Inventory Control V: Joint Optimization of Reorder Point and Batch QuantityTextbook
Two decisions that are usually taken separately
An (R,Q) policy has two parameters. Chapter 4 of Axsäter's Inventory Control chooses the
batch quantity Q from a deterministic model, and Chapter 5 chooses the reorder point R from a
stochastic one with Q held fixed; the book presents this two-step practice as an adequate
approximation. Section 6.1 asks what is lost by it and shows how to optimize both parameters
jointly in one stochastic model. For discrete demand the answer, due to Federgruen and Zheng
(1992), is an algorithm of remarkable simplicity: increase Q one unit at a time, keep the
reorder point optimal along the way by a one-line rule, and stop at the first Q for which the
cost goes up. The claim that this stopping rule finds the global optimum over all pairs
(R,Q) is the capstone of Sect. 6.1.1.1 and the goal of this mission. The same idea is reused
in the book for (s,S) policies (Sect. 6.1.1.2) and, in continuous form, for normally
distributed demand (Sect. 6.1.2).
Setting
An item is controlled by a continuous review (R,Q) policy with integral reorder point R and
batch quantity Q≥1. Demand is discrete and stationary; the lead-time demandD(L)
takes values in the nonnegative integers with probabilities pj=Pr[D(L)=j] and has a
finite mean μ′. The average demand per unit of time is μ. Costs are a holding cost h
and a shortage cost b1, both per unit and time unit, and an ordering cost A per batch.
The building block is the cost of an (S−1,S) policy that keeps the inventory position at a
fixed integer k. By the standard argument of Sect. 5.3.2 the inventory level a lead-time later
is k−D(L), and the average holding and shortage cost rate is (Eq. 6.3)
g(k)=−b1(k−μ′)+(h+b1)j=1∑kjPr[D(L)=k−j].
Under the (R,Q) policy the inventory position is uniformly distributed on
{R+1,…,R+Q} (Proposition 5.1), so the total average cost rate is (Eq. 6.4)
C(R,Q)=QAμ+Q1k=R+1∑R+Qg(k),
and C(Q)=minRC(R,Q) (Eq. 6.5), attained at an optimal reorder point R∗(Q). The
ready rateS3(R)=Pr[IL>0]=Q1∑k=R+1R+QPr[D(L)≤k−1] links
the cost to service: raising the reorder point by one unit changes the cost by
−b1+(h+b1)S3(R+1) (Eq. 5.60).
Formalization targets
Goal — the Federgruen-Zheng stopping rule is optimal
Let Q∗≥1 be the smallest batch quantity with C(Q∗+1)≥C(Q∗) and let R∗
be an optimal reorder point for Q∗. Then
C(R∗,Q∗)≤C(R,Q)for all R∈Z,Q≥1.
Supporting targets
The increment identity g(k+1)−g(k)=−b1+(h+b1)Pr[D(L)≤k]; convexity of g on
Z together with g(k)→∞ as ∣k∣→∞; Eq. (5.60) and the convexity of
C(⋅,Q) in R; Eq. (5.61), that the largest R with S3(R)≤b1/(h+b1) is optimal
for its Q; existence of an optimal R for every Q; the recursion (6.6)-(6.7),
R∗(Q+1)∈{R∗(Q)−1,R∗(Q)} chosen by comparing g(R∗(Q)) with
g(R∗(Q)+Q+1), and C(Q+1)=C(Q)Q+1Q+min{g(R∗(Q)),g(R∗(Q)+Q+1)}Q+11;
the equivalence C(Q+1)≥C(Q)⟺min{⋅}≥C(Q) and the monotonicity of that
minimum in Q; and the existence of some Q at which the costs stop decreasing.
Significance
The result itself. Joint optimization typically enlarges the batch and lowers the reorder
point relative to the two-step procedure, and the book's Example 6.1 puts the resulting cost
saving at a few percent. The Federgruen-Zheng procedure makes the exact joint optimum for
discrete demand as cheap to compute as the two-step approximation, because each step of the
recursion evaluates g at two points. It is the exact benchmark against which the book's
approximate techniques for normal demand (Sects. 6.1.2 and 6.1.3) are judged, and its
structural core, that the optimal window of Q consecutive inventory positions grows one
neighbour at a time, is the discrete-convexity fact behind the whole of Sect. 6.1.
Formalizing it. The mathematics is settled. What the mission produces is a Lean development
in which the steps the book marks "evident" and "obvious" are separate statements: that the
recursion preserves optimality, that the marginal cost of enlarging the batch is monotone, and
that a minimum over R exists at all. None of the statements has a machine-checked proof yet.
Difficulty
The obvious first idea, to argue that C(Q) is convex in Q and stop at its first increase,
does not work as stated: C(Q) is a minimum over R of a ratio and is not convex in general.
What is true, and what the proof uses, is that the marginal cost (Q+1)C(Q+1)−QC(Q) is
nondecreasing, because it equals the smaller of the two g-values adjacent to the optimal window.
Establishing the recursion (6.6) is where discrete convexity is needed: one must show that the
best window of Q+1 consecutive positions is obtained from the best window of Q by adding a
neighbour, which fails for non-convex g. The window sums R↦∑k=R+1R+Qg(k)
are themselves convex in R with increments g(R+Q+1)−g(R+1), and the argument compares a
competing window with the optimal one through the end terms. The remaining steps are finite
algebra and an induction on Q from Q∗.
Formalization scope
A DiscreteDemand is a function p:N→R with p≥0, ∑p=1
and a summable first moment; Pr[D(L)≤k] is a finite sum over 0≤j≤k, empty for
k<0. The reorder point ranges over Z and the batch quantity over N,
with Q≥1 assumed in every statement because Lean's division by 0 is 0. Convexity of a
function on Z is stated as nondecreasing increments, and divergence as
Tendsto g (cocompact ℤ) atTop.
C(Q) enters the goal as a function CQ together with the hypothesis that CQ Q is the least
value of R↦C(R,Q); the stopping index Q∗ is characterized by the two conditions
that define "the smallest Q with C(Q+1)≥C(Q)", and R∗ by optimality at Q∗.
That these objects exist is the content of two separate items, so the goal is not vacuous: a
minimum over R exists for every Q because g→∞, and the costs cannot decrease
forever because the average of the Q smallest values of g tends to infinity. The
positivity of A and μ is the book's setting and is assumed where it appears.
The uniform inventory position of Proposition 5.1, which needs the book's assumption that not
all demands are multiples of an integer larger than one, is taken as given in the cost formula
(6.4), as the book does; the proposition itself is the subject of the next mission of this
series. The definitions are reusable for the (s,S) optimization of Sect. 6.1.1.2 and for the
multi-echelon batch-ordering results of Sect. 10.5; contributions formalizing the
Zheng-Federgruen (s,S) algorithm on top of them are welcome.
Selected references
Sven Axsäter, Inventory Control, 3rd edition, International Series in Operations Research & Management Science 225, Springer, 2015, Sects. 5.9.1 and 6.1.1. DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-15729-0
Awi Federgruen and Yu-Sheng Zheng, An Efficient Algorithm for Computing an Optimal (r,Q) Policy in Continuous Review Stochastic Inventory Systems, Operations Research 40(4), 1992, pp. 808-813. DOI 10.1287/opre.40.4.808
Yu-Sheng Zheng and Awi Federgruen, Finding Optimal (s,S) Policies Is About as Simple as Evaluating a Single Policy, Operations Research 39(4), 1991, pp. 654-665. DOI 10.1287/opre.39.4.654
Paul Zipkin, Foundations of Inventory Management, McGraw-Hill, 2000.
