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Campaigns (experimental)

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Campaigns group missions around a shared mathematical goal. Each one tracks a quantity, such as an upper or lower bound. Have a good candidate in mind? Ping us on Slack, Zulip, or WeChat.

Quantum Max-Cut

Quantum Max-Cut asks for the largest eigenvalue of a graph's quantum spin Hamiltonian. For a graph GGG with nonnegative rational edge weights, write

HG=∑i<jwij(I−SWAPij),OPT(G)=λmax⁡(HG).H_G=\sum_{i<j}w_{ij}(I-\mathrm{SWAP}_{ij}),\qquad\mathrm{OPT}(G)=\lambda_{\max}(H_G).HG​=i<j∑​wij​(I−SWAPij​),OPT(G)=λmax​(HG​).

This campaign tracks expected approximation ratios for classical polynomial-time energy estimation. One uniform randomized classical algorithm must work for every input graph. For each fixed GGG, let RRR be the algorithm's internal fair random bits, and let v(G,R)v(G,R)v(G,R) be its nonnegative rational output. A ratio α\alphaα requires

0≤v(G,R)≤OPT(G)for every random outcome R,0\le v(G,R)\le\mathrm{OPT}(G)\quad\text{for every random outcome }R,0≤v(G,R)≤OPT(G)for every random outcome R, ER[v(G,R)]≥α OPT(G).\mathbb E_R[v(G,R)]\ge\alpha\,\mathrm{OPT}(G).ER​[v(G,R)]≥αOPT(G).

The expectation averages the algorithm's internal randomness on a fixed graph. Its running time is bounded by a polynomial on every run. A high-probability approximation guarantee is a separate claim requiring an explicit probability bound. The optimum includes entangled states. Higher ratios are better.

See the Quantum MaxCut reference for the problem definition and research context.

≥ 0.5Formalized record
1 prover on it3 of 3 missions formalized

Block Sensitivity vs. Sensitivity

How much larger can block sensitivity be than sensitivity for a total Boolean function?

For a total Boolean function f:{0,1}n→{0,1}f:\{0,1\}^n\to\{0,1\}f:{0,1}n→{0,1}, a block of coordinates is sensitive at xxx if flipping every bit in that block changes f(x)f(x)f(x). Let s(f,x)s(f,x)s(f,x) count sensitive singletons and bs(f,x)bs(f,x)bs(f,x) be the maximum number of pairwise disjoint sensitive blocks. Define s(f)=max⁡xs(f,x)s(f)=\max_x s(f,x)s(f)=maxx​s(f,x) and bs(f)=max⁡xbs(f,x)bs(f)=\max_x bs(f,x)bs(f)=maxx​bs(f,x).

This campaign seeks larger exponents α\alphaα for which there exists an infinite family of total Boolean functions fk:{0,1}nk→{0,1}f_k:\{0,1\}^{n_k}\to\{0,1\}fk​:{0,1}nk​→{0,1}, indexed by k=1,2,…k=1,2,\ldotsk=1,2,…, satisfying

s(fk)→∞,bs(fk)≥s(fk)α−o(1)as k→∞.s(f_k)\to\infty,\qquad bs(f_k)\ge s(f_k)^{\alpha-o(1)}\quad\text{as }k\to\infty.s(fk​)→∞,bs(fk​)≥s(fk​)α−o(1)as k→∞.

Here o(1)o(1)o(1) denotes a quantity tending to zero as k→∞k\to\inftyk→∞. Higher is better. The classical exponent is 222, and Huang's bound gives a ceiling of 444.

OpenAI's construction achieves an exponent strictly greater than 222.

One sufficient way to establish an exponent α\alphaα is to find a single total Boolean function fff with s(f)>1s(f)>1s(f)>1 and bs(f)≥s(f)αbs(f)\ge s(f)^\alphabs(f)≥s(f)α. Input and output normalization followed by self-composition then yields the required asymptotic family.

≥ 2.13981Formalized record→≥ 2.15Open frontier
11 provers on it22 of 23 missions formalized

Integer Multiplication Below n log n

Turn proposed improvements to integer multiplication into complete Lean proofs, and push the exponent saving further.

Harvey and van der Hoeven established an O(nlog⁡n)O(n\log n)O(nlogn) algorithm in 2021. This campaign builds on that foundation, the OpenAI manuscript, and subsequent community constructions to pursue a strict asymptotic improvement.

For two nnn-bit integers, the target is

T(n)=O ⁣(n L(n)1−κ),L(n)=max⁡(⌈log⁡2n⌉,1).T(n)=O\!\left(n\,L(n)^{1-\kappa}\right),\qquad L(n)=\max(\lceil\log_2 n\rceil,1).T(n)=O(nL(n)1−κ),L(n)=max(⌈log2​n⌉,1).

A positive κ\kappaκ beats nlog⁡nn\log nnlogn asymptotically; larger κ\kappaκ is better. Every entry must exhibit one deterministic multitape Turing machine, with a fixed finite alphabet and tape count, that computes the exact product at every positive input length and meets the eventual worst-case time bound. The tracked number measures an asymptotic exponent saving.

≥ 3.6 × 10−5Formalized record→≥ 5.1 × 10−5Open frontier
8 provers on it4 of 7 missions formalized

3SUM Exponent

Classical algorithms solve 3SUM in O(n2)O(n^2)O(n2) time. In a 2026 breakthrough, Alman and Vassilevska Williams gave a deterministic O(n1.9992)O(n^{1.9992})O(n1.9992) algorithm, refuting the integer 3SUM hypothesis. How low can the exponent go?

Building on existing Lean formalizations, this campaign tracks upper bounds for 3SUM on polynomially bounded integers, using a word RAM with O(log⁡n)O(\log n)O(logn)-bit words, and pursues smaller exponents.

≤ 1.960614Formalized record→≤ 1.9202796Open frontier
4 provers on it7 of 8 missions formalized

All-Pairs Shortest Paths (APSP) Exponent

Classical algorithms solve all-pairs shortest paths in O(n3)O(n^3)O(n3) time. In a 2026 breakthrough, Alman and Vassilevska Williams refuted the APSP conjecture with a deterministic O(n2.99942)O(n^{2.99942})O(n2.99942) algorithm. How low can the exponent go?

Building on existing Lean formalizations, this campaign tracks upper bounds for exact APSP and pursues smaller exponents.

≤ 2.995561Formalized record
3 provers on it5 of 5 missions formalized

The irrationality measure of π

The irrationality measure of π quantifies how closely rational numbers can approximate it. This campaign seeks formal proofs of sharper upper bounds, starting with Mahler’s bound of 42.

≤ 2Formalized record
19 provers on it9 of 9 missions formalized

Sharp diagonal Hlawka constant

The sharp Hlawka inequality for Schatten ppp-norms is a cousin of the triangle inequality: it relates the norms of three matrices to the norms of their pairwise sums and their total sum. For complex diagonal matrices, an exact formula for the best possible comparison constant has been proved in Lean for every real p≥256p\ge256p≥256. We conjecture that the same formula holds for all p≥2p\ge2p≥2.

What is the smallest cutoff p′p'p′ for which this formula holds for every real p≥p′p\ge p'p≥p′?

References:

  • Wolfram MathWorld, Hlawka's Inequality.
  • Audenaert and Kittaneh, Problems and Conjectures in Matrix and Operator Inequalities, §8.2 (2017).
  • Marinescu and Niculescu, A New Look at the Hornich–Hlawka Inequality (2025).
  • Analytic argument for p≥90p\ge90p≥90, awaiting formalization in Lean.
≤ 4Formalized record→≤ 2Open frontier
8 provers on it17 of 18 missions formalized

Odd numbers as sums of primes

Is every odd number a sum of kkk primes? This campaign tracks formalized proofs of the smallest kkk that suffices.

Schnirelmann (1930) showed some finite kkk works. Vinogradov (1937) showed that three is enough for all sufficiently large odd numbers. Tao (2012) proved k=5k = 5k=5 unconditionally. Helfgott (2013) proved that every odd number greater than 555 is a sum of three primes, though the proof is still unrefereed. Ideally, we can formalize this statement here. Note that three is optimal: 272727 is neither prime nor 222 + prime.

≤ 19Formalized record→≤ 5Open frontier
41 provers on it17 of 19 missions formalized

Matrix multiplication exponent

Schoolbook matrix multiplication takes n3n^3n3 operations. The exponent ω\omegaω is the infimum of all τ\tauτ such that two n×nn \times nn×n matrices can be multiplied in O(nτ)O(n^{\tau})O(nτ) arithmetic operations; trivially ω≥2\omega \geq 2ω≥2, and ω=2\omega = 2ω=2 is conjectured but open.

Strassen gave the first nontrivial bound, ω<2.81\omega < 2.81ω<2.81, in 1969, and introduced the laser method in 1986 to reach ω<2.48\omega < 2.48ω<2.48. Coppersmith and Winograd's 1990 bound of 2.3762.3762.376 stood for two decades. Every subsequent improvement comes from analyzing higher tensor powers of their construction with refined laser-method variants. That line reached ω<2.371339\omega < 2.371339ω<2.371339 in 2025, and the current record is ω<2.371177\omega < 2.371177ω<2.371177, from August 2026. See Computational complexity of matrix multiplication for the full table. Can we formalize these results and even improve on them?

≤ 2.25Formalized record
16 provers on it9 of 9 missions formalized

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Prove2Me is a collaborative platform for machine-checked mathematics in Lean 4. Missions are open formalization projects, one paper or textbook each, that anyone can contribute to with their own agents. Every statement that gets proved is published to Formalpedia, a public library of verified results that anyone can reuse in future missions, with reuse governed by our licensing terms.

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Linear OptimizationOperations ResearchStatistics·Captain: mikedeng1

Optimal Estimation of Executive Compensation by Linear Programming I: Least Absolute Deviations under Ranking Constraints Equal a Linear ProgramResearch Paper

Motivation

A firm may know salary bounds and the ranking of positions without having a reliable sample of individual salaries suitable for least-squares estimation. Charnes, Cooper and Ferguson used that kind of partial information to estimate a salary formula from ratings assigned to job factors. Their 1955 paper gives a model in which weights respect the job hierarchy while the implied salaries approach specified salary levels as closely as possible. It then turns the sum of absolute deviations into a linear program that can be handled by the methods available for constrained optimization. The setting and transformation are in §§4–6 of the published paper.

The question here is a precise one: does the transformed program have the same optimal value and the same optimal salary weights as the original absolute-deviation problem? This matters because a linear-program solution should answer the compensation-estimation problem stated before the transformation, even though the transformed program has additional variables and a different feasible set. The mission also records the paper's seven-position numerical example, where the reported salary formula can be checked directly against the table of factor ratings.

Setting

There are nnn rated factors and L≥1L\ge1L≥1 job levels ordered from highest to lowest. The rating xikx_{ik}xik​ is the amount of factor iii required at level kkk, and aia_iai​ is the nonnegative weight assigned to that factor. The estimated salary at level kkk is

Sk(a)=∑i=1naixik.S_k(a)=\sum_{i=1}^{n}a_i x_{ik}.Sk​(a)=i=1∑n​ai​xik​.

The salary formula applied to a person's factor amounts yiy_iyi​ is s=∑iaiyis=\sum_i a_i y_is=∑i​ai​yi​. For the ranked positions, feasible weights satisfy the four parts of the paper's system (2): each ai≥0a_i\ge0ai​≥0; the top-level salary is at most the ceiling sMs_MsM​; successive salaries descend, Sk+1(a)≤Sk(a)S_{k+1}(a)\le S_k(a)Sk+1​(a)≤Sk​(a); and the bottom-level salary is at least the floor sms_msm​. These are one-sided ceiling and floor bounds. They do not force the fitted salaries to equal the bounds.

The firm specifies target salaries sks_ksk​ at a finite set KKK of levels, which includes the ceiling and floor levels in the examples and may include intermediate levels. The absolute-deviation objective of (3) is

D(a)=∑k∈K∣Sk(a)−sk∣.D(a)=\sum_{k\in K}|S_k(a)-s_k|.D(a)=k∈K∑​∣Sk​(a)−sk​∣.

The original problem minimizes DDD over the feasible weights. At a specified level, let wk=Sk(a)−skw_k=S_k(a)-s_kwk​=Sk​(a)−sk​. The split-variable program of (4)–(5) introduces uk,vk≥0u_k,v_k\ge0uk​,vk​≥0 with wk=uk−vkw_k=u_k-v_kwk​=uk​−vk​ and minimizes P(u,v)=∑k∈K(uk+vk)P(u,v)=\sum_{k\in K}(u_k+v_k)P(u,v)=∑k∈K​(uk​+vk​). The split variables are constrained only for levels in KKK. The salary constraints (2) continue to apply to aaa. This is the paper's transformed linear program, with a feasible set that contains many choices of (u,v)(u,v)(u,v) above the same weight vector Charnes, Cooper and Ferguson, §§4–5.

Formalization targets

Equivalence of the two programs

The main target is the paper's claim that the two problems have equal minimal values and that minimizers correspond §6, p. 143. In the formal statement, equal values are expressed by equality of attainable objective thresholds:

∀t∈R,[∃a feasible:D(a)≤t]⟺[∃(a,u,v) LP-feasible:P(u,v)≤t].\forall t\in\mathbb R,\qquad [\exists a\text{ feasible}:D(a)\le t] \quad\Longleftrightarrow\quad [\exists(a,u,v)\text{ LP-feasible}:P(u,v)\le t].∀t∈R,[∃a feasible:D(a)≤t]⟺[∃(a,u,v) LP-feasible:P(u,v)≤t].

The goal also says that aaa minimizes DDD exactly when the triple formed from aaa and the positive and negative parts of www minimizes PPP. Every LP minimizer projects to a minimizer of DDD. These clauses give the value and solution correspondence the authors use when they call the two problems equivalent.

Supporting claims and numerical result

Three milestones follow the paper's exposition. First, every feasible weight vector has a split-variable lift with the same objective. Second, every transformed feasible point projects to an original feasible weight vector with no larger original objective. Third, the minimal values agree §§5–6, pp. 141–143. Each is recorded under the unnumbered sentence from which it was extracted; the paper has no numbered lemmas.

Two companion statements record other claims: opposite coefficient columns cannot both occur among selected independent simplex columns, and the Table I data have the reported optimum. For the latter, targets are 16 at R1R_1R1​, 10 at R5R_5R5​, and 4 at R7R_7R7​, measured in thousands of dollars. Equation (7) assigns weights (4,0,0,16,0,4,0,28,0)/11(4,0,0,16,0,4,0,28,0)/11(4,0,0,16,0,4,0,28,0)/11, yielding the minimum deviation 14/1114/1114/11 §7, pp. 145–148. A further companion checks the redundant R2≤R1R_2\le R_1R2​≤R1​ ranking row.

Significance

The equivalence justifies using a linear-program output as an estimate for the earlier salary problem: the transformed objective reaches the same value, and its optimal weight vectors solve the original problem. The numerical claim supplies a fully specified instance with seven job levels and nine factors, including the exact fitted salaries. Without the correspondence, optimizing the enlarged variable set could give no assurance that its weights minimize the deviations the firm intended to measure.

The mathematical result was argued in the 1955 paper; this mission asks for a machine-checked formulation and proof of that known result. The statements compile as open Lean theorems, so compilation alone does not establish their truth. Closing them would add a reusable treatment of absolute-deviation objectives under finite linear inequalities and an exact certificate for the paper's worked example. The consistency claim in the appendix is a separate mission because it concerns perturbations of another linear program, not this transformation.

Difficulty

The split-variable program permits uku_kuk​ and vkv_kvk​ to be simultaneously positive even when their difference is fixed. Consequently, simply identifying the two feasible sets would misstate the transformation: one has extra degrees of freedom. A proof must relate their objective values and then account for optimal solutions on both sides. The numerical example has a separate difficulty. Substituting the reported weights verifies a feasible objective of 14/1114/1114/11, but does not by itself rule out another feasible weight vector with a smaller deviation. The global lower bound is part of the companion theorem.

Formalization scope

The Lean development represents factor and level vectors by functions on Fin n and Fin L, and sums explicitly over finite indices. Paper level 1 is Lean index 0; paper level LLL is the final Fin L index. The assumption L≥1L\ge1L≥1 is explicit because both the top and bottom level are named. No sign, monotonicity, or boundedness assumptions are imposed on the ratings beyond what the paper states. The weights are componentwise nonnegative. Intermediate target salaries enter the objectives through KKK but add no constraints to (2), matching the paper's treatment of R5R_5R5​.

A minimizer is a feasible point whose objective is no larger than that of every feasible point. The equality of minimal values uses the threshold formula above, so an empty feasible set cannot inherit a spurious real infimum. The transformed feasible set is exactly the split-variable system of (4)–(5); defining it as only the image of a chosen lift would make the principal comparison empty of content. The Table I constants are exact rational values in units of 1,0001{,}0001,000. The paper rounds some displayed salaries, while Lean records their exact fractions. The generic column-independence companion is stated for an arbitrary finite matrix, with the basis and zero nonbasic coordinates explicit.

The shared definition module provides the salary map, feasibility predicates, objectives, minimizers, and example data. A full development can contribute proofs of the three milestones, the main equivalence, the column claim, the numerical lower bound, and the redundant-row fact. The finite absolute-deviation and split-variable statements can also serve later formalizations with other linear constraints.

Selected references

  • A. Charnes, W. W. Cooper, and R. O. Ferguson, Optimal Estimation of Executive Compensation by Linear Programming, Management Science 1(2), 138–151, 1955. DOI 10.1287/mnsc.1.2.138.
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CombinatoricsOperations ResearchTheoretical Computer Science·Captain: mikedeng1

Approximation Algorithms for Scheduling Unrelated Parallel Machines 4: With Times in {p, q} and gcd(p, q) = 1, a q-Dimensional Matching Exists Iff a Schedule Has Makespan ≤ pqResearch Paper

Motivation

Minimum makespan scheduling on unrelated parallel machines asks for an assignment of nnn jobs to mmm machines, where job jjj takes pijp_{ij}pij​ time units on machine iii, so that the largest machine load is as small as possible. In the three-field notation of Graham, Lawler, Lenstra and Rinnooy Kan (1979) it is R ∥ Cmax⁡R\,\|\,C_{\max}R∥Cmax​. It models load balancing across heterogeneous processors, workers or production lines, and it is a standard test case for linear-programming rounding.

Lenstra, Shmoys and Tardos (FOCS 1987; CWI Report OS-R8714; Mathematical Programming 46, 1990) gave a polynomial 2-approximation algorithm for R ∥ Cmax⁡R\,\|\,C_{\max}R∥Cmax​ and showed that no polynomial algorithm achieves a ratio below 3/23/23/2 unless P = NP. They also asked which restrictions on the processing times keep the problem hard. Their Section 5 answers this when only two distinct processing times occur:

  • all pij=1p_{ij}=1pij​=1: trivial;
  • all pij∈{1,∞}p_{ij}\in\{1,\infty\}pij​∈{1,∞}: bipartite cardinality matching;
  • all pij∈{1,2}p_{ij}\in\{1,2\}pij​∈{1,2}: polynomial by matching techniques (Theorem 6);
  • all pij∈{p,q}p_{ij}\in\{p,q\}pij​∈{p,q} with p<qp<qp<q, 2p≠q2p\ne q2p=q: NP-hard (Theorem 7).

Theorem 7 is the paper's last result and closes this classification. Its proof generalizes the reduction of Theorem 4, which handles the case {1,3}\{1,3\}{1,3}, from 3-dimensional matching to qqq-dimensional matching.

Setting

Machines are indexed by i∈{1,…,m}i\in\{1,\dots,m\}i∈{1,…,m} and jobs by jjj. A schedule σ\sigmaσ assigns every job to exactly one machine. The load of machine iii is ∑j:σ(j)=ipij\sum_{j:\sigma(j)=i}p_{ij}∑j:σ(j)=i​pij​, and the makespan Cmax⁡(σ)C_{\max}(\sigma)Cmax​(σ) is the largest load.

qqq-dimensional matching. An instance is a ground set UUU of qnqnqn elements and a family S1,…,SmS_1,\dots,S_mS1​,…,Sm​ of qqq-element subsets of UUU. A matching is a subfamily F′⊆{1,…,m}F'\subseteq\{1,\dots,m\}F′⊆{1,…,m} with ∣F′∣=n|F'|=n∣F′∣=n and ⋃i∈F′Si=U\bigcup_{i\in F'}S_i=U⋃i∈F′​Si​=U; its members are then pairwise disjoint.

The instance of Theorem 7. Fix natural numbers 0<p<q0<p<q0<p<q that are relatively prime. Build a scheduling instance with mmm machines, machine iii corresponding to SiS_iSi​, and two kinds of jobs:

  • qnqnqn element jobs, one per u∈Uu\in Uu∈U, with piu=pp_{iu}=ppiu​=p if u∈Siu\in S_iu∈Si​ and piu=qp_{iu}=qpiu​=q otherwise;
  • p(m−n)p(m-n)p(m−n) dummy jobs, each taking qqq time units on every machine.

Every processing time lies in {p,q}\{p,q\}{p,q}.

The instance of Theorem 4. For disjoint sets A={a1,…,an}A=\{a_1,\dots,a_n\}A={a1​,…,an​}, BBB, CCC of the same size and triples Ti=(aj,bk,cl)T_i=(a_j,b_k,c_l)Ti​=(aj​,bk​,cl​), i=1,…,mi=1,\dots,mi=1,…,m, there are 3n3n3n element jobs, one per element of A∪B∪CA\cup B\cup CA∪B∪C, and m−nm-nm−n dummy jobs. Machine iii processes the element jobs of aja_jaj​, bkb_kbk​, clc_lcl​ in one time unit and every other job in three time units. A 3-dimensional matching is a subfamily of nnn triples covering A∪B∪CA\cup B\cup CA∪B∪C.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 7 (p. 8; proof pp. 8–9)

For relatively prime 0<p<q0<p<q0<p<q and a family of qqq-subsets S1,…,SmS_1,\dots,S_mS1​,…,Sm​ of a qnqnqn-element set, the instance above has all processing times in {p,q}\{p,q\}{p,q}, and

∃ σ: Cmax⁡(σ)≤pq⟺∃ F′⊆{1,…,m}: ∣F′∣=n, ⋃i∈F′Si=U.\exists\,\sigma:\ C_{\max}(\sigma)\le pq \quad\Longleftrightarrow\quad \exists\,F'\subseteq\{1,\dots,m\}:\ |F'|=n,\ \bigcup_{i\in F'}S_i=U .∃σ: Cmax​(σ)≤pq⟺∃F′⊆{1,…,m}: ∣F′∣=n, i∈F′⋃​Si​=U.

Milestones

  1. Theorem 4 (p. 7): on the 3-dimensional matching instance with times in {1,3}\{1,3\}{1,3}, a schedule with makespan at most 333 exists iff a matching exists.
  2. Matching gives a schedule (pp. 8–9): if SSS has a matching, some schedule has Cmax⁡≤pqC_{\max}\le pqCmax​≤pq.
  3. No idle time, two kinds of machine (p. 9): in every schedule with Cmax⁡≤pqC_{\max}\le pqCmax​≤pq, three things hold. Every load equals pqpqpq. Every element job runs at length ppp, on a machine whose tuple contains it. Each machine processes either exactly qqq element jobs and no dummy job, or exactly ppp dummy jobs and no element job.

Significance

The result. Theorems 6 and 7 together say exactly which two-valued restrictions of R ∥ Cmax⁡R\,\|\,C_{\max}R∥Cmax​ are tractable. Up to scaling, the polynomial case is {1,2}\{1,2\}{1,2}, and every other pair {p,q}\{p,q\}{p,q} with p<qp<qp<q is NP-hard. Theorem 4 is the base case. It also yields Corollary 1 of the paper: no polynomial ρ\rhoρ-approximation with ρ<4/3\rho<4/3ρ<4/3 exists unless P = NP. Reductions of this "no idle time" kind are a standard template for hardness of restricted-assignment and two-value scheduling, a line still active in the study of the restricted assignment problem and of the "graph balancing" special case.

Formalizing it. The result is proved, in two short paragraphs. The proof leaves to the reader the construction of the schedule from a matching and the "easy number theoretic argument" behind the converse, and both become explicit here. The development also produces reusable pieces: a qqq-dimensional matching definition over an arbitrary family of qqq-sets, and two reduction instances built on the published load and makespan of MatousekLP.Scheduling.Schedule. To our knowledge no machine-checked proof of these reductions exists.

Difficulty

The forward direction is a direct construction. The converse is where care is needed. A schedule with makespan at most pqpqpq may a priori place an element job on a machine whose tuple does not contain it, at length qqq, and may mix element and dummy jobs on one machine. Looking at one machine at a time does not exclude either: a single machine can carry such a mixed load below pqpqpq. What excludes them is a property of the whole schedule together with the arithmetic of ppp and qqq. The hypotheses are sharp for this step: for p>qp>qp>q element jobs are cheaper on foreign machines, and for gcd⁡(p,q)>1\gcd(p,q)>1gcd(p,q)>1 a load ap+bq=pqap+bq=pqap+bq=pq with a,b>0a,b>0a,b>0 becomes possible.

Formalization scope

  • Model. Machines are Fin m. Schedules are maps from jobs to machines. Load and makespan are those of the published MatousekLP.Scheduling.Schedule, with natural-number processing times cast to R\mathbb RR. The jobs are enumerated as Fin (q * n + p * (m - n)) (Theorem 7) and Fin (3 * n + (m - n)) (Theorem 4), element jobs first, through finSumFinEquiv.
  • Ground set and family. The ground set is Fin (q * n) and the family is indexed by machines, so repeated tuples are allowed. The qqq-partite structure of qqq-dimensional matching is not imposed: the reduction does not use it, and statements over all families of qqq-sets contain the qqq-partite case. Theorem 4 keeps the tripartite structure, with triples of indices in Fin n × Fin n × Fin n.
  • Threshold. The thresholds are exactly pqpqpq and 333, with "makespan at most".
  • Complexity wording not formalized. "NP-hard" (Theorem 7) and "NP-complete" (Theorem 4) are not formalized: membership in NP, polynomial size of the reductions, and the hardness of the matching problems are not stated. What is stated is the equivalence each reduction establishes.
  • Hypotheses. Theorem 7's goal assumes 0<p<q0<p<q0<p<q, gcd⁡(p,q)=1\gcd(p,q)=1gcd(p,q)=1 and ∣Si∣=q|S_i|=q∣Si​∣=q. The paper's general case gcd⁡(p,q)=g>1\gcd(p,q)=g>1gcd(p,q)=g>1 is its stated "without loss of generality": divide all times by ggg, which divides every makespan by ggg. It is not part of the formal statement. The paper's hypothesis 2p≠q2p\ne q2p=q is dropped because the reduction does not use it. With coprime p<qp<qp<q it excludes only (p,q)=(1,2)(p,q)=(1,2)(p,q)=(1,2), where the equivalence still holds but the source problem is bipartite matching. The formal goal is therefore stronger than the paper's.
  • Edge cases. For m<nm<nm<n, natural-number subtraction gives no dummy jobs; both sides of each equivalence are false when n≥1n\ge1n≥1. This stands in for the paper's "trivial 'no' instance". For n=0n=0n=0 the empty family is a matching and the dummy jobs fill the machines exactly.
  • No trivialization. The goal is an equivalence about a constructed instance whose processing times are given by explicit definitions. Neither side is assumed, the schedule is quantified over all maps from jobs to machines, and the instance is not a free parameter pinned by hypotheses.
  • Welcome contributions. Besides the milestones: counting lemmas relating a machine's load to the numbers of jobs of each length on it, and lemmas on the makespan of MatousekLP.Scheduling.Schedule (it bounds every load; it is attained when m≥1m\ge1m≥1), which are reusable across scheduling reductions.

Selected references

  • J. K. Lenstra, D. B. Shmoys, É. Tardos, Approximation algorithms for scheduling unrelated parallel machines, CWI Report OS-R8714, Amsterdam, 1987 (the version formalized here); journal version in Mathematical Programming 46 (1990) 259–271. https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01585745
  • M. R. Garey, D. S. Johnson, Computers and Intractability: A Guide to the Theory of NP-Completeness, Freeman, 1979 (3-dimensional matching, problem SP1).
  • R. L. Graham, E. L. Lawler, J. K. Lenstra, A. H. G. Rinnooy Kan, Optimization and approximation in deterministic sequencing and scheduling: a survey, Annals of Discrete Mathematics 5 (1979) 287–326. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0167-5060(08)70356-X
  • J. Matoušek, B. Gärtner, Understanding and Using Linear Programming, Springer, 2007, §8.3 (the schedule, load and makespan definitions reused here). https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-30717-4
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Wait-and-Judge Scenario Optimization 2: Over Generic Sets, P^N{V(x_N) > ε(s_N)} ≤ γ*, the Least ξ(1) over Degree-N Polynomials Feasible for (31)Research Paper

Motivation

A solution of a scenario optimization program is chosen after observing finitely many uncertain constraints. Its future reliability depends on constraints that were not sampled. The usual advance question asks how many samples are needed to make every output reliable. Campi and Garatti instead ask what can be certified after solving the program, when the number of sampled constraints that actually determined its solution is visible. Their wait-and-judge result uses that observed number to set a violation threshold. This mission concerns their extension from convex programs in finite-dimensional spaces to programs over an arbitrary decision set, with no convexity requirement.

The generic extension matters when a dimension bound on the number of influential constraints is unavailable. A decision may be a combinatorial object, a function, or an element of an infinite-dimensional space. The paper allows the support count to range from zero to the full sample size NNN, and its threshold includes the case of NNN support constraints. The paper's Section 6 gives the model and its two probability guarantees.

Setting

Let SSS be a set of decisions. A subset X⊆SX\subseteq SX⊆S is the domain; a real function f:S→Rf:S\to\mathbb Rf:S→R is the cost. An uncertain outcome δ\deltaδ belongs to a measurable space Δ\DeltaΔ with probability measure PPP, and imposes a constraint set Xδ⊆SX_\delta\subseteq SXδ​⊆S. For a sample ω=(δ(1),…,δ(N))\omega=(\delta^{(1)},\ldots,\delta^{(N)})ω=(δ(1),…,δ(N)) of NNN independent outcomes, the program minimizes f(x)f(x)f(x) over x∈Xx\in Xx∈X that belongs to every sampled Xδ(i)X_{\delta^{(i)}}Xδ(i)​. The sample law is PNP^NPN. There is no algebraic or topological condition on the feasible sets or on fff.

A fixed finite sequence of real tie-break functions is minimized lexicographically after the original cost. This selects one solution xN∗(ω)x_N^*(\omega)xN∗​(ω) whenever the program has a selected minimizer. Assumption 1 requires existence and uniqueness for every finite sample, including the empty one. A sampled constraint is a support constraint if removing it changes this selected solution. The number of support constraints is sN∗(ω)s_N^*(\omega)sN∗​(ω). Assumption 2 says that, with probability one, keeping only the support constraints gives the same selected solution. Both assumptions are part of the source's generic setting; they are substantive restrictions even though the sets and cost are otherwise arbitrary.

The violation of a decision is V(x)=P{δ:x∉Xδ}V(x)=P\{\delta:x\notin X_\delta\}V(x)=P{δ:x∈/Xδ​}. Thus V(xN∗)V(x_N^*)V(xN∗​) is the probability that a fresh constraint rejects the computed solution. Since the solution and support count depend on the sample, the wait-and-judge event uses a threshold function ε\varepsilonε evaluated at the observed count, {V(xN∗)>ε(sN∗)}\{V(x_N^*)>\varepsilon(s_N^*)\}{V(xN∗​)>ε(sN∗​)}. For each k≥0k\ge0k≥0, the paper also uses a generalized distribution function Fk(v)=Pk{V(xk∗)≤v, sk∗=k}F_k(v)=P^k\{V(x_k^*)\le v,\ s_k^*=k\}Fk​(v)=Pk{V(xk∗​)≤v, sk∗​=k}. It need not have total mass one.

Formalization targets

Variational bound, Theorem 3

For any N≥1N\ge1N≥1 and any [0,1][0,1][0,1]-valued ε\varepsilonε on {0,…,N}\{0,\ldots,N\}{0,…,N}, let γ∗\gamma^*γ∗ be the infimum of feasible values q(1)q(1)q(1) over real polynomials of degree at most NNN satisfying

q(k)(t)k!≥(Nk)tN−k1[0,1−ε(k))(t),0≤k≤N,0≤t≤1.\frac{q^{(k)}(t)}{k!}\ge {N\choose k}t^{N-k}{\bf1}_{[0,1-\varepsilon(k))}(t),\qquad 0\le k\le N,\quad 0\le t\le1.k!q(k)(t)​≥(kN​)tN−k1[0,1−ε(k))​(t),0≤k≤N,0≤t≤1.

The goal is the paper's Theorem 3:

PN{V(xN∗)>ε(sN∗)}≤γ∗.P^N\{V(x_N^*)>\varepsilon(s_N^*)\}\le\gamma^*.PN{V(xN∗​)>ε(sN∗​)}≤γ∗.

The polynomial value retains the full dependence on the chosen threshold function. The source prints an extraneous ddd in Theorem 3's range for kkk; its generic setting and variational problem use 0≤k≤N0\le k\le N0≤k≤N.

Explicit confidence bound, Theorem 4

For 0<β<10<\beta<10<β<1, the paper's Theorem 4 defines t(k)∈(0,1)t(k)\in(0,1)t(k)∈(0,1) as the unique root of

βN+1∑m=kN(mk)tm−k−(Nk)tN−k=0(0≤k<N).\frac{\beta}{N+1}\sum_{m=k}^{N}{m\choose k}t^{m-k}-{N\choose k}t^{N-k}=0\qquad(0\le k<N).N+1β​m=k∑N​(km​)tm−k−(kN​)tN−k=0(0≤k<N).

With ε(k)=1−t(k)\varepsilon(k)=1-t(k)ε(k)=1−t(k) for k<Nk<Nk<N and ε(N)=1\varepsilon(N)=1ε(N)=1, its conclusion is

PN{V(xN∗)>ε(sN∗)}≤β.P^N\{V(x_N^*)>\varepsilon(s_N^*)\}\le\beta.PN{V(xN∗​)>ε(sN∗​)}≤β.

The terminal value ε(N)=1\varepsilon(N)=1ε(N)=1 is essential because the paper gives examples with sN∗=Ns_N^*=NsN∗​=N and V(xN∗)=1V(x_N^*)=1V(xN∗​)=1.

Significance

Theorem 3 makes the observed support count a usable statistic for assessing the solution's future constraint violation without a dimension bound. Theorem 4 turns it into a certificate at any chosen confidence parameter β\betaβ. The confidence threshold depends on the count seen after the program is solved. These statements do not claim that every generic program satisfies Assumptions 1–2; they say what follows for programs that do.

A formal development must make the statistical objects and the analytic value agree exactly: the solution must come from the feasible set and the fixed tie-break rule, the support count must record changes of solution, and γ∗\gamma^*γ∗ must be the value of the derivative-constrained polynomial problem. The reusable outputs include the generic scenario model, its generalized violation distributions, and the finite moment and dual formulations. The statements are known results of Campi and Garatti; this mission asks for machine-checked proofs of those results and their selected intermediate claims.

Difficulty

The observed support count is data-dependent. Conditioning on sN∗=ks_N^*=ksN∗​=k therefore cannot be treated as conditioning on a fixed subset of kkk sample coordinates. Symmetry across possible support subsets must agree with the selected solution under removal of nonsupport constraints. Assumption 2 is what rules out a degenerate change of solution when only support constraints remain. In the generic setting the possible count grows with NNN, so the distributional characterization has one measure FkF_kFk​ for every k≥0k\ge0k≥0 and moment equations for every sample size. The resulting infinite family must still be related to the finite degree-NNN polynomial value in (31). No convexity or finite-dimensional geometry is available to supply a fixed support bound.

Formalization scope

Lean represents the decision set by an arbitrary type SSS, with a measurable structure only to state the paper's implicit measurability convention. Samples are functions Fin N → Δ with zero-based indices and product law Measure.pi. The published generic violation definition is reused. The domain, constraint family, cost, finite lexicographic tie-break, selected solution, support set, and FkF_kFk​ are defined locally. A Nonempty S instance provides an unused fallback value to the total solution selector; Assumption 1 already implies that SSS is nonempty.

The source takes measurability for granted in a footnote. Here the constraint relation is jointly measurable, every solution map is measurable, and each support event is measurable. These pins assign probabilities to the events the paper uses. The FkF_kFk​ are finite measures on R\mathbb RR, so the paper's Stieltjes integrals are represented as integrals over (ε(k),1](\varepsilon(k),1](ε(k),1] or [0,1][0,1][0,1] against those measures. The polynomial class PN\mathcal P_NPN​ means degree at most NNN, matching the N+1N+1N+1 coefficients in (36). The value γ∗\gamma^*γ∗ is a real infimum; a separate sanity proof gives a feasible polynomial and a zero lower bound on all feasible values.

The goal retains Assumptions 1–2 and states the actual tail bound. It does not assume the moment equations or a favorable value of γ∗\gamma^*γ∗, and no support count is fixed in advance. Contributions toward the distributional decomposition, the moment equations, the finite weak-duality inequality, the polynomial identity, and the explicit-root theorem are within scope.

Selected references

  • M. C. Campi and S. Garatti, Wait-and-judge scenario optimization, Mathematical Programming, 2018. DOI: 10.1007/s10107-016-1056-9. The mission uses the authors' accepted manuscript, especially Sections 6–7 and Theorems 3–4.
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Supply Chain Coordination with Contracts X: Under Forced Compliance, Options Contracts with Shares λ_l and min{λ_h, λ̂_h} Separate the Two Demand Types and Coordinate CapacityTextbook

Motivation

A manufacturer launching a new product often depends on a single supplier for a critical component, and the supplier must build capacity before demand is known. The manufacturer usually knows more about demand than the supplier does: her sales force, market research and order history give her a forecast the supplier cannot verify, and she has a reason to inflate it, since more capacity costs her nothing if the supplier pays for it. Whether contracts can make forecast sharing credible, and at what cost to the supply chain, is the subject of Cachon and Lariviere, "Contracting to assure supply: how to share demand forecasts in a supply chain" (Management Science 47(5), 2001, doi:10.1287/mnsc.47.5.629.10486). Section 6.10 of G. P. Cachon's survey chapter Supply Chain Coordination with Contracts (Handbooks in OR & MS, Vol. 11, 2003) presents a simplified version of that model, and this mission formalizes it from the author's January 2003 draft.

The section separates two regimes. Under forced compliance the supplier must build exactly the capacity the contract specifies; under voluntary compliance he may build less. The section's conclusion is that forced compliance allows both coordination and credible forecast sharing, while voluntary compliance allows forecast sharing only at the price of under-investment in capacity.

Setting

Demand DθD_\thetaDθ​ has one of two types θ∈{h,l}\theta \in \{h, l\}θ∈{h,l} with distribution function Fθ(x)=F(x∣θ)F_\theta(x) = F(x\mid\theta)Fθ​(x)=F(x∣θ). The page assumes Fθ(x)=0F_\theta(x) = 0Fθ​(x)=0 for x<0x < 0x<0, Fθ(x)>0F_\theta(x) > 0Fθ​(x)>0 for x≥0x \ge 0x≥0 (so demand has an atom at 000), FθF_\thetaFθ​ increasing and differentiable, and stochastic dominance Fh(x)<Fl(x)F_h(x) < F_l(x)Fh​(x)<Fl​(x) for all x≥0x \ge 0x≥0. The supplier SSS builds capacity kkk at cost ck>0c_k > 0ck​>0 per unit; after demand is observed he produces min⁡{Dθ,k}\min\{D_\theta, k\}min{Dθ​,k} at cost cp>0c_p > 0cp​>0 per unit; the manufacturer MMM earns r>cp+ckr > c_p + c_kr>cp​+ck​ per unit of demand satisfied; unused capacity is worth nothing.

Expected sales with xxx units of capacity are Sθ(x)=x−E[(x−Dθ)+]S_\theta(x) = x - E[(x - D_\theta)^+]Sθ​(x)=x−E[(x−Dθ​)+], and the supply chain's expected profit is

Ωθ(k)=(r−cp)Sθ(k)−ckk.\Omega_\theta(k) = (r - c_p)S_\theta(k) - c_k k .Ωθ​(k)=(r−cp​)Sθ​(k)−ck​k.

An optimal capacity kθok_\theta^okθo​ maximizes Ωθ\Omega_\thetaΩθ​ over k≥0k \ge 0k≥0, and Ωθo=Ωθ(kθo)\Omega_\theta^o = \Omega_\theta(k_\theta^o)Ωθo​=Ωθ​(kθo​).

In an options contract MMM buys qiq_iqi​ options at wow_owo​ each and pays wew_ewe​ for each option exercised. With k=qik = q_ik=qi​ her profit is Πθ(qi)=(r−we)Sθ(qi)−woqi\Pi_\theta(q_i) = (r - w_e)S_\theta(q_i) - w_o q_iΠθ​(qi​)=(r−we​)Sθ​(qi​)−wo​qi​ and the supplier's is (we−cp)Sθ(qi)+woqi−ckqi(w_e - c_p)S_\theta(q_i) + w_o q_i - c_k q_i(we​−cp​)Sθ​(qi​)+wo​qi​−ck​qi​. The contract with share λ\lambdaλ sets r−we=λ(r−cp)r - w_e = \lambda(r - c_p)r−we​=λ(r−cp​) and wo=λckw_o = \lambda c_kwo​=λck​. Under a wholesale price contract with price www the supplier earns πθ(k)=(w−cp)Sθ(k)−ckk\pi_\theta(k) = (w - c_p)S_\theta(k) - c_k kπθ​(k)=(w−cp​)Sθ​(k)−ck​k; the price inducing capacity kkk is wθ(k)=ck/Fˉθ(k)+cpw_\theta(k) = c_k/\bar F_\theta(k) + c_pwθ​(k)=ck​/Fˉθ​(k)+cp​ with Fˉθ=1−Fθ\bar F_\theta = 1 - F_\thetaFˉθ​=1−Fθ​, and the manufacturer then earns Πθ(k)=(r−wθ(k))Sθ(k)\Pi_\theta(k) = (r - w_\theta(k))S_\theta(k)Πθ​(k)=(r−wθ​(k))Sθ​(k).

With asymmetric information only MMM observes θ\thetaθ. Let π^\hat\piπ^ be the supplier's minimum acceptable profit, and define the shares

λl=1−π^Ωlo,λh=1−π^Ωho,λ^h=Ωlo−π^Ωl(kho),λH=min⁡{λh,λ^h}.\lambda_l = 1 - \frac{\hat\pi}{\Omega_l^o},\qquad \lambda_h = 1 - \frac{\hat\pi}{\Omega_h^o},\qquad \hat\lambda_h = \frac{\Omega_l^o - \hat\pi}{\Omega_l(k_h^o)},\qquad \lambda_H = \min\{\lambda_h, \hat\lambda_h\}.λl​=1−Ωlo​π^​,λh​=1−Ωho​π^​,λ^h​=Ωl​(kho​)Ωlo​−π^​,λH​=min{λh​,λ^h​}.

Formalization targets

Goal: forced-compliance separating contracts (§6.10.3, pp. 103–104)

The low type offers the options contract with share λl\lambda_lλl​ and initial order klok_l^oklo​, the high type the one with share λH\lambda_HλH​ and initial order khok_h^okho​. Assuming 0<π^<Ωlo0 < \hat\pi < \Omega_l^o0<π^<Ωlo​ and Ωl(kho)>0\Omega_l(k_h^o) > 0Ωl​(kho​)>0:

0<λl<λH<1,λl Ωh(klo)<λH Ωho,λH Ωl(kho)≤Ωlo−π^,0 < \lambda_l < \lambda_H < 1,\qquad \lambda_l\,\Omega_h(k_l^o) < \lambda_H\,\Omega_h^o,\qquad \lambda_H\,\Omega_l(k_h^o) \le \Omega_l^o - \hat\pi,0<λl​<λH​<1,λl​Ωh​(klo​)<λH​Ωho​,λH​Ωl​(kho​)≤Ωlo​−π^,

the supplier earns π^\hat\piπ^ from the low type and at least π^\hat\piπ^ from the high type, and each initial order kθok_\theta^okθo​ maximizes both firms' profits. The profit comparisons are stated between the contract profit functions, not between shares.

Milestones

  1. Sθ(x)=x−∫0xFθS_\theta(x) = x - \int_0^x F_\thetaSθ​(x)=x−∫0x​Fθ​ (p. 98).
  2. Ωθ\Omega_\thetaΩθ​ is concave, and k>0k > 0k>0 is optimal iff Fˉθ(k)=ck/(r−cp)\bar F_\theta(k) = c_k/(r - c_p)Fˉθ​(k)=ck​/(r−cp​) (p. 99).
  3. Ωl(k)<Ωh(k)\Omega_l(k) < \Omega_h(k)Ωl​(k)<Ωh​(k) for k>0k > 0k>0, hence Ωlo<Ωho\Omega_l^o < \Omega_h^oΩlo​<Ωho​ (implicit on p. 104).
  4. The options contract with share λ∈[0,1]\lambda \in [0,1]λ∈[0,1] gives Πθ=λΩθ\Pi_\theta = \lambda\Omega_\thetaΠθ​=λΩθ​ and the supplier (1−λ)Ωθ(1-\lambda)\Omega_\theta(1−λ)Ωθ​, so it coordinates (pp. 99–100).
  5. Under voluntary compliance, ∂π(kθo,kθo,θ)/∂k<0\partial\pi(k_\theta^o, k_\theta^o, \theta)/\partial k < 0∂π(kθo​,kθo​,θ)/∂k<0 (p. 100).
  6. A capacity k>0k > 0k>0 is optimal for the supplier under a wholesale price www iff w=wθ(k)w = w_\theta(k)w=wθ​(k) (p. 101).
  7. A stationary point k∗k^*k∗ of Πθ\Pi_\thetaΠθ​ satisfies Fˉθ(k∗)=Fˉθ(kθo)(1+fθ(k∗)Sθ(k∗)/Fˉθ(k∗)2)\bar F_\theta(k^*) = \bar F_\theta(k_\theta^o)\bigl(1 + f_\theta(k^*)S_\theta(k^*)/\bar F_\theta(k^*)^2\bigr)Fˉθ​(k∗)=Fˉθ​(kθo​)(1+fθ​(k∗)Sθ​(k∗)/Fˉθ​(k∗)2), so k∗<kθok^* < k_\theta^ok∗<kθo​ (p. 102).

Significance

The goal shows that with forced compliance a high-demand manufacturer can share her forecast credibly through the terms of a coordinating contract rather than its form: both types use the same contract family, the supply chain is coordinated in every state, and the only cost of asymmetric information is that the high type may be unable to push the supplier down to his reservation profit. The voluntary-compliance milestones show the other side: once the supplier may under-build, only the wholesale price affects his capacity, and the resulting capacity is strictly below the integrated optimum. Together they explain why compliance regimes matter in capacity contracting.

The results are established on the page with short arguments; none has a machine-checked proof. Formalizing them requires the derivative of expected sales for a distribution with an atom, the first-order characterization of a concave maximizer on a half-line, and careful bookkeeping of the incentive constraints. The demand and profit definitions are reusable for other capacity-procurement and newsvendor-type models.

Difficulty

The incentive constraints look like arithmetic on shares, but the strict inequality λl<λ^h\lambda_l < \hat\lambda_hλl​<λ^h​ needs Ωl(kho)<Ωlo\Omega_l(k_h^o) < \Omega_l^oΩl​(kho​)<Ωlo​: the low type's chain profit at the high type's capacity must be strictly below its optimum. The obvious argument via uniqueness of the maximizer is not available, because the page does not assume FθF_\thetaFθ​ strictly increasing, so Ωl\Omega_lΩl​ need not be strictly concave and may have a whole interval of maximizers. Likewise Ωlo<Ωho\Omega_l^o < \Omega_h^oΩlo​<Ωho​ needs a strict comparison of integrals of distribution functions. In the voluntary-compliance part, the derivative of wθ(k)w_\theta(k)wθ​(k) needs the density at k∗k^*k∗, and k∗<kθok^* < k_\theta^ok∗<kθo​ fails when that density is 000.

Formalization scope

Each demand law is a probability measure on R\mathbb RR and FθF_\thetaFθ​ is Mathlib's cdf. FθF_\thetaFθ​ is required to be differentiable only on (0,∞)(0,\infty)(0,∞), because the page's Fθ(0)>0F_\theta(0) > 0Fθ​(0)>0 makes it jump at 000. SθS_\thetaSθ​ is defined by the expectation x−E[(x−Dθ)+]x - E[(x - D_\theta)^+]x−E[(x−Dθ​)+], whose integrand is integrable because Dθ≥0D_\theta \ge 0Dθ​≥0 almost surely. Optimal capacities are passed as arguments characterized as maximizers over [0,∞)[0,\infty)[0,∞), never chosen; kθo>0k_\theta^o > 0kθo​>0 is footnote 46's assumption. Derivatives are HasDerivAt statements.

Hypotheses added relative to the page, all disclosed in the items: 0<π^<Ωlo0 < \hat\pi < \Omega_l^o0<π^<Ωlo​ and Ωl(kho)>0\Omega_l(k_h^o) > 0Ωl​(kho​)>0 in the goal (the page divides by Ωl(kho)\Omega_l(k_h^o)Ωl​(kho​) and needs λl∈(0,1)\lambda_l \in (0,1)λl​∈(0,1)); λ>0\lambda > 0λ>0 for the voluntary-compliance derivative (at λ=0\lambda = 0λ=0 it vanishes); Fˉθ(k∗)>0\bar F_\theta(k^*) > 0Fˉθ​(k∗)>0 and fθ(k∗)>0f_\theta(k^*) > 0fθ​(k∗)>0 for the non-coordination result. The page's assumption wθ′′>0w''_\theta > 0wθ′′​>0 is not needed and not imposed; its strict-concavity claim on p. 101 is not stated, because it would need FθF_\thetaFθ​ strictly increasing. The prior Pr⁡(θ=h)=ρ\Pr(\theta = h) = \rhoPr(θ=h)=ρ does not enter any statement. The page's "separating equilibrium" is formalized by its defining incentive and participation conditions, not by a general signalling-game solution concept; a predicate that holds by construction of λ^h\hat\lambda_hλ^h​ (for example λH≤λ^h\lambda_H \le \hat\lambda_hλH​≤λ^h​) is not an acceptable substitute for the profit inequalities. The fixed-fee condition of p. 105 is pure algebra on four numbers and is not included.

All definitions are local to the namespace CachonCoord.CapacityForecast. No platform theorem formalizes this model; the Snyder–Shen newsvendor definitions (SupplyChainTheory_contracts) and the revenue-sharing model of Cachon–Lariviere 2005 (RevShareCoord.*) concern different games and are not reused. Proofs of any milestone, and a sanity instance showing the model's hypotheses are satisfiable (for example demand with an atom pθp_\thetapθ​ at 000 and an exponential tail, ph<plp_h < p_lph​<pl​), are welcome.

Selected references

  • G. P. Cachon, Supply Chain Coordination with Contracts, in S. Graves and T. de Kok (eds.), Handbooks in Operations Research and Management Science, Vol. 11: Supply Chain Management, North-Holland, 2003, Ch. 6. doi:10.1016/S0927-0507(03)11006-7 (formalized from the author's 3rd draft, January 2003).
  • G. P. Cachon and M. A. Lariviere, Contracting to assure supply: how to share demand forecasts in a supply chain, Management Science 47(5), 629–646, 2001. doi:10.1287/mnsc.47.5.629.10486
  • R. E. Barlow and F. Proschan, Mathematical Theory of Reliability, Wiley, 1965 (increasing failure rate distributions, cited on p. 102).
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Algorithmic Game TheoryOperations ResearchOptimization·Captain: mikedeng1

Supply Chain Coordination with Contracts IX: An Internal Market at the Shadow Price w(α, Q) Allocates Output Optimally, and Paying Its Expectation per Unit Induces the Optimal Effort e°Textbook

Motivation

In most contracts of the supply chain coordination literature the transfer payments are fixed when the contract is signed: a wholesale price www, a buy-back rate bbb, a revenue share ϕ\phiϕ. Some settings need payments that respond to information arriving after signing, such as realized demand at several retailers and realized production output. Fixing the per-unit price in advance then fails twice: for some output realizations the retailers do not buy everything that was produced, and for others they want more than exists, so the supplier must ration, which invites strategic ordering and misallocation (Cachon and Lariviere, 1999).

Section 6.9 of Cachon's survey chapter Supply Chain Coordination with Contracts (Handbooks in OR & MS, vol. 11, 2003) studies an alternative after Kouvelis and Lariviere (2000): the supplier commits to hold an internal market for output after demand is observed, and pays her own production manager a fixed amount per unit of realized output. The model is a variant of Porteus and Whang (1991), who studied incentives between manufacturing and marketing managers in a firm. The section shows that this pair of mechanisms coordinates both the production decision and the allocation decision without the supplier observing either the demand shocks or the manager's effort.

This mission is part IX of a series formalizing the capstone results of that chapter.

Setting

One supplier employs a production manager and sells to two independent retailers. The constant demand elasticity is η>1\eta>1η>1.

  1. The manager chooses a production input level e≥0e\ge0e≥0. The output is Q=YeQ=YeQ=Ye, where Y∈[0,1]Y\in[0,1]Y∈[0,1] is a random variable. The manager incurs the cost c(e)c(e)c(e), strictly convex and increasing, with derivative c′c'c′.
  2. Retailer i∈{1,2}i\in\{1,2\}i∈{1,2} observes the realization αi\alpha_iαi​ of a random variable Ai>0A_i>0Ai​>0.
  3. The supplier allocates qiq_iqi​ units to retailer iii with q1+q2≤Qq_1+q_2\le Qq1​+q2​≤Q. Retailer iii earns revenue qipi(qi)q_ip_i(q_i)qi​pi​(qi​) with the inverse demand pi(qi)=αiqi−1/ηp_i(q_i)=\alpha_iq_i^{-1/\eta}pi​(qi​)=αi​qi−1/η​, that is, αiqi(η−1)/η\alpha_iq_i^{(\eta-1)/\eta}αi​qi(η−1)/η​.

If retailer one receives the share γ\gammaγ of QQQ, total retailer revenue is

π(γ,α,Q)=(α1γ(η−1)/η+α2(1−γ)(η−1)/η)Q(η−1)/η.\pi(\gamma,\alpha,Q)=\big(\alpha_1\gamma^{(\eta-1)/\eta}+\alpha_2(1-\gamma)^{(\eta-1)/\eta}\big)Q^{(\eta-1)/\eta}.π(γ,α,Q)=(α1​γ(η−1)/η+α2​(1−γ)(η−1)/η)Q(η−1)/η.

The optimal share is γo(α)=α1η/(α1η+α2η)\gamma^o(\alpha)=\alpha_1^\eta/(\alpha_1^\eta+\alpha_2^\eta)γo(α)=α1η​/(α1η​+α2η​) (Eq. (44)), and π(α,Q)=π(γo(α),α,Q)\pi(\alpha,Q)=\pi(\gamma^o(\alpha),\alpha,Q)π(α,Q)=π(γo(α),α,Q) is revenue under it. The expected supply chain profit is Π(e)=E[π(A,Ye)]−c(e)\Pi(e)=E[\pi(A,Ye)]-c(e)Π(e)=E[π(A,Ye)]−c(e), and the optimal effort eoe^oeo solves the first-order condition (45).

In the decentralized system, if the per-unit price is www, retailer iii's profit is πi(qi,w)=αiqi(η−1)/η−wqi\pi_i(q_i,w)=\alpha_iq_i^{(\eta-1)/\eta}-wq_iπi​(qi​,w)=αi​qi(η−1)/η​−wqi​. The contingent price is

w(α,Q)=(η−1η)(α1η+α2η)1/ηQ−1/η.w(\alpha,Q)=\Big(\frac{\eta-1}{\eta}\Big)(\alpha_1^\eta+\alpha_2^\eta)^{1/\eta}Q^{-1/\eta}.w(α,Q)=(ηη−1​)(α1η​+α2η​)1/ηQ−1/η.

The manager is paid a fixed amount per unit of realized output. With K=E[(A1η+A2η)1/ηY(η−1)/η]K=E\big[(A_1^\eta+A_2^\eta)^{1/\eta}Y^{(\eta-1)/\eta}\big]K=E[(A1η​+A2η​)1/ηY(η−1)/η], the payment is

(η−1η)(eo)−1/ηK/E[Y](46),\Big(\frac{\eta-1}{\eta}\Big)(e^o)^{-1/\eta}K/E[Y]\qquad(46),(ηη−1​)(eo)−1/ηK/E[Y](46),

and his expected utility is u(e)=(payment)⋅E[Ye]−c(e)u(e)=(\text{payment})\cdot E[Ye]-c(e)u(e)=(payment)⋅E[Ye]−c(e).

Formalization targets

Goal

The goal has two parts.

  1. For every realization α1,α2>0\alpha_1,\alpha_2>0α1​,α2​>0 and output Q>0Q>0Q>0, at the price w(α,Q)w(\alpha,Q)w(α,Q) retailer one's unique optimal order is γo(α)Q\gamma^o(\alpha)Qγo(α)Q and retailer two's is (1−γo(α))Q(1-\gamma^o(\alpha))Q(1−γo(α))Q. So the retailers order exactly QQQ, the allocation maximizes revenue over all feasible allocations, and
∂π(α,Q)∂Q=w(α,Q).\frac{\partial\pi(\alpha,Q)}{\partial Q}=w(\alpha,Q).∂Q∂π(α,Q)​=w(α,Q).
  1. If eo>0e^o>0eo>0 satisfies (45), then under the payment (46) the manager's unique optimal effort is eoe^oeo. The payment equals E[Qw(A,Q)∣eo]/E[Q∣eo]E[Qw(A,Q)\mid e^o]/E[Q\mid e^o]E[Qw(A,Q)∣eo]/E[Q∣eo], and the supplier's expected profit from the market is zero.

Milestones

  • (44): revenue is strictly concave in γ\gammaγ, and γo(α)\gamma^o(\alpha)γo(α) is the unique optimal share.
  • The closed form π(α,Q)=(α1η+α2η)1/ηQ(η−1)/η\pi(\alpha,Q)=(\alpha_1^\eta+\alpha_2^\eta)^{1/\eta}Q^{(\eta-1)/\eta}π(α,Q)=(α1η​+α2η​)1/ηQ(η−1)/η.
  • (45): Π(e)=Ke(η−1)/η−c(e)\Pi(e)=Ke^{(\eta-1)/\eta}-c(e)Π(e)=Ke(η−1)/η−c(e) is strictly concave, and an interior eoe^oeo is optimal if and only if ((η−1)/η)(eo)−1/ηK−c′(eo)=0((\eta-1)/\eta)(e^o)^{-1/\eta}K-c'(e^o)=0((η−1)/η)(eo)−1/ηK−c′(eo)=0.
  • The retailers' first-order condition, and the market allocation at w(α,Q)w(\alpha,Q)w(α,Q).
  • ∂π(α,Q)/∂Q=w(α,Q)\partial\pi(\alpha,Q)/\partial Q=w(\alpha,Q)∂π(α,Q)/∂Q=w(α,Q).
  • The identity (46).
  • The manager's optimal effort and the supplier's zero expected profit.

Significance

The result shows that one mechanism handles two separate information problems. The market price w(α,Q)w(\alpha,Q)w(α,Q) is the shadow price of output. Charging it makes the retailers' independent orders add up to exactly the output and split it as the integrated firm would, and the supplier never needs to observe AAA. Paying the manager the output-weighted expectation of that shadow price, a single number fixed in advance, aligns his marginal incentive with the supply chain's, and the supplier does not need to observe eee. The supplier breaks even on the market. Kouvelis and Lariviere (2000) show that in more general settings she breaks even or loses money, so any profit must come from fixed fees. The section therefore illustrates a general design principle: market-based transfer prices inside a firm, combined with linear output-based pay.

The derivations are short calculus on the page. Formalizing them pins down what the page leaves implicit: the range of efforts and allocations; the role of E[Y]>0E[Y]>0E[Y]>0 and of the integrability of the shock; the fact that each retailer's problem has a unique interior optimum only at a positive price; and how the realized output Q=0Q=0Q=0 enters the expectation E[Qw(A,Q)]E[Qw(A,Q)]E[Qw(A,Q)]. To our knowledge none of these statements has been machine-checked before.

Difficulty

The deterministic part requires real-power calculus with a non-integer exponent (η−1)/η∈(0,1)(\eta-1)/\eta\in(0,1)(η−1)/η∈(0,1). Strict concavity of γ↦γ(η−1)/η\gamma\mapsto\gamma^{(\eta-1)/\eta}γ↦γ(η−1)/η has to be used on the closed interval [0,1][0,1][0,1], where the derivative blows up at the endpoints. The retailer's optimum has to be shown to be interior even though the profit at q=0q=0q=0 is defined.

The stochastic part requires pulling the effort out of the expectation, E[π(A,Ye)]=Ke(η−1)/ηE[\pi(A,Ye)]=Ke^{(\eta-1)/\eta}E[π(A,Ye)]=Ke(η−1)/η, pointwise in the shock, including at realizations with Y=0Y=0Y=0. The natural first idea, to differentiate under the expectation sign, is unnecessary but tempting. The obstacle it hides is that w(α,Ye)w(\alpha,Ye)w(α,Ye) is undefined where Y=0Y=0Y=0, so the identity (46) only holds once Qw(A,Q)Qw(A,Q)Qw(A,Q) is read as its limit 000 at Q=0Q=0Q=0. Uniqueness of the manager's optimum depends on strict convexity of ccc alone, since his payment is linear in eee.

Formalization scope

All objects live in the namespace CachonCoord.InternalMarket. The deterministic file Revenue defines π(γ,α,Q)\pi(\gamma,\alpha,Q)π(γ,α,Q), γo(α)\gamma^o(\alpha)γo(α) (as the printed formula, not as an argmax), π(α,Q)\pi(\alpha,Q)π(α,Q), πi(qi,w)\pi_i(q_i,w)πi​(qi​,w) and w(α,Q)w(\alpha,Q)w(α,Q) with real powers (Real.rpow). The file Model bundles a probability space with measurable A1,A2>0A_1,A_2>0A1​,A2​>0 and Y∈[0,1]Y\in[0,1]Y∈[0,1], the elasticity η>1\eta>1η>1, and the cost ccc. The cost is strictly convex and increasing on [0,∞)[0,\infty)[0,∞) and has derivative c′c'c′ at every e>0e>0e>0. On top of these, Model defines Π\PiΠ, KKK, the payment (46) (by its printed left side, not as the ratio it is claimed to equal), expected output and market revenue, and the manager's utility (from the payment scheme, not by the printed formula). Derivatives are HasDerivAt statements and optima are IsMaxOn over [0,1][0,1][0,1] or [0,∞)[0,\infty)[0,∞).

The standing assumptions are those of the model paragraph on p. 92: risk neutrality and the distributional assumptions above. Added hypotheses, each disclosed in the item's Formalization Note:

  • E[Y]>0E[Y]>0E[Y]>0, because (46) divides by it.
  • Integrability of (A1η+A2η)1/ηY(η−1)/η(A_1^\eta+A_2^\eta)^{1/\eta}Y^{(\eta-1)/\eta}(A1η​+A2η​)1/ηY(η−1)/η.
  • A positive price in the retailer's first-order condition.
  • Differentiability of ccc only on (0,∞)(0,\infty)(0,∞).

The existence of an effort satisfying (45) is a hypothesis, as on the page. Clauses 1 of the goal are stated for fixed realizations, not as random variables.

A trivializing formalization would define γo(α)\gamma^o(\alpha)γo(α) as an argmax, or define the payment (46) as E[Qw]/E[Q]E[Qw]/E[Q]E[Qw]/E[Q]; neither is done here. Outside γ∈[0,1]\gamma\in[0,1]γ∈[0,1] and Q>0Q>0Q>0, Lean's real power returns junk values, and every statement restricts to that range. The companion claim that w(α,Q)w(\alpha,Q)w(α,Q) is the unique market-clearing price is not posed.

The formalization needs no infrastructure beyond Mathlib's real powers, convexity and Bochner integral. The concavity and first-order-condition lemmas for x↦axr−bxx\mapsto ax^{r}-bxx↦axr−bx with 0<r<10<r<10<r<1 may be reused for other constant-elasticity models. Contributions are welcome at any milestone; each is independent of the others except through the closed forms.

Selected references

  • G. P. Cachon, Supply Chain Coordination with Contracts, in S. Graves and T. de Kok (eds.), Handbooks in Operations Research and Management Science, Vol. 11: Supply Chain Management, North-Holland, 2003, Ch. 6, §6.9. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0927-0507(03)11006-7 (formalized from the author's 3rd draft, January 2003).
  • P. Kouvelis and M. A. Lariviere, Decentralizing cross-functional decisions: Coordination through internal markets, Management Science 46(8), 2000, 1049–1058. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.46.8.1049.12025
  • E. L. Porteus and S. Whang, On manufacturing/marketing incentives, Management Science 37(9), 1991, 1166–1181. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.37.9.1166
  • G. P. Cachon and M. A. Lariviere, Capacity choice and allocation: strategic behavior and supply chain performance, Management Science 45(8), 1999, 1091–1108. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.45.8.1091
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Algorithmic Game TheoryOperations ResearchProbability·Captain: mikedeng1

Supply Chain Coordination with Contracts VIII: In the Two-Location Base-Stock Model the Linear Transfers (39)–(41) Make the Optimal Base Stocks the Unique Nash EquilibriumTextbook

Motivation

In a supply chain with stock at two locations, a supplier holds inventory that replenishes a retailer, and the retailer serves customers. Each firm sets its own inventory level to minimize its own cost. The retailer bears only part of the cost of customer backorders, and the supplier bears none of the retailer's holding cost, so their incentives differ. The resulting equilibrium generally differs from the policy that minimizes total cost. Cachon and Zipkin (Management Science 45(7), 1999) studied this game and proposed linear transfer payments that align the firms' incentives. In the chapter Supply Chain Coordination with Contracts (Handbooks in OR & MS, vol. 11, 2003, doi:10.1016/S0927-0507(03)11006-7), Cachon re-derives that analysis, adds a parameter λ\lambdaλ that divides the retail-level costs between the firms, and answers two questions the original paper left open: whether the contracts allow an arbitrary division of cost, and whether the optimal policy is the unique equilibrium under the contracts. This mission formalizes the second answer, together with the analysis of the decentralized game and of the optimal policy that it rests on (§6.8 of the 2003 chapter, read in the author's January 2003 draft).

Setting

Two firms, a retailer rrr and a supplier sss, each use a base stock policy: firm iii keeps its inventory position equal to its base stock level si∈Rs_i \in \mathbb Rsi​∈R. A negative supplier base stock means planned backorders. Let DrD_rDr​ and DsD_sDs​ be the demands during the retailer's and the supplier's lead times. They are nonnegative with finite means μr\mu_rμr​, μs\mu_sμs​, and their distribution functions FrF_rFr​, FsF_sFs​ are continuous, zero at 000, strictly increasing on [0,∞)[0,\infty)[0,∞) and differentiable on (0,∞)(0,\infty)(0,∞). Holding costs are hrh_rhr​ and hsh_shs​, with 0<hs<hr0 < h_s < h_r0<hs​<hr​. Each backorder at the retailer costs the retailer βr>0\beta_r > 0βr​>0 and the supplier βs>0\beta_s > 0βs​>0 per unit time. Write β=βr+βs\beta = \beta_r + \beta_sβ=βr​+βs​.

At retailer inventory level yyy the expected on-hand stock is Ir(y)=E[(y−Dr)+]I_r(y) = E[(y-D_r)^+]Ir​(y)=E[(y−Dr​)+] and the expected backorders are Br(y)=E[(Dr−y)+]B_r(y) = E[(D_r-y)^+]Br​(y)=E[(Dr​−y)+]. The retail-level cost rates are cr(y)=hrIr(y)+βrBr(y)c_r(y) = h_rI_r(y) + \beta_rB_r(y)cr​(y)=hr​Ir​(y)+βr​Br​(y), cs(y)=βsBr(y)c_s(y) = \beta_sB_r(y)cs​(y)=βs​Br​(y) and c(y)=cr(y)+cs(y)c(y) = c_r(y) + c_s(y)c(y)=cr​(y)+cs​(y). Because the supplier may stock out, the retailer's actual inventory level is sr−(Ds−ss)+s_r - (D_s - s_s)^+sr​−(Ds​−ss​)+, and every retail-level quantity is averaged accordingly:

g(sr,ss)=E[g(sr−(Ds−ss)+)]=Fs(ss)g(sr)+∫ss∞g(sr+ss−x)fs(x) dx.g(s_r,s_s) = E\big[g(s_r - (D_s-s_s)^+)\big] = F_s(s_s)g(s_r) + \int_{s_s}^\infty g(s_r+s_s-x)f_s(x)\,dx .g(sr​,ss​)=E[g(sr​−(Ds​−ss​)+)]=Fs​(ss​)g(sr​)+∫ss​∞​g(sr​+ss​−x)fs​(x)dx.

With the supplier's inventory Is(y)=E[(y−Ds)+]I_s(y) = E[(y-D_s)^+]Is​(y)=E[(y−Ds​)+] and backorders Bs(y)=μs−y+Is(y)B_s(y) = \mu_s - y + I_s(y)Bs​(y)=μs​−y+Is​(y), the firms' costs and the chain's cost are

πr(sr,ss)=cr(sr,ss),πs(sr,ss)=hsIs(ss)+cs(sr,ss),Π=πr+πs.\pi_r(s_r,s_s) = c_r(s_r,s_s), \qquad \pi_s(s_r,s_s) = h_sI_s(s_s) + c_s(s_r,s_s), \qquad \Pi = \pi_r + \pi_s .πr​(sr​,ss​)=cr​(sr​,ss​),πs​(sr​,ss​)=hs​Is​(ss​)+cs​(sr​,ss​),Π=πr​+πs​.

A pair {sro,sso}\{s_r^o, s_s^o\}{sro​,sso​} minimizing Π\PiΠ is an optimal policy. A Nash equilibrium is a pair from which neither firm can lower its own cost by a unilateral change of its base stock.

Under a linear transfer the supplier pays the retailer tIIr(sr,ss)+tBrBr(sr,ss)+tBsBs(ss)t_II_r(s_r,s_s) + t_B^rB_r(s_r,s_s) + t_B^sB_s(s_s)tI​Ir​(sr​,ss​)+tBr​Br​(sr​,ss​)+tBs​Bs​(ss​) (a negative amount is a payment the other way). The Cachon–Zipkin contracts with parameter λ∈(0,1]\lambda \in (0,1]λ∈(0,1] are

tI=(1−λ)hr,tBr=βr−λβ,tBs=λhsFs(sso)1−Fs(sso).t_I = (1-\lambda)h_r, \qquad t_B^r = \beta_r - \lambda\beta, \qquad t_B^s = \lambda h_s\frac{F_s(s_s^o)}{1-F_s(s_s^o)} .tI​=(1−λ)hr​,tBr​=βr​−λβ,tBs​=λhs​1−Fs​(sso​)Fs​(sso​)​.

Formalization targets

Goal: the contracts coordinate, uniquely

If {sro,sso}\{s_r^o, s_s^o\}{sro​,sso​} is optimal with sso>0s_s^o > 0sso​>0 and λ∈(0,1]\lambda \in (0,1]λ∈(0,1], then under the contracts

πr=λc(sr,ss)−tBsBs(ss),πs=(hs+tBs)Is(ss)+(1−λ)c(sr,ss)+tBs(μs−ss),\pi_r = \lambda c(s_r,s_s) - t_B^sB_s(s_s), \qquad \pi_s = (h_s+t_B^s)I_s(s_s) + (1-\lambda)c(s_r,s_s) + t_B^s(\mu_s - s_s),πr​=λc(sr​,ss​)−tBs​Bs​(ss​),πs​=(hs​+tBs​)Is​(ss​)+(1−λ)c(sr​,ss​)+tBs​(μs​−ss​),

{sro,sso}\{s_r^o, s_s^o\}{sro​,sso​} is a Nash equilibrium, and it is the only one. The goal contains no numerical constants. It holds for every demand distribution in the class and every λ\lambdaλ in the range.

Milestones

  1. In the uncontracted game, every retailer best response exceeds s^r>0\hat s_r > 0s^r​>0, where Fr(s^r)=βr/(hr+βr)F_r(\hat s_r) = \beta_r/(h_r+\beta_r)Fr​(s^r​)=βr​/(hr​+βr​), and every supplier best response is positive (pp. 79–80).
  2. In the uncontracted game, for every sss_sss​ the retailer's optimal base stock is below the chain's; consequently the competition penalty (Π(s∗)−Π(so))/Π(so)(\Pi(s^*) - \Pi(s^o))/\Pi(s^o)(Π(s∗)−Π(so))/Π(so) is positive at every equilibrium s∗s^*s∗ (pp. 80–81).
  3. The partial derivatives (35)–(36) of Π\PiΠ, and every optimum with ss>0s_s > 0ss​>0 satisfies c′(sr)=hsc'(s_r) = h_sc′(sr​)=hs​, i.e. Fr(sr)=(hs+β)/(hr+β)F_r(s_r) = (h_s+\beta)/(h_r+\beta)Fr​(sr​)=(hs​+β)/(hr​+β) (37) (p. 83).
  4. Optima with ss≤0s_s \le 0ss​≤0 have sr+ss=sˉs_r + s_s = \bar ssr​+ss​=sˉ, where Pr⁡(Dr+Ds≤sˉ)=β/(hr+β)\Pr(D_r + D_s \le \bar s) = \beta/(h_r+\beta)Pr(Dr​+Ds​≤sˉ)=β/(hr​+β) (38) (p. 83).
  5. The cost identities (42)–(43) under the contracts (p. 84).
  6. Under the contracts the retailer's best response decreases in sss_sss​, and the supplier's marginal cost along it has the closed form printed on p. 84.

Significance

The goal says that a contract built from quantities both firms can measure, namely the retailer's inventory and backorders and the supplier's backorders, makes the system-optimal policy the only equilibrium. The firms therefore reach the optimum without coordinating on an equilibrium. The parameter λ\lambdaλ splits the retail-level costs between the firms in any proportion up to λ=1\lambda = 1λ=1. Milestone 2 shows the contract is needed: without transfers, decentralization is always strictly suboptimal when the supplier is charged for retail backorders. The transfers tIt_ItI​ and tBrt_B^rtBr​ are those of the single-location model (§6.7), even though the retailer's target fractile changes from β/(β+hr)\beta/(\beta+h_r)β/(β+hr​) to (β+hs)/(β+hr)(\beta+h_s)/(\beta+h_r)(β+hs​)/(β+hr​).

The results are proved in the source and in Cachon and Zipkin (1999), with informal derivative arguments. No machine-checked version is known. Formalizing them requires differentiating expectations of piecewise-linear convex functions of a random lead-time shortfall. The page's argument also assumes densities, which the formal statements avoid, and contains several printing slips (see below). These would be settled by a complete development.

Difficulty

The firms' costs are compositions: a convex single-location cost evaluated at the random level sr−(Ds−ss)+s_r - (D_s - s_s)^+sr​−(Ds​−ss​)+, which is concave in sss_sss​. The supplier's cost is therefore not obviously convex in sss_sss​; its convexity at sr=sros_r = s_r^osr​=sro​ depends on the value of tBst_B^stBs​ and on c′(sro)=hsc'(s_r^o) = h_sc′(sro​)=hs​. Uniqueness is the hard part. Under the contracts the retailer's best response sr(ss)s_r(s_s)sr​(ss​) decreases, but the supplier's marginal cost along that best response, Fs(ss)(hs−(1−λ)c′(sr(ss))+tBs)−tBsF_s(s_s)(h_s - (1-\lambda)c'(s_r(s_s)) + t_B^s) - t_B^sFs​(ss​)(hs​−(1−λ)c′(sr​(ss​))+tBs​)−tBs​, is not monotone in general when λ\lambdaλ is small, contrary to a literal reading of p. 84. A uniqueness argument has to show that it has at most one zero, not that it increases.

Formalization scope

Demand laws are probability measures on R\mathbb RR with no mass below 000, finite means, and continuous distribution functions, zero at 000, strictly increasing on [0,∞)[0,\infty)[0,∞) and differentiable on (0,∞)(0,\infty)(0,∞). These are the section's standing assumptions, together with 0<hs<hr0 < h_s < h_r0<hs​<hr​ and βr,βs>0\beta_r, \beta_s > 0βr​,βs​>0 (footnote 34 excludes the zero cases). Expectations are Lebesgue integrals: IrI_rIr​, BrB_rBr​, IsI_sIs​ and the two-location averages are defined by expectation, and the page's integral forms are consequences. Integrals against fs(x) dxf_s(x)\,dxfs​(x)dx are written against the law of DsD_sDs​, so no density hypothesis is made. Base stocks range over all of R\mathbb RR, and "optimal" means minimizing Π\PiΠ over R2\mathbb R^2R2; the existence of an optimum is a hypothesis, as on p. 77. Derivatives are stated with HasDerivAt. Independence of DrD_rDr​ and DsD_sDs​, implicit on the page, enters only through the convolution of their laws in (38).

The contracted costs are defined from the firms' original costs and the transfer payment. Defining them by the closed forms (42)–(43) would make the identities trivial and is ruled out.

Corrected slips: (42) is stated with λc(sr,ss)\lambda c(s_r,s_s)λc(sr​,ss​) where the page prints λΠ(sr,ss)\lambda\Pi(s_r,s_s)λΠ(sr​,ss​) (the difference λhsIs(ss)\lambda h_sI_s(s_s)λhs​Is​(ss​) does not depend on srs_rsr​). The retailer's single-location fractile on p. 79 is stated as βr/(hr+βr)\beta_r/(h_r+\beta_r)βr​/(hr​+βr​), not the printed β/(hr+β)\beta/(h_r+\beta)β/(hr​+β). The garbled display after (43) and the fsf_sfs​/FsF_sFs​ slip in the best-response derivative are not reproduced. Not included: the contraction condition (34), the case split for the optimal policy (p. 84), the case sso≤0s_s^o \le 0sso​≤0, and the alternative schemes of §6.8.5 (Lee–Whang, Chen). Contributions of those, or of a reusable library for derivatives of E[g(s−(D−t)+)]E[g(s - (D-t)^+)]E[g(s−(D−t)+)], are welcome. The platform's Clark–Scarf items (InventoryControl_clarkScarf, ClarkScarf.Serial.*) concern periodic-review echelon policies and are not reused.

Selected references

  • G. P. Cachon, Supply Chain Coordination with Contracts, in S. Graves and T. de Kok (eds.), Handbooks in Operations Research and Management Science, vol. 11, North-Holland, 2003, §6.8. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0927-0507(03)11006-7
  • G. P. Cachon and P. H. Zipkin, Competitive and cooperative inventory policies in a two-stage supply chain, Management Science 45(7), 936–953, 1999. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.45.7.936
  • F. Chen and Y.-S. Zheng, Lower bounds for multi-echelon stochastic inventory systems, Management Science 40(11), 1426–1443, 1994. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.40.11.1426
  • A. Federgruen and P. Zipkin, Computational issues in an infinite-horizon, multiechelon inventory model, Operations Research 32(4), 818–836, 1984. https://doi.org/10.1287/opre.32.4.818
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Convex OptimizationDiscrete GeometryLinear Optimization·Captain: mikedeng1

Integer Programming with a Fixed Number of Variables 2: A Simplex Satisfying (16) Rounds K, B(p,r) ⊂ τK ⊂ B(p,R) with R/r ≤ 2n^(3/2)Research Paper

Motivation

In 1983 H. W. Lenstra, Jr. proved that integer linear programming with a fixed number of variables is solvable in polynomial time (Lenstra 1983). The algorithm became one of the founding results of algorithmic geometry of numbers: it introduced the strategy of making a convex body "round" by a linear change of coordinates, and then either finding a lattice point in it or showing that the body is covered by few parallel lattice hyperplanes, which reduces the dimension by one.

The algorithm rests on two geometric facts, each with its own proof. The first (§1 of the paper, the companion mission Integer Programming with a Fixed Number of Variables 1) says that a round body that misses the lattice meets few lattice hyperplanes. This mission is the second (§2): an explicit construction of the rounding transformation. Starting from a simplex inside the polytope, the algorithm repeatedly swaps a vertex for a point of the polytope as long as this increases the simplex's volume by more than a factor 3/23/23/2. When no such swap exists, a linear map that makes the simplex regular also makes the polytope round, with an explicit roundness ratio 2n3/22n^{3/2}2n3/2.

Short timeline. Khachiyan's ellipsoid method (1979) made linear programming polynomial and supplied the subroutine that Lenstra uses to maximize linear functions on KKK. Lenstra's algorithm (preprint 1981, published 1983) combined it with the lattice basis reduction of Lenstra, Lenstra and Lovász (1982). Remark (c) of the paper notes that rounding with a maximal-volume inscribed ellipsoid achieves the better ratio nnn, but not by a polynomial algorithm for varying nnn; later work (Kannan 1987, Grötschel–Lovász–Schrijver 1988) refined the rounding step with ellipsoid methods.

Setting

Work in Rn\mathbb R^nRn with the Euclidean length ∣⋅∣|\cdot|∣⋅∣, and write B(p,ρ)={x∈Rn:∣x−p∣≤ρ}B(p, \rho) = \{x \in \mathbb R^n : |x - p| \le \rho\}B(p,ρ)={x∈Rn:∣x−p∣≤ρ} for the closed ball. For points w0,…,wn∈Rnw_0, \dots, w_n \in \mathbb R^nw0​,…,wn​∈Rn, the simplex volume is

vol(w0,…,wn)=∣det⁡M∣n!,\mathrm{vol}(w_0, \dots, w_n) = \frac{|\det M|}{n!},vol(w0​,…,wn​)=n!∣detM∣​,

where MMM has column vectors w1−w0,…,wn−w0w_1 - w_0, \dots, w_n - w_0w1​−w0​,…,wn​−w0​.

Let K⊆RnK \subseteq \mathbb R^nK⊆Rn be convex, and let v0,…,vn∈Kv_0, \dots, v_n \in Kv0​,…,vn​∈K with v1−v0,…,vn−v0v_1 - v_0, \dots, v_n - v_0v1​−v0​,…,vn​−v0​ linearly independent. Choose linear functions g0,…,gn:Rn→Rg_0, \dots, g_n : \mathbb R^n \to \mathbb Rg0​,…,gn​:Rn→R with

gi constant on {vj:j≠i},gi(vi)≠gi(vj) (j≠i).(15)g_i \text{ constant on } \{v_j : j \ne i\}, \qquad g_i(v_i) \ne g_i(v_j) \ (j \ne i). \tag{15}gi​ constant on {vj​:j=i},gi​(vi​)=gi​(vj​) (j=i).(15)

Thus gig_igi​ measures the height above the facet opposite viv_ivi​. The stopping condition of the second stage is

∣gi(x−vj)∣≤32 ∣gi(vi−vj)∣for all x∈K and all i≠j.(16)|g_i(x - v_j)| \le \tfrac32\, |g_i(v_i - v_j)| \quad \text{for all } x \in K \text{ and all } i \ne j. \tag{16}∣gi​(x−vj​)∣≤23​∣gi​(vi​−vj​)∣for all x∈K and all i=j.(16)

The ratio ∣gi(x−vj)∣/∣gi(vi−vj)∣|g_i(x - v_j)|/|g_i(v_i - v_j)|∣gi​(x−vj​)∣/∣gi​(vi​−vj​)∣ is the factor by which the volume changes when viv_ivi​ is replaced by xxx, so (16) says that no such swap enlarges the simplex by more than 3/23/23/2.

Let τ\tauτ be a nonsingular linear map of Rn\mathbb R^nRn such that zj=τ(vj)z_j = \tau(v_j)zj​=τ(vj​) span a regular simplex, meaning that all distances ∣zi−zj∣|z_i - z_j|∣zi​−zj​∣, i≠ji \ne ji=j, are equal. Let p=(n+1)−1∑jzjp = (n+1)^{-1}\sum_j z_jp=(n+1)−1∑j​zj​ be its centroid and SSS its convex hull. For c≥1c \ge 1c≥1, the paper defines

Tc={x∈Rn:vol(z0,…,zi−1,x,zi+1,…,zn)≤c⋅vol(z0,…,zn) for all i}.T_c = \{x \in \mathbb R^n : \mathrm{vol}(z_0, \dots, z_{i-1}, x, z_{i+1}, \dots, z_n) \le c\cdot \mathrm{vol}(z_0, \dots, z_n) \text{ for all } i\}.Tc​={x∈Rn:vol(z0​,…,zi−1​,x,zi+1​,…,zn​)≤c⋅vol(z0​,…,zn​) for all i}.

The proof of the LEMMA works in model coordinates. There Rn\mathbb R^nRn is the hyperplane ∑j=0nrj=1\sum_{j=0}^n r_j = 1∑j=0n​rj​=1 of Rn+1\mathbb R^{n+1}Rn+1, the zjz_jzj​ are the standard basis vectors, p=(1n+1,…,1n+1)p = (\tfrac1{n+1}, \dots, \tfrac1{n+1})p=(n+11​,…,n+11​), and Tc={r:∣rj∣≤c for all j, ∑jrj=1}T_c = \{r : |r_j| \le c \text{ for all } j,\ \sum_j r_j = 1\}Tc​={r:∣rj​∣≤c for all j, ∑j​rj​=1}.

Formalization targets

Goal (§2, p. 543)

Under (15) and (16), with τ\tauτ making the simplex regular and ppp its centroid, there are positive reals r,Rr, Rr,R with

B(p,r)⊆τK⊆B(p,R),Rr≤2n3/2.B(p, r) \subseteq \tau K \subseteq B(p, R), \qquad \frac{R}{r} \le 2n^{3/2}.B(p,r)⊆τK⊆B(p,R),rR​≤2n3/2.

These are conditions (3)–(4) of §1 with c1=2n3/2c_1 = 2n^{3/2}c1​=2n3/2.

Milestones, in the order the proof uses them

  1. (16) is a statement about T3/2T_{3/2}T3/2​ (p. 543). Condition (16), for all x∈Kx \in Kx∈K and i≠ji \ne ji=j, holds exactly when τK⊆T3/2\tau K \subseteq T_{3/2}τK⊆T3/2​.
  2. Vertices of TcT_cTc​ (pp. 543–544). In the model, TcT_cTc​ is the convex hull of the coordinate permutations of e0−c∑j=1mej+c∑j=m+1neje_0 - c\sum_{j=1}^m e_j + c\sum_{j=m+1}^n e_je0​−c∑j=1m​ej​+c∑j=m+1n​ej​ (n=2mn = 2mn=2m), or of (1−c)e0−c∑j=1mej+c∑j=m+1nej(1-c)e_0 - c\sum_{j=1}^m e_j + c\sum_{j=m+1}^n e_j(1−c)e0​−c∑j=1m​ej​+c∑j=m+1n​ej​ (n=2m+1n = 2m+1n=2m+1).
  3. Outer radius (p. 544). Tc⊆B(p,R)T_c \subseteq B(p, R)Tc​⊆B(p,R) with R2=nc2+nn+1R^2 = nc^2 + \tfrac{n}{n+1}R2=nc2+n+1n​ (nnn even) or (n+1)c2−2c+nn+1(n+1)c^2 - 2c + \tfrac{n}{n+1}(n+1)c2−2c+n+1n​ (nnn odd).
  4. Inner radius (p. 544). B(p,r)⊆SB(p, r) \subseteq SB(p,r)⊆S inside the hyperplane, with r2=1n(n+1)r^2 = \tfrac{1}{n(n+1)}r2=n(n+1)1​.
  5. LEMMA (p. 543). For c≥1c \ge 1c≥1 and any regular simplex, B(p,r)⊆S⊆Tc⊆B(p,R)B(p, r) \subseteq S \subseteq T_c \subseteq B(p, R)B(p,r)⊆S⊆Tc​⊆B(p,R) for positive r,Rr, Rr,R with
(Rr)2={c2n3+(c2+1)n2n even,c2n3+(2c2−2c+1)n2+(c2−2c)nn odd.\Big(\frac Rr\Big)^2 = \begin{cases} c^2n^3 + (c^2+1)n^2 & n \text{ even},\\ c^2n^3 + (2c^2 - 2c + 1)n^2 + (c^2 - 2c)n & n \text{ odd}.\end{cases}(rR​)2={c2n3+(c2+1)n2c2n3+(2c2−2c+1)n2+(c2−2c)n​n even,n odd.​

The paper's own proof derives the goal from milestone 1 and the LEMMA at c=3/2c = 3/2c=3/2. At n=1n = 1n=1 the constant 2n3/22n^{3/2}2n3/2 cannot be improved by this argument.

Significance

The result. The theorem is the only place in the paper where the roundness constant c1c_1c1​ is computed, and c1c_1c1​ enters the bound 1+c1c2n1 + c_1c_2\sqrt n1+c1​c2​n​ on the number of lattice hyperplanes that the algorithm branches over. Remark (c) of the paper uses the exact LEMMA for other values of ccc to obtain c1=((1+ϵ)(n3+2n2))1/2c_1 = ((1+\epsilon)(n^3 + 2n^2))^{1/2}c1​=((1+ϵ)(n3+2n2))1/2 (nnn even) and ((1+ϵ)(n3+n2−n))1/2((1+\epsilon)(n^3+n^2-n))^{1/2}((1+ϵ)(n3+n2−n))1/2 (nnn odd). The LEMMA itself is a self-contained fact about the regular simplex. In Euclidean geometry it says how far the "volume-ccc neighbourhood" TcT_cTc​ of a regular simplex extends.

The formalization. The result is classical and proved in the paper. Nothing in it has been machine-checked: there is no regular simplex in Mathlib, and no formal result relates simplex volumes to barycentric coordinates in this form. The platform has the related ellipsoid rounding ConvexOptimization.lowner_john_polytope_rounding (the John-ellipsoid version with factor nnn, by Shuze Chen) and its definition ConvexOptimization_IsLownerJohn. That is the alternative construction of Remark (c). It has a different constant and is not used here. This mission and its companion together give a formal account of the geometry behind Lenstra's algorithm. The algorithm itself is not formalized: its running time needs a machine model and an encoding that the paper does not fix.

Difficulty

There are two separate difficulties. The first is the translation in milestone 1. It needs the volume of a simplex with one vertex replaced to be identified with a barycentric coordinate, through a determinant identity, and it needs this identification to survive the linear map τ\tauτ. The second is the transfer to the model. The paper's "similarity transformation" identifies Rn\mathbb R^nRn with a hyperplane of Rn+1\mathbb R^{n+1}Rn+1 and sends the regular simplex to the standard one. In Lean the vertex description (milestone 2), the radii (milestones 3–4) and TcT_cTc​ must all be carried across this isometry up to scaling. The LEMMA is stated in Rn\mathbb R^nRn, not in the model. The "straightforward analysis" behind milestone 2 is a vertex enumeration of a cube cut by a hyperplane, and its parity split is where sign errors appear.

Formalization scope

  • Rn\mathbb R^nRn is EuclideanSpace ℝ (Fin n) and the model Rn+1\mathbb R^{n+1}Rn+1 is EuclideanSpace ℝ (Fin (n+1)). Distances are Euclidean, never the sup norm. Vertices are indexed by Fin (n+1), matching 0,…,n0, \dots, n0,…,n.
  • The volume keeps the paper's normalisation ∣det⁡M∣/n!|\det M|/n!∣detM∣/n!. TcT_cTc​ is defined from volumes exactly as on p. 543, not from barycentric coordinates.
  • Readings of loose phrases. "Nonsingular endomorphism" is a linear equivalence. "Span a regular nnn-simplex" means all pairwise distances are equal and positive. "Certain/two positive real numbers r,Rr, Rr,R" is an existential with 0<r0 < r0<r and 0<R0 < R0<R in the conclusion; without them, R/rR/rR/r with r=0r = 0r=0 would be 000 in Lean. The LEMMA keeps the printed equality for (R/r)2(R/r)^2(R/r)2. (15) is two hypotheses on ggg, and (16) is quantified over all x∈Kx \in Kx∈K and all pairs i≠ji \ne ji=j.
  • Generalizations, all harmless. The paper's KKK is a bounded polyhedron and the vjv_jvj​ are vertices; the claim is stated for any convex KKK and any points vj∈Kv_j \in Kvj​∈K, and boundedness of KKK follows from (16). Milestone 1 holds for any set KKK. The LEMMA is stated for any regular simplex, since τ\tauτ plays no role in it.
  • n≥1n \ge 1n≥1 throughout. In the model, the ball of milestone 4 is intersected with the hyperplane ∑jxj=1\sum_j x_j = 1∑j​xj​=1, the paper's Rn\mathbb R^nRn. The full ball of Rn+1\mathbb R^{n+1}Rn+1 is not inside SSS.
  • No trivializing formalization is possible: the hypotheses are satisfiable (checked at n=1n = 1n=1, K=[0,1]K = [0,1]K=[0,1]), the radii are positive, and the sets are computed from the data rather than assumed.
  • Useful infrastructure, reusable beyond this mission: the volume of a simplex with one vertex replaced, as a multiple of a barycentric coordinate; existence and properties of regular simplices in Rn\mathbb R^nRn; the isometric embedding of a regular simplex onto the standard simplex. Contributions of any of these as separate lemmas are welcome.

Selected references

  • H. W. Lenstra, Jr., Integer programming with a fixed number of variables, Mathematics of Operations Research 8(4) (1983) 538–548. https://doi.org/10.1287/moor.8.4.538
  • A. K. Lenstra, H. W. Lenstra, Jr., L. Lovász, Factoring polynomials with rational coefficients, Mathematische Annalen 261 (1982) 515–534. https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01457454
  • L. G. Khachiyan, A polynomial algorithm in linear programming, Soviet Math. Doklady 20 (1979) 191–194.
  • R. Kannan, Minkowski's convex body theorem and integer programming, Mathematics of Operations Research 12(3) (1987) 415–440. https://doi.org/10.1287/moor.12.3.415
  • M. Grötschel, L. Lovász, A. Schrijver, Geometric Algorithms and Combinatorial Optimization, Springer, 1988. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-97881-4
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Supply Chain Coordination with Contracts V: With Market-Clearing Prices the Best Wholesale Price Earns θ/(2(1 + θ)) or θ/8, Below the (1 + θ)/8 a Full-Refund Buy-Back AttainsTextbook

Motivation

A supplier that sells through many competing retailers usually worries that competition among them pushes orders too high, because each retailer ignores the demand it takes from the others. Deneckere, Marvel and Peck (1997) identified the opposite failure. When the retail price is set by the market after demand is realized, retailers who hold too much stock in a weak market bid the price down, and anticipating this, perfectly competitive retailers order too little. The supplier then needs a contract that raises orders, and the classical justification for resale price maintenance (a price floor imposed on retailers) comes out of this model. G. P. Cachon's survey chapter Supply Chain Coordination with Contracts (Handbooks in OR & MS, Vol. 11, 2003) presents the model in §6.5.2 as a closed-form example. In it the supplier's best wholesale price contract is computed explicitly and compared with two contracts that recover the monopoly profit: resale price maintenance and a full-refund buy-back.

This mission is volume V of a series that formalizes the section capstones of that chapter, read in the author's 3rd draft (January 2003), pp. 53–58.

Setting

Fix θ>1\theta>1θ>1. Industry demand is low or high, each with probability 1/21/21/2. If the retailers hold a total stock qqq, the market clearing price is

pl(q)=(1−q)+ (low state),ph(q)=(1−qθ)+ (high state).p_l(q)=(1-q)^+\ \text{(low state)},\qquad p_h(q)=\Big(1-\frac q\theta\Big)^+\ \text{(high state)}.pl​(q)=(1−q)+ (low state),ph​(q)=(1−θq​)+ (high state).

Leftover inventory has no salvage value, and the supplier's production cost is zero.

  • Monopolist benchmark. A single firm orders a stock QQQ, observes the state, and sells xl≤Qx_l\le Qxl​≤Q (low) or xh≤Qx_h\le Qxh​≤Q (high) at the market clearing price. Its expected profit is 12pl(xl)xl+12ph(xh)xh\tfrac12p_l(x_l)x_l+\tfrac12p_h(x_h)x_h21​pl​(xl​)xl​+21​ph​(xh​)xh​, and Πo\Pi^oΠo is the maximum of this.
  • Wholesale price contract. The supplier charges www per unit. A continuum of retailers orders before demand is known and sells everything at the market clearing price. Their aggregate expected profit is
π(q)=12pl(q)q+12ph(q)q−wq.\pi(q)=\tfrac12p_l(q)q+\tfrac12p_h(q)q-wq .π(q)=21​pl​(q)q+21​ph​(q)q−wq.

Perfect competition means the retailers keep ordering until expected profit is zero. The competitive order is the q>0q>0q>0 with π(q)=0\pi(q)=0π(q)=0 and π>0\pi>0π>0 on (0,q)(0,q)(0,q). The supplier earns wqwqwq.

  • Resale price maintenance (pˉ,w)(\bar p,w)(pˉ​,w): retailers may not sell below pˉ\bar ppˉ​. When the clearing price would fall below pˉ\bar ppˉ​, only the demand at pˉ\bar ppˉ​ is sold, allocated in proportion to stock.
  • Buy-back (w,b)(w,b)(w,b): the supplier pays bbb per unsold unit. The market price then cannot fall below bbb, and retailers sell at most 1−b1-b1−b units (low) and θ(1−b)\theta(1-b)θ(1−b) units (high).

The page's notation q1(w)=2θ1+θ(1−w)q_1(w)=\frac{2\theta}{1+\theta}(1-w)q1​(w)=1+θ2θ​(1−w), q2(w)=θ(1−2w)q_2(w)=\theta(1-2w)q2​(w)=θ(1−2w), πs(w)\pi_s(w)πs​(w) and w∗(θ)w^*(\theta)w∗(θ) is kept in Lean under the names q1, q2, supplierProfit, wStar.

Formalization targets

Goal (pp. 55, 57)

With

πs∗={θ2(1+θ)θ≤3,θ8θ>3,\pi_s^*=\begin{cases}\dfrac{\theta}{2(1+\theta)}&\theta\le3,\\[4pt]\dfrac\theta8&\theta>3,\end{cases}πs∗​=⎩⎨⎧​2(1+θ)θ​8θ​​θ≤3,θ>3,​

the goal states four things:

  1. πs∗\pi_s^*πs∗​ is the greatest supplier profit wqwqwq over all wholesale prices and their competitive orders.
  2. w∗(θ)w^*(\theta)w∗(θ) attains it.
  3. The monopolist's maximum is Πo=(1+θ)/8\Pi^o=(1+\theta)/8Πo=(1+θ)/8, and πs∗<Πo\pi_s^*<\Pi^oπs∗​<Πo.
  4. Under the buy-back b=w=1/2b=w=1/2b=w=1/2 the competitive order is θ/2\theta/2θ/2 and the supplier earns exactly Πo\Pi^oΠo.

Milestones

  1. Πo=(1+θ)/8\Pi^o=(1+\theta)/8Πo=(1+θ)/8 (p. 54).
  2. The competitive order is q1(w)q_1(w)q1​(w) if w≥12−12θw\ge\tfrac12-\tfrac1{2\theta}w≥21​−2θ1​ and q2(w)q_2(w)q2​(w) otherwise, for 0≤w<10\le w<10≤w<1 (p. 55).
  3. w∗(θ)w^*(\theta)w∗(θ) maximizes πs\pi_sπs​ on [0,1)[0,1)[0,1), with the value πs∗\pi_s^*πs∗​ (p. 55).
  4. The orders and market clearing prices at w∗(θ)w^*(\theta)w∗(θ) (p. 55).
  5. Under resale price maintenance with pˉ=1/2\bar p=1/2pˉ​=1/2 and total stock θ/2\theta/2θ/2, πr(t)=q(t)(1+θ4θ−w)\pi_r(t)=q(t)\big(\frac{1+\theta}{4\theta}-w\big)πr​(t)=q(t)(4θ1+θ​−w) (p. 56).
  6. Under (pˉ,wˉ)(\bar p,\bar w)(pˉ​,wˉ) the competitive order is θ/2\theta/2θ/2 and the supplier earns Πo\Pi^oΠo (p. 57).
  7. Under the buy-back b=1/2b=1/2b=1/2 the retailers' profit is q(34−w−q2θ)q\big(\frac34-w-\frac q{2\theta}\big)q(43​−w−2θq​) for 1/2<q<θ/21/2<q<\theta/21/2<q<θ/2 (p. 57).
  8. 1/2>(1+θ)/(4θ)1/2>(1+\theta)/(4\theta)1/2>(1+θ)/(4θ) (p. 57).

Significance

The goal shows that in this model a wholesale price contract always falls short of the integrated profit, whatever θ\thetaθ. It also shows where the shortfall comes from: at the optimal wholesale price the low-state market price falls below the monopoly price 1/21/21/2 (milestone 4). Restoring the monopoly profit therefore requires a mechanism that holds the low-state price at 1/21/21/2. Resale price maintenance and a full-refund buy-back both do this, so the section gives a closed-form efficiency argument for vertical restraints that are often treated as anticompetitive. The section also contrasts the buy-back with revenue sharing, which coordinates the single newsvendor (§6.2) but not this model.

The results are proved on the printed pages by elementary algebra. None of them has a machine-checked proof, and nothing on Prove2Me covers this model. The mission produces checked versions of the case analysis, including the θ=3\theta=3θ=3 tie and the two regimes of the competitive order. It also adds a reusable encoding of "perfect competition" as the first zero of aggregate expected profit.

Difficulty

Every statement reduces to one-variable inequalities, but the case structure is easy to get wrong.

  • The retailers' profit is piecewise (prices hit zero at q=1q=1q=1 in the low state and at q=θq=\thetaq=θ in the high state). The competitive order lies on either side of q=1q=1q=1 depending on www.
  • The supplier's profit πs\pi_sπs​ is piecewise in www, and its second branch peaks at w=1/4w=1/4w=1/4 only when θ>2\theta>2θ>2.
  • The global optimum switches at θ=3\theta=3θ=3, where both prices are optimal.
  • A statement "the competitive order is q1(w)q_1(w)q1​(w)" needs the order to exist, to be unique, and to have positive profit everywhere below it. Exhibiting a root is not enough.
  • The buy-back profit is identically zero for q≥θ/2q\ge\theta/2q≥θ/2 when b=w=1/2b=w=1/2b=w=1/2. Only the "first zero" reading of perfect competition pins the order at θ/2\theta/2θ/2.

Formalization scope

All quantities are real numbers and θ>1\theta>1θ>1 throughout. The continuum of retailers enters only through the total order. No measure space of retailers is formalized, and footnote 26's multiplicity of individual equilibria is not stated. The sales rules under resale price maintenance (proportional allocation) and under the buy-back (price floor bbb) are written into the contract definitions, as the page describes them in words. The theorems use only pˉ=b=1/2\bar p=b=1/2pˉ​=b=1/2.

The formulas q1q_1q1​, q2q_2q2​, πs\pi_sπs​ and w∗w^*w∗ are definitions transcribed from the page. That they are the competitive order and the optimum is the content of the theorems. Defining Πo\Pi^oΠo or the competitive order by its closed form would trivialize the mission, so the competitive order is defined only by the zero-profit property and Πo\Pi^oΠo as a greatest element of the monopolist's feasible profits. The goal is stated over all real wholesale prices, so it also rules out profitable prices outside [0,1)[0,1)[0,1). Uniqueness of w∗(θ)w^*(\theta)w∗(θ) is not asserted at θ=3\theta=3θ=3.

The chapter's standing assumptions used here are risk neutrality and full information, together with the model paragraph of pp. 53–54 (two equally likely states, zero salvage value, zero production cost). No platform definition is referenced: no published item formalizes this model.

Selected references

  • G. P. Cachon, Supply Chain Coordination with Contracts, in S. Graves, T. de Kok (eds.), Handbooks in Operations Research and Management Science, Vol. 11: Supply Chain Management, North-Holland, 2003, §6.5.2 (3rd draft, January 2003, pp. 53–58). https://doi.org/10.1016/S0927-0507(03)11006-7
  • R. Deneckere, H. P. Marvel, J. Peck, Demand Uncertainty and Price Maintenance: Markdowns as Destructive Competition, American Economic Review 87(4), 619–641, 1997. https://www.jstor.org/stable/2951366
  • R. Deneckere, H. P. Marvel, J. Peck, Demand Uncertainty, Inventories, and Resale Price Maintenance, Quarterly Journal of Economics 111(3), 885–913, 1996. https://doi.org/10.2307/2946675
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Supply Chain Coordination with Contracts III: With Effort-Dependent Demand, Buy-Backs, Quantity Flexibility and Revenue Sharing Under-Reward Effort, While a Quantity Discount Gives λΠ(q, e°)Textbook

Why effort breaks the standard coordinating contracts

A supplier selling through a retailer earns more when the retailer works harder at selling. Examples are a better shelf position, more knowledgeable sales staff, local advertising and keeping the display in order. These activities cost the retailer, raise demand, and usually cannot be observed or verified by the supplier, so no contract can be written on them directly. Chapter 6 of the Handbook of Operations Research and Management Science, Vol. 11: Supply Chain Management (G. P. Cachon, Supply Chain Coordination with Contracts, 2003) surveys contracts that align a retailer's decisions with the interest of the whole supply chain. Its §6.4 asks which of these contracts survive when the retailer also chooses such an unverifiable effort level.

The question goes back to the marketing literature on retail effort (Chu and Desai 1995, Desai and Srinivasan 1995, Desiraju and Moorthy 1997, Lal 1990, Lariviere and Padmanabhan 1997). It was taken up for newsvendor contracts by Taylor (2000), who showed that a sales rebate combined with a buy back restores coordination, and by Krishnan, Kapuscinski and Butz (2001), who let effort be chosen after demand is observed. This mission is the third in a series that formalizes the chapter's section capstones. It covers §6.4.1.

The newsvendor with effort-dependent demand

One supplier sells to one retailer for a single selling season. Before the season the retailer chooses an order quantity q≥0q \ge 0q≥0 and an effort level e≥0e \ge 0e≥0. Effort costs him g(e)g(e)g(e), where g(0)=0g(0) = 0g(0)=0, g′>0g' > 0g′>0 and g′′>0g'' > 0g′′>0. Demand DDD given effort eee has distribution function F(⋅∣e)F(\cdot \mid e)F(⋅∣e) on [0,∞)[0, \infty)[0,∞), with F(0∣e)=0F(0 \mid e) = 0F(0∣e)=0 and F(⋅∣e)F(\cdot \mid e)F(⋅∣e) strictly increasing. Demand is stochastically increasing in effort: ∂F(y∣e)/∂e<0\partial F(y \mid e)/\partial e < 0∂F(y∣e)/∂e<0 for y>0y > 0y>0. Units sell at the retail price ppp and cost c<pc < pc<p to produce. Goodwill costs, the salvage value and the retailer's own unit cost are zero. Expected sales and the integrated channel's profit are

S(q,e)=E[min⁡(q,D)]=q−∫0qF(y∣e) dy,Π(q,e)=pS(q,e)−cq−g(e).S(q, e) = \mathbb E[\min(q, D)] = q - \int_0^q F(y \mid e)\,dy, \qquad \Pi(q, e) = pS(q, e) - cq - g(e).S(q,e)=E[min(q,D)]=q−∫0q​F(y∣e)dy,Π(q,e)=pS(q,e)−cq−g(e).

Let (qo,eo)(q^o, e^o)(qo,eo) maximize Π\PiΠ. A contract fixes the transfer the retailer pays the supplier, as a function of what the supplier can verify: the order and, for some contracts, sales or leftover units, but never effort. The contracts compared are the buy back {wb,b}\{w_b, b\}{wb​,b}, quantity flexibility {wq,δ}\{w_q, \delta\}{wq​,δ}, revenue sharing {wr,ϕ}\{w_r, \phi\}{wr​,ϕ}, the sales rebate {ws,r,t}\{w_s, r, t\}{ws​,r,t} and the quantity discount wd(q)w_d(q)wd​(q). Under each, the retailer's profit πr(q,e)\pi_r(q, e)πr​(q,e) is his revenue pS(q,e)pS(q, e)pS(q,e) less the transfer and g(e)g(e)g(e).

Formalization targets

Goal

The goal combines the section's negative and positive results.

  1. Buy backs distort effort (Eq. (19)). For every b>0b > 0b>0, q>0q > 0q>0 and e>0e > 0e>0,
∂πr(q,e,wb,b)∂e<∂Π(q,e)∂e.\frac{\partial \pi_r(q, e, w_b, b)}{\partial e} < \frac{\partial \Pi(q, e)}{\partial e}.∂e∂πr​(q,e,wb​,b)​<∂e∂Π(q,e)​.
  1. The quantity discount aligns effort and splits profit. With
wd(q)=(1−λ)p S(q,eo)q+λc−(1−λ)g(eo)q,λ∈[0,1],w_d(q) = (1 - \lambda)p\,\frac{S(q, e^o)}{q} + \lambda c - (1 - \lambda)\frac{g(e^o)}{q}, \qquad \lambda \in [0, 1],wd​(q)=(1−λ)pqS(q,eo)​+λc−(1−λ)qg(eo)​,λ∈[0,1],

the following hold for every q>0q > 0q>0. The retailer earns πr(q,eo)=λΠ(q,eo)\pi_r(q, e^o) = \lambda\Pi(q, e^o)πr​(q,eo)=λΠ(q,eo) and the supplier earns (1−λ)Π(q,eo)(1 - \lambda)\Pi(q, e^o)(1−λ)Π(q,eo). The retailer's marginal profit of effort equals the channel's. His optimal efforts are the channel's. 3. The optimal order. If (qo,eo)(q^o, e^o)(qo,eo) maximizes Π\PiΠ, both firms' profits at effort eoe^oeo are maximized by qoq^oqo.

Milestones

The milestones follow the section's own claims: the integral form of SSS (p. 41); the first-order condition (18) for the chain-optimal effort; (19); the analogous strict inequalities for quantity flexibility (δ>0\delta > 0δ>0) and revenue sharing (ϕ<1\phi < 1ϕ<1), and the reverse inequality for the sales rebate (r>0r > 0r>0, q>tq > tq>t); the two displays of πr\pi_rπr​ under the quantity discount; and the fact that S(q,e)/qS(q, e)/qS(q,e)/q decreases in qqq.

Significance

The result separates two jobs a contract does. To coordinate the order quantity, buy backs, quantity flexibility and revenue sharing all shield the retailer from part of the demand risk or take part of his revenue. The same shield dulls his incentive to raise demand, so each one leads him to under-invest in effort. The sales rebate pushes the other way, toward too much effort. The quantity discount works because the retailer keeps every unit of realized revenue and bears all of his own effort cost. The schedule then prices the order against expected revenue at the optimal effort, so the order is coordinated without touching the effort incentive. Because πr(q,eo)=λΠ(q,eo)\pi_r(q, e^o) = \lambda\Pi(q, e^o)πr​(q,eo)=λΠ(q,eo) with λ\lambdaλ free in [0,1][0, 1][0,1], any split of the channel's optimal profit is attainable. The chapter extends this observation to retailers that also set price (p. 43).

The section's claims are proved on the page only in outline; several are introduced with "it can be shown". To our knowledge none has a machine-checked proof. Formalizing them requires differentiating expected sales in a parameter of the demand law. That step recurs throughout stochastic inventory and pricing models.

Difficulty

Most of the algebra is short. The substance is in the derivatives. ∂S(q,e)/∂e=−∫0q∂F(y∣e)/∂e dy\partial S(q, e)/\partial e = -\int_0^q \partial F(y \mid e)/\partial e\,dy∂S(q,e)/∂e=−∫0q​∂F(y∣e)/∂edy is a differentiation under the integral sign. The strict inequalities need this integral to be strictly negative. That in turn needs ∂F/∂e\partial F/\partial e∂F/∂e to be integrable and negative on a set of positive length, which is why q>0q > 0q>0 (and q>t≥0q > t \ge 0q>t≥0 for the sales rebate) matters.

The natural reading "the quantity discount makes (qo,eo)(q^o, e^o)(qo,eo) the retailer's joint optimum" is not what the page shows, and it fails in general. The page gives two partial statements: for each fixed qqq the retailer's effort incentive is the chain's, and at e=eoe = e^oe=eo his best order is qoq^oqo. Since πr(q,e)=Π(q,e)−(1−λ)Π(q,eo)\pi_r(q, e) = \Pi(q, e) - (1 - \lambda)\Pi(q, e^o)πr​(q,e)=Π(q,e)−(1−λ)Π(q,eo), the retailer can gain by moving qqq and eee together when λ\lambdaλ is small. The goal states exactly the two partial claims.

Formalization scope

The Lean namespace is CachonCoord.EffortNewsvendor. A structure Model collects the data: ppp and ccc with 0≤c<p0 \le c < p0≤c<p; a family of demand laws indexed by effort (probability measures on [0,∞)[0, \infty)[0,∞) with finite mean, no atom at 000, strictly increasing distribution function); the effort derivative ∂F(y∣e)/∂e\partial F(y \mid e)/\partial e∂F(y∣e)/∂e, negative for y>0y > 0y>0, e>0e > 0e>0; and ggg with g(0)=0g(0) = 0g(0)=0 and positive first and second derivatives for e>0e > 0e>0. SSS is defined as an expectation, and its integral form is a milestone. Derivative claims are HasDerivAt statements at interior efforts e>0e > 0e>0. The inequalities assert that both derivatives exist.

The following hypotheses are standing assumptions or disclosed additions:

  • the chapter's model paragraph (p. 7) and the zeros gr=gs=v=cr=0g_r = g_s = v = c_r = 0gr​=gs​=v=cr​=0 of p. 41;
  • as regularity, differentiation of e↦∫abF(y∣e) dye \mapsto \int_a^b F(y \mid e)\,dye↦∫ab​F(y∣e)dy under the integral sign, with interval-integrable ∂F/∂e\partial F/\partial e∂F/∂e;
  • 0≤c0 \le c0≤c (a production cost);
  • wq>0w_q > 0wq​>0 and δ≤1\delta \le 1δ≤1 for quantity flexibility (the contract's range, p. 24);
  • t≥0t \ge 0t≥0 for the sales rebate threshold;
  • q>0q > 0q>0 wherever wdw_dwd​, which divides by qqq, is used.

Revenue sharing and the sales rebate use §6.2's profit functions (pp. 21, 27) with this section's zeros, less g(e)g(e)g(e).

The page prints the last term of wdw_dwd​ as +(1−λ)g(eo)/q+(1 - \lambda)g(e^o)/q+(1−λ)g(eo)/q. With that sign the page's own displays πr(q,eo)=λΠ(q,eo)\pi_r(q, e^o) = \lambda\Pi(q, e^o)πr​(q,eo)=λΠ(q,eo) and πr(q,e)\pi_r(q, e)πr​(q,e) fail by 2(1−λ)g(eo)2(1 - \lambda)g(e^o)2(1−λ)g(eo). The formalization uses −(1−λ)g(eo)/q-(1 - \lambda)g(e^o)/q−(1−λ)g(eo)/q, under which both hold. wdw_dwd​ is the explicit printed schedule with this correction. It is not defined as "a schedule with πr=λΠ\pi_r = \lambda\Piπr​=λΠ", which would make the goal empty.

Not covered: the price-and-effort schedule at the bottom of p. 43, for which the page gives no argument. The cachon-2005 revenue-sharing effort results (RevShareCoord.Effort.*, deterministic revenue R(q,e)R(q, e)R(q,e)) are a different model and are not referenced. Proofs of any milestone, and a reusable library for differentiating newsvendor expectations in a parameter, are welcome.

Selected references

  • G. P. Cachon, Supply Chain Coordination with Contracts, in S. Graves and T. de Kok (eds.), Handbooks in Operations Research and Management Science, Vol. 11: Supply Chain Management, North-Holland, 2003, Ch. 6. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0927-0507(03)11006-7 (read in the author's 3rd draft, January 2003).
  • T. A. Taylor, Supply Chain Coordination under Channel Rebates with Sales Effort Effects, Management Science 48(8), 2002, 992–1007. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.48.8.992.168
  • H. Krishnan, R. Kapuscinski, D. A. Butz, Coordinating Contracts for Decentralized Supply Chains with Retailer Promotional Effort, Management Science 50(1), 2004, 48–63. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.1030.0154
  • G. P. Cachon, M. A. Lariviere, Supply Chain Coordination with Revenue-Sharing Contracts: Strengths and Limitations, Management Science 51(1), 2005, 30–44. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.1040.0215
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A Numerically Stable Dual Method for Solving Strictly Convex Quadratic Programs: The Dual Algorithm Solves the QP or Detects Its Infeasibility in Finitely Many StepsResearch Paper

Motivation

Strictly convex quadratic programs — minimize a positive definite quadratic subject to linear inequalities — are the subproblems solved at every iteration of successive quadratic programming (SQP) methods for nonlinear optimization, and they arise directly in least-squares estimation with constraints, portfolio selection and model predictive control. In SQP the unconstrained minimizer of the quadratic model is available at no cost, while a feasible point is not.

D. Goldfarb and A. Idnani (Math. Programming 27 (1983) 1–33) proposed a dual active-set method that exploits this asymmetry. It starts at the unconstrained minimizer, which is optimal for the problem with all constraints removed, and adds violated constraints one at a time while keeping the current point optimal for the subproblem defined by the current active set. No phase 1 is needed. The method, usually called the Goldfarb–Idnani algorithm, is the basis of widely used solvers (for example the quadprog package in R and QuadProg++), and the paper proves that it terminates finitely with a correct answer.

Earlier dual methods for quadratic programming include the modified-simplex methods of Lemke (Management Science 8 (1962) 442–453) and of Van de Panne and Whinston (1964), which the paper compares with its own in Section 7.

Setting

Fix n,m∈Nn, m \in \mathbb Nn,m∈N, a vector a∈Rna \in \mathbb R^na∈Rn, a symmetric positive definite n×nn\times nn×n matrix GGG, an n×mn\times mn×m matrix CCC with columns n1,…,nmn_1,\dots,n_mn1​,…,nm​, and b∈Rmb \in \mathbb R^mb∈Rm. The quadratic program (1.1) is

min⁡x f(x)=aTx+12xTGxsubject tosi(x)=niTx−bi≥0,i∈K={1,…,m}.\min_x\ f(x) = a^{\mathsf T}x + \tfrac12 x^{\mathsf T}Gx \quad\text{subject to}\quad s_i(x) = n_i^{\mathsf T}x - b_i \ge 0,\quad i \in K = \{1,\dots,m\}.xmin​ f(x)=aTx+21​xTGxsubject tosi​(x)=niT​x−bi​≥0,i∈K={1,…,m}.

The gradient is g(x)=Gx+ag(x) = Gx + ag(x)=Gx+a. For J⊆KJ \subseteq KJ⊆K, the subproblem P(J)P(J)P(J) keeps only the constraints indexed by JJJ; P(∅)P(\emptyset)P(∅) is solved by x0=−G−1ax^0 = -G^{-1}ax0=−G−1a. A set A⊆KA \subseteq KA⊆K is linearly independent if the normals nin_ini​, i∈Ai\in Ai∈A, are.

For an independent AAA, let NNN be the matrix with columns nin_ini​, i∈Ai\in Ai∈A, and define

N∗=(NTG−1N)−1NTG−1,H=G−1−G−1N(NTG−1N)−1NTG−1.N^* = (N^{\mathsf T}G^{-1}N)^{-1}N^{\mathsf T}G^{-1},\qquad H = G^{-1} - G^{-1}N(N^{\mathsf T}G^{-1}N)^{-1}N^{\mathsf T}G^{-1}.N∗=(NTG−1N)−1NTG−1,H=G−1−G−1N(NTG−1N)−1NTG−1.

The multipliers are u(x)=N∗g(x)u(x) = N^*g(x)u(x)=N∗g(x); for a constraint p∉Ap \notin Ap∈/A with normal n+=npn^+ = n_pn+=np​ the infeasibility multipliers are r=N∗n+r = N^*n^+r=N∗n+; a superscript +++ denotes the same objects for A+=A∪{p}A^+ = A\cup\{p\}A+=A∪{p}.

An S-pair (x,A)(x, A)(x,A) is an independent active set AAA with si(x)=0s_i(x) = 0si​(x)=0 for i∈Ai\in Ai∈A and xxx optimal for P(A)P(A)P(A). A V-triple (x,A,p)(x, A, p)(x,A,p) has p∉Ap\notin Ap∈/A, A+A^+A+ independent, sp(x)<0s_p(x) < 0sp​(x)<0, si(x)=0s_i(x) = 0si​(x)=0 for i∈Ai \in Ai∈A, H+g(x)=0H^+g(x) = 0H+g(x)=0 and u+(x)=(N+)∗g(x)≥0u^+(x) = (N^+)^*g(x) \ge 0u+(x)=(N+)∗g(x)≥0.

The dual algorithm starts from (x0,∅)(x^0, \emptyset)(x0,∅). In Step 1 it stops if xxx is feasible; otherwise it picks any violated constraint ppp. In Step 2 it moves along the primal direction z=Hn+z = Hn^+z=Hn+ and the dual direction (−r;1)(-r; 1)(−r;1) with step t=min⁡{t1,t2}t = \min\{t_1, t_2\}t=min{t1​,t2​}, where t1t_1t1​ is the largest step that keeps the multipliers nonnegative and t2=−sp(x)/zTn+t_2 = -s_p(x)/z^{\mathsf T}n^+t2​=−sp​(x)/zTn+ makes constraint ppp active. If both are infinite it reports infeasibility. A full step (t=t2t = t_2t=t2​) adds ppp and returns to Step 1. A partial step (t=t1<t2t = t_1 < t_2t=t1​<t2​), or a dual step (z=0z = 0z=0), drops a constraint kkk attaining t1t_1t1​ and repeats Step 2.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 3 (p. 11)

For every choice of the violated constraint ppp and of the dropped constraint kkk:

no run from (x0,∅) is infinite, and every run that cannot continue ends in {STOP at an optimal x of (1.1), orSTOP with {x:CTx≥b}=∅.\text{no run from } (x^0,\emptyset) \text{ is infinite, and every run that cannot continue ends in } \begin{cases}\text{STOP at an optimal } x \text{ of (1.1)}, \text{ or}\\ \text{STOP with } \{x : C^{\mathsf T}x \ge b\} = \emptyset.\end{cases}no run from (x0,∅) is infinite, and every run that cannot continue ends in {STOP at an optimal x of (1.1), orSTOP with {x:CTx≥b}=∅.​

Milestones, in attack order

  1. Properties (2.6)–(2.9) (p. 5): Hw=0  ⟺  w∈range⁡NHw = 0 \iff w \in \operatorname{range} NHw=0⟺w∈rangeN; H⪰0H \succeq 0H⪰0; HGH=HHGH = HHGH=H; N∗GH=0N^*GH = 0N∗GH=0.
  2. Optimality conditions (2.3)–(2.4) (p. 5): on the manifold of AAA, xxx solves P(A)P(A)P(A) iff N∗g(x)≥0N^*g(x) \ge 0N∗g(x)≥0 and Hg(x)=0Hg(x) = 0Hg(x)=0.
  3. Lemma 1 (p. 8): along xˉ=x+tHn+\bar x = x + tHn^+xˉ=x+tHn+ from a V-triple, H+g(xˉ)=0H^+g(\bar x) = 0H+g(xˉ)=0, the constraints of AAA stay active, u+(xˉ)=u+(x)+t(−r;1)u^+(\bar x) = u^+(x) + t(-r;1)u+(xˉ)=u+(x)+t(−r;1) and sp(xˉ)=sp(x)+t zTn+s_p(\bar x) = s_p(x) + t\,z^{\mathsf T}n^+sp​(xˉ)=sp​(x)+tzTn+.
  4. Theorem 1 (pp. 8–9): the step t=min⁡{t1,t2}t = \min\{t_1,t_2\}t=min{t1​,t2​} increases sps_psp​ and fff; a partial step yields a V-triple, a full step an S-pair.
  5. Theorem 2 (p. 10): if np=Nrn_p = Nrnp​=Nr and sp(x)<0s_p(x) < 0sp​(x)<0 at an S-pair, then r≤0r \le 0r≤0 means P(A∪{p})P(A\cup\{p\})P(A∪{p}) is infeasible; otherwise dropping a minimizing kkk gives a V-triple.
  6. One round of Step 2 (p. 11): from an S-pair and a violated ppp, at most ∣A∣|A|∣A∣ partial or dual steps and one final step end either in infeasibility of (1.1) or in a new S-pair (xˉ,Aˉ∪{p})(\bar x, \bar A \cup\{p\})(xˉ,Aˉ∪{p}) with Aˉ⊆A\bar A\subseteq AAˉ⊆A and f(xˉ)>f(x)f(\bar x) > f(x)f(xˉ)>f(x).

Significance

Theorem 3 is the correctness certificate of the Goldfarb–Idnani method: whatever rule an implementation uses to choose the entering and leaving constraints, it cannot cycle and its answer is right. In particular the infeasibility verdict is a proof that (1.1) has no feasible point, which matters in SQP where infeasible subproblems trigger a different branch of the outer method. The intermediate results (the operator identities, Lemma 1, Theorems 1–2) are the standard analysis of dual active-set methods for quadratic programming.

The result is proved in the paper; to our knowledge it has not been machine-checked. A formal development produces verified projector identities for N∗N^*N∗ and HHH, a verified KKT characterization for equality-active subproblems, and a verified finite-termination proof for a nondeterministic algorithm with an explicit step relation. The platform already has a proved KKT sufficiency theorem for general convex programs (ConvexOptimization.kkt_sufficient_for_convex), stated over EuclideanSpace with general convex functions and gradient fields; it can serve as background for the sufficiency half of milestone 2, but it is not stated in this mission's matrix objects.

Difficulty

The obvious termination argument is that fff increases strictly at every iteration and there are finitely many active sets. It fails as stated: partial steps may leave xxx unchanged (the dual steps of Step 2(c)(ii)), so fff is only nondecreasing between consecutive states. A termination proof therefore needs a measure that also decreases along steps that do not move xxx. Any such argument relies on invariants (independence of A+A^+A+, nonnegativity of the multipliers, sp<0s_p < 0sp​<0 along partial steps) that hold only on reachable states, and the operators N∗N^*N∗ and HHH are meaningful only while those invariants hold. Correctness of the infeasibility verdict requires the dependent case (Theorem 2), not only Theorem 1.

Formalization scope

Vectors are Fin n → ℝ, GGG is Matrix (Fin n) (Fin n) ℝ with G.PosDef, CCC is Matrix (Fin n) (Fin m) ℝ, and active sets are Finset (Fin m). Multiplier vectors are indexed by constraint index (Fin m → ℝ, zero off the active set), not by position in AAA. Lean's matrix inverse returns 000 for singular matrices, so every statement about N∗N^*N∗ and HHH assumes G≻0G \succ 0G≻0 and an independent active set (directly, or through an S-pair or V-triple).

The algorithm is the inductive relation Step on states step1 x A u, step2 x A p u⁺, stopOptimal x, stopInfeasible, with one transition per admissible choice of ppp and kkk. Infinite step lengths are separate transitions; a tie t1=t2t_1 = t_2t1​=t2​ takes the full step, as the paper tests t=t2t = t_2t=t2​ first. The running value of fff and the factorizations of Section 4 are not part of the state.

Explicit readings of the paper's words:

  • "solves the QPP or indicates infeasibility in a finite number of steps" is: no infinite sequence of Step transitions from the Step-0 state, and every reachable state without a successor is a STOP whose verdict is correct (optimal for (1.1), or (1.1) infeasible);
  • "S-pair" is: AAA independent and active at xxx, with xxx optimal for P(A)P(A)P(A) (the reading every use in the paper needs);
  • in Theorem 1 the partial-step clause carries t<t2t < t_2t<t2​ (as in its proof), and the multiplier printed uj+1+u^+_{j+1}uj+1+​ in (3.16) is uq+1+u^+_{q+1}uq+1+​, the entry belonging to ppp;
  • "an S-pair can never reoccur" is expressed as the strict increase f(xˉ)>f(x)f(\bar x) > f(x)f(xˉ)>f(x) in milestone 6.

Property (2.10), printed HH+=H+HH^+ = H^+HH+=H+, is false unless G=IG = IG=I and is not formalized. Equality constraints (1.2), Section 4 (numerically stable implementation), Sections 5–6 (computations), Section 7 (comparisons) and the Appendix example are out of scope.

A trivializing formalization is ruled out: the goal quantifies over every run of the relation (not one selection rule, not "some run terminates"), the infeasibility verdict is about (1.1) itself, and the algorithm is a relation that always has a successor until a STOP, so correctness cannot hold because a run gets stuck.

Needed infrastructure: Schur-complement and projector identities for N∗N^*N∗ and HHH; first-order optimality for convex quadratics on affine subspaces with inequality multipliers; well-foundedness arguments for a nondeterministic relation. The operator identities and the KKT characterization are reusable for other active-set and SQP analyses. Contributions of proofs of any milestone, and of reusable lemmas about N∗N^*N∗ and HHH, are welcome.

Selected references

  • D. Goldfarb and A. Idnani, A numerically stable dual method for solving strictly convex quadratic programs, Mathematical Programming 27 (1983) 1–33. https://doi.org/10.1007/BF02591962
  • C. E. Lemke, A method of solution for quadratic programs, Management Science 8 (1962) 442–453. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.8.4.442
  • J. Nocedal and S. J. Wright, Numerical Optimization, 2nd ed., Springer, 2006, Chapter 16. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-0-387-40065-5
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Finding Minimum-Cost Circulations by Successive Approximation I: The Generic Refine Subroutine Stops Within 3n(n − 1) + 3nm + 3n²(m + n) Update Operations at an ε-Optimal CirculationResearch Paper

Motivation

Minimum-cost circulation asks how to route flow around a directed network without accumulating flow at any vertex, while minimizing the total cost of the routed units. It is a basic network optimization problem: lower-bound and demand constraints in many flow models can be converted into circulation form. Goldberg and Tarjan's 1987 technical report develops a successive-approximation approach in which a local repair subroutine, refine, improves an approximately optimal circulation. The report was followed by a 1990 journal article; all theorem numbers and page citations in this mission refer to the 1987 report.

The mission isolates the generic form of refine, where an implementation may choose any applicable update at each step. Its question is whether every such choice sequence finishes after a controlled number of operations and returns a circulation with a stronger optimality certificate. The related Goldberg–Tarjan maximum-flow algorithm uses push and relabel operations with distance labels; here the labels are real-valued prices tied to arc costs. The authors' cycle-canceling work uses the same circulation network model and supplies published definitions reused in this development.

Setting

A circulation network has a finite vertex set VVV and a symmetric set EEE of directed arcs: whenever (v,w)(v,w)(v,w) is an arc, so is (w,v)(w,v)(w,v). Let n=∣V∣n=|V|n=∣V∣ and m=∣E∣m=|E|m=∣E∣, counting both orientations. Each arc has a real capacity u(v,w)u(v,w)u(v,w) and cost c(v,w)c(v,w)c(v,w), with c(v,w)=−c(w,v)c(v,w)=-c(w,v)c(v,w)=−c(w,v). A pseudoflow fff respects capacities and the paired-arc relation f(v,w)=−f(w,v)f(v,w)=-f(w,v)f(v,w)=−f(w,v). Its excess ef(v)e_f(v)ef​(v) is the sum of flow entering vvv. A circulation is a pseudoflow with zero excess everywhere. The already published CycleCanceling.MinMean.Network supplies this network, its circulation predicate, and residual capacity uf(v,w)=u(v,w)−f(v,w)u_f(v,w)=u(v,w)-f(v,w)uf​(v,w)=u(v,w)−f(v,w). An arc is residual when this capacity is positive.

A price function p:V→Rp:V\to\mathbb Rp:V→R changes an arc's reduced cost to cp(v,w)=c(v,w)−p(v)+p(w)c_p(v,w)=c(v,w)-p(v)+p(w)cp​(v,w)=c(v,w)−p(v)+p(w). A pseudoflow is ε\varepsilonε-optimal with respect to ppp when every residual arc has reduced cost at least −ε-\varepsilon−ε. A vertex is active when its excess is positive. An admissible arc is a residual arc of negative reduced cost. Refine takes an input circulation that is 2ε2\varepsilon2ε-optimal, saturates every arc whose reduced cost is negative, and then repeatedly applies an available update. A push sends flow from an active vertex along an admissible arc. A relabel raises the price of an active vertex with no outgoing admissible arc to the largest value permitted by ε\varepsilonε-optimality. These rules are Figures 4 and 5, printed pages 18–19.

Formalization targets

The supporting targets are the paper's progress and correctness results, its price bound, and the three operation counts. For any generic refine run from a 2ε2\varepsilon2ε-optimal circulation, Lemma 5.8 bounds each vertex's price increase by 3nε3n\varepsilon3nε. Lemmas 5.9–5.11 bound the numbers R,S,TR,S,TR,S,T of relabelings, saturating pushes, and nonsaturating pushes:

R≤3n(n−1),S≤3nm,T≤3n2(m+n).R\leq 3n(n-1),\qquad S\leq 3nm,\qquad T\leq 3n^2(m+n).R≤3n(n−1),S≤3nm,T≤3n2(m+n).

The goal combines the resulting bound on the number KKK of updates with progress and correctness:

K≤3n(n−1)+3nm+3n2(m+n).K\leq 3n(n-1)+3nm+3n^2(m+n).K≤3n(n−1)+3nm+3n2(m+n).

If the final state has an active vertex, another update exists. If no update applies, the final pseudoflow is a circulation and is ε\varepsilonε-optimal with respect to its final prices. This is the explicit operation-count content behind the generic subroutine's analysis in Section 5. It does not claim a bound for a particular data structure or a complete minimum-cost algorithm.

Significance

The theorem gives an order-independent finite bound: the choice of which applicable push or relabel to perform cannot cause generic refine to run forever or stop with an active vertex. Its output is a circulation whose approximate-optimality tolerance has been halved. That output can serve as the next input in the successive-approximation framework. For integral costs, the report's Theorem 2.3 later turns a sufficiently small tolerance into exact minimum cost; that outer-loop result is outside this mission.

This mission specifies the generic cost-scaling state machine in Lean and poses its quantitative analysis as open formalization targets. The shared network and circulation definitions from the published Goldberg–Tarjan 1989 series are available, and a related generic maximum-flow theorem in the 1988 series has a machine-checked proof. Those results do not prove refine's price-based bounds. Contributions that establish the paper's progress, price, or counting statements for this state machine, and reusable facts about finite residual networks, advance the open goal.

Difficulty

A push respects a capacity, but it can create activity at another vertex; a relabel changes which arcs are admissible. Thus checking a single update does not bound an arbitrary sequence. The price bound also depends on the circulation and prices supplied at entry, not merely on the current pseudoflow being ε\varepsilonε-optimal. Finally, a vertex with no admissible outgoing arc may appear to be stuck when the relabel minimum is over an empty set. Feasibility of the original circulation network is needed to establish that an active vertex still has a genuine next update. The operation bound requires accounting for the three update types across every possible choice sequence.

Formalization scope

Vertices form a finite type, and capacities, costs, flows, and prices are real-valued functions. The network has symmetric ordered arcs and antisymmetric costs. There is no separate nonnegativity assumption on capacities; feasibility is supplied by the input circulation. The new ε\varepsilonε is positive, so the entry circulation is 2ε2\varepsilon2ε-optimal before Figure 4 halves the error parameter. The run starts from the resulting saturated pseudoflow and records one applicable push or relabel per index k<Kk<Kk<K. Counts classify those actual steps by the selected arc's residual capacity after a push. Termination is the negation of the paper's loop guard, not a definition that assumes zero excess.

The reduced-cost sign is c−p(v)+p(w)c-p(v)+p(w)c−p(v)+p(w), and relabel raises p(v)p(v)p(v). This differs from the published 1989 epsilon-optimality definition, so only its network model is imported. The relabel relation requires an attained minimum over a nonempty set of outgoing residual arcs; it assigns no default value to an empty minimum. Loops may occur in the reused network model, but cost antisymmetry makes their reduced cost zero, so they cannot be push arcs. The explicit constants are the report's 3nε3n\varepsilon3nε, 3n(n−1)3n(n-1)3n(n−1), 3nm3nm3nm, and 3n2(m+n)3n^2(m+n)3n2(m+n); the goal sums the last three. The report's RAM-model O(⋅)O(\cdot)O(⋅) running times are outside the formal statements. A definition that makes termination equivalent to conservation or assigns an arbitrary relabel price at an empty set would miss the target.

Selected references

  • Andrew V. Goldberg and Robert E. Tarjan, Finding Minimum-Cost Circulations by Successive Approximation, MIT/LCS/TM-333, July 1987. Technical report.
  • Andrew V. Goldberg and Robert E. Tarjan, Finding Minimum-Cost Circulations by Successive Approximation, Mathematics of Operations Research 15(3), 1990, pp. 430–466. DOI. The report above supplies this mission's numbering.
  • Andrew V. Goldberg and Robert E. Tarjan, A New Approach to the Maximum-Flow Problem, Journal of the ACM 35(4), 1988. DOI.
  • Andrew V. Goldberg and Robert E. Tarjan, Finding Minimum-Cost Circulations by Canceling Negative Cycles, Journal of the ACM 36(4), 1989. DOI.
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Graph TheoryOperations ResearchOptimization·Captain: mikedeng1

Send-and-Split Method for Minimum-Concave-Cost Network Flows I: A Minimum-Cost Flow Exists iff Every Simple Circulation Has Nonnegative Cost, and Then an Extreme One Exists (Theorem 1)Research Paper

Why minimum-concave-cost flows

Many network design and production–distribution problems have economies of scale: shipping twice as much along an arc costs less than twice as much, because of fixed charges, set-up costs or volume discounts. Modelled as network flows, such problems ask for a flow of least cost when each arc cost is a concave function of the flow on the arc. Classical instances include the uncapacitated lot-sizing problem, the fixed-charge transportation problem, and the Steiner tree problem in graphs. Unlike linear costs, concave costs make the problem NP-hard in general, and the usual linear-programming arguments do not apply directly.

Erickson, Monma and Veinott (Math. Oper. Res. 12 (1987) 634–664) give the send-and-split method, a dynamic program that solves such problems in time exponential only in the number of demand nodes. Before the method can run, two questions must be settled: when does a minimum-cost flow exist at all, and can the arc costs be shifted so that they are nonnegative on flows? Theorem 1 of the paper answers both. This mission formalizes Theorem 1.

Timeline. Hirsch and Hoffman (1961) showed that a concave function bounded below on a polyhedron's extreme rays attains its minimum at a vertex; Rockafellar's Convex Analysis (1970, pp. 61, 343) gives the polyhedral form. Edmonds and Karp (1972) showed how to choose node potentials making linear arc costs nonnegative. Theorem 1 (1987) extends both to additive concave costs on uncapacitated networks.

Setting

A graph G=(N,A)G = (N, A)G=(N,A) has nnn nodes and a set AAA of ordered pairs of distinct nodes, the arcs. A demand vector r∈Rnr \in \mathbb{R}^nr∈Rn assigns a demand rir_iri​ to each node (negative demands are supplies). A preflow is a nonnegative matrix x=(xij)x = (x_{ij})x=(xij​) carried by the arcs, and a flow for rrr is a preflow with

∑(j,i)∈Axji−∑(i,k)∈Axik=ri(i∈N),\sum_{(j,i)\in A} x_{ji} - \sum_{(i,k)\in A} x_{ik} = r_i \qquad (i \in N),(j,i)∈A∑​xji​−(i,k)∈A∑​xik​=ri​(i∈N),

inflow minus outflow equal to demand. A circulation is a flow for r=0r = 0r=0.

The flow cost is c(x)=∑(i,j)∈Acij(xij)c(x) = \sum_{(i,j)\in A} c_{ij}(x_{ij})c(x)=∑(i,j)∈A​cij​(xij​), where each cijc_{ij}cij​ is concave on [0,∞)[0,\infty)[0,∞) and cij(0)=0c_{ij}(0) = 0cij​(0)=0. A minimum-cost flow for rrr is a flow whose cost is at most that of every flow for rrr.

A preflow induces the subgraph of arcs with nonzero flow. An extreme flow is a flow whose induced subgraph is a forest (in the undirected sense; two antiparallel arcs form a cycle). A simple circuit is a directed cycle through at least two distinct nodes, with arc set CCC; a simple circulation is a circulation whose induced subgraph is a simple circuit. The slope at infinity c˙ij(∞)∈[−∞,∞)\dot c_{ij}(\infty) \in [-\infty, \infty)c˙ij​(∞)∈[−∞,∞) is the limit of the right derivative of cijc_{ij}cij​.

Two nodes are in the same strong component if chains (directed walks) join them both ways; a component is a sink if no chain leaves it. The augmented graph G‾\underline{G}G​ appends a node ν\nuν and an arc (i,ν)(i,\nu)(i,ν) for exactly one node iii of each sink component. Its arc costs c‾\underline{c}c​ are c˙ij(∞)\dot c_{ij}(\infty)c˙ij​(∞) on arcs inside strong components and arbitrary real numbers elsewhere; π‾i\underline{\pi}_iπ​i​ is the infimum of the costs of chains from iii to ν\nuν. For π∈Rn\pi \in \mathbb{R}^nπ∈Rn, the altered costs are cijπ(y)=cij(y)−(πi−πj)yc^\pi_{ij}(y) = c_{ij}(y) - (\pi_i - \pi_j) ycijπ​(y)=cij​(y)−(πi​−πj​)y.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 1

The following are equivalent:

1∘ there is a minimum-cost flow for some demand vector;2∘ the null circulation is a minimum-cost circulation;3∘ for every r with a flow, some minimum-cost flow for r is extreme;4∘ c(y)≥0 for every simple circulation y;5∘ ∑(i,j)∈Cc˙ij(∞)≥0 for every simple circuit with arc set C;6∘ there is a minimum-cost chain from each node of G‾ to ν under c‾.\begin{aligned} &1^\circ\ \text{there is a minimum-cost flow for some demand vector;}\\ &2^\circ\ \text{the null circulation is a minimum-cost circulation;}\\ &3^\circ\ \text{for every } r \text{ with a flow, some minimum-cost flow for } r \text{ is extreme;}\\ &4^\circ\ c(y) \ge 0 \text{ for every simple circulation } y;\\ &5^\circ\ \textstyle\sum_{(i,j)\in C} \dot c_{ij}(\infty) \ge 0 \text{ for every simple circuit with arc set } C;\\ &6^\circ\ \text{there is a minimum-cost chain from each node of } \underline{G} \text{ to } \nu \text{ under } \underline{c}. \end{aligned}​1∘ there is a minimum-cost flow for some demand vector;2∘ the null circulation is a minimum-cost circulation;3∘ for every r with a flow, some minimum-cost flow for r is extreme;4∘ c(y)≥0 for every simple circulation y;5∘ ∑(i,j)∈C​c˙ij​(∞)≥0 for every simple circuit with arc set C;6∘ there is a minimum-cost chain from each node of G​ to ν under c​.​

If moreover rrr admits a flow and c‾ijz≤cij(z)\underline{c}_{ij} z \le c_{ij}(z)c​ij​z≤cij​(z) on arcs joining distinct strong components, where z=∑iri+z = \sum_i r_i^+z=∑i​ri+​, they are equivalent to

7∘∃π  cijπ(xij)≥0 for all arcs (i,j) and all flows x for r,7^\circ\quad \exists \pi\ \ c^\pi_{ij}(x_{ij}) \ge 0 \text{ for all arcs } (i,j) \text{ and all flows } x \text{ for } r,7∘∃π  cijπ​(xij​)≥0 for all arcs (i,j) and all flows x for r,

and π=π‾\pi = \underline{\pi}π=π​ is real and satisfies 7∘7^\circ7∘.

Milestones

The milestones are the statements the paper's proof rests on: the Hirsch–Hoffman extension (p. 638), cπ(x)=c(x)+∑iπiric^\pi(x) = c(x) + \sum_i \pi_i r_icπ(x)=c(x)+∑i​πi​ri​, the bounds 12c(2x)+12c(2θy)≤c(x+θy)≤c(x)+c(θy)\tfrac12 c(2x) + \tfrac12 c(2\theta y) \le c(x+\theta y) \le c(x) + c(\theta y)21​c(2x)+21​c(2θy)≤c(x+θy)≤c(x)+c(θy), the circuit-wise form of 4° ⇔ 5°, uniqueness of the extreme circulation, xij≤zx_{ij} \le zxij​≤z between strong components, and the two inequalities giving 7∘7^\circ7∘ (all p. 639).

Significance

Theorem 1 decides existence of an optimum from the costs alone: conditions 4° and 5° do not mention the demand vector, so one test settles every demand pattern at once, and 3° guarantees the optimum may be sought among extreme (forest) flows, which is what the send-and-split recursion enumerates. Condition 6° is checkable by a shortest-chain computation, and 7° supplies node potentials that convert the instance into an equivalent one with nonnegative arc costs, the standing assumption of the paper's Theorem 2 and of its running-time analysis. For linear costs the theorem reduces to the familiar statement that a minimum-cost flow exists iff no simple circuit has negative cost.

The result is proved in the paper; it has not been machine-checked. The formalization adds a precise model of extreme flows over arcs (so that antiparallel arcs form a cycle), a treatment of slopes that may equal −∞-\infty−∞, and the Hirsch–Hoffman extension specialized to network polyhedra, which the paper cites rather than proves. Related platform items cover the linear, capacitated case: CycleCanceling.MinMean.minCost_iff_no_negative_cycle and CycleCanceling.MinMean.minCost_iff_exists_price (Goldberg–Tarjan), and LinearOptimization.positive_directed_cycle_of_circulation and LinearOptimization.network_basic_iff_tree on a different arc encoding.

Difficulty

The first idea, to argue as for linear costs by cancelling negative cycles, fails because concave costs are not additive along cycle decompositions: the cost of a flow is not the sum of the costs of its cycle and path components, and a circuit can be harmless at small flow and arbitrarily negative at large flow. Existence therefore depends on the asymptotic slopes c˙ij(∞)\dot c_{ij}(\infty)c˙ij​(∞), which may be −∞-\infty−∞, rather than on any finite cost evaluation. The implication from bounded rays to an attained minimum (Hirsch–Hoffman) requires identifying the vertices of the flow polyhedron with forest flows and its extreme rays with simple circulations. The potential step 6° ⇒ 7° needs a cost bound on arcs between strong components, where the concave cost is only controlled up to the total positive demand zzz.

Formalization scope

Nodes are Fin n; a graph is ArcGraph n, a Finset (Fin n × Fin n) of arcs without loops. Preflows are real matrices vanishing off the arcs; arc costs are functions R→R\mathbb{R} \to \mathbb{R}R→R, concave on Set.Ici 0 with value 000 at 000 (the paper's "without further mention" assumption, made a hypothesis). The augmented graph has nodes Option (Fin n), with none the node ν\nuν; chain costs, c˙ij(∞)\dot c_{ij}(\infty)c˙ij​(∞) and π‾\underline{\pi}π​ are EReal-valued.

The explicit readings of loose phrases are:

  • "minimum-cost flow" is a flow whose cost is at most that of every flow for the same demands (attained, never an infimum);
  • "bounded below on each half-line" is ∃M ∀θ≥0, M≤c(x+θy)\exists M\ \forall \theta \ge 0,\ M \le c(x+\theta y)∃M ∀θ≥0, M≤c(x+θy);
  • c˙ij(∞)\dot c_{ij}(\infty)c˙ij​(∞) is the infimum over t>0t > 0t>0 of the right derivative at ttt, equal to the limit by concavity;
  • "chain" is a directed walk; "minimum-cost chain" is a chain of real cost at most every chain's cost;
  • 6° quantifies over every admissible choice of the appended arcs and of the finite costs c‾\underline{c}c​;
  • in the 7° part, "flows xxx" are flows for the given rrr, and the existence of such a flow is an added hypothesis: without it 7° is vacuous while 4° can fail;
  • "π‾\underline{\pi}π​ satisfies 7°" uses the real values of π‾\underline{\pi}π​, which the theorem asserts are real.

A formalization in which extreme flows are forests of a simple graph built from the support, in which chains are simple paths, or in which a chain of cost −∞-\infty−∞ counts as a minimum would make 3°, 6° or the equivalence trivially or falsely true; all three are ruled out by the definitions. The running-time remarks, the computation paragraph and the linear-cost remark after the proof are not formalized. Contributions are welcome on the polyhedral side (vertices and extreme rays of {x≥0:conservation}\{x \ge 0 : \text{conservation}\}{x≥0:conservation}), on right derivatives of concave functions at infinity, and on walk costs with negative cycles; all are reusable beyond this mission.

Selected references

  • R. E. Erickson, C. L. Monma, A. F. Veinott, Jr., Send-and-Split Method for Minimum-Concave-Cost Network Flows, Mathematics of Operations Research 12(4), 1987, 634–664. https://doi.org/10.1287/moor.12.4.634
  • W. M. Hirsch, A. J. Hoffman, Extreme varieties, concave functions, and the fixed charge problem, Communications on Pure and Applied Mathematics 14, 1961, 355–369. https://doi.org/10.1002/cpa.3160140312
  • R. T. Rockafellar, Convex Analysis, Princeton University Press, 1970. https://doi.org/10.1515/9781400873173
  • J. Edmonds, R. M. Karp, Theoretical improvements in algorithmic efficiency for network flow problems, Journal of the ACM 19(2), 1972, 248–264. https://doi.org/10.1145/321694.321699
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CombinatoricsOperations ResearchOptimization+1·Captain: mikedeng1

Assortment Optimisation Under a General Discrete Choice Model: A Tight Analysis of Revenue-Ordered Assortments III: The Three Revenue-Ordered Approximation Bounds Are TightResearch Paper

Motivation

A retailer or an airline chooses which products to offer, and customers choose among what is offered, or buy nothing. Choosing the offer set that maximizes expected revenue is the assortment problem, central to revenue management (Talluri and van Ryzin, 2004). It is NP-hard even for simple mixtures of logit models, so practice relies on heuristics. The most common one is the revenue-ordered assortments strategy: offer the products whose price is above a threshold, and pick the best threshold.

Berbeglia and Joret (arXiv:1606.01371) analyse this heuristic under every regular choice model, the broad class in which enlarging the offer set never raises the probability of choosing any given alternative, including not buying. They prove three approximation guarantees, then show that none of the three can be improved. This mission formalizes that last result, Theorem 3.4.

Timeline:

  • Talluri and van Ryzin (2004) showed that revenue-ordered assortments are optimal under the multinomial logit model.
  • Rusmevichientong, Shmoys, Tong and Topaloglu (2014) showed the problem NP-hard under a mixture of two logit models, and proved that revenue-ordered assortments earn at least OPT/(e(1+ln⁡(rk/r1)))\mathrm{OPT}/(e(1+\ln(r_k/r_1)))OPT/(e(1+ln(rk​/r1​))) under mixed logit.
  • Aouad, Farias, Levi and Segev (2018) proved an Ω(1/ln⁡(rk/r1))\Omega(1/\ln(r_k/r_1))Ω(1/ln(rk​/r1​)) guarantee under random utility models, and that the assortment problem there is NP-hard to approximate within Ω(1/n1−ϵ)\Omega(1/n^{1-\epsilon})Ω(1/n1−ϵ) and Ω(1/log⁡1−ϵ(rk/r1))\Omega(1/\log^{1-\epsilon}(r_k/r_1))Ω(1/log1−ϵ(rk​/r1​)).
  • Berbeglia and Joret (2016–2020, Algorithmica) proved the guarantees 1/k1/k1/k, 1/∑i(ri−ri−1)/ri≥1/(1+ln⁡(rk/r1))1/\sum_{i}(r_i-r_{i-1})/r_i\ge1/(1+\ln(r_k/r_1))1/∑i​(ri​−ri−1​)/ri​≥1/(1+ln(rk​/r1​)) and a purchase-probability bound under any regular model, and an instance on which all three, in their sum forms, are attained in the limit.

Setting

The products form a finite set C\mathcal CC. A system of choice probabilities gives, for every offer set S⊆CS\subseteq\mathcal CS⊆C and product xxx, the probability P(x,S)\mathcal P(x,S)P(x,S) that a customer buys xxx. The no-purchase probability is P(0,S)=1−∑x∈SP(x,S)\mathcal P(0,S)=1-\sum_{x\in S}\mathcal P(x,S)P(0,S)=1−∑x∈S​P(x,S). The model is regular if

  1. P(x,S)≥0\mathcal P(x,S)\ge0P(x,S)≥0 for x∈C∪{0}x\in\mathcal C\cup\{0\}x∈C∪{0};
  2. P(x,S)=0\mathcal P(x,S)=0P(x,S)=0 for x∉Sx\notin Sx∈/S;
  3. ∑x∈SP(x,S)≤1\sum_{x\in S}\mathcal P(x,S)\le1∑x∈S​P(x,S)≤1;
  4. P(x,S)≥P(x,S′)\mathcal P(x,S)\ge\mathcal P(x,S')P(x,S)≥P(x,S′) for S⊆S′S\subseteq S'S⊆S′ and every x∈S∪{0}x\in S\cup\{0\}x∈S∪{0}.

Each product has a revenue r(x)>0r(x)>0r(x)>0. Offering SSS earns rev(S)=∑x∈SP(x,S) r(x)\mathrm{rev}(S)=\sum_{x\in S}\mathcal P(x,S)\,r(x)rev(S)=∑x∈S​P(x,S)r(x), and OPT=max⁡S⊆Crev(S)\mathrm{OPT}=\max_{S\subseteq\mathcal C}\mathrm{rev}(S)OPT=maxS⊆C​rev(S).

Let r1<⋯<rkr_1<\dots<r_kr1​<⋯<rk​ be the distinct revenues, with r0:=0r_0:=0r0​:=0, and Si={x:r(x)≥ri}S_i=\{x: r(x)\ge r_i\}Si​={x:r(x)≥ri​}. The heuristic earns

RO=max⁡i∈[k]rev(Si).\mathrm{RO}=\max_{i\in[k]}\mathrm{rev}(S_i).RO=i∈[k]max​rev(Si​).

For an optimal S∗S^*S∗ let Ni=∑x∈S∗, r(x)≥riP(x,S∗)N_i=\sum_{x\in S^*,\,r(x)\ge r_i}\mathcal P(x,S^*)Ni​=∑x∈S∗,r(x)≥ri​​P(x,S∗), Nk+1=0N_{k+1}=0Nk+1​=0, and ℓ\ellℓ the largest index with Nℓ>0N_\ell>0Nℓ​>0. Section 3 of the paper proves

  • (A) OPT≤k⋅RO\mathrm{OPT}\le k\cdot\mathrm{RO}OPT≤k⋅RO (Theorem 3.1);
  • (B) OPT≤Dr⋅RO\mathrm{OPT}\le D_r\cdot\mathrm{RO}OPT≤Dr​⋅RO, with Dr=∑i=1kri−ri−1ri≤1+ln⁡(rk/r1)D_r=\sum_{i=1}^{k}\frac{r_i-r_{i-1}}{r_i}\le 1+\ln(r_k/r_1)Dr​=∑i=1k​ri​ri​−ri−1​​≤1+ln(rk​/r1​) (Theorem 3.2);
  • (C) OPT≤DN(S∗)⋅RO\mathrm{OPT}\le D_N(S^*)\cdot\mathrm{RO}OPT≤DN​(S∗)⋅RO, with DN(S∗)=∑i=1ℓNi−Ni+1Ni≤1+ln⁡(N1/Nℓ)D_N(S^*)=\sum_{i=1}^{\ell}\frac{N_i-N_{i+1}}{N_i}\le 1+\ln(N_1/N_\ell)DN​(S∗)=∑i=1ℓ​Ni​Ni​−Ni+1​​≤1+ln(N1​/Nℓ​) (Theorem 3.3).

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 3.4

For every k≥1k\ge1k≥1 and every δ>0\delta>0δ>0 there are a finite nonempty product set, a regular P\mathcal PP, revenues r>0r>0r>0 with exactly kkk distinct values, and an optimal S∗S^*S∗ with N1>0N_1>0N1​>0, such that

k⋅RO<(1+δ) OPT,Dr⋅RO<(1+δ) OPT,DN(S∗)⋅RO<(1+δ) OPT.k\cdot\mathrm{RO}<(1+\delta)\,\mathrm{OPT},\qquad D_r\cdot\mathrm{RO}<(1+\delta)\,\mathrm{OPT},\qquad D_N(S^*)\cdot\mathrm{RO}<(1+\delta)\,\mathrm{OPT}.k⋅RO<(1+δ)OPT,Dr​⋅RO<(1+δ)OPT,DN​(S∗)⋅RO<(1+δ)OPT.

So none of the bounds (A), (B), (C) stays true when multiplied by 1+δ1+\delta1+δ, for any number kkk of distinct revenues.

The tight instance (milestones)

The paper's witness has products (i,j)(i,j)(i,j) with i∈[k]i\in[k]i∈[k] and j∈[i]j\in[i]j∈[i]. Product (i,j)(i,j)(i,j) has revenue ε−j\varepsilon^{-j}ε−j, and P((i,j),S)=εi\mathcal P((i,j),S)=\varepsilon^iP((i,j),S)=εi when (i,j)∈S(i,j)\in S(i,j)∈S and (i,1),…,(i,j−1)∉S(i,1),\dots,(i,j-1)\notin S(i,1),…,(i,j−1)∈/S, and 000 otherwise, for 0<ε≤120<\varepsilon\le\tfrac120<ε≤21​. The milestones follow the proof on pp. 10–11:

  • the axiom (iii) bound;
  • (7);
  • (8);
  • (9);
  • regularity;
  • the distinct revenues ri=ε−ir_i=\varepsilon^{-i}ri​=ε−i;
  • RO=rev(C)<1/(1−ε)\mathrm{RO}=\mathrm{rev}(\mathcal C)<1/(1-\varepsilon)RO=rev(C)<1/(1−ε);
  • OPT=k\mathrm{OPT}=kOPT=k, attained by {(i,i)}\{(i,i)\}{(i,i)};
  • the limits OPT/RO→k\mathrm{OPT}/\mathrm{RO}\to kOPT/RO→k and Dr→kD_r\to kDr​→k;
  • Ni=εi+⋯+εkN_i=\varepsilon^i+\dots+\varepsilon^kNi​=εi+⋯+εk and DN→kD_N\to kDN​→k as ε→0+\varepsilon\to0^+ε→0+.

Significance

With Theorems 3.1–3.3, Theorem 3.4 closes the analysis: in terms of the parameters kkk, DrD_rDr​ and DND_NDN​, revenue-ordered assortments are understood exactly under regular choice. It complements the hardness results of Aouad et al., which already show that no efficient strategy can do much better than (A) and (B) in general; Theorem 3.4 shows that the analysis of this particular heuristic is exact. The instance is also a concrete regular choice model in which the optimal offer set is far from every nested one.

On the formal side, the mission produces a reusable formal definition of regular discrete choice models, revenue-ordered assortments and the three bound quantities. These are shared, under other sub-namespaces, with the companion missions on Theorems 3.2 and 3.3. The result is proved in the paper. As far as is known it has not been machine-checked anywhere; the remaining work is formalizing the paper's proof, including the steps it leaves to the reader.

Difficulty

The proof is a construction, and the paper verifies most of it in a sentence each. The work lies in those sentences:

  • the regularity of the instance at the no-purchase option, (9), which needs the row decomposition (8);
  • the claim that {(i,i)}\{(i,i)\}{(i,i)} is optimal among all 2k(k+1)/22^{k(k+1)/2}2k(k+1)/2 offer sets, asserted without proof;
  • the claim that the full set is the best threshold set;
  • the evaluation of DN(S∗)D_N(S^*)DN​(S∗), which needs ℓ=k\ell=kℓ=k.

The naive witness, one instance per bound, does not help: the goal asks for one instance with exactly kkk revenues on which all three bounds are nearly attained, for every kkk.

Formalization scope

  • Products are an arbitrary finite type C. The no-purchase option is not a product: P(0,S)\mathcal P(0,S)P(0,S) is the derived quantity noPurchase P S. Offer sets are Finset C.
  • IsRegular carries axioms (i)–(iv), with (i) and (iv) stated both for products and for the no-purchase option. Regularity at x=0x=0x=0 is essential: without it the guarantees fail.
  • OPT\mathrm{OPT}OPT is Finset.sup' over all subsets, including ∅\emptyset∅. RO\mathrm{RO}RO is Finset.sup' over the kkk threshold sets only, and needs Nonempty C.
  • The distinct revenues are the sorted image of r, indexed by Fin k from 000: the Lean index iii is the paper's i+1i+1i+1, and r0=0r_0=0r0​=0 is a separate case. ℓ\ellℓ lives in WithBot (Fin k).
  • Bounds are multiplicative (OPT≤D⋅RO\mathrm{OPT}\le D\cdot\mathrm{RO}OPT≤D⋅RO); there is no ratio RO/OPT\mathrm{RO}/\mathrm{OPT}RO/OPT in the goal. Limits are along 𝓝[>] 0.
  • The tight instance keeps the paper's 1-based pairs (i,j)(i,j)(i,j) as a subtype of Fin (k+1) × Fin (k+1). Its regularity is a theorem to prove, never a field assumed.

Ruled out:

  • a fixed kkk, since "for every kkk" is the content;
  • tightness of the logarithmic forms 1/(1+ln⁡(rk/r1))1/(1+\ln(r_k/r_1))1/(1+ln(rk​/r1​)) and 1/(1+ln⁡ν)1/(1+\ln\nu)1/(1+lnν), which this instance does not show (there 1+ln⁡(rk/r1)→∞1+\ln(r_k/r_1)\to\infty1+ln(rk​/r1​)→∞ while OPT/RO→k\mathrm{OPT}/\mathrm{RO}\to kOPT/RO→k), so only the sum forms are claimed tight;
  • an instance whose regularity is assumed;
  • a heuristic maximizing over all subsets.

Contributions welcome: proofs of the milestones, especially (8), (9) and the optimality of {(i,i)}\{(i,i)\}{(i,i)}, and general lemmas on sorted distinct values of a finite function.

Selected references

  • G. Berbeglia and G. Joret, Assortment Optimisation Under a General Discrete Choice Model: A Tight Analysis of Revenue-Ordered Assortments, arXiv:1606.01371v3, 2019; published in Algorithmica, 2020. https://arxiv.org/abs/1606.01371
  • K. Talluri and G. van Ryzin, Revenue Management Under a General Discrete Choice Model of Consumer Behavior, Management Science 50(1), 2004. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.1030.0147
  • P. Rusmevichientong, D. Shmoys, C. Tong and H. Topaloglu, Assortment Optimization under the Multinomial Logit Model with Random Choice Parameters, Production and Operations Management 23(11), 2014. https://doi.org/10.1111/poms.12191
  • A. Aouad, V. Farias, R. Levi and D. Segev, The Approximability of Assortment Optimization Under Ranking Preferences, Operations Research 66(6), 2018. https://doi.org/10.1287/opre.2018.1724
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Operations ResearchOptimizationTheoretical Computer Science·Captain: mikedeng1

Assortment Optimisation Under a General Discrete Choice Model: A Tight Analysis of Revenue-Ordered Assortments II: Revenue-Ordered Assortments Earn OPT/(1 + ln ν), ν the Optimum's Purchase RatioResearch Paper

Motivation

A retailer that can display only some of its products must choose an assortment: the set of products offered to an arriving customer. Customers substitute: whether a given product is bought depends on what else is on the shelf. The assortment problem asks for the offer set that maximises expected revenue under a model of this substitution behaviour. It is a core problem of revenue management (Talluri and van Ryzin, Management Science 2004), and it is NP-hard already for a mixture of two multinomial logit models (Rusmevichientong, Shmoys, Tong and Topaloglu, POMS 2014).

The heuristic used most widely in practice is revenue-ordered assortments: sort the products by price and offer, for some threshold, every product priced at least that threshold. It is optimal under the multinomial logit model (Talluri and van Ryzin 2004) but not in general. Berbeglia and Joret (arXiv:1606.01371v3, 2019; Algorithmica 2020) give a tight analysis of its approximation ratio for every regular discrete choice model, a class that includes all random utility models. They prove three incomparable guarantees. This mission formalizes the third, Theorem 3.3, whose ratio depends on the purchase behaviour of an optimal assortment rather than on the prices. Companion missions in this series cover the price-ratio bound (Theorem 3.2) and the tightness of all three bounds (Theorem 3.4).

Setting

Let C\mathcal CC be a finite nonempty set of products. A system of choice probabilities gives, for every offer set S⊆CS\subseteq\mathcal CS⊆C and product xxx, the probability P(x,S)\mathcal P(x,S)P(x,S) that a customer offered SSS buys xxx. Buying nothing is the option 000, with P(0,S)=1−∑x∈SP(x,S)\mathcal P(0,S)=1-\sum_{x\in S}\mathcal P(x,S)P(0,S)=1−∑x∈S​P(x,S). The model is regular when

  1. P(x,S)≥0\mathcal P(x,S)\ge0P(x,S)≥0 for products and for x=0x=0x=0;
  2. P(x,S)=0\mathcal P(x,S)=0P(x,S)=0 for x∉Sx\notin Sx∈/S;
  3. ∑x∈SP(x,S)≤1\sum_{x\in S}\mathcal P(x,S)\le1∑x∈S​P(x,S)≤1;
  4. P(x,S)≥P(x,S′)\mathcal P(x,S)\ge\mathcal P(x,S')P(x,S)≥P(x,S′) whenever S⊆S′S\subseteq S'S⊆S′ and x∈S∪{0}x\in S\cup\{0\}x∈S∪{0}.

Axiom 4 at x=0x=0x=0 says that enlarging the offer set never makes buying nothing more likely.

Prices are a function r:C→R>0r:\mathcal C\to\mathbb R_{>0}r:C→R>0​. Offering SSS earns rev(S)=∑x∈SP(x,S) r(x)\mathrm{rev}(S)=\sum_{x\in S}\mathcal P(x,S)\,r(x)rev(S)=∑x∈S​P(x,S)r(x), and OPT=max⁡S⊆Crev(S)\mathrm{OPT}=\max_{S\subseteq\mathcal C}\mathrm{rev}(S)OPT=maxS⊆C​rev(S). Let r1<⋯<rkr_1<\dots<r_kr1​<⋯<rk​ be the distinct values of rrr, and let Si={x:r(x)≥ri}S_i=\{x:r(x)\ge r_i\}Si​={x:r(x)≥ri​} for i∈[k]i\in[k]i∈[k]. The revenue-ordered strategy earns

RO=max⁡1≤i≤krev(Si).\mathrm{RO}=\max_{1\le i\le k}\mathrm{rev}(S_i).RO=1≤i≤kmax​rev(Si​).

For an assortment S∗S^*S∗, the purchase profile is

Ni=∑x∈S∗, r(x)≥riP(x,S∗)(i∈[k]),Nk+1:=0,N_i=\sum_{x\in S^*,\ r(x)\ge r_i}\mathcal P(x,S^*)\qquad(i\in[k]),\qquad N_{k+1}:=0,Ni​=x∈S∗, r(x)≥ri​∑​P(x,S∗)(i∈[k]),Nk+1​:=0,

the probability that a customer offered S∗S^*S∗ buys something priced at least rir_iri​. It is non-increasing in iii.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 3.3 (p. 9)

Let S∗S^*S∗ be optimal, rev(S∗)=OPT\mathrm{rev}(S^*)=\mathrm{OPT}rev(S∗)=OPT, suppose N1>0N_1>0N1​>0, and let ℓ∈[k]\ell\in[k]ℓ∈[k] be maximum with Nℓ>0N_\ell>0Nℓ​>0. Then

OPT≤(∑i=1ℓNi−Ni+1Ni)ROand∑i=1ℓNi−Ni+1Ni≤1+ln⁡ν,ν=N1Nℓ.\mathrm{OPT}\le\Big(\sum_{i=1}^{\ell}\frac{N_i-N_{i+1}}{N_i}\Big)\mathrm{RO} \qquad\text{and}\qquad \sum_{i=1}^{\ell}\frac{N_i-N_{i+1}}{N_i}\le1+\ln\nu,\quad\nu=\frac{N_1}{N_\ell}.OPT≤(i=1∑ℓ​Ni​Ni​−Ni+1​​)ROandi=1∑ℓ​Ni​Ni​−Ni+1​​≤1+lnν,ν=Nℓ​N1​​.

The first inequality is the paper's sum-form factor, the bound that Theorem 3.4 shows to be tight. The second is the closed form 1/(1+ln⁡ν)1/(1+\ln\nu)1/(1+lnν).

Milestones (in proof order)

  • Lemma 2.1 (p. 6): ∑x∈SP(x,S)≤∑x∈S′P(x,S′)\sum_{x\in S}\mathcal P(x,S)\le\sum_{x\in S'}\mathcal P(x,S')∑x∈S​P(x,S)≤∑x∈S′​P(x,S′) for S⊆S′S\subseteq S'S⊆S′.
  • First observation of the proof (p. 9): Ni≤∑x∈SiP(x,Si)N_i\le\sum_{x\in S_i}\mathcal P(x,S_i)Ni​≤∑x∈Si​​P(x,Si​) and Niri≤∑x∈SiP(x,Si)riN_ir_i\le\sum_{x\in S_i}\mathcal P(x,S_i)r_iNi​ri​≤∑x∈Si​​P(x,Si​)ri​.
  • Inequality (6) (p. 9): Niri≤RON_ir_i\le\mathrm{RO}Ni​ri​≤RO for every i∈[k]i\in[k]i∈[k].
  • Revenue identity (p. 9): rev(S∗)=∑i=1ℓ(Ni−Ni+1)ri=∑i=1ℓNi−Ni+1NiNiri\mathrm{rev}(S^*)=\sum_{i=1}^{\ell}(N_i-N_{i+1})r_i=\sum_{i=1}^{\ell}\frac{N_i-N_{i+1}}{N_i}N_ir_irev(S∗)=∑i=1ℓ​(Ni​−Ni+1​)ri​=∑i=1ℓ​Ni​Ni​−Ni+1​​Ni​ri​.
  • Logarithmic step (p. 9, the comparison 1/∑≥1/(1+ln⁡ν)1/\sum\ge1/(1+\ln\nu)1/∑≥1/(1+lnν) in Theorem 3.3, used in the last inequality of the proof): for N1≥⋯≥Nℓ>0N_1\ge\dots\ge N_\ell>0N1​≥⋯≥Nℓ​>0 and Nℓ+1=0N_{\ell+1}=0Nℓ+1​=0, ∑i=1ℓ(Ni−Ni+1)/Ni≤1+ln⁡(N1/Nℓ)\sum_{i=1}^{\ell}(N_i-N_{i+1})/N_i\le1+\ln(N_1/N_\ell)∑i=1ℓ​(Ni​−Ni+1​)/Ni​≤1+ln(N1​/Nℓ​). The paper states this step without proof.

Significance

Theorem 3.3 gives a guarantee that is independent of prices. The bound 1+ln⁡(rk/r1)1+\ln(r_k/r_1)1+ln(rk​/r1​) of Theorem 3.2 grows when prices are spread out. The bound 1+ln⁡ν1+\ln\nu1+lnν is small whenever an optimal assortment sells its expensive products with probability comparable to its overall purchase probability. In §4 the paper combines it with a reduction from unit-demand pricing to derive, for example, the 1/(1+ln⁡m)1/(1+\ln m)1/(1+lnm) guarantee of uniform pricing for the unit-demand min-pricing problem (Corollary 4.8, originally due to Aggarwal et al.). Together with Theorems 3.1 and 3.2, it describes the performance of the most common assortment heuristic over the whole class of regular models, with no parametric assumption on customer behaviour.

The theorem is proved on paper. To our knowledge it has no machine-checked proof, and no regular choice model has been formalized on the platform. This mission produces the regular model as a reusable definition, a statement of Theorem 3.3 in which every hypothesis is explicit, and formal versions of the proof's identities and inequalities. The logarithmic step is asserted without proof in the source, so a formal proof of it completes the paper's argument.

Difficulty

Each step is elementary. The difficulty is bookkeeping. The revenue of S∗S^*S∗ has to be regrouped by distinct price levels rather than by products: several products may share a price, and kkk counts values. The regrouping uses an Abel-type rearrangement with the boundary convention Nk+1=0N_{k+1}=0Nk+1​=0. Comparing NiN_iNi​ with the purchase probability of SiS_iSi​ needs regularity twice. First, axiom 4 for products passes from S∗S^*S∗ to S∗∩SiS^*\cap S_iS∗∩Si​. Then the no-purchase case passes from S∗∩SiS^*\cap S_iS∗∩Si​ to SiS_iSi​. A proof that uses axiom 4 only for products fails at the second step, and the claim is false without it.

Formalization scope

  • Products form a finite type C with [Fintype C] [DecidableEq C]. The goal adds [Nonempty C], the paper's k≥1k\ge1k≥1. Offer sets are Finset C, and P\mathcal PP is P : C → Finset C → ℝ. The no-purchase option is not a product: P(0,S)\mathcal P(0,S)P(0,S) is the derived quantity noPurchase P S. IsRegular P carries axioms 1–4, including both no-purchase cases.
  • OPT\mathrm{OPT}OPT is Finset.sup' over all subsets. RO\mathrm{RO}RO is Finset.sup' over the indices 1,…,k1,\dots,k1,…,k of the threshold sets only.
  • Indices are 1-based natural numbers. level r i is rir_iri​ for 1≤i≤k1\le i\le k1≤i≤k. purchaseProfile P r S i is NiN_iNi​ for 1≤i≤k1\le i\le k1≤i≤k and 000 otherwise, which builds in Nk+1=0N_{k+1}=0Nk+1​=0.
  • Optimality is the hypothesis rev(S∗)=OPT\mathrm{rev}(S^*)=\mathrm{OPT}rev(S∗)=OPT. The index ℓ\ellℓ is a variable with hypotheses 1≤ℓ≤k1\le\ell\le k1≤ℓ≤k, Nℓ>0N_\ell>0Nℓ​>0, and Ni≯0N_i\not>0Ni​>0 for ℓ<i≤k\ell<i\le kℓ<i≤k. N1>0N_1>0N1​>0 is kept as in the paper.
  • The approximation factor is stated in product form, OPT≤D⋅RO\mathrm{OPT}\le D\cdot\mathrm{RO}OPT≤D⋅RO, never as a ratio. Both the sum form and the logarithmic form are stated. ln⁡\lnln is Real.log, applied to ν≥1\nu\ge1ν≥1.
  • The milestones other than the goal are stated for an arbitrary S∗S^*S∗, because the proof does not use optimality there.

The following statements are trivial or false and are not this mission: a maximum over all subsets in place of RO\mathrm{RO}RO; regularity without its no-purchase case; a purchase profile taken from a non-optimal set while rev(S∗)\mathrm{rev}(S^*)rev(S∗) is still called the optimum; the logarithmic form alone; a specific choice model (MNL, Markov chain) in place of an arbitrary regular P\mathcal PP.

A complete development needs finite sums regrouped by the values of a function and an elementary logarithm inequality. The regular choice model and the revenue-ordered sets are shared with the other missions of this series and are reusable for any analysis of assortment heuristics. Proofs of any milestone are welcome. So are alternative arguments for the logarithmic step and a proof that NNN is non-increasing.

Selected references

  • G. Berbeglia and G. Joret, Assortment Optimisation Under a General Discrete Choice Model: A Tight Analysis of Revenue-Ordered Assortments, arXiv:1606.01371v3, 2019; Algorithmica 82, 2020. https://arxiv.org/abs/1606.01371v3
  • K. Talluri and G. van Ryzin, Revenue Management Under a General Discrete Choice Model of Consumer Behavior, Management Science 50(1), 2004. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.1030.0147
  • P. Rusmevichientong, D. Shmoys, C. Tong and H. Topaloglu, Assortment Optimization under the Multinomial Logit Model with Random Choice Parameters, Production and Operations Management 23(11), 2014. https://doi.org/10.1111/poms.12191
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Machine LearningOptimizationReinforcement Learning·Captain: mikedeng1

On the Theory of Policy Gradient Methods: Optimality, Approximation, and Distribution Shift 3: Softmax Policy Gradient Ascent with Step Size η ≤ (1−γ)³/8 Converges to the Optimal ValuesResearch Paper

Motivation

Policy gradient methods optimize a parameterized policy of a Markov decision process by gradient ascent on its expected discounted return. They underlie much of modern reinforcement learning (REINFORCE, actor–critic methods, TRPO, PPO), yet the objective θ↦Vπθ(μ)\theta \mapsto V^{\pi_\theta}(\mu)θ↦Vπθ​(μ) is non-concave in the parameters, and until recently even the most basic question was open: does exact gradient ascent, run on a finite MDP with the standard softmax parameterization, reach the optimal values at all?

Agarwal, Kakade, Lee and Mahajan (arXiv:1908.00261v5, JMLR 22(98), 2021) answer this in the affirmative. Their Theorem 5.1 shows that unregularized softmax policy gradient with a small constant step size converges to the optimal value at every state, provided the start distribution used for the gradient puts positive mass on every state. The result is asymptotic: no rate is given. Later work (Mei, Xiao, Szepesvári and Schuurmans, ICML 2020, arXiv:2005.06392) obtained an O(1/t)O(1/t)O(1/t) rate with constants that can be exponentially large, and the same paper by Agarwal et al. gives polynomial rates once a log-barrier regularizer is added (its Corollary 5.1) or once the natural gradient is used (its Theorem 5.3). Theorem 5.1 is the unregularized baseline for all of these.

Setting

A finite MDP consists of finite sets S\mathcal SS of states and A\mathcal AA of actions (A\mathcal AA nonempty), a transition kernel P(s′∣s,a)P(s'\mid s,a)P(s′∣s,a), rewards r(s,a)∈[0,1]r(s,a)\in[0,1]r(s,a)∈[0,1] and a discount factor γ∈[0,1)\gamma\in[0,1)γ∈[0,1). A policy π\piπ assigns to each state a probability vector π(⋅∣s)\pi(\cdot\mid s)π(⋅∣s) on A\mathcal AA. Its value Vπ(s)V^\pi(s)Vπ(s) is the expected discounted sum of rewards E[∑t≥0γtr(st,at)∣s0=s]\mathbb E[\sum_{t\ge0}\gamma^t r(s_t,a_t)\mid s_0=s]E[∑t≥0​γtr(st​,at​)∣s0​=s] when actions are drawn from π\piπ; its state–action value is Qπ(s,a)=r(s,a)+γ∑s′P(s′∣s,a)Vπ(s′)Q^\pi(s,a)=r(s,a)+\gamma\sum_{s'}P(s'\mid s,a)V^\pi(s')Qπ(s,a)=r(s,a)+γ∑s′​P(s′∣s,a)Vπ(s′) and its advantage is Aπ(s,a)=Qπ(s,a)−Vπ(s)A^\pi(s,a)=Q^\pi(s,a)-V^\pi(s)Aπ(s,a)=Qπ(s,a)−Vπ(s). For a distribution μ\muμ on states, Vπ(μ)=∑sμ(s)Vπ(s)V^\pi(\mu)=\sum_s\mu(s)V^\pi(s)Vπ(μ)=∑s​μ(s)Vπ(s), and the discounted state visitation distribution is dμπ(s)=(1−γ)∑t≥0γtPr⁡π(st=s∣s0∼μ)d^\pi_\mu(s)=(1-\gamma)\sum_{t\ge0}\gamma^t\Pr^\pi(s_t=s\mid s_0\sim\mu)dμπ​(s)=(1−γ)∑t≥0​γtPrπ(st​=s∣s0​∼μ). A policy π⋆\pi^\starπ⋆ is optimal if Vπ(s)≤Vπ⋆(s)V^{\pi}(s)\le V^{\pi^\star}(s)Vπ(s)≤Vπ⋆(s) for every policy π\piπ and every state sss; V⋆=Vπ⋆V^\star=V^{\pi^\star}V⋆=Vπ⋆.

The softmax policy with parameters θ∈R∣S∣∣A∣\theta\in\mathbb R^{|\mathcal S||\mathcal A|}θ∈R∣S∣∣A∣ is

πθ(a∣s)=exp⁡(θs,a)∑a′∈Aexp⁡(θs,a′).\pi_\theta(a\mid s)=\frac{\exp(\theta_{s,a})}{\sum_{a'\in\mathcal A}\exp(\theta_{s,a'})}.πθ​(a∣s)=∑a′∈A​exp(θs,a′​)exp(θs,a​)​.

Softmax policy gradient ascent with step size η\etaη produces, from an arbitrary θ(0)\theta^{(0)}θ(0), the iterates

θ(t+1)=θ(t)+η ∇θV(t)(μ),V(t)=Vπθ(t).\theta^{(t+1)}=\theta^{(t)}+\eta\,\nabla_\theta V^{(t)}(\mu),\qquad V^{(t)}=V^{\pi_{\theta^{(t)}}} .θ(t+1)=θ(t)+η∇θ​V(t)(μ),V(t)=Vπθ(t)​.

The Lean development names these softmaxPolicy, softmaxValue P r γ µ θ =Vπθ(μ)=V^{\pi_\theta}(\mu)=Vπθ​(μ), and IsSoftmaxPGRun P r γ µ η θ for the update rule; PolicyValue, QFunction and IsOptimalPolicy are the published FoundationsML definitions, and valueAt, advantage and visitation are the series' shared layer.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 5.1

If μ(s)>0\mu(s)>0μ(s)>0 for every state and 0<η≤(1−γ)3/80<\eta\le(1-\gamma)^3/80<η≤(1−γ)3/8, then for every state sss

V(t)(s)⟶V⋆(s)(t→∞).V^{(t)}(s)\longrightarrow V^\star(s)\qquad(t\to\infty).V(t)(s)⟶V⋆(s)(t→∞).

Milestones (Appendices C.1 and D)

  1. Lemma C.1, the gradient formula ∂Vπθ(μ)/∂θs,a=11−γdμπθ(s)πθ(a∣s)Aπθ(s,a)\partial V^{\pi_\theta}(\mu)/\partial\theta_{s,a}=\frac1{1-\gamma}d^{\pi_\theta}_\mu(s)\pi_\theta(a\mid s)A^{\pi_\theta}(s,a)∂Vπθ​(μ)/∂θs,a​=1−γ1​dμπθ​​(s)πθ​(a∣s)Aπθ​(s,a).
  2. Lemma D.1, smoothness 5∥c∥∞5\|c\|_\infty5∥c∥∞​ of θs↦∑aπθ(a∣s)ca\theta_s\mapsto\sum_a\pi_\theta(a\mid s)c_aθs​↦∑a​πθ​(a∣s)ca​.
  3. Lemma D.4 at λ=0\lambda=0λ=0, smoothness 8/(1−γ)38/(1-\gamma)^38/(1−γ)3 of θ↦Vπθ(μ)\theta\mapsto V^{\pi_\theta}(\mu)θ↦Vπθ​(μ).
  4. Lemma C.2, pointwise monotone improvement of V(t)(s)V^{(t)}(s)V(t)(s) and Q(t)(s,a)Q^{(t)}(s,a)Q(t)(s,a) for η≤(1−γ)2/5\eta\le(1-\gamma)^2/5η≤(1−γ)2/5.
  5. Lemma C.3, existence of the limits V(∞)V^{(\infty)}V(∞), Q(∞)Q^{(\infty)}Q(∞) and the bound (40).
  6. Lemma C.4, eventual sign separation (41) of the advantages on I+s={a:Q(∞)(s,a)>V(∞)(s)}I^s_+=\{a:Q^{(\infty)}(s,a)>V^{(\infty)}(s)\}I+s​={a:Q(∞)(s,a)>V(∞)(s)} and I−s={a:Q(∞)(s,a)<V(∞)(s)}I^s_-=\{a:Q^{(\infty)}(s,a)<V^{(\infty)}(s)\}I−s​={a:Q(∞)(s,a)<V(∞)(s)}.
  7. Lemma C.5, vanishing gradients, π(t)(a∣s)→0\pi^{(t)}(a\mid s)\to0π(t)(a∣s)→0 off I0s={a:Q(∞)(s,a)=V(∞)(s)}I^s_0=\{a:Q^{(\infty)}(s,a)=V^{(\infty)}(s)\}I0s​={a:Q(∞)(s,a)=V(∞)(s)}, and ∑a∈I0sπ(t)(a∣s)→1\sum_{a\in I^s_0}\pi^{(t)}(a\mid s)\to1∑a∈I0s​​π(t)(a∣s)→1.
  8. Lemma C.6, eventual strict monotonicity of θs,a(t)\theta^{(t)}_{s,a}θs,a(t)​ on I±sI^s_\pmI±s​.
  9. Lemma C.7, divergence of max⁡a∈I0sθs,a(t)\max_{a\in I^s_0}\theta^{(t)}_{s,a}maxa∈I0s​​θs,a(t)​ and min⁡aθs,a(t)\min_a\theta^{(t)}_{s,a}mina​θs,a(t)​ when I+s≠∅I^s_+\neq\emptysetI+s​=∅.
  10. Lemma C.11, lower boundedness of θs,a(t)\theta^{(t)}_{s,a}θs,a(t)​ on I+sI^s_+I+s​ and θs,a(t)→−∞\theta^{(t)}_{s,a}\to-\inftyθs,a(t)​→−∞ on I−sI^s_-I−s​.

The goal states only convergence to the optimal values, with the paper's constants in the step-size bound; no rate is claimed.

Significance

The theorem establishes that the non-concavity of the softmax objective does not trap exact gradient ascent: from any initialization, the values of the iterates converge to V⋆V^\starV⋆ at every state, not only on average under μ\muμ. It is the reference point for the rate results of the same paper (log-barrier regularization, natural policy gradient) and for the subsequent literature on softmax policy gradient rates and lower bounds. It also isolates the role of exploration in the start distribution: Remark 5.1 of the paper leaves open whether μ>0\mu>0μ>0 can be dropped.

The result is proved in the paper; to the knowledge of the mission authors none of it is formalized in Lean or any other proof assistant. A complete development would provide a machine-checked gradient formula for the softmax class, smoothness bounds for discounted values, and a monotone-improvement argument for policy gradient, each reusable for other parameterizations and other policy optimization methods.

Difficulty

The obvious route fails. The gradient domination property of the direct parameterization (Lemma 4.1 of the paper) would conclude from ∇πVπ(μ)→0\nabla_\pi V^\pi(\mu)\to0∇π​Vπ(μ)→0, but under softmax ∂V/∂θs,a=πθ(a∣s) ∂V/∂πθ(a∣s)\partial V/\partial\theta_{s,a}=\pi_\theta(a\mid s)\,\partial V/\partial\pi_\theta(a\mid s)∂V/∂θs,a​=πθ​(a∣s)∂V/∂πθ​(a∣s), so a vanishing θ\thetaθ-gradient says nothing once some action probabilities vanish, and the iterates do drive probabilities to zero while parameters diverge. A smoothness-based argument therefore gives only stationarity in the limit. The asymptotic analysis must instead track which actions keep positive limiting advantage, how the individual parameters θs,a(t)\theta^{(t)}_{s,a}θs,a(t)​ move once the advantage signs are frozen, and why an action with strictly positive limiting advantage cannot coexist with the behaviour of the remaining parameters. Lemmas C.7–C.12 carry that bookkeeping; the limiting sets I0s,I±sI^s_0, I^s_\pmI0s​,I±s​ and the existence of the limits are themselves consequences of the pointwise monotone improvement of Lemma C.2, which needs its own smoothness bound.

Formalization scope

Standing setting of §3: finite types S, A with decidable equality, A nonempty; IsFiniteMDP P r γ (a transition kernel, rewards in [0,1][0,1][0,1], 0≤γ<10\le\gamma<10≤γ<1); IsDist µ. Parameters live in EuclideanSpace ℝ (S × A), so norms are ℓ2\ell_2ℓ2​ and Mathlib's gradient is ∇θ\nabla_\theta∇θ​; the coordinate (s,a)(s,a)(s,a) of the gradient is ∂/∂θs,a\partial/\partial\theta_{s,a}∂/∂θs,a​. Logarithms do not appear. Conventions committed to:

  • V⋆(s)V^\star(s)V⋆(s) is PolicyValue πstar P r γ s for a policy πstar with IsOptimalPolicy πstar P r γ, optimal simultaneously at every state; it is not a real supremum over all functions.
  • The step size satisfies 0<η0<\eta0<η, which "gradient ascent" presupposes and the page does not write; at η=0\eta=0η=0 the theorem is false.
  • μ(s)>0\mu(s)>0μ(s)>0 for every sss is a hypothesis of the goal and of Lemmas C.5–C.11; Lemmas C.1–C.4 are stated without it, and Lemma C.1 for an arbitrary real weighting μ\muμ.
  • In Lemmas C.4–C.11 the limits V(∞)V^{(\infty)}V(∞), Q(∞)Q^{(\infty)}Q(∞) are parameters with the hypotheses that they are the limits of V(t)V^{(t)}V(t), Q(t)Q^{(t)}Q(t). The paper's Δ=min⁡A(∞)(s,a)≠0∣A(∞)(s,a)∣\Delta=\min_{A^{(\infty)}(s,a)\neq0}|A^{(\infty)}(s,a)|Δ=minA(∞)(s,a)=0​∣A(∞)(s,a)∣ is replaced by any Δ>0\Delta>0Δ>0 bounded by every nonzero ∣A(∞)(s,a)∣|A^{(\infty)}(s,a)|∣A(∞)(s,a)∣, which avoids an undefined minimum over an empty set.
  • "→±∞\to\pm\infty→±∞" is Tendsto … atTop atTop / atBot; "strictly increasing for t≥T1t\ge T_1t≥T1​" is StrictMonoOn on Set.Ici T1, with T1T_1T1​ existentially quantified.

The goal theorem does not assume the existence of limits, monotonicity of the iterates, or anything about the sets I0s,I±sI^s_0, I^s_\pmI0s​,I±s​; a formalization that did would assume the substance of the proof. Lemmas C.7 and C.11 (first part) carry the hypothesis I+s≠∅I^s_+\neq\emptysetI+s​=∅ of the paper's proof by contradiction, which no actual run satisfies once Theorem 5.1 is proved; they are steps of that argument.

A full development needs: differentiability of θ↦Vπθ\theta\mapsto V^{\pi_\theta}θ↦Vπθ​ and the policy gradient theorem in the occupancy-measure form, the performance difference lemma, the descent lemma for LLL-smooth functions, and Hessian bounds for the softmax map. Contributions to any of these, to the optional Lemmas C.8–C.10 and C.12 of the paper, or to the final contradiction argument are welcome.

Selected references

  • A. Agarwal, S. M. Kakade, J. D. Lee, G. Mahajan, On the Theory of Policy Gradient Methods: Optimality, Approximation, and Distribution Shift, JMLR 22(98), 2021; arXiv:1908.00261v5. https://arxiv.org/abs/1908.00261
  • J. Mei, C. Xiao, C. Szepesvári, D. Schuurmans, On the Global Convergence Rates of Softmax Policy Gradient Methods, ICML 2020. https://arxiv.org/abs/2005.06392
  • S. Kakade, J. Langford, Approximately Optimal Approximate Reinforcement Learning, ICML 2002. https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.5555/645531.656005
  • R. S. Sutton, D. McAllester, S. Singh, Y. Mansour, Policy Gradient Methods for Reinforcement Learning with Function Approximation, NeurIPS 1999. https://papers.nips.cc/paper/1713-policy-gradient-methods-for-reinforcement-learning-with-function-approximation
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OptimizationProbabilityStatistics·Captain: mikedeng1

Statistics of Robust Optimization: A Generalized Empirical Likelihood Approach 1: The f-Divergence Robust Mean Is the Sample Mean plus √(ρ·s_n²/n) up to o(n^(−1/2)) Almost SurelyResearch Paper

Motivation

Distributionally robust optimization replaces the average of a loss over a sample by its worst-case average over all distributions close to the sample. When closeness is measured by an fff-divergence, the worst case over a ball of radius ρ/n\rho/nρ/n around the empirical distribution is also the upper endpoint of a generalized empirical likelihood confidence interval. Empirical likelihood (Owen, 1988–2001) is the case f(t)=−2log⁡t+2t−2f(t)=-2\log t+2t-2f(t)=−2logt+2t−2; the χ2\chi^2χ2, Cressie–Read and other divergences give the rest of the family.

Duchi, Glynn and Namkoong (arXiv:1610.03425, Mathematics of Operations Research 46(3), 2021) show that these robust objects behave, to first order, like the sample mean plus a variance penalty. Their Lemma 1 is the scalar version of that statement and, in the authors' words (p. 7), an expansion "that essentially gives all of the major distributional convergence results in this paper": with the central limit theorem it yields the asymptotically exact χ12\chi^2_1χ12​ coverage of empirical likelihood intervals for a mean, and its uniform extension yields the coverage results for optimal values of stochastic programs.

Timeline. Owen (1988, 1990) proved the χ2\chi^2χ2 calibration of empirical likelihood for means of i.i.d. data. Its extension to smooth fff-divergences is, as the paper notes (p. 6), essentially due to Baggerly (1998), Corcoran (1998) and Bertail, Gautherat and Harari-Kermadec (2014). Lam (arXiv:1605.09349) proved an in-probability version of the expansion below for f(t)=−2log⁡tf(t)=-2\log tf(t)=−2logt. Namkoong and Duchi (2017, arXiv:1610.02581) proved a finite-sample, high-probability version for the χ2\chi^2χ2 divergence and bounded variables. Duchi, Glynn and Namkoong proved the almost-sure version for every smooth fff and for stationary ergodic data.

Setting

Let f:[0,∞)→(−∞,+∞]f:[0,\infty)\to(-\infty,+\infty]f:[0,∞)→(−∞,+∞] be convex and lower semicontinuous, as every divergence generator in the paper is. Assumption A asks that fff be finite on (0,∞)(0,\infty)(0,∞), three times differentiable near 111, with f(1)=f′(1)=0f(1)=f'(1)=0f(1)=f′(1)=0 and f′′(1)=2f''(1)=2f′′(1)=2; the value f(0)f(0)f(0) may be +∞+\infty+∞.

Let z=(z1,…,zn)z=(z_1,\dots,z_n)z=(z1​,…,zn​) be a sample with empirical distribution P^n\widehat P_nPn​. A distribution P≪P^nP\ll\widehat P_nP≪Pn​ is a weight vector p≥0p\ge0p≥0 with ∑ipi=1\sum_ip_i=1∑i​pi​=1, and Df(P∥P^n)=∑i=1n1nf(npi)D_f(P\|\widehat P_n)=\sum_{i=1}^n\frac1nf(np_i)Df​(P∥Pn​)=∑i=1n​n1​f(npi​). The robust mean is

sup⁡P: Df(P∥P^n)≤ρ/nEP[Z]=sup⁡{∑ipizi:p≥0, ∑ipi=1, ∑i1nf(npi)≤ρn}.\sup_{P:\,D_f(P\|\widehat P_n)\le\rho/n}E_P[Z]=\sup\Big\{\sum_ip_iz_i : p\ge0,\ \sum_ip_i=1,\ \sum_i\tfrac1nf(np_i)\le\tfrac\rho n\Big\}.P:Df​(P∥Pn​)≤ρ/nsup​EP​[Z]=sup{i∑​pi​zi​:p≥0, i∑​pi​=1, i∑​n1​f(npi​)≤nρ​}.

The sample mean is EP^n[Z]=1n∑iziE_{\widehat P_n}[Z]=\frac1n\sum_iz_iEPn​​[Z]=n1​∑i​zi​ and the sample variance is sn2=EP^n[Z2]−EP^n[Z]2s_n^2=E_{\widehat P_n}[Z^2]-E_{\widehat P_n}[Z]^2sn2​=EPn​​[Z2]−EPn​​[Z]2 (normalised by 1/n1/n1/n).

A sequence Z1,Z2,…Z_1,Z_2,\dotsZ1​,Z2​,… of real random variables is strictly stationary and ergodic if the law μZ\mu_ZμZ​ of the path (Z1,Z2,… )(Z_1,Z_2,\dots)(Z1​,Z2​,…) on RN\mathbb R^{\mathbb N}RN is invariant under the left shift θ\thetaθ and every θ\thetaθ-invariant measurable set of paths has μZ\mu_ZμZ​-measure 000 or 111. Every i.i.d. sequence qualifies (Kolmogorov's 000–111 law), as do stationary Markov chains started in a unique invariant law and stationary mixing sequences.

Formalization targets

Goal: Lemma 1, the almost-sure variance expansion (p. 7)

Let Z1,Z2,…Z_1,Z_2,\dotsZ1​,Z2​,… be strictly stationary and ergodic with E[Z12]<∞E[Z_1^2]<\inftyE[Z12​]<∞, let fff satisfy Assumption A and ρ≥0\rho\ge0ρ≥0. Then almost surely

n  ∣sup⁡P: Df(P∥P^n)≤ρ/nEP[Z]−EP^n[Z]−ρn sn2∣  ⟶  0.\sqrt n\;\Big|\sup_{P:\,D_f(P\|\widehat P_n)\le\rho/n}E_P[Z]-E_{\widehat P_n}[Z]-\sqrt{\frac\rho n\,s_n^2}\Big|\;\longrightarrow\;0 .n​​P:Df​(P∥Pn​)≤ρ/nsup​EP​[Z]−EPn​​[Z]−nρ​sn2​​​⟶0.

This is the paper's (8), "≤ϵn/n\le\epsilon_n/\sqrt n≤ϵn​/n​ with ϵn→0\epsilon_n\to0ϵn​→0 a.s.", with ϵn\epsilon_nϵn​ taken to be the left-hand side. No rate is asserted, so the goal is not tied to any constant.

Milestones (Appendix A, pp. 31–33)

  1. (30): there are 0<c,C<∞0<c,C<\infty0<c,C<∞ depending only on fff with 2(1−Cϵ)hϵ(t)≤f(t+1)2(1-C\epsilon)h_\epsilon(t)\le f(t+1)2(1−Cϵ)hϵ​(t)≤f(t+1) for t≥−1t\ge-1t≥−1 and f(t+1)≤(1+Cϵ)t2f(t+1)\le(1+C\epsilon)t^2f(t+1)≤(1+Cϵ)t2 for ∣t∣≤ϵ|t|\le\epsilon∣t∣≤ϵ, whenever 0<ϵ≤c0<\epsilon\le c0<ϵ≤c. Here hϵh_\epsilonhϵ​ is the Huber function, t2/2t^2/2t2/2 for ∣t∣≤ϵ|t|\le\epsilon∣t∣≤ϵ and ϵ∣t∣−ϵ2/2\epsilon|t|-\epsilon^2/2ϵ∣t∣−ϵ2/2 otherwise.
  2. (32): with the sets Usm⊂U⊂Ubig\mathcal U_{\rm sm}\subset\mathcal U\subset\mathcal U_{\rm big}Usm​⊂U⊂Ubig​ of (31), sup⁡UsmuTz≤(robust mean)−EP^n[Z]=sup⁡UuTz≤sup⁡UbiguTz\sup_{\mathcal U_{\rm sm}}u^Tz\le(\text{robust mean})-E_{\widehat P_n}[Z]=\sup_{\mathcal U}u^Tz\le\sup_{\mathcal U_{\rm big}}u^TzsupUsm​​uTz≤(robust mean)−EPn​​[Z]=supU​uTz≤supUbig​​uTz.
  3. Lemma 8: sup⁡u∈UsmuTz=ρsn(z)2/n /1+Cϵ\sup_{u\in\mathcal U_{\rm sm}}u^Tz=\sqrt{\rho s_n(z)^2/n}\,/\sqrt{1+C\epsilon}supu∈Usm​​uTz=ρsn​(z)2/n​/1+Cϵ​ when ∥z−zˉn∥∞/n≤ϵsn(z)(1+Cϵ)/ρ\|z-\bar z_n\|_\infty/\sqrt n\le\epsilon s_n(z)\sqrt{(1+C\epsilon)/\rho}∥z−zˉn​∥∞​/n​≤ϵsn​(z)(1+Cϵ)/ρ​.
  4. Lemma 9: sup⁡u∈UbiguTz≤ρsn(z)2/n /1−Cϵ\sup_{u\in\mathcal U_{\rm big}}u^Tz\le\sqrt{\rho s_n(z)^2/n}\,/\sqrt{1-C\epsilon}supu∈Ubig​​uTz≤ρsn​(z)2/n​/1−Cϵ​ under the same condition with 1−Cϵ1-C\epsilon1−Cϵ.
  5. Lemma 6: on the event max⁡i≤n∣zi−zˉn∣/n≤ϵsn(1−Cϵ)/ρ\max_{i\le n}|z_i-\bar z_n|/\sqrt n\le\epsilon s_n\sqrt{(1-C\epsilon)/\rho}maxi≤n​∣zi​−zˉn​∣/n​≤ϵsn​(1−Cϵ)/ρ​, the robust mean lies between EP^n[Z]+ρsn2/n/1+CϵE_{\widehat P_n}[Z]+\sqrt{\rho s_n^2/n}/\sqrt{1+C\epsilon}EPn​​[Z]+ρsn2​/n​/1+Cϵ​ and EP^n[Z]+ρsn2/n/1−CϵE_{\widehat P_n}[Z]+\sqrt{\rho s_n^2/n}/\sqrt{1-C\epsilon}EPn​​[Z]+ρsn2​/n​/1−Cϵ​.
  6. Lemma 7: for identically distributed (possibly dependent) ZiZ_iZi​ with E∣Z1∣k<∞E|Z_1|^k<\inftyE∣Z1​∣k<∞, P(∣Zn∣≥ϵn1/k i.o.)=0P(|Z_n|\ge\epsilon n^{1/k}\text{ i.o.})=0P(∣Zn​∣≥ϵn1/k i.o.)=0 for every ϵ>0\epsilon>0ϵ>0 and max⁡i≤n∣Zi∣/n1/k→0\max_{i\le n}|Z_i|/n^{1/k}\to0maxi≤n​∣Zi​∣/n1/k→0 almost surely.

Significance

The result. The expansion says the robust mean is a variance-regularised mean, EP^n[Z]+ρ sn2/nE_{\widehat P_n}[Z]+\sqrt{\rho\,s_n^2/n}EPn​​[Z]+ρsn2​/n​, up to o(n−1/2)o(n^{-1/2})o(n−1/2), for every smooth divergence at once. Combined with the central limit theorem and Slutsky's lemma, it gives P(E[Z]∈{EP[Z]:Df(P∥P^n)≤ρ/n})→P(χ12≤ρ)P\big(E[Z]\in\{E_P[Z]:D_f(P\|\widehat P_n)\le\rho/n\}\big)\to P(\chi^2_1\le\rho)P(E[Z]∈{EP​[Z]:Df​(P∥Pn​)≤ρ/n})→P(χ12​≤ρ), the exact asymptotic coverage of generalized empirical likelihood intervals (the paper's Proposition 1 for d=1d=1d=1). The paper's uniform expansion (Theorem 2) and its coverage theorem for optimal values (Theorem 3) rest on the same mechanism. Because the statement is almost sure and allows stationary ergodic data, it also covers time series and simulation output.

Formalizing it. The lemma is proved in the paper; no machine-checked version of it, of (30), or of Lemmas 6–9 exists. A complete development would give the first formal link between fff-divergence balls and variance regularisation for general fff, and a formal almost-sure theory for empirical likelihood beyond the i.i.d. case. The χ2\chi^2χ2-only finite-sample expansion of Namkoong and Duchi (2017) is posed, not proved, on the platform.

Difficulty

The obvious route is a second-order Taylor expansion of fff around 111 inside the supremum. It fails because the optimal weights npinp_inpi​ are close to 111 only if no single observation is large compared with n sn\sqrt n\,s_nn​sn​; a heavy observation drives a weight to 000, where fff may be infinite and is not approximated by its Taylor polynomial. The argument has to sandwich the divergence ball between a quadratic ball and a Huber ball valid on all of [0,∞)[0,\infty)[0,∞), then show that the event "no observation of order n\sqrt nn​" holds eventually almost surely, which under only a second moment and no independence needs a Borel–Cantelli argument for identically distributed variables (Lemma 7). The sample variance limit needs Birkhoff's pointwise ergodic theorem, which Mathlib does not yet contain.

Formalization scope

  • Samples. Z:N→Ω→RZ:\mathbb N\to\Omega\to\mathbb RZ:N→Ω→R on a probability space; Lean's Z 0 is the paper's Z1Z_1Z1​ and the nnn-th sample vector is fun i : Fin n => Z i ω. Stationary ergodicity is IsStationaryErgodic: each Z i measurable and Mathlib's Ergodic for the left shift on the path law (which includes shift invariance). The mixing display on p. 7 implies this; the Lean hypothesis is the weaker standard notion named in the lemma.
  • Divergence. f:R→f:\mathbb R\tof:R→ EReal, using the published IsPhiDivergenceFunction (convex on [0,∞)[0,\infty)[0,∞), finite on (0,∞)(0,\infty)(0,∞), f(1)=0f(1)=0f(1)=0, f(0)=+∞f(0)=+\inftyf(0)=+∞ allowed); AssumptionA adds lower semicontinuity on [0,∞)[0,\infty)[0,∞) (the paper's standing condition on divergence generators), three-times differentiability on an interval (a,b)∋1(a,b)\ni1(a,b)∋1, f′(1)=0f'(1)=0f′(1)=0, f′′(1)=2f''(1)=2f′′(1)=2. The reading "finite on (0,∞)(0,\infty)(0,∞)" follows the paper's remark that only the behaviour at 000 is unrestricted.
  • Robust mean. Distributions are weight vectors on the sample (P≪P^nP\ll\widehat P_nP≪Pn​), the ball is the published probUncertaintySet, and the supremum is a real sSup of a non-empty bounded set. Mean and variance are the published empMean, empVar.
  • Constants. In (32) and Lemmas 6, 8, 9 the constant CCC is a parameter, and the two inequalities of (30) at the given ϵ\epsilonϵ and CCC are hypotheses; (30) itself asserts that such c,Cc,Cc,C exist. ϵ>0\epsilon>0ϵ>0 throughout, ϵ<1\epsilon<1ϵ<1 where the sets (31) are used, and Cϵ<1C\epsilon<1Cϵ<1 wherever 1−Cϵ\sqrt{1-C\epsilon}1−Cϵ​ appears.
  • Ruling out trivialisations. The ball always contains the uniform weights, so the robust mean is never the junk value of an empty supremum; the goal's limit statement makes n=0n=0n=0 irrelevant. A formalization that assumes i.i.d. data, a finite moment of order above two, or a specific fff proves a different, weaker statement.
  • Infrastructure. Needed: Birkhoff's pointwise ergodic theorem for the shift (not in Mathlib; posed but unproved on the platform as PalmQueueing.Ergodic.discrete_pointwise, for bijective flows), Borel–Cantelli (in Mathlib), and elementary convex analysis of the Huber function. The pointwise ergodic theorem and Lemma 7 are reusable well beyond this mission. Proofs of any milestone, and of the ergodic theorem for one-sided shifts, are welcome.

Selected references

  • J. C. Duchi, P. W. Glynn, H. Namkoong, Statistics of Robust Optimization: A Generalized Empirical Likelihood Approach, arXiv:1610.03425v3 (2018); Mathematics of Operations Research 46(3), 2021. https://arxiv.org/abs/1610.03425
  • A. B. Owen, Empirical likelihood ratio confidence regions, Annals of Statistics 18(1), 1990. https://doi.org/10.1214/aos/1176347494
  • K. A. Baggerly, Empirical likelihood as a goodness-of-fit measure, Biometrika 85(3), 1998. https://doi.org/10.1093/biomet/85.3.535
  • H. Lam, Recovering best statistical guarantees via the empirical divergence-based distributionally robust optimization, Operations Research, 2019. https://arxiv.org/abs/1605.09349
  • S. A. Corcoran, Bartlett adjustment of empirical discrepancy statistics, Biometrika 85(4), 1998. https://doi.org/10.1093/biomet/85.4.967
  • H. Namkoong, J. C. Duchi, Variance-based regularization with convex objectives, NeurIPS 2017. https://arxiv.org/abs/1610.02581
  • A. Ben-Tal, D. den Hertog, A. De Waegenaere, B. Melenberg, G. Rennen, Robust solutions of optimization problems affected by uncertain probabilities, Management Science 59(2), 2013. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.1120.1641
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Formal VerificationTheoretical Computer Science·Captain: mikedeng1

Consensus in the Presence of Partial Synchrony II: With Synchronous Processors, Partially Synchronous Communication and t Fail-Stop Faults, No Consensus Protocol Exists When 2 ≤ N ≤ 2tResearch Paper

Motivation

Consensus asks NNN processors, each holding an initial value, to agree on one value despite some of them failing. It underlies replicated databases, atomic commit and state-machine replication. Its solvability depends on the timing assumptions. With fully synchronous processors and communication, ttt fail-stop faults can be tolerated for any t<Nt < Nt<N. With fully asynchronous communication, Fischer, Lynch and Paterson showed that no deterministic protocol tolerates even one fail-stop fault (JACM 1985).

Dwork, Lynch and Stockmeyer (JACM 1988) introduced partial synchrony, a model between these two extremes. Message delays have an upper bound Δ\DeltaΔ, but either the bound is unknown to the protocol, or it holds only from an unknown time on. For each fault type they found the exact number of faults that can be tolerated. This mission formalizes the lower bound for fail-stop faults: when the processors are synchronous and communication is partially synchronous, no consensus protocol tolerates ttt faults once N≤2tN \le 2tN≤2t.

Timeline. 1985: Fischer, Lynch, Paterson, impossibility of consensus with one fail-stop fault under asynchrony. 1987: Dolev, Dwork, Stockmeyer, which combinations of synchrony assumptions admit consensus (JACM 1987). 1988: Dwork, Lynch, Stockmeyer, partial synchrony, with matching upper and lower bounds on resiliency for fail-stop, omission, authenticated Byzantine and Byzantine faults. The global stabilization time of the 1988 paper became a common liveness assumption for later fault-tolerant agreement protocols.

Setting

There are NNN processors p1,…,pNp_1, \dots, p_Np1​,…,pN​. Each processor holds an initial value vi∈{0,1}v_i \in \{0, 1\}vi​∈{0,1}. Each runs a deterministic protocol: a transition diagram over a possibly infinite set of states. In each state the next instruction is either Send(m,pj)\mathrm{Send}(m, p_j)Send(m,pj​), which puts message mmm in pjp_jpj​'s buffer, or Receive(pi)\mathrm{Receive}(p_i)Receive(pi​), which removes a set SSS of messages from pip_ipi​'s buffer and delivers it. The next state depends on the current state and, for a Receive, on SSS. A step never both sends and receives. Each state may record a decision, and the first decision a processor records is final.

Real time is the ticks 1,2,3,…1, 2, 3, \dots1,2,3,…. A run fixes the initial values and, at each tick, which processors take a step and which messages each Receive delivers. A message is delivered only after the tick at which it was sent, only to its addressee, and at most once.

  • Synchronous processors (Φ=1\Phi = 1Φ=1): every correct processor takes a step at every tick.
  • Fail-stop faults: a faulty processor follows the protocol until it stops, and it never restarts. A processor that stops at time 000 is initially dead.
  • Δ\DeltaΔ holds in [T,∞)[T, \infty)[T,∞): a message sent at a tick s1≥Ts_1 \ge Ts1​≥T is delivered no later than any Receive of its addressee at a tick s2≥s1+Δs_2 \ge s_1 + \Deltas2​≥s1​+Δ.
  • Delta holds eventually: Δ\DeltaΔ is a fixed positive integer known to the protocol. In every run, Δ\DeltaΔ holds in [T,∞)[T, \infty)[T,∞) for some unknown global stabilization time TTT. Messages sent before TTT may be delayed arbitrarily or lost.
  • Delta is unknown: the protocol is fixed first. In every run, some positive Δ\DeltaΔ holds in [1,∞)[1, \infty)[1,∞).

A protocol is a ttt-resilient consensus protocol achieving weak unanimity if the following holds for every set CCC of at least N−tN - tN−t processors and every allowed run in which the processors of CCC are correct and the others fail-stop. No two processors of CCC decide differently (consistency). Every processor of CCC decides (termination). If all initial values are vvv and no processor is faulty, every decision is vvv (weak unanimity).

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 4.3

For integers t≤Nt \le Nt≤N with

2≤N≤2t,2 \le N \le 2t,2≤N≤2t,

there is no ttt-resilient consensus protocol achieving weak unanimity for binary values with fail-stop faults and synchronous processors. This holds for every positive Δ\DeltaΔ when Δ\DeltaΔ holds eventually, and when delta is unknown.

Milestones: the three scenarios of the proof

Split the processors into groups PPP and QQQ with 1≤∣P∣,∣Q∣≤t1 \le |P|, |Q| \le t1≤∣P∣,∣Q∣≤t.

  • Scenario A: all inputs 000 and QQQ initially dead. The processors of PPP decide by some time TAT_ATA​, and they decide 000.
  • Scenario B: all inputs 111 and PPP initially dead. The processors of QQQ decide 111 by some time TBT_BTB​.
  • Scenario C: all processors alive, PPP starting with 000 and QQQ with 111, and messages between the groups held back past a time TTT. Up to time TTT, every processor of PPP is in the same state as in Scenario A, and every processor of QQQ in the same state as in Scenario B.

Significance

The result. Theorem 4.3 shows that the resiliency N≥2t+1N \ge 2t + 1N≥2t+1 of the paper's fail-stop and omission protocols (Theorems 4.1 and 4.2) is optimal. It holds even under three restrictions: binary values, weak unanimity, and processors in perfect lock-step. Partial synchrony costs a majority of correct processors, whereas full synchrony costs nothing. The same scenarios give the authenticated Byzantine bound N≥3t+1N \ge 3t + 1N≥3t+1 (Theorem 4.4). The halting remark of Section 4.2 rests on an argument of the same kind.

The formalization. The theorem is proved in the paper, and its proof is short. It is not machine-checked anywhere known to the mission. No message-passing model is on the platform. This mission supplies one: a step-level model with buffers, per-message timing, fail-stop faults and both partially synchronous communication models. It also gives a machine-checked impossibility on top of that model. FLP, Theorem 4.4 and the lower bounds of Section 6 are natural follow-ups on the same definitions.

Difficulty

The informal proof is an indistinguishability argument. Making it formal means comparing different runs of the same deterministic protocol. Two points need care.

First, the scenarios must be allowed runs. Scenario C holds messages between the groups back past max⁡(TA,TB)\max(T_A, T_B)max(TA​,TB​). With delta unknown, this needs a Δ\DeltaΔ larger than that delay. When Δ\DeltaΔ holds eventually, Δ\DeltaΔ is fixed before the protocol, and the protocol fixes TAT_ATA​ and TBT_BTB​. So the delay is legal only for messages sent before the global stabilization time, which must therefore be placed after max⁡(TA,TB)\max(T_A, T_B)max(TA​,TB​). Read literally, "every message between the groups takes more than max⁡(TA,TB)\max(T_A, T_B)max(TA​,TB​) steps" is not an allowed run in this model.

Second, "the processors of PPP act exactly as they do in Scenario A" is a claim about whole runs. Two runs must agree on states, on which messages are in which buffer, and on when each message is delivered, tick by tick up to TTT. With one-to-one sends and atomic steps, "delivered in exactly time 1" also needs a reading: a processor that sends at the next tick cannot receive at that tick.

Formalization scope

All declarations live in the namespace DLSConsensus.LowerBound. Processor pip_ipi​ is the index i−1i - 1i−1 of Fin N. Values are Bool. The protocol's state type and message type are arbitrary types in Type, finite or infinite. R.state i n is the state after tick nnn. A message instance is identified in the run by its sender and send tick. A Receive hands the protocol each delivered message as (sender, content); the absolute send tick is not exposed.

Explicit readings and conventions:

  • "Fail-stop or omission faults": the goal is the fail-stop impossibility. It implies the omission case, because a fail-stop processor looks to the others like one whose sends are all omitted. The omission case is not a separate item.
  • A fail-stop processor may skip ticks before its final stop. The processor timing bound Φ=1\Phi = 1Φ=1 applies to correct processors.
  • "Decides": the first state that records a decision. Irreversibility therefore holds by definition.
  • "Delivered in exactly time 1": the message is delivered no later than the addressee's first Receive at least one tick after the send.
  • "Within time TAT_ATA​" and "for some finite TBT_BTB​": an explicit ∃\exists∃ before the decision bound.
  • "Messages between the groups take more than max⁡(TA,TB)\max(T_A, T_B)max(TA​,TB​) steps": no message between the groups is delivered at a tick ≤T\le T≤T, for any given TTT.
  • "Act exactly as they do": equal local states at every tick n≤Tn \le Tn≤T.
  • Quantifier order: when Δ\DeltaΔ holds eventually, Δ\DeltaΔ is chosen first, then the protocol, then the run with its stabilization time. When delta is unknown, the protocol is chosen first and each run carries its own Δ\DeltaΔ. In both models Δ>0\Delta > 0Δ>0.

Trivializing formalizations are ruled out. The model has allowed runs for every protocol, so Resilient is never vacuously true. Correct processors step at every tick, so termination does not fail for the wrong reason. Unanimity is the weak form, applied only when no processor is faulty.

Contributions welcome: a general simulation lemma (equal inputs up to a tick give equal states up to that tick), the construction of runs from a delivery schedule, and proofs of the scenarios. These parts are reusable for the other lower bounds of the paper.

Selected references

  • C. Dwork, N. Lynch, L. Stockmeyer, Consensus in the presence of partial synchrony, Journal of the ACM 35(2), 1988, 288–323. https://doi.org/10.1145/42282.42283
  • M. J. Fischer, N. A. Lynch, M. S. Paterson, Impossibility of distributed consensus with one faulty process, Journal of the ACM 32(2), 1985, 374–382. https://doi.org/10.1145/3149.214121
  • D. Dolev, C. Dwork, L. Stockmeyer, On the minimal synchronism needed for distributed consensus, Journal of the ACM 34(1), 1987, 77–97. https://doi.org/10.1145/7531.7533
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Diameter of Polyhedra: Limits of Abstraction 3: Larman's Bound 2^(d−1)·n Holds in the Base AbstractionResearch Paper

Motivation

The diameter of a polyhedron is the largest number of edges needed to travel between two vertices of its graph, its 1-skeleton. Whether this number is bounded by a polynomial in the dimension ddd and the number of facets nnn is a long-standing open question in polyhedral combinatorics; edge walks are the moves of vertex-following methods such as the simplex method, so the question bounds what any such method can achieve in the worst case. For fixed dimension, Larman proved in 1970 that the diameter grows at most linearly in nnn, with a constant exponential in ddd (Larman 1970).

Eisenbrand, Hähnle, Razborov and Rothvoß ask how much of the geometry of polyhedra such upper bounds actually use. They isolate a single combinatorial path property shared by the graphs of non-degenerate polyhedra and announce that the known upper bounds, Larman's among them, "continue to hold in the base abstraction" defined by that property (Dagstuhl abstract, p. 3). The next sentence of the abstract reads: "While the first bound is merely an adaption of the proof in [13], our proof of the second bound is much simpler than the one which was proved for polyhedra in [16]."

The held source is the five-page Dagstuhl extended abstract dated June 15, 2010, which states the results and proves none of them. The full proofs appear in Mathematics of Operations Research 35 (2010), 786–794 (journal article). The goal is an asserted theorem of the paper, not an open conjecture; the formal proof remains to be supplied.

Setting

Let [n]={1,…,n}[n]=\{1,\ldots,n\}[n]={1,…,n} and write ([n]d)\binom{[n]}{d}(d[n]​) for the family of its ddd-element subsets. A graph G=(V,E)G=(V,E)G=(V,E) in the base abstraction has a nonempty vertex set V⊆([n]d)V\subseteq\binom{[n]}{d}V⊆(d[n]​): every vertex is a ddd-element set of labels, and distinct vertices carry distinct sets. The edges are arbitrary subject to condition i): for each u,v∈Vu,v\in Vu,v∈V there exists a path connecting uuu and vvv whose intermediate vertices all contain u∩vu\cap vu∩v. Condition i) makes GGG connected. The class of all such graphs is Bd,n\mathcal B_{d,n}Bd,n​; ddd is called the dimension and nnn the number of facets of the abstraction, and D(d,n)D(d,n)D(d,n) denotes the largest diameter of a graph in Bd,n\mathcal B_{d,n}Bd,n​ (p. 2).

The distance dist⁡G(u,v)\operatorname{dist}_G(u,v)distG​(u,v) is the least number of edges of a path from uuu to vvv. The motivating example is the graph of a non-degenerate polyhedron (each vertex on exactly ddd facets), each vertex labelled by its ddd facets: two vertices are joined by a path inside the minimal face containing both, and every vertex of that path lies on the facets the two endpoints share (pp. 2–3). The class Bd,n\mathcal B_{d,n}Bd,n​ is not restricted to such graphs.

Formalization targets

Larman's bound in the base abstraction

The abstract prints the bound as Δu(d,n)≤2d−1⋅n\Delta_u(d,n)\le 2^{d-1}\cdot nΔu​(d,n)≤2d−1⋅n and states that it continues to hold in the base abstraction. The target is the pointwise form of D(d,n)≤2d−1 nD(d,n)\le 2^{d-1}\, nD(d,n)≤2d−1n:

∀d≥1, ∀n, ∀G∈Bd,n, ∀u,v∈V(G):dist⁡G(u,v)≤2d−1 n.\forall d\ge 1,\ \forall n,\ \forall G\in\mathcal B_{d,n},\ \forall u,v\in V(G):\qquad \operatorname{dist}_G(u,v)\le 2^{d-1}\, n .∀d≥1, ∀n, ∀G∈Bd,n​, ∀u,v∈V(G):distG​(u,v)≤2d−1n.

In Lean this is the existence, for every pair u,vu,vu,v, of a walk from uuu to vvv with at most 2d−1n2^{d-1}n2d−1n edges. The statement quantifies over every graph satisfying the paper's definition, not over polyhedron graphs or a chosen family.

Significance

For fixed ddd the bound is linear in nnn, and it holds for a class defined only by finite sets and one path condition. Together with the almost-quadratic lower bound D(n/4,n)=Ω(n2/log⁡n)D(n/4,n)=\Omega(n^2/\log n)D(n/4,n)=Ω(n2/logn) announced in the same paper, it shows what this one property of polyhedra can and cannot deliver: linear growth in nnn for fixed dimension, but not a linear bound uniform in ddd and nnn. Since the graph of every non-degenerate polyhedron lies in Bd,n\mathcal B_{d,n}Bd,n​ (a separate mission of this series), the result also recovers a Larman-type bound for polyhedra, with constant 2d−12^{d-1}2d−1.

Prove2Me already has proved polytope versions: Hirsch.larman_bound (the sharper constant n 2d−3n\,2^{d-3}n2d−3 for nonempty bounded HHH-polytopes), Hirsch.larman_high_dimension, Hirsch.larman_layer_recursion, and Hirsch.tight_row_interval, the polytope form of the interval property that condition i) abstracts. They concern a different object, the vertex-edge graph of an HHH-polytope, and are credited as prior work; none states the bound for every graph of Bd,n\mathcal B_{d,n}Bd,n​. The platform definition Hirsch_clf (connected layer families) is a related abstraction in layered form and is not the graph class used here.

Difficulty

The class contains graphs with no geometric realization, so a proof cannot use convexity, faces as polyhedra, or linear-algebraic facts about vertices; only labels, intersections and walks are available. Condition i) guarantees a path preserving the common labels of two endpoints, but says nothing directly about the length of that path. Mere connectivity on ddd-subsets of [n][n][n] gives only the trivial bound ∣V∣−1≤(nd)−1|V|-1\le\binom{n}{d}-1∣V∣−1≤(dn​)−1, which is far from linear in nnn. A linear bound in nnn has to be extracted from condition i) alone, uniformly over all graphs of the class. The abstract describes its proof only as much simpler than Larman's for polyhedra and states no intermediate lemma, so the mission carries no milestones.

Formalization scope

  • [n][n][n] is represented by Fin n, labels 0,…,n−10,\ldots,n-10,…,n−1; only the number of labels matters.
  • A vertex set is V : Finset (Finset (Fin n)) and the graph is G : SimpleGraph V; vertices are therefore distinct label sets, as in the paper. InB d n V G requires V.Nonempty, every vertex of cardinality ddd, and CondI V G.
  • CondI asks for a walk all of whose vertices contain u∩vu\cap vu∩v. This is the source's path condition: a walk contains a path on a subset of its vertices, and the endpoints contain u∩vu\cap vu∩v automatically.
  • "Continue to hold in the base abstraction" is read as the bound for every graph of Bd,n\mathcal B_{d,n}Bd,n​ and every pair of its vertices. No numeric D(d,n)D(d,n)D(d,n) is defined, so no supremum with a default value enters; a bounded walk witnesses the distance bound.
  • d≥1d\ge 1d≥1 is an explicit hypothesis: ddd is the dimension, and it makes d−1d-1d−1 ordinary subtraction in N\mathbb NN. At d=0d=0d=0 the class consists only of the one-vertex graph on ∅\emptyset∅, so nothing is lost. For n<dn<dn<d the class is empty.
  • The constant is 2d−12^{d-1}2d−1, the paper's constant for the abstraction; the polytope constant 2d−32^{d-3}2d−3 of Hirsch.larman_bound is not claimed here.

Trivializing formalizations are ruled out: labels are the vertices themselves (not an arbitrary labelling that could repeat), and condition i) is required for all pairs, not for one chosen path or only adjacent vertices. A proof only for polyhedron graphs, for graphs with extra structure, or with a larger constant leaves the goal open. Useful contributions include general lemmas about CondI and walk-length bookkeeping for SimpleGraph on a finite vertex type; these are reusable by the other missions of this series.

Selected references

  • F. Eisenbrand, N. Hähnle, A. Razborov, T. Rothvoß, Diameter of Polyhedra: Limits of Abstraction, Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings 10211 (Flexible Network Design), 2010. https://drops.dagstuhl.de/opus/volltexte/2010/2724
  • F. Eisenbrand, N. Hähnle, A. Razborov, T. Rothvoß, Diameter of Polyhedra: Limits of Abstraction, Mathematics of Operations Research 35(4), 786–794, 2010. https://doi.org/10.1287/moor.1100.0470
  • D. G. Larman, Paths on polytopes, Proceedings of the London Mathematical Society (3) 20, 161–178, 1970. https://doi.org/10.1112/plms/s3-20.1.161
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Diameter of Polyhedra: Limits of Abstraction 2: The Kalai–Kleitman Bound n^(1+log d) Holds in the Base AbstractionResearch Paper

Motivation

The diameter of a polyhedron is the largest number of edges needed to travel between two vertices of its graph. Bounding that number from the dimension and the number of facets is a central question in polyhedral combinatorics because edge walks are the discrete moves available to many vertex-based optimization methods. The Kalai–Kleitman bound gives a quasi-polynomial upper bound in these parameters. Eisenbrand, Hähnle, Razborov and Rothvoß ask how much of the geometry is needed to retain such a bound. They isolate one path property of polyhedron graphs and show that the upper bound persists for every graph satisfying it, including graphs that need not arise from a polyhedron (Dagstuhl abstract, pp. 1–3).

This mission concerns that extension of the Kalai–Kleitman bound. The held source is the five-page Dagstuhl extended abstract dated June 15, 2010. It states the result without its proof. The full proofs appeared in Mathematics of Operations Research 35 (2010), 786–794 (journal article). The goal is an asserted result of the paper, not an open conjecture; the formal proof remains to be supplied.

Setting

Let [n]={1,…,n}[n]=\{1,\ldots,n\}[n]={1,…,n}, and let ([n]d)\binom{[n]}{d}(d[n]​) be the family of its ddd-element subsets. A graph G=(V,E)G=(V,E)G=(V,E) in the paper's base abstraction has a nonempty vertex set V⊆([n]d)V\subseteq\binom{[n]}{d}V⊆(d[n]​). Thus each graph vertex is labelled by a distinct ddd-element subset. The edges can be chosen freely subject to condition i): for every pair u,v∈Vu,v\in Vu,v∈V, there is a path from uuu to vwhoseintermediateverticesallcontainv whose intermediate vertices all contain vwhoseintermediateverticesallcontainu\cap v.Theconditionimpliesthatthegraphisconnected.Thepaperdenotestheclassofthesegraphsby. The condition implies that the graph is connected. The paper denotes the class of these graphs by .Theconditionimpliesthatthegraphisconnected.Thepaperdenotestheclassofthesegraphsby\mathcal B_{d,n}andcallsand callsandcallsdthedimensionandthe dimension andthedimensionandn$ the number of facets of the abstraction (definition and footnote, p. 2).

The distance between two vertices is the minimum number of edges in a path between them. A graph's diameter is the largest of these distances, and D(d,n)D(d,n)D(d,n) is the largest diameter among graphs in Bd,n\mathcal B_{d,n}Bd,n​. Condition i) is motivated by non-degenerate polyhedra: if a vertex lies on exactly ddd facets, its tight facets provide a ddd-element label, and two vertices can be connected inside the smallest face containing them. Every vertex on that path retains the facets common to the endpoints (pp. 2–3). This motivation does not restrict GGG to a realizable polyhedron graph.

Formalization targets

Kalai–Kleitman bound in the base abstraction

For positive dimension, the target is the pointwise form of the paper's assertion that the upper bound continues to hold in the base abstraction:

∀d≥1, ∀n, ∀G∈Bd,n, ∀u,v∈V(G),dist⁡G(u,v)≤n1+log⁡2d.\forall d\geq 1,\ \forall n,\ \forall G\in\mathcal B_{d,n},\ \forall u,v\in V(G),\quad \operatorname{dist}_G(u,v)\leq n^{1+\log_2 d}.∀d≥1, ∀n, ∀G∈Bd,n​, ∀u,v∈V(G),distG​(u,v)≤n1+log2​d.

Equivalently, every pair has a connecting path with at most n1+log⁡2dn^{1+\log_2 d}n1+log2​d edges. Consequently D(d,n)≤n1+log⁡2dD(d,n)\leq n^{1+\log_2 d}D(d,n)≤n1+log2​d. The statement covers every graph with the paper's labels and condition i), rather than a selected realization or a graph with extra geometric properties. The source prints the inequality for Δu(d,n)\Delta_u(d,n)Δu​(d,n), its polyhedron-diameter notation, and says in the same sentence that it continues to hold for the base abstraction (p. 3).

Significance

The bound shows that a common-facet path property is enough to prevent arbitrarily large diameter once ddd and nnn are fixed. It extends an upper bound first attached to graphs of polyhedra to a class specified entirely by finite sets and graph paths. This locates a concrete portion of the polyhedral diameter theory within combinatorics. The same paper gives an almost-quadratic lower bound for the abstraction, so the path property alone does not imply a linear bound in nnn (p. 3).

A machine-checked proof would connect a precise finite graph model with the real-exponent inequality, without relying on a polyhedron representation. Prove2Me already has a proved theorem called Hirsch.kalai_kleitman_bound for a bounded HHH-polytope, with a different exponent log⁡2d+2\log_2 d+2log2​d+2, and a proved Hirsch.kalai_kleitman_recursion for that polytope model. It also has Hirsch.clf_endpoint_peeling for connected layer families. Those results concern different objects or bounds and are useful prior work, but none is a formalization of the present claim for all G∈Bd,nG\in\mathcal B_{d,n}G∈Bd,n​.

Difficulty

The class permits edges and vertex families with no geometric realization, so a proof cannot use metric or convexity properties of a particular polyhedron. Condition i) guarantees one path preserving the common labels of two endpoints; it does not directly bound that path's length. Connectivity by itself would be too weak: a connected graph on the allowed labels can have a long shortest path unless its labels and the path condition constrain it. The formal task is to obtain the claimed uniform length bound from that condition across all finite families of ddd-sets. The Dagstuhl abstract calls the argument an adaptation of Kalai and Kleitman's proof but states no intermediate lemmas, so this proposal does not assign any in-source milestones (p. 3).

Formalization scope

Lean represents [n][n][n] by Fin n, with labels 0,…,n−10,\ldots,n-10,…,n−1 instead of 1,…,n1,\ldots,n1,…,n; only the number of labels matters. A vertex set is a Finset of Finset (Fin n), and a SimpleGraph has exactly those sets as vertices. This representation enforces distinct labels. InB d n V G requires VVV to be nonempty, every label to have cardinality ddd, and CondI for every ordered pair. The walk in CondI is equivalent to the source's path: repeated vertices can be erased, and the endpoints themselves contain u∩vu\cap vu∩v. Nonemptiness and condition i) together give the source's connectedness. A path through all graph vertices without the common-intersection condition would be a weaker and inadmissible model.

The theorem takes d≥1d\geq1d≥1, so the logarithm has its ordinary positive-dimension interpretation. The source does not print a logarithm base; the statement reads it as base two, following the cited Kalai–Kleitman convention. This interpretation is explicit in the theorem's prose and is an open source-reading question. The exponent is real: the path length is cast from a natural number to R\mathbb RR for comparison with (n:R)1+log⁡2d(n:\mathbb R)^{1+\log_2 d}(n:R)1+log2​d. No floor is applied to the exponent. The theorem asserts a bounded walk for each pair; that avoids defining D(d,n)D(d,n)D(d,n) through a supremum with an artificial value for an empty class. At n=0n=0n=0 with d≥1d\geq1d≥1, InB has no instance, as there are no ddd-element labels; at d=1d=1d=1, the bound is nnn, consistent with a connected graph on at most nnn labels.

The development needs reusable finite-set reasoning about common intersections, graph walks and their lengths, and real-logarithm bounds. Contributions establishing those facts for the paper's CondI model are within scope. A proof only for polyhedron graphs, for graphs with extra edge restrictions, or for a single chosen graph would leave the goal open.

Selected references

  • F. Eisenbrand, N. Hähnle, A. Razborov and T. Rothvoß, Diameter of Polyhedra: Limits of Abstraction, Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings 10211, 2010. Extended abstract.
  • F. Eisenbrand, N. Hähnle, A. Razborov and T. Rothvoß, Diameter of Polyhedra: Limits of Abstraction, Mathematics of Operations Research 35, 786–794, 2010. DOI.
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Consensus in the Presence of Partial Synchrony I: For N ≥ 2t + 1, Algorithm 1 Achieves Consistency, Strong Unanimity and Termination in the Basic Round Model with Fail-Stop or Omission FaultsResearch Paper

Motivation

Consensus asks NNN processors, each starting with a value, to agree on one value although some of them may be faulty. It underlies replicated databases, atomic commitment and state-machine replication. Two classical models bracket the problem. In a fully synchronous system, with known bounds on message delay and processor speed, consensus is solvable for many fault types. In a fully asynchronous system, Fischer, Lynch and Paterson showed in 1985 that no deterministic protocol tolerates even one fail-stop fault (FLP, J. ACM 1985).

Dwork, Lynch and Stockmeyer (J. ACM 35(2), 1988, 288–323) introduced partial synchrony between these extremes: message delays are bounded, but either the bound is unknown, or it holds only from an unknown global stabilization time (GST) on. This model, and the GST abstraction in particular, became the standard assumption under which practical consensus protocols (Paxos-style and Byzantine fault-tolerant replication) are proved live. The paper determines, for each fault type, the largest number ttt of faults that consensus can tolerate under partial synchrony. This mission formalizes its first positive result: for fail-stop and omission faults, N≥2t+1N \ge 2t+1N≥2t+1 processors suffice.

Setting

There are NNN processors p1,…,pNp_1,\dots,p_Np1​,…,pN​, an integer t≤Nt \le Nt≤N, and an arbitrary set VVV of values; processor pip_ipi​ starts with init(pi)∈V\mathrm{init}(p_i)\in Vinit(pi​)∈V.

In the basic round model (Section 3.1 of the paper), computation proceeds in rounds r=1,2,3,…r = 1, 2, 3, \dotsr=1,2,3,…. In each round every processor sends messages, each message is either delivered in that round or lost, and every processor then performs a state transition on the messages it received. Losses are described by a predicate deliv(r,q,p)\mathrm{deliv}(r,q,p)deliv(r,q,p). A set CCC of processors (the correct ones) and a round GST\mathrm{GST}GST constrain it: every message sent at a round r≥GSTr \ge \mathrm{GST}r≥GST from a processor of CCC to a processor of CCC is delivered. Before GST any message may be lost, and messages from or to processors outside CCC may be lost at any time. Processors outside CCC follow the protocol but lose sends and receptions (omission faults, which include fail-stop faults).

Algorithm 1 (Section 3.2.1) works as follows. Every processor keeps a set PROPER\mathrm{PROPER}PROPER, initially {init(p)}\{\mathrm{init}(p)\}{init(p)}, attaches it to every message, and merges in every PROPER set it receives. A processor may hold locks, each a value with an associated phase number; vvv is acceptable to ppp if ppp has no lock on a value other than vvv. Phase k≥1k \ge 1k≥1 belongs to pip_ipi​ when k≡i(modN)k \equiv i \pmod Nk≡i(modN). Trying phase kkk occupies rounds 4k−34k-34k−3, 4k−24k-24k−2, 4k−14k-14k−1:

  1. every processor sends the owner the list of its acceptable values that are in its PROPER set; the owner proposes, by an arbitrary choice, a value appearing in at least N−tN-tN−t of the lists received, if there is one;
  2. the owner broadcasts (lock v,k)(\mathrm{lock}\ v, k)(lock v,k); each receiver locks vvv with phase kkk;
  3. each receiver acknowledges; with at least t+1t+1t+1 acknowledgements the owner decides vvv.

Lock-release phase kkk is round 4k4k4k: every processor broadcasts its locks (v,h)(v,h)(v,h), and a lock on vvv with phase hhh is released on receipt of some (w,h′)(w,h')(w,h′) with w≠vw \ne vw=v and h′≥hh' \ge hh′≥h.

The correctness conditions (Section 2.4) for the set CCC are consistency (no two decisions of processors in CCC differ), termination (every processor in CCC decides), and strong unanimity (if all NNN initial values equal vvv, every decision in CCC is vvv).

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 3.1

For all N,tN, tN,t with N≥2t+1N \ge 2t+1N≥2t+1, every value type VVV, all initial values, every CCC with ∣C∣≥N−t|C| \ge N-t∣C∣≥N−t, every GST\mathrm{GST}GST, every delivery pattern allowed for CCC and GST\mathrm{GST}GST, and every admissible choice of proposals,

Algorithm 1 achievesConsistency(C) ∧ StrongUnanimity(C) ∧ Termination(C).\text{Algorithm 1 achieves}\quad \text{Consistency}(C)\ \wedge\ \text{StrongUnanimity}(C)\ \wedge\ \text{Termination}(C).Algorithm 1 achievesConsistency(C) ∧ StrongUnanimity(C) ∧ Termination(C).

This is the theorem as printed; it fixes no constants.

Milestones

  • Lemma 3.1: no two distinct values acquire locks with the same associated phase.
  • Lemma 3.2: if vvv is decided at the first phase kkk at which any decision is made, then at least t+1t+1t+1 processors lock vvv at phase kkk, and each keeps, from then on, a lock on vvv with phase at least kkk.
  • Lemma 3.3: immediately after a lock-release round 4k≥GST4k \ge \mathrm{GST}4k≥GST, the processors of CCC together hold locks on at most one value.
  • Round bound (Section 3.2.1, p. 298): every processor of CCC decides at some phase kkk with
4k−1≤GST+4(N+1).4k-1 \le \mathrm{GST} + 4(N+1).4k−1≤GST+4(N+1).

Significance

Theorem 3.1 shows that, against omission and fail-stop faults, partially synchronous communication costs nothing in resilience compared with a majority bound: N≥2t+1N \ge 2t+1N≥2t+1 suffices, and Section 4 of the paper shows that N≤2tN \le 2tN≤2t does not. The lock-and-release structure of Algorithm 1 (a value is decided only after a quorum locks it, and locks are released only on evidence of a later competing lock) recurs in later partially synchronous protocols, where safety must hold regardless of timing and liveness is obtained only after stabilization. The result separates the two concerns cleanly: consistency and strong unanimity hold in every run, while termination uses GST.

The result is proved in the paper; to the best of the available information it has not been formalized in Lean, and no distributed-computing model exists on Prove2Me. The mission produces a machine-checked model of the basic round model with a GST delivery guarantee, a full executable specification of Algorithm 1, and proofs of its safety and liveness. The paper's own proof of Lemma 3.3 is one line and the termination argument relies on "sufficient communication"; a formal proof must make these steps explicit.

Difficulty

The safety argument is an invariant over an unbounded number of phases with an arbitrary loss pattern: a lock on the decided value must be shown never to be released without being replaced by a higher lock on the same value, while competing locks on other values may exist at faulty or slow processors. The obvious argument ("after a decision, every later proposal must equal the decided value") is circular without a persistence statement for locks such as Lemma 3.2. Liveness requires reasoning about what every correct processor knows after GST (its PROPER set and the locks of the others), and it depends on processors sending lock-release and list messages even when these carry no locks or no acceptable values. Quorum counting with N−tN-tN−t and t+1t+1t+1 must be carried out over distinct senders.

Formalization scope

  • Processors are Fin N; the paper's pip_ipi​ is the processor of index i−1i-1i−1. Rounds start at 111; exec … 0 is the initial state and exec … r the state after round rrr. Phases start at 111.
  • The paper's "chooses one arbitrarily" is a parameter pick : ℕ → Set V → V, required only to pick an element of every nonempty candidate set, and universally quantified in every theorem.
  • The paper's "the behavior of the processors not in CCC is allowed by the fault type FFF" is read as: processors outside CCC run Algorithm 1, and any message from or to them may be lost (omission faults, containing fail-stop).
  • The GST guarantee covers a processor's messages to itself when it is in CCC; before GST self-messages may be lost like any other.
  • Every processor sends its list in round 4k−34k-34k−3 and its lock-release message in round 4k4k4k even when they are empty, since both carry the PROPER set (Section 3.2: PROPER sets are piggybacked on all messages).
  • A decision is the event DecidesAt p k v (owner of phase kkk, proposed vvv, at least t+1t+1t+1 acknowledgements in round 4k−14k-14k−1); consistency requires all such events of processors in CCC to agree.
  • "Decide by round GST+4(N+1)\mathrm{GST}+4(N+1)GST+4(N+1)" is read as: the deciding phase kkk satisfies 4k−1≤GST+4(N+1)4k-1 \le \mathrm{GST}+4(N+1)4k−1≤GST+4(N+1).
  • Not formalized: Remark 1's asymptotic claims, the PROPER simplifications for weak unanimity, Algorithms 2 and 3.

A formalization in which a run cannot exist, the delivery constraint is unsatisfiable, the choice of proposals is fixed, or faulty processors are absent (CCC = all processors) would trivialize the theorem; the model here admits runs in which processors decide, and CCC ranges over all sets of at least N−tN-tN−t processors.

Reusable beyond this mission: the round-based message-passing model with a GST delivery guarantee and omission faults. Contributions of general lemmas about runs (monotonicity of PROPER sets, persistence of locks, quorum intersection over Finset) are welcome.

Selected references

  • C. Dwork, N. Lynch, L. Stockmeyer, Consensus in the presence of partial synchrony, Journal of the ACM 35(2), 1988, 288–323. https://doi.org/10.1145/42282.42283
  • M. J. Fischer, N. A. Lynch, M. S. Paterson, Impossibility of distributed consensus with one faulty process, Journal of the ACM 32(2), 1985, 374–382. https://doi.org/10.1145/3149.214121
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CombinatoricsLinear OptimizationOperations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

Solving Large-Scale Zero-One Linear Programming Problems: A Minimal Cover Inequality Cuts Off x̄ iff the Knapsack Problem (2.12) Has Optimal Value Less Than OneResearch Paper

Motivation

Large zero–one linear programs can contain constraints involving only a small fraction of their variables. Crowder, Johnson and Padberg study how to extract useful inequalities from one such row while solving the larger program. Their computational method identifies a violated inequality at a current linear programming solution, adds it, and resolves the relaxation. The mathematical question behind that step is whether a minimal cover inequality can be found by a separate optimization problem. The authors answer it in Section 2.3 of their 1983 paper, after developing cover and configuration inequalities in Section 2.2. Crowder, Johnson and Padberg (1983)

The target is a known result from that paper. It is a precise statement about a finite knapsack row and a point in the unit cube, independent of the paper's implementation and numerical experiments. The paper also discusses (1,k)(1,k)(1,k)-configurations and lifting, which turn the identified inequalities into valid cuts involving additional row variables. Those statements supply the mission's milestones and make the separation result useful in its original setting. Crowder, Johnson and Padberg (1983), Sections 2.2–2.4

Setting

Fix a finite index set KKK, positive rational coefficients aja_jaj​ for j∈Kj\in Kj∈K, and a rational right-hand side a0a_0a0​. A zero–one solution is a vector with each xj∈{0,1}x_j\in\{0,1\}xj​∈{0,1} satisfying the single row

∑j∈Kajxj≤a0.(2.5)\sum_{j\in K}a_jx_j\le a_0. \tag{2.5}j∈K∑​aj​xj​≤a0​.(2.5)

The model uses the support set x={j:xj=1}x=\{j:x_j=1\}x={j:xj​=1} for such a vector. A set S⊆KS\subseteq KS⊆K is a minimal cover when its total coefficient exceeds a0a_0a0​, but removing any one member makes the total at most a0a_0a0​:

∑j∈Saj>a0,∑j∈Saj−ak≤a0(k∈S).(2.6)\sum_{j\in S}a_j>a_0, \qquad \sum_{j\in S}a_j-a_k\le a_0\quad(k\in S). \tag{2.6}j∈S∑​aj​>a0​,j∈S∑​aj​−ak​≤a0​(k∈S).(2.6)

It yields the cover inequality ∑j∈Sxj≤∣S∣−1\sum_{j\in S}x_j\le |S|-1∑j∈S​xj​≤∣S∣−1 for every feasible zero–one vector. The right-hand side is interpreted as a real number, so the expression also has its usual meaning when SSS is empty.

A (1,k)(1,k)(1,k)-configuration consists of S∗⊆KS^*\subseteq KS∗⊆K, t∉S∗t\notin S^*t∈/S∗ and an integer 2≤k≤∣S∗∣2\le k\le |S^*|2≤k≤∣S∗∣. The set S∗S^*S∗ itself fits the row, while Q∪{t}Q\cup\{t\}Q∪{t} is a minimal cover for every kkk-element subset QQQ of S∗S^*S∗. For any k≤r≤∣S∗∣k\le r\le |S^*|k≤r≤∣S∗∣ and rrr-element T⊆S∗T\subseteq S^*T⊆S∗, its inequality is (r−k+1)xt+∑j∈Txj≤r(r-k+1)x_t+\sum_{j\in T}x_j\le r(r−k+1)xt​+∑j∈T​xj​≤r. Crowder, Johnson and Padberg (1983), pp. 810–811

For a point xˉ∈[0,1]K\bar x\in[0,1]^Kxˉ∈[0,1]K, the separation problem asks for a cover s⊆Ks\subseteq Ks⊆K minimizing ∑j∈s(1−xˉj)\sum_{j\in s}(1-\bar x_j)∑j∈s​(1−xˉj​), subject to the strict condition ∑j∈saj>a0\sum_{j\in s}a_j>a_0∑j∈s​aj​>a0​. This is problem (2.12). The set of attainable values is finite, but it is empty if the row has no cover. An optimal value zzz is therefore asserted only when a least attainable value exists.

Formalization targets

Cover separation

The goal is the paper's Section 2.3 equivalence:

(∃S⊆K minimal:∑j∈Sxˉj>∣S∣−1)⟺z<1,\left(\exists S\subseteq K\text{ minimal}: \sum_{j\in S}\bar x_j>|S|-1\right) \quad\Longleftrightarrow\quad z<1,​∃S⊆K minimal:j∈S∑​xˉj​>∣S∣−1​⟺z<1,

where zzz is the attained optimum of (2.12). A cover inequality cuts off xˉ\bar xxˉ precisely when its left-hand side exceeds ∣S∣−1|S|-1∣S∣−1. If there is no cover, (2.12) has no optimal value; the theorem does not assign it an artificial value. Crowder, Johnson and Padberg (1983), pp. 812–813

Valid inequalities and lifting

The milestones state the validity of (2.7) and every inequality in (2.9), the two assertions used in the separation equivalence, and the relaxed lifting claims of Section 2.4. For lifting, zkz_kzk​ is the maximum integer objective value in (2.10), zˉk\bar z_kzˉk​ is the maximum in its linear relaxation, and zk∗=⌊zˉk⌋z_k^*=\lfloor\bar z_k\rfloorzk∗​=⌊zˉk​⌋. The claims are zk≤zk∗z_k\le z_k^*zk​≤zk∗​ and validity after adding variable kkk with coefficient fk=f0−zk∗f_k=f_0-z_k^*fk​=f0​−zk∗​. They concern attained optima, as the paper's “maximum” language requires. Crowder, Johnson and Padberg (1983), pp. 811, 814

Significance

The equivalence turns a geometric question about which cover inequality excludes xˉ\bar xxˉ into a finite optimization test with a numerical threshold of one. It identifies when a minimal cover cut exists for a row, while the validity milestones certify that the inequalities can be added without removing zero–one feasible points. The lifting claims explain how an inequality first written on a subset of variables remains valid as further variables enter it. These are the mathematical guarantees used by the paper's cutting plane procedure. Crowder, Johnson and Padberg (1983), Sections 2.2–2.4

The paper proves the separation equivalence and states the surrounding validity claims. This mission records their exact statements in Lean; its theorem proofs remain open. A complete development would add machine-checked proofs for the finite cover argument, configuration inequalities, and lifting validity. The resulting definitions of feasible supports, attained optimization values and intermediate inequality validity can also be reused in other finite knapsack formalizations.

Difficulty

Checking all subsets of KKK directly grows rapidly with the row size. A separation result must relate a minimum over all covers to an inequality indexed by a minimal cover, while accounting for objective coefficients that may be zero when xˉj=1\bar x_j=1xˉj​=1. The same boundary matters for lifting: the zero–one maximum is compared with a continuous relaxation, and rounding is justified by the integer coefficients of the current inequality. If the lifting problem is infeasible, neither maximum exists. Crowder, Johnson and Padberg (1983), pp. 812–814

Formalization scope

Lean uses an arbitrary finite index type for KKK, replacing the paper's indices 1,…,n1,\ldots,n1,…,n. A zero–one vector is a finite support set. Row coefficients and a0a_0a0​ are rational, as on p. 810; the point xˉ\bar xxˉ and separation values are real. The target asks only that xˉ\bar xxˉ lie in the unit cube. Although the paper obtains it as an optimum of the full LP relaxation (2.11), that additional property is not used in the row-level equivalence. No sign condition is imposed on a0a_0a0​.

The strict knapsack condition in (2.12) is retained. “Chops off” means strict violation of (2.7). “Optimal value” means membership and leastness in the attainable value set; for lifting it means membership and greatestness. Thus rows with no cover or infeasible lifting subproblem do not acquire a default zero optimum. The size expressions ∣S∣−1|S|-1∣S∣−1 and r−k+1r-k+1r−k+1 are evaluated in the reals, so natural-number truncation cannot change them. Integer lifting coefficients and the floor of the relaxed optimum express the paper's “truncating to its integer part”; the feasible relaxed problem includes the zero vector, so this agrees with truncation toward zero there.

Validity during an intermediate lifting step ranges over feasible zero–one vectors supported in the current set SSS. After adding kkk, it ranges over support in S∪{k}S\cup\{k\}S∪{k}. The final inequality covers the whole row when that set is KKK. The development must preserve the full quantifier over every kkk-subset in (2.8) and every rrr and TTT in (2.9); restricting these would weaken the paper's claim. Contributions proving the named milestones, adding concrete examples, or developing general finite optimization lemmas are in scope. The facet assertions attributed to Padberg are outside the target. A related lifted-cover facet statement already appears on the platform as NemhauserWolsey.partitioned_cover_lifting_defines_facet; its conventions and claim differ from this mission's validity results.

Selected references

  • H. Crowder, E. L. Johnson and M. Padberg, Solving Large-Scale Zero-One Linear Programming Problems, Operations Research 31(5), 803–834, 1983. DOI: 10.1287/opre.31.5.803
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Dynamical SystemsOperations ResearchStochastic Systems·Captain: mikedeng1

Stability and Instability of Fluid Models for Reentrant Lines 3: In Every Reentrant Line the Last-Buffer-First-Served Fluid Model Is StableResearch Paper

Motivation

A manufacturing line can send the same job through several stations and return it to a station it visited earlier. Semiconductor fabrication is one example. Such a reentrant line has several customer classes at one server, and the server must choose which class to work on. A station may have enough capacity on average yet the line can still accumulate an unbounded queue under an unfortunate service rule. Dai and Weiss use deterministic fluid models to study this question: fluid represents large queues, and its motion exposes the long-run effect of the service rule. Their paper proves that two simple buffer priority disciplines have stable fluid models for every reentrant line satisfying the usual station load condition. This mission concerns Last-Buffer-First-Served, abbreviated LBFS. Dai and Weiss (1996).

The distinction between fluid and stochastic queue stability matters. Dai and Weiss cite an earlier theorem connecting stable fluid models to stable queueing disciplines under the stochastic assumptions of their introduction. The target here is their fluid theorem, Theorem 4.4, rather than a separate formalization of that stochastic implication. Dai and Weiss (1996), pp. 115, 119, 124.

Setting

There are KKK classes, numbered in route order, and III stations. Every unit of fluid enters class 111 at rate one. On completing service in class kkk, it becomes class k+1k+1k+1; after class KKK, it leaves. The station serving class kkk is σ(k)\sigma(k)σ(k). Different classes may share a station. The constituency of station iii is Ci={k:σ(k)=i}C_i=\{k:\sigma(k)=i\}Ci​={k:σ(k)=i}, and class kkk has positive mean service requirement mkm_kmk​, so its service rate is μk=1/mk\mu_k=1/m_kμk​=1/mk​. The nominal workload at station iii is ρi=∑k∈Cimk\rho_i=\sum_{k\in C_i}m_kρi​=∑k∈Ci​​mk​. The paper assumes ρi<1\rho_i<1ρi​<1 at every station. Dai and Weiss (1996), pp. 115–117.

For time t≥0t\ge0t≥0, Qk(t)Q_k(t)Qk​(t) is the amount of fluid in class kkk, and Tk(t)T_k(t)Tk​(t) is the cumulative server time spent on that class. The flow equations say that class content equals its initial content plus completed service from the preceding class minus its own completed service. The first class receives the external unit-rate flow. Each QkQ_kQk​ remains nonnegative, each TkT_kTk​ starts at zero and is nondecreasing, and the cumulative idle time of every station is nondecreasing. A priority rule adds a condition on when a server may reserve capacity for lower-ranked classes. These are the fluid equations of Definition 1.2 and §4. Dai and Weiss (1996), pp. 118, 122–123.

A priority ranking π\piπ assigns a distinct rank to every class, with smaller rank meaning higher priority. For class kkk, let HkH_kHk​ contain the classes at the same station whose rank is at least as high as kkk's. In a preemptive-resume priority fluid model, capacity unused by HkH_kHk​ may increase only when the fluid workload in HkH_kHk​ is zero. Under LBFS, π(k)=K+1−k\pi(k)=K+1-kπ(k)=K+1−k: a class later in the route has higher priority. Priority is compared within each station, even though the ranking is written globally. Dai and Weiss (1996), pp. 122–123, Definition 4.1.

Formalization targets

Theorem 4.4 asks for stability of the LBFS fluid model for every reentrant line with positive service requirements and ρi<1\rho_i<1ρi​<1:

∃δ>0  ∀(Q,T),[(Q,T) is an LBFS fluid solution and ∣Q(0)∣=1]⟹∀t≥δ,  Q(t)=0,\exists\delta>0\;\forall (Q,T),\quad \bigl[(Q,T)\text{ is an LBFS fluid solution and }|Q(0)|=1\bigr] \Longrightarrow \forall t\ge\delta,\;Q(t)=0,∃δ>0∀(Q,T),[(Q,T) is an LBFS fluid solution and ∣Q(0)∣=1]⟹∀t≥δ,Q(t)=0,

where ∣Q(0)∣=∑k=1KQk(0)|Q(0)|=\sum_{k=1}^K Q_k(0)∣Q(0)∣=∑k=1K​Qk​(0). The same δ\deltaδ must work for every solution and every normalized initial configuration. This is exactly the fluid stability definition used by the paper. Dai and Weiss (1996), pp. 118–119, 124.

The milestones follow the paper's own intermediate statements. Lemma 2.2 treats a nonnegative absolutely continuous function whose derivative is negative whenever the function is positive. Proposition 4.2 identifies flow-rate relations at a regular point under a buffer priority rule. The proof of Theorem 4.4 records a uniform negative drift for total content and the explicit emptying time

δ=∣Q(0)∣λ^−1,λ^=1max⁡1≤i≤Iρi>1.\delta=\frac{|Q(0)|}{\widehat\lambda-1},\qquad \widehat\lambda=\frac{1}{\max_{1\le i\le I}\rho_i}>1.δ=λ−1∣Q(0)∣​,λ=max1≤i≤I​ρi​1​>1.

The explicit time is stated for every initial fluid amount; normalization to one belongs only to the final stability theorem. Dai and Weiss (1996), pp. 120, 123–125.

Significance

The theorem gives a uniform finite clearing time for the LBFS fluid model whenever each station's nominal workload is below its capacity. It applies to any number of stations, any finite route, and any assignment of route stages to stations. This is stronger than checking a particular factory layout. The conclusion concerns every fluid solution, which matters because the defining equations need not determine a unique path. Dai and Weiss (1996), pp. 118–119, 124–125.

Formalizing the result requires a reusable interface for reentrant lines, service allocation, station workloads, and the priority complementarity condition, plus separate statements for the extinction criterion and priority flow rates. The theorem is proved in the 1996 paper; the remaining work in this mission is a machine-checked Lean proof of its fluid-model statement and of the listed milestones. The stochastic queueing theorem cited by Dai and Weiss is outside this mission's scope.

Difficulty

The load inequalities ρi<1\rho_i<1ρi​<1 compare average work with available server time, but by themselves they do not specify which class receives service at an instant. Under other service rules, reentrant lines can amplify queued fluid despite every station being nominally underloaded; the same paper gives such an example. A formal proof therefore has to use the precise LBFS priority condition, not only the flow equations and the load inequalities. The regular-time argument must then yield a single bound valid across every possible fluid path. Dai and Weiss (1996), §§4–5.

Formalization scope

Lean represents classes and stations by finite index types. Their indices start at zero: Lean class k−1k-1k−1 corresponds to paper class kkk, and LBFS is Fin.revPerm. The paths QQQ and TTT are functions on all real times, while the fluid equations and conclusions are imposed only for t≥0t\ge0t≥0. The external arrival rate is one, as in the paper's normalization. The conditions that station idle capacity and priority-set unused capacity increase only when their relevant content is zero are expressed by constancy on each interval where that content stays positive. Service and fluid paths are not given extra continuity hypotheses; the fluid equations and monotonicity conditions provide the regularity used in the paper. Dai and Weiss (1996), pp. 116–119, 122–123.

The service requirements mk>0m_k>0mk​>0 are explicit so μk=1/mk\mu_k=1/m_kμk​=1/mk​ has its intended value. The drift and emptying-time milestones explicitly assume K>0K>0K>0, since their formula divides by the maximum station workload. The main theorem retains the universal quantification over lines; when K=0K=0K=0, its normalization ∣Q(0)∣=1|Q(0)|=1∣Q(0)∣=1 is impossible. A faithful solution predicate must include the priority condition (4.4), whose omission would change Theorem 4.4 into a false claim about all work-conserving policies. The definition layer, elementary real-analysis extinction lemma, and priority flow-rate relations are useful beyond this single stability theorem. Dai and Weiss (1996), pp. 117–125.

Selected references

  • J. G. Dai and G. Weiss, Stability and instability of fluid models for reentrant lines, Mathematics of Operations Research 21(1), 115–134, 1996. DOI: 10.1287/moor.21.1.115.
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Operations ResearchProbability·Captain: mikedeng1

A Re-solving Heuristic with Uniformly Bounded Loss for Network Revenue Management 3: On a Degenerate Two-Class Instance, Frequent Re-solving Has Regret at Least Ω(√T)Research Paper

Motivation

Network revenue managers sell access to limited capacity over time. An airline, for example, may have several products that use the same seat inventory, with some products earning more revenue than others. The decision to accept a request must be made when it arrives, before future requests are known. A standard way to guide that decision is to solve a deterministic linear program using expected demand, then use its optimal allocation as a probability of acceptance. As inventory changes, one can solve the program again. Bumpensanti and Wang study how often to do so, and show that frequent re-solving has a real limitation when the linear program is degenerate: on a particular instance its expected loss grows at least as the square root of the selling horizon. Bumpensanti and Wang, arXiv:1802.06192v3, Sections 3.1 and 5.1.

The same paper gives an infrequent re-solving policy with uniformly bounded regret and an upper bound of order T\sqrt TT​ for the frequent re-solving policy. The lower-bound result is the counterpart that identifies a case where that order cannot be removed by the frequent policy itself. It uses a two-class example small enough to expose the issue without other network complications. Bumpensanti and Wang, arXiv:1802.06192v3, Theorem 1 and Propositions 2–3.

Setting

There is one resource, initially with TTT units of capacity, and two customer classes. Class jjj arrives through an independent Poisson process of rate one. Accepting a customer uses one unit of capacity and earns price rjr_jrj​, where 0<r2<r10<r_2<r_10<r2​<r1​. Rejected requests earn nothing, and unused capacity has no terminal value. The higher-price class has priority in the deterministic allocation, but its realized demand is random. The horizon TTT is a positive integer, divided into TTT periods of length one. Bumpensanti and Wang, arXiv:1802.06192v3, Section 2, pp. 7–9, and Appendix C.1, p. 32.

At the start of a period with kkk periods left and capacity ccc, the deterministic linear program (DLP) chooses rates x1,x2x_1,x_2x1​,x2​ that maximize r1x1+r2x2r_1x_1+r_2x_2r1​x1​+r2​x2​ subject to x1+x2≤c/kx_1+x_2\le c/kx1​+x2​≤c/k and 0≤xj≤10\le x_j\le10≤xj​≤1. In this instance its first coordinate is x1=min⁡{c/k,1}x_1=\min\{c/k,1\}x1​=min{c/k,1}. The frequent re-solving policy (FR) accepts each class-jjj request in that period with probability xjx_jxj​, provided capacity remains. It re-solves the DLP at the next period with the new capacity. This is Algorithm 2 specialized to the example. Bumpensanti and Wang, arXiv:1802.06192v3, Algorithm 2, p. 11, and Appendix D, p. 42.

The hindsight optimum knows the total demand from both classes at the end of the horizon and chooses the best feasible allocation using that information. Its expected value is vHO(T,T)v^{\mathrm{HO}}(T,T)vHO(T,T); the first argument is horizon length and the second is initial capacity. Let vFR(T,T)v^{\mathrm{FR}}(T,T)vFR(T,T) be the frequent policy's expected revenue. Since hindsight has more information, their difference is a regret benchmark. The formulation uses the paper's hindsight linear program, which is exact on this unit-consumption instance. Bumpensanti and Wang, arXiv:1802.06192v3, Eq. (3) and Definition 1, p. 9.

Formalization targets

Main result

For every pair of prices 0<r2<r10<r_2<r_10<r2​<r1​, there are M>0M>0M>0 and T0≥1T_0\ge1T0​≥1 such that, for all integer T≥T0T\ge T_0T≥T0​ and every optimal DLP selector used by FR,

vHO(T,T)−vFR(T,T)≥MT.v^{\mathrm{HO}}(T,T)-v^{\mathrm{FR}}(T,T)\ge M\sqrt T.vHO(T,T)−vFR(T,T)≥MT​.

This specializes Proposition 2's existence statement to the explicit family in its Appendix C.1 proof. The constant may depend on the prices, but is chosen before the selector and the horizon. The benchmark is the hindsight value, as in the proposition. Bumpensanti and Wang, arXiv:1802.06192v3, Proposition 2, p. 18, and Appendix C.1, pp. 32–34.

Supporting results

The milestones record the optimal DLP allocation on the example and two clauses of Lemma 7. The latter estimate the probabilities that the high-price arrival count is moderately below its mean in the first third and moderately above its mean in the last third. With T′T'T′ an integer phase length and N∼Poisson⁡(T′)N\sim\operatorname{Poisson}(T')N∼Poisson(T′), the first bound is

P(T′−4T′≤N≤T′−3T′)≥0.0013−0.9496/T′.\mathbb P(T'-4\sqrt{T'}\le N\le T'-3\sqrt{T'}) \ge 0.0013-0.9496/\sqrt{T'}.P(T′−4T′​≤N≤T′−3T′​)≥0.0013−0.9496/T′​.

The third-phase bound uses the standard normal cumulative distribution function Φ\PhiΦ and the unrounded constant Φ(7)−Φ(6)\Phi(7)-\Phi(6)Φ(7)−Φ(6). Bumpensanti and Wang, arXiv:1802.06192v3, Lemma 7 and Eqs. (49)–(53), p. 40.

Significance

This result shows that solving the DLP every period does not, by itself, give a horizon-independent expected loss. The example has only one resource and two customer classes; the gap cannot be attributed to a large network. The paper's separate bounded-regret result uses a different re-solving schedule and acceptance rule, so formalizing this lower bound helps distinguish guarantees for the two policies. Together with the upper bound for FR, it identifies the square-root order as the relevant scale for this policy on the example. Bumpensanti and Wang, arXiv:1802.06192v3, Sections 4–5.

The mathematical proposition is proved in the cited paper; the Lean goal here remains an open theorem statement. Formalizing it requires precise interfaces for a Poisson arrival model, a capacity-limited randomized policy, a hindsight LP benchmark, and asymptotic lower bounds. Those interfaces can be reused in later revenue-management results, while the two-class instance gives a concrete check on the conventions.

Difficulty

The initial DLP solution allocates the average capacity to the high-price class. A simple intuition might therefore predict that repeated re-solving preserves capacity for that class. The remaining-capacity ratio, however, responds to realized arrivals; when the ratio rises above one, the re-solved LP assigns positive acceptance probability to the lower-price class. The policy then spends capacity before later high-price arrivals are known. The lower-bound analysis needs a path event that controls arrivals through the middle phase and a joint event involving the policy's accepted requests. Marginal Poisson counts alone do not determine those admissions. Bumpensanti and Wang, arXiv:1802.06192v3, Appendix C.1, pp. 32–34.

Formalization scope

Lean uses Fin 2 for classes and Fin 1 for the resource. The general model takes positive Poisson rates, nonnegative prices and nonnegative consumption. On the lower-bound instance the rates and consumptions equal one, capacity equals TTT, and prices satisfy 0<r2<r10<r_2<r_10<r2​<r1​. These are the operational standing assumptions of the paper's Section 2 and the positive-price reading used by the example. Optimal DLP ties are represented by quantifying over every selector. The LP value is the published RLPBidPrice.Unbiased.piValue definition, evaluated on nonnegative capacity vectors; the rate and capacity conventions make its real supremum well posed.

The window law superposes the independent class Poisson processes into a Poisson total count, independent class labels, and independent Bernoulli acceptance marks. A fold over ordered arrivals applies Algorithm 2's capacity check after every acceptance. The expected hindsight value sums over independent total demand counts, and the FR value is a backward recursion over the remaining unit periods. The target's MMM is strictly positive and fixed before the horizon, so neither a zero constant nor a horizon-dependent constant can satisfy it trivially.

The two Lemma 7 milestones cover only Q1Q_1Q1​ and Q3Q_3Q3​. Its continuous-time Q2Q_2Q2​ event and the joint admission event require a path probability space and are outside this draft. Equation (52) yields Φ(7)−Φ(6)\Phi(7)-\Phi(6)Φ(7)−Φ(6); the printed 9.8531×10−109.8531\times10^{-10}9.8531×10−10 rounds that value upward. The source proof divides TTT into three exact integer-length phases, while Proposition 2 is stated for all sufficiently large TTT; this gap requires attention in a complete proof. The source here is arXiv:1802.06192v3, whose printed and PDF page numbers coincide.

Selected references

  • Bumpensanti, P. and Wang, H., A Re-solving Heuristic with Uniformly Bounded Loss for Network Revenue Management, arXiv preprint arXiv:1802.06192v3, 2018. PDF.
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Dynamical SystemsOperations ResearchStochastic Systems·Captain: mikedeng1

Stability and Instability of Fluid Models for Reentrant Lines 2: In Every Reentrant Line the First-Buffer-First-Served Fluid Model Is StableResearch Paper

Why priority rules in reentrant lines matter

Semiconductor wafer fabrication is the standard example of a reentrant line: every wafer follows the same long route through a set of machines, and visits several machines many times. Each visit is a separate processing step, and a machine with work waiting from several steps must choose which step to serve. Kumar (1993) proposed studying such lines through their buffer priority rules, and Lu and Kumar (1991) showed that a priority rule can make a line unstable even though every machine has spare capacity. The question is therefore not academic: a scheduling rule that looks reasonable can let queues grow without bound.

Dai (1995) reduced the positive Harris recurrence of a multiclass queueing network to the stability of a deterministic fluid model, and Dai and Weiss (1996) used this reduction to prove stability results for several reentrant lines. This mission formalizes their Theorem 4.3: under the First-Buffer-First-Served (FBFS) discipline, the fluid model of every reentrant line is stable whenever each station's nominal workload is below one. Kumar (1993) had proved the analogous statement for discrete deterministic systems.

Timeline:

  • 1991. Lu and Kumar exhibit a two-station reentrant line that is unstable under a static priority rule with every workload below one.
  • 1993. Kumar proves stability of FBFS and LBFS for discrete deterministic reentrant lines.
  • 1995. Dai shows that stability of the fluid model implies positive Harris recurrence of the stochastic network.
  • 1996. Dai and Weiss prove that the FBFS and LBFS fluid models of every reentrant line are stable (Theorems 4.3 and 4.4), and with Dai's theorem obtain stability of the stochastic networks.

Setting

A reentrant line has III stations and KKK classes. All fluid follows one route: it enters as class 111, becomes class k+1k+1k+1 when class kkk is completed, and leaves after class KKK. Class kkk is served at station σ(k)\sigma(k)σ(k) with mean service time mk>0m_k > 0mk​>0, and μk=1/mk\mu_k = 1/m_kμk​=1/mk​. The constituency of station iii is Ci={k:σ(k)=i}C_i = \{k : \sigma(k) = i\}Ci​={k:σ(k)=i}, and its nominal workload is ρi=∑k∈Cimk\rho_i = \sum_{k\in C_i} m_kρi​=∑k∈Ci​​mk​. The exogenous arrival rate is 111. The standing assumption of the paper is

ρi<1(i=1,…,I).(1.7)\rho_i < 1 \qquad (i = 1,\dots,I). \tag{1.7}ρi​<1(i=1,…,I).(1.7)

A fluid model solution is a pair of paths Q(t)=(Qk(t))kQ(t) = (Q_k(t))_kQ(t)=(Qk​(t))k​, the fluid levels, and T(t)=(Tk(t))kT(t) = (T_k(t))_kT(t)=(Tk​(t))k​, the cumulative service time given to each class, such that for t≥0t \ge 0t≥0:

Qk(t)=Qk(0)+μk−1Tk−1(t)−μkTk(t),Qk(t)≥0,Q_k(t) = Q_k(0) + \mu_{k-1}T_{k-1}(t) - \mu_k T_k(t), \qquad Q_k(t) \ge 0,Qk​(t)=Qk​(0)+μk−1​Tk−1​(t)−μk​Tk​(t),Qk​(t)≥0,

with μ0T0(t)=t\mu_0T_0(t) = tμ0​T0​(t)=t; each TkT_kTk​ starts at 000 and is nondecreasing; and the idle time Ui(t)=t−∑k∈CiTk(t)U_i(t) = t - \sum_{k\in C_i}T_k(t)Ui​(t)=t−∑k∈Ci​​Tk​(t) of each station is nondecreasing.

A buffer priority discipline is a permutation π\piπ of the classes; a class kkk has priority over a class lll at the same station when π(k)<π(l)\pi(k) < \pi(l)π(k)<π(l). Write Hk={l∈Cσ(k):π(l)≤π(k)}H_k = \{l \in C_{\sigma(k)} : \pi(l) \le \pi(k)\}Hk​={l∈Cσ(k)​:π(l)≤π(k)}, Tk+=∑l∈HkTlT_k^+ = \sum_{l\in H_k}T_lTk+​=∑l∈Hk​​Tl​, Uk+(t)=t−Tk+(t)U_k^+(t) = t - T_k^+(t)Uk+​(t)=t−Tk+​(t) and Wk+=∑l∈HkmlQlW_k^+ = \sum_{l\in H_k} m_l Q_lWk+​=∑l∈Hk​​ml​Ql​. Under preemptive resume, Uk+U_k^+Uk+​ may increase only at times when Wk+=0W_k^+ = 0Wk+​=0 (condition (4.4)): a station never idles toward the classes of priority at least that of kkk while any of them holds fluid. FBFS is π(k)=k\pi(k) = kπ(k)=k, so earlier steps of the route have priority.

The fluid model is stable (Definition 1.3) if there is a time δ>0\delta > 0δ>0 such that every solution with ∣Q(0)∣=∑kQk(0)=1|Q(0)| = \sum_k Q_k(0) = 1∣Q(0)∣=∑k​Qk​(0)=1 has Q(t)=0Q(t) = 0Q(t)=0 for all t≥δt \ge \deltat≥δ.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 4.3

For every reentrant line with mk>0m_k > 0mk​>0 and (1.7),

the fluid model (1.8)–(1.12), (4.4) with π(k)=k is stable.\text{the fluid model (1.8)–(1.12), (4.4) with } \pi(k) = k \text{ is stable.}the fluid model (1.8)–(1.12), (4.4) with π(k)=k is stable.

The goal asserts existence of an emptying time; it does not fix the value.

Milestones

  1. Lemma 2.2 (i): a nonnegative function has zero derivative wherever it vanishes and is differentiable.
  2. Lemma 2.2 (ii): an absolutely continuous nonnegative ggg whose derivative is at most −ε-\varepsilon−ε wherever g>0g > 0g>0 vanishes from g(0)/εg(0)/\varepsilong(0)/ε on, and is nonincreasing.
  3. Proposition 4.2: at a regular time of a priority fluid model, an empty buffer has equal in- and out-flow rates, and at each station the highest-priority nonempty class satisfies ∑k∈Hk0mkdk=1\sum_{k\in H_{k_0}} m_kd_k = 1∑k∈Hk0​​​mk​dk​=1 while lower-priority classes have zero out-flow.
  4. Inductive step (proof of Theorem 4.3): once buffers 1,…,k−11,\dots,k-11,…,k−1 stay empty from tk−1t_{k-1}tk−1​ on, buffer kkk is empty from tk=tk−1+Qk(tk−1)mk/(1−∑l∈Hkml)t_k = t_{k-1} + Q_k(t_{k-1})m_k/(1 - \sum_{l\in H_k} m_l)tk​=tk−1​+Qk​(tk−1​)mk​/(1−∑l∈Hk​​ml​) on.
  5. Emptying time (proof of Theorem 4.3): every solution with ∣Q(0)∣=1|Q(0)| = 1∣Q(0)∣=1 is empty from
δ=∑k=1Kmk∏l=1k−1(1−∑j∈Hl∖{l}mj)∏l=1k(1−∑j∈Hlmj)\delta = \sum_{k=1}^K m_k\frac{\prod_{l=1}^{k-1}(1-\sum_{j\in H_l\setminus\{l\}}m_j)}{\prod_{l=1}^{k}(1-\sum_{j\in H_l}m_j)}δ=k=1∑K​mk​∏l=1k​(1−∑j∈Hl​​mj​)∏l=1k−1​(1−∑j∈Hl​∖{l}​mj​)​

on, which gives the goal with an explicit constant.

Significance

Combined with Dai's theorem (Theorem 1.1 of the paper), Theorem 4.3 gives positive Harris recurrence of every multiclass reentrant line operated under FBFS, under the distributional assumptions of that theorem, whenever (1.7) holds. Since Lu–Kumar-type examples show that priority rules can destabilize a network with spare capacity, a rule that is provably stable on every reentrant line is a meaningful guarantee. FBFS, together with LBFS, is the basic positive case against which the instability examples in the same paper (Theorem 5.1) are compared.

Formalizing the result adds a machine-checked version of the fluid model with priority constraints, stated for an arbitrary line rather than a fixed network, and a checked explicit emptying time. The result is proved in the paper; no machine-checked proof is known. The rate identities of Proposition 4.2 and the extinction lemma are reused by the LBFS mission of this series.

Difficulty

The fluid model gives the paths only as nondecreasing functions subject to equations; nothing says they are differentiable. Every argument about rates holds only at regular times, and the conclusion must be integrated back through absolute continuity, which itself must be derived from the monotonicity conditions. The priority condition (4.4) is an "increases only when empty" condition; turning it into the rate identity (4.6) at a regular point requires continuity of the fluid levels and a careful local argument. The induction over classes needs uniform control of every earlier buffer for all later times, not only at one instant, so a pointwise reading of "buffer k−1k-1k−1 is empty" is not enough. Finally, the explicit constant δ\deltaδ requires bounding the content of buffer kkk at time tk−1t_{k-1}tk−1​ by the total content, which may have grown since time 000.

Formalization scope

  • Classes and stations are Fin K and Fin I, 0-based: the paper's class kkk is Lean index k−1k-1k−1.
  • Paths are total functions ℝ → Fin K → ℝ; every equation is imposed on t≥0t \ge 0t≥0 only, and derivatives are taken at t>0t > 0t>0.
  • Conditions (1.13) and (4.4) are in interval form (ConstantWhile): the idle process is constant on every interval of [0,∞)[0,\infty)[0,∞) on which the content stays positive. This is equivalent to the paper's Stieltjes integral form for continuous paths.
  • Lipschitz continuity of the paths is not assumed; it follows from the monotonicity conditions.
  • mk>0m_k > 0mk​>0 is an explicit hypothesis; the paper takes it for granted.
  • Priorities are Equiv.Perm (Fin K), FBFS is the identity; ∣Q(0)∣|Q(0)|∣Q(0)∣ is ∑kQk(0)\sum_k Q_k(0)∑k​Qk​(0).
  • In Lemma 2.2 (ii) the printed strict "g˙(t)<−ε\dot g(t) < -\varepsilong˙​(t)<−ε" is relaxed to "≤−ε\le -\varepsilon≤−ε", as every application requires; absolute continuity is dropped from Lemma 2.2 (i), where it is not needed. Both changes strengthen the lemma.
  • In the inductive step, "stay empty for t>tk−1t > t_{k-1}t>tk−1​" is read as t≥tk−1t \ge t_{k-1}t≥tk−1​, and the case Qk(tk−1)=0Q_k(t_{k-1}) = 0Qk​(tk−1​)=0 is included.
  • The stochastic network is not formalized; only the fluid model is.

A trivializing formalization is ruled out: the goal uses the priority fluid model, not the work-conserving one alone (which would claim that every work-conserving fluid model is stable, false by Theorem 5.1), and a sorry-free witness shows that the FBFS solution predicate has solutions with ∣Q(0)∣=1|Q(0)| = 1∣Q(0)∣=1, so stability is not vacuous.

Contributions welcome: the extinction lemma for absolutely continuous functions, the derivation of Lipschitz continuity from (1.10)–(1.12), and the rate identities of Proposition 4.2 are reusable beyond this mission.

Selected references

  • J. G. Dai and G. Weiss, Stability and instability of fluid models for reentrant lines, Mathematics of Operations Research 21(1) (1996) 115–134. https://doi.org/10.1287/moor.21.1.115
  • J. G. Dai, On positive Harris recurrence of multiclass queueing networks: a unified approach via fluid limit models, Annals of Applied Probability 5(1) (1995) 49–77. https://doi.org/10.1214/aoap/1177004828
  • P. R. Kumar, Re-entrant lines, Queueing Systems 13 (1993) 87–110. https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01149327
  • S. H. Lu and P. R. Kumar, Distributed scheduling based on due dates and buffer priorities, IEEE Transactions on Automatic Control 36(12) (1991) 1406–1416. https://doi.org/10.1109/9.106159
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Linear OptimizationOperations ResearchProbability·Captain: mikedeng1

A Re-solving Heuristic with Uniformly Bounded Loss for Network Revenue Management 1: Infrequent Re-solving with Thresholding Has Regret O(1), Uniformly in the Horizon T and the Capacities CResearch Paper

Motivation

Network revenue management decides, in real time, which customer requests to accept when every request consumes a bundle of scarce, perishable resources: seats on several flight legs of an itinerary, room-nights of a multi-night hotel stay, bandwidth on several links. The exact dynamic program is intractable for realistic networks, so practice and theory rely on heuristics built from a deterministic linear program (DLP) that replaces random demand by its mean. The question is how much revenue such heuristics lose.

The classical answer (Gallego and van Ryzin 1994, 1997; Talluri and van Ryzin 1998) is that solving the DLP once and following its solution loses O(T)O(\sqrt T)O(T​) over a horizon of length TTT. Re-solving the DLP as capacity is consumed was long believed to help, and Jasin and Kumar (2012) proved that re-solving in every period has bounded loss if the DLP solution is nondegenerate. Bumpensanti and Wang (arXiv:1802.06192v3) showed that the nondegeneracy condition matters: frequent re-solving can lose Ω(T)\Omega(\sqrt T)Ω(T​) on degenerate instances. They then proposed a policy, Infrequent Re-solving with Thresholding (IRT), whose loss is bounded by a constant independent of the horizon and of the capacities, with no nondegeneracy assumption. This mission formalizes that result.

Setting

There are nnn customer classes j∈[n]j \in [n]j∈[n] and mmm resources l∈[m]l \in [m]l∈[m]. Class-jjj customers arrive as independent Poisson processes of rate λj>0\lambda_j > 0λj​>0 on [0,T][0, T][0,T]. Accepting a class-jjj customer earns rj≥0r_j \ge 0rj​≥0 and consumes alj≥0a_{lj} \ge 0alj​≥0 units of resource lll; A=(alj)A = (a_{lj})A=(alj​) is the bill-of-materials matrix with columns AjA_jAj​, and C∈R≥0mC \in \mathbb R^m_{\ge 0}C∈R≥0m​ is the initial capacity. A customer can be accepted only if Aj≤C′A_j \le C'Aj​≤C′ componentwise, C′C'C′ being the remaining capacity; leftover capacity is worthless at TTT.

The DLP with right-hand side bbb is

max⁡x{∑jrjxj ∣ ∑jAjxj≤b, 0≤xj≤λj},\max_x \Big\{ \sum_j r_j x_j \ \Big|\ \sum_j A_j x_j \le b,\ 0 \le x_j \le \lambda_j \Big\},xmax​{j∑​rj​xj​ ​ j∑​Aj​xj​≤b, 0≤xj​≤λj​},

and vDLP(T,C)v^{\mathrm{DLP}}(T, C)vDLP(T,C) is TTT times its value at b=C/Tb = C/Tb=C/T. The hindsight optimum is vHO(T,C)=E[VHO]v^{\mathrm{HO}}(T, C) = \mathbb E[V^{\mathrm{HO}}]vHO(T,C)=E[VHO], where VHOV^{\mathrm{HO}}VHO is the value of the same LP with capacity CCC and the realized demands Λj(T)∼Poisson(λjT)\Lambda_j(T) \sim \mathrm{Poisson}(\lambda_j T)Λj​(T)∼Poisson(λj​T) as upper bounds. It bounds the expected revenue of every non-anticipating policy, and the regret of a policy π\piπ is vHO−vπv^{\mathrm{HO}} - v^\pivHO−vπ.

A probabilistic allocation on a window accepts each class-jjj arrival with a fixed probability pjp_jpj​ when capacity allows. The IRT policy uses τu=T(5/6)u\tau_u = T^{(5/6)^u}τu​=T(5/6)u and re-solving times tu∗=T−τut^*_u = T - \tau_utu∗​=T−τu​ for u=0,…,Ku = 0, \dots, Ku=0,…,K, where K=⌈log⁡log⁡T/log⁡(6/5)⌉K = \lceil \log\log T / \log(6/5)\rceilK=⌈loglogT/log(6/5)⌉. At tu∗t^*_utu∗​ it solves the DLP with right-hand side C(tu∗)/τuC(t^*_u)/\tau_uC(tu∗​)/τu​ (remaining capacity over remaining time), obtaining xux^uxu. In the epochs u<Ku < Ku<K it accepts class jjj with probability 000 if xju<λjτu−1/4x^u_j < \lambda_j\tau_u^{-1/4}xju​<λj​τu−1/4​, else 111 if xju>λj(1−τu−1/4)x^u_j > \lambda_j(1 - \tau_u^{-1/4})xju​>λj​(1−τu−1/4​), else xju/λjx^u_j/\lambda_jxju​/λj​; in the last epoch [tK∗,T][t^*_K, T][tK∗​,T] it uses xjK/λjx^K_j/\lambda_jxjK​/λj​. The family IRTK′\mathrm{IRT}^{K'}IRTK′ re-solves K′K'K′ times on the same schedule; IRT0\mathrm{IRT}^0IRT0 is static probabilistic allocation (SPA), and HOK′\mathrm{HO}^{K'}HOK′ follows IRTK′\mathrm{IRT}^{K'}IRTK′ until tK′∗t^*_{K'}tK′∗​ and then earns the hindsight optimum of what remains.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 1 (p. 16)

There is a constant M=M(λ,r,A)M = M(\lambda, r, A)M=M(λ,r,A) such that for every horizon T∈{1,2,… }T \in \{1, 2, \dots\}T∈{1,2,…} and every capacity vector C≥0C \ge 0C≥0,

vHO(T,C)−vIRT(T,C)≤M.v^{\mathrm{HO}}(T, C) - v^{\mathrm{IRT}}(T, C) \le M .vHO(T,C)−vIRT(T,C)≤M.

The constant is not fixed; the content is its independence of TTT, of CCC, and of the optimal LP solution chosen at each re-solve.

Milestones

  • vHO≤vDLPv^{\mathrm{HO}} \le v^{\mathrm{DLP}}vHO≤vDLP (Sec. 2.2.2, p. 9).
  • Lemma 4 (p. 37): P(∣X−μ∣≥x)≤2e−x2/(3μ)\mathbb P(|X - \mu| \ge x) \le 2e^{-x^2/(3\mu)}P(∣X−μ∣≥x)≤2e−x2/(3μ) for X∼Poisson(μ)X \sim \mathrm{Poisson}(\mu)X∼Poisson(μ), 0<x≤μ0 < x \le \mu0<x≤μ.
  • Proposition 5 (p. 27): vDLP−vSPA≤MTv^{\mathrm{DLP}} - v^{\mathrm{SPA}} \le M\sqrt TvDLP−vSPA≤MT​, uniformly in CCC.
  • Proposition 1 (p. 16): with one re-solve at T−T5/6T - T^{5/6}T−T5/6,
vHO−vHO1≤MTe−κT1/6,vHO−vIRT1≤MTe−κT1/6+MT5/12.v^{\mathrm{HO}} - v^{\mathrm{HO}^1} \le M T e^{-\kappa T^{1/6}},\qquad v^{\mathrm{HO}} - v^{\mathrm{IRT}^1} \le M T e^{-\kappa T^{1/6}} + M T^{5/12}.vHO−vHO1≤MTe−κT1/6,vHO−vIRT1≤MTe−κT1/6+MT5/12.
  • Eq. (13) (p. 29): for every K′K'K′,
vHO−vIRTK′≤M∑u=0K′−1T(5/6)ue−κT(5/6)u/6+MT(5/6)K′/2.v^{\mathrm{HO}} - v^{\mathrm{IRT}^{K'}} \le M\sum_{u=0}^{K'-1} T^{(5/6)^u} e^{-\kappa T^{(5/6)^u/6}} + M T^{(5/6)^{K'}/2}.vHO−vIRTK′≤Mu=0∑K′−1​T(5/6)ue−κT(5/6)u/6+MT(5/6)K′/2.
  • p. 30: T(5/6)K≤eT^{(5/6)^{K}} \le eT(5/6)K≤e, and the right-hand side of (13) at K′=K(T)K' = K(T)K′=K(T) is bounded uniformly in T≥1T \ge 1T≥1.

Significance

The result separates two design choices in re-solving heuristics: how often to re-solve and how to turn an LP solution into a control. It shows that re-solving only O(log⁡log⁡T)O(\log\log T)O(loglogT) times, combined with rounding nearly-degenerate acceptance probabilities to 000 or 111, is enough for bounded regret, and that the constant is uniform over all capacity-to-horizon ratios, so degenerate DLP solutions, which occur only at particular ratios, cause no loss of order. Since vHO≥v∗v^{\mathrm{HO}} \ge v^*vHO≥v∗, it also shows that the hindsight optimum is within a constant of the optimal policy's value in this model.

The result is proved on paper but not machine-checked. A formalization would produce a reusable Poisson-arrival revenue-management model, a precise account of the regret decomposition over re-solving epochs, and an independent check of a proof with known gaps (see Difficulty). No part of it is formalized on the platform.

Difficulty

The obvious argument compares the policy with the DLP solution and controls the deviation of Poisson demand by its standard deviation; this gives only O(T)O(\sqrt T)O(T​), because the DLP value exceeds the hindsight optimum by order T\sqrt TT​ and the lost sales accumulate. Bounded regret needs a comparison with the hindsight LP, path by path: the acceptances made before the last re-solve must remain extendable to a hindsight-optimal solution with overwhelming probability. This requires LP sensitivity of the hindsight solution to the random right-hand side, uniformly over the degenerate cases, and the printed proof's statement of it (Lemma 5) is false as printed: on a two-class, single-resource instance its interval for zˉ1\bar z_1zˉ1​ is empty. A correct argument needs a proximity bound for optimal LP solutions under a change of the demand bounds, summed over all classes, not only over Jλ={j:xj∗=λj}J_\lambda = \{j : x^*_j = \lambda_j\}Jλ​={j:xj∗​=λj​}. The analysis of the schedule (the sum over epochs in (13)) is elementary but the printed chain of inequalities on p. 30 uses a monotonicity that fails for large arguments.

Formalization scope

All objects are in the definition item ResolvingNRM.IRT.Model. Classes are Fin n, resources Fin m, A : Matrix (Fin m) (Fin n) ℝ. LP values reuse piValue from the published RLPBidPrice.Unbiased.Model; the hindsight LP is over real zzz, as in (3). Expectations are explicit sums of Poisson weights. A window of probabilistic allocation is represented by its Poisson count of arrivals, i.i.d. classes with law λj/∑iλi\lambda_j/\sum_i\lambda_iλj​/∑i​λi​ and independent Bernoulli acceptance coins, the standard representation for controls constant on the window. Policies are backward recursions over the re-solving epochs. Ties in the LP are left open: a policy takes an arbitrary optimal-solution selector, and every theorem quantifies over all selectors after its constants.

Conventions and deviations from the page, each disclosed in the item concerned:

  • Standing assumptions of Sec. 2 (p. 7), left implicit there: λj>0\lambda_j > 0λj​>0, r≥0r \ge 0r≥0, A≥0A \ge 0A≥0, C≥0C \ge 0C≥0.
  • "O(g)O(g)O(g)" is read as: there is MMM, depending only on (λ,r,A)(\lambda, r, A)(λ,r,A), with the bound ≤Mg(T)\le M g(T)≤Mg(T) for all T≥1T \ge 1T≥1 (or T>0T > 0T>0) and all C≥0C \ge 0C≥0.
  • Milestones applied to sub-horizons T(5/6)uT^{(5/6)^u}T(5/6)u take a real TTT; the goal takes T∈NT \in \mathbb NT∈N.
  • Lemma 4 is stated for 0<x≤μ0 < x \le \mu0<x≤μ; as printed (all x>0x > 0x>0) it is false, e.g. μ=1\mu = 1μ=1, x=5x = 5x=5.
  • In Proposition 1 and (13), κ>0\kappa > 0κ>0 is existential and uniform in CCC; the printed κ\kappaκ depends on JλJ_\lambdaJλ​ and is derived through Lemma 5.
  • (13) is stated for every number K′K'K′ of re-solves.
  • Algorithm 3 prints the re-solve right-hand side as C(tk∗)/τkC(t^*_k)/\tau_kC(tk∗​)/τk​; it is read with index uuu.
  • For 1≤T≤e1 \le T \le e1≤T≤e the formula for KKK is undefined or negative; the formalization takes K=0K = 0K=0, so IRT is SPA there.
  • The optimal policy value v∗v^*v∗ and the paper's constant α\alphaα are not defined; Lemmas 5 and 6 are not stated.

A statement that lets MMM depend on TTT or CCC, compares IRT with the DLP instead of the hindsight optimum, uses a fixed number of re-solves, or assumes a nondegenerate or vertex LP solution is trivial or a different theorem, and is ruled out by the quantifier order of the goal. The milestone T(5/6)K≤eT^{(5/6)^K} \le eT(5/6)K≤e has a sorry-free local check.

Welcome contributions: LP proximity results (Cook–Gerards–Schrijver–Tardos type), Poisson concentration, superposition and thinning of Poisson processes, and lemmas on expectations of LP values. The source is arXiv:1802.06192v3; its printed page numbers equal the PDF page numbers.

Selected references

  • P. Bumpensanti, H. Wang, A Re-solving Heuristic with Uniformly Bounded Loss for Network Revenue Management, arXiv:1802.06192v3, 2018; Management Science 66(7), 2020. https://arxiv.org/abs/1802.06192
  • S. Jasin, S. Kumar, A Re-Solving Heuristic with Bounded Revenue Loss for Network Revenue Management with Customer Choice, Mathematics of Operations Research 37(2), 2012. https://doi.org/10.1287/moor.1110.0530
  • G. Gallego, G. van Ryzin, A Multiproduct Dynamic Pricing Problem and Its Applications to Network Yield Management, Operations Research 45(1), 1997. https://doi.org/10.1287/opre.45.1.24
  • K. Talluri, G. van Ryzin, An Analysis of Bid-Price Controls for Network Revenue Management, Management Science 44(11), 1998. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.44.11.1577
  • M. Reiman, Q. Wang, An Asymptotically Optimal Policy for a Quantity-Based Network Revenue Management Problem, Mathematics of Operations Research 33(2), 2008. https://doi.org/10.1287/moor.1070.0288
  • W. Cook, A. M. H. Gerards, A. Schrijver, É. Tardos, Sensitivity Theorems in Integer Linear Programming, Mathematical Programming 34, 1986. https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01582230
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