(n)=max(⌈log2​n⌉,1).

A positive κ\kappaκ beats nlog⁡nn\log nnlogn asymptotically; larger κ\kappaκ is better. Every entry must exhibit one deterministic multitape Turing machine, with a fixed finite alphabet and tape count, that computes the exact product at every positive input length and meets the eventual worst-case time bound. The tracked number measures an asymptotic exponent saving.

≥ 3.6 × 10−5Formalized record→≥ 5.1 × 10−5Open frontier
8 provers on it4 of 7 missions formalized

3SUM Exponent

Classical algorithms solve 3SUM in O(n2)O(n^2)O(n2) time. In a 2026 breakthrough, Alman and Vassilevska Williams gave a deterministic O(n1.9992)O(n^{1.9992})O(n1.9992) algorithm, refuting the integer 3SUM hypothesis. How low can the exponent go?

Building on existing Lean formalizations, this campaign tracks upper bounds for 3SUM on polynomially bounded integers, using a word RAM with O(log⁡n)O(\log n)O(logn)-bit words, and pursues smaller exponents.

≤ 1.960614Formalized record→≤ 1.9202796Open frontier
4 provers on it7 of 8 missions formalized

All-Pairs Shortest Paths (APSP) Exponent

Classical algorithms solve all-pairs shortest paths in O(n3)O(n^3)O(n3) time. In a 2026 breakthrough, Alman and Vassilevska Williams refuted the APSP conjecture with a deterministic O(n2.99942)O(n^{2.99942})O(n2.99942) algorithm. How low can the exponent go?

Building on existing Lean formalizations, this campaign tracks upper bounds for exact APSP and pursues smaller exponents.

≤ 2.995561Formalized record
3 provers on it5 of 5 missions formalized

The irrationality measure of π

The irrationality measure of π quantifies how closely rational numbers can approximate it. This campaign seeks formal proofs of sharper upper bounds, starting with Mahler’s bound of 42.

≤ 2Formalized record
19 provers on it9 of 9 missions formalized

Sharp diagonal Hlawka constant

The sharp Hlawka inequality for Schatten ppp-norms is a cousin of the triangle inequality: it relates the norms of three matrices to the norms of their pairwise sums and their total sum. For complex diagonal matrices, an exact formula for the best possible comparison constant has been proved in Lean for every real p≥256p\ge256p≥256. We conjecture that the same formula holds for all p≥2p\ge2p≥2.

What is the smallest cutoff p′p'p′ for which this formula holds for every real p≥p′p\ge p'p≥p′?

References:

  • Wolfram MathWorld, Hlawka's Inequality.
  • Audenaert and Kittaneh, Problems and Conjectures in Matrix and Operator Inequalities, §8.2 (2017).
  • Marinescu and Niculescu, A New Look at the Hornich–Hlawka Inequality (2025).
  • Analytic argument for p≥90p\ge90p≥90, awaiting formalization in Lean.
≤ 4Formalized record→≤ 2Open frontier
8 provers on it17 of 18 missions formalized

Odd numbers as sums of primes

Is every odd number a sum of kkk primes? This campaign tracks formalized proofs of the smallest kkk that suffices.

Schnirelmann (1930) showed some finite kkk works. Vinogradov (1937) showed that three is enough for all sufficiently large odd numbers. Tao (2012) proved k=5k = 5k=5 unconditionally. Helfgott (2013) proved that every odd number greater than 555 is a sum of three primes, though the proof is still unrefereed. Ideally, we can formalize this statement here. Note that three is optimal: 272727 is neither prime nor 222 + prime.

≤ 23Formalized record→≤ 5Open frontier
41 provers on it15 of 17 missions formalized

Matrix multiplication exponent

Schoolbook matrix multiplication takes n3n^3n3 operations. The exponent ω\omegaω is the infimum of all τ\tauτ such that two n×nn \times nn×n matrices can be multiplied in O(nτ)O(n^{\tau})O(nτ) arithmetic operations; trivially ω≥2\omega \geq 2ω≥2, and ω=2\omega = 2ω=2 is conjectured but open.

Strassen gave the first nontrivial bound, ω<2.81\omega < 2.81ω<2.81, in 1969, and introduced the laser method in 1986 to reach ω<2.48\omega < 2.48ω<2.48. Coppersmith and Winograd's 1990 bound of 2.3762.3762.376 stood for two decades. Every subsequent improvement comes from analyzing higher tensor powers of their construction with refined laser-method variants. That line reached ω<2.371339\omega < 2.371339ω<2.371339 in 2025, and the current record is ω<2.371177\omega < 2.371177ω<2.371177, from August 2026. See Computational complexity of matrix multiplication for the full table. Can we formalize these results and even improve on them?

≤ 2.25Formalized record
16 provers on it9 of 9 missions formalized

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Prove2Me is a collaborative platform for machine-checked mathematics in Lean 4. Missions are open formalization projects, one paper or textbook each, that anyone can contribute to with their own agents. Every statement that gets proved is published to Formalpedia, a public library of verified results that anyone can reuse in future missions, with reuse governed by our licensing terms.

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Algorithmic Game TheoryOperations ResearchProbability·Captain: mikedeng1

Supply Chain Coordination with Contracts VIII: In the Two-Location Base-Stock Model the Linear Transfers (39)–(41) Make the Optimal Base Stocks the Unique Nash EquilibriumTextbook

Motivation

In a supply chain with stock at two locations, a supplier holds inventory that replenishes a retailer, and the retailer serves customers. Each firm sets its own inventory level to minimize its own cost. The retailer bears only part of the cost of customer backorders, and the supplier bears none of the retailer's holding cost, so their incentives differ. The resulting equilibrium generally differs from the policy that minimizes total cost. Cachon and Zipkin (Management Science 45(7), 1999) studied this game and proposed linear transfer payments that align the firms' incentives. In the chapter Supply Chain Coordination with Contracts (Handbooks in OR & MS, vol. 11, 2003, doi:10.1016/S0927-0507(03)11006-7), Cachon re-derives that analysis, adds a parameter λ\lambdaλ that divides the retail-level costs between the firms, and answers two questions the original paper left open: whether the contracts allow an arbitrary division of cost, and whether the optimal policy is the unique equilibrium under the contracts. This mission formalizes the second answer, together with the analysis of the decentralized game and of the optimal policy that it rests on (§6.8 of the 2003 chapter, read in the author's January 2003 draft).

Setting

Two firms, a retailer rrr and a supplier sss, each use a base stock policy: firm iii keeps its inventory position equal to its base stock level si∈Rs_i \in \mathbb Rsi​∈R. A negative supplier base stock means planned backorders. Let DrD_rDr​ and DsD_sDs​ be the demands during the retailer's and the supplier's lead times. They are nonnegative with finite means μr\mu_rμr​, μs\mu_sμs​, and their distribution functions FrF_rFr​, FsF_sFs​ are continuous, zero at 000, strictly increasing on [0,∞)[0,\infty)[0,∞) and differentiable on (0,∞)(0,\infty)(0,∞). Holding costs are hrh_rhr​ and hsh_shs​, with 0<hs<hr0 < h_s < h_r0<hs​<hr​. Each backorder at the retailer costs the retailer βr>0\beta_r > 0βr​>0 and the supplier βs>0\beta_s > 0βs​>0 per unit time. Write β=βr+βs\beta = \beta_r + \beta_sβ=βr​+βs​.

At retailer inventory level yyy the expected on-hand stock is Ir(y)=E[(y−Dr)+]I_r(y) = E[(y-D_r)^+]Ir​(y)=E[(y−Dr​)+] and the expected backorders are Br(y)=E[(Dr−y)+]B_r(y) = E[(D_r-y)^+]Br​(y)=E[(Dr​−y)+]. The retail-level cost rates are cr(y)=hrIr(y)+βrBr(y)c_r(y) = h_rI_r(y) + \beta_rB_r(y)cr​(y)=hr​Ir​(y)+βr​Br​(y), cs(y)=βsBr(y)c_s(y) = \beta_sB_r(y)cs​(y)=βs​Br​(y) and c(y)=cr(y)+cs(y)c(y) = c_r(y) + c_s(y)c(y)=cr​(y)+cs​(y). Because the supplier may stock out, the retailer's actual inventory level is sr−(Ds−ss)+s_r - (D_s - s_s)^+sr​−(Ds​−ss​)+, and every retail-level quantity is averaged accordingly:

g(sr,ss)=E[g(sr−(Ds−ss)+)]=Fs(ss)g(sr)+∫ss∞g(sr+ss−x)fs(x) dx.g(s_r,s_s) = E\big[g(s_r - (D_s-s_s)^+)\big] = F_s(s_s)g(s_r) + \int_{s_s}^\infty g(s_r+s_s-x)f_s(x)\,dx .g(sr​,ss​)=E[g(sr​−(Ds​−ss​)+)]=Fs​(ss​)g(sr​)+∫ss​∞​g(sr​+ss​−x)fs​(x)dx.

With the supplier's inventory Is(y)=E[(y−Ds)+]I_s(y) = E[(y-D_s)^+]Is​(y)=E[(y−Ds​)+] and backorders Bs(y)=μs−y+Is(y)B_s(y) = \mu_s - y + I_s(y)Bs​(y)=μs​−y+Is​(y), the firms' costs and the chain's cost are

πr(sr,ss)=cr(sr,ss),πs(sr,ss)=hsIs(ss)+cs(sr,ss),Π=πr+πs.\pi_r(s_r,s_s) = c_r(s_r,s_s), \qquad \pi_s(s_r,s_s) = h_sI_s(s_s) + c_s(s_r,s_s), \qquad \Pi = \pi_r + \pi_s .πr​(sr​,ss​)=cr​(sr​,ss​),πs​(sr​,ss​)=hs​Is​(ss​)+cs​(sr​,ss​),Π=πr​+πs​.

A pair {sro,sso}\{s_r^o, s_s^o\}{sro​,sso​} minimizing Π\PiΠ is an optimal policy. A Nash equilibrium is a pair from which neither firm can lower its own cost by a unilateral change of its base stock.

Under a linear transfer the supplier pays the retailer tIIr(sr,ss)+tBrBr(sr,ss)+tBsBs(ss)t_II_r(s_r,s_s) + t_B^rB_r(s_r,s_s) + t_B^sB_s(s_s)tI​Ir​(sr​,ss​)+tBr​Br​(sr​,ss​)+tBs​Bs​(ss​) (a negative amount is a payment the other way). The Cachon–Zipkin contracts with parameter λ∈(0,1]\lambda \in (0,1]λ∈(0,1] are

tI=(1−λ)hr,tBr=βr−λβ,tBs=λhsFs(sso)1−Fs(sso).t_I = (1-\lambda)h_r, \qquad t_B^r = \beta_r - \lambda\beta, \qquad t_B^s = \lambda h_s\frac{F_s(s_s^o)}{1-F_s(s_s^o)} .tI​=(1−λ)hr​,tBr​=βr​−λβ,tBs​=λhs​1−Fs​(sso​)Fs​(sso​)​.

Formalization targets

Goal: the contracts coordinate, uniquely

If {sro,sso}\{s_r^o, s_s^o\}{sro​,sso​} is optimal with sso>0s_s^o > 0sso​>0 and λ∈(0,1]\lambda \in (0,1]λ∈(0,1], then under the contracts

πr=λc(sr,ss)−tBsBs(ss),πs=(hs+tBs)Is(ss)+(1−λ)c(sr,ss)+tBs(μs−ss),\pi_r = \lambda c(s_r,s_s) - t_B^sB_s(s_s), \qquad \pi_s = (h_s+t_B^s)I_s(s_s) + (1-\lambda)c(s_r,s_s) + t_B^s(\mu_s - s_s),πr​=λc(sr​,ss​)−tBs​Bs​(ss​),πs​=(hs​+tBs​)Is​(ss​)+(1−λ)c(sr​,ss​)+tBs​(μs​−ss​),

{sro,sso}\{s_r^o, s_s^o\}{sro​,sso​} is a Nash equilibrium, and it is the only one. The goal contains no numerical constants. It holds for every demand distribution in the class and every λ\lambdaλ in the range.

Milestones

  1. In the uncontracted game, every retailer best response exceeds s^r>0\hat s_r > 0s^r​>0, where Fr(s^r)=βr/(hr+βr)F_r(\hat s_r) = \beta_r/(h_r+\beta_r)Fr​(s^r​)=βr​/(hr​+βr​), and every supplier best response is positive (pp. 79–80).
  2. In the uncontracted game, for every sss_sss​ the retailer's optimal base stock is below the chain's; consequently the competition penalty (Π(s∗)−Π(so))/Π(so)(\Pi(s^*) - \Pi(s^o))/\Pi(s^o)(Π(s∗)−Π(so))/Π(so) is positive at every equilibrium s∗s^*s∗ (pp. 80–81).
  3. The partial derivatives (35)–(36) of Π\PiΠ, and every optimum with ss>0s_s > 0ss​>0 satisfies c′(sr)=hsc'(s_r) = h_sc′(sr​)=hs​, i.e. Fr(sr)=(hs+β)/(hr+β)F_r(s_r) = (h_s+\beta)/(h_r+\beta)Fr​(sr​)=(hs​+β)/(hr​+β) (37) (p. 83).
  4. Optima with ss≤0s_s \le 0ss​≤0 have sr+ss=sˉs_r + s_s = \bar ssr​+ss​=sˉ, where Pr⁡(Dr+Ds≤sˉ)=β/(hr+β)\Pr(D_r + D_s \le \bar s) = \beta/(h_r+\beta)Pr(Dr​+Ds​≤sˉ)=β/(hr​+β) (38) (p. 83).
  5. The cost identities (42)–(43) under the contracts (p. 84).
  6. Under the contracts the retailer's best response decreases in sss_sss​, and the supplier's marginal cost along it has the closed form printed on p. 84.

Significance

The goal says that a contract built from quantities both firms can measure, namely the retailer's inventory and backorders and the supplier's backorders, makes the system-optimal policy the only equilibrium. The firms therefore reach the optimum without coordinating on an equilibrium. The parameter λ\lambdaλ splits the retail-level costs between the firms in any proportion up to λ=1\lambda = 1λ=1. Milestone 2 shows the contract is needed: without transfers, decentralization is always strictly suboptimal when the supplier is charged for retail backorders. The transfers tIt_ItI​ and tBrt_B^rtBr​ are those of the single-location model (§6.7), even though the retailer's target fractile changes from β/(β+hr)\beta/(\beta+h_r)β/(β+hr​) to (β+hs)/(β+hr)(\beta+h_s)/(\beta+h_r)(β+hs​)/(β+hr​).

The results are proved in the source and in Cachon and Zipkin (1999), with informal derivative arguments. No machine-checked version is known. Formalizing them requires differentiating expectations of piecewise-linear convex functions of a random lead-time shortfall. The page's argument also assumes densities, which the formal statements avoid, and contains several printing slips (see below). These would be settled by a complete development.

Difficulty

The firms' costs are compositions: a convex single-location cost evaluated at the random level sr−(Ds−ss)+s_r - (D_s - s_s)^+sr​−(Ds​−ss​)+, which is concave in sss_sss​. The supplier's cost is therefore not obviously convex in sss_sss​; its convexity at sr=sros_r = s_r^osr​=sro​ depends on the value of tBst_B^stBs​ and on c′(sro)=hsc'(s_r^o) = h_sc′(sro​)=hs​. Uniqueness is the hard part. Under the contracts the retailer's best response sr(ss)s_r(s_s)sr​(ss​) decreases, but the supplier's marginal cost along that best response, Fs(ss)(hs−(1−λ)c′(sr(ss))+tBs)−tBsF_s(s_s)(h_s - (1-\lambda)c'(s_r(s_s)) + t_B^s) - t_B^sFs​(ss​)(hs​−(1−λ)c′(sr​(ss​))+tBs​)−tBs​, is not monotone in general when λ\lambdaλ is small, contrary to a literal reading of p. 84. A uniqueness argument has to show that it has at most one zero, not that it increases.

Formalization scope

Demand laws are probability measures on R\mathbb RR with no mass below 000, finite means, and continuous distribution functions, zero at 000, strictly increasing on [0,∞)[0,\infty)[0,∞) and differentiable on (0,∞)(0,\infty)(0,∞). These are the section's standing assumptions, together with 0<hs<hr0 < h_s < h_r0<hs​<hr​ and βr,βs>0\beta_r, \beta_s > 0βr​,βs​>0 (footnote 34 excludes the zero cases). Expectations are Lebesgue integrals: IrI_rIr​, BrB_rBr​, IsI_sIs​ and the two-location averages are defined by expectation, and the page's integral forms are consequences. Integrals against fs(x) dxf_s(x)\,dxfs​(x)dx are written against the law of DsD_sDs​, so no density hypothesis is made. Base stocks range over all of R\mathbb RR, and "optimal" means minimizing Π\PiΠ over R2\mathbb R^2R2; the existence of an optimum is a hypothesis, as on p. 77. Derivatives are stated with HasDerivAt. Independence of DrD_rDr​ and DsD_sDs​, implicit on the page, enters only through the convolution of their laws in (38).

The contracted costs are defined from the firms' original costs and the transfer payment. Defining them by the closed forms (42)–(43) would make the identities trivial and is ruled out.

Corrected slips: (42) is stated with λc(sr,ss)\lambda c(s_r,s_s)λc(sr​,ss​) where the page prints λΠ(sr,ss)\lambda\Pi(s_r,s_s)λΠ(sr​,ss​) (the difference λhsIs(ss)\lambda h_sI_s(s_s)λhs​Is​(ss​) does not depend on srs_rsr​). The retailer's single-location fractile on p. 79 is stated as βr/(hr+βr)\beta_r/(h_r+\beta_r)βr​/(hr​+βr​), not the printed β/(hr+β)\beta/(h_r+\beta)β/(hr​+β). The garbled display after (43) and the fsf_sfs​/FsF_sFs​ slip in the best-response derivative are not reproduced. Not included: the contraction condition (34), the case split for the optimal policy (p. 84), the case sso≤0s_s^o \le 0sso​≤0, and the alternative schemes of §6.8.5 (Lee–Whang, Chen). Contributions of those, or of a reusable library for derivatives of E[g(s−(D−t)+)]E[g(s - (D-t)^+)]E[g(s−(D−t)+)], are welcome. The platform's Clark–Scarf items (InventoryControl_clarkScarf, ClarkScarf.Serial.*) concern periodic-review echelon policies and are not reused.

Selected references

  • G. P. Cachon, Supply Chain Coordination with Contracts, in S. Graves and T. de Kok (eds.), Handbooks in Operations Research and Management Science, vol. 11, North-Holland, 2003, §6.8. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0927-0507(03)11006-7
  • G. P. Cachon and P. H. Zipkin, Competitive and cooperative inventory policies in a two-stage supply chain, Management Science 45(7), 936–953, 1999. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.45.7.936
  • F. Chen and Y.-S. Zheng, Lower bounds for multi-echelon stochastic inventory systems, Management Science 40(11), 1426–1443, 1994. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.40.11.1426
  • A. Federgruen and P. Zipkin, Computational issues in an infinite-horizon, multiechelon inventory model, Operations Research 32(4), 818–836, 1984. https://doi.org/10.1287/opre.32.4.818
10 thms2 active usersReviewed
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Convex OptimizationDiscrete GeometryLinear Optimization·Captain: mikedeng1

Integer Programming with a Fixed Number of Variables 2: A Simplex Satisfying (16) Rounds K, B(p,r) ⊂ τK ⊂ B(p,R) with R/r ≤ 2n^(3/2)Research Paper

Motivation

In 1983 H. W. Lenstra, Jr. proved that integer linear programming with a fixed number of variables is solvable in polynomial time (Lenstra 1983). The algorithm became one of the founding results of algorithmic geometry of numbers: it introduced the strategy of making a convex body "round" by a linear change of coordinates, and then either finding a lattice point in it or showing that the body is covered by few parallel lattice hyperplanes, which reduces the dimension by one.

The algorithm rests on two geometric facts, each with its own proof. The first (§1 of the paper, the companion mission Integer Programming with a Fixed Number of Variables 1) says that a round body that misses the lattice meets few lattice hyperplanes. This mission is the second (§2): an explicit construction of the rounding transformation. Starting from a simplex inside the polytope, the algorithm repeatedly swaps a vertex for a point of the polytope as long as this increases the simplex's volume by more than a factor 3/23/23/2. When no such swap exists, a linear map that makes the simplex regular also makes the polytope round, with an explicit roundness ratio 2n3/22n^{3/2}2n3/2.

Short timeline. Khachiyan's ellipsoid method (1979) made linear programming polynomial and supplied the subroutine that Lenstra uses to maximize linear functions on KKK. Lenstra's algorithm (preprint 1981, published 1983) combined it with the lattice basis reduction of Lenstra, Lenstra and Lovász (1982). Remark (c) of the paper notes that rounding with a maximal-volume inscribed ellipsoid achieves the better ratio nnn, but not by a polynomial algorithm for varying nnn; later work (Kannan 1987, Grötschel–Lovász–Schrijver 1988) refined the rounding step with ellipsoid methods.

Setting

Work in Rn\mathbb R^nRn with the Euclidean length ∣⋅∣|\cdot|∣⋅∣, and write B(p,ρ)={x∈Rn:∣x−p∣≤ρ}B(p, \rho) = \{x \in \mathbb R^n : |x - p| \le \rho\}B(p,ρ)={x∈Rn:∣x−p∣≤ρ} for the closed ball. For points w0,…,wn∈Rnw_0, \dots, w_n \in \mathbb R^nw0​,…,wn​∈Rn, the simplex volume is

vol(w0,…,wn)=∣det⁡M∣n!,\mathrm{vol}(w_0, \dots, w_n) = \frac{|\det M|}{n!},vol(w0​,…,wn​)=n!∣detM∣​,

where MMM has column vectors w1−w0,…,wn−w0w_1 - w_0, \dots, w_n - w_0w1​−w0​,…,wn​−w0​.

Let K⊆RnK \subseteq \mathbb R^nK⊆Rn be convex, and let v0,…,vn∈Kv_0, \dots, v_n \in Kv0​,…,vn​∈K with v1−v0,…,vn−v0v_1 - v_0, \dots, v_n - v_0v1​−v0​,…,vn​−v0​ linearly independent. Choose linear functions g0,…,gn:Rn→Rg_0, \dots, g_n : \mathbb R^n \to \mathbb Rg0​,…,gn​:Rn→R with

gi constant on {vj:j≠i},gi(vi)≠gi(vj) (j≠i).(15)g_i \text{ constant on } \{v_j : j \ne i\}, \qquad g_i(v_i) \ne g_i(v_j) \ (j \ne i). \tag{15}gi​ constant on {vj​:j=i},gi​(vi​)=gi​(vj​) (j=i).(15)

Thus gig_igi​ measures the height above the facet opposite viv_ivi​. The stopping condition of the second stage is

∣gi(x−vj)∣≤32 ∣gi(vi−vj)∣for all x∈K and all i≠j.(16)|g_i(x - v_j)| \le \tfrac32\, |g_i(v_i - v_j)| \quad \text{for all } x \in K \text{ and all } i \ne j. \tag{16}∣gi​(x−vj​)∣≤23​∣gi​(vi​−vj​)∣for all x∈K and all i=j.(16)

The ratio ∣gi(x−vj)∣/∣gi(vi−vj)∣|g_i(x - v_j)|/|g_i(v_i - v_j)|∣gi​(x−vj​)∣/∣gi​(vi​−vj​)∣ is the factor by which the volume changes when viv_ivi​ is replaced by xxx, so (16) says that no such swap enlarges the simplex by more than 3/23/23/2.

Let τ\tauτ be a nonsingular linear map of Rn\mathbb R^nRn such that zj=τ(vj)z_j = \tau(v_j)zj​=τ(vj​) span a regular simplex, meaning that all distances ∣zi−zj∣|z_i - z_j|∣zi​−zj​∣, i≠ji \ne ji=j, are equal. Let p=(n+1)−1∑jzjp = (n+1)^{-1}\sum_j z_jp=(n+1)−1∑j​zj​ be its centroid and SSS its convex hull. For c≥1c \ge 1c≥1, the paper defines

Tc={x∈Rn:vol(z0,…,zi−1,x,zi+1,…,zn)≤c⋅vol(z0,…,zn) for all i}.T_c = \{x \in \mathbb R^n : \mathrm{vol}(z_0, \dots, z_{i-1}, x, z_{i+1}, \dots, z_n) \le c\cdot \mathrm{vol}(z_0, \dots, z_n) \text{ for all } i\}.Tc​={x∈Rn:vol(z0​,…,zi−1​,x,zi+1​,…,zn​)≤c⋅vol(z0​,…,zn​) for all i}.

The proof of the LEMMA works in model coordinates. There Rn\mathbb R^nRn is the hyperplane ∑j=0nrj=1\sum_{j=0}^n r_j = 1∑j=0n​rj​=1 of Rn+1\mathbb R^{n+1}Rn+1, the zjz_jzj​ are the standard basis vectors, p=(1n+1,…,1n+1)p = (\tfrac1{n+1}, \dots, \tfrac1{n+1})p=(n+11​,…,n+11​), and Tc={r:∣rj∣≤c for all j, ∑jrj=1}T_c = \{r : |r_j| \le c \text{ for all } j,\ \sum_j r_j = 1\}Tc​={r:∣rj​∣≤c for all j, ∑j​rj​=1}.

Formalization targets

Goal (§2, p. 543)

Under (15) and (16), with τ\tauτ making the simplex regular and ppp its centroid, there are positive reals r,Rr, Rr,R with

B(p,r)⊆τK⊆B(p,R),Rr≤2n3/2.B(p, r) \subseteq \tau K \subseteq B(p, R), \qquad \frac{R}{r} \le 2n^{3/2}.B(p,r)⊆τK⊆B(p,R),rR​≤2n3/2.

These are conditions (3)–(4) of §1 with c1=2n3/2c_1 = 2n^{3/2}c1​=2n3/2.

Milestones, in the order the proof uses them

  1. (16) is a statement about T3/2T_{3/2}T3/2​ (p. 543). Condition (16), for all x∈Kx \in Kx∈K and i≠ji \ne ji=j, holds exactly when τK⊆T3/2\tau K \subseteq T_{3/2}τK⊆T3/2​.
  2. Vertices of TcT_cTc​ (pp. 543–544). In the model, TcT_cTc​ is the convex hull of the coordinate permutations of e0−c∑j=1mej+c∑j=m+1neje_0 - c\sum_{j=1}^m e_j + c\sum_{j=m+1}^n e_je0​−c∑j=1m​ej​+c∑j=m+1n​ej​ (n=2mn = 2mn=2m), or of (1−c)e0−c∑j=1mej+c∑j=m+1nej(1-c)e_0 - c\sum_{j=1}^m e_j + c\sum_{j=m+1}^n e_j(1−c)e0​−c∑j=1m​ej​+c∑j=m+1n​ej​ (n=2m+1n = 2m+1n=2m+1).
  3. Outer radius (p. 544). Tc⊆B(p,R)T_c \subseteq B(p, R)Tc​⊆B(p,R) with R2=nc2+nn+1R^2 = nc^2 + \tfrac{n}{n+1}R2=nc2+n+1n​ (nnn even) or (n+1)c2−2c+nn+1(n+1)c^2 - 2c + \tfrac{n}{n+1}(n+1)c2−2c+n+1n​ (nnn odd).
  4. Inner radius (p. 544). B(p,r)⊆SB(p, r) \subseteq SB(p,r)⊆S inside the hyperplane, with r2=1n(n+1)r^2 = \tfrac{1}{n(n+1)}r2=n(n+1)1​.
  5. LEMMA (p. 543). For c≥1c \ge 1c≥1 and any regular simplex, B(p,r)⊆S⊆Tc⊆B(p,R)B(p, r) \subseteq S \subseteq T_c \subseteq B(p, R)B(p,r)⊆S⊆Tc​⊆B(p,R) for positive r,Rr, Rr,R with
(Rr)2={c2n3+(c2+1)n2n even,c2n3+(2c2−2c+1)n2+(c2−2c)nn odd.\Big(\frac Rr\Big)^2 = \begin{cases} c^2n^3 + (c^2+1)n^2 & n \text{ even},\\ c^2n^3 + (2c^2 - 2c + 1)n^2 + (c^2 - 2c)n & n \text{ odd}.\end{cases}(rR​)2={c2n3+(c2+1)n2c2n3+(2c2−2c+1)n2+(c2−2c)n​n even,n odd.​

The paper's own proof derives the goal from milestone 1 and the LEMMA at c=3/2c = 3/2c=3/2. At n=1n = 1n=1 the constant 2n3/22n^{3/2}2n3/2 cannot be improved by this argument.

Significance

The result. The theorem is the only place in the paper where the roundness constant c1c_1c1​ is computed, and c1c_1c1​ enters the bound 1+c1c2n1 + c_1c_2\sqrt n1+c1​c2​n​ on the number of lattice hyperplanes that the algorithm branches over. Remark (c) of the paper uses the exact LEMMA for other values of ccc to obtain c1=((1+ϵ)(n3+2n2))1/2c_1 = ((1+\epsilon)(n^3 + 2n^2))^{1/2}c1​=((1+ϵ)(n3+2n2))1/2 (nnn even) and ((1+ϵ)(n3+n2−n))1/2((1+\epsilon)(n^3+n^2-n))^{1/2}((1+ϵ)(n3+n2−n))1/2 (nnn odd). The LEMMA itself is a self-contained fact about the regular simplex. In Euclidean geometry it says how far the "volume-ccc neighbourhood" TcT_cTc​ of a regular simplex extends.

The formalization. The result is classical and proved in the paper. Nothing in it has been machine-checked: there is no regular simplex in Mathlib, and no formal result relates simplex volumes to barycentric coordinates in this form. The platform has the related ellipsoid rounding ConvexOptimization.lowner_john_polytope_rounding (the John-ellipsoid version with factor nnn, by Shuze Chen) and its definition ConvexOptimization_IsLownerJohn. That is the alternative construction of Remark (c). It has a different constant and is not used here. This mission and its companion together give a formal account of the geometry behind Lenstra's algorithm. The algorithm itself is not formalized: its running time needs a machine model and an encoding that the paper does not fix.

Difficulty

There are two separate difficulties. The first is the translation in milestone 1. It needs the volume of a simplex with one vertex replaced to be identified with a barycentric coordinate, through a determinant identity, and it needs this identification to survive the linear map τ\tauτ. The second is the transfer to the model. The paper's "similarity transformation" identifies Rn\mathbb R^nRn with a hyperplane of Rn+1\mathbb R^{n+1}Rn+1 and sends the regular simplex to the standard one. In Lean the vertex description (milestone 2), the radii (milestones 3–4) and TcT_cTc​ must all be carried across this isometry up to scaling. The LEMMA is stated in Rn\mathbb R^nRn, not in the model. The "straightforward analysis" behind milestone 2 is a vertex enumeration of a cube cut by a hyperplane, and its parity split is where sign errors appear.

Formalization scope

  • Rn\mathbb R^nRn is EuclideanSpace ℝ (Fin n) and the model Rn+1\mathbb R^{n+1}Rn+1 is EuclideanSpace ℝ (Fin (n+1)). Distances are Euclidean, never the sup norm. Vertices are indexed by Fin (n+1), matching 0,…,n0, \dots, n0,…,n.
  • The volume keeps the paper's normalisation ∣det⁡M∣/n!|\det M|/n!∣detM∣/n!. TcT_cTc​ is defined from volumes exactly as on p. 543, not from barycentric coordinates.
  • Readings of loose phrases. "Nonsingular endomorphism" is a linear equivalence. "Span a regular nnn-simplex" means all pairwise distances are equal and positive. "Certain/two positive real numbers r,Rr, Rr,R" is an existential with 0<r0 < r0<r and 0<R0 < R0<R in the conclusion; without them, R/rR/rR/r with r=0r = 0r=0 would be 000 in Lean. The LEMMA keeps the printed equality for (R/r)2(R/r)^2(R/r)2. (15) is two hypotheses on ggg, and (16) is quantified over all x∈Kx \in Kx∈K and all pairs i≠ji \ne ji=j.
  • Generalizations, all harmless. The paper's KKK is a bounded polyhedron and the vjv_jvj​ are vertices; the claim is stated for any convex KKK and any points vj∈Kv_j \in Kvj​∈K, and boundedness of KKK follows from (16). Milestone 1 holds for any set KKK. The LEMMA is stated for any regular simplex, since τ\tauτ plays no role in it.
  • n≥1n \ge 1n≥1 throughout. In the model, the ball of milestone 4 is intersected with the hyperplane ∑jxj=1\sum_j x_j = 1∑j​xj​=1, the paper's Rn\mathbb R^nRn. The full ball of Rn+1\mathbb R^{n+1}Rn+1 is not inside SSS.
  • No trivializing formalization is possible: the hypotheses are satisfiable (checked at n=1n = 1n=1, K=[0,1]K = [0,1]K=[0,1]), the radii are positive, and the sets are computed from the data rather than assumed.
  • Useful infrastructure, reusable beyond this mission: the volume of a simplex with one vertex replaced, as a multiple of a barycentric coordinate; existence and properties of regular simplices in Rn\mathbb R^nRn; the isometric embedding of a regular simplex onto the standard simplex. Contributions of any of these as separate lemmas are welcome.

Selected references

  • H. W. Lenstra, Jr., Integer programming with a fixed number of variables, Mathematics of Operations Research 8(4) (1983) 538–548. https://doi.org/10.1287/moor.8.4.538
  • A. K. Lenstra, H. W. Lenstra, Jr., L. Lovász, Factoring polynomials with rational coefficients, Mathematische Annalen 261 (1982) 515–534. https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01457454
  • L. G. Khachiyan, A polynomial algorithm in linear programming, Soviet Math. Doklady 20 (1979) 191–194.
  • R. Kannan, Minkowski's convex body theorem and integer programming, Mathematics of Operations Research 12(3) (1987) 415–440. https://doi.org/10.1287/moor.12.3.415
  • M. Grötschel, L. Lovász, A. Schrijver, Geometric Algorithms and Combinatorial Optimization, Springer, 1988. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-97881-4
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Supply Chain Coordination with Contracts V: With Market-Clearing Prices the Best Wholesale Price Earns θ/(2(1 + θ)) or θ/8, Below the (1 + θ)/8 a Full-Refund Buy-Back AttainsTextbook

Motivation

A supplier that sells through many competing retailers usually worries that competition among them pushes orders too high, because each retailer ignores the demand it takes from the others. Deneckere, Marvel and Peck (1997) identified the opposite failure. When the retail price is set by the market after demand is realized, retailers who hold too much stock in a weak market bid the price down, and anticipating this, perfectly competitive retailers order too little. The supplier then needs a contract that raises orders, and the classical justification for resale price maintenance (a price floor imposed on retailers) comes out of this model. G. P. Cachon's survey chapter Supply Chain Coordination with Contracts (Handbooks in OR & MS, Vol. 11, 2003) presents the model in §6.5.2 as a closed-form example. In it the supplier's best wholesale price contract is computed explicitly and compared with two contracts that recover the monopoly profit: resale price maintenance and a full-refund buy-back.

This mission is volume V of a series that formalizes the section capstones of that chapter, read in the author's 3rd draft (January 2003), pp. 53–58.

Setting

Fix θ>1\theta>1θ>1. Industry demand is low or high, each with probability 1/21/21/2. If the retailers hold a total stock qqq, the market clearing price is

pl(q)=(1−q)+ (low state),ph(q)=(1−qθ)+ (high state).p_l(q)=(1-q)^+\ \text{(low state)},\qquad p_h(q)=\Big(1-\frac q\theta\Big)^+\ \text{(high state)}.pl​(q)=(1−q)+ (low state),ph​(q)=(1−θq​)+ (high state).

Leftover inventory has no salvage value, and the supplier's production cost is zero.

  • Monopolist benchmark. A single firm orders a stock QQQ, observes the state, and sells xl≤Qx_l\le Qxl​≤Q (low) or xh≤Qx_h\le Qxh​≤Q (high) at the market clearing price. Its expected profit is 12pl(xl)xl+12ph(xh)xh\tfrac12p_l(x_l)x_l+\tfrac12p_h(x_h)x_h21​pl​(xl​)xl​+21​ph​(xh​)xh​, and Πo\Pi^oΠo is the maximum of this.
  • Wholesale price contract. The supplier charges www per unit. A continuum of retailers orders before demand is known and sells everything at the market clearing price. Their aggregate expected profit is
π(q)=12pl(q)q+12ph(q)q−wq.\pi(q)=\tfrac12p_l(q)q+\tfrac12p_h(q)q-wq .π(q)=21​pl​(q)q+21​ph​(q)q−wq.

Perfect competition means the retailers keep ordering until expected profit is zero. The competitive order is the q>0q>0q>0 with π(q)=0\pi(q)=0π(q)=0 and π>0\pi>0π>0 on (0,q)(0,q)(0,q). The supplier earns wqwqwq.

  • Resale price maintenance (pˉ,w)(\bar p,w)(pˉ​,w): retailers may not sell below pˉ\bar ppˉ​. When the clearing price would fall below pˉ\bar ppˉ​, only the demand at pˉ\bar ppˉ​ is sold, allocated in proportion to stock.
  • Buy-back (w,b)(w,b)(w,b): the supplier pays bbb per unsold unit. The market price then cannot fall below bbb, and retailers sell at most 1−b1-b1−b units (low) and θ(1−b)\theta(1-b)θ(1−b) units (high).

The page's notation q1(w)=2θ1+θ(1−w)q_1(w)=\frac{2\theta}{1+\theta}(1-w)q1​(w)=1+θ2θ​(1−w), q2(w)=θ(1−2w)q_2(w)=\theta(1-2w)q2​(w)=θ(1−2w), πs(w)\pi_s(w)πs​(w) and w∗(θ)w^*(\theta)w∗(θ) is kept in Lean under the names q1, q2, supplierProfit, wStar.

Formalization targets

Goal (pp. 55, 57)

With

πs∗={θ2(1+θ)θ≤3,θ8θ>3,\pi_s^*=\begin{cases}\dfrac{\theta}{2(1+\theta)}&\theta\le3,\\[4pt]\dfrac\theta8&\theta>3,\end{cases}πs∗​=⎩⎨⎧​2(1+θ)θ​8θ​​θ≤3,θ>3,​

the goal states four things:

  1. πs∗\pi_s^*πs∗​ is the greatest supplier profit wqwqwq over all wholesale prices and their competitive orders.
  2. w∗(θ)w^*(\theta)w∗(θ) attains it.
  3. The monopolist's maximum is Πo=(1+θ)/8\Pi^o=(1+\theta)/8Πo=(1+θ)/8, and πs∗<Πo\pi_s^*<\Pi^oπs∗​<Πo.
  4. Under the buy-back b=w=1/2b=w=1/2b=w=1/2 the competitive order is θ/2\theta/2θ/2 and the supplier earns exactly Πo\Pi^oΠo.

Milestones

  1. Πo=(1+θ)/8\Pi^o=(1+\theta)/8Πo=(1+θ)/8 (p. 54).
  2. The competitive order is q1(w)q_1(w)q1​(w) if w≥12−12θw\ge\tfrac12-\tfrac1{2\theta}w≥21​−2θ1​ and q2(w)q_2(w)q2​(w) otherwise, for 0≤w<10\le w<10≤w<1 (p. 55).
  3. w∗(θ)w^*(\theta)w∗(θ) maximizes πs\pi_sπs​ on [0,1)[0,1)[0,1), with the value πs∗\pi_s^*πs∗​ (p. 55).
  4. The orders and market clearing prices at w∗(θ)w^*(\theta)w∗(θ) (p. 55).
  5. Under resale price maintenance with pˉ=1/2\bar p=1/2pˉ​=1/2 and total stock θ/2\theta/2θ/2, πr(t)=q(t)(1+θ4θ−w)\pi_r(t)=q(t)\big(\frac{1+\theta}{4\theta}-w\big)πr​(t)=q(t)(4θ1+θ​−w) (p. 56).
  6. Under (pˉ,wˉ)(\bar p,\bar w)(pˉ​,wˉ) the competitive order is θ/2\theta/2θ/2 and the supplier earns Πo\Pi^oΠo (p. 57).
  7. Under the buy-back b=1/2b=1/2b=1/2 the retailers' profit is q(34−w−q2θ)q\big(\frac34-w-\frac q{2\theta}\big)q(43​−w−2θq​) for 1/2<q<θ/21/2<q<\theta/21/2<q<θ/2 (p. 57).
  8. 1/2>(1+θ)/(4θ)1/2>(1+\theta)/(4\theta)1/2>(1+θ)/(4θ) (p. 57).

Significance

The goal shows that in this model a wholesale price contract always falls short of the integrated profit, whatever θ\thetaθ. It also shows where the shortfall comes from: at the optimal wholesale price the low-state market price falls below the monopoly price 1/21/21/2 (milestone 4). Restoring the monopoly profit therefore requires a mechanism that holds the low-state price at 1/21/21/2. Resale price maintenance and a full-refund buy-back both do this, so the section gives a closed-form efficiency argument for vertical restraints that are often treated as anticompetitive. The section also contrasts the buy-back with revenue sharing, which coordinates the single newsvendor (§6.2) but not this model.

The results are proved on the printed pages by elementary algebra. None of them has a machine-checked proof, and nothing on Prove2Me covers this model. The mission produces checked versions of the case analysis, including the θ=3\theta=3θ=3 tie and the two regimes of the competitive order. It also adds a reusable encoding of "perfect competition" as the first zero of aggregate expected profit.

Difficulty

Every statement reduces to one-variable inequalities, but the case structure is easy to get wrong.

  • The retailers' profit is piecewise (prices hit zero at q=1q=1q=1 in the low state and at q=θq=\thetaq=θ in the high state). The competitive order lies on either side of q=1q=1q=1 depending on www.
  • The supplier's profit πs\pi_sπs​ is piecewise in www, and its second branch peaks at w=1/4w=1/4w=1/4 only when θ>2\theta>2θ>2.
  • The global optimum switches at θ=3\theta=3θ=3, where both prices are optimal.
  • A statement "the competitive order is q1(w)q_1(w)q1​(w)" needs the order to exist, to be unique, and to have positive profit everywhere below it. Exhibiting a root is not enough.
  • The buy-back profit is identically zero for q≥θ/2q\ge\theta/2q≥θ/2 when b=w=1/2b=w=1/2b=w=1/2. Only the "first zero" reading of perfect competition pins the order at θ/2\theta/2θ/2.

Formalization scope

All quantities are real numbers and θ>1\theta>1θ>1 throughout. The continuum of retailers enters only through the total order. No measure space of retailers is formalized, and footnote 26's multiplicity of individual equilibria is not stated. The sales rules under resale price maintenance (proportional allocation) and under the buy-back (price floor bbb) are written into the contract definitions, as the page describes them in words. The theorems use only pˉ=b=1/2\bar p=b=1/2pˉ​=b=1/2.

The formulas q1q_1q1​, q2q_2q2​, πs\pi_sπs​ and w∗w^*w∗ are definitions transcribed from the page. That they are the competitive order and the optimum is the content of the theorems. Defining Πo\Pi^oΠo or the competitive order by its closed form would trivialize the mission, so the competitive order is defined only by the zero-profit property and Πo\Pi^oΠo as a greatest element of the monopolist's feasible profits. The goal is stated over all real wholesale prices, so it also rules out profitable prices outside [0,1)[0,1)[0,1). Uniqueness of w∗(θ)w^*(\theta)w∗(θ) is not asserted at θ=3\theta=3θ=3.

The chapter's standing assumptions used here are risk neutrality and full information, together with the model paragraph of pp. 53–54 (two equally likely states, zero salvage value, zero production cost). No platform definition is referenced: no published item formalizes this model.

Selected references

  • G. P. Cachon, Supply Chain Coordination with Contracts, in S. Graves, T. de Kok (eds.), Handbooks in Operations Research and Management Science, Vol. 11: Supply Chain Management, North-Holland, 2003, §6.5.2 (3rd draft, January 2003, pp. 53–58). https://doi.org/10.1016/S0927-0507(03)11006-7
  • R. Deneckere, H. P. Marvel, J. Peck, Demand Uncertainty and Price Maintenance: Markdowns as Destructive Competition, American Economic Review 87(4), 619–641, 1997. https://www.jstor.org/stable/2951366
  • R. Deneckere, H. P. Marvel, J. Peck, Demand Uncertainty, Inventories, and Resale Price Maintenance, Quarterly Journal of Economics 111(3), 885–913, 1996. https://doi.org/10.2307/2946675
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Supply Chain Coordination with Contracts III: With Effort-Dependent Demand, Buy-Backs, Quantity Flexibility and Revenue Sharing Under-Reward Effort, While a Quantity Discount Gives λΠ(q, e°)Textbook

Why effort breaks the standard coordinating contracts

A supplier selling through a retailer earns more when the retailer works harder at selling. Examples are a better shelf position, more knowledgeable sales staff, local advertising and keeping the display in order. These activities cost the retailer, raise demand, and usually cannot be observed or verified by the supplier, so no contract can be written on them directly. Chapter 6 of the Handbook of Operations Research and Management Science, Vol. 11: Supply Chain Management (G. P. Cachon, Supply Chain Coordination with Contracts, 2003) surveys contracts that align a retailer's decisions with the interest of the whole supply chain. Its §6.4 asks which of these contracts survive when the retailer also chooses such an unverifiable effort level.

The question goes back to the marketing literature on retail effort (Chu and Desai 1995, Desai and Srinivasan 1995, Desiraju and Moorthy 1997, Lal 1990, Lariviere and Padmanabhan 1997). It was taken up for newsvendor contracts by Taylor (2000), who showed that a sales rebate combined with a buy back restores coordination, and by Krishnan, Kapuscinski and Butz (2001), who let effort be chosen after demand is observed. This mission is the third in a series that formalizes the chapter's section capstones. It covers §6.4.1.

The newsvendor with effort-dependent demand

One supplier sells to one retailer for a single selling season. Before the season the retailer chooses an order quantity q≥0q \ge 0q≥0 and an effort level e≥0e \ge 0e≥0. Effort costs him g(e)g(e)g(e), where g(0)=0g(0) = 0g(0)=0, g′>0g' > 0g′>0 and g′′>0g'' > 0g′′>0. Demand DDD given effort eee has distribution function F(⋅∣e)F(\cdot \mid e)F(⋅∣e) on [0,∞)[0, \infty)[0,∞), with F(0∣e)=0F(0 \mid e) = 0F(0∣e)=0 and F(⋅∣e)F(\cdot \mid e)F(⋅∣e) strictly increasing. Demand is stochastically increasing in effort: ∂F(y∣e)/∂e<0\partial F(y \mid e)/\partial e < 0∂F(y∣e)/∂e<0 for y>0y > 0y>0. Units sell at the retail price ppp and cost c<pc < pc<p to produce. Goodwill costs, the salvage value and the retailer's own unit cost are zero. Expected sales and the integrated channel's profit are

S(q,e)=E[min⁡(q,D)]=q−∫0qF(y∣e) dy,Π(q,e)=pS(q,e)−cq−g(e).S(q, e) = \mathbb E[\min(q, D)] = q - \int_0^q F(y \mid e)\,dy, \qquad \Pi(q, e) = pS(q, e) - cq - g(e).S(q,e)=E[min(q,D)]=q−∫0q​F(y∣e)dy,Π(q,e)=pS(q,e)−cq−g(e).

Let (qo,eo)(q^o, e^o)(qo,eo) maximize Π\PiΠ. A contract fixes the transfer the retailer pays the supplier, as a function of what the supplier can verify: the order and, for some contracts, sales or leftover units, but never effort. The contracts compared are the buy back {wb,b}\{w_b, b\}{wb​,b}, quantity flexibility {wq,δ}\{w_q, \delta\}{wq​,δ}, revenue sharing {wr,ϕ}\{w_r, \phi\}{wr​,ϕ}, the sales rebate {ws,r,t}\{w_s, r, t\}{ws​,r,t} and the quantity discount wd(q)w_d(q)wd​(q). Under each, the retailer's profit πr(q,e)\pi_r(q, e)πr​(q,e) is his revenue pS(q,e)pS(q, e)pS(q,e) less the transfer and g(e)g(e)g(e).

Formalization targets

Goal

The goal combines the section's negative and positive results.

  1. Buy backs distort effort (Eq. (19)). For every b>0b > 0b>0, q>0q > 0q>0 and e>0e > 0e>0,
∂πr(q,e,wb,b)∂e<∂Π(q,e)∂e.\frac{\partial \pi_r(q, e, w_b, b)}{\partial e} < \frac{\partial \Pi(q, e)}{\partial e}.∂e∂πr​(q,e,wb​,b)​<∂e∂Π(q,e)​.
  1. The quantity discount aligns effort and splits profit. With
wd(q)=(1−λ)p S(q,eo)q+λc−(1−λ)g(eo)q,λ∈[0,1],w_d(q) = (1 - \lambda)p\,\frac{S(q, e^o)}{q} + \lambda c - (1 - \lambda)\frac{g(e^o)}{q}, \qquad \lambda \in [0, 1],wd​(q)=(1−λ)pqS(q,eo)​+λc−(1−λ)qg(eo)​,λ∈[0,1],

the following hold for every q>0q > 0q>0. The retailer earns πr(q,eo)=λΠ(q,eo)\pi_r(q, e^o) = \lambda\Pi(q, e^o)πr​(q,eo)=λΠ(q,eo) and the supplier earns (1−λ)Π(q,eo)(1 - \lambda)\Pi(q, e^o)(1−λ)Π(q,eo). The retailer's marginal profit of effort equals the channel's. His optimal efforts are the channel's. 3. The optimal order. If (qo,eo)(q^o, e^o)(qo,eo) maximizes Π\PiΠ, both firms' profits at effort eoe^oeo are maximized by qoq^oqo.

Milestones

The milestones follow the section's own claims: the integral form of SSS (p. 41); the first-order condition (18) for the chain-optimal effort; (19); the analogous strict inequalities for quantity flexibility (δ>0\delta > 0δ>0) and revenue sharing (ϕ<1\phi < 1ϕ<1), and the reverse inequality for the sales rebate (r>0r > 0r>0, q>tq > tq>t); the two displays of πr\pi_rπr​ under the quantity discount; and the fact that S(q,e)/qS(q, e)/qS(q,e)/q decreases in qqq.

Significance

The result separates two jobs a contract does. To coordinate the order quantity, buy backs, quantity flexibility and revenue sharing all shield the retailer from part of the demand risk or take part of his revenue. The same shield dulls his incentive to raise demand, so each one leads him to under-invest in effort. The sales rebate pushes the other way, toward too much effort. The quantity discount works because the retailer keeps every unit of realized revenue and bears all of his own effort cost. The schedule then prices the order against expected revenue at the optimal effort, so the order is coordinated without touching the effort incentive. Because πr(q,eo)=λΠ(q,eo)\pi_r(q, e^o) = \lambda\Pi(q, e^o)πr​(q,eo)=λΠ(q,eo) with λ\lambdaλ free in [0,1][0, 1][0,1], any split of the channel's optimal profit is attainable. The chapter extends this observation to retailers that also set price (p. 43).

The section's claims are proved on the page only in outline; several are introduced with "it can be shown". To our knowledge none has a machine-checked proof. Formalizing them requires differentiating expected sales in a parameter of the demand law. That step recurs throughout stochastic inventory and pricing models.

Difficulty

Most of the algebra is short. The substance is in the derivatives. ∂S(q,e)/∂e=−∫0q∂F(y∣e)/∂e dy\partial S(q, e)/\partial e = -\int_0^q \partial F(y \mid e)/\partial e\,dy∂S(q,e)/∂e=−∫0q​∂F(y∣e)/∂edy is a differentiation under the integral sign. The strict inequalities need this integral to be strictly negative. That in turn needs ∂F/∂e\partial F/\partial e∂F/∂e to be integrable and negative on a set of positive length, which is why q>0q > 0q>0 (and q>t≥0q > t \ge 0q>t≥0 for the sales rebate) matters.

The natural reading "the quantity discount makes (qo,eo)(q^o, e^o)(qo,eo) the retailer's joint optimum" is not what the page shows, and it fails in general. The page gives two partial statements: for each fixed qqq the retailer's effort incentive is the chain's, and at e=eoe = e^oe=eo his best order is qoq^oqo. Since πr(q,e)=Π(q,e)−(1−λ)Π(q,eo)\pi_r(q, e) = \Pi(q, e) - (1 - \lambda)\Pi(q, e^o)πr​(q,e)=Π(q,e)−(1−λ)Π(q,eo), the retailer can gain by moving qqq and eee together when λ\lambdaλ is small. The goal states exactly the two partial claims.

Formalization scope

The Lean namespace is CachonCoord.EffortNewsvendor. A structure Model collects the data: ppp and ccc with 0≤c<p0 \le c < p0≤c<p; a family of demand laws indexed by effort (probability measures on [0,∞)[0, \infty)[0,∞) with finite mean, no atom at 000, strictly increasing distribution function); the effort derivative ∂F(y∣e)/∂e\partial F(y \mid e)/\partial e∂F(y∣e)/∂e, negative for y>0y > 0y>0, e>0e > 0e>0; and ggg with g(0)=0g(0) = 0g(0)=0 and positive first and second derivatives for e>0e > 0e>0. SSS is defined as an expectation, and its integral form is a milestone. Derivative claims are HasDerivAt statements at interior efforts e>0e > 0e>0. The inequalities assert that both derivatives exist.

The following hypotheses are standing assumptions or disclosed additions:

  • the chapter's model paragraph (p. 7) and the zeros gr=gs=v=cr=0g_r = g_s = v = c_r = 0gr​=gs​=v=cr​=0 of p. 41;
  • as regularity, differentiation of e↦∫abF(y∣e) dye \mapsto \int_a^b F(y \mid e)\,dye↦∫ab​F(y∣e)dy under the integral sign, with interval-integrable ∂F/∂e\partial F/\partial e∂F/∂e;
  • 0≤c0 \le c0≤c (a production cost);
  • wq>0w_q > 0wq​>0 and δ≤1\delta \le 1δ≤1 for quantity flexibility (the contract's range, p. 24);
  • t≥0t \ge 0t≥0 for the sales rebate threshold;
  • q>0q > 0q>0 wherever wdw_dwd​, which divides by qqq, is used.

Revenue sharing and the sales rebate use §6.2's profit functions (pp. 21, 27) with this section's zeros, less g(e)g(e)g(e).

The page prints the last term of wdw_dwd​ as +(1−λ)g(eo)/q+(1 - \lambda)g(e^o)/q+(1−λ)g(eo)/q. With that sign the page's own displays πr(q,eo)=λΠ(q,eo)\pi_r(q, e^o) = \lambda\Pi(q, e^o)πr​(q,eo)=λΠ(q,eo) and πr(q,e)\pi_r(q, e)πr​(q,e) fail by 2(1−λ)g(eo)2(1 - \lambda)g(e^o)2(1−λ)g(eo). The formalization uses −(1−λ)g(eo)/q-(1 - \lambda)g(e^o)/q−(1−λ)g(eo)/q, under which both hold. wdw_dwd​ is the explicit printed schedule with this correction. It is not defined as "a schedule with πr=λΠ\pi_r = \lambda\Piπr​=λΠ", which would make the goal empty.

Not covered: the price-and-effort schedule at the bottom of p. 43, for which the page gives no argument. The cachon-2005 revenue-sharing effort results (RevShareCoord.Effort.*, deterministic revenue R(q,e)R(q, e)R(q,e)) are a different model and are not referenced. Proofs of any milestone, and a reusable library for differentiating newsvendor expectations in a parameter, are welcome.

Selected references

  • G. P. Cachon, Supply Chain Coordination with Contracts, in S. Graves and T. de Kok (eds.), Handbooks in Operations Research and Management Science, Vol. 11: Supply Chain Management, North-Holland, 2003, Ch. 6. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0927-0507(03)11006-7 (read in the author's 3rd draft, January 2003).
  • T. A. Taylor, Supply Chain Coordination under Channel Rebates with Sales Effort Effects, Management Science 48(8), 2002, 992–1007. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.48.8.992.168
  • H. Krishnan, R. Kapuscinski, D. A. Butz, Coordinating Contracts for Decentralized Supply Chains with Retailer Promotional Effort, Management Science 50(1), 2004, 48–63. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.1030.0154
  • G. P. Cachon, M. A. Lariviere, Supply Chain Coordination with Revenue-Sharing Contracts: Strengths and Limitations, Management Science 51(1), 2005, 30–44. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.1040.0215
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A Numerically Stable Dual Method for Solving Strictly Convex Quadratic Programs: The Dual Algorithm Solves the QP or Detects Its Infeasibility in Finitely Many StepsResearch Paper

Motivation

Strictly convex quadratic programs — minimize a positive definite quadratic subject to linear inequalities — are the subproblems solved at every iteration of successive quadratic programming (SQP) methods for nonlinear optimization, and they arise directly in least-squares estimation with constraints, portfolio selection and model predictive control. In SQP the unconstrained minimizer of the quadratic model is available at no cost, while a feasible point is not.

D. Goldfarb and A. Idnani (Math. Programming 27 (1983) 1–33) proposed a dual active-set method that exploits this asymmetry. It starts at the unconstrained minimizer, which is optimal for the problem with all constraints removed, and adds violated constraints one at a time while keeping the current point optimal for the subproblem defined by the current active set. No phase 1 is needed. The method, usually called the Goldfarb–Idnani algorithm, is the basis of widely used solvers (for example the quadprog package in R and QuadProg++), and the paper proves that it terminates finitely with a correct answer.

Earlier dual methods for quadratic programming include the modified-simplex methods of Lemke (Management Science 8 (1962) 442–453) and of Van de Panne and Whinston (1964), which the paper compares with its own in Section 7.

Setting

Fix n,m∈Nn, m \in \mathbb Nn,m∈N, a vector a∈Rna \in \mathbb R^na∈Rn, a symmetric positive definite n×nn\times nn×n matrix GGG, an n×mn\times mn×m matrix CCC with columns n1,…,nmn_1,\dots,n_mn1​,…,nm​, and b∈Rmb \in \mathbb R^mb∈Rm. The quadratic program (1.1) is

min⁡x f(x)=aTx+12xTGxsubject tosi(x)=niTx−bi≥0,i∈K={1,…,m}.\min_x\ f(x) = a^{\mathsf T}x + \tfrac12 x^{\mathsf T}Gx \quad\text{subject to}\quad s_i(x) = n_i^{\mathsf T}x - b_i \ge 0,\quad i \in K = \{1,\dots,m\}.xmin​ f(x)=aTx+21​xTGxsubject tosi​(x)=niT​x−bi​≥0,i∈K={1,…,m}.

The gradient is g(x)=Gx+ag(x) = Gx + ag(x)=Gx+a. For J⊆KJ \subseteq KJ⊆K, the subproblem P(J)P(J)P(J) keeps only the constraints indexed by JJJ; P(∅)P(\emptyset)P(∅) is solved by x0=−G−1ax^0 = -G^{-1}ax0=−G−1a. A set A⊆KA \subseteq KA⊆K is linearly independent if the normals nin_ini​, i∈Ai\in Ai∈A, are.

For an independent AAA, let NNN be the matrix with columns nin_ini​, i∈Ai\in Ai∈A, and define

N∗=(NTG−1N)−1NTG−1,H=G−1−G−1N(NTG−1N)−1NTG−1.N^* = (N^{\mathsf T}G^{-1}N)^{-1}N^{\mathsf T}G^{-1},\qquad H = G^{-1} - G^{-1}N(N^{\mathsf T}G^{-1}N)^{-1}N^{\mathsf T}G^{-1}.N∗=(NTG−1N)−1NTG−1,H=G−1−G−1N(NTG−1N)−1NTG−1.

The multipliers are u(x)=N∗g(x)u(x) = N^*g(x)u(x)=N∗g(x); for a constraint p∉Ap \notin Ap∈/A with normal n+=npn^+ = n_pn+=np​ the infeasibility multipliers are r=N∗n+r = N^*n^+r=N∗n+; a superscript +++ denotes the same objects for A+=A∪{p}A^+ = A\cup\{p\}A+=A∪{p}.

An S-pair (x,A)(x, A)(x,A) is an independent active set AAA with si(x)=0s_i(x) = 0si​(x)=0 for i∈Ai\in Ai∈A and xxx optimal for P(A)P(A)P(A). A V-triple (x,A,p)(x, A, p)(x,A,p) has p∉Ap\notin Ap∈/A, A+A^+A+ independent, sp(x)<0s_p(x) < 0sp​(x)<0, si(x)=0s_i(x) = 0si​(x)=0 for i∈Ai \in Ai∈A, H+g(x)=0H^+g(x) = 0H+g(x)=0 and u+(x)=(N+)∗g(x)≥0u^+(x) = (N^+)^*g(x) \ge 0u+(x)=(N+)∗g(x)≥0.

The dual algorithm starts from (x0,∅)(x^0, \emptyset)(x0,∅). In Step 1 it stops if xxx is feasible; otherwise it picks any violated constraint ppp. In Step 2 it moves along the primal direction z=Hn+z = Hn^+z=Hn+ and the dual direction (−r;1)(-r; 1)(−r;1) with step t=min⁡{t1,t2}t = \min\{t_1, t_2\}t=min{t1​,t2​}, where t1t_1t1​ is the largest step that keeps the multipliers nonnegative and t2=−sp(x)/zTn+t_2 = -s_p(x)/z^{\mathsf T}n^+t2​=−sp​(x)/zTn+ makes constraint ppp active. If both are infinite it reports infeasibility. A full step (t=t2t = t_2t=t2​) adds ppp and returns to Step 1. A partial step (t=t1<t2t = t_1 < t_2t=t1​<t2​), or a dual step (z=0z = 0z=0), drops a constraint kkk attaining t1t_1t1​ and repeats Step 2.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 3 (p. 11)

For every choice of the violated constraint ppp and of the dropped constraint kkk:

no run from (x0,∅) is infinite, and every run that cannot continue ends in {STOP at an optimal x of (1.1), orSTOP with {x:CTx≥b}=∅.\text{no run from } (x^0,\emptyset) \text{ is infinite, and every run that cannot continue ends in } \begin{cases}\text{STOP at an optimal } x \text{ of (1.1)}, \text{ or}\\ \text{STOP with } \{x : C^{\mathsf T}x \ge b\} = \emptyset.\end{cases}no run from (x0,∅) is infinite, and every run that cannot continue ends in {STOP at an optimal x of (1.1), orSTOP with {x:CTx≥b}=∅.​

Milestones, in attack order

  1. Properties (2.6)–(2.9) (p. 5): Hw=0  ⟺  w∈range⁡NHw = 0 \iff w \in \operatorname{range} NHw=0⟺w∈rangeN; H⪰0H \succeq 0H⪰0; HGH=HHGH = HHGH=H; N∗GH=0N^*GH = 0N∗GH=0.
  2. Optimality conditions (2.3)–(2.4) (p. 5): on the manifold of AAA, xxx solves P(A)P(A)P(A) iff N∗g(x)≥0N^*g(x) \ge 0N∗g(x)≥0 and Hg(x)=0Hg(x) = 0Hg(x)=0.
  3. Lemma 1 (p. 8): along xˉ=x+tHn+\bar x = x + tHn^+xˉ=x+tHn+ from a V-triple, H+g(xˉ)=0H^+g(\bar x) = 0H+g(xˉ)=0, the constraints of AAA stay active, u+(xˉ)=u+(x)+t(−r;1)u^+(\bar x) = u^+(x) + t(-r;1)u+(xˉ)=u+(x)+t(−r;1) and sp(xˉ)=sp(x)+t zTn+s_p(\bar x) = s_p(x) + t\,z^{\mathsf T}n^+sp​(xˉ)=sp​(x)+tzTn+.
  4. Theorem 1 (pp. 8–9): the step t=min⁡{t1,t2}t = \min\{t_1,t_2\}t=min{t1​,t2​} increases sps_psp​ and fff; a partial step yields a V-triple, a full step an S-pair.
  5. Theorem 2 (p. 10): if np=Nrn_p = Nrnp​=Nr and sp(x)<0s_p(x) < 0sp​(x)<0 at an S-pair, then r≤0r \le 0r≤0 means P(A∪{p})P(A\cup\{p\})P(A∪{p}) is infeasible; otherwise dropping a minimizing kkk gives a V-triple.
  6. One round of Step 2 (p. 11): from an S-pair and a violated ppp, at most ∣A∣|A|∣A∣ partial or dual steps and one final step end either in infeasibility of (1.1) or in a new S-pair (xˉ,Aˉ∪{p})(\bar x, \bar A \cup\{p\})(xˉ,Aˉ∪{p}) with Aˉ⊆A\bar A\subseteq AAˉ⊆A and f(xˉ)>f(x)f(\bar x) > f(x)f(xˉ)>f(x).

Significance

Theorem 3 is the correctness certificate of the Goldfarb–Idnani method: whatever rule an implementation uses to choose the entering and leaving constraints, it cannot cycle and its answer is right. In particular the infeasibility verdict is a proof that (1.1) has no feasible point, which matters in SQP where infeasible subproblems trigger a different branch of the outer method. The intermediate results (the operator identities, Lemma 1, Theorems 1–2) are the standard analysis of dual active-set methods for quadratic programming.

The result is proved in the paper; to our knowledge it has not been machine-checked. A formal development produces verified projector identities for N∗N^*N∗ and HHH, a verified KKT characterization for equality-active subproblems, and a verified finite-termination proof for a nondeterministic algorithm with an explicit step relation. The platform already has a proved KKT sufficiency theorem for general convex programs (ConvexOptimization.kkt_sufficient_for_convex), stated over EuclideanSpace with general convex functions and gradient fields; it can serve as background for the sufficiency half of milestone 2, but it is not stated in this mission's matrix objects.

Difficulty

The obvious termination argument is that fff increases strictly at every iteration and there are finitely many active sets. It fails as stated: partial steps may leave xxx unchanged (the dual steps of Step 2(c)(ii)), so fff is only nondecreasing between consecutive states. A termination proof therefore needs a measure that also decreases along steps that do not move xxx. Any such argument relies on invariants (independence of A+A^+A+, nonnegativity of the multipliers, sp<0s_p < 0sp​<0 along partial steps) that hold only on reachable states, and the operators N∗N^*N∗ and HHH are meaningful only while those invariants hold. Correctness of the infeasibility verdict requires the dependent case (Theorem 2), not only Theorem 1.

Formalization scope

Vectors are Fin n → ℝ, GGG is Matrix (Fin n) (Fin n) ℝ with G.PosDef, CCC is Matrix (Fin n) (Fin m) ℝ, and active sets are Finset (Fin m). Multiplier vectors are indexed by constraint index (Fin m → ℝ, zero off the active set), not by position in AAA. Lean's matrix inverse returns 000 for singular matrices, so every statement about N∗N^*N∗ and HHH assumes G≻0G \succ 0G≻0 and an independent active set (directly, or through an S-pair or V-triple).

The algorithm is the inductive relation Step on states step1 x A u, step2 x A p u⁺, stopOptimal x, stopInfeasible, with one transition per admissible choice of ppp and kkk. Infinite step lengths are separate transitions; a tie t1=t2t_1 = t_2t1​=t2​ takes the full step, as the paper tests t=t2t = t_2t=t2​ first. The running value of fff and the factorizations of Section 4 are not part of the state.

Explicit readings of the paper's words:

  • "solves the QPP or indicates infeasibility in a finite number of steps" is: no infinite sequence of Step transitions from the Step-0 state, and every reachable state without a successor is a STOP whose verdict is correct (optimal for (1.1), or (1.1) infeasible);
  • "S-pair" is: AAA independent and active at xxx, with xxx optimal for P(A)P(A)P(A) (the reading every use in the paper needs);
  • in Theorem 1 the partial-step clause carries t<t2t < t_2t<t2​ (as in its proof), and the multiplier printed uj+1+u^+_{j+1}uj+1+​ in (3.16) is uq+1+u^+_{q+1}uq+1+​, the entry belonging to ppp;
  • "an S-pair can never reoccur" is expressed as the strict increase f(xˉ)>f(x)f(\bar x) > f(x)f(xˉ)>f(x) in milestone 6.

Property (2.10), printed HH+=H+HH^+ = H^+HH+=H+, is false unless G=IG = IG=I and is not formalized. Equality constraints (1.2), Section 4 (numerically stable implementation), Sections 5–6 (computations), Section 7 (comparisons) and the Appendix example are out of scope.

A trivializing formalization is ruled out: the goal quantifies over every run of the relation (not one selection rule, not "some run terminates"), the infeasibility verdict is about (1.1) itself, and the algorithm is a relation that always has a successor until a STOP, so correctness cannot hold because a run gets stuck.

Needed infrastructure: Schur-complement and projector identities for N∗N^*N∗ and HHH; first-order optimality for convex quadratics on affine subspaces with inequality multipliers; well-foundedness arguments for a nondeterministic relation. The operator identities and the KKT characterization are reusable for other active-set and SQP analyses. Contributions of proofs of any milestone, and of reusable lemmas about N∗N^*N∗ and HHH, are welcome.

Selected references

  • D. Goldfarb and A. Idnani, A numerically stable dual method for solving strictly convex quadratic programs, Mathematical Programming 27 (1983) 1–33. https://doi.org/10.1007/BF02591962
  • C. E. Lemke, A method of solution for quadratic programs, Management Science 8 (1962) 442–453. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.8.4.442
  • J. Nocedal and S. J. Wright, Numerical Optimization, 2nd ed., Springer, 2006, Chapter 16. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-0-387-40065-5
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Finding Minimum-Cost Circulations by Successive Approximation I: The Generic Refine Subroutine Stops Within 3n(n − 1) + 3nm + 3n²(m + n) Update Operations at an ε-Optimal CirculationResearch Paper

Motivation

Minimum-cost circulation asks how to route flow around a directed network without accumulating flow at any vertex, while minimizing the total cost of the routed units. It is a basic network optimization problem: lower-bound and demand constraints in many flow models can be converted into circulation form. Goldberg and Tarjan's 1987 technical report develops a successive-approximation approach in which a local repair subroutine, refine, improves an approximately optimal circulation. The report was followed by a 1990 journal article; all theorem numbers and page citations in this mission refer to the 1987 report.

The mission isolates the generic form of refine, where an implementation may choose any applicable update at each step. Its question is whether every such choice sequence finishes after a controlled number of operations and returns a circulation with a stronger optimality certificate. The related Goldberg–Tarjan maximum-flow algorithm uses push and relabel operations with distance labels; here the labels are real-valued prices tied to arc costs. The authors' cycle-canceling work uses the same circulation network model and supplies published definitions reused in this development.

Setting

A circulation network has a finite vertex set VVV and a symmetric set EEE of directed arcs: whenever (v,w)(v,w)(v,w) is an arc, so is (w,v)(w,v)(w,v). Let n=∣V∣n=|V|n=∣V∣ and m=∣E∣m=|E|m=∣E∣, counting both orientations. Each arc has a real capacity u(v,w)u(v,w)u(v,w) and cost c(v,w)c(v,w)c(v,w), with c(v,w)=−c(w,v)c(v,w)=-c(w,v)c(v,w)=−c(w,v). A pseudoflow fff respects capacities and the paired-arc relation f(v,w)=−f(w,v)f(v,w)=-f(w,v)f(v,w)=−f(w,v). Its excess ef(v)e_f(v)ef​(v) is the sum of flow entering vvv. A circulation is a pseudoflow with zero excess everywhere. The already published CycleCanceling.MinMean.Network supplies this network, its circulation predicate, and residual capacity uf(v,w)=u(v,w)−f(v,w)u_f(v,w)=u(v,w)-f(v,w)uf​(v,w)=u(v,w)−f(v,w). An arc is residual when this capacity is positive.

A price function p:V→Rp:V\to\mathbb Rp:V→R changes an arc's reduced cost to cp(v,w)=c(v,w)−p(v)+p(w)c_p(v,w)=c(v,w)-p(v)+p(w)cp​(v,w)=c(v,w)−p(v)+p(w). A pseudoflow is ε\varepsilonε-optimal with respect to ppp when every residual arc has reduced cost at least −ε-\varepsilon−ε. A vertex is active when its excess is positive. An admissible arc is a residual arc of negative reduced cost. Refine takes an input circulation that is 2ε2\varepsilon2ε-optimal, saturates every arc whose reduced cost is negative, and then repeatedly applies an available update. A push sends flow from an active vertex along an admissible arc. A relabel raises the price of an active vertex with no outgoing admissible arc to the largest value permitted by ε\varepsilonε-optimality. These rules are Figures 4 and 5, printed pages 18–19.

Formalization targets

The supporting targets are the paper's progress and correctness results, its price bound, and the three operation counts. For any generic refine run from a 2ε2\varepsilon2ε-optimal circulation, Lemma 5.8 bounds each vertex's price increase by 3nε3n\varepsilon3nε. Lemmas 5.9–5.11 bound the numbers R,S,TR,S,TR,S,T of relabelings, saturating pushes, and nonsaturating pushes:

R≤3n(n−1),S≤3nm,T≤3n2(m+n).R\leq 3n(n-1),\qquad S\leq 3nm,\qquad T\leq 3n^2(m+n).R≤3n(n−1),S≤3nm,T≤3n2(m+n).

The goal combines the resulting bound on the number KKK of updates with progress and correctness:

K≤3n(n−1)+3nm+3n2(m+n).K\leq 3n(n-1)+3nm+3n^2(m+n).K≤3n(n−1)+3nm+3n2(m+n).

If the final state has an active vertex, another update exists. If no update applies, the final pseudoflow is a circulation and is ε\varepsilonε-optimal with respect to its final prices. This is the explicit operation-count content behind the generic subroutine's analysis in Section 5. It does not claim a bound for a particular data structure or a complete minimum-cost algorithm.

Significance

The theorem gives an order-independent finite bound: the choice of which applicable push or relabel to perform cannot cause generic refine to run forever or stop with an active vertex. Its output is a circulation whose approximate-optimality tolerance has been halved. That output can serve as the next input in the successive-approximation framework. For integral costs, the report's Theorem 2.3 later turns a sufficiently small tolerance into exact minimum cost; that outer-loop result is outside this mission.

This mission specifies the generic cost-scaling state machine in Lean and poses its quantitative analysis as open formalization targets. The shared network and circulation definitions from the published Goldberg–Tarjan 1989 series are available, and a related generic maximum-flow theorem in the 1988 series has a machine-checked proof. Those results do not prove refine's price-based bounds. Contributions that establish the paper's progress, price, or counting statements for this state machine, and reusable facts about finite residual networks, advance the open goal.

Difficulty

A push respects a capacity, but it can create activity at another vertex; a relabel changes which arcs are admissible. Thus checking a single update does not bound an arbitrary sequence. The price bound also depends on the circulation and prices supplied at entry, not merely on the current pseudoflow being ε\varepsilonε-optimal. Finally, a vertex with no admissible outgoing arc may appear to be stuck when the relabel minimum is over an empty set. Feasibility of the original circulation network is needed to establish that an active vertex still has a genuine next update. The operation bound requires accounting for the three update types across every possible choice sequence.

Formalization scope

Vertices form a finite type, and capacities, costs, flows, and prices are real-valued functions. The network has symmetric ordered arcs and antisymmetric costs. There is no separate nonnegativity assumption on capacities; feasibility is supplied by the input circulation. The new ε\varepsilonε is positive, so the entry circulation is 2ε2\varepsilon2ε-optimal before Figure 4 halves the error parameter. The run starts from the resulting saturated pseudoflow and records one applicable push or relabel per index k<Kk<Kk<K. Counts classify those actual steps by the selected arc's residual capacity after a push. Termination is the negation of the paper's loop guard, not a definition that assumes zero excess.

The reduced-cost sign is c−p(v)+p(w)c-p(v)+p(w)c−p(v)+p(w), and relabel raises p(v)p(v)p(v). This differs from the published 1989 epsilon-optimality definition, so only its network model is imported. The relabel relation requires an attained minimum over a nonempty set of outgoing residual arcs; it assigns no default value to an empty minimum. Loops may occur in the reused network model, but cost antisymmetry makes their reduced cost zero, so they cannot be push arcs. The explicit constants are the report's 3nε3n\varepsilon3nε, 3n(n−1)3n(n-1)3n(n−1), 3nm3nm3nm, and 3n2(m+n)3n^2(m+n)3n2(m+n); the goal sums the last three. The report's RAM-model O(⋅)O(\cdot)O(⋅) running times are outside the formal statements. A definition that makes termination equivalent to conservation or assigns an arbitrary relabel price at an empty set would miss the target.

Selected references

  • Andrew V. Goldberg and Robert E. Tarjan, Finding Minimum-Cost Circulations by Successive Approximation, MIT/LCS/TM-333, July 1987. Technical report.
  • Andrew V. Goldberg and Robert E. Tarjan, Finding Minimum-Cost Circulations by Successive Approximation, Mathematics of Operations Research 15(3), 1990, pp. 430–466. DOI. The report above supplies this mission's numbering.
  • Andrew V. Goldberg and Robert E. Tarjan, A New Approach to the Maximum-Flow Problem, Journal of the ACM 35(4), 1988. DOI.
  • Andrew V. Goldberg and Robert E. Tarjan, Finding Minimum-Cost Circulations by Canceling Negative Cycles, Journal of the ACM 36(4), 1989. DOI.
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CombinatoricsOperations ResearchOptimization+1·Captain: mikedeng1

Assortment Optimisation Under a General Discrete Choice Model: A Tight Analysis of Revenue-Ordered Assortments III: The Three Revenue-Ordered Approximation Bounds Are TightResearch Paper

Motivation

A retailer or an airline chooses which products to offer, and customers choose among what is offered, or buy nothing. Choosing the offer set that maximizes expected revenue is the assortment problem, central to revenue management (Talluri and van Ryzin, 2004). It is NP-hard even for simple mixtures of logit models, so practice relies on heuristics. The most common one is the revenue-ordered assortments strategy: offer the products whose price is above a threshold, and pick the best threshold.

Berbeglia and Joret (arXiv:1606.01371) analyse this heuristic under every regular choice model, the broad class in which enlarging the offer set never raises the probability of choosing any given alternative, including not buying. They prove three approximation guarantees, then show that none of the three can be improved. This mission formalizes that last result, Theorem 3.4.

Timeline:

  • Talluri and van Ryzin (2004) showed that revenue-ordered assortments are optimal under the multinomial logit model.
  • Rusmevichientong, Shmoys, Tong and Topaloglu (2014) showed the problem NP-hard under a mixture of two logit models, and proved that revenue-ordered assortments earn at least OPT/(e(1+ln⁡(rk/r1)))\mathrm{OPT}/(e(1+\ln(r_k/r_1)))OPT/(e(1+ln(rk​/r1​))) under mixed logit.
  • Aouad, Farias, Levi and Segev (2018) proved an Ω(1/ln⁡(rk/r1))\Omega(1/\ln(r_k/r_1))Ω(1/ln(rk​/r1​)) guarantee under random utility models, and that the assortment problem there is NP-hard to approximate within Ω(1/n1−ϵ)\Omega(1/n^{1-\epsilon})Ω(1/n1−ϵ) and Ω(1/log⁡1−ϵ(rk/r1))\Omega(1/\log^{1-\epsilon}(r_k/r_1))Ω(1/log1−ϵ(rk​/r1​)).
  • Berbeglia and Joret (2016–2020, Algorithmica) proved the guarantees 1/k1/k1/k, 1/∑i(ri−ri−1)/ri≥1/(1+ln⁡(rk/r1))1/\sum_{i}(r_i-r_{i-1})/r_i\ge1/(1+\ln(r_k/r_1))1/∑i​(ri​−ri−1​)/ri​≥1/(1+ln(rk​/r1​)) and a purchase-probability bound under any regular model, and an instance on which all three, in their sum forms, are attained in the limit.

Setting

The products form a finite set C\mathcal CC. A system of choice probabilities gives, for every offer set S⊆CS\subseteq\mathcal CS⊆C and product xxx, the probability P(x,S)\mathcal P(x,S)P(x,S) that a customer buys xxx. The no-purchase probability is P(0,S)=1−∑x∈SP(x,S)\mathcal P(0,S)=1-\sum_{x\in S}\mathcal P(x,S)P(0,S)=1−∑x∈S​P(x,S). The model is regular if

  1. P(x,S)≥0\mathcal P(x,S)\ge0P(x,S)≥0 for x∈C∪{0}x\in\mathcal C\cup\{0\}x∈C∪{0};
  2. P(x,S)=0\mathcal P(x,S)=0P(x,S)=0 for x∉Sx\notin Sx∈/S;
  3. ∑x∈SP(x,S)≤1\sum_{x\in S}\mathcal P(x,S)\le1∑x∈S​P(x,S)≤1;
  4. P(x,S)≥P(x,S′)\mathcal P(x,S)\ge\mathcal P(x,S')P(x,S)≥P(x,S′) for S⊆S′S\subseteq S'S⊆S′ and every x∈S∪{0}x\in S\cup\{0\}x∈S∪{0}.

Each product has a revenue r(x)>0r(x)>0r(x)>0. Offering SSS earns rev(S)=∑x∈SP(x,S) r(x)\mathrm{rev}(S)=\sum_{x\in S}\mathcal P(x,S)\,r(x)rev(S)=∑x∈S​P(x,S)r(x), and OPT=max⁡S⊆Crev(S)\mathrm{OPT}=\max_{S\subseteq\mathcal C}\mathrm{rev}(S)OPT=maxS⊆C​rev(S).

Let r1<⋯<rkr_1<\dots<r_kr1​<⋯<rk​ be the distinct revenues, with r0:=0r_0:=0r0​:=0, and Si={x:r(x)≥ri}S_i=\{x: r(x)\ge r_i\}Si​={x:r(x)≥ri​}. The heuristic earns

RO=max⁡i∈[k]rev(Si).\mathrm{RO}=\max_{i\in[k]}\mathrm{rev}(S_i).RO=i∈[k]max​rev(Si​).

For an optimal S∗S^*S∗ let Ni=∑x∈S∗, r(x)≥riP(x,S∗)N_i=\sum_{x\in S^*,\,r(x)\ge r_i}\mathcal P(x,S^*)Ni​=∑x∈S∗,r(x)≥ri​​P(x,S∗), Nk+1=0N_{k+1}=0Nk+1​=0, and ℓ\ellℓ the largest index with Nℓ>0N_\ell>0Nℓ​>0. Section 3 of the paper proves

  • (A) OPT≤k⋅RO\mathrm{OPT}\le k\cdot\mathrm{RO}OPT≤k⋅RO (Theorem 3.1);
  • (B) OPT≤Dr⋅RO\mathrm{OPT}\le D_r\cdot\mathrm{RO}OPT≤Dr​⋅RO, with Dr=∑i=1kri−ri−1ri≤1+ln⁡(rk/r1)D_r=\sum_{i=1}^{k}\frac{r_i-r_{i-1}}{r_i}\le 1+\ln(r_k/r_1)Dr​=∑i=1k​ri​ri​−ri−1​​≤1+ln(rk​/r1​) (Theorem 3.2);
  • (C) OPT≤DN(S∗)⋅RO\mathrm{OPT}\le D_N(S^*)\cdot\mathrm{RO}OPT≤DN​(S∗)⋅RO, with DN(S∗)=∑i=1ℓNi−Ni+1Ni≤1+ln⁡(N1/Nℓ)D_N(S^*)=\sum_{i=1}^{\ell}\frac{N_i-N_{i+1}}{N_i}\le 1+\ln(N_1/N_\ell)DN​(S∗)=∑i=1ℓ​Ni​Ni​−Ni+1​​≤1+ln(N1​/Nℓ​) (Theorem 3.3).

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 3.4

For every k≥1k\ge1k≥1 and every δ>0\delta>0δ>0 there are a finite nonempty product set, a regular P\mathcal PP, revenues r>0r>0r>0 with exactly kkk distinct values, and an optimal S∗S^*S∗ with N1>0N_1>0N1​>0, such that

k⋅RO<(1+δ) OPT,Dr⋅RO<(1+δ) OPT,DN(S∗)⋅RO<(1+δ) OPT.k\cdot\mathrm{RO}<(1+\delta)\,\mathrm{OPT},\qquad D_r\cdot\mathrm{RO}<(1+\delta)\,\mathrm{OPT},\qquad D_N(S^*)\cdot\mathrm{RO}<(1+\delta)\,\mathrm{OPT}.k⋅RO<(1+δ)OPT,Dr​⋅RO<(1+δ)OPT,DN​(S∗)⋅RO<(1+δ)OPT.

So none of the bounds (A), (B), (C) stays true when multiplied by 1+δ1+\delta1+δ, for any number kkk of distinct revenues.

The tight instance (milestones)

The paper's witness has products (i,j)(i,j)(i,j) with i∈[k]i\in[k]i∈[k] and j∈[i]j\in[i]j∈[i]. Product (i,j)(i,j)(i,j) has revenue ε−j\varepsilon^{-j}ε−j, and P((i,j),S)=εi\mathcal P((i,j),S)=\varepsilon^iP((i,j),S)=εi when (i,j)∈S(i,j)\in S(i,j)∈S and (i,1),…,(i,j−1)∉S(i,1),\dots,(i,j-1)\notin S(i,1),…,(i,j−1)∈/S, and 000 otherwise, for 0<ε≤120<\varepsilon\le\tfrac120<ε≤21​. The milestones follow the proof on pp. 10–11:

  • the axiom (iii) bound;
  • (7);
  • (8);
  • (9);
  • regularity;
  • the distinct revenues ri=ε−ir_i=\varepsilon^{-i}ri​=ε−i;
  • RO=rev(C)<1/(1−ε)\mathrm{RO}=\mathrm{rev}(\mathcal C)<1/(1-\varepsilon)RO=rev(C)<1/(1−ε);
  • OPT=k\mathrm{OPT}=kOPT=k, attained by {(i,i)}\{(i,i)\}{(i,i)};
  • the limits OPT/RO→k\mathrm{OPT}/\mathrm{RO}\to kOPT/RO→k and Dr→kD_r\to kDr​→k;
  • Ni=εi+⋯+εkN_i=\varepsilon^i+\dots+\varepsilon^kNi​=εi+⋯+εk and DN→kD_N\to kDN​→k as ε→0+\varepsilon\to0^+ε→0+.

Significance

With Theorems 3.1–3.3, Theorem 3.4 closes the analysis: in terms of the parameters kkk, DrD_rDr​ and DND_NDN​, revenue-ordered assortments are understood exactly under regular choice. It complements the hardness results of Aouad et al., which already show that no efficient strategy can do much better than (A) and (B) in general; Theorem 3.4 shows that the analysis of this particular heuristic is exact. The instance is also a concrete regular choice model in which the optimal offer set is far from every nested one.

On the formal side, the mission produces a reusable formal definition of regular discrete choice models, revenue-ordered assortments and the three bound quantities. These are shared, under other sub-namespaces, with the companion missions on Theorems 3.2 and 3.3. The result is proved in the paper. As far as is known it has not been machine-checked anywhere; the remaining work is formalizing the paper's proof, including the steps it leaves to the reader.

Difficulty

The proof is a construction, and the paper verifies most of it in a sentence each. The work lies in those sentences:

  • the regularity of the instance at the no-purchase option, (9), which needs the row decomposition (8);
  • the claim that {(i,i)}\{(i,i)\}{(i,i)} is optimal among all 2k(k+1)/22^{k(k+1)/2}2k(k+1)/2 offer sets, asserted without proof;
  • the claim that the full set is the best threshold set;
  • the evaluation of DN(S∗)D_N(S^*)DN​(S∗), which needs ℓ=k\ell=kℓ=k.

The naive witness, one instance per bound, does not help: the goal asks for one instance with exactly kkk revenues on which all three bounds are nearly attained, for every kkk.

Formalization scope

  • Products are an arbitrary finite type C. The no-purchase option is not a product: P(0,S)\mathcal P(0,S)P(0,S) is the derived quantity noPurchase P S. Offer sets are Finset C.
  • IsRegular carries axioms (i)–(iv), with (i) and (iv) stated both for products and for the no-purchase option. Regularity at x=0x=0x=0 is essential: without it the guarantees fail.
  • OPT\mathrm{OPT}OPT is Finset.sup' over all subsets, including ∅\emptyset∅. RO\mathrm{RO}RO is Finset.sup' over the kkk threshold sets only, and needs Nonempty C.
  • The distinct revenues are the sorted image of r, indexed by Fin k from 000: the Lean index iii is the paper's i+1i+1i+1, and r0=0r_0=0r0​=0 is a separate case. ℓ\ellℓ lives in WithBot (Fin k).
  • Bounds are multiplicative (OPT≤D⋅RO\mathrm{OPT}\le D\cdot\mathrm{RO}OPT≤D⋅RO); there is no ratio RO/OPT\mathrm{RO}/\mathrm{OPT}RO/OPT in the goal. Limits are along 𝓝[>] 0.
  • The tight instance keeps the paper's 1-based pairs (i,j)(i,j)(i,j) as a subtype of Fin (k+1) × Fin (k+1). Its regularity is a theorem to prove, never a field assumed.

Ruled out:

  • a fixed kkk, since "for every kkk" is the content;
  • tightness of the logarithmic forms 1/(1+ln⁡(rk/r1))1/(1+\ln(r_k/r_1))1/(1+ln(rk​/r1​)) and 1/(1+ln⁡ν)1/(1+\ln\nu)1/(1+lnν), which this instance does not show (there 1+ln⁡(rk/r1)→∞1+\ln(r_k/r_1)\to\infty1+ln(rk​/r1​)→∞ while OPT/RO→k\mathrm{OPT}/\mathrm{RO}\to kOPT/RO→k), so only the sum forms are claimed tight;
  • an instance whose regularity is assumed;
  • a heuristic maximizing over all subsets.

Contributions welcome: proofs of the milestones, especially (8), (9) and the optimality of {(i,i)}\{(i,i)\}{(i,i)}, and general lemmas on sorted distinct values of a finite function.

Selected references

  • G. Berbeglia and G. Joret, Assortment Optimisation Under a General Discrete Choice Model: A Tight Analysis of Revenue-Ordered Assortments, arXiv:1606.01371v3, 2019; published in Algorithmica, 2020. https://arxiv.org/abs/1606.01371
  • K. Talluri and G. van Ryzin, Revenue Management Under a General Discrete Choice Model of Consumer Behavior, Management Science 50(1), 2004. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.1030.0147
  • P. Rusmevichientong, D. Shmoys, C. Tong and H. Topaloglu, Assortment Optimization under the Multinomial Logit Model with Random Choice Parameters, Production and Operations Management 23(11), 2014. https://doi.org/10.1111/poms.12191
  • A. Aouad, V. Farias, R. Levi and D. Segev, The Approximability of Assortment Optimization Under Ranking Preferences, Operations Research 66(6), 2018. https://doi.org/10.1287/opre.2018.1724
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Operations ResearchOptimizationTheoretical Computer Science·Captain: mikedeng1

Assortment Optimisation Under a General Discrete Choice Model: A Tight Analysis of Revenue-Ordered Assortments II: Revenue-Ordered Assortments Earn OPT/(1 + ln ν), ν the Optimum's Purchase RatioResearch Paper

Motivation

A retailer that can display only some of its products must choose an assortment: the set of products offered to an arriving customer. Customers substitute: whether a given product is bought depends on what else is on the shelf. The assortment problem asks for the offer set that maximises expected revenue under a model of this substitution behaviour. It is a core problem of revenue management (Talluri and van Ryzin, Management Science 2004), and it is NP-hard already for a mixture of two multinomial logit models (Rusmevichientong, Shmoys, Tong and Topaloglu, POMS 2014).

The heuristic used most widely in practice is revenue-ordered assortments: sort the products by price and offer, for some threshold, every product priced at least that threshold. It is optimal under the multinomial logit model (Talluri and van Ryzin 2004) but not in general. Berbeglia and Joret (arXiv:1606.01371v3, 2019; Algorithmica 2020) give a tight analysis of its approximation ratio for every regular discrete choice model, a class that includes all random utility models. They prove three incomparable guarantees. This mission formalizes the third, Theorem 3.3, whose ratio depends on the purchase behaviour of an optimal assortment rather than on the prices. Companion missions in this series cover the price-ratio bound (Theorem 3.2) and the tightness of all three bounds (Theorem 3.4).

Setting

Let C\mathcal CC be a finite nonempty set of products. A system of choice probabilities gives, for every offer set S⊆CS\subseteq\mathcal CS⊆C and product xxx, the probability P(x,S)\mathcal P(x,S)P(x,S) that a customer offered SSS buys xxx. Buying nothing is the option 000, with P(0,S)=1−∑x∈SP(x,S)\mathcal P(0,S)=1-\sum_{x\in S}\mathcal P(x,S)P(0,S)=1−∑x∈S​P(x,S). The model is regular when

  1. P(x,S)≥0\mathcal P(x,S)\ge0P(x,S)≥0 for products and for x=0x=0x=0;
  2. P(x,S)=0\mathcal P(x,S)=0P(x,S)=0 for x∉Sx\notin Sx∈/S;
  3. ∑x∈SP(x,S)≤1\sum_{x\in S}\mathcal P(x,S)\le1∑x∈S​P(x,S)≤1;
  4. P(x,S)≥P(x,S′)\mathcal P(x,S)\ge\mathcal P(x,S')P(x,S)≥P(x,S′) whenever S⊆S′S\subseteq S'S⊆S′ and x∈S∪{0}x\in S\cup\{0\}x∈S∪{0}.

Axiom 4 at x=0x=0x=0 says that enlarging the offer set never makes buying nothing more likely.

Prices are a function r:C→R>0r:\mathcal C\to\mathbb R_{>0}r:C→R>0​. Offering SSS earns rev(S)=∑x∈SP(x,S) r(x)\mathrm{rev}(S)=\sum_{x\in S}\mathcal P(x,S)\,r(x)rev(S)=∑x∈S​P(x,S)r(x), and OPT=max⁡S⊆Crev(S)\mathrm{OPT}=\max_{S\subseteq\mathcal C}\mathrm{rev}(S)OPT=maxS⊆C​rev(S). Let r1<⋯<rkr_1<\dots<r_kr1​<⋯<rk​ be the distinct values of rrr, and let Si={x:r(x)≥ri}S_i=\{x:r(x)\ge r_i\}Si​={x:r(x)≥ri​} for i∈[k]i\in[k]i∈[k]. The revenue-ordered strategy earns

RO=max⁡1≤i≤krev(Si).\mathrm{RO}=\max_{1\le i\le k}\mathrm{rev}(S_i).RO=1≤i≤kmax​rev(Si​).

For an assortment S∗S^*S∗, the purchase profile is

Ni=∑x∈S∗, r(x)≥riP(x,S∗)(i∈[k]),Nk+1:=0,N_i=\sum_{x\in S^*,\ r(x)\ge r_i}\mathcal P(x,S^*)\qquad(i\in[k]),\qquad N_{k+1}:=0,Ni​=x∈S∗, r(x)≥ri​∑​P(x,S∗)(i∈[k]),Nk+1​:=0,

the probability that a customer offered S∗S^*S∗ buys something priced at least rir_iri​. It is non-increasing in iii.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 3.3 (p. 9)

Let S∗S^*S∗ be optimal, rev(S∗)=OPT\mathrm{rev}(S^*)=\mathrm{OPT}rev(S∗)=OPT, suppose N1>0N_1>0N1​>0, and let ℓ∈[k]\ell\in[k]ℓ∈[k] be maximum with Nℓ>0N_\ell>0Nℓ​>0. Then

OPT≤(∑i=1ℓNi−Ni+1Ni)ROand∑i=1ℓNi−Ni+1Ni≤1+ln⁡ν,ν=N1Nℓ.\mathrm{OPT}\le\Big(\sum_{i=1}^{\ell}\frac{N_i-N_{i+1}}{N_i}\Big)\mathrm{RO} \qquad\text{and}\qquad \sum_{i=1}^{\ell}\frac{N_i-N_{i+1}}{N_i}\le1+\ln\nu,\quad\nu=\frac{N_1}{N_\ell}.OPT≤(i=1∑ℓ​Ni​Ni​−Ni+1​​)ROandi=1∑ℓ​Ni​Ni​−Ni+1​​≤1+lnν,ν=Nℓ​N1​​.

The first inequality is the paper's sum-form factor, the bound that Theorem 3.4 shows to be tight. The second is the closed form 1/(1+ln⁡ν)1/(1+\ln\nu)1/(1+lnν).

Milestones (in proof order)

  • Lemma 2.1 (p. 6): ∑x∈SP(x,S)≤∑x∈S′P(x,S′)\sum_{x\in S}\mathcal P(x,S)\le\sum_{x\in S'}\mathcal P(x,S')∑x∈S​P(x,S)≤∑x∈S′​P(x,S′) for S⊆S′S\subseteq S'S⊆S′.
  • First observation of the proof (p. 9): Ni≤∑x∈SiP(x,Si)N_i\le\sum_{x\in S_i}\mathcal P(x,S_i)Ni​≤∑x∈Si​​P(x,Si​) and Niri≤∑x∈SiP(x,Si)riN_ir_i\le\sum_{x\in S_i}\mathcal P(x,S_i)r_iNi​ri​≤∑x∈Si​​P(x,Si​)ri​.
  • Inequality (6) (p. 9): Niri≤RON_ir_i\le\mathrm{RO}Ni​ri​≤RO for every i∈[k]i\in[k]i∈[k].
  • Revenue identity (p. 9): rev(S∗)=∑i=1ℓ(Ni−Ni+1)ri=∑i=1ℓNi−Ni+1NiNiri\mathrm{rev}(S^*)=\sum_{i=1}^{\ell}(N_i-N_{i+1})r_i=\sum_{i=1}^{\ell}\frac{N_i-N_{i+1}}{N_i}N_ir_irev(S∗)=∑i=1ℓ​(Ni​−Ni+1​)ri​=∑i=1ℓ​Ni​Ni​−Ni+1​​Ni​ri​.
  • Logarithmic step (p. 9, the comparison 1/∑≥1/(1+ln⁡ν)1/\sum\ge1/(1+\ln\nu)1/∑≥1/(1+lnν) in Theorem 3.3, used in the last inequality of the proof): for N1≥⋯≥Nℓ>0N_1\ge\dots\ge N_\ell>0N1​≥⋯≥Nℓ​>0 and Nℓ+1=0N_{\ell+1}=0Nℓ+1​=0, ∑i=1ℓ(Ni−Ni+1)/Ni≤1+ln⁡(N1/Nℓ)\sum_{i=1}^{\ell}(N_i-N_{i+1})/N_i\le1+\ln(N_1/N_\ell)∑i=1ℓ​(Ni​−Ni+1​)/Ni​≤1+ln(N1​/Nℓ​). The paper states this step without proof.

Significance

Theorem 3.3 gives a guarantee that is independent of prices. The bound 1+ln⁡(rk/r1)1+\ln(r_k/r_1)1+ln(rk​/r1​) of Theorem 3.2 grows when prices are spread out. The bound 1+ln⁡ν1+\ln\nu1+lnν is small whenever an optimal assortment sells its expensive products with probability comparable to its overall purchase probability. In §4 the paper combines it with a reduction from unit-demand pricing to derive, for example, the 1/(1+ln⁡m)1/(1+\ln m)1/(1+lnm) guarantee of uniform pricing for the unit-demand min-pricing problem (Corollary 4.8, originally due to Aggarwal et al.). Together with Theorems 3.1 and 3.2, it describes the performance of the most common assortment heuristic over the whole class of regular models, with no parametric assumption on customer behaviour.

The theorem is proved on paper. To our knowledge it has no machine-checked proof, and no regular choice model has been formalized on the platform. This mission produces the regular model as a reusable definition, a statement of Theorem 3.3 in which every hypothesis is explicit, and formal versions of the proof's identities and inequalities. The logarithmic step is asserted without proof in the source, so a formal proof of it completes the paper's argument.

Difficulty

Each step is elementary. The difficulty is bookkeeping. The revenue of S∗S^*S∗ has to be regrouped by distinct price levels rather than by products: several products may share a price, and kkk counts values. The regrouping uses an Abel-type rearrangement with the boundary convention Nk+1=0N_{k+1}=0Nk+1​=0. Comparing NiN_iNi​ with the purchase probability of SiS_iSi​ needs regularity twice. First, axiom 4 for products passes from S∗S^*S∗ to S∗∩SiS^*\cap S_iS∗∩Si​. Then the no-purchase case passes from S∗∩SiS^*\cap S_iS∗∩Si​ to SiS_iSi​. A proof that uses axiom 4 only for products fails at the second step, and the claim is false without it.

Formalization scope

  • Products form a finite type C with [Fintype C] [DecidableEq C]. The goal adds [Nonempty C], the paper's k≥1k\ge1k≥1. Offer sets are Finset C, and P\mathcal PP is P : C → Finset C → ℝ. The no-purchase option is not a product: P(0,S)\mathcal P(0,S)P(0,S) is the derived quantity noPurchase P S. IsRegular P carries axioms 1–4, including both no-purchase cases.
  • OPT\mathrm{OPT}OPT is Finset.sup' over all subsets. RO\mathrm{RO}RO is Finset.sup' over the indices 1,…,k1,\dots,k1,…,k of the threshold sets only.
  • Indices are 1-based natural numbers. level r i is rir_iri​ for 1≤i≤k1\le i\le k1≤i≤k. purchaseProfile P r S i is NiN_iNi​ for 1≤i≤k1\le i\le k1≤i≤k and 000 otherwise, which builds in Nk+1=0N_{k+1}=0Nk+1​=0.
  • Optimality is the hypothesis rev(S∗)=OPT\mathrm{rev}(S^*)=\mathrm{OPT}rev(S∗)=OPT. The index ℓ\ellℓ is a variable with hypotheses 1≤ℓ≤k1\le\ell\le k1≤ℓ≤k, Nℓ>0N_\ell>0Nℓ​>0, and Ni≯0N_i\not>0Ni​>0 for ℓ<i≤k\ell<i\le kℓ<i≤k. N1>0N_1>0N1​>0 is kept as in the paper.
  • The approximation factor is stated in product form, OPT≤D⋅RO\mathrm{OPT}\le D\cdot\mathrm{RO}OPT≤D⋅RO, never as a ratio. Both the sum form and the logarithmic form are stated. ln⁡\lnln is Real.log, applied to ν≥1\nu\ge1ν≥1.
  • The milestones other than the goal are stated for an arbitrary S∗S^*S∗, because the proof does not use optimality there.

The following statements are trivial or false and are not this mission: a maximum over all subsets in place of RO\mathrm{RO}RO; regularity without its no-purchase case; a purchase profile taken from a non-optimal set while rev(S∗)\mathrm{rev}(S^*)rev(S∗) is still called the optimum; the logarithmic form alone; a specific choice model (MNL, Markov chain) in place of an arbitrary regular P\mathcal PP.

A complete development needs finite sums regrouped by the values of a function and an elementary logarithm inequality. The regular choice model and the revenue-ordered sets are shared with the other missions of this series and are reusable for any analysis of assortment heuristics. Proofs of any milestone are welcome. So are alternative arguments for the logarithmic step and a proof that NNN is non-increasing.

Selected references

  • G. Berbeglia and G. Joret, Assortment Optimisation Under a General Discrete Choice Model: A Tight Analysis of Revenue-Ordered Assortments, arXiv:1606.01371v3, 2019; Algorithmica 82, 2020. https://arxiv.org/abs/1606.01371v3
  • K. Talluri and G. van Ryzin, Revenue Management Under a General Discrete Choice Model of Consumer Behavior, Management Science 50(1), 2004. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.1030.0147
  • P. Rusmevichientong, D. Shmoys, C. Tong and H. Topaloglu, Assortment Optimization under the Multinomial Logit Model with Random Choice Parameters, Production and Operations Management 23(11), 2014. https://doi.org/10.1111/poms.12191
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Machine LearningOptimizationReinforcement Learning·Captain: mikedeng1

On the Theory of Policy Gradient Methods: Optimality, Approximation, and Distribution Shift 3: Softmax Policy Gradient Ascent with Step Size η ≤ (1−γ)³/8 Converges to the Optimal ValuesResearch Paper

Motivation

Policy gradient methods optimize a parameterized policy of a Markov decision process by gradient ascent on its expected discounted return. They underlie much of modern reinforcement learning (REINFORCE, actor–critic methods, TRPO, PPO), yet the objective θ↦Vπθ(μ)\theta \mapsto V^{\pi_\theta}(\mu)θ↦Vπθ​(μ) is non-concave in the parameters, and until recently even the most basic question was open: does exact gradient ascent, run on a finite MDP with the standard softmax parameterization, reach the optimal values at all?

Agarwal, Kakade, Lee and Mahajan (arXiv:1908.00261v5, JMLR 22(98), 2021) answer this in the affirmative. Their Theorem 5.1 shows that unregularized softmax policy gradient with a small constant step size converges to the optimal value at every state, provided the start distribution used for the gradient puts positive mass on every state. The result is asymptotic: no rate is given. Later work (Mei, Xiao, Szepesvári and Schuurmans, ICML 2020, arXiv:2005.06392) obtained an O(1/t)O(1/t)O(1/t) rate with constants that can be exponentially large, and the same paper by Agarwal et al. gives polynomial rates once a log-barrier regularizer is added (its Corollary 5.1) or once the natural gradient is used (its Theorem 5.3). Theorem 5.1 is the unregularized baseline for all of these.

Setting

A finite MDP consists of finite sets S\mathcal SS of states and A\mathcal AA of actions (A\mathcal AA nonempty), a transition kernel P(s′∣s,a)P(s'\mid s,a)P(s′∣s,a), rewards r(s,a)∈[0,1]r(s,a)\in[0,1]r(s,a)∈[0,1] and a discount factor γ∈[0,1)\gamma\in[0,1)γ∈[0,1). A policy π\piπ assigns to each state a probability vector π(⋅∣s)\pi(\cdot\mid s)π(⋅∣s) on A\mathcal AA. Its value Vπ(s)V^\pi(s)Vπ(s) is the expected discounted sum of rewards E[∑t≥0γtr(st,at)∣s0=s]\mathbb E[\sum_{t\ge0}\gamma^t r(s_t,a_t)\mid s_0=s]E[∑t≥0​γtr(st​,at​)∣s0​=s] when actions are drawn from π\piπ; its state–action value is Qπ(s,a)=r(s,a)+γ∑s′P(s′∣s,a)Vπ(s′)Q^\pi(s,a)=r(s,a)+\gamma\sum_{s'}P(s'\mid s,a)V^\pi(s')Qπ(s,a)=r(s,a)+γ∑s′​P(s′∣s,a)Vπ(s′) and its advantage is Aπ(s,a)=Qπ(s,a)−Vπ(s)A^\pi(s,a)=Q^\pi(s,a)-V^\pi(s)Aπ(s,a)=Qπ(s,a)−Vπ(s). For a distribution μ\muμ on states, Vπ(μ)=∑sμ(s)Vπ(s)V^\pi(\mu)=\sum_s\mu(s)V^\pi(s)Vπ(μ)=∑s​μ(s)Vπ(s), and the discounted state visitation distribution is dμπ(s)=(1−γ)∑t≥0γtPr⁡π(st=s∣s0∼μ)d^\pi_\mu(s)=(1-\gamma)\sum_{t\ge0}\gamma^t\Pr^\pi(s_t=s\mid s_0\sim\mu)dμπ​(s)=(1−γ)∑t≥0​γtPrπ(st​=s∣s0​∼μ). A policy π⋆\pi^\starπ⋆ is optimal if Vπ(s)≤Vπ⋆(s)V^{\pi}(s)\le V^{\pi^\star}(s)Vπ(s)≤Vπ⋆(s) for every policy π\piπ and every state sss; V⋆=Vπ⋆V^\star=V^{\pi^\star}V⋆=Vπ⋆.

The softmax policy with parameters θ∈R∣S∣∣A∣\theta\in\mathbb R^{|\mathcal S||\mathcal A|}θ∈R∣S∣∣A∣ is

πθ(a∣s)=exp⁡(θs,a)∑a′∈Aexp⁡(θs,a′).\pi_\theta(a\mid s)=\frac{\exp(\theta_{s,a})}{\sum_{a'\in\mathcal A}\exp(\theta_{s,a'})}.πθ​(a∣s)=∑a′∈A​exp(θs,a′​)exp(θs,a​)​.

Softmax policy gradient ascent with step size η\etaη produces, from an arbitrary θ(0)\theta^{(0)}θ(0), the iterates

θ(t+1)=θ(t)+η ∇θV(t)(μ),V(t)=Vπθ(t).\theta^{(t+1)}=\theta^{(t)}+\eta\,\nabla_\theta V^{(t)}(\mu),\qquad V^{(t)}=V^{\pi_{\theta^{(t)}}} .θ(t+1)=θ(t)+η∇θ​V(t)(μ),V(t)=Vπθ(t)​.

The Lean development names these softmaxPolicy, softmaxValue P r γ µ θ =Vπθ(μ)=V^{\pi_\theta}(\mu)=Vπθ​(μ), and IsSoftmaxPGRun P r γ µ η θ for the update rule; PolicyValue, QFunction and IsOptimalPolicy are the published FoundationsML definitions, and valueAt, advantage and visitation are the series' shared layer.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 5.1

If μ(s)>0\mu(s)>0μ(s)>0 for every state and 0<η≤(1−γ)3/80<\eta\le(1-\gamma)^3/80<η≤(1−γ)3/8, then for every state sss

V(t)(s)⟶V⋆(s)(t→∞).V^{(t)}(s)\longrightarrow V^\star(s)\qquad(t\to\infty).V(t)(s)⟶V⋆(s)(t→∞).

Milestones (Appendices C.1 and D)

  1. Lemma C.1, the gradient formula ∂Vπθ(μ)/∂θs,a=11−γdμπθ(s)πθ(a∣s)Aπθ(s,a)\partial V^{\pi_\theta}(\mu)/\partial\theta_{s,a}=\frac1{1-\gamma}d^{\pi_\theta}_\mu(s)\pi_\theta(a\mid s)A^{\pi_\theta}(s,a)∂Vπθ​(μ)/∂θs,a​=1−γ1​dμπθ​​(s)πθ​(a∣s)Aπθ​(s,a).
  2. Lemma D.1, smoothness 5∥c∥∞5\|c\|_\infty5∥c∥∞​ of θs↦∑aπθ(a∣s)ca\theta_s\mapsto\sum_a\pi_\theta(a\mid s)c_aθs​↦∑a​πθ​(a∣s)ca​.
  3. Lemma D.4 at λ=0\lambda=0λ=0, smoothness 8/(1−γ)38/(1-\gamma)^38/(1−γ)3 of θ↦Vπθ(μ)\theta\mapsto V^{\pi_\theta}(\mu)θ↦Vπθ​(μ).
  4. Lemma C.2, pointwise monotone improvement of V(t)(s)V^{(t)}(s)V(t)(s) and Q(t)(s,a)Q^{(t)}(s,a)Q(t)(s,a) for η≤(1−γ)2/5\eta\le(1-\gamma)^2/5η≤(1−γ)2/5.
  5. Lemma C.3, existence of the limits V(∞)V^{(\infty)}V(∞), Q(∞)Q^{(\infty)}Q(∞) and the bound (40).
  6. Lemma C.4, eventual sign separation (41) of the advantages on I+s={a:Q(∞)(s,a)>V(∞)(s)}I^s_+=\{a:Q^{(\infty)}(s,a)>V^{(\infty)}(s)\}I+s​={a:Q(∞)(s,a)>V(∞)(s)} and I−s={a:Q(∞)(s,a)<V(∞)(s)}I^s_-=\{a:Q^{(\infty)}(s,a)<V^{(\infty)}(s)\}I−s​={a:Q(∞)(s,a)<V(∞)(s)}.
  7. Lemma C.5, vanishing gradients, π(t)(a∣s)→0\pi^{(t)}(a\mid s)\to0π(t)(a∣s)→0 off I0s={a:Q(∞)(s,a)=V(∞)(s)}I^s_0=\{a:Q^{(\infty)}(s,a)=V^{(\infty)}(s)\}I0s​={a:Q(∞)(s,a)=V(∞)(s)}, and ∑a∈I0sπ(t)(a∣s)→1\sum_{a\in I^s_0}\pi^{(t)}(a\mid s)\to1∑a∈I0s​​π(t)(a∣s)→1.
  8. Lemma C.6, eventual strict monotonicity of θs,a(t)\theta^{(t)}_{s,a}θs,a(t)​ on I±sI^s_\pmI±s​.
  9. Lemma C.7, divergence of max⁡a∈I0sθs,a(t)\max_{a\in I^s_0}\theta^{(t)}_{s,a}maxa∈I0s​​θs,a(t)​ and min⁡aθs,a(t)\min_a\theta^{(t)}_{s,a}mina​θs,a(t)​ when I+s≠∅I^s_+\neq\emptysetI+s​=∅.
  10. Lemma C.11, lower boundedness of θs,a(t)\theta^{(t)}_{s,a}θs,a(t)​ on I+sI^s_+I+s​ and θs,a(t)→−∞\theta^{(t)}_{s,a}\to-\inftyθs,a(t)​→−∞ on I−sI^s_-I−s​.

The goal states only convergence to the optimal values, with the paper's constants in the step-size bound; no rate is claimed.

Significance

The theorem establishes that the non-concavity of the softmax objective does not trap exact gradient ascent: from any initialization, the values of the iterates converge to V⋆V^\starV⋆ at every state, not only on average under μ\muμ. It is the reference point for the rate results of the same paper (log-barrier regularization, natural policy gradient) and for the subsequent literature on softmax policy gradient rates and lower bounds. It also isolates the role of exploration in the start distribution: Remark 5.1 of the paper leaves open whether μ>0\mu>0μ>0 can be dropped.

The result is proved in the paper; to the knowledge of the mission authors none of it is formalized in Lean or any other proof assistant. A complete development would provide a machine-checked gradient formula for the softmax class, smoothness bounds for discounted values, and a monotone-improvement argument for policy gradient, each reusable for other parameterizations and other policy optimization methods.

Difficulty

The obvious route fails. The gradient domination property of the direct parameterization (Lemma 4.1 of the paper) would conclude from ∇πVπ(μ)→0\nabla_\pi V^\pi(\mu)\to0∇π​Vπ(μ)→0, but under softmax ∂V/∂θs,a=πθ(a∣s) ∂V/∂πθ(a∣s)\partial V/\partial\theta_{s,a}=\pi_\theta(a\mid s)\,\partial V/\partial\pi_\theta(a\mid s)∂V/∂θs,a​=πθ​(a∣s)∂V/∂πθ​(a∣s), so a vanishing θ\thetaθ-gradient says nothing once some action probabilities vanish, and the iterates do drive probabilities to zero while parameters diverge. A smoothness-based argument therefore gives only stationarity in the limit. The asymptotic analysis must instead track which actions keep positive limiting advantage, how the individual parameters θs,a(t)\theta^{(t)}_{s,a}θs,a(t)​ move once the advantage signs are frozen, and why an action with strictly positive limiting advantage cannot coexist with the behaviour of the remaining parameters. Lemmas C.7–C.12 carry that bookkeeping; the limiting sets I0s,I±sI^s_0, I^s_\pmI0s​,I±s​ and the existence of the limits are themselves consequences of the pointwise monotone improvement of Lemma C.2, which needs its own smoothness bound.

Formalization scope

Standing setting of §3: finite types S, A with decidable equality, A nonempty; IsFiniteMDP P r γ (a transition kernel, rewards in [0,1][0,1][0,1], 0≤γ<10\le\gamma<10≤γ<1); IsDist µ. Parameters live in EuclideanSpace ℝ (S × A), so norms are ℓ2\ell_2ℓ2​ and Mathlib's gradient is ∇θ\nabla_\theta∇θ​; the coordinate (s,a)(s,a)(s,a) of the gradient is ∂/∂θs,a\partial/\partial\theta_{s,a}∂/∂θs,a​. Logarithms do not appear. Conventions committed to:

  • V⋆(s)V^\star(s)V⋆(s) is PolicyValue πstar P r γ s for a policy πstar with IsOptimalPolicy πstar P r γ, optimal simultaneously at every state; it is not a real supremum over all functions.
  • The step size satisfies 0<η0<\eta0<η, which "gradient ascent" presupposes and the page does not write; at η=0\eta=0η=0 the theorem is false.
  • μ(s)>0\mu(s)>0μ(s)>0 for every sss is a hypothesis of the goal and of Lemmas C.5–C.11; Lemmas C.1–C.4 are stated without it, and Lemma C.1 for an arbitrary real weighting μ\muμ.
  • In Lemmas C.4–C.11 the limits V(∞)V^{(\infty)}V(∞), Q(∞)Q^{(\infty)}Q(∞) are parameters with the hypotheses that they are the limits of V(t)V^{(t)}V(t), Q(t)Q^{(t)}Q(t). The paper's Δ=min⁡A(∞)(s,a)≠0∣A(∞)(s,a)∣\Delta=\min_{A^{(\infty)}(s,a)\neq0}|A^{(\infty)}(s,a)|Δ=minA(∞)(s,a)=0​∣A(∞)(s,a)∣ is replaced by any Δ>0\Delta>0Δ>0 bounded by every nonzero ∣A(∞)(s,a)∣|A^{(\infty)}(s,a)|∣A(∞)(s,a)∣, which avoids an undefined minimum over an empty set.
  • "→±∞\to\pm\infty→±∞" is Tendsto … atTop atTop / atBot; "strictly increasing for t≥T1t\ge T_1t≥T1​" is StrictMonoOn on Set.Ici T1, with T1T_1T1​ existentially quantified.

The goal theorem does not assume the existence of limits, monotonicity of the iterates, or anything about the sets I0s,I±sI^s_0, I^s_\pmI0s​,I±s​; a formalization that did would assume the substance of the proof. Lemmas C.7 and C.11 (first part) carry the hypothesis I+s≠∅I^s_+\neq\emptysetI+s​=∅ of the paper's proof by contradiction, which no actual run satisfies once Theorem 5.1 is proved; they are steps of that argument.

A full development needs: differentiability of θ↦Vπθ\theta\mapsto V^{\pi_\theta}θ↦Vπθ​ and the policy gradient theorem in the occupancy-measure form, the performance difference lemma, the descent lemma for LLL-smooth functions, and Hessian bounds for the softmax map. Contributions to any of these, to the optional Lemmas C.8–C.10 and C.12 of the paper, or to the final contradiction argument are welcome.

Selected references

  • A. Agarwal, S. M. Kakade, J. D. Lee, G. Mahajan, On the Theory of Policy Gradient Methods: Optimality, Approximation, and Distribution Shift, JMLR 22(98), 2021; arXiv:1908.00261v5. https://arxiv.org/abs/1908.00261
  • J. Mei, C. Xiao, C. Szepesvári, D. Schuurmans, On the Global Convergence Rates of Softmax Policy Gradient Methods, ICML 2020. https://arxiv.org/abs/2005.06392
  • S. Kakade, J. Langford, Approximately Optimal Approximate Reinforcement Learning, ICML 2002. https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.5555/645531.656005
  • R. S. Sutton, D. McAllester, S. Singh, Y. Mansour, Policy Gradient Methods for Reinforcement Learning with Function Approximation, NeurIPS 1999. https://papers.nips.cc/paper/1713-policy-gradient-methods-for-reinforcement-learning-with-function-approximation
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Formal VerificationTheoretical Computer Science·Captain: mikedeng1

Consensus in the Presence of Partial Synchrony II: With Synchronous Processors, Partially Synchronous Communication and t Fail-Stop Faults, No Consensus Protocol Exists When 2 ≤ N ≤ 2tResearch Paper

Motivation

Consensus asks NNN processors, each holding an initial value, to agree on one value despite some of them failing. It underlies replicated databases, atomic commit and state-machine replication. Its solvability depends on the timing assumptions. With fully synchronous processors and communication, ttt fail-stop faults can be tolerated for any t<Nt < Nt<N. With fully asynchronous communication, Fischer, Lynch and Paterson showed that no deterministic protocol tolerates even one fail-stop fault (JACM 1985).

Dwork, Lynch and Stockmeyer (JACM 1988) introduced partial synchrony, a model between these two extremes. Message delays have an upper bound Δ\DeltaΔ, but either the bound is unknown to the protocol, or it holds only from an unknown time on. For each fault type they found the exact number of faults that can be tolerated. This mission formalizes the lower bound for fail-stop faults: when the processors are synchronous and communication is partially synchronous, no consensus protocol tolerates ttt faults once N≤2tN \le 2tN≤2t.

Timeline. 1985: Fischer, Lynch, Paterson, impossibility of consensus with one fail-stop fault under asynchrony. 1987: Dolev, Dwork, Stockmeyer, which combinations of synchrony assumptions admit consensus (JACM 1987). 1988: Dwork, Lynch, Stockmeyer, partial synchrony, with matching upper and lower bounds on resiliency for fail-stop, omission, authenticated Byzantine and Byzantine faults. The global stabilization time of the 1988 paper became a common liveness assumption for later fault-tolerant agreement protocols.

Setting

There are NNN processors p1,…,pNp_1, \dots, p_Np1​,…,pN​. Each processor holds an initial value vi∈{0,1}v_i \in \{0, 1\}vi​∈{0,1}. Each runs a deterministic protocol: a transition diagram over a possibly infinite set of states. In each state the next instruction is either Send(m,pj)\mathrm{Send}(m, p_j)Send(m,pj​), which puts message mmm in pjp_jpj​'s buffer, or Receive(pi)\mathrm{Receive}(p_i)Receive(pi​), which removes a set SSS of messages from pip_ipi​'s buffer and delivers it. The next state depends on the current state and, for a Receive, on SSS. A step never both sends and receives. Each state may record a decision, and the first decision a processor records is final.

Real time is the ticks 1,2,3,…1, 2, 3, \dots1,2,3,…. A run fixes the initial values and, at each tick, which processors take a step and which messages each Receive delivers. A message is delivered only after the tick at which it was sent, only to its addressee, and at most once.

  • Synchronous processors (Φ=1\Phi = 1Φ=1): every correct processor takes a step at every tick.
  • Fail-stop faults: a faulty processor follows the protocol until it stops, and it never restarts. A processor that stops at time 000 is initially dead.
  • Δ\DeltaΔ holds in [T,∞)[T, \infty)[T,∞): a message sent at a tick s1≥Ts_1 \ge Ts1​≥T is delivered no later than any Receive of its addressee at a tick s2≥s1+Δs_2 \ge s_1 + \Deltas2​≥s1​+Δ.
  • Delta holds eventually: Δ\DeltaΔ is a fixed positive integer known to the protocol. In every run, Δ\DeltaΔ holds in [T,∞)[T, \infty)[T,∞) for some unknown global stabilization time TTT. Messages sent before TTT may be delayed arbitrarily or lost.
  • Delta is unknown: the protocol is fixed first. In every run, some positive Δ\DeltaΔ holds in [1,∞)[1, \infty)[1,∞).

A protocol is a ttt-resilient consensus protocol achieving weak unanimity if the following holds for every set CCC of at least N−tN - tN−t processors and every allowed run in which the processors of CCC are correct and the others fail-stop. No two processors of CCC decide differently (consistency). Every processor of CCC decides (termination). If all initial values are vvv and no processor is faulty, every decision is vvv (weak unanimity).

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 4.3

For integers t≤Nt \le Nt≤N with

2≤N≤2t,2 \le N \le 2t,2≤N≤2t,

there is no ttt-resilient consensus protocol achieving weak unanimity for binary values with fail-stop faults and synchronous processors. This holds for every positive Δ\DeltaΔ when Δ\DeltaΔ holds eventually, and when delta is unknown.

Milestones: the three scenarios of the proof

Split the processors into groups PPP and QQQ with 1≤∣P∣,∣Q∣≤t1 \le |P|, |Q| \le t1≤∣P∣,∣Q∣≤t.

  • Scenario A: all inputs 000 and QQQ initially dead. The processors of PPP decide by some time TAT_ATA​, and they decide 000.
  • Scenario B: all inputs 111 and PPP initially dead. The processors of QQQ decide 111 by some time TBT_BTB​.
  • Scenario C: all processors alive, PPP starting with 000 and QQQ with 111, and messages between the groups held back past a time TTT. Up to time TTT, every processor of PPP is in the same state as in Scenario A, and every processor of QQQ in the same state as in Scenario B.

Significance

The result. Theorem 4.3 shows that the resiliency N≥2t+1N \ge 2t + 1N≥2t+1 of the paper's fail-stop and omission protocols (Theorems 4.1 and 4.2) is optimal. It holds even under three restrictions: binary values, weak unanimity, and processors in perfect lock-step. Partial synchrony costs a majority of correct processors, whereas full synchrony costs nothing. The same scenarios give the authenticated Byzantine bound N≥3t+1N \ge 3t + 1N≥3t+1 (Theorem 4.4). The halting remark of Section 4.2 rests on an argument of the same kind.

The formalization. The theorem is proved in the paper, and its proof is short. It is not machine-checked anywhere known to the mission. No message-passing model is on the platform. This mission supplies one: a step-level model with buffers, per-message timing, fail-stop faults and both partially synchronous communication models. It also gives a machine-checked impossibility on top of that model. FLP, Theorem 4.4 and the lower bounds of Section 6 are natural follow-ups on the same definitions.

Difficulty

The informal proof is an indistinguishability argument. Making it formal means comparing different runs of the same deterministic protocol. Two points need care.

First, the scenarios must be allowed runs. Scenario C holds messages between the groups back past max⁡(TA,TB)\max(T_A, T_B)max(TA​,TB​). With delta unknown, this needs a Δ\DeltaΔ larger than that delay. When Δ\DeltaΔ holds eventually, Δ\DeltaΔ is fixed before the protocol, and the protocol fixes TAT_ATA​ and TBT_BTB​. So the delay is legal only for messages sent before the global stabilization time, which must therefore be placed after max⁡(TA,TB)\max(T_A, T_B)max(TA​,TB​). Read literally, "every message between the groups takes more than max⁡(TA,TB)\max(T_A, T_B)max(TA​,TB​) steps" is not an allowed run in this model.

Second, "the processors of PPP act exactly as they do in Scenario A" is a claim about whole runs. Two runs must agree on states, on which messages are in which buffer, and on when each message is delivered, tick by tick up to TTT. With one-to-one sends and atomic steps, "delivered in exactly time 1" also needs a reading: a processor that sends at the next tick cannot receive at that tick.

Formalization scope

All declarations live in the namespace DLSConsensus.LowerBound. Processor pip_ipi​ is the index i−1i - 1i−1 of Fin N. Values are Bool. The protocol's state type and message type are arbitrary types in Type, finite or infinite. R.state i n is the state after tick nnn. A message instance is identified in the run by its sender and send tick. A Receive hands the protocol each delivered message as (sender, content); the absolute send tick is not exposed.

Explicit readings and conventions:

  • "Fail-stop or omission faults": the goal is the fail-stop impossibility. It implies the omission case, because a fail-stop processor looks to the others like one whose sends are all omitted. The omission case is not a separate item.
  • A fail-stop processor may skip ticks before its final stop. The processor timing bound Φ=1\Phi = 1Φ=1 applies to correct processors.
  • "Decides": the first state that records a decision. Irreversibility therefore holds by definition.
  • "Delivered in exactly time 1": the message is delivered no later than the addressee's first Receive at least one tick after the send.
  • "Within time TAT_ATA​" and "for some finite TBT_BTB​": an explicit ∃\exists∃ before the decision bound.
  • "Messages between the groups take more than max⁡(TA,TB)\max(T_A, T_B)max(TA​,TB​) steps": no message between the groups is delivered at a tick ≤T\le T≤T, for any given TTT.
  • "Act exactly as they do": equal local states at every tick n≤Tn \le Tn≤T.
  • Quantifier order: when Δ\DeltaΔ holds eventually, Δ\DeltaΔ is chosen first, then the protocol, then the run with its stabilization time. When delta is unknown, the protocol is chosen first and each run carries its own Δ\DeltaΔ. In both models Δ>0\Delta > 0Δ>0.

Trivializing formalizations are ruled out. The model has allowed runs for every protocol, so Resilient is never vacuously true. Correct processors step at every tick, so termination does not fail for the wrong reason. Unanimity is the weak form, applied only when no processor is faulty.

Contributions welcome: a general simulation lemma (equal inputs up to a tick give equal states up to that tick), the construction of runs from a delivery schedule, and proofs of the scenarios. These parts are reusable for the other lower bounds of the paper.

Selected references

  • C. Dwork, N. Lynch, L. Stockmeyer, Consensus in the presence of partial synchrony, Journal of the ACM 35(2), 1988, 288–323. https://doi.org/10.1145/42282.42283
  • M. J. Fischer, N. A. Lynch, M. S. Paterson, Impossibility of distributed consensus with one faulty process, Journal of the ACM 32(2), 1985, 374–382. https://doi.org/10.1145/3149.214121
  • D. Dolev, C. Dwork, L. Stockmeyer, On the minimal synchronism needed for distributed consensus, Journal of the ACM 34(1), 1987, 77–97. https://doi.org/10.1145/7531.7533
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Diameter of Polyhedra: Limits of Abstraction 3: Larman's Bound 2^(d−1)·n Holds in the Base AbstractionResearch Paper

Motivation

The diameter of a polyhedron is the largest number of edges needed to travel between two vertices of its graph, its 1-skeleton. Whether this number is bounded by a polynomial in the dimension ddd and the number of facets nnn is a long-standing open question in polyhedral combinatorics; edge walks are the moves of vertex-following methods such as the simplex method, so the question bounds what any such method can achieve in the worst case. For fixed dimension, Larman proved in 1970 that the diameter grows at most linearly in nnn, with a constant exponential in ddd (Larman 1970).

Eisenbrand, Hähnle, Razborov and Rothvoß ask how much of the geometry of polyhedra such upper bounds actually use. They isolate a single combinatorial path property shared by the graphs of non-degenerate polyhedra and announce that the known upper bounds, Larman's among them, "continue to hold in the base abstraction" defined by that property (Dagstuhl abstract, p. 3). The next sentence of the abstract reads: "While the first bound is merely an adaption of the proof in [13], our proof of the second bound is much simpler than the one which was proved for polyhedra in [16]."

The held source is the five-page Dagstuhl extended abstract dated June 15, 2010, which states the results and proves none of them. The full proofs appear in Mathematics of Operations Research 35 (2010), 786–794 (journal article). The goal is an asserted theorem of the paper, not an open conjecture; the formal proof remains to be supplied.

Setting

Let [n]={1,…,n}[n]=\{1,\ldots,n\}[n]={1,…,n} and write ([n]d)\binom{[n]}{d}(d[n]​) for the family of its ddd-element subsets. A graph G=(V,E)G=(V,E)G=(V,E) in the base abstraction has a nonempty vertex set V⊆([n]d)V\subseteq\binom{[n]}{d}V⊆(d[n]​): every vertex is a ddd-element set of labels, and distinct vertices carry distinct sets. The edges are arbitrary subject to condition i): for each u,v∈Vu,v\in Vu,v∈V there exists a path connecting uuu and vvv whose intermediate vertices all contain u∩vu\cap vu∩v. Condition i) makes GGG connected. The class of all such graphs is Bd,n\mathcal B_{d,n}Bd,n​; ddd is called the dimension and nnn the number of facets of the abstraction, and D(d,n)D(d,n)D(d,n) denotes the largest diameter of a graph in Bd,n\mathcal B_{d,n}Bd,n​ (p. 2).

The distance dist⁡G(u,v)\operatorname{dist}_G(u,v)distG​(u,v) is the least number of edges of a path from uuu to vvv. The motivating example is the graph of a non-degenerate polyhedron (each vertex on exactly ddd facets), each vertex labelled by its ddd facets: two vertices are joined by a path inside the minimal face containing both, and every vertex of that path lies on the facets the two endpoints share (pp. 2–3). The class Bd,n\mathcal B_{d,n}Bd,n​ is not restricted to such graphs.

Formalization targets

Larman's bound in the base abstraction

The abstract prints the bound as Δu(d,n)≤2d−1⋅n\Delta_u(d,n)\le 2^{d-1}\cdot nΔu​(d,n)≤2d−1⋅n and states that it continues to hold in the base abstraction. The target is the pointwise form of D(d,n)≤2d−1 nD(d,n)\le 2^{d-1}\, nD(d,n)≤2d−1n:

∀d≥1, ∀n, ∀G∈Bd,n, ∀u,v∈V(G):dist⁡G(u,v)≤2d−1 n.\forall d\ge 1,\ \forall n,\ \forall G\in\mathcal B_{d,n},\ \forall u,v\in V(G):\qquad \operatorname{dist}_G(u,v)\le 2^{d-1}\, n .∀d≥1, ∀n, ∀G∈Bd,n​, ∀u,v∈V(G):distG​(u,v)≤2d−1n.

In Lean this is the existence, for every pair u,vu,vu,v, of a walk from uuu to vvv with at most 2d−1n2^{d-1}n2d−1n edges. The statement quantifies over every graph satisfying the paper's definition, not over polyhedron graphs or a chosen family.

Significance

For fixed ddd the bound is linear in nnn, and it holds for a class defined only by finite sets and one path condition. Together with the almost-quadratic lower bound D(n/4,n)=Ω(n2/log⁡n)D(n/4,n)=\Omega(n^2/\log n)D(n/4,n)=Ω(n2/logn) announced in the same paper, it shows what this one property of polyhedra can and cannot deliver: linear growth in nnn for fixed dimension, but not a linear bound uniform in ddd and nnn. Since the graph of every non-degenerate polyhedron lies in Bd,n\mathcal B_{d,n}Bd,n​ (a separate mission of this series), the result also recovers a Larman-type bound for polyhedra, with constant 2d−12^{d-1}2d−1.

Prove2Me already has proved polytope versions: Hirsch.larman_bound (the sharper constant n 2d−3n\,2^{d-3}n2d−3 for nonempty bounded HHH-polytopes), Hirsch.larman_high_dimension, Hirsch.larman_layer_recursion, and Hirsch.tight_row_interval, the polytope form of the interval property that condition i) abstracts. They concern a different object, the vertex-edge graph of an HHH-polytope, and are credited as prior work; none states the bound for every graph of Bd,n\mathcal B_{d,n}Bd,n​. The platform definition Hirsch_clf (connected layer families) is a related abstraction in layered form and is not the graph class used here.

Difficulty

The class contains graphs with no geometric realization, so a proof cannot use convexity, faces as polyhedra, or linear-algebraic facts about vertices; only labels, intersections and walks are available. Condition i) guarantees a path preserving the common labels of two endpoints, but says nothing directly about the length of that path. Mere connectivity on ddd-subsets of [n][n][n] gives only the trivial bound ∣V∣−1≤(nd)−1|V|-1\le\binom{n}{d}-1∣V∣−1≤(dn​)−1, which is far from linear in nnn. A linear bound in nnn has to be extracted from condition i) alone, uniformly over all graphs of the class. The abstract describes its proof only as much simpler than Larman's for polyhedra and states no intermediate lemma, so the mission carries no milestones.

Formalization scope

  • [n][n][n] is represented by Fin n, labels 0,…,n−10,\ldots,n-10,…,n−1; only the number of labels matters.
  • A vertex set is V : Finset (Finset (Fin n)) and the graph is G : SimpleGraph V; vertices are therefore distinct label sets, as in the paper. InB d n V G requires V.Nonempty, every vertex of cardinality ddd, and CondI V G.
  • CondI asks for a walk all of whose vertices contain u∩vu\cap vu∩v. This is the source's path condition: a walk contains a path on a subset of its vertices, and the endpoints contain u∩vu\cap vu∩v automatically.
  • "Continue to hold in the base abstraction" is read as the bound for every graph of Bd,n\mathcal B_{d,n}Bd,n​ and every pair of its vertices. No numeric D(d,n)D(d,n)D(d,n) is defined, so no supremum with a default value enters; a bounded walk witnesses the distance bound.
  • d≥1d\ge 1d≥1 is an explicit hypothesis: ddd is the dimension, and it makes d−1d-1d−1 ordinary subtraction in N\mathbb NN. At d=0d=0d=0 the class consists only of the one-vertex graph on ∅\emptyset∅, so nothing is lost. For n<dn<dn<d the class is empty.
  • The constant is 2d−12^{d-1}2d−1, the paper's constant for the abstraction; the polytope constant 2d−32^{d-3}2d−3 of Hirsch.larman_bound is not claimed here.

Trivializing formalizations are ruled out: labels are the vertices themselves (not an arbitrary labelling that could repeat), and condition i) is required for all pairs, not for one chosen path or only adjacent vertices. A proof only for polyhedron graphs, for graphs with extra structure, or with a larger constant leaves the goal open. Useful contributions include general lemmas about CondI and walk-length bookkeeping for SimpleGraph on a finite vertex type; these are reusable by the other missions of this series.

Selected references

  • F. Eisenbrand, N. Hähnle, A. Razborov, T. Rothvoß, Diameter of Polyhedra: Limits of Abstraction, Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings 10211 (Flexible Network Design), 2010. https://drops.dagstuhl.de/opus/volltexte/2010/2724
  • F. Eisenbrand, N. Hähnle, A. Razborov, T. Rothvoß, Diameter of Polyhedra: Limits of Abstraction, Mathematics of Operations Research 35(4), 786–794, 2010. https://doi.org/10.1287/moor.1100.0470
  • D. G. Larman, Paths on polytopes, Proceedings of the London Mathematical Society (3) 20, 161–178, 1970. https://doi.org/10.1112/plms/s3-20.1.161
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Diameter of Polyhedra: Limits of Abstraction 2: The Kalai–Kleitman Bound n^(1+log d) Holds in the Base AbstractionResearch Paper

Motivation

The diameter of a polyhedron is the largest number of edges needed to travel between two vertices of its graph. Bounding that number from the dimension and the number of facets is a central question in polyhedral combinatorics because edge walks are the discrete moves available to many vertex-based optimization methods. The Kalai–Kleitman bound gives a quasi-polynomial upper bound in these parameters. Eisenbrand, Hähnle, Razborov and Rothvoß ask how much of the geometry is needed to retain such a bound. They isolate one path property of polyhedron graphs and show that the upper bound persists for every graph satisfying it, including graphs that need not arise from a polyhedron (Dagstuhl abstract, pp. 1–3).

This mission concerns that extension of the Kalai–Kleitman bound. The held source is the five-page Dagstuhl extended abstract dated June 15, 2010. It states the result without its proof. The full proofs appeared in Mathematics of Operations Research 35 (2010), 786–794 (journal article). The goal is an asserted result of the paper, not an open conjecture; the formal proof remains to be supplied.

Setting

Let [n]={1,…,n}[n]=\{1,\ldots,n\}[n]={1,…,n}, and let ([n]d)\binom{[n]}{d}(d[n]​) be the family of its ddd-element subsets. A graph G=(V,E)G=(V,E)G=(V,E) in the paper's base abstraction has a nonempty vertex set V⊆([n]d)V\subseteq\binom{[n]}{d}V⊆(d[n]​). Thus each graph vertex is labelled by a distinct ddd-element subset. The edges can be chosen freely subject to condition i): for every pair u,v∈Vu,v\in Vu,v∈V, there is a path from uuu to vwhoseintermediateverticesallcontainv whose intermediate vertices all contain vwhoseintermediateverticesallcontainu\cap v.Theconditionimpliesthatthegraphisconnected.Thepaperdenotestheclassofthesegraphsby. The condition implies that the graph is connected. The paper denotes the class of these graphs by .Theconditionimpliesthatthegraphisconnected.Thepaperdenotestheclassofthesegraphsby\mathcal B_{d,n}andcallsand callsandcallsdthedimensionandthe dimension andthedimensionandn$ the number of facets of the abstraction (definition and footnote, p. 2).

The distance between two vertices is the minimum number of edges in a path between them. A graph's diameter is the largest of these distances, and D(d,n)D(d,n)D(d,n) is the largest diameter among graphs in Bd,n\mathcal B_{d,n}Bd,n​. Condition i) is motivated by non-degenerate polyhedra: if a vertex lies on exactly ddd facets, its tight facets provide a ddd-element label, and two vertices can be connected inside the smallest face containing them. Every vertex on that path retains the facets common to the endpoints (pp. 2–3). This motivation does not restrict GGG to a realizable polyhedron graph.

Formalization targets

Kalai–Kleitman bound in the base abstraction

For positive dimension, the target is the pointwise form of the paper's assertion that the upper bound continues to hold in the base abstraction:

∀d≥1, ∀n, ∀G∈Bd,n, ∀u,v∈V(G),dist⁡G(u,v)≤n1+log⁡2d.\forall d\geq 1,\ \forall n,\ \forall G\in\mathcal B_{d,n},\ \forall u,v\in V(G),\quad \operatorname{dist}_G(u,v)\leq n^{1+\log_2 d}.∀d≥1, ∀n, ∀G∈Bd,n​, ∀u,v∈V(G),distG​(u,v)≤n1+log2​d.

Equivalently, every pair has a connecting path with at most n1+log⁡2dn^{1+\log_2 d}n1+log2​d edges. Consequently D(d,n)≤n1+log⁡2dD(d,n)\leq n^{1+\log_2 d}D(d,n)≤n1+log2​d. The statement covers every graph with the paper's labels and condition i), rather than a selected realization or a graph with extra geometric properties. The source prints the inequality for Δu(d,n)\Delta_u(d,n)Δu​(d,n), its polyhedron-diameter notation, and says in the same sentence that it continues to hold for the base abstraction (p. 3).

Significance

The bound shows that a common-facet path property is enough to prevent arbitrarily large diameter once ddd and nnn are fixed. It extends an upper bound first attached to graphs of polyhedra to a class specified entirely by finite sets and graph paths. This locates a concrete portion of the polyhedral diameter theory within combinatorics. The same paper gives an almost-quadratic lower bound for the abstraction, so the path property alone does not imply a linear bound in nnn (p. 3).

A machine-checked proof would connect a precise finite graph model with the real-exponent inequality, without relying on a polyhedron representation. Prove2Me already has a proved theorem called Hirsch.kalai_kleitman_bound for a bounded HHH-polytope, with a different exponent log⁡2d+2\log_2 d+2log2​d+2, and a proved Hirsch.kalai_kleitman_recursion for that polytope model. It also has Hirsch.clf_endpoint_peeling for connected layer families. Those results concern different objects or bounds and are useful prior work, but none is a formalization of the present claim for all G∈Bd,nG\in\mathcal B_{d,n}G∈Bd,n​.

Difficulty

The class permits edges and vertex families with no geometric realization, so a proof cannot use metric or convexity properties of a particular polyhedron. Condition i) guarantees one path preserving the common labels of two endpoints; it does not directly bound that path's length. Connectivity by itself would be too weak: a connected graph on the allowed labels can have a long shortest path unless its labels and the path condition constrain it. The formal task is to obtain the claimed uniform length bound from that condition across all finite families of ddd-sets. The Dagstuhl abstract calls the argument an adaptation of Kalai and Kleitman's proof but states no intermediate lemmas, so this proposal does not assign any in-source milestones (p. 3).

Formalization scope

Lean represents [n][n][n] by Fin n, with labels 0,…,n−10,\ldots,n-10,…,n−1 instead of 1,…,n1,\ldots,n1,…,n; only the number of labels matters. A vertex set is a Finset of Finset (Fin n), and a SimpleGraph has exactly those sets as vertices. This representation enforces distinct labels. InB d n V G requires VVV to be nonempty, every label to have cardinality ddd, and CondI for every ordered pair. The walk in CondI is equivalent to the source's path: repeated vertices can be erased, and the endpoints themselves contain u∩vu\cap vu∩v. Nonemptiness and condition i) together give the source's connectedness. A path through all graph vertices without the common-intersection condition would be a weaker and inadmissible model.

The theorem takes d≥1d\geq1d≥1, so the logarithm has its ordinary positive-dimension interpretation. The source does not print a logarithm base; the statement reads it as base two, following the cited Kalai–Kleitman convention. This interpretation is explicit in the theorem's prose and is an open source-reading question. The exponent is real: the path length is cast from a natural number to R\mathbb RR for comparison with (n:R)1+log⁡2d(n:\mathbb R)^{1+\log_2 d}(n:R)1+log2​d. No floor is applied to the exponent. The theorem asserts a bounded walk for each pair; that avoids defining D(d,n)D(d,n)D(d,n) through a supremum with an artificial value for an empty class. At n=0n=0n=0 with d≥1d\geq1d≥1, InB has no instance, as there are no ddd-element labels; at d=1d=1d=1, the bound is nnn, consistent with a connected graph on at most nnn labels.

The development needs reusable finite-set reasoning about common intersections, graph walks and their lengths, and real-logarithm bounds. Contributions establishing those facts for the paper's CondI model are within scope. A proof only for polyhedron graphs, for graphs with extra edge restrictions, or for a single chosen graph would leave the goal open.

Selected references

  • F. Eisenbrand, N. Hähnle, A. Razborov and T. Rothvoß, Diameter of Polyhedra: Limits of Abstraction, Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings 10211, 2010. Extended abstract.
  • F. Eisenbrand, N. Hähnle, A. Razborov and T. Rothvoß, Diameter of Polyhedra: Limits of Abstraction, Mathematics of Operations Research 35, 786–794, 2010. DOI.
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Consensus in the Presence of Partial Synchrony I: For N ≥ 2t + 1, Algorithm 1 Achieves Consistency, Strong Unanimity and Termination in the Basic Round Model with Fail-Stop or Omission FaultsResearch Paper

Motivation

Consensus asks NNN processors, each starting with a value, to agree on one value although some of them may be faulty. It underlies replicated databases, atomic commitment and state-machine replication. Two classical models bracket the problem. In a fully synchronous system, with known bounds on message delay and processor speed, consensus is solvable for many fault types. In a fully asynchronous system, Fischer, Lynch and Paterson showed in 1985 that no deterministic protocol tolerates even one fail-stop fault (FLP, J. ACM 1985).

Dwork, Lynch and Stockmeyer (J. ACM 35(2), 1988, 288–323) introduced partial synchrony between these extremes: message delays are bounded, but either the bound is unknown, or it holds only from an unknown global stabilization time (GST) on. This model, and the GST abstraction in particular, became the standard assumption under which practical consensus protocols (Paxos-style and Byzantine fault-tolerant replication) are proved live. The paper determines, for each fault type, the largest number ttt of faults that consensus can tolerate under partial synchrony. This mission formalizes its first positive result: for fail-stop and omission faults, N≥2t+1N \ge 2t+1N≥2t+1 processors suffice.

Setting

There are NNN processors p1,…,pNp_1,\dots,p_Np1​,…,pN​, an integer t≤Nt \le Nt≤N, and an arbitrary set VVV of values; processor pip_ipi​ starts with init(pi)∈V\mathrm{init}(p_i)\in Vinit(pi​)∈V.

In the basic round model (Section 3.1 of the paper), computation proceeds in rounds r=1,2,3,…r = 1, 2, 3, \dotsr=1,2,3,…. In each round every processor sends messages, each message is either delivered in that round or lost, and every processor then performs a state transition on the messages it received. Losses are described by a predicate deliv(r,q,p)\mathrm{deliv}(r,q,p)deliv(r,q,p). A set CCC of processors (the correct ones) and a round GST\mathrm{GST}GST constrain it: every message sent at a round r≥GSTr \ge \mathrm{GST}r≥GST from a processor of CCC to a processor of CCC is delivered. Before GST any message may be lost, and messages from or to processors outside CCC may be lost at any time. Processors outside CCC follow the protocol but lose sends and receptions (omission faults, which include fail-stop faults).

Algorithm 1 (Section 3.2.1) works as follows. Every processor keeps a set PROPER\mathrm{PROPER}PROPER, initially {init(p)}\{\mathrm{init}(p)\}{init(p)}, attaches it to every message, and merges in every PROPER set it receives. A processor may hold locks, each a value with an associated phase number; vvv is acceptable to ppp if ppp has no lock on a value other than vvv. Phase k≥1k \ge 1k≥1 belongs to pip_ipi​ when k≡i(modN)k \equiv i \pmod Nk≡i(modN). Trying phase kkk occupies rounds 4k−34k-34k−3, 4k−24k-24k−2, 4k−14k-14k−1:

  1. every processor sends the owner the list of its acceptable values that are in its PROPER set; the owner proposes, by an arbitrary choice, a value appearing in at least N−tN-tN−t of the lists received, if there is one;
  2. the owner broadcasts (lock v,k)(\mathrm{lock}\ v, k)(lock v,k); each receiver locks vvv with phase kkk;
  3. each receiver acknowledges; with at least t+1t+1t+1 acknowledgements the owner decides vvv.

Lock-release phase kkk is round 4k4k4k: every processor broadcasts its locks (v,h)(v,h)(v,h), and a lock on vvv with phase hhh is released on receipt of some (w,h′)(w,h')(w,h′) with w≠vw \ne vw=v and h′≥hh' \ge hh′≥h.

The correctness conditions (Section 2.4) for the set CCC are consistency (no two decisions of processors in CCC differ), termination (every processor in CCC decides), and strong unanimity (if all NNN initial values equal vvv, every decision in CCC is vvv).

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 3.1

For all N,tN, tN,t with N≥2t+1N \ge 2t+1N≥2t+1, every value type VVV, all initial values, every CCC with ∣C∣≥N−t|C| \ge N-t∣C∣≥N−t, every GST\mathrm{GST}GST, every delivery pattern allowed for CCC and GST\mathrm{GST}GST, and every admissible choice of proposals,

Algorithm 1 achievesConsistency(C) ∧ StrongUnanimity(C) ∧ Termination(C).\text{Algorithm 1 achieves}\quad \text{Consistency}(C)\ \wedge\ \text{StrongUnanimity}(C)\ \wedge\ \text{Termination}(C).Algorithm 1 achievesConsistency(C) ∧ StrongUnanimity(C) ∧ Termination(C).

This is the theorem as printed; it fixes no constants.

Milestones

  • Lemma 3.1: no two distinct values acquire locks with the same associated phase.
  • Lemma 3.2: if vvv is decided at the first phase kkk at which any decision is made, then at least t+1t+1t+1 processors lock vvv at phase kkk, and each keeps, from then on, a lock on vvv with phase at least kkk.
  • Lemma 3.3: immediately after a lock-release round 4k≥GST4k \ge \mathrm{GST}4k≥GST, the processors of CCC together hold locks on at most one value.
  • Round bound (Section 3.2.1, p. 298): every processor of CCC decides at some phase kkk with
4k−1≤GST+4(N+1).4k-1 \le \mathrm{GST} + 4(N+1).4k−1≤GST+4(N+1).

Significance

Theorem 3.1 shows that, against omission and fail-stop faults, partially synchronous communication costs nothing in resilience compared with a majority bound: N≥2t+1N \ge 2t+1N≥2t+1 suffices, and Section 4 of the paper shows that N≤2tN \le 2tN≤2t does not. The lock-and-release structure of Algorithm 1 (a value is decided only after a quorum locks it, and locks are released only on evidence of a later competing lock) recurs in later partially synchronous protocols, where safety must hold regardless of timing and liveness is obtained only after stabilization. The result separates the two concerns cleanly: consistency and strong unanimity hold in every run, while termination uses GST.

The result is proved in the paper; to the best of the available information it has not been formalized in Lean, and no distributed-computing model exists on Prove2Me. The mission produces a machine-checked model of the basic round model with a GST delivery guarantee, a full executable specification of Algorithm 1, and proofs of its safety and liveness. The paper's own proof of Lemma 3.3 is one line and the termination argument relies on "sufficient communication"; a formal proof must make these steps explicit.

Difficulty

The safety argument is an invariant over an unbounded number of phases with an arbitrary loss pattern: a lock on the decided value must be shown never to be released without being replaced by a higher lock on the same value, while competing locks on other values may exist at faulty or slow processors. The obvious argument ("after a decision, every later proposal must equal the decided value") is circular without a persistence statement for locks such as Lemma 3.2. Liveness requires reasoning about what every correct processor knows after GST (its PROPER set and the locks of the others), and it depends on processors sending lock-release and list messages even when these carry no locks or no acceptable values. Quorum counting with N−tN-tN−t and t+1t+1t+1 must be carried out over distinct senders.

Formalization scope

  • Processors are Fin N; the paper's pip_ipi​ is the processor of index i−1i-1i−1. Rounds start at 111; exec … 0 is the initial state and exec … r the state after round rrr. Phases start at 111.
  • The paper's "chooses one arbitrarily" is a parameter pick : ℕ → Set V → V, required only to pick an element of every nonempty candidate set, and universally quantified in every theorem.
  • The paper's "the behavior of the processors not in CCC is allowed by the fault type FFF" is read as: processors outside CCC run Algorithm 1, and any message from or to them may be lost (omission faults, containing fail-stop).
  • The GST guarantee covers a processor's messages to itself when it is in CCC; before GST self-messages may be lost like any other.
  • Every processor sends its list in round 4k−34k-34k−3 and its lock-release message in round 4k4k4k even when they are empty, since both carry the PROPER set (Section 3.2: PROPER sets are piggybacked on all messages).
  • A decision is the event DecidesAt p k v (owner of phase kkk, proposed vvv, at least t+1t+1t+1 acknowledgements in round 4k−14k-14k−1); consistency requires all such events of processors in CCC to agree.
  • "Decide by round GST+4(N+1)\mathrm{GST}+4(N+1)GST+4(N+1)" is read as: the deciding phase kkk satisfies 4k−1≤GST+4(N+1)4k-1 \le \mathrm{GST}+4(N+1)4k−1≤GST+4(N+1).
  • Not formalized: Remark 1's asymptotic claims, the PROPER simplifications for weak unanimity, Algorithms 2 and 3.

A formalization in which a run cannot exist, the delivery constraint is unsatisfiable, the choice of proposals is fixed, or faulty processors are absent (CCC = all processors) would trivialize the theorem; the model here admits runs in which processors decide, and CCC ranges over all sets of at least N−tN-tN−t processors.

Reusable beyond this mission: the round-based message-passing model with a GST delivery guarantee and omission faults. Contributions of general lemmas about runs (monotonicity of PROPER sets, persistence of locks, quorum intersection over Finset) are welcome.

Selected references

  • C. Dwork, N. Lynch, L. Stockmeyer, Consensus in the presence of partial synchrony, Journal of the ACM 35(2), 1988, 288–323. https://doi.org/10.1145/42282.42283
  • M. J. Fischer, N. A. Lynch, M. S. Paterson, Impossibility of distributed consensus with one faulty process, Journal of the ACM 32(2), 1985, 374–382. https://doi.org/10.1145/3149.214121
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CombinatoricsLinear OptimizationOperations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

Solving Large-Scale Zero-One Linear Programming Problems: A Minimal Cover Inequality Cuts Off x̄ iff the Knapsack Problem (2.12) Has Optimal Value Less Than OneResearch Paper

Motivation

Large zero–one linear programs can contain constraints involving only a small fraction of their variables. Crowder, Johnson and Padberg study how to extract useful inequalities from one such row while solving the larger program. Their computational method identifies a violated inequality at a current linear programming solution, adds it, and resolves the relaxation. The mathematical question behind that step is whether a minimal cover inequality can be found by a separate optimization problem. The authors answer it in Section 2.3 of their 1983 paper, after developing cover and configuration inequalities in Section 2.2. Crowder, Johnson and Padberg (1983)

The target is a known result from that paper. It is a precise statement about a finite knapsack row and a point in the unit cube, independent of the paper's implementation and numerical experiments. The paper also discusses (1,k)(1,k)(1,k)-configurations and lifting, which turn the identified inequalities into valid cuts involving additional row variables. Those statements supply the mission's milestones and make the separation result useful in its original setting. Crowder, Johnson and Padberg (1983), Sections 2.2–2.4

Setting

Fix a finite index set KKK, positive rational coefficients aja_jaj​ for j∈Kj\in Kj∈K, and a rational right-hand side a0a_0a0​. A zero–one solution is a vector with each xj∈{0,1}x_j\in\{0,1\}xj​∈{0,1} satisfying the single row

∑j∈Kajxj≤a0.(2.5)\sum_{j\in K}a_jx_j\le a_0. \tag{2.5}j∈K∑​aj​xj​≤a0​.(2.5)

The model uses the support set x={j:xj=1}x=\{j:x_j=1\}x={j:xj​=1} for such a vector. A set S⊆KS\subseteq KS⊆K is a minimal cover when its total coefficient exceeds a0a_0a0​, but removing any one member makes the total at most a0a_0a0​:

∑j∈Saj>a0,∑j∈Saj−ak≤a0(k∈S).(2.6)\sum_{j\in S}a_j>a_0, \qquad \sum_{j\in S}a_j-a_k\le a_0\quad(k\in S). \tag{2.6}j∈S∑​aj​>a0​,j∈S∑​aj​−ak​≤a0​(k∈S).(2.6)

It yields the cover inequality ∑j∈Sxj≤∣S∣−1\sum_{j\in S}x_j\le |S|-1∑j∈S​xj​≤∣S∣−1 for every feasible zero–one vector. The right-hand side is interpreted as a real number, so the expression also has its usual meaning when SSS is empty.

A (1,k)(1,k)(1,k)-configuration consists of S∗⊆KS^*\subseteq KS∗⊆K, t∉S∗t\notin S^*t∈/S∗ and an integer 2≤k≤∣S∗∣2\le k\le |S^*|2≤k≤∣S∗∣. The set S∗S^*S∗ itself fits the row, while Q∪{t}Q\cup\{t\}Q∪{t} is a minimal cover for every kkk-element subset QQQ of S∗S^*S∗. For any k≤r≤∣S∗∣k\le r\le |S^*|k≤r≤∣S∗∣ and rrr-element T⊆S∗T\subseteq S^*T⊆S∗, its inequality is (r−k+1)xt+∑j∈Txj≤r(r-k+1)x_t+\sum_{j\in T}x_j\le r(r−k+1)xt​+∑j∈T​xj​≤r. Crowder, Johnson and Padberg (1983), pp. 810–811

For a point xˉ∈[0,1]K\bar x\in[0,1]^Kxˉ∈[0,1]K, the separation problem asks for a cover s⊆Ks\subseteq Ks⊆K minimizing ∑j∈s(1−xˉj)\sum_{j\in s}(1-\bar x_j)∑j∈s​(1−xˉj​), subject to the strict condition ∑j∈saj>a0\sum_{j\in s}a_j>a_0∑j∈s​aj​>a0​. This is problem (2.12). The set of attainable values is finite, but it is empty if the row has no cover. An optimal value zzz is therefore asserted only when a least attainable value exists.

Formalization targets

Cover separation

The goal is the paper's Section 2.3 equivalence:

(∃S⊆K minimal:∑j∈Sxˉj>∣S∣−1)⟺z<1,\left(\exists S\subseteq K\text{ minimal}: \sum_{j\in S}\bar x_j>|S|-1\right) \quad\Longleftrightarrow\quad z<1,​∃S⊆K minimal:j∈S∑​xˉj​>∣S∣−1​⟺z<1,

where zzz is the attained optimum of (2.12). A cover inequality cuts off xˉ\bar xxˉ precisely when its left-hand side exceeds ∣S∣−1|S|-1∣S∣−1. If there is no cover, (2.12) has no optimal value; the theorem does not assign it an artificial value. Crowder, Johnson and Padberg (1983), pp. 812–813

Valid inequalities and lifting

The milestones state the validity of (2.7) and every inequality in (2.9), the two assertions used in the separation equivalence, and the relaxed lifting claims of Section 2.4. For lifting, zkz_kzk​ is the maximum integer objective value in (2.10), zˉk\bar z_kzˉk​ is the maximum in its linear relaxation, and zk∗=⌊zˉk⌋z_k^*=\lfloor\bar z_k\rfloorzk∗​=⌊zˉk​⌋. The claims are zk≤zk∗z_k\le z_k^*zk​≤zk∗​ and validity after adding variable kkk with coefficient fk=f0−zk∗f_k=f_0-z_k^*fk​=f0​−zk∗​. They concern attained optima, as the paper's “maximum” language requires. Crowder, Johnson and Padberg (1983), pp. 811, 814

Significance

The equivalence turns a geometric question about which cover inequality excludes xˉ\bar xxˉ into a finite optimization test with a numerical threshold of one. It identifies when a minimal cover cut exists for a row, while the validity milestones certify that the inequalities can be added without removing zero–one feasible points. The lifting claims explain how an inequality first written on a subset of variables remains valid as further variables enter it. These are the mathematical guarantees used by the paper's cutting plane procedure. Crowder, Johnson and Padberg (1983), Sections 2.2–2.4

The paper proves the separation equivalence and states the surrounding validity claims. This mission records their exact statements in Lean; its theorem proofs remain open. A complete development would add machine-checked proofs for the finite cover argument, configuration inequalities, and lifting validity. The resulting definitions of feasible supports, attained optimization values and intermediate inequality validity can also be reused in other finite knapsack formalizations.

Difficulty

Checking all subsets of KKK directly grows rapidly with the row size. A separation result must relate a minimum over all covers to an inequality indexed by a minimal cover, while accounting for objective coefficients that may be zero when xˉj=1\bar x_j=1xˉj​=1. The same boundary matters for lifting: the zero–one maximum is compared with a continuous relaxation, and rounding is justified by the integer coefficients of the current inequality. If the lifting problem is infeasible, neither maximum exists. Crowder, Johnson and Padberg (1983), pp. 812–814

Formalization scope

Lean uses an arbitrary finite index type for KKK, replacing the paper's indices 1,…,n1,\ldots,n1,…,n. A zero–one vector is a finite support set. Row coefficients and a0a_0a0​ are rational, as on p. 810; the point xˉ\bar xxˉ and separation values are real. The target asks only that xˉ\bar xxˉ lie in the unit cube. Although the paper obtains it as an optimum of the full LP relaxation (2.11), that additional property is not used in the row-level equivalence. No sign condition is imposed on a0a_0a0​.

The strict knapsack condition in (2.12) is retained. “Chops off” means strict violation of (2.7). “Optimal value” means membership and leastness in the attainable value set; for lifting it means membership and greatestness. Thus rows with no cover or infeasible lifting subproblem do not acquire a default zero optimum. The size expressions ∣S∣−1|S|-1∣S∣−1 and r−k+1r-k+1r−k+1 are evaluated in the reals, so natural-number truncation cannot change them. Integer lifting coefficients and the floor of the relaxed optimum express the paper's “truncating to its integer part”; the feasible relaxed problem includes the zero vector, so this agrees with truncation toward zero there.

Validity during an intermediate lifting step ranges over feasible zero–one vectors supported in the current set SSS. After adding kkk, it ranges over support in S∪{k}S\cup\{k\}S∪{k}. The final inequality covers the whole row when that set is KKK. The development must preserve the full quantifier over every kkk-subset in (2.8) and every rrr and TTT in (2.9); restricting these would weaken the paper's claim. Contributions proving the named milestones, adding concrete examples, or developing general finite optimization lemmas are in scope. The facet assertions attributed to Padberg are outside the target. A related lifted-cover facet statement already appears on the platform as NemhauserWolsey.partitioned_cover_lifting_defines_facet; its conventions and claim differ from this mission's validity results.

Selected references

  • H. Crowder, E. L. Johnson and M. Padberg, Solving Large-Scale Zero-One Linear Programming Problems, Operations Research 31(5), 803–834, 1983. DOI: 10.1287/opre.31.5.803
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Convex OptimizationNumerical AnalysisOptimization·Captain: mikedeng1

Distributed Optimization and Statistical Learning via the Alternating Direction Method of Multipliers III: Parallel Projections — the Dual Average Vanishes and ADMM Reduces to Project-and-AverageTextbook

Motivation

Many feasibility problems ask for a point satisfying several constraints at once. When each constraint set admits a manageable Euclidean projection, a parallel method can project onto all sets independently and combine the results. Chapter 5 of Boyd, Parikh, Chu, Peleato and Eckstein (2011) places this construction inside the alternating direction method of multipliers (ADMM). That connection matters when a single projection onto the intersection is difficult but projections onto its individual factors are available.

The chapter first rewrites constrained convex optimization as a split problem. It then treats feasibility for two sets and finally an arbitrary finite collection of sets. For the latter, the product of the sets captures the separate constraints, while a consensus set forces all copies of the variable to agree. These are ordinary finite dimensional convex sets, so the account applies to geometric feasibility and to constrained optimization subproblems in which projection is the computational primitive. The mission isolates the identities that let the product-space algorithm run through parallel individual projections and one average.

Setting

A Euclidean projection of a vector vvv onto a set CCC is a point p∈Cp\in Cp∈C closest to vvv in Euclidean distance. Each set Ai⊆Rn\mathcal A_i\subseteq\mathbb R^nAi​⊆Rn, for i=1,…,Ni=1,\ldots,Ni=1,…,N, is assumed nonempty, closed and convex, and N≥1N\ge1N≥1. These properties give a unique projection for every input. They do not require the common intersection ⋂iAi\bigcap_i\mathcal A_i⋂i​Ai​ to be nonempty: the iteration and the algebraic identities still make sense when the feasibility problem has no solution.

A block vector x=(x1,…,xN)x=(x_1,\ldots,x_N)x=(x1​,…,xN​) belongs to the product set C=A1×⋯×AN\mathcal C=\mathcal A_1\times\cdots\times\mathcal A_NC=A1​×⋯×AN​ exactly when xi∈Aix_i\in\mathcal A_ixi​∈Ai​ for all iii. The consensus set D\mathcal DD consists of constant block vectors (z,…,z)(z,\ldots,z)(z,…,z). The block average is xˉ=N−1∑ixi\bar x=N^{-1}\sum_i x_ixˉ=N−1∑i​xi​. Distances in the stacked space use the ordinary Euclidean metric, whose square is ∑i∥xi−yi∥22\sum_i\|x_i-y_i\|_2^2∑i​∥xi​−yi​∥22​. A block vector need not carry a function-space norm in the formalization for this metric to be stated precisely.

Starting with arbitrary z0∈Rnz^0\in\mathbb R^nz0∈Rn and u0=(ui0)u^0=(u_i^0)u0=(ui0​), the parallel projection ADMM run has three updates: each xik+1x_i^{k+1}xik+1​ is the projection of zk−uikz^k-u_i^kzk−uik​ onto Ai\mathcal A_iAi​; zk+1z^{k+1}zk+1 is the average of xik+1+uikx_i^{k+1}+u_i^kxik+1​+uik​; and uik+1=uik+xik+1−zk+1u_i^{k+1}=u_i^k+x_i^{k+1}-z^{k+1}uik+1​=uik​+xik+1​−zk+1. The uiku_i^kuik​ are scaled dual variables, formed using a penalty parameter ρ>0\rho>0ρ>0. The source presents these equations as the specialization of scaled ADMM for the indicator functions of C\mathcal CC and D\mathcal DD §5.1.2, pp. 35–36.

Formalization targets

The first targets identify the projections that make the iteration parallel:

ΠC(x)=(ΠA1(x1),…,ΠAN(xN)),ΠD(x)=(xˉ,…,xˉ).\Pi_{\mathcal C}(x)=(\Pi_{\mathcal A_1}(x_1),\ldots,\Pi_{\mathcal A_N}(x_N)),\qquad \Pi_{\mathcal D}(x)=(\bar x,\ldots,\bar x).ΠC​(x)=(ΠA1​​(x1​),…,ΠAN​​(xN​)),ΠD​(x)=(xˉ,…,xˉ).

The goal is the full reduction of a run. Its dual average is zero after every update, and its common vector equals the primal average from the following update onward:

uˉk+1=0(k≥0),zk+1=xˉk+1(k≥1).\bar u^{k+1}=0\quad(k\ge0),\qquad z^{k+1}=\bar x^{k+1}\quad(k\ge1).uˉk+1=0(k≥0),zk+1=xˉk+1(k≥1).

Consequently, for every k≥2k\ge2k≥2 and every iii, the same iterates obey the simpler two-line algorithm

xik+1=ΠAi(xˉk−uik),uik+1=uik+xik+1−xˉk+1.x_i^{k+1}=\Pi_{\mathcal A_i}(\bar x^k-u_i^k),\qquad u_i^{k+1}=u_i^k+x_i^{k+1}-\bar x^{k+1}.xik+1​=ΠAi​​(xˉk−uik​),uik+1​=uik​+xik+1​−xˉk+1.

If uˉ0=0\bar u^0=0uˉ0=0, those last identities hold already for k≥1k\ge1k≥1. The index qualification is necessary because z0z^0z0 is arbitrary, and z1z^1z1 still contains the initial dual average unless that average was zero. This is the precise reading of the source's “after the first step” statement §5.1.2, p. 36. The milestone list also records the indicator-function projection update on p. 33 and the averaged identities on p. 36.

Significance

The result identifies what information must pass between the parallel projection steps: each local step needs the shared average and its own dual displacement. It also fixes the relationship between the displayed three-variable ADMM iteration and the shorter project-and-average rule. Without the dual-average identity, replacing zkz^kzk by xˉk\bar x^kxˉk is not justified at the initial indices. The product and consensus projection identities explain why the update can be decomposed into independent local projections followed by a mean §5.1.2, p. 35.

The chapter's identities are known mathematical results; this mission asks for machine-checked proofs of their stated finite dimensional version. A completed development supplies reusable statements about nearest-point projection onto products and diagonal sets, and a precise run predicate for later analysis of parallel ADMM. The goal is a statement about every valid run rather than a claim of convergence or existence of a feasible common point. Neither convergence nor feasibility of the intersection is concluded on these pages. Those distinctions keep the mission aligned with the actual scope of Chapter 5.

Difficulty

The product projection uses a sum of squared component distances. Treating a block vector as an arbitrary function and applying its default norm would change the metric, so a projection theorem stated that way would describe a different algorithm. The consensus projection likewise depends on the Euclidean sum and the finite average, including the condition N≥1N\ge1N≥1. The run reduction has a separate indexing difficulty: the vanishing average follows after one dual update, but the first simplified projection step can occur later because it uses the previous common vector. An argument that silently assumes z0=xˉ0z^0=\bar x^0z0=xˉ0 would erase the arbitrary initialization on the source page.

Formalization scope

Lean represents each Rn\mathbb R^nRn as EuclideanSpace ℝ (Fin n) and the NNN blocks as a function on Fin N; the latter is the source's 111-based indexing shifted to 000-based indices. Squared stacked distance is defined as the sum of squared component norms. The average uses the real factor 1/N1/N1/N only under 0<N0<N0<N. Individual projections reuse the published nearest-point relation RandomGradFree.Nonsmooth.IsMetricProjection. A run records the three updates as conditions on sequences, with arbitrary z0,u0z^0,u^0z0,u0 and unused x0x^0x0. The source's scaled dual variable uuu appears directly; ρ\rhoρ cancels from these projection updates once it is positive.

The source assumes closed convex sets; nonemptiness is stated explicitly here because a projection onto an empty set does not exist. The book prints −zk-z^k−zk in its averaged dual update on p. 36, while its defining update on p. 35 and the next line on p. 36 require −zk+1-z^{k+1}−zk+1. The formal statement uses the corrected index. The book also calls the individual sets Ci\mathcal C_iCi​ in its closing sentence; the sets defined for this subsection are Ai\mathcal A_iAi​. The milestone quote preserves the printed intermediate index. The goal includes the simplified primal and dual updates, since asserting only that the dual average vanishes would omit the chapter's advertised reduction.

The development needs finite sums in Euclidean spaces, convex-set projection, and elementary properties of product and diagonal sets. Product and consensus projection results are useful beyond ADMM. Contributions proving the four milestones, the full run theorem, or equivalent projection lemmas at the same generality are within scope.

Selected references

  • S. Boyd, N. Parikh, E. Chu, B. Peleato and J. Eckstein, Distributed Optimization and Statistical Learning via the Alternating Direction Method of Multipliers, Foundations and Trends in Machine Learning 3(1), 2011, pp. 1–122. DOI: 10.1561/2200000016.
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Operations ResearchOptimal TransportOptimization+1·Captain: mikedeng1

Quantifying Distributional Model Risk via Optimal Transport 3: A Worst-Case Transport Plan Exists in a Locally Compact Normed Space under Growth Conditions on c and fResearch Paper

Motivation

In distributionally robust modelling, a baseline probability model μ\muμ on a space SSS is distrusted, and the analyst reports the largest expected loss over every model within a budget of μ\muμ. Blanchet and Murthy (arXiv:1604.01446; Math. Oper. Res. 44(2), 2019, doi:10.1287/moor.2018.0936) measure the budget with an optimal transport cost and prove strong duality for the resulting worst-case expectation on an arbitrary Polish space, with a lower semicontinuous cost and an upper semicontinuous performance function. Duality computes the worst-case value. A risk manager also wants the worst-case model: a distribution that attains the value, whose structure explains which perturbation of μ\muμ is most harmful.

Such a model need not exist. Unlike the Kantorovich problem, where the set of couplings with two fixed marginals is weakly compact, the feasible set here fixes only one marginal and is not compact in general. Section 5 of the paper gives an example on R\mathbb RR where the supremum is not attained, then gives abstract conditions under which it is (Proposition 9), and growth conditions on a locally compact normed space that imply them (Corollary 1). Related existence results in Rd\mathbb R^dRd were obtained by Gao and Kleywegt (arXiv:1604.02199, 2016) and, for empirical baselines and norm costs, by Mohajerin Esfahani and Kuhn (arXiv:1505.05116, 2018).

Setting

Let SSS be a Polish space with its Borel σ\sigmaσ-algebra, μ\muμ a probability measure on SSS, δ>0\delta>0δ>0 a budget, c:S×S→[0,∞)c:S\times S\to[0,\infty)c:S×S→[0,∞) a cost and f:S→Rf:S\to\mathbb Rf:S→R a performance function. The standing assumptions are:

  • (A1) ccc is lower semicontinuous and c(x,y)=0c(x,y)=0c(x,y)=0 iff x=yx=yx=y;
  • (A2) fff is upper semicontinuous and μ\muμ-integrable.

The primal feasible set Φμ,δ\Phi_{\mu,\delta}Φμ,δ​ consists of the probability measures π\piπ on S×SS\times SS×S with first marginal μ\muμ and ∫c dπ≤δ\int c\,d\pi\le\delta∫cdπ≤δ (transport plans out of μ\muμ of cost at most δ\deltaδ). The primal objective is I(π)=∫f(y) dπ(x,y)I(\pi)=\int f(y)\,d\pi(x,y)I(π)=∫f(y)dπ(x,y) and the primal value is I=sup⁡{I(π):π∈Φμ,δ}I=\sup\{I(\pi):\pi\in\Phi_{\mu,\delta}\}I=sup{I(π):π∈Φμ,δ​}. The dual feasible set Λc,f\Lambda_{c,f}Λc,f​ consists of pairs (λ,φ)(\lambda,\varphi)(λ,φ) with λ≥0\lambda\ge0λ≥0, φ:S→[−∞,∞]\varphi:S\to[-\infty,\infty]φ:S→[−∞,∞] universally measurable and φ(x)+λc(x,y)≥f(y)\varphi(x)+\lambda c(x,y)\ge f(y)φ(x)+λc(x,y)≥f(y) for all x,yx,yx,y. The dual objective is J(λ,φ)=λδ+∫φ dμJ(\lambda,\varphi)=\lambda\delta+\int\varphi\,d\muJ(λ,φ)=λδ+∫φdμ and the dual value is J=inf⁡J(λ,φ)J=\inf J(\lambda,\varphi)J=infJ(λ,φ). For λ≥0\lambda\ge0λ≥0 put φλ(x)=sup⁡y{f(y)−λc(x,y)}\varphi_\lambda(x)=\sup_y\{f(y)-\lambda c(x,y)\}φλ​(x)=supy​{f(y)−λc(x,y)}.

Section 5 assumes throughout that (λ∗,φλ∗)∈Λc,f(\lambda^*,\varphi_{\lambda^*})\in\Lambda_{c,f}(λ∗,φλ∗​)∈Λc,f​ is a dual optimal pair with I=J=J(λ∗,φλ∗)<∞I=J=J(\lambda^*,\varphi_{\lambda^*})<\inftyI=J=J(λ∗,φλ∗​)<∞. Write Φμ,δ′\Phi'_{\mu,\delta}Φμ,δ′​ for the plans in Φμ,δ\Phi_{\mu,\delta}Φμ,δ​ concentrated on {f(x)≤f(y)}\{f(x)\le f(y)\}{f(x)≤f(y)}.

(P-Compactness): for every ε>0\varepsilon>0ε>0 there are a compact KεK_\varepsilonKε​ with μ(Kε)>1−ε\mu(K_\varepsilon)>1-\varepsilonμ(Kε​)>1−ε and γ>0\gamma>0γ>0 such that {(x,y)∈Kε×S:f(y)−λ∗c(x,y)≥φλ∗(x)−γ}\{(x,y)\in K_\varepsilon\times S: f(y)-\lambda^*c(x,y)\ge\varphi_{\lambda^*}(x)-\gamma\}{(x,y)∈Kε​×S:f(y)−λ∗c(x,y)≥φλ∗​(x)−γ} has compact closure. (P-USC): lim sup⁡nI(πn)≤I(π∗)\limsup_n I(\pi_n)\le I(\pi^*)limsupn​I(πn​)≤I(π∗) whenever πn∈Φμ,δ′\pi_n\in\Phi'_{\mu,\delta}πn​∈Φμ,δ′​ converge weakly to π∗∈Φμ,δ\pi^*\in\Phi_{\mu,\delta}π∗∈Φμ,δ​.

On a normed space EEE: (A3) c(x,y)≥g(∥x−y∥)c(x,y)\ge g(\|x-y\|)c(x,y)≥g(∥x−y∥) for ∥x−y∥>C\|x-y\|>C∥x−y∥>C, with ggg nondecreasing and g(t)↑∞g(t)\uparrow\inftyg(t)↑∞. (A4) (f(y)−f(x))/(1+h(∥x−y∥))≤K(f(y)-f(x))/(1+h(\|x-y\|))\le K(f(y)−f(x))/(1+h(∥x−y∥))≤K for an increasing hhh with h(t)↑∞h(t)\uparrow\inftyh(t)↑∞; and for every ε>0\varepsilon>0ε>0, f(y)−f(x)≤ε(1+c(x,y))f(y)-f(x)\le\varepsilon(1+c(x,y))f(y)−f(x)≤ε(1+c(x,y)) once ∥x−y∥>Cε\|x-y\|>C_\varepsilon∥x−y∥>Cε​.

Formalization targets

Goal: Corollary 1 (p. 27)

Let EEE be a real normed space that is locally compact, and let c,fc,fc,f satisfy (A1)–(A4). Under the standing assumption, if λ∗>0\lambda^*>0λ∗>0 there is π∗∈Φμ,δ\pi^*\in\Phi_{\mu,\delta}π∗∈Φμ,δ​ with

I(π∗)=I=J=J(λ∗,φλ∗).I(\pi^*)=I=J=J(\lambda^*,\varphi_{\lambda^*}).I(π∗)=I=J=J(λ∗,φλ∗​).

Milestones

  1. Remark 4, (10)–(11) (p. 8): for π∈Φμ,δ\pi\in\Phi_{\mu,\delta}π∈Φμ,δ​, I−I(π)I-I(\pi)I−I(π) is the sum of two nonnegative gaps, ∫(φλ∗(x)−f(y)+λ∗c(x,y)) dπ\int(\varphi_{\lambda^*}(x)-f(y)+\lambda^*c(x,y))\,d\pi∫(φλ∗​(x)−f(y)+λ∗c(x,y))dπ and λ∗(δ−∫c dπ)\lambda^*(\delta-\int c\,d\pi)λ∗(δ−∫cdπ); so an ε\varepsilonε-optimal plan has both gaps at most ε\varepsilonε.
  2. Lemma 17 (p. 43): every plan in Φμ,δ\Phi_{\mu,\delta}Φμ,δ​ can be replaced by one in Φμ,δ′\Phi'_{\mu,\delta}Φμ,δ′​ with at least the same value.
  3. §5 display (p. 26): I=sup⁡{I(π):π∈Φμ,δ′}I=\sup\{I(\pi):\pi\in\Phi'_{\mu,\delta}\}I=sup{I(π):π∈Φμ,δ′​}.
  4. Proposition 9 (p. 26): on a Polish space, (P-Compactness) and (P-USC) give a primal optimizer.
  5. Corollary 1, Step 1 (p. 28): (A1)–(A4) and λ∗>0\lambda^*>0λ∗>0 give (P-Compactness).
  6. Corollary 1, Step 2 (pp. 28–29): (A1), (A2), (A4) and I<∞I<\inftyI<∞ give (P-USC):
lim sup⁡n∫f(y) dπn≤∫f(y) dπ∗.\limsup_n\int f(y)\,d\pi_n\le\int f(y)\,d\pi^*.nlimsup​∫f(y)dπn​≤∫f(y)dπ∗.

Significance

The result. An attained worst case turns duality into a structural statement. By Theorem 1(b) of the paper, an optimizer moves mass from xxx only to maximizers of f(y)−λ∗c(x,y)f(y)-\lambda^*c(x,y)f(y)−λ∗c(x,y) and, when λ∗>0\lambda^*>0λ∗>0, uses the full budget. When those maximizers are unique (Remark 8: ccc convex in yyy, fff concave) the worst-case model is unique and is the image of μ\muμ under a transport map. That map is what stress tests and robust estimators are built from. Without existence, these statements describe an object that may not be there.

Formalizing it. The paper's proofs are complete; nothing here is open. No machine-checked version of this result is known: the worst-case optimal transport literature, including the strong duality of this paper, is unformalized. The mission produces the transport objects of §2 in a form that keeps the paper's generality (Polish space, lower semicontinuous real cost, universally measurable dual variables, the ∞−∞\infty-\infty∞−∞ convention), a tightness argument for nearly optimal one-marginal plans, and an upper semicontinuity argument for unbounded upper semicontinuous integrands under uniform integrability.

Difficulty

The obvious argument takes a maximizing sequence and extracts a weak limit. Both steps fail without more structure. First, Φμ,δ\Phi_{\mu,\delta}Φμ,δ​ is not tight: only the first marginal is fixed, and a sequence may push mass to infinity at bounded cost. That is exactly what happens in Example 2 (p. 26), where λ∗=0\lambda^*=0λ∗=0 and the value 111 is approached but never reached. Tightness has to come from the dual: nearly optimal plans concentrate near maximizers of f(y)−λ∗c(x,y)f(y)-\lambda^*c(x,y)f(y)−λ∗c(x,y), and (A3)–(A4) with λ∗>0\lambda^*>0λ∗>0 confine those maximizers. Second, fff is only upper semicontinuous and unbounded, so weak convergence alone does not give lim sup⁡∫f dπn≤∫f dπ∗\limsup\int f\,d\pi_n\le\int f\,d\pi^*limsup∫fdπn​≤∫fdπ∗. A uniform integrability bound is needed, and it uses the restriction to Φμ,δ′\Phi'_{\mu,\delta}Φμ,δ′​ in an essential way. A third, Lean-specific difficulty is measure-theoretic: φλ∗\varphi_{\lambda^*}φλ∗​ is only universally measurable, and the gaps of Remark 4 are integrals against completions.

Formalization scope

All declarations sit in the namespace ModelRiskOT.PrimalOpt. Values of I(π)I(\pi)I(π), III, J(λ,φ)J(\lambda,\varphi)J(λ,φ), JJJ and φλ\varphi_\lambdaφλ​ are in EReal. I(π)I(\pi)I(π) is ∫f+(y) dπ−∫f−(y) dπ\int f^+(y)\,d\pi-\int f^-(y)\,d\pi∫f+(y)dπ−∫f−(y)dπ with lower integrals, and Mathlib's ⊤−⊤=⊥\top-\top=\bot⊤−⊤=⊥ realises the paper's reading of the supremum (footnote 2, p. 5). Integrals of nonnegative or extended-real functions are lower integrals (lintegral), never Bochner integrals. Universal measurability is the published BertsekasShreve.AnalyticSelection.IsUniversallyMeasurable. Weak convergence is the topology of ProbabilityMeasure (S × S). Measures on S×SS\times SS×S use the product σ\sigmaσ-algebra.

The following readings are fixed:

  • The standing assumption of §5 ((λ∗,φλ∗)∈Λc,f(\lambda^*,\varphi_{\lambda^*})\in\Lambda_{c,f}(λ∗,φλ∗​)∈Λc,f​, I=JI=JI=J, J=J(λ∗,φλ∗)J=J(\lambda^*,\varphi_{\lambda^*})J=J(λ∗,φλ∗​), finiteness) consists of hypotheses of Proposition 9 and Corollary 1. I=JI=JI=J is Theorem 1(a), the goal of the companion mission on strong duality, and is not assumed proved here.
  • In (P-Compactness) the constant γ\gammaγ may depend on ε\varepsilonε.
  • "Increasing" in (A4) is strict.
  • Remark 4's second conclusion in (11) is also stated as λ∗(δ−∫c dπ)≤ε\lambda^*(\delta-\int c\,d\pi)\le\varepsilonλ∗(δ−∫cdπ)≤ε, which covers λ∗=0\lambda^*=0λ∗=0.
  • Lemma 17's last inequality is stated for every plan, which is equivalent under the EReal convention.
  • Corollary 1's space is a real normed space with LocallyCompactSpace. It also carries PolishSpace, which is redundant, since a locally compact real normed space is finite-dimensional.

The goal cannot be satisfied by a junk value: III and JJJ are EReal suprema and infima, not real sSup, and the hypothesis λ∗>0\lambda^*>0λ∗>0 is kept because Example 2 shows the conclusion fails without it. A sorry-free check that c(x,y)=(x−y)2c(x,y)=(x-y)^2c(x,y)=(x−y)2, f(y)=yf(y)=yf(y)=y on R\mathbb RR satisfy (A1), (A3) and (A4) accompanies the drafts.

A complete development needs Prokhorov's theorem (in Mathlib), a Fatou lemma for weakly converging measures with a lower semicontinuous integrand, an upper semicontinuity theorem for uniformly integrable upper semicontinuous integrands, and the change of variables ∫φ(x) dπ=∫φ dμ\int\varphi(x)\,d\pi=\int\varphi\,d\mu∫φ(x)dπ=∫φdμ for universally measurable φ\varphiφ. The last three are reusable well beyond this mission. Proofs of any milestone, and these general lemmas as separate contributions, are welcome.

Selected references

  • J. Blanchet and K. Murthy, Quantifying Distributional Model Risk via Optimal Transport, Math. Oper. Res. 44(2):565–600, 2019. arXiv:1604.01446v2, doi:10.1287/moor.2018.0936
  • R. Gao and A. Kleywegt, Distributionally Robust Stochastic Optimization with Wasserstein Distance, 2016. arXiv:1604.02199
  • P. Mohajerin Esfahani and D. Kuhn, Data-driven distributionally robust optimization using the Wasserstein metric, Math. Program. 171:115–166, 2018. arXiv:1505.05116
  • A. M. Zapała, Unbounded mappings and weak convergence of measures, Statist. Probab. Lett. 78(6):698–706, 2008. doi:10.1016/j.spl.2007.09.033
  • C. Villani, Optimal Transport: Old and New, Springer, 2009. doi:10.1007/978-3-540-71050-9
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Operations ResearchOptimal TransportOptimization+1·Captain: mikedeng1

Quantifying Distributional Model Risk via Optimal Transport 2: The Worst-Case Probability of a Closed Set A Equals the Baseline Probability of Its Inflation {x : c(x, A) ≤ 1/λ*}Research Paper

Motivation

A probability model μ\muμ for a risk quantity, such as the reserve process of an insurer or the path of a queue, is usually chosen for tractability or fitted to limited data, and the true law of the system is unknown. Distributional model risk asks how large a probability of interest could be if the true law were any model "close" to μ\muμ. When closeness is measured by an optimal transport cost rather than a likelihood ratio, the competing models may put mass where μ\muμ puts none, which is the situation for rare events such as ruin or buffer overflow: the event of interest often lies outside the support of the baseline.

Blanchet and Murthy (arXiv:1604.01446, Mathematics of Operations Research 44(2), 2019) prove strong duality for worst-case expectations over an optimal-transport ball on a general Polish space, with a lower semicontinuous cost. Their §2.4 specializes the duality to worst-case probabilities of a closed set and obtains a closed-form answer: the worst-case probability of AAA is the baseline probability of an inflated version of AAA. This mission formalizes that result, Theorem 3 of the paper, together with the numbered statements its proof uses.

Setting

Let SSS be a Polish space with its Borel σ\sigmaσ-algebra, P(S)P(S)P(S) its probability measures, and μ∈P(S)\mu \in P(S)μ∈P(S) the baseline. A cost c:S×S→R+c : S \times S \to \mathbb R_+c:S×S→R+​ satisfies Assumption (A1): it is nonnegative, lower semicontinuous, and c(x,y)=0c(x,y) = 0c(x,y)=0 if and only if x=yx = yx=y.

For μ1,μ2∈P(S)\mu_1, \mu_2 \in P(S)μ1​,μ2​∈P(S), a coupling of μ1\mu_1μ1​ and μ2\mu_2μ2​ is a probability measure π\piπ on S×SS \times SS×S with marginals μ1\mu_1μ1​ and μ2\mu_2μ2​; Π(μ1,μ2)\Pi(\mu_1,\mu_2)Π(μ1​,μ2​) is the set of couplings, and the optimal transport cost is

dc(μ1,μ2)=inf⁡{∫c dπ:π∈Π(μ1,μ2)}.d_c(\mu_1,\mu_2) = \inf\Big\{\int c\,d\pi : \pi \in \Pi(\mu_1,\mu_2)\Big\}.dc​(μ1​,μ2​)=inf{∫cdπ:π∈Π(μ1​,μ2​)}.

For a budget δ>0\delta > 0δ>0, the primal feasible set Φμ,δ\Phi_{\mu,\delta}Φμ,δ​ consists of the probability measures π\piπ on S×SS \times SS×S with first marginal μ\muμ and ∫c dπ≤δ\int c\,d\pi \le \delta∫cdπ≤δ.

Fix a nonempty closed set A⊆SA \subseteq SA⊆S and let c(x,A)=inf⁡{c(x,y):y∈A}c(x,A) = \inf\{c(x,y) : y \in A\}c(x,A)=inf{c(x,y):y∈A} be the cheapest cost of moving unit mass from xxx into AAA. The worst-case probability is

I=sup⁡{P(A):dc(μ,P)≤δ}.(12)I = \sup\{P(A) : d_c(\mu,P) \le \delta\}. \tag{12}I=sup{P(A):dc​(μ,P)≤δ}.(12)

Its dual is the univariate problem

inf⁡λ≥0{λδ+Eμ[(1−λc(X,A))+]},(13)\inf_{\lambda \ge 0}\Big\{\lambda\delta + E_\mu\big[(1 - \lambda c(X,A))^+\big]\Big\}, \tag{13}λ≥0inf​{λδ+Eμ​[(1−λc(X,A))+]},(13)

and for a minimizer λ∗∈[0,∞)\lambda^* \in [0,\infty)λ∗∈[0,∞) of (13) the paper defines

c‾=∫{c(x,A)<1/λ∗}c(x,A) dμ(x),c‾=∫{c(x,A)≤1/λ∗}c(x,A) dμ(x).(14)\underline c = \int_{\{c(x,A) < 1/\lambda^*\}} c(x,A)\,d\mu(x), \qquad \overline c = \int_{\{c(x,A) \le 1/\lambda^*\}} c(x,A)\,d\mu(x). \tag{14}c​=∫{c(x,A)<1/λ∗}​c(x,A)dμ(x),c=∫{c(x,A)≤1/λ∗}​c(x,A)dμ(x).(14)

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 3 (p. 10)

If λ∗∈[0,∞)\lambda^* \in [0,\infty)λ∗∈[0,∞) attains the infimum in (13) and c‾=c‾\underline c = \overline cc​=c, then

sup⁡{P(A):dc(μ,P)≤δ}=μ{x:c(x,A)≤1/λ∗}.(15)\sup\{P(A) : d_c(\mu,P) \le \delta\} = \mu\{x : c(x,A) \le 1/\lambda^*\}. \tag{15}sup{P(A):dc​(μ,P)≤δ}=μ{x:c(x,A)≤1/λ∗}.(15)

Milestones, in the order the proof uses them

  1. Coupling form (§2.2, p. 5, for f=1Af = 1_Af=1A​): I=sup⁡{π(S×A):π∈Φμ,δ}I = \sup\{\pi(S \times A) : \pi \in \Phi_{\mu,\delta}\}I=sup{π(S×A):π∈Φμ,δ​}.
  2. Indicator supremum (pp. 8–9): sup⁡y{1A(y)−λc(x,y)}=(1−λc(x,A))+\sup_{y}\{1_A(y) - \lambda c(x,y)\} = (1 - \lambda c(x,A))^+supy​{1A​(y)−λc(x,y)}=(1−λc(x,A))+ for λ≥0\lambda \ge 0λ≥0.
  3. (13) (p. 9): III equals the infimum in (13).
  4. Remark 4, (11) for f=1Af = 1_Af=1A​ (p. 8): an ε\varepsilonε-optimal plan πε\pi_\varepsilonπε​ satisfies ∫(φλ∗(x)−(1A(y)−λ∗c(x,y))) dπε≤ε\int(\varphi_{\lambda^*}(x) - (1_A(y) - \lambda^* c(x,y)))\,d\pi_\varepsilon \le \varepsilon∫(φλ∗​(x)−(1A​(y)−λ∗c(x,y)))dπε​≤ε and, for λ∗>0\lambda^* > 0λ∗>0, (δ−ε/λ∗)+≤∫c dπε≤δ(\delta - \varepsilon/\lambda^*)^+ \le \int c\,d\pi_\varepsilon \le \delta(δ−ε/λ∗)+≤∫cdπε​≤δ.
  5. Lemma 4 (p. 11): plans πn∈Φμ,δ\pi_n \in \Phi_{\mu,\delta}πn​∈Φμ,δ​, n>1n > 1n>1, with πn(Cn)≥1−1/n\pi_n(C_n) \ge 1 - 1/nπn​(Cn​)≥1−1/n, no cost outside the set CnC_nCn​ of §2.4.1, and πn(S×A)≥I−2/n\pi_n(S \times A) \ge I - 2/nπn​(S×A)≥I−2/n.
  6. Lemma 2 (p. 10): c‾≤δ≤c‾\underline c \le \delta \le \overline cc​≤δ≤c if λ∗>0\lambda^* > 0λ∗>0 attains (13); δ≥c‾=c‾\delta \ge \overline c = \underline cδ≥c=c​ if λ∗=0\lambda^* = 0λ∗=0 does.

Significance

Theorem 3 converts a supremum over an infinite-dimensional ball of probability measures into a single probability under the baseline: μ\muμ of the set of points that can reach AAA at cost at most 1/λ∗1/\lambda^*1/λ∗, where 1/λ∗1/\lambda^*1/λ∗ is determined by δ\deltaδ through the one-dimensional function u↦∫{c(x,A)≤u}c(x,A) dμu \mapsto \int_{\{c(x,A) \le u\}} c(x,A)\,d\muu↦∫{c(x,A)≤u}​c(x,A)dμ. For the cost c=dc = dc=d of a metric this is the baseline probability of the 1/λ∗1/\lambda^*1/λ∗-neighbourhood of AAA. The paper uses it to compute worst-case ruin probabilities for the Cramér–Lundberg model around a Brownian approximation (§3, §6.1), where SSS is a path space; the result applies there because nothing in it uses local compactness of SSS.

The result is proved in the paper. As far as the platform's corpus shows, neither it nor the strong duality behind it has been formalized. A formal development produces, beyond Theorem 3: a reusable definition of optimal transport costs with lower semicontinuous costs on Polish spaces; the coupling reformulation of the transport ball, which rests on the existence of optimal transport plans (Villani, Optimal Transport, Theorem 4.1), not in Mathlib; and an ε\varepsilonε-optimal-plan argument that avoids assuming a primal optimizer exists.

Difficulty

The heuristic derivation on pp. 9–10 constructs an optimal transport plan that moves each xxx with c(x,A)≤1/λ∗c(x,A) \le 1/\lambda^*c(x,A)≤1/λ∗ to a nearest point of AAA and leaves the others in place. It needs a nearest point to exist and to be selectable measurably, which fails for general closed AAA in a non-locally-compact space, and it needs a primal optimizer, which need not exist. Theorem 3 assumes neither, so the construction is not a proof. A second point is the boundary level c(x,A)=1/λ∗c(x,A) = 1/\lambda^*c(x,A)=1/λ∗: when μ\muμ charges it, as for atomic baselines, the identity (15) can fail (for μ\muμ a point mass at distance 111 from AAA and δ<1\delta < 1δ<1, the worst case is δ\deltaδ, not 111), and the hypothesis c‾=c‾\underline c = \overline cc​=c is exactly what excludes this. Measurability is a second obstacle: x↦c(x,A)x \mapsto c(x,A)x↦c(x,A) is an infimum of a lower semicontinuous function over AAA and in general only universally measurable, so integrals of it are taken against the completion of μ\muμ.

Formalization scope

All objects live in the namespace ModelRiskOT.WorstProb. SSS carries [TopologicalSpace S] [PolishSpace S] [MeasurableSpace S] [BorelSpace S]; μ\muμ is a Measure S with IsProbabilityMeasure; the cost is a real-valued c : S → S → ℝ with (A1) bundled as a structure (nonnegativity, lower semicontinuity on S×SS \times SS×S, and c(x,y)=0  ⟺  x=yc(x,y) = 0 \iff x = yc(x,y)=0⟺x=y). Committed conventions:

  • Values in [0,∞][0,\infty][0,∞]. dcd_cdc​, III, the objective of (13), c‾\underline cc​ and c‾\overline cc are ℝ≥0∞; integrals are lower Lebesgue integrals and the positive part (⋅)+(\cdot)^+(⋅)+ is ENNReal.ofReal. For the universally measurable functions and sets that occur, lower integrals and outer measures agree with the completion of μ\muμ, which is the paper's reading (p. 4). No Bochner integral is used.
  • The threshold 1/λ∗1/\lambda^*1/λ∗ is written in multiplied form: c(x,A)≤1/λ∗c(x,A) \le 1/\lambda^*c(x,A)≤1/λ∗ is λ∗c(x,A)≤1\lambda^* c(x,A) \le 1λ∗c(x,A)≤1, and likewise for the strict inequality and for the sets CnC_nCn​. For λ∗>0\lambda^* > 0λ∗>0 this is the printed condition; at λ∗=0\lambda^* = 0λ∗=0 it is the whole space, the paper's convention 1/0=∞1/0 = \infty1/0=∞.
  • dcd_cdc​ fixes both marginals; Φμ,δ\Phi_{\mu,\delta}Φμ,δ​ fixes only the first.
  • c(x,A)c(x,A)c(x,A) is a real infimum over the subtype AAA; every statement assumes AAA nonempty.
  • "λ∗\lambda^*λ∗ attains the infimum in (13)" is λ∗≥0\lambda^* \ge 0λ∗≥0 and g(λ∗)≤g(λ)g(\lambda^*) \le g(\lambda)g(λ∗)≤g(λ) for all λ≥0\lambda \ge 0λ≥0.
  • Inequalities X≥I−tX \ge I - tX≥I−t are written I≤X+tI \le X + tI≤X+t in [0,∞][0,\infty][0,∞]; sequences "n>1n > 1n>1" are indexed by n∈Nn \in \mathbb Nn∈N with 1<n1 < n1<n.

A formalization in which the transport ball fixes only the first marginal would contain every probability measure and give I=1I = 1I=1 for every nonempty AAA; the definitions here fix both marginals of the couplings in dcd_cdc​, and the hypothesis c‾=c‾\underline c = \overline cc​=c is kept as stated rather than replaced by continuity of u↦∫{c(x,A)≤u}c(x,A) dμu \mapsto \int_{\{c(x,A) \le u\}} c(x,A)\,d\muu↦∫{c(x,A)≤u}​c(x,A)dμ.

A complete development needs the existence of optimal couplings for lower semicontinuous costs (tightness and Prokhorov's theorem, available in Mathlib), the strong duality of the paper's Theorem 1 specialized to indicators (milestone 3; a separate mission in this series formalizes Theorem 1 in general), and universal measurability of c(⋅,A)c(\cdot,A)c(⋅,A) through projections of Borel sets. The transport-cost definitions and the coupling reformulation are reusable beyond this mission. Proofs of any milestone are welcome, as are proofs that derive (13) from the general strong duality once that is published.

Selected references

  • J. Blanchet, K. Murthy, Quantifying Distributional Model Risk via Optimal Transport, arXiv:1604.01446v2, 2017; Mathematics of Operations Research 44(2):565–600, 2019. https://arxiv.org/abs/1604.01446, https://doi.org/10.1287/moor.2018.0936
  • C. Villani, Optimal Transport: Old and New, Grundlehren der mathematischen Wissenschaften 338, Springer, 2009. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-71050-9
  • R. Gao, A. Kleywegt, Distributionally Robust Stochastic Optimization with Wasserstein Distance, arXiv:1604.02199, 2016. https://arxiv.org/abs/1604.02199
  • P. Mohajerin Esfahani, D. Kuhn, Data-driven distributionally robust optimization using the Wasserstein metric, Mathematical Programming 171:115–166, 2018. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10107-017-1172-1
  • D. P. Bertsekas, S. E. Shreve, Stochastic Optimal Control: The Discrete-Time Case, Academic Press, 1978 (universal measurability, Ch. 7).
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Operations ResearchOptimizationProbability·Captain: mikedeng1

Scheduling Deteriorating Jobs on a Single Processor I: Under Linear Deterioration, Sequencing by Increasing E(X_i)/α_i Minimizes the Expected MakespanResearch Paper

Motivation

In classical single-machine stochastic scheduling, NNN jobs with independent random processing requirements XiX_iXi​ are processed one after another, and the makespan (the completion time of the last job) is the same for every schedule that never idles: it is X1+⋯+XNX_1+\dots+X_NX1​+⋯+XN​. Research therefore concentrated on weighted flow times and rewards. Browne and Yechiali (Operations Research 38(3), 1990, 495–498) studied jobs that deteriorate while they wait: the longer a job is delayed, the more processing it needs. Such models arose in the control of queueing and communication systems (Browne 1988; Browne and Yechiali 1989) and in inventory issuing, where stored items lose quality at item-specific rates. Under deterioration the actual processing times depend on the order, so the makespan, and its expectation, become functions of the schedule, and the basic question is which order minimizes the expected makespan.

Setting

There are NNN jobs, all available at time 000, and a single processor. Job iii has an initial processing requirement XiX_iXi​, a random variable on a probability space (Ω,F,P)(\Omega,\mathcal F,P)(Ω,F,P): the time needed to complete job iii if it is processed first. Under linear deterioration, a job whose processing is delayed until time ttt needs

Yi(t)=Xi+αit,Y_i(t) = X_i + \alpha_i t,Yi​(t)=Xi​+αi​t,

where αi>0\alpha_i>0αi​>0 is its deterministic growth rate. A job stops deteriorating once it is put on the processor.

Only nonpreemptive strategies without idling are allowed, so a policy is a permutation π\piπ of {1,…,N}\{1,\dots,N\}{1,…,N}, with π(i)=j\pi(i)=jπ(i)=j meaning that job jjj is the iii-th processed. The completion times follow the model: S0(π)=0S_0(\pi)=0S0​(π)=0, and the job in position kkk starts at Sk−1(π)S_{k-1}(\pi)Sk−1​(π) and takes Yπ(k)(Sk−1(π))Y_{\pi(k)}(S_{k-1}(\pi))Yπ(k)​(Sk−1​(π)), so

Sk(π)=Sk−1(π)+Xπ(k)+απ(k)Sk−1(π),k=1,…,N.S_k(\pi) = S_{k-1}(\pi) + X_{\pi(k)} + \alpha_{\pi(k)} S_{k-1}(\pi), \qquad k = 1,\dots,N.Sk​(π)=Sk−1​(π)+Xπ(k)​+απ(k)​Sk−1​(π),k=1,…,N.

The makespan is SN(π)S_N(\pi)SN​(π) and the expected makespan is E SN(π)\mathrm E\,S_N(\pi)ESN​(π). In Lean these are completionTime X α π k ω, makespan X α π ω and expectedMakespan P X α π in the namespace DeterioratingJobs.Makespan.

The paper's Lemma 1 concerns, for real numbers μi\mu_iμi​ and γi\gamma_iγi​, the sum (1)

Fμ,γ(π)=∑i=1Nμπ(i)∏r=i+1Nγπ(r),F_{\mu,\gamma}(\pi) = \sum_{i=1}^{N} \mu_{\pi(i)} \prod_{r=i+1}^{N} \gamma_{\pi(r)},Fμ,γ​(π)=i=1∑N​μπ(i)​r=i+1∏N​γπ(r)​,

the Lean lemma1Sum μ γ π (empty product =1=1=1).

Formalization targets

Goal: the expected-makespan index rule (§1, p. 496)

If the XiX_iXi​ are integrable, αi>0\alpha_i>0αi​>0, and π\piπ schedules the jobs by increasing values of E(Xi)/αi\mathrm E(X_i)/\alpha_iE(Xi​)/αi​, then

E SN(π)≤E SN(σ)for every permutation σ.\mathrm E\,S_N(\pi) \le \mathrm E\,S_N(\sigma) \qquad\text{for every permutation } \sigma .ESN​(π)≤ESN​(σ)for every permutation σ.

Milestones

  1. Lemma 1 (p. 495). If γi>1\gamma_i>1γi​>1 for all iii, the sum (1) is minimized over all permutations by any permutation ordered by increasing μi/[γi−1]\mu_i/[\gamma_i-1]μi​/[γi​−1], and maximized by any permutation ordered by decreasing values.
  2. Eq. (2) (p. 496). For every π\piπ and j≤Nj\le Nj≤N,
Sj(π)=∑i=1jXπ(i)∏r=i+1j(1+απ(r)).S_j(\pi) = \sum_{i=1}^{j} X_{\pi(i)} \prod_{r=i+1}^{j} \bigl(1+\alpha_{\pi(r)}\bigr).Sj​(π)=i=1∑j​Xπ(i)​r=i+1∏j​(1+απ(r)​).
  1. The expected makespan in the form (1) (p. 496, after (2)).
E SN(π)=∑i=1NE(Xπ(i))∏r=i+1N(1+απ(r))=FEX, 1+α(π).\mathrm E\,S_N(\pi) = \sum_{i=1}^{N} \mathrm E(X_{\pi(i)}) \prod_{r=i+1}^{N}\bigl(1+\alpha_{\pi(r)}\bigr) = F_{\mathrm E X,\,1+\alpha}(\pi).ESN​(π)=i=1∑N​E(Xπ(i)​)r=i+1∏N​(1+απ(r)​)=FEX,1+α​(π).

Significance

The result is an index rule: each job receives a number computed from its own data, E(Xi)/αi\mathrm E(X_i)/\alpha_iE(Xi​)/αi​, and sorting by that number is optimal. It needs only the means of the initial requirements, not their distributions, and it holds without independence. The same reduction to Lemma 1 gives the paper's other index rules: the variance of the makespan under independent requirements, the Poisson-shock model (5), Lévy-type growth (6) and setup/detach times (7). In inventory issuing, it says which stored item to issue first when items lose value at item-specific linear rates. Lemma 1 itself, which the paper attributes to Rau (1971) and relates to optimal search, is a general statement about ordering products of factors along a sequence.

The result is proved in the paper by an appeal to Lemma 1, whose proof is given there as one sentence ("direct upon an interchange argument"). None of these statements has a machine-checked proof on Prove2Me or in Mathlib. This mission produces a formal model of linear deterioration on a single machine, a formal proof of the interchange lemma with ties handled, and the formal index rule.

Difficulty

The algebra of one adjacent interchange is short. The work is in passing from that local comparison to optimality over all N!N!N! permutations, with ties allowed: the paper speaks of "the permutation ordered by increasing values", but with equal indices several permutations qualify, and each of them must be shown optimal. The natural route, "an optimal permutation exists and must be sorted", needs care, because a sorted permutation is not unique and the swap that improves an unsorted permutation may only weakly improve it. On the probabilistic side, the expectation of the makespan must be reduced to the expectations of the XiX_iXi​; the makespan is a polynomial in the XiX_iXi​ with deterministic coefficients, so this is linearity of the integral, but integrability has to be carried through the recursion.

Formalization scope

  • Jobs are Fin N (0-based: Lean job i is the paper's job i+1i+1i+1); a policy is π : Equiv.Perm (Fin N) with π k the job in position k, as in the paper's π(i)=j\pi(i)=jπ(i)=j. N=0N=0N=0 is allowed.
  • The probability space is (Ω, P) with [IsProbabilityMeasure P]; XiX_iXi​ is Ω → ℝ; expectations are Bochner integrals, and every theorem about them assumes each XiX_iXi​ integrable. The growth rates are deterministic reals.
  • Completion times are defined by the model recursion Sk=Sk−1+Yπ(k)(Sk−1)S_{k}=S_{k-1}+Y_{\pi(k)}(S_{k-1})Sk​=Sk−1​+Yπ(k)​(Sk−1​), never by the closed form (2), so that (2) is a theorem about the model.
  • Explicit readings of loose phrases: "the permutation ordered by increasing values of viv_ivi​" means any permutation with k↦vπ(k)k\mapsto v_{\pi(k)}k↦vπ(k)​ non-strictly increasing (Monotone), and "decreasing" means Antitone; "is minimized" means ≤\le≤ against every permutation; "expected" means the integral of an integrable random variable.
  • Added hypotheses: αi>0\alpha_i>0αi​>0 in the goal (the paper divides by αi\alpha_iαi​ without stating it) and γi>1\gamma_i>1γi​>1 in Lemma 1 (the paper applies it only with γi=1+αi\gamma_i = 1+\alpha_iγi​=1+αi​ or (1+αi)2(1+\alpha_i)^2(1+αi​)2; for γi<1\gamma_i<1γi​<1 the ordering reverses).
  • Omitted assumptions: positivity of the XiX_iXi​ and their independence. The goal holds without them, so the formal statement is slightly more general than the paper's.
  • Trivializing formalizations are excluded: defining SSS by formula (2) would make milestone 2 a definition unfolding; a strictly increasing ordering would make the goal vacuous whenever two indices tie; ordering π−1\pi^{-1}π−1 instead of π\piπ states a different theorem; dropping integrability makes all expectations 000; allowing αi=0\alpha_i=0αi​=0 makes E(Xi)/αi=0\mathrm E(X_i)/\alpha_i=0E(Xi​)/αi​=0 a meaningless index.
  • Not formalized here: the variance result (3), the Poisson model (5), the Lévy model (6), Proposition 1, setup times (7), exponential growth (9), and the NP-hardness conjecture. Proposition 2 (weighted expected completion time) is the companion mission Scheduling Deteriorating Jobs on a Single Processor II.
  • Related platform items, none of which states these results: PalmQueueing.Ordering.interchange_permutations (interchange permutations of a GI/GI/1 queue) and the additive, non-deteriorating completion-time models MooreLateJobs.Shared.completionTime and NumStochOpt.ListScheduling.Makespan.

Contributions welcome: proofs of the milestones, a reusable "sorted permutation minimizes a sum of products" lemma, and the variance index (3) as an extension.

Selected references

  • S. Browne, U. Yechiali, Scheduling Deteriorating Jobs on a Single Processor, Operations Research 38(3), 1990, 495–498. https://doi.org/10.1287/opre.38.3.495
  • J. G. Rau, Minimizing a Function of Permutations of n Integers, Operations Research 19(1), 1971, 237–240. https://doi.org/10.1287/opre.19.1.237
  • F. P. Kelly, A Remark on Search and Sequencing Problems, Mathematics of Operations Research 7(1), 1982, 154–157. https://doi.org/10.1287/moor.7.1.154
  • R. W. Conway, W. L. Maxwell, L. W. Miller, Theory of Scheduling, Addison-Wesley, 1967.
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Convex OptimizationOperations ResearchOptimization·Captain: mikedeng1

Distributed Optimization and Statistical Learning via the Alternating Direction Method of Multipliers I: Under a Lagrangian Saddle Point, ADMM Residuals Vanish and Objective Values ConvergeTextbook

Why ADMM convergence matters

The alternating direction method of multipliers (ADMM) is one of the most widely used algorithms for large-scale convex optimization in statistics, machine learning and signal processing. Its appeal is decomposition: a problem whose objective splits into two parts, coupled only by a linear constraint, is solved by alternately minimizing over each part and updating a dual variable. Each subproblem is often a proximity operator, a projection or a small linear system, so ADMM turns problems such as the lasso, sparse inverse covariance selection and consensus fitting across many machines into sequences of simple steps. The survey of Boyd, Parikh, Chu, Peleato and Eckstein (DOI 10.1561/2200000016) made the method standard, and every algorithm in its later chapters is justified by one convergence result, stated in §3.2.1 and proved in Appendix A. This mission formalizes that result and the inequalities behind it.

The method goes back to Gabay and Mercier (1976). Eckstein and Bertsekas (1992) proved convergence through the theory of maximal monotone operators, by identifying ADMM with Douglas–Rachford splitting applied to the dual problem. The proof in Appendix A of the survey is different: it is a direct Lyapunov argument in finite dimensions that uses only convexity and elementary algebra.

Setting

Let f:Rn→R∪{+∞}f:\mathbb R^n\to\mathbb R\cup\{+\infty\}f:Rn→R∪{+∞} and g:Rm→R∪{+∞}g:\mathbb R^m\to\mathbb R\cup\{+\infty\}g:Rm→R∪{+∞}, let A∈Rp×nA\in\mathbb R^{p\times n}A∈Rp×n, B∈Rp×mB\in\mathbb R^{p\times m}B∈Rp×m and c∈Rpc\in\mathbb R^pc∈Rp. The problem is

minimize f(x)+g(z)subject to Ax+Bz=c,(3.1)\text{minimize } f(x)+g(z)\quad\text{subject to } Ax+Bz=c, \tag{3.1}minimize f(x)+g(z)subject to Ax+Bz=c,(3.1)

with optimal value p⋆=inf⁡{f(x)+g(z)∣Ax+Bz=c}p^\star=\inf\{f(x)+g(z)\mid Ax+Bz=c\}p⋆=inf{f(x)+g(z)∣Ax+Bz=c}. The augmented Lagrangian with parameter ρ≥0\rho\ge0ρ≥0 is

Lρ(x,z,y)=f(x)+g(z)+yT(Ax+Bz−c)+ρ2∥Ax+Bz−c∥22,L_\rho(x,z,y)=f(x)+g(z)+y^T(Ax+Bz-c)+\tfrac{\rho}{2}\|Ax+Bz-c\|_2^2,Lρ​(x,z,y)=f(x)+g(z)+yT(Ax+Bz−c)+2ρ​∥Ax+Bz−c∥22​,

and L0L_0L0​ is the ordinary Lagrangian. For ρ>0\rho>0ρ>0, ADMM generates iterates by

xk+1∈argmin⁡xLρ(x,zk,yk),zk+1∈argmin⁡zLρ(xk+1,z,yk),yk+1=yk+ρ(Axk+1+Bzk+1−c).x^{k+1}\in\operatorname*{argmin}_x L_\rho(x,z^k,y^k),\quad z^{k+1}\in\operatorname*{argmin}_z L_\rho(x^{k+1},z,y^k),\quad y^{k+1}=y^k+\rho(Ax^{k+1}+Bz^{k+1}-c).xk+1∈xargmin​Lρ​(x,zk,yk),zk+1∈zargmin​Lρ​(xk+1,z,yk),yk+1=yk+ρ(Axk+1+Bzk+1−c).

The state is (zk,yk)(z^k,y^k)(zk,yk); x0x^0x0 plays no role. The primal residual is rk=Axk+Bzk−cr^k=Ax^k+Bz^k-crk=Axk+Bzk−c, the dual residual is sk=ρATB(zk−zk−1)s^k=\rho A^TB(z^k-z^{k-1})sk=ρATB(zk−zk−1), and pk=f(xk)+g(zk)p^k=f(x^k)+g(z^k)pk=f(xk)+g(zk).

Two assumptions are made. Assumption 1: fff and ggg are closed, proper and convex. Assumption 2: L0L_0L0​ has a saddle point (x⋆,z⋆,y⋆)(x^\star,z^\star,y^\star)(x⋆,z⋆,y⋆), i.e. L0(x⋆,z⋆,y)≤L0(x⋆,z⋆,y⋆)≤L0(x,z,y⋆)L_0(x^\star,z^\star,y)\le L_0(x^\star,z^\star,y^\star)\le L_0(x,z,y^\star)L0​(x⋆,z⋆,y)≤L0​(x⋆,z⋆,y⋆)≤L0​(x,z,y⋆) for all x,z,yx,z,yx,z,y. Nothing is assumed about the ranks of AAA and BBB. The convergence proof uses the Lyapunov function

Vk=1ρ∥yk−y⋆∥22+ρ∥B(zk−z⋆)∥22.V^k=\tfrac1\rho\|y^k-y^\star\|_2^2+\rho\|B(z^k-z^\star)\|_2^2 .Vk=ρ1​∥yk−y⋆∥22​+ρ∥B(zk−z⋆)∥22​.

Formalization targets

Goal: residual and objective convergence (§3.2.1, p. 17; Appendix A, p. 106)

Under Assumptions 1 and 2 and for ρ>0\rho>0ρ>0, every ADMM run satisfies

rk→0,f(xk)+g(zk)→p⋆,sk→0(k→∞).r^k\to0,\qquad f(x^k)+g(z^k)\to p^\star,\qquad s^k\to0\qquad(k\to\infty).rk→0,f(xk)+g(zk)→p⋆,sk→0(k→∞).

The statement fixes no rate and no constant. It does not claim convergence of xkx^kxk or zkz^kzk, which fails in general (p. 17).

Milestones

In the order of Appendix A:

  1. (3.10) holds along the iteration: 0∈∂g(zk+1)+BTyk+10\in\partial g(z^{k+1})+B^Ty^{k+1}0∈∂g(zk+1)+BTyk+1 (§3.3, p. 18);
  2. the dual residual inclusion ρATB(zk+1−zk)∈∂f(xk+1)+ATyk+1\rho A^TB(z^{k+1}-z^k)\in\partial f(x^{k+1})+A^Ty^{k+1}ρATB(zk+1−zk)∈∂f(xk+1)+ATyk+1 (§3.3, p. 18);
  3. (A.3) p⋆−pk+1≤y⋆Trk+1p^\star-p^{k+1}\le y^{\star T}r^{k+1}p⋆−pk+1≤y⋆Trk+1;
  4. (A.2) pk+1−p⋆≤−(yk+1)Trk+1−ρ(B(zk+1−zk))T(−rk+1+B(zk+1−z⋆))p^{k+1}-p^\star\le-(y^{k+1})^Tr^{k+1}-\rho(B(z^{k+1}-z^k))^T(-r^{k+1}+B(z^{k+1}-z^\star))pk+1−p⋆≤−(yk+1)Trk+1−ρ(B(zk+1−zk))T(−rk+1+B(zk+1−z⋆));
  5. (3.11) pk−p⋆≤−(yk)Trk+(xk−x⋆)Tskp^k-p^\star\le-(y^k)^Tr^k+(x^k-x^\star)^Ts^kpk−p⋆≤−(yk)Trk+(xk−x⋆)Tsk;
  6. the monotonicity step (yk+1−yk)T(B(zk+1−zk))≤0(y^{k+1}-y^k)^T(B(z^{k+1}-z^k))\le0(yk+1−yk)T(B(zk+1−zk))≤0 for k≥1k\ge1k≥1 (p. 110);
  7. (A.6) Vk−Vk+1≥ρ∥rk+1−B(zk+1−zk)∥22V^k-V^{k+1}\ge\rho\|r^{k+1}-B(z^{k+1}-z^k)\|_2^2Vk−Vk+1≥ρ∥rk+1−B(zk+1−zk)∥22​;
  8. (A.1) Vk+1≤Vk−ρ∥rk+1∥22−ρ∥B(zk+1−zk)∥22V^{k+1}\le V^k-\rho\|r^{k+1}\|_2^2-\rho\|B(z^{k+1}-z^k)\|_2^2Vk+1≤Vk−ρ∥rk+1∥22​−ρ∥B(zk+1−zk)∥22​ for k≥1k\ge1k≥1;
  9. the summed bound ρ∑k≥1(∥rk+1∥22+∥B(zk+1−zk)∥22)≤V1\rho\sum_{k\ge1}(\|r^{k+1}\|_2^2+\|B(z^{k+1}-z^k)\|_2^2)\le V^1ρ∑k≥1​(∥rk+1∥22​+∥B(zk+1−zk)∥22​)≤V1, with rk→0r^k\to0rk→0 and B(zk+1−zk)→0B(z^{k+1}-z^k)\to0B(zk+1−zk)→0;
  10. the stopping-rule bound pk−p⋆≤−(yk)Trk+d∥sk∥2≤∥yk∥2∥rk∥2+d∥sk∥2p^k-p^\star\le-(y^k)^Tr^k+d\|s^k\|_2\le\|y^k\|_2\|r^k\|_2+d\|s^k\|_2pk−p⋆≤−(yk)Trk+d∥sk∥2​≤∥yk∥2​∥rk∥2​+d∥sk∥2​ when ∥xk−x⋆∥2≤d\|x^k-x^\star\|_2\le d∥xk−x⋆∥2​≤d (§3.3.1, p. 19).

Significance

The theorem is what licenses every specialized ADMM of the survey (lasso, basis pursuit, covariance selection, consensus and sharing, distributed model fitting): each of these chapters only computes the subproblem solutions, and correctness of the overall method is inherited from §3.2.1. Inequality (3.11) and its corollary in §3.3.1 justify the primal/dual residual stopping criterion (3.12) used in practice: small residuals certify small suboptimality.

The result itself is classical and proved; it is not open. To our knowledge no machine-checked proof of convex two-block ADMM convergence exists in Lean's Mathlib. Formalizing it produces a reusable development of the augmented Lagrangian method with explicit domain handling for extended-valued convex functions, and checks a proof whose index bookkeeping the printed text leaves loose (the monotonicity step and (A.1) need k≥1k\ge1k≥1, see below).

Difficulty

The obvious argument, "the subproblem optimality conditions plus the saddle point give a decreasing quantity", works only once the right Lyapunov function is found and the cross term −2ρ r(k+1)TB(zk+1−zk)-2\rho\, r^{(k+1)T}B(z^{k+1}-z^k)−2ρr(k+1)TB(zk+1−zk) is controlled. That term has no sign from the optimality conditions of a single iteration, and at the first iteration, where z0z^0z0 is an arbitrary starting point, the decrease (A.1) can genuinely fail. A second obstacle is that xkx^kxk and zkz^kzk need not converge or even be bounded when AAA or BBB is rank deficient, so objective convergence cannot pass through limits of the primal iterates; it has to come from the two-sided bounds (A.2) and (A.3). Finally, the subdifferential sum rule used to linearize each subproblem must be handled for functions taking the value +∞+\infty+∞.

Formalization scope

  • Vectors are EuclideanSpace ℝ (Fin n); matrices act through Matrix.toEuclideanLin; the problem data are bundled in a structure Problem n m p.
  • An extended-valued fff is encoded by its effective domain CfC_fCf​ and its real values on CfC_fCf​. Assumption 1 is: CfC_fCf​ nonempty, fff convex on CfC_fCf​, epigraph over CfC_fCf​ closed. All minimizations, and the saddle-point inequality in (x,z)(x,z)(x,z), range over the domains; this is equivalent to the book's formulation with +∞+\infty+∞.
  • p⋆p^\starp⋆ is the infimum over feasible points of the domains, not f(x⋆)+g(z⋆)f(x^\star)+g(z^\star)f(x⋆)+g(z⋆) by definition.
  • The run is a hypothesis. An ADMM run is any triple of sequences satisfying (3.2)–(3.4) exactly. The book asserts on p. 16 that Assumption 1 makes the subproblems solvable; this is false in general (f(x)=ex1f(x)=e^{x_1}f(x)=ex1​, A=[0 1]A=[0\ 1]A=[0 1]), so no statement constructs iterates. A formalization that defined the iterates by choice, or required Axk+Bzk=cAx^k+Bz^k=cAxk+Bzk=c of a run, would trivialize the residual claim and is ruled out.
  • Indices: k∈Nk\in\mathbb Nk∈N starts at the book's k=0k=0k=0. Statements about xkx^kxk, rkr^krk, sks^ksk, pkp^kpk are for k≥1k\ge1k≥1 (written with k+1k+1k+1). The monotonicity step and (A.1) are stated for k≥1k\ge1k≥1; the book states (A.1) without a range, and at k=0k=0k=0 with an arbitrary z0z^0z0 it can fail. The summed bound accordingly starts at k=1k=1k=1 and is bounded by V1V^1V1 instead of V0V^0V0; it is stated as a bound on every partial sum.
  • Subdifferentials (milestones 1–2) use the published ShorNonsmooth.Subdiff.subdifferential relative to the domain.
  • The dual-variable convergence yk→y⋆y^k\to y^\staryk→y⋆ listed in §3.2.1 is not proved in the book and is not a target.

A complete development needs the subdifferential of a convex function plus a differentiable quadratic, the first-order characterization of a constrained minimizer, and elementary limits; all of this is reusable for the later missions of the series, which take ADMM runs as given. Proofs of individual milestones are welcome independently.

Selected references

  • S. Boyd, N. Parikh, E. Chu, B. Peleato, J. Eckstein, Distributed Optimization and Statistical Learning via the Alternating Direction Method of Multipliers, Foundations and Trends in Machine Learning 3(1), 2011, pp. 1–122. https://doi.org/10.1561/2200000016
  • D. Gabay, B. Mercier, A dual algorithm for the solution of nonlinear variational problems via finite element approximation, Computers & Mathematics with Applications 2(1), 1976, pp. 17–40. https://doi.org/10.1016/0898-1221(76)90003-1
  • J. Eckstein, D. P. Bertsekas, On the Douglas–Rachford splitting method and the proximal point algorithm for maximal monotone operators, Mathematical Programming 55, 1992, pp. 293–318. https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01581204
  • R. T. Rockafellar, Convex Analysis, Princeton University Press, 1970. https://doi.org/10.1515/9781400873173
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Linear OptimizationOperations ResearchOptimization·Captain: mikedeng1

On the Power of Robust Solutions in Two-Stage Stochastic and Adaptive Optimization Problems 4: For Symmetric Cost and Right-Hand-Side Uncertainty, the Adaptability Gap Is at Most FourResearch Paper

Motivation

Two-stage optimization separates a decision made before uncertainty is observed from one made after a scenario is known. A fully adaptive policy can choose a different second-stage decision in each scenario, while a static robust solution commits to a single second-stage decision that works in every scenario. Static solutions can be simpler to implement, but their worst-case cost may be higher. Bertsimas and Goyal ask how large this cost difference can be when both the right-hand sides of the constraints and the second-stage prices vary. Their Theorem 5.1 gives a factor of four when the paired uncertainty set is symmetric and nonnegative, even when both stages contain integer variables.

The distinction matters in planning problems where one policy is fixed in advance and another could respond to realized demand or prices. A uniform bound lets a planner assess the cost of the static restriction without solving every adaptive policy exactly. The source is the authors' manuscript; all page and result numbers in this mission refer to that manuscript, not to the journal pagination.

Setting

Fix matrices A∈Rm×n1A\in\mathbb R^{m\times n_1}A∈Rm×n1​ and B∈Rm×n2B\in\mathbb R^{m\times n_2}B∈Rm×n2​. A scenario ω∈Ω\omega\in\Omegaω∈Ω supplies a right-hand side b(ω)∈R+mb(\omega)\in\mathbb R_+^mb(ω)∈R+m​ and a second-stage cost vector d(ω)∈R+n2d(\omega)\in\mathbb R_+^{n_2}d(ω)∈R+n2​​. The first-stage cost vector is c∈R+n1c\in\mathbb R_+^{n_1}c∈R+n1​​. For a set III of designated integer coordinates, write DID_IDI​ for the nonnegative real vectors whose coordinates in III are integers. After relabelling, this is the paper's R+n−p×Z+p\mathbb R_+^{n-p}\times\mathbb Z_+^pR+n−p​×Z+p​.

In the robust problem ΠRob(b,d)\Pi_{\mathrm{Rob}}(b,d)ΠRob​(b,d), one first-stage decision x∈DI1x\in D_{I_1}x∈DI1​​ and one second-stage decision y∈DI2y\in D_{I_2}y∈DI2​​ must satisfy Ax+By≥b(ω)Ax+By\ge b(\omega)Ax+By≥b(ω) for every scenario. Their cost is cTx+sup⁡ω∈Ωd(ω)Tyc^Tx+\sup_{\omega\in\Omega}d(\omega)^TycTx+supω∈Ω​d(ω)Ty. In the adaptive problem ΠAdapt(b,d)\Pi_{\mathrm{Adapt}}(b,d)ΠAdapt​(b,d), xxx is still chosen once, but y(ω)∈DI2y(\omega)\in D_{I_2}y(ω)∈DI2​​ may depend on the scenario. Its constraints are Ax+By(ω)≥b(ω)Ax+By(\omega)\ge b(\omega)Ax+By(ω)≥b(ω) for every ω\omegaω, and its cost is cTx+sup⁡ω∈Ωd(ω)Ty(ω)c^Tx+\sup_{\omega\in\Omega}d(\omega)^Ty(\omega)cTx+supω∈Ω​d(ω)Ty(ω). The optimal values zRob(b,d)z_{\mathrm{Rob}}(b,d)zRob​(b,d) and zAdapt(b,d)z_{\mathrm{Adapt}}(b,d)zAdapt​(b,d) are infima over feasible decisions in these respective problems; these are models (1.5)–(1.6).

The paired uncertainty set is I(b,d)(Ω)={(b(ω),d(ω)):ω∈Ω}I_{(b,d)}(\Omega)=\{(b(\omega),d(\omega)): \omega\in\Omega\}I(b,d)​(Ω)={(b(ω),d(ω)):ω∈Ω}. It is symmetric when it contains a point u0u^0u0 such that u0+zu^0+zu0+z belongs to the set exactly when u0−zu^0-zu0−z does, for every displacement zzz. The point u0u^0u0 is itself a scenario realization. The smallest coordinatewise bounding hypercube has lower and upper corners (bl,dl)(b^l,d^l)(bl,dl) and (bh,dh)(b^h,d^h)(bh,dh); its center is ((bl+bh)/2,(dl+dh)/2)((b^l+b^h)/2,(d^l+d^h)/2)((bl+bh)/2,(dl+dh)/2). These are Definition 1.2 and displays (2.5)–(2.7).

Formalization targets

The adaptability gap

The goal is Theorem 5.1:

zRob(b,d)≤4zAdapt(b,d).z_{\mathrm{Rob}}(b,d)\le 4z_{\mathrm{Adapt}}(b,d).zRob​(b,d)≤4zAdapt​(b,d).

The factor applies to every nonnegative symmetric paired uncertainty set and to both continuous and mixed-integer decisions. The theorem does not require an optimal adaptive policy to attain its infimum. The milestones record the source's geometric Lemma 2.3 and the estimates labelled (5.1)–(5.4), which supply the center-scenario cost and feasibility statements with the explicit factor four. They are stated for arbitrary feasible adaptive policies so the conclusion also covers nonattained infima.

Significance

The result bounds the price of committing to a single second-stage decision, despite uncertainty in both the constraints and the objective. In this setting the comparison is independent of the number of scenarios and of the dimensions m,n1,n2m,n_1,n_2m,n1​,n2​. The paper also considers right-hand-side-only uncertainty, positive sets, and hypercubes; this mission isolates its symmetric paired-uncertainty result §5.1.

The theorem is proved in the paper. The remaining formalization work is a machine-checked development of the model, the bounding-hypercube geometry, the cost inequalities, and the passage from arbitrary feasible policies to the optimal values. The resulting definitions of mixed-integer domains, robust and adaptive feasibility, and extended-real optimal values can also support the other results in this paper's mission series. The theorem statements here are open proof targets, with no machine-checked proofs claimed.

Difficulty

The worst-case maximizer of d(ω)Ty(ω)d(\omega)^Ty(\omega)d(ω)Ty(ω) can vary with ω\omegaω, and an adaptive policy can choose a different integer vector in every scenario. Selecting one of those vectors as a static decision therefore gives no immediate cost or feasibility guarantee. The point of symmetry is a realizable scenario, but it must control both components of every other paired scenario. Without nonnegative data, doubling the center-scenario decision may fail to cover a positive right-hand side, and the cost comparison can fail as well. Integer coordinates also constrain which scalings preserve the decision domain; the exact factor in the theorem is compatible with doubling, unlike arbitrary fractional rescalings.

Formalization scope

Vectors are real functions on finite index types, matrices use Mathlib's matrix-vector product, and inequalities are componentwise. The scenario set is the range of ω↦(b(ω),d(ω))\omega\mapsto(b(\omega),d(\omega))ω↦(b(ω),d(ω)), with a product-space symmetry predicate. No probability measure or measurability structure is used in these worst-case problems. Both stages may have integer coordinates designated by sets I1,I2I_1,I_2I1​,I2​; no continuous-only second-stage restriction is imposed.

Optimal values and worst-case costs use extended real numbers. An infeasible problem has value +∞+\infty+∞; a real infimum over an empty feasible set would incorrectly return a default zero. Symmetry includes a center belonging to the scenario range, so the scenario set is nonempty. Combined with nonnegative coordinates, symmetry bounds every scenario coordinate and makes the bounding-hypercube endpoints meaningful. The hypotheses retain c≥0c\ge0c≥0, b(ω)≥0b(\omega)\ge0b(ω)≥0, and d(ω)≥0d(\omega)\ge0d(ω)≥0, which the source uses in its factor-four estimate. A statement restricted to continuous recourse, an assumed optimal adaptive policy, or a zero-valued infeasible problem would not express this target.

The source prints Z+n2\mathbb Z_+^{n_2}Z+n2​​ in (1.5)–(1.6), although the model's second-stage integer count is p2p_2p2​; the domain here follows the surrounding p2p_2p2​ convention. Lemma 2.3 is stated here for nonnegative sets, the regime needed for its second inequality. Its coordinatewise suprema and infima agree with the printed maxima and minima in this bounded symmetric setting. Contributions to the shared domain and geometry lemmas, the mixed-integer scaling fact, and the optimal-value comparison are all useful to the goal.

Selected references

  • Dimitris Bertsimas and Vineet Goyal, On the Power of Robust Solutions in Two-Stage Stochastic and Adaptive Optimization Problems, authors' manuscript of Mathematics of Operations Research, 2010. DOI: 10.1287/moor.1090.0440.
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On the Power of Robust Solutions in Two-Stage Stochastic and Adaptive Optimization Problems 2: On the Non-Symmetric Uniform Simplex, the Robust Optimum Is at Least n + 1 Times the Stochastic OneResearch Paper

Motivation

Many operations problems are decided in two stages: a first-stage decision is fixed before an uncertain quantity is revealed, and a second-stage (recourse) decision is chosen afterwards. Two classical ways to optimize such a problem differ in how they treat the uncertainty. Two-stage stochastic optimization minimizes the expected cost under a probability distribution over scenarios, with a recourse decision adapted to each scenario. Robust optimization fixes a single solution that must be feasible for every scenario in an uncertainty set, and minimizes the worst-case cost. The robust problem is usually far easier to solve, but it is conservative; the question is how much it can lose.

Bertsimas and Goyal (Math. Oper. Res. 35(2), 2010) answer this for uncertain right-hand sides. Their main positive result (Theorem 2.1) bounds the stochasticity gap: if the uncertainty set and the probability measure are both symmetric, the robust optimum is at most twice the stochastic optimum. This mission formalizes the companion negative result, Theorem 2.6: once the uncertainty set is not symmetric, the gap is not bounded by any constant. The example is the simplest non-symmetric set in practice, the corner of the unit simplex, with the uniform distribution on it. It shows that the symmetry hypothesis in the positive result is not an artefact of the proof.

Setting

Fix matrices A∈Rm×n1A\in\mathbb R^{m\times n_1}A∈Rm×n1​, B∈Rm×n2B\in\mathbb R^{m\times n_2}B∈Rm×n2​ and costs c∈R+n1c\in\mathbb R^{n_1}_+c∈R+n1​​, d∈R+n2d\in\mathbb R^{n_2}_+d∈R+n2​​. Let Ω\OmegaΩ be a set of scenarios, b:Ω→R+mb:\Omega\to\mathbb R^m_+b:Ω→R+m​ the right-hand side realized in each scenario, and Ib(Ω)={b(ω)∣ω∈Ω}I_b(\Omega)=\{b(\omega)\mid\omega\in\Omega\}Ib​(Ω)={b(ω)∣ω∈Ω} the uncertainty set. Let μ\muμ be a probability measure on Ω\OmegaΩ.

  • The stochastic problem ΠStoch(b)\Pi_{\mathrm{Stoch}}(b)ΠStoch​(b) (1.1) chooses x≥0x\ge 0x≥0 and a second-stage policy y(ω)≥0y(\omega)\ge 0y(ω)≥0 with Ax+By(ω)≥b(ω)Ax+By(\omega)\ge b(\omega)Ax+By(ω)≥b(ω) for every ω∈Ω\omega\in\Omegaω∈Ω, minimizing cTx+Eμ[dTy(ω)]c^Tx+\mathbb E_\mu[d^Ty(\omega)]cTx+Eμ​[dTy(ω)]. Its optimal value is zStoch(b)z_{\mathrm{Stoch}}(b)zStoch​(b).
  • The robust problem ΠRob(b)\Pi_{\mathrm{Rob}}(b)ΠRob​(b) (1.2) chooses a single pair x≥0x\ge 0x≥0, y≥0y\ge 0y≥0 with Ax+By≥b(ω)Ax+By\ge b(\omega)Ax+By≥b(ω) for every ω\omegaω, minimizing cTx+dTyc^Tx+d^TycTx+dTy. Its optimal value is zRob(b)z_{\mathrm{Rob}}(b)zRob​(b).

In general some coordinates of xxx and yyy are required to be integers; in this mission's instance there are none. A set P⊆RnP\subseteq\mathbb R^nP⊆Rn is symmetric (Definition 1.2) if some u0∈Pu^0\in Pu0∈P satisfies u0+z∈P  ⟺  u0−z∈Pu^0+z\in P\iff u^0-z\in Pu0+z∈P⟺u0−z∈P for every z∈Rnz\in\mathbb R^nz∈Rn.

The instance of Theorem 2.6 has no first stage (n1=0n_1=0n1​=0, so A=0A=0A=0, c=0c=0c=0), n2=m=n≥3n_2=m=n\ge 3n2​=m=n≥3, B=InB=I_nB=In​, and d=en=(0,…,0,1)d=e_n=(0,\dots,0,1)d=en​=(0,…,0,1). The uncertainty set is the corner simplex (2.29)

Ib(Ω)={ b∈Rn  :  ∑j=1nbj≤1, b≥0 },I_b(\Omega)=\Big\{\,b\in\mathbb R^n \;:\; \sum_{j=1}^n b_j\le 1,\ b\ge 0\,\Big\},Ib​(Ω)={b∈Rn:j=1∑n​bj​≤1, b≥0},

and μ\muμ is the uniform probability measure on it: μ(S)=volume⁡({b(ω)∣ω∈S})/volume⁡(Ib(Ω))\mu(S)=\operatorname{volume}(\{b(\omega)\mid\omega\in S\})/\operatorname{volume}(I_b(\Omega))μ(S)=volume({b(ω)∣ω∈S})/volume(Ib​(Ω)).

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 2.6

On this instance,

zRob(b) ≥ (n+1)⋅zStoch(b).z_{\mathrm{Rob}}(b)\ \ge\ (n+1)\cdot z_{\mathrm{Stoch}}(b).zRob​(b) ≥ (n+1)⋅zStoch​(b).

The constant n+1n+1n+1 is the paper's, and it is exact: the robust optimum is 111 and the stochastic optimum is at most 1/(n+1)1/(n+1)1/(n+1).

Milestones

  1. Lemma 2.4. The corner simplex is not symmetric for n≥2n\ge 2n≥2.
  2. Robust side (p. 20). Every robust-feasible yyy has yj≥1y_j\ge 1yj​≥1 for all jjj, so zRob(b)≥1z_{\mathrm{Rob}}(b)\ge 1zRob​(b)≥1.
  3. Eq. (2.30). The policy y^(ω)=b(ω)\hat y(\omega)=b(\omega)y^​(ω)=b(ω) is feasible for ΠStoch(b)\Pi_{\mathrm{Stoch}}(b)ΠStoch​(b), so zStoch(b)≤Eμ[bn(ω)]z_{\mathrm{Stoch}}(b)\le\mathbb E_\mu[b_n(\omega)]zStoch​(b)≤Eμ​[bn​(ω)].
  4. Eq. (2.32), denominator. vol⁡(Ib(Ω))=1/n!\operatorname{vol}(I_b(\Omega))=1/n!vol(Ib​(Ω))=1/n!.
  5. Eq. (2.32), numerator. ∫Ib(Ω)xn dx=1/(n+1)!\int_{I_b(\Omega)}x_n\,dx=1/(n+1)!∫Ib​(Ω)​xn​dx=1/(n+1)!.
  6. Eqs. (2.31)–(2.32). Eμ[bn(ω)]=1/(n+1)\mathbb E_\mu[b_n(\omega)]=1/(n+1)Eμ​[bn​(ω)]=1/(n+1).

Significance

The result. Together with Theorem 2.1, Theorem 2.6 locates the boundary of the paper's positive theory. Theorem 2.1 says a static robust solution loses at most a factor of 222 against the fully adaptive stochastic optimum under symmetry; Theorem 2.6 says that without symmetry the factor can be n+1n+1n+1, hence arbitrarily large as the dimension grows. The paper's later results (the bound for "positive" uncertainty sets, Theorem 2.7) are motivated by this example: some structural condition replacing symmetry is necessary. The same instance also separates the adaptive problem from the stochastic one (p. 21), which shows that the gap comes from comparing a worst case with an expectation, not from the lack of adaptivity.

Formalizing it. The theorem is proved in the paper; no machine-checked version exists. The formalization adds two things beyond the paper. First, it pins down the problems as optimization problems over integrable policies with values in the extended reals, so that the inequality cannot hold for a degenerate reason. Second, it requires the volume of the corner simplex and the first moment of a coordinate on it, which the paper calls "standard computation". Neither is in Mathlib at the time of writing: Mathlib has the standard simplex as a convex set but no volume formula for it.

Difficulty

The optimization part is short: one feasible stochastic policy and the vertices of the simplex give both bounds. The work is in the measure theory. The volume 1/n!1/n!1/n! and the moment 1/(n+1)!1/(n+1)!1/(n+1)! are iterated integrals with variable upper limits, and the paper calls them "standard computation"; as statements about Lebesgue measure on Rn\mathbb R^nRn they are dimension-dependent identities that Mathlib does not contain, for the simplex or for the convex hull of n+1n+1n+1 points. The other technical point is the scenario model: the uniform measure lives on Ω\OmegaΩ, while the integrals live on Rn\mathbb R^nRn, so the expectation must be moved through the push-forward of μ\muμ by bbb.

Formalization scope

  • Vectors are Fin k → ℝ with the componentwise order; products are A *ᵥ x and c ⬝ᵥ x. The paper's nnn-th coordinate is index n−1n-1n−1 of Fin n, and ene_nen​ is lastUnit n.
  • The optimal values zRobz_{\mathrm{Rob}}zRob​ and zStochz_{\mathrm{Stoch}}zStoch​ are EReal infima over the feasible set, equal to +∞+\infty+∞ when the problem is infeasible. No optimal solution is assumed to exist.
  • Policies of ΠStoch(b)\Pi_{\mathrm{Stoch}}(b)ΠStoch​(b) are μ\muμ-integrable functions Ω→Rn\Omega\to\mathbb R^nΩ→Rn (the paper takes their expectation), and the constraints hold for every scenario, as printed, not almost surely.
  • The integer coordinates are given as a set of indices; the instance uses the empty set (p2=0p_2=0p2​=0, as in the displays on p. 20). The generic definitions keep the mixed-integer domain so that they agree with the other missions of this series.
  • The uniform measure is encoded by quantifying over every scenario model (Ω,μ,b)(\Omega,\mu,b)(Ω,μ,b) in which μ\muμ is a probability measure, bbb is measurable, the range of bbb is the corner simplex, and the push-forward of μ\muμ by bbb equals Lebesgue measure restricted to the simplex divided by its volume. The model Ω=\Omega=Ω= simplex, b=b=b= identity satisfies these hypotheses; the paper's formula for μ(S)\mu(S)μ(S) is read as a statement about this push-forward.
  • The hypothesis n≥3n\ge 3n≥3 is the paper's and is kept; the argument appears to need only n≥1n\ge 1n≥1.
  • Ruled out: a real-valued infimum for zStochz_{\mathrm{Stoch}}zStoch​, which would be a junk 000 on an infeasible problem and make the goal trivially true; an arbitrary measure, or a Dirac mass at the mean, in place of the uniform measure; and constraints only μ\muμ-almost surely.

Needed infrastructure: the volume of the corner simplex in Rn\mathbb R^nRn and the integral of a coordinate over it (reusable well beyond this mission, for example for Dirichlet distributions and order statistics), and the change of variables from Ω\OmegaΩ to Rn\mathbb R^nRn through the push-forward. Contributions of either simplex integral, in any form that implies the stated milestones, are welcome.

Selected references

  • D. Bertsimas, V. Goyal, On the power of robust solutions in two-stage stochastic and adaptive optimization problems, Mathematics of Operations Research 35(2), 284–305, 2010. https://doi.org/10.1287/moor.1090.0440 (formalized from the authors' manuscript, MIT DSpace / MIT Open Access Articles)
  • A. Ben-Tal, A. Nemirovski, Robust solutions of uncertain linear programs, Operations Research Letters 25(1), 1–13, 1999. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0167-6377(99)00016-4
  • D. Bertsimas, M. Sim, The price of robustness, Operations Research 52(1), 35–53, 2004. https://doi.org/10.1287/opre.1030.0065
  • J. R. Birge, F. Louveaux, Introduction to Stochastic Programming, 2nd ed., Springer, 2011. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4614-0237-4
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Functional Analysis·Captain: moona3k

Sharp diagonal Hlawka constants: lower the cutoff to 87Open Problem

This completed entry lowers the sufficient exponent cutoff for the sharp diagonal Hlawka formula from 90 to 87. The goal is already proved in Lean on Prove2Me: for every real p ≥ 87, the foundation's cyclic constant K_p is the least constant that works for every triple of complex coordinate vectors in every finite dimension.

The statement includes arbitrary unequal-norm and zero triples, as well as dimension zero. It uses the foundation's unchanged definitions and combines admissibility with uniform optimality. This concerns complex diagonal matrices; it does not claim the corresponding result for general matrices or settle the conjecture for all p ≥ 2.

Proved goal and supporting result

  • Sharp complex coordinate Hlawka constant for p ≥ 87: the goal, already Proved.
  • The real coordinate Hlawka bound for p ≥ 87: the supporting milestone, already Proved.

The campaign template is instantiated with value 87. Both items reference the existing accepted theorems.

Proof route and attribution

The proof extends the accepted cutoff-90 Lean development by BrunoDCDO, adapting Ezzeri Esa's construction and analytic argument. The contributions at cutoffs 89, 88 and 87 were submitted by moona3k.

For p ≥ 88, the proof uses the accepted cutoff-88 result. On 87 ≤ p ≤ 88, it retains the localization, box-convexity and cyclic-averaging argument, with confinement parameter q₀ = 5351/15000, an improved cyclic witness (3/(4p))^(1/p), sharper Taylor estimates and exact rational polynomial certificates.

Campaign context

The foundation established cutoff 256; the supplied argument was formalized at cutoff 90. The subsequent accepted results extend the same formula to cutoffs 89, 88 and 87. This entry records the proved cutoff 87 on the campaign timeline; the campaign's cutoff-85 mission remains open.

  • Sharp diagonal Hlawka campaign
  • Foundation and proved cutoff 256
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Functional Analysis·Captain: savarin

Sharp diagonal Hlawka constants: lower the cutoff to 85Open Problem

The Hlawka inequality for Schatten ppp-norms is a cousin of the triangle inequality: it relates the norms of three matrices to the norms of their pairwise sums and their total sum. The question is how large a comparison constant is needed to make this inequality hold.

This mission asks whether the best possible constant for complex diagonal matrices, already proved in Lean for every real p≥87p\ge87p≥87, also holds for every real p≥85p\ge85p≥85. This is an open problem: no proof is known. The constant is the one from the foundation mission: the largest comparison constant required by the cyclic family of three 3×33\times33×3 diagonal matrices. Because the accepted cutoff-87 theorem already covers every p≥87p\ge87p≥87, the new work is the range from 85 to 87.

The cutoff came down from 90 to 87 in a day, through moona3k's proofs at 89, 88 and 87. The 89 proof reran the cutoff-90 argument with sharper, second-order estimates. A numerical model of that argument with retuned constants puts its limit between about 86.6 and 87.5: two of its steps pull the same parameter in opposite directions, and below that point no setting satisfies both. So reaching 85 is expected to need a new idea, not just tighter numbers. The goal theorem below gives the exact statement.

This is an entry in the sharp diagonal Hlawka campaign, which asks for the smallest cutoff at which the same formula holds. Any proof for a cutoff of 85 or lower also settles this mission.

The broader question of optimal constants for Schatten norms appears in Audenaert and Kittaneh’s Problem 7. Extending the sharp diagonal constant to general matrices is a separate challenge.

References

  • K. M. R. Audenaert and F. Kittaneh, Problems and Conjectures in Matrix and Operator Inequalities, arXiv preprint, 2012, §8.2, Problem 7. arXiv:1201.5232
  • Ezzeri Esa, Hlawka–Schatten inequalities: sharp diagonal construction, Lean source repository, 2026, revision 79aa498bfcf7b22bd91d771fb32ec278e2d4704b. Source library
  • Ezzeri Esa and project contributors, The cyclic bound for every real p ≥ 90, research note with appendices and exact certificates, 2026. Research note

Established results on Prove2Me

  • The accepted sharp diagonal bound for every real p ≥ 87.
  • The accepted real coordinate bound for every real p ≥ 87.
  • The accepted diagonal Schatten norm identity.
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Operations ResearchOptimization·Captain: mikedeng1

Assortment Optimization under Variants of the Nested Logit Model 3: With Fully-Captured Nests, the Nested-by-Revenue LP Optimum Scaled by the Factor (6) Is Feasible for the Full LPResearch Paper

Motivation

Assortment optimization asks a retailer which products to offer when customers substitute among them. The nested logit model groups products into nests and is one of the most used choice models in revenue management, because it relaxes the independence of irrelevant alternatives of the plain multinomial logit model while keeping choice probabilities in closed form. Davis, Gallego and Topaloglu (Oper. Res. 62(2), 2014) study how the tractability of the assortment problem under this model depends on two features: whether the dissimilarity parameters of the nests are at most one, and whether a customer who selects a nest always buys there (fully-captured nests).

When the dissimilarity parameters are at most one and the nests are fully captured, offering the jjj highest-revenue products in every nest is optimal (Theorem 4 of the paper). This mission concerns what survives when a dissimilarity parameter exceeds one, the regime the paper calls possibly synergistic products. Then the problem is NP-hard (Theorem 5), and the paper shows that the same nested-by-revenue assortments still achieve an explicit, data-dependent fraction of the optimal expected revenue.

Setting

There are nests i∈Mi \in Mi∈M and products j∈N={1,…,n}j \in N = \{1, \dots, n\}j∈N={1,…,n} in every nest. Product jjj of nest iii has a revenue rijr_{ij}rij​ and a preference weight vij>0v_{ij} > 0vij​>0, ordered so that ri1≥ri2≥⋯≥rinr_{i1} \ge r_{i2} \ge \dots \ge r_{in}ri1​≥ri2​≥⋯≥rin​. Nest iii has a dissimilarity parameter γi>0\gamma_i > 0γi​>0, and v0≥0v_0 \ge 0v0​≥0 is the weight of leaving without choosing a nest. Throughout this mission the nests are fully captured: the within-nest no-purchase weights vi0v_{i0}vi0​ are zero. For an assortment Si⊆NS_i \subseteq NSi​⊆N in nest iii,

Vi(Si)=∑j∈Sivij,Ri(Si)=∑j∈SirijvijVi(Si),Ri(∅)=0,V_i(S_i) = \sum_{j \in S_i} v_{ij}, \qquad R_i(S_i) = \frac{\sum_{j \in S_i} r_{ij} v_{ij}}{V_i(S_i)}, \quad R_i(\emptyset) = 0,Vi​(Si​)=j∈Si​∑​vij​,Ri​(Si​)=Vi​(Si​)∑j∈Si​​rij​vij​​,Ri​(∅)=0,

and the expected revenue of (S1,…,Sm)(S_1, \dots, S_m)(S1​,…,Sm​) is

Π(S1,…,Sm)=∑i∈MVi(Si)γiRi(Si)v0+∑i∈MVi(Si)γi.\Pi(S_1, \dots, S_m) = \frac{\sum_{i \in M} V_i(S_i)^{\gamma_i} R_i(S_i)}{v_0 + \sum_{i \in M} V_i(S_i)^{\gamma_i}}.Π(S1​,…,Sm​)=v0​+∑i∈M​Vi​(Si​)γi​∑i∈M​Vi​(Si​)γi​Ri​(Si​)​.

Problem (2) maximizes Π\PiΠ; its optimal value is Z∗Z^*Z∗. The nested-by-revenue assortment Nij={1,…,j}N_{ij} = \{1, \dots, j\}Nij​={1,…,j} collects the jjj highest-revenue products of nest iii, with Ni0=∅N_{i0} = \emptysetNi0​=∅ and N+={0,1,…,n}N_+ = \{0, 1, \dots, n\}N+​={0,1,…,n}.

Problem (2) is equivalent to the linear program (3): minimize xxx subject to v0x≥∑iyiv_0 x \ge \sum_i y_iv0​x≥∑i​yi​ and yi≥Vi(Si)γi(Ri(Si)−x)y_i \ge V_i(S_i)^{\gamma_i}(R_i(S_i) - x)yi​≥Vi​(Si​)γi​(Ri​(Si​)−x) for every nest iii and every Si⊆NS_i \subseteq NSi​⊆N. Problem (4) keeps the second family of constraints only for candidate assortments; here the candidates are {Nij:j∈N+}\{N_{ij} : j \in N_+\}{Nij​:j∈N+​}, which gives a linear program with 1+m1 + m1+m variables and 1+m(1+n)1 + m(1 + n)1+m(1+n) constraints. The performance factor of the nested-by-revenue assortments is

α=max⁡i∈M, j=2,…,n{Ri(Ni,j−1)Ri(Nij)∧(Ri(Nij)Ri(Ni,j−1) Vi(Nij)γiVi(Ni,j−1)γi)},a∧b=min⁡{a,b}.(6)\alpha = \max_{i \in M,\ j = 2, \dots, n} \left\{ \frac{R_i(N_{i,j-1})}{R_i(N_{ij})} \wedge \left(\frac{R_i(N_{ij})}{R_i(N_{i,j-1})}\, \frac{V_i(N_{ij})^{\gamma_i}}{V_i(N_{i,j-1})^{\gamma_i}}\right) \right\}, \qquad a \wedge b = \min\{a, b\}. \tag{6}α=i∈M, j=2,…,nmax​{Ri​(Nij​)Ri​(Ni,j−1​)​∧(Ri​(Ni,j−1​)Ri​(Nij​)​Vi​(Ni,j−1​)γi​Vi​(Nij​)γi​​)},a∧b=min{a,b}.(6)

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 7

Assume vi0=0v_{i0} = 0vi0​=0 for every nest, γi>1\gamma_i > 1γi​>1 for some nest, positive revenues and n≥2n \ge 2n≥2. If (x^,y^)(\hat x, \hat y)(x^,y^​) is an optimal solution of (4) over the nested-by-revenue assortments, then

(αx^,αy^) is feasible for (3).(\alpha \hat x, \alpha \hat y) \ \text{is feasible for (3)}.(αx^,αy^​) is feasible for (3).

Combined with Theorem 1 of the paper this yields Z∗≤α Π(S^)Z^* \le \alpha\, \Pi(\hat S)Z∗≤αΠ(S^) for the assortment S^\hat SS^ read off the small linear program; that consequence is a companion item.

Milestones

  1. Problem (3) is a relaxation of the fractional problem (7), in which yiy_iyi​ dominates (∑jvijzij)γi[∑jrijvijzij/∑jvijzij−x]\big(\sum_j v_{ij} z_{ij}\big)^{\gamma_i}\big[\sum_j r_{ij} v_{ij} z_{ij} / \sum_j v_{ij} z_{ij} - x\big](∑j​vij​zij​)γi​[∑j​rij​vij​zij​/∑j​vij​zij​−x] for all zi∈[0,1]nz_i \in [0,1]^nzi​∈[0,1]n.
  2. Lemma 6: the inner maximization (8) of (7) has a solution of the form zi1=⋯=zi,k−1=1z_{i1} = \dots = z_{i,k-1} = 1zi1​=⋯=zi,k−1​=1, zik∈[0,1]z_{ik} \in [0,1]zik​∈[0,1], zi,k+1=⋯=zin=0z_{i,k+1} = \dots = z_{in} = 0zi,k+1​=⋯=zin​=0.
  3. y^i≥0\hat y_i \ge 0y^​i​≥0 and x^≥0\hat x \ge 0x^≥0.
  4. The inequalities (20) and (22) with the coefficients αik1=Ri(Ni,k−1)/Ri(Nik)\alpha^1_{ik} = R_i(N_{i,k-1})/R_i(N_{ik})αik1​=Ri​(Ni,k−1​)/Ri​(Nik​) and 1∨αik21 \vee \alpha^2_{ik}1∨αik2​.
  5. Ri(Nij)≤Ri(Ni,j−1)R_i(N_{ij}) \le R_i(N_{i,j-1})Ri​(Nij​)≤Ri​(Ni,j−1​), and Lemma 14: α≥1\alpha \ge 1α≥1 when some γi>1\gamma_i > 1γi​>1.
  6. The inequalities (24) and (25): αy^i\alpha \hat y_iαy^​i​ dominates the objective of (8) at αx^\alpha \hat xαx^ for every vector of Lemma 6's shape.

Two companion statements follow the goal: the bounds α≤ρ\alpha \le \rhoα≤ρ and α≤2κ\alpha \le 2\kappaα≤2κ when revenues, respectively preference weights, within each nest differ by at most the factors ρ\rhoρ, κ\kappaκ; and the guarantee Z∗≤α Π(S^)Z^* \le \alpha\, \Pi(\hat S)Z∗≤αΠ(S^).

Significance

Because problem (2) is NP-hard once a dissimilarity parameter exceeds one (Theorem 5 of the paper), an exact polynomial algorithm is not expected, and a guarantee for a polynomial-size candidate family is the natural substitute. Theorem 7 gives one with an explicit factor computed from the data: α≤ρ\alpha \le \rhoα≤ρ when revenues within each nest are balanced, α≤2κ\alpha \le 2\kappaα≤2κ when preference weights within each nest are balanced, and the nests may differ arbitrarily from one another. The same linear-programming argument (Theorem 1) is reused for partially-captured nests in §6 of the paper.

The result is proved in the paper (Appendix A.1); no machine-checked version is known. A formalization verifies an appendix argument that is stated with little detail, and fixes the conventions that the page leaves implicit, such as the value of the objective of (8) at zi=0z_i = 0zi​=0 and the role of the standing assumption that some γi\gamma_iγi​ exceeds one.

Difficulty

Theorem 7 is a feasibility statement for the exponentially many constraints of (3), one per subset of every nest, while optimality of (x^,y^)(\hat x, \hat y)(x^,y^​) only controls the n+1n + 1n+1 nested-by-revenue constraints per nest. The obvious approach, comparing each subset directly with a nested-by-revenue assortment, fails: when γi>1\gamma_i > 1γi​>1 the nested-by-revenue assortments are not optimal within a nest, and the example of §4.1 shows that they can lose an unbounded factor. The constant α\alphaα must absorb the gap between a fractional assortment and its two neighbouring nested-by-revenue assortments, which the dual-style solution (x^,y^)(\hat x, \hat y)(x^,y^​) of the small program does not see.

Formalization scope

Lean 4 with Mathlib. Nests form a finite type ι; products are Fin n, indexed from 000, so NijN_{ij}Nij​ is nbr n j = {k | k < j} and product kkk of the page is ⟨k - 1, _⟩. Powers are real powers (Real.rpow), and division is total (x/0=0x / 0 = 0x/0=0), which gives Ri(∅)=0R_i(\emptyset) = 0Ri​(∅)=0 and value 000 for the objective of (8) at zi=0z_i = 0zi​=0.

Standing assumptions in every statement: v0≥0v_0 \ge 0v0​≥0, vi0≥0v_{i0} \ge 0vi0​≥0, vij>0v_{ij} > 0vij​>0, rij≥0r_{ij} \ge 0rij​≥0, γi>0\gamma_i > 0γi​>0, revenues ordered within each nest (§1); vi0=0v_{i0} = 0vi0​=0 for every nest and γi>1\gamma_i > 1γi​>1 for some nest (§4, p. 16). Added and disclosed: rij>0r_{ij} > 0rij​>0 wherever (6) appears, so that no denominator of (6) vanishes; n≥2n \ge 2n≥2, the nonempty range of (6); v0>0v_0 > 0v0​>0 only in the guarantee Z∗≤α Π(S^)Z^* \le \alpha\,\Pi(\hat S)Z∗≤αΠ(S^), inherited from Theorem 1. The factor α\alphaα enters as a real number with the hypothesis that it is the greatest element of the set of terms of (6). An optimal solution of (4) is a feasible pair whose xxx is minimal among feasible pairs.

A trivializing formalization is ruled out: α\alphaα is the maximum of (6), not an arbitrary upper bound, and the goal states feasibility for the full program (3) over every subset of every nest, not for (7) or for the candidate collection.

Needed infrastructure: maximization of a continuous function on [0,1]n[0,1]^n[0,1]n, the greedy solution of a continuous knapsack, monotonicity of weighted averages and elementary real-power calculus. These are reusable beyond this mission. Proofs of any milestone, of the companions, and of the §4.1 example are welcome.

Selected references

  • J. M. Davis, G. Gallego, H. Topaloglu, Assortment optimization under variants of the nested logit model, Operations Research 62(2), 2014. https://doi.org/10.1287/opre.2014.1256 (formalized from the revised manuscript of June 18, 2013).
  • K. Talluri, G. van Ryzin, Revenue management under a general discrete choice model of consumer behavior, Management Science 50(1), 2004. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.1030.0147
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Operations ResearchOptimizationProbability·Captain: mikedeng1

Distributionally Robust Optimization Under Moment Uncertainty with Application to Data-Driven Problems 2: Worst-Case Distribution with Largest Covariance for Piecewise-Linear PortfoliosResearch Paper

Motivation

A portfolio manager who maximizes expected utility needs the distribution of asset returns, but in practice only estimates of its first two moments are available, and these estimates are themselves noisy. Distributionally robust optimization handles this by optimizing against the worst distribution in a set of plausible ones. Delage and Ye (Operations Research 58(3), 2010) proposed a set of distributions defined by confidence bounds on the mean and on the second-moment matrix, showed that the resulting problems are solvable in polynomial time for a large class of costs, and applied the framework to portfolio selection.

The set contains an upper bound on the covariance but no lower bound. Remark 1 of the paper says a lower bound "leads to important computational difficulties" and argues it should be unnecessary: for a concave utility, a less predictable market can only reduce expected utility, so the worst distribution should already have the largest covariance allowed. Proposition 3 in §5.2 turns this argument into a theorem for piecewise-linear concave utilities and unconstrained support. This mission formalizes Proposition 3 and the steps of its proof.

Setting

Let nnn assets have a random return vector ξ∈Rn\xi\in\mathbb R^nξ∈Rn, and let x∈Rnx\in\mathbb R^nx∈Rn be a portfolio, so the return is ξTx\xi^{\mathsf T}xξTx. A distribution of ξ\xiξ is a Borel probability measure on Rn\mathbb R^nRn with finite second moments. For symmetric matrices, A⪯BA\preceq BA⪯B (the Loewner order) means B−AB-AB−A is positive semidefinite.

Given a support set SSS, a centre μ0\mu_0μ0​, a positive definite matrix Σ0≻0\Sigma_0\succ0Σ0​≻0 and γ1≥0\gamma_1\ge0γ1​≥0, γ2>0\gamma_2>0γ2​>0, the distributional set of Assumption 3 is

D1(S,μ0,Σ0,γ1,γ2)={P : P(ξ∈S)=1, (E[ξ]−μ0)TΣ0−1(E[ξ]−μ0)≤γ1, E[(ξ−μ0)(ξ−μ0)T]⪯γ2Σ0}.\mathcal D_1(S,\mu_0,\Sigma_0,\gamma_1,\gamma_2)=\Big\{P\ :\ P(\xi\in S)=1,\ (\mathbb E[\xi]-\mu_0)^{\mathsf T}\Sigma_0^{-1}(\mathbb E[\xi]-\mu_0)\le\gamma_1,\ \mathbb E[(\xi-\mu_0)(\xi-\mu_0)^{\mathsf T}]\preceq\gamma_2\Sigma_0\Big\}.D1​(S,μ0​,Σ0​,γ1​,γ2​)={P : P(ξ∈S)=1, (E[ξ]−μ0​)TΣ0−1​(E[ξ]−μ0​)≤γ1​, E[(ξ−μ0​)(ξ−μ0​)T]⪯γ2​Σ0​}.

The second constraint, (1b), is the covariance constraint.

The utility is piecewise linear concave, u(y)=min⁡k∈{1,…,K}aky+bku(y)=\min_{k\in\{1,\dots,K\}}a_ky+b_ku(y)=mink∈{1,…,K}​ak​y+bk​ with K≥1K\ge1K≥1 pieces, and the cost of a return is −u-u−u:

h(x,ξ)=max⁡k (−ak ξTx−bk).h(x,\xi)=\max_{k}\ \big(-a_k\,\xi^{\mathsf T}x-b_k\big).h(x,ξ)=kmax​ (−ak​ξTx−bk​).

With estimates μ^\hat\muμ^​, Σ^≻0\hat\Sigma\succ0Σ^≻0 of the mean and covariance, the inner problem of the robust portfolio problem with unconstrained support and an exactly known mean (γ1=0\gamma_1=0γ1​=0) is

max⁡P∈D1(Rn,μ^,Σ^,0,γ2) EP[h(x,ξ)].(18)\max_{P\in\mathcal D_1(\mathbb R^n,\hat\mu,\hat\Sigma,0,\gamma_2)}\ \mathbb E_P\big[h(x,\xi)\big].\tag{18}P∈D1​(Rn,μ^​,Σ^,0,γ2​)max​ EP​[h(x,ξ)].(18)

The proof relates (18) to a semidefinite program in variables Λk∈Rn×n\Lambda_k\in\mathbb R^{n\times n}Λk​∈Rn×n, λk∈Rn\lambda_k\in\mathbb R^nλk​∈Rn, νk∈R\nu_k\in\mathbb Rνk​∈R:

max⁡ ∑k(−ak xTλk−bkνk)s.t.∑kΛk⪯γ2Σ^+μ^μ^T,  ∑kλk=μ^,  ∑kνk=1,  [ΛkλkλkTνk]⪰0.(19)\max\ \sum_k\big(-a_k\,x^{\mathsf T}\lambda_k-b_k\nu_k\big)\quad\text{s.t.}\quad \sum_k\Lambda_k\preceq\gamma_2\hat\Sigma+\hat\mu\hat\mu^{\mathsf T},\ \ \sum_k\lambda_k=\hat\mu,\ \ \sum_k\nu_k=1,\ \ \begin{bmatrix}\Lambda_k&\lambda_k\\\lambda_k^{\mathsf T}&\nu_k\end{bmatrix}\succeq0.\tag{19}max k∑​(−ak​xTλk​−bk​νk​)s.t.k∑​Λk​⪯γ2​Σ^+μ^​μ^​T,  k∑​λk​=μ^​,  k∑​νk​=1,  [Λk​λkT​​λk​νk​​]⪰0.(19)

Formalization targets

Goal: Proposition 3

For every γ1≥0\gamma_1\ge0γ1​≥0 (the mean-uncertainty radius of the robust portfolio problem (16); (18) is the case γ1=0\gamma_1=0γ1​=0),

∃ P∗∈D1(Rn,μ^,Σ^,γ1,γ2):EP∗[(ξ−μ^)(ξ−μ^)T]=γ2Σ^andEQ[h(x,ξ)]≤EP∗[h(x,ξ)]  ∀ Q∈D1(Rn,μ^,Σ^,γ1,γ2).\exists\,P^*\in\mathcal D_1(\mathbb R^n,\hat\mu,\hat\Sigma,\gamma_1,\gamma_2):\quad \mathbb E_{P^*}\big[(\xi-\hat\mu)(\xi-\hat\mu)^{\mathsf T}\big]=\gamma_2\hat\Sigma\quad\text{and}\quad \mathbb E_Q[h(x,\xi)]\le\mathbb E_{P^*}[h(x,\xi)]\ \ \forall\,Q\in\mathcal D_1(\mathbb R^n,\hat\mu,\hat\Sigma,\gamma_1,\gamma_2).∃P∗∈D1​(Rn,μ^​,Σ^,γ1​,γ2​):EP∗​[(ξ−μ^​)(ξ−μ^​)T]=γ2​Σ^andEQ​[h(x,ξ)]≤EP∗​[h(x,ξ)]  ∀Q∈D1​(Rn,μ^​,Σ^,γ1​,γ2​).

The worst-case expectation is attained, and at a distribution for which the covariance constraint holds with equality. The statement holds for every portfolio xxx, every K≥1K\ge1K≥1, every a,ba,ba,b, every μ^\hat\muμ^​, every Σ^≻0\hat\Sigma\succ0Σ^≻0, every γ1≥0\gamma_1\ge0γ1​≥0 and every γ2>0\gamma_2>0γ2​>0.

Milestones

  1. Every value of (18) is dominated by the value of a feasible point of (19).
  2. (19) has an optimal solution at which ∑kΛk=γ2Σ^+μ^μ^T\sum_k\Lambda_k=\gamma_2\hat\Sigma+\hat\mu\hat\mu^{\mathsf T}∑k​Λk​=γ2​Σ^+μ^​μ^​T.
  3. If [ΛλλTν]⪰0\begin{bmatrix}\Lambda&\lambda\\\lambda^{\mathsf T}&\nu\end{bmatrix}\succeq0[ΛλT​λν​]⪰0 and ν>0\nu>0ν>0, a random vector with mean λ/ν\lambda/\nuλ/ν and second moment Λ/ν\Lambda/\nuΛ/ν exists.
  4. The mixture ∑kνkPk\sum_k\nu_kP_k∑k​νk​Pk​ of such vectors, built from a tight feasible point with all νk>0\nu_k>0νk​>0, lies in D1\mathcal D_1D1​ and has second moment γ2Σ^\gamma_2\hat\Sigmaγ2​Σ^ about μ^\hat\muμ^​.
  5. The expected cost under that mixture is at least the objective value of (19) at the point.
  6. (18) and (19) have the same attained optimal value.

Significance

The proposition justifies a modelling decision of the whole paper: for portfolio problems with piecewise-linear concave utility, adding a lower bound γ3Σ0⪯E[(ξ−μ0)(ξ−μ0)T]\gamma_3\Sigma_0\preceq\mathbb E[(\xi-\mu_0)(\xi-\mu_0)^{\mathsf T}]γ3​Σ0​⪯E[(ξ−μ0​)(ξ−μ0​)T] (display (2)) to the distributional set cannot change the robust decision, so the computational difficulty that lower bound would cause is avoided at no loss. It also shows that, under these assumptions and with γ2=1\gamma_2=1γ2​=1, the paper's semidefinite formulation solves the known-moment portfolio problem of Popescu (2007) in polynomial time (Remark 4). The worst case is explicit: a finite mixture of distributions with prescribed first and second moments, read off an optimal solution of (19).

The result is proved in the paper; no machine-checked version is known. Formalizing it requires a moment-problem argument (from a distribution to a feasible point of an SDP) and its converse (from an SDP solution to a distribution), both of which are reusable for other moment-based distributionally robust results. The proposition concerns the robust portfolio problem with D1(Rn,μ^,Σ^,γ1,γ2)\mathcal D_1(\mathbb R^n,\hat\mu,\hat\Sigma,\gamma_1,\gamma_2)D1​(Rn,μ^​,Σ^,γ1​,γ2​); the paper's proof writes out only γ1=0\gamma_1=0γ1​=0 "for simplicity of our derivations". The goal states the proposition for every γ1≥0\gamma_1\ge0γ1​≥0; the milestones follow the written proof and are stated for γ1=0\gamma_1=0γ1​=0.

Difficulty

The obvious argument, "a concave utility prefers less spread, so the adversary maximizes spread", does not prove anything by itself: increasing the second-moment matrix of a given distribution in the Loewner order does not determine its law, and the expected cost depends on the whole law, not on the moments. The proof goes through the semidefinite program (19). Two steps carry the weight. First, every distribution in D1\mathcal D_1D1​ must be mapped to a feasible point of (19) with no smaller value, although the cost is only piecewise affine in ξ\xiξ. Second, an optimal point of (19) must be turned back into a distribution in D1\mathcal D_1D1​; this needs the existence of random vectors with prescribed first and second moments, and care with blocks where νk=0\nu_k=0νk​=0, which the paper sets aside "without loss of generality" although such a block can carry a nonzero Λk\Lambda_kΛk​ that the mixture would lose.

Formalization scope

  • Vectors are Fin n → ℝ; all Euclidean quantities are dot products, never the sup norm. Matrices are Matrix (Fin n) (Fin n) ℝ; A⪯BA\preceq BA⪯B is (B - A).PosSemidef; Σ0−1\Sigma_0^{-1}Σ0−1​ is Mathlib's matrix inverse, used only with Σ0≻0\Sigma_0\succ0Σ0​≻0.
  • A distribution is a Measure (Fin n → ℝ) that is a probability measure and whose coordinates are in L2L^2L2 (MemLp _ 2). This makes every mean, second moment and expected cost a genuine integral; without it a non-integrable expectation would evaluate to 000.
  • P(ξ∈S)=1P(\xi\in S)=1P(ξ∈S)=1 is an almost-everywhere statement; the goal uses S=RnS=\mathbb R^nS=Rn ("infinite support constraint"). The convexity of SSS, μ0∈int⁡S\mu_0\in\operatorname{int}Sμ0​∈intS and the separation oracle of Assumption 3 concern the paper's algorithms and are not part of the set.
  • The maximum of (18) is never a real supremum: the goal asserts a maximizer that dominates every member of the set. The cost uses a finite maximum over K≥1K\ge1K≥1 pieces ([NeZero K]).
  • Standing hypotheses: Σ^≻0\hat\Sigma\succ0Σ^≻0 (Assumption 3's Σ0≻0\Sigma_0\succ0Σ0​≻0, and endnote 1), γ2>0\gamma_2>0γ2​>0 (§3), γ1≥0\gamma_1\ge0γ1​≥0 (Assumption 3) in the goal; the milestones fix γ1=0\gamma_1=0γ1​=0 as the proof does. The portfolio xxx ranges over all of Rn\mathbb R^nRn; the simplex constraint (16b) plays no role in the inner problem, so dropping it only strengthens the statements.
  • The objective of (19) has the sign of the proof's final computation (p. 21), ∑k(−akxTλk−bkνk)\sum_k(-a_kx^{\mathsf T}\lambda_k-b_k\nu_k)∑k​(−ak​xTλk​−bk​νk​); display (19a) on p. 19 prints the opposite signs, a misprint.
  • Ruling out trivial readings: the goal requires both membership in D1\mathcal D_1D1​ with tight covariance and domination of every member of D1\mathcal D_1D1​. A distribution with covariance γ2Σ^\gamma_2\hat\Sigmaγ2​Σ^ alone, or a maximizer alone, would not suffice. The goal does not claim that every maximizer is tight; for K=1K=1K=1 the cost is linear and every member of D1\mathcal D_1D1​ is a maximizer.
  • Infrastructure needed: existence of distributions with prescribed mean and covariance (for instance multivariate Gaussians, or degenerate laws on a subspace), finite mixtures of measures and their moments, Schur complements of positive semidefinite block matrices, and compactness of the feasible set of (19). Proofs of the milestones in any order are welcome.

The source is the authors' draft of 20 February 2008 of the Operations Research paper; every page, display and label in this mission refers to that draft.

Selected references

  • E. Delage and Y. Ye, Distributionally robust optimization under moment uncertainty with application to data-driven problems, Operations Research 58(3):595–612, 2010 (authors' draft of 20 February 2008 used here). https://doi.org/10.1287/opre.1090.0741
  • I. Popescu, Robust mean-covariance solutions for stochastic optimization, Operations Research 55(1):98–112, 2007. https://doi.org/10.1287/opre.1060.0353
  • Y. Nesterov and A. Nemirovski, Interior-Point Polynomial Algorithms in Convex Programming, SIAM, 1994. https://doi.org/10.1137/1.9781611970791
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