Inventory Control VI: Optimality of (R, Q) Policies When Ordering in BatchesTextbook
Why the policy class is not up for debate
Every model in Chapters 5 and 6 of Axsäter's Inventory Control assumes at the outset that the
ordering policy is of (R,Q) or (s,S) type. Section 6.2 asks whether better policies exist and
answers, for the case in which there are no ordering costs but every order must be a multiple of
a fixed batch quantity Q, that none do: Proposition 6.1, "an (R,Q) policy is optimal", with a
proof the book attributes to Chen (2000). For Q=1 it is the optimality of an order-up-to-S
policy in the absence of ordering costs, and for continuous or Poisson demand it transfers to
(s,S) policies, which are then the same thing. The proposition is the one place in the book
where a policy is compared against every feasible alternative rather than against other
members of its own family, and its proof is short enough to be given in full, which makes it the
natural capstone of Chapter 6.
Setting
Demand is compound Poisson: customers arrive according to a Poisson process with rate
λ and each demands an integral number of units, with sizes D0,D1,… independent
and identically distributed with law f on the positive integers, independent of the arrival
process. The book's standing assumption that not all demands are multiples of some integer
larger than one is kept. Writing Tn for the n-th arrival time, N(t) for the number of
arrivals by time t and Sn=D0+⋯+Dn−1, the total demand by time t is SN(t).
The replenishment lead-time L is constant and D(L), the demand over a lead-time, has law
D. A holding cost h>0 and a shortage cost b1>0 per unit and time unit are charged.
There are no ordering costs, but all orders must be multiples of a given batch quantity Q≥1
and can only be triggered by customer demands. A policy is therefore any rule m that
decides at each demand epoch how many batches to order; with initial position y0 the
inventory position evolves as yn+1=yn−Dn+mnQ (Eq. 6.22), and yt=yN(t).
The standard argument of Sect. 5.3.2 gives the cost rate at time t+L as
the expected holding-plus-shortage cost rate of an inventory level k−D(L) (Eq. 6.20), which
is convex in k with g(k)→∞ as ∣k∣→∞. The band cost is
gˉ(y)=∑j=1Qg(y+j) and R denotes an integer minimizing gˉ. The
(R,Q) policy orders, as soon as the position is at or below R, the smallest number of
batches that brings it above R; its position lives in the band {R+1,…,R+Q} from the
first order on. The performance measure is the long-run average cost rate
T1∫0Tg(yt−L)dt as T→∞.
Formalization targets
Goal — Proposition 6.1
Almost surely, (1) for every policy m and every y0,
T→∞liminfT1∫0Tg(yt−Lm)dt≥Qgˉ(R),
and (2) the (R,Q) policy attains it:
T1∫0Tg(yt−L(R,Q))dt⟶Qgˉ(R).
Supporting targets
Lemma 6.1, that x↦g(z+xQ) is convex and minimized at the representative of z in
the band; the closed form of the (R,Q) position, y0−Sn until the first order and the band
representative of y0−Sn afterwards; the uniform occupation of the band by the reduced
process yt′, the book's "the steady state distribution can be shown to be uniform", and its
consequence that the long-run average of g(yt′) is gˉ(R)/Q; Proposition 5.1 in the same
ergodic form for the (R,Q) policy; and the two halves of the goal as separate statements.
Significance
The result itself. Proposition 6.1 is what licenses the two-parameter policies on which the
rest of the book's single-echelon theory is built, and it does so for the practically important
case of batch ordering (pallets, containers, production lots). Its proof also explains why the
policy works: the only quantity a policy controls is the residue class of the inventory position
modulo Q, which no policy can influence, and the position within that class, which the
(R,Q) policy always sets to the cheapest possible value. The book extends the same reasoning to
other cost structures and to periodic review.
Formalizing it. The proposition is a theorem about the class of all policies, and the book's
proof is pathwise: Lemma 6.1 compares any policy with the reduced process instant by instant, and
an ergodic statement about the reduced process does the rest. Formalizing it therefore forces
the policy class, the demand process and the long-run average to be written down exactly, which
the book never does. Nothing here is open; no statement has a machine-checked proof yet.
Difficulty
The pointwise comparison is elementary once Lemma 6.1 is available, and Lemma 6.1 is discrete
convexity. The difficulty is entirely in the ergodic statement: that the reduced position
yt′= (the band representative of y0−SN(t)) spends a fraction 1/Q of the time at
each point of the band, almost surely. In discrete time this is the convergence of occupation
frequencies for an irreducible random walk on Z/QZ with step law f
modulo Q, where irreducibility is exactly the aperiodicity assumption on f, and the book's
double-stochasticity argument (Eq. 5.33-5.34) identifies the uniform law as stationary. Passing
to continuous time adds the exponential holding times: the time average is the arrival average
weighted by i.i.d. holding times independent of the walk, which a strong law of large numbers
turns back into the discrete statement. Mathlib has the strong law and the exponential law but
no ergodic theorem for finite Markov chains, so that is the groundwork a solver must build. The
naive route through the stationary distribution of the embedded chain at demand epochs is not
enough on its own: for pure Poisson demand that chain is periodic, and the book itself notes it.
Formalization scope
A CompoundPoissonDemand on a probability space packages the rate, the size law with f0=0
and the aperiodicity condition, and two sequences of random variables, the gaps and the sizes,
with their laws (expMeasure lam, the given pmf), independence within each sequence, and
independence between the sequences. Arrival times are partial sums of the gaps, count t is
the supremum of {n:Tn≤t}, and cumDemand n is the partial sum of the sizes. A policy
is a function m : ℕ → Ω → ℕ with no measurability requirement; ipPath and ipAt are the
position after the n-th demand and at time t; rqIP and rqOrders are the (R,Q) policy,
with a theorem identifying rqOrders as a policy in the general sense. avgCost is
T1∫0Tg(yt−L)dt with ys=y0 for s<0. The cost function g
is sPolicyCost from the previous mission, applied to a DiscreteDemand that the hypotheses
tie to the process as the law of the demand in (0,L].
Conventions: Q≥1, L≥0, h,b1>0; R is any minimizer of gˉ (it exists by
the divergence of g, proved in the previous mission); y0 is arbitrary. count and the
interval integral take junk values on the null set where arrivals do not tend to infinity, which
the almost-sure conclusions absorb. "liminf≥c" is stated as "for every ε>0,
eventually ≥c−ε", avoiding a liminf on R that could be junk.
Two readings that would trivialize the goal are excluded: the lower bound is over every rule,
not over stationary or measurable ones, and the achievability half is a genuine limit, not a
bound. The demand model and the occupation-frequency theorems are reusable for Proposition 10.1
and the batch-ordering models of Sect. 10.5; contributions establishing the ergodic theorem for
irreducible chains on a finite cyclic group are welcome and would close most of this mission.
Selected references
Sven Axsäter, Inventory Control, 3rd edition, International Series in Operations Research & Management Science 225, Springer, 2015, Sects. 5.3.1 and 6.2.1. DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-15729-0
Fangruo Chen, Optimal Policies for Multi-Echelon Inventory Problems with Batch Ordering, Operations Research 48(3), 2000, pp. 376-389. DOI 10.1287/opre.48.3.376.12427
Awi Federgruen and Yu-Sheng Zheng, An Efficient Algorithm for Computing an Optimal (r,Q) Policy in Continuous Review Stochastic Inventory Systems, Operations Research 40(4), 1992, pp. 808-813. DOI 10.1287/opre.40.4.808
Evan L. Porteus, Foundations of Stochastic Inventory Theory, Stanford University Press, 2002.
Fundamentals of Supply Chain Theory V: The Bullwhip EffectTextbook
Why orders swing more than sales
Procter & Gamble observed in the 1990s that the orders its distributors placed for diapers were
far more variable than the retail sales of diapers, and that its own orders to suppliers were more
variable still, although the end demand for diapers is about as stable as demand gets. The
phenomenon, a growing amplification of variability as one moves upstream in a supply chain, is the
bullwhip effect. Lee, Padmanabhan and Whang
(1997) argued that it is not a symptom of irrational
behaviour: four rational responses of an inventory manager to their own environment each produce
it. Chapter 13 of Snyder and Shen's Fundamentals of Supply Chain Theory
(2019) makes three of the four quantitative, following
Chen, Drezner, Ryan and Simchi-Levi (2000) for
demand signal processing, Lee et al. for the rationing game, and Cachon
(1999) for order batching. This mission formalizes those
three models and the theorems the chapter proves about them.
Setting
Demand signal processing. A retailer faces a demand process Dt, t∈Z, that
follows the stationary first-order autoregressive model
Dt=d+ρDt−1+ϵt,
with a constant d≥0, a correlation constant −1<ρ<1, and errors ϵt that
are independent N(0,σ2) variables, each independent of the demands before period t.
In steady state every Dt has the law N(d/(1−ρ),σ2/(1−ρ2)). The retailer
replenishes with a lead time of L periods under a base-stock policy but does not know the
demand parameters, so it estimates the lead-time demand from a moving average of the previous
m≥1 demands:
and sets the base-stock level St=μ^tL+zασ^etL, where zα
is a safety factor. The book writes the constant in σ^etL as CLρ and does
not give its form; here it is a free parameter C. Each period the retailer orders
Qt=St−St−1+Dt−1, which may be negative. In Lean the process is the structure
AR1Demand, whose fields are the parameters, the errors, the demands, the recursion, the
independence properties and the stationary law; muHat, err, sigmaHat, baseStock and
order are the five quantities above.
Order batching.N retailers face independent N(μ,σ2) demands in every period and
each orders once every R≥1 periods, the order being its demand over the previous R
periods. The supplier's order in a given period is the total ordered by the retailers whose
ordering day falls in that period. Three patterns are compared: random ordering, in which each
retailer's day is uniform over the R days, so the number X of retailers ordering on a given
day is binomial(N,1/R); positively correlated ordering, in which all retailers order on the
same day, so X=N with probability 1/R and 0 otherwise; and balanced ordering, in which
the retailers are spread as evenly as possible, so with N=MR+k, 0≤k<R, X is M+1
with probability k/R and M otherwise. The structure BatchOrders P N R mu sigma carries the
demands, the ordering count X independent of them, and supplierOrder, the sum of the last R
demands of retailers 1,…,X; each pattern enters a theorem as a hypothesis on the law of X.
Rationing game. Two identical retailers face single-period demand with distribution function
F, holding cost h and stockout penalty p, so the newsvendor quantity Q∗ satisfies
F(Q∗)=p/(h+p). With probability r the supplier can deliver only A1<2Q∗ units in total
and allocates them pro rata to the orders, retailer 1 receiving A1Q1/(Q1+Q2); with
probability 1−r supply is unlimited. Retailer 1's expected cost when the retailers order
Q1 and Q2 is
g1(Q1)=(1−r)nv(Q1)+rnv(Q1+Q2A1Q1),
with nv the newsvendor cost; this is rationingCost.
Formalization targets
Goal: Theorem 13.2, demand signal processing
Var[Dt]Var[Qt]≥1+(m2L+m22L2)(1−ρm),
with equality when zα=0. This is bullwhip_signal_processing. The bound exceeds 1
whenever L>0, whatever the value of ρ: a lead time and a moving-average forecast are
enough to produce the effect.
Supporting targets
The chapter's own route to the goal, each a milestone: the steady-state moments (13.2) to (13.4),
E[Dt]=d/(1−ρ), Var[Dt]=σ2/(1−ρ2) and
Cov[Dt,Dt−k]=ρkVar[Dt]; the identity
Qt=(1+L/m)Dt−1−(L/m)Dt−m−1+zα(σ^etL−σ^e,t−1L);
Lemma 13.1, Cov[Dt−i,σ^etL]=0 for 1≤i≤m; the vanishing of the
cross term (13.12); and the variance of the demand part,
(1+(2L/m+2L2/m2)(1−ρm))Var[Dt].
Order batching, Theorem 13.4: under the three patterns the supplier's order has mean Nμ and
Var[Qtc]≥Var[Qtr]≥Var[Qtb]≥Nσ2,
through the three variance formulas Nσ2+μ2N(R−1), Nσ2+μ2N2(R−1) and
Nσ2+μ2k(R−k).
The rationing game, Theorem 13.3: if Q>0 is a symmetric Nash equilibrium, that is, Q
minimizes g1 over positive order quantities when the other retailer orders Q, then
Q>Q∗.
Significance
The three theorems are the quantitative core of the chapter. Theorem 13.2 is the single-stage
building block that Theorems 13.6 and 13.7 later iterate along a serial chain, giving the
product-form and the exponential lower bounds on the amplification at stage k; its
comparative statics, the bound decreasing in m and increasing in L, are the basis of the
remedies the chapter recommends (shorter lead times, smoother forecasts, sharing point-of-sale
data). Theorem 13.4 ranks the ordering patterns and justifies the advice to balance ordering
days when batching cannot be avoided. Theorem 13.3 shows that pro-rata rationing alone inflates
orders; the book is careful to note that inflated orders are not by themselves inflated variances,
and that the variance statement for this model is due to Rong, Shen and Snyder
(2017).
None of these results has a machine-checked proof. The book's proofs of Theorems 13.2 and 13.4
are complete but informal, and the proof of Lemma 13.1 is omitted with a citation to Ryan's
1997 thesis; formalizing it requires a self-contained argument. The variance decomposition of
Qt and the conditioning argument for Theorem 13.4 are reusable for the multistage results of
Sect. 13.2.5, which are natural follow-up missions on the same definitions.
Difficulty
The obvious computation of Var[Qt] expands the order into its demand part and its
safety-stock part and hopes the cross term disappears. It does, but not for a reason visible in
the formulas: σ^etL is a square root of a sum of squares of forecast errors, a
nonlinear function of m+m demands, and its covariance with a single demand is zero only
because the errors are jointly Gaussian with mean zero and σ^ is an even function of
them, so the covariance is the expectation of an odd function of a centred Gaussian vector. That
is Lemma 13.1, and the vanishing of the cross term needs two further covariances,
Cov[Dt−1,σ^e,t−1L] and Cov[Dt−m−1,σ^etL], which the
book reduces to the lemma through the recursion (the second reduction divides by ρ) but
which hold for every ρ by the same symmetry. A solver must set up the joint Gaussian
structure of the demand vector and prove the odd-function argument; nothing in Mathlib does this
directly.
The second obstacle is that the moments (13.2) to (13.4) are not assumed but derived: the
structure carries the stationary law of each Dt and the independence of ϵt from the
past, and the autocovariance ρkVar[Dt] has to be obtained from the recursion by
induction on the lag, with integrability supplied by the Gaussian laws.
For Theorem 13.4 the work is the conditioning on X: given X=x the supplier's order is a sum
of xR independent normals, so its conditional mean is xRμ and conditional variance
xRσ2, and the total variance is E[Var[Q∣X]]+Var[E[Q∣X]].
The order is defined by a sum over retailers i<X, so the independence of X from the demands
has to be used through the indicator structure rather than through a conditional-expectation
library result.
For Theorem 13.3 the argument is a first-order condition. It requires that the newsvendor cost be
differentiable with derivative (h+p)F(y)−p, which holds when F is continuous, and that the
symmetric equilibrium be an interior minimizer, which is why Q>0 and the minimization over
Q1>0 are hypotheses.
Formalization scope
Time is indexed by Z so that Dt−m−1 exists for every t. AR1Demand asserts the
recursion for every outcome, the independence of the whole error family, the independence of
ϵt from (Ds)s<t, and the stationary law of every Dt; these are the
"steady-state" assumptions the book makes in words. The structure is satisfiable: the stationary
Gaussian AR(1) process on a full-measure set of error sequences has all these properties. The
constant CLρ is a free real parameter C; no theorem depends on its value.
The goal divides by Var[Dt], which is σ2/(1−ρ2)>0 under the structure's
hypotheses σ>0 and ∣ρ∣<1, so the ratio is a genuine quotient. Mathlib's
ProbabilityTheory.variance and covariance are used; both are the ordinary real quantities
for square-integrable variables, which every variable here is, σ^etL included.
In BatchOrders the demands are indexed by Fin N × Fin R, the count X is a natural-valued
random variable bounded by N and independent of the demand family, and supplierOrder sums the
R demands of retailers 1,…,X, the book's "without loss of generality" choice. The laws
of X are hypotheses on point probabilities P.real {ω | X ω = j}; with R≥1 each of the
three families of hypotheses is satisfiable by a structure with the corresponding law. The
subtractions R−1 and R−k are real.
In the rationing game the demand law is a probability measure on R whose distribution
function is continuous and strictly increasing on [0,∞); the newsvendor loss is assumed
integrable at every order quantity. The pro-rata allocation uses Lean's total division, which is
never at 0 in the theorem since Q1+Q2>0.
Beyond the ten milestones, the multistage Theorems 13.6 and 13.7 and the centralized-information
bound of Theorem 13.5 are welcome as extensions on the same AR1Demand.
H. L. Lee, V. Padmanabhan and S. Whang, Information distortion in a supply chain: the bullwhip effect, Management Science 43(4), 1997. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.43.4.546
F. Chen, Z. Drezner, J. K. Ryan and D. Simchi-Levi, Quantifying the bullwhip effect in a simple supply chain: the impact of forecasting, lead times, and information, Management Science 46(3), 2000. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.46.3.436.12069
G. P. Cachon, Managing supply chain demand variability with scheduled ordering policies, Management Science 45(6), 1999. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.45.6.843
Y. Rong, Z.-J. M. Shen and L. V. Snyder, The impact of ordering behavior on order-quantity variability: a study of forward and reverse bullwhip effects, Naval Research Logistics 64(1), 2017. https://doi.org/10.1002/nav.21757
Fundamentals of Supply Chain Theory VI: Pooling and FlexibilityTextbook
Pooling as a design principle
A firm that holds inventory in five warehouses needs more safety stock than one that holds the
same inventory in one warehouse, because the demands of five regions do not all run high at
once. Eppen (1979) made this precise for a multi-location
newsvendor and gave it its name, the risk-pooling effect. Chapter 7 of Snyder and Shen's
Fundamentals of Supply Chain Theory (2019) follows the
same idea through three settings in which pooling happens without physical consolidation: two
retailers who ship stock to each other after seeing demand (transshipments, after Tagaras
1989), and plants that can each make more than one
product (process flexibility, after Jordan and Graves
1995). The chapter's capstone is the theorem of
Simchi-Levi and Wei (2012) that, among designs in
which every plant makes two products and every product is made at two plants, a single long
chain through all of them is best. This mission formalizes the chapter's numbered results, with
that theorem as its goal.
Setting
Risk pooling.N distribution centers face normally distributed per-period demands
Di∼N(μi,σi2) with correlation coefficients ρij, and each runs a
base-stock policy with holding cost h and backorder cost p per unit per period, so its
optimal expected cost is the optimal newsvendor cost optNvCost h p D, the infimum over
base-stock levels S of E[h(S−D)++p(D−S)+]. Merging the centers gives one
facing the total demand, normal with mean ∑iμi and variance
σ02=∑i∑jσiσjρij (pooledVariance).
Transshipments. Two retailers i,j with base-stock levels Si,Sj face independent
demands. After demand is observed, under complete pooling the retailer with a surplus sends
the retailer with a shortage Yji=min{Sj−Dj,Di−Si} units (transship), and
nothing moves otherwise. The type-1 service level is the probability of no stockout,
αi0=Pr[Di≤Si] without and αi=Pr[Di−Si≤Yji] with
transshipments; the type-2 service level is the fill rate, one minus expected unmet demand
over expected demand, βi0 and βi likewise.
Process flexibility. A flexibility design on n products and n plants is a set E
of (product, plant) pairs, an edge (i,j) meaning plant j can make product i. Given a
demand realization d and a common plant capacity C, the performanceP(d,E) (perf)
is the maximum sales obtainable by assigning production along the edges of E without
exceeding any capacity or demand, the linear program (7.22) to (7.26). A balanced system
(BalancedSystem) has equal capacities and an exchangeable demand vector, one whose joint
law is invariant under permutations of the products, and [E]=E[P(D,E)] is the
expected performance (expPerf). The named designs are the dedicated design Dn={(i,i)},
the long chainCn in which plant j also makes product j+1 (and plant n makes
product 1), the open chain Lk obtained from Ck by deleting the edge (1,k), and
Lkn, the open chain on the first k pairs together with the dedicated edges of the rest. A
2-flexibility design (TwoFlex) is one in which every product has exactly two plants and
every plant exactly two products; Cn is one, and so is any union of disjoint shorter chains.
Formalization targets
Goal: Theorem 7.9
For a balanced system of size n≥2 with exchangeable demand,
Cn∈argA∈F2max[A],
that is, Cn is a 2-flexibility design and [A]≤[Cn] for every 2-flexibility design A.
This is long_chain_optimal.
Supporting targets
The chapter's route to the goal: Lemma 7.5, supermodularity of sales in the flexible edges of
the long chain for every realization,
P(d,E)+P(d,E∖{α,β})≥P(d,E∖{α})+P(d,E∖{β})
for E⊆Cn; Corollary 7.6, the same in expectation; Lemma 7.7, the increments
[Lk+1n]−[Lkn] are nondecreasing in k, ending with [Cn]−[Lnn]; and Lemma 7.8,
[Cn]=n([Ln]−[Ln−1]).
Risk pooling, Theorem 7.1: gC∗≤gD∗, the optimal cost of the merged center is at most
the sum of the optimal costs of the separate ones, with the covariance inequality
∑i∑jσiσjρij≤∑iσi as a separate lemma.
Transshipments, Theorems 7.2 to 7.4: αi=αi0+∣∂E[Yji]/∂Si∣,
βi=βi0+E[Yji]/E[Di], and all four post-transshipment
service levels are nondecreasing in Si.
Significance
Theorem 7.9 is the analytical answer to a question that had been settled only by simulation:
Jordan and Graves reported that one chain through all plants achieves nearly twice the sales
benefit of three short chains with the same number of edges, and Simchi-Levi and Wei proved
that no arrangement of the same edge budget does better. It is the justification for the
chaining guideline used in automotive and semiconductor capacity planning, and Lemma 7.8, which
expresses the long chain through open chains, is what makes the long chain's performance
computable by a greedy pass. Theorem 7.1 is the quantitative basis for consolidation decisions
and for postponement, since a generic product is pooled inventory. Theorems 7.2 to 7.4 quantify
what transshipments buy in service, which is the argument for allowing them despite their cost.
None of these results has a machine-checked proof. The book proves Lemma 7.7, Lemma 7.8 and
Theorem 7.9 in full given Lemma 7.5, which it cites to Simchi-Levi and Wei, and omits the proofs
of Theorems 7.3 and 7.4 and the identity (7.30) behind Lemma 7.8. Formalizing Lemma 7.5 and
(7.30) means formalizing the structure of maximum flows on a cycle, which is reusable for the
later results of Simchi-Levi and Wei on the long chain's performance relative to full
flexibility and for the multi-echelon flexibility models the chapter cites.
Difficulty
The obvious approach to Theorem 7.9 is to compare Cn with an arbitrary 2-flexibility design
directly. Nothing in the definitions supports that: the two designs share no structure beyond
their degree sequences. The book's argument instead routes everything through the long chain's
own edges. Lemma 7.5 gives supermodularity only for subsets of Cn, and the decomposition of
an arbitrary 2-flexibility design into disjoint cycles, each a relabeled long chain on a
subsystem, is what allows the comparison. A solver must therefore prove that a 2-regular
bipartite graph is a disjoint union of even cycles, that exchangeability makes every relabeling
of a cycle worth the same as Cnj on its subsystem, and that the performance of a disjoint
union is the sum of the performances of its parts.
Lemma 7.5 itself is where the combinatorics lives. It says that on the cycle Cn the maximum
flow is supermodular in the flexible edges, and the proof in Simchi-Levi and Wei goes through
the structure of augmenting paths on a cycle. The natural first idea, that supermodularity
follows from some general property of maximum flows, is false: maximum flow is not supermodular
in arbitrary edge sets, and the lemma is specific to subsets of a single cycle.
Lemma 7.7 is where exchangeability is used, and it is used in a way that is easy to state and
tedious to formalize: removing the edge (2,1) from Lk+1n leaves a design that is
Lkn only after the pair 1 is moved to the end, so the argument needs the invariance of
[E] under relabeling the products and plants by a common permutation. The book notes that
Lemma 7.7, unlike Lemma 7.5, is false realization by realization.
For the transshipment theorems, the book differentiates a density formula by Leibniz's rule.
Under the weaker hypothesis stated here, laws without atoms and with finite means, the
derivative of E[Yji] in Si has to be obtained by dominated convergence from the
pointwise derivative of a piecewise-linear function whose kinks lie on null sets.
Formalization scope
perf is a supremum over a set of reals, nonempty because y=0 is feasible when d≥0
and C≥0, and bounded by ∑idi; the demand is nonnegative for every outcome and the
capacity nonnegative in BalancedSystem, and Lemma 7.5 carries these as hypotheses. The
supremum is attained, but the definition does not assert it. Expected performance is a Lebesgue
integral; the demand is integrable by assumption and P(d,E) is 1-Lipschitz in d, so the
integrand is integrable, and a solver must prove this measurability rather than assume it.
Exchangeability is the equality of the laws of (Dσ(i))i and (Di)i for every
permutation σ. Designs are finite sets of pairs of Fin n; the chains are defined with
finRotate, so indices wrap modulo n and the closing edge of Cn is (1,n) in the book's
numbering, which is the edge its proofs and Figure 7.3(c) use. Lemma 7.8 involves open chains on
subsystems of sizes n and n−1; these are designs on Fin k evaluated on the first k
coordinates of the demand (subDemand, subPerf).
Theorem 7.1 states the optimal costs as infima of the newsvendor cost over all base-stock
levels, on Mathlib's gaussianReal; a nonpositive pooled variance gives a degenerate law, for
which the inequality still holds, so the statement is not trivialized by that convention. The
transshipment theorems take the two demand laws as probability measures on R with no
atoms (Theorem 7.2) and finite, positive means; the quantity Yji is defined for all
outcomes and the service levels are probabilities and expectations under the product law.
The definition module is shared by all eleven items. Beyond the milestones, formalizing the
identity (7.30) as its own lemma and the disjoint-union additivity of perf would be natural
contributions.
G. D. Eppen, Effects of centralization on expected costs in a multi-location newsboy problem, Management Science 25(5), 1979. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.25.5.498
G. Tagaras, Effects of pooling on the optimization and service levels of two-location inventory systems, IIE Transactions 21(3), 1989. https://doi.org/10.1080/07408178908966208
W. C. Jordan and S. C. Graves, Principles on the benefits of manufacturing process flexibility, Management Science 41(4), 1995. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.41.4.577
D. Simchi-Levi and Y. Wei, Understanding the performance of the long chain and sparse designs in process flexibility, Operations Research 60(5), 2012. https://doi.org/10.1287/opre.1120.1082
Inventory Control VII: Multi-Echelon Lot Sizing and Roundy's 98 % ApproximationTextbook
Batch quantities that cannot be chosen one site at a time
Chapter 9 of Axsäter's Inventory Control opens with the observation that in a multi-echelon
system it is not optimal to choose batch quantities installation by installation: the batch at
one site is the demand pattern of the next site upstream. Even with constant customer demand
the exact optimum can be complicated, and the book's Example 9.4 shows a four-stage serial
system whose optimal batch at one stage alternates between two values over time. Roundy (1985,
1986) showed that this complexity can be avoided at a guaranteed price: restrict every batch
quantity to be a power of two times a common basic quantity, nested from stage to stage, and the
best such policy costs at most 2 % more than the optimum. The book presents the result for a
serial system and remarks that the same approach handles assembly and distribution systems
and, in Sect. 7.3.1.2, joint replenishments. It is the capstone of Chapter 9 and the
multi-echelon payoff of the powers-of-two analysis of Chapter 7.
Setting
A serial system has N installations; installation i produces item i from one unit of
item i+1, item N is obtained from an outside supplier, and item 1 faces a constant,
continuous final demandd. Lead-times are zero, shortages are not allowed, production is
instantaneous, and each batch quantity Qi is constant over time. Installation i has an
ordering costAi per batch and an echelon holding costei per unit and time unit,
charged on the echelon stock (the stock at installation i and everything downstream), so that
the cost per time unit is the sum of N single-item costs of the chapter 4 form,
C(Q)=i=1∑N(ei2Qi+AiQid)(Eq. 9.17).
The book first works out the two-level case, where the optimum has Q2=kQ1 for a positive
integer k, the cost (9.9) is the EOQ cost with modified parameters A1+A2/k and
e1+ke2, and the best k is found from k∗=A2e1/(A1e2) by a rounding rule.
For N stages, Roundy's constraints (9.16) require Qi=2kiQi−1 with nonnegative
integers ki, so that every solution is nested. The relaxed constraints (9.18) require
only Qi−1≤Qi; they are implied by (9.16), the relaxed problem is convex with linear
constraints, and its solution Qrel is computed by aggregating consecutive stages
whose cost ratios Ai/ei decrease. Roundy's solution rounds Qrel to
Qi=2miq for a basic quantity q, chosen as in Proposition 7.2.
Formalization targets
Goal — Roundy's 98 % approximation
For d>0, Ai>0, ei>0 and any minimizer Qrel of C over positive
batch quantities satisfying (9.18), there exist q>0 and integers m1≤⋯≤mN
such that Qi=2miq satisfies (9.16) and
C(2mq)≤2ln21C(Qrel).
Supporting targets
The two-level results of Sect. 9.2.1: the equivalence of the installation and echelon cost
forms (9.6) and (9.9); the optimal Q1 and cost (9.10)-(9.11) for a given k; the closed form
and convexity of C(k)2 (9.12) and the real minimizer k∗ (9.13); and the integer rounding
rule with its corollary that A1/e1≥A2/e2 forces k=1. For N stages: existence of
the relaxed optimum; the aggregation lemma, that Ai/ei<Ai−1/ei−1 forces
Qirel=Qi−1rel; that (9.16) implies (9.18), so the relaxed optimum
bounds every powers-of-two policy from below; and that rounding to the nearest power of two
times q is monotone and lands within a factor 2.
Significance
The result itself. Roundy's theorem replaces an intractable lot-sizing problem by a
closed-form computation with a provable 2 % guarantee, and the policies it produces are the
nested, periodic schedules that production planning wants anyway. In Example 9.4 the rounding
with q=1 is already within 0.7 % of the relaxed bound. The two-level analysis has its own
use: the modified parameters A1+A2/k and e1+ke2 are what the Blackburn-Millen
heuristic of Sect. 9.3.2 feeds to the Wagner-Whitin algorithm under time-varying demand, and the
condition A1/e1≥A2/e2 tells when a two-stage system collapses to one stage.
Formalizing it. The book proves the bound in a paragraph that leans on three earlier results:
Proposition 7.2 for the rounding, the Lagrangean relaxation for the lower bound, and the
aggregation algorithm for the structure of Qrel. Formalizing it makes explicit
what the paragraph glosses: that the multipliers vanish off tight constraints, that equal
quantities round to equal quantities, and that the comparison class is the class of nested
constant-batch policies. The published Proposition 7.2 (pot_two_percent) and the mean value
1/(2ln2) are cited as reference items. Nothing here is open; no statement has a
machine-checked proof yet.
Difficulty
The obvious argument, rounding Qrel item by item and invoking Proposition 7.2 for
each, does not work: Proposition 7.2 bounds the rounded cost relative to each item's
unconstrained optimum, and Qirel is generally not that optimum. The proof must
pass through the Lagrangean relaxation (9.19)-(9.20), under which Qrelis the
unconstrained optimum for the modified holding costs ei′=ei−2λi+2λi+1,
apply Proposition 7.2 there, and transfer the bound back using complementary slackness: the
multiplier λi is positive only where Qirel=Qi−1rel, and
equal quantities round to equal quantities, so the correction terms λi(Qi−Qi−1)
vanish for both Qrel and its rounding. A solver therefore needs the KKT conditions
for this convex program, or an equivalent direct argument through the aggregation structure
(within an aggregate all quantities are equal and their sum is an EOQ problem). The two-level
statements and the rounding lemma are elementary.
Formalization scope
Stages are indexed by Fin N; the cost is serialCost A e d Q = ∑ i, eoqCost (A i) d (e i) (Q i)
with eoqCost imported from the chapter 4 definitions, and the two-level cost is
eoqCost (A1 + A2/k) d (e1 + k e2) Q1 by definition, so the published eoq_optimal and
eoq_cost_at_eoq apply to it directly. SerialNested and SerialPowerOfTwo are the constraints
(9.18) and (9.16) on consecutive indices; for N≤1 both hold vacuously and the goal is
Proposition 7.2 for one item. potRound q Q is ⌊log2(Q/q)+21⌋.
All theorems assume d,Ai,ei>0 and positive batch quantities. The book says "nonnegative
ordering and echelon holding costs"; strict positivity is needed for the relaxed problem to have
a solution at all (ei=0 or Ai=0 sends the optimal Qi to ∞ or 0), and it is
what the book's own examples satisfy. The relaxed optimum enters the goal as a hypothesis, with
existence stated separately; uniqueness is not used. The constant is the exact
1/(2ln2).
Two readings are excluded. The bound is not against an arbitrary nested Q, for which it would
be false, but against the relaxed optimum; and the comparison class is stated as nested
constant-batch policies, the class the relaxed problem bounds directly, not the book's larger
class of time-varying policies, which would need a dynamic model. The definitions are reusable
for assembly systems and for the joint replenishment problem of Sect. 7.3.1.2, whose Roundy
analysis is the same with a fictive item 0 of zero holding cost; contributions in that direction
are welcome.
Selected references
Sven Axsäter, Inventory Control, 3rd edition, International Series in Operations Research & Management Science 225, Springer, 2015, Sect. 9.2. DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-15729-0
Robin Roundy, 98%-Effective Integer-Ratio Lot-Sizing for One-Warehouse Multi-Retailer Systems, Management Science 31(11), 1985, pp. 1416-1430. DOI 10.1287/mnsc.31.11.1416
Robin Roundy, A 98%-Effective Lot-Sizing Rule for a Multi-Product, Multi-Stage Production/Inventory System, Mathematics of Operations Research 11(4), 1986, pp. 699-727. DOI 10.1287/moor.11.4.699
John A. Muckstadt and Robin O. Roundy, Analysis of Multistage Production Systems, in: Handbooks in Operations Research and Management Science 4, Elsevier, 1993, pp. 59-131. DOI 10.1016/S0927-0507(05)80182-4
Peter L. Jackson, William L. Maxwell and John A. Muckstadt, The Joint Replenishment Problem with a Powers-of-Two Restriction, IIE Transactions 17(1), 1985, pp. 25-32. DOI 10.1080/07408178508975268
Fundamentals of Supply Chain Theory VII: Multiechelon Inventory ModelsTextbook
One stage at a time
A serial supply chain is the simplest multiechelon system: a retailer orders from a warehouse,
which orders from a plant, which orders from an outside supplier with unlimited stock. Only the
retailer sees customer demand, only the retailer pays a stockout penalty, and every stage pays
to hold inventory. Choosing how much each stage should hold looks like a joint optimization over
all stages at once, because an upstream stockout delays every downstream replenishment. Clark
and Scarf (1960) showed that it is not: measured in
echelon terms, the optimal policy is a base-stock policy at every stage, and the optimal
levels can be found one stage at a time from the customer upward, each step a single-variable
convex minimization. Chapter 6 of Snyder and Shen's Fundamentals of Supply Chain Theory
(2019) presents the infinite-horizon form of that
result as its Theorem 6.3, the bounds of Shang and Song
(2003) that make the levels cheap to approximate,
and the contrasting guaranteed-service model of Graves and Willems
(2000), in which stages quote delivery times rather
than fill rates and the optimal safety stocks are all-or-nothing. This mission formalizes the
chapter's numbered results, with Theorem 6.3 as its goal.
Setting
Stages are numbered 1,…,N from the customer upward. Stage j has a local holding
costhj′ per unit per period; its echelon holding cost is hj=hj′−hj+1′ with
hN+1′=0, so that hj′=∑i≥jhi (localHolding, echelonHolding). Stage
j's echelon consists of stages j,j−1,…,1, and its echelon on-hand inventory
Ij (echelonOnHand) is all on-hand and in-transit stock in that echelon. Stage 1 pays a
stockout cost p per unit per period. Orders placed by stage j arrive after a lead time
Lj if stage j+1 can ship them; Dj denotes the lead-time demand at stage j.
An echelon base-stock policy gives each stage a level Sj and orders to keep its echelon
inventory position at Sj. The chapter derives, from conservation of flow, a recursion that
evaluates the expected cost of any echelon base-stock vector S (csBar, csHat, csG):
and the expected cost of the system under S is gN(SN). The term gˉj is the
implicit penalty function: it charges stage j+1 for the downstream consequences of
running short. A vector is sequentially optimal (CSSequential) when each Sj minimizes
gj, which depends only on S1,…,Sj−1.
The Shang-Song bounds compare gj with the cost of the j-stage truncated system when all its
local holding costs are set to one value, hj for the lower bound and ∑k≤jhk for
the upper (ssLower, ssUpper). With equal holding costs all stock is held at stage 1, so each
bound is a single-stage newsvendor cost for the demand D~j=D1+⋯+Dj over the
cumulative lead time (tildeLaw) with stockout cost p+hj+1′, plus the holding cost of the
stock in transit to stages 1,…,j−1, whose mean is E[D1]+⋯+E[Dj−1]
(pipelineMean).
In the guaranteed-service model each stage i has a processing time Ti, quotes a
committed service timeSi to its customer, and receives an inbound time SIi=Si+1
from its supplier (gsInbound), SIN being external. Demand is bounded, so the stage can meet
every order within Si by holding safety stock kSIi+Ti−Si with k=zασ,
and the holding cost is g(S)=∑ihikSIi+Ti−Si (gsCost) over the
feasible times 0≤Si≤SIi+Ti (GSFeasible).
Formalization targets
Goal: Theorem 6.3
For echelon holding costs hj≥0, stockout cost p≥0 and lead-time demands of finite
mean, if S∗ is sequentially optimal then for every echelon base-stock vector S,
gN(SN∗∣S∗)≤gN(SN∣S),
and gN(SN∗∣S∗) is the optimal cost. This is clark_scarf_sequential.
Supporting targets
Proposition 6.1, ∑jhjIj=∑jhj′(Ij′+ITj−1); the stage-1 identities (6.29)
and (6.30), that g1 is a newsvendor cost with penalty p+h2′ and its minimizer solves
F1(S1∗)=(p+h2′)/(h1+p+h2′); convexity of every gj under sequential
optimality; existence of a sequentially optimal vector when hj>0 and p>0; Theorem 6.4,
gjl≤gj≤gju, and Sjl≤Sj∗≤Sju where Sju minimizes gjl and Sjl
minimizes gju (the book's pairing, p. 200); and Theorem 6.5, that in
the guaranteed-service serial system with s1=0 every optimal Si∗ is 0 or
Si+1∗+Ti.
Theorem 6.2, the optimality of echelon base-stock policies among all policies, is stated in the
book without a model of the policy space and is not a target here; Theorem 6.3 is the
optimization it licenses.
Significance
Theorem 6.3 is what Zipkin calls the fundamental equations of supply chain theory. It reduces a
joint optimization over N coupled levels to N one-dimensional convex problems, and every
exact method and most heuristics for serial and assembly systems, Rosling's reduction of
assembly systems to serial ones included, run through it. Theorem 6.4 turns the recursion into
closed-form bounds and the Shang-Song heuristic, which the book reports as accurate to within a
fraction of a percent. Theorem 6.5 explains the shape of optimal safety stock placement under
guaranteed service and why its dynamic program only needs to examine endpoints.
None of these results has a machine-checked proof. The book proves none of them in full: Theorem
6.3 is asserted after an informal derivation, Theorem 6.4 is cited, and Proposition 6.1 and
Theorem 6.5 are left as exercises. Formalizing the recursion's convexity and the exchange
argument behind Theorem 6.3 produces a reusable treatment of the implicit penalty function; the
concavity-on-a-polytope argument for Theorem 6.5 is reusable for the tree systems of Sect. 6.3.5.
Difficulty
The obvious attack on Theorem 6.3, differentiating the system cost in each Sj, fails
immediately: the cost depends on Sj through min{Sj,x} inside nested expectations and
is not convex in S jointly. The argument that works is an induction along the recursion,
comparing gj(⋅∣S) with gj(⋅∣S∗) pointwise. Its key step is that, for
the convex gj(⋅∣S∗) minimized at Sj∗, the value gj(min{Sj∗,x}) is the
least value of gj on (−∞,x], so that any other truncation point can only cost more.
That step needs convexity of gj(⋅∣S∗), which needs gˉj−1(⋅∣S∗)
convex, which needs Sj−1∗ to be a minimizer; for an arbitrary S the functions
gˉj(⋅∣S) are not convex, and the induction must carry both vectors at once.
Integrability is a second, silent obstacle. Each gj is an expectation of translates of
g^j; the recursion preserves Lipschitz continuity with a constant growing with the costs,
and finite means are exactly what make every integral in the recursion a genuine expectation
rather than Lean's default value zero.
Theorem 6.4 requires relating the recursion, in which demands enter one stage at a time, to a
single newsvendor cost in the sum D~j, which is a convolution; the inequalities come
from the structure of (6.31) in the two extreme holding-cost profiles and are not obvious from
the recursion's formulas. Theorem 6.5 is a statement about every minimizer, not the existence
of an extreme one, so the proof must show the cost is strictly concave along every feasible
direction that changes a net lead time and then classify the vertices of the feasible region.
Formalization scope
Stages are indexed by natural numbers 1,…,N; the cost functions take total functions
on N and never read values outside that range. The recursion is defined for every
vector S, so the theorem compares values of one family of functions rather than a separately
defined system cost; the identification of gN(SN∣S) with the steady-state expected cost
of the physical system is the book's derivation and is not restated. Expectations are Lebesgue
integrals under the lead-time demand laws, assumed to be probability measures on R
with finite means. Sequential optimality is a hypothesis of the goal; a separate target shows
it is satisfiable when hj>0 and p>0, so the goal is not vacuous.
The bounding functions of Theorem 6.4 keep the holding cost of pipeline stock that the truncated
cost (6.31) charges. The book omits that constant when it writes their minimizers, which it does
not affect, but part (a) compares values, and without the constant the upper bound fails already
in the book's own Example 6.1. For part (b) the minimizers of the bounding functions are asserted
to exist and to bracket Sj∗; when the fractiles of D~j are unique these are the
book's quantile values. Theorem 6.5 is stated over real service times; because the feasible region's vertices
are integral when the data are, every integer-optimal vector is optimal over the reals, so the
real statement contains the book's integer program (6.38) to (6.42). Proposition 6.1 is stated
with IT0=0 built into the echelon sum.
The definition module is shared by all nine items. The dynamic program (6.43) to (6.44) for
guaranteed-service serial systems and the tree-system algorithm of Sect. 6.3.6 are natural
extensions on the same definitions.
A. J. Clark and H. Scarf, Optimal policies for a multi-echelon inventory problem, Management Science 6(4), 1960. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.6.4.475
F. Chen and Y.-S. Zheng, Lower bounds for multi-echelon stochastic inventory systems, Management Science 40(11), 1994. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.40.11.1426
K. H. Shang and J.-S. Song, Newsvendor bounds and heuristic for optimal policies in serial supply chains, Management Science 49(5), 2003. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.49.5.618.15147
S. C. Graves and S. P. Willems, Optimizing strategic safety stock placement in supply chains, Manufacturing & Service Operations Management 2(1), 2000. https://doi.org/10.1287/msom.2.1.68.23267
Inventory Control VIII: The Clark-Scarf Decomposition for a Serial SystemTextbook
Safety stock in a chain
Chapter 10 of Axsäter's Inventory Control turns to reorder points and safety stocks in
multi-echelon systems, where the installations cannot be treated separately: a large stock
downstream lets an upstream site run lean, and a long upstream lead-time argues for stock at
the top. The best-known exact technique for serial systems is the decomposition of Clark and
Scarf (1960), which the book presents in the infinite-horizon form of Federgruen and Zipkin
(1984). It is also where the echelon stock measure comes from. The section's argument is
short and self-contained, and its conclusion is a complete description of the optimal policy for
a two-level serial system: order-up-to levels at both installations, one of them a newsboy
solution, the other the minimizer of a convex function in which upstream shortages appear as an
induced cost. It is the capstone of Chapter 10.
Setting
Installation 1 faces normally distributed period demand with mean μ and standard deviation
σ, independent across periods, so the demand over n periods, D(n), is normal with
mean nμ and standard deviation nσ. Installation 1 replenishes from
installation 2 with lead-time L1 periods; installation 2 replenishes from an outside supplier
with infinite supply and lead-time L2. Demand that cannot be met is backordered. Costs per
unit and period are echelon holding costse1,e2≥0, so the installation holding
costs are h1=e1+e2 and h2=e2, and a shortage cost b1 at installation 1; there
are no ordering costs. Events in a period occur in the order: installation 2 orders, its
delivery arrives, installation 1 orders, its delivery arrives, demand, cost evaluation.
Consider an arbitrary period t. After ordering, installation 2 has an echelon inventory
position y2, and by the standard argument its echelon stock in period t+L2 is
y2−D(L2). Installation 1 then orders, realizing an echelon position y1 that cannot
exceed what is available: y1≤y2−D(L2) (Eq. 10.1). Its inventory level after the
demand in period t+L2+L1 is y1−D(L1+1). The expected period costs are
C2=h2E(y2−D(L2)−y1) at installation 2 and
C1=h1E(y1−D(L1+1))++b1E(y1−D(L1+1))− at installation 1,
and the book reallocates the term −h2y1 to obtain
with μ2′=L2μ and μ1′′=(L1+1)μ. As a function of a free y^1,
C~1 is the newsboy-type function C^1 of Eq. (10.6), minimized at the level
S1=y^1∗ given by the fractile equation (10.8). Passing everything available up to
S1 to installation 1, y1=min{S1,y2−D(L2)}, gives the total cost C^2(y2)
of Eq. (10.9), whose minimizer S2=y2∗ is the order-up-to level of installation 2.
Formalization targets
Goal — the decomposition
With S1 from (10.8) and S2 a minimizer of C^2: for every y2 and every
allocation rule a with a(u)≤y2−u and finite expected cost,
C^2(S2)≤E[C~2(y2)+C~1(a(D(L2)))],
and the order-up-to policy (S1,S2) attains C^2(S2).
Supporting targets
Eq. (10.3), the stage-1 period cost through the expected backorders; the reallocation
(10.4)-(10.5), which leaves the total unchanged; the closed form (10.6) of C^1 through
the loss function G; the convexity of C^1, its derivative (10.7), and the fractile
characterization (10.8) of its minimizers; the pointwise rule that min{S1,y2−u} is the
cheapest feasible y1; the identity (10.9); and the convexity of C^2 (Problem 10.1)
with the existence of its minimizer when e2>0.
Significance
The result itself. The decomposition reduces a two-dimensional stochastic control problem to
two one-dimensional convex problems solved in sequence, from downstream to upstream, and it
identifies the optimal policy class. The downstream level S1 is a newsboy solution with
overage cost e1, the value added, and underage cost e2+b1, and it is independent of the
upstream installation altogether; the upstream level S2 sees the downstream installation only
through the induced shortage cost, the last term of (10.9). The book notes the extensions the
argument admits, to more echelons, to batch ordering at the top, and, via Rosling's
equivalence, to assembly systems, and its Sect. 10.1.2 adapts it, now only approximately, to
distribution systems under the balance assumption. Example 10.1 shows the typical outcome: the
optimal average stock at the upstream installation is slightly negative.
Formalizing it. The section's mathematics is a chain of expectations under Gaussian laws and
two convexity arguments. Formalizing it fixes what "optimal" means, a per-period comparison
against every allocation rule, and separates the two convexity claims the book makes in one
clause each. Nothing here is open; no statement has a machine-checked proof yet.
Difficulty
The pointwise allocation rule and the newsboy fractile are the same arguments as in the newsboy
mission. The two places where work is needed are the identity (10.9), an expectation of a
piecewise function split at u=y2−S1, and the convexity of C^2, which requires
seeing that x↦C^1(min{S1,x}) is convex precisely because S1 is a
minimizer of the convex C^1 (for any other cut-off the function is not convex), and that
convexity is preserved by integrating against the law of D(L2), which needs the integrability
of the linearly growing C^1. Existence of S2 then follows from the growth of C^2
at both ends, which comes from the asymptotics of the loss function: G(z)→0 as
z→∞ and G(z)+z→0 as z→−∞.
Formalization scope
D(n) is csDemand mu sigma n, the Gaussian law newsboyDemand (n μ) (√n σ) from the newsboy
mission, so the loss function G and its closed form are reused as references. The costs are
parametrized by e1,e2,b1 with h1=e1+e2 and h2=e2 written out; C~1,
C~2, the pre-reallocation period cost and C^2 are Bochner integrals against these
laws. Every statement assumes σ>0; the goal and the convexity statements assume
e1,e2≥0 and b1>0, the book's cost signs. L2=0 is allowed and makes D(L2) a
point mass, which is the setting of the book's Problem 10.2.
S1 enters as any solution of the fractile equation (10.8) and S2 as any minimizer of
C^2; the other items show that both exist when e1,e2>0. When e1=0 the fractile is
1, no S1 exists, and the goal is vacuous, which is faithful: the book observes that then
S1→∞ and installation 2 never carries stock. Symmetrically, when e2=0 and
L2≥1, C^2 decreases towards its infimum without attaining it, so no S2 exists
and the goal is again vacuous: with free upstream holding the optimal y2 is unbounded. Allocation rules are arbitrary functions
of the realized D(L2) with an integrability hypothesis; without it Lean's integral of a
non-integrable cost would be 0 and could undercut C^2(S2), which is negative in
Example 10.1's stage-1 term.
What is not modelled is the infinite-horizon dynamic problem: the book's optimality claim is
made period by period, and the passage to the stationary policy rests on the remark that the
outside supplier has infinite supply, so the same y2 can be chosen in every period. The
definitions are reusable for the three-echelon extension and for the distribution system of
Sect. 10.1.2; contributions formalizing Problem 10.2 (L2=0) as a first step are welcome.
Selected references
Sven Axsäter, Inventory Control, 3rd edition, International Series in Operations Research & Management Science 225, Springer, 2015, Sect. 10.1.1. DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-15729-0
Andrew J. Clark and Herbert Scarf, Optimal Policies for a Multi-Echelon Inventory Problem, Management Science 6(4), 1960, pp. 475-490. DOI 10.1287/mnsc.6.4.475
Awi Federgruen and Paul Zipkin, Computational Issues in an Infinite-Horizon, Multiechelon Inventory Model, Operations Research 32(4), 1984, pp. 818-836. DOI 10.1287/opre.32.4.818
Kaj Rosling, Optimal Inventory Policies for Assembly Systems under Random Demands, Operations Research 37(4), 1989, pp. 565-579. DOI 10.1287/opre.37.4.565
Geert-Jan van Houtum, Karl Inderfurth and Willem H. M. Zijm, Materials Coordination in Stochastic Multi-Echelon Systems, European Journal of Operational Research 95(1), 1996, pp. 1-23. DOI 10.1016/0377-2217(96)00080-8
Fundamentals of Supply Chain Theory VIII: Supply Chain ContractsTextbook
Why the newsvendor orders too little
A retailer facing uncertain single-period demand and buying from a supplier at a wholesale
price orders less than the two of them together would want. The reason is not irrationality
but incentives: the retailer bears the whole cost of unsold stock while the supplier collects
a margin on every unit ordered, so each party marks up its own cost and the combined markup,
Spengler's (1950) double marginalization, depresses the
order. Pasternack (1985) showed that a buyback
credit for unsold units, priced correctly, realigns the retailer with the chain, and Cachon
(2003) surveys the contracts that followed.
Chapter 14 of Snyder and Shen's Fundamentals of Supply Chain Theory
(2019) develops this as a Stackelberg game on the
newsvendor model: the supplier sets contract terms, the retailer sets the order quantity. This
mission formalizes the chapter's seven theorems, with the buyback allocation theorem, which
shows that buyback both coordinates the chain and can divide its profit in any proportion, as
the goal.
Setting
Demand D is a random variable with law on R and mean μ. The retail price is
r; the supplier's and retailer's per-unit costs are cs and cr with c=cs+cr<r;
lost sales cost the two parties goodwill penalties ps and pr with p=ps+pr; unsold
units salvage for v<cr (ContractData). With S(Q)=E[min{Q,D}] the expected
sales (expSales) and I(Q)=Q−S(Q) the expected leftover (expLeftover), a transfer
paymentT(Q) from retailer to supplier determines the two profits (retailerProfit,
supplierProfit),
whose sum Π(Q)=(r−v+p)S(Q)−(c−v)Q−pμ (chainProfit) is independent of the
contract. The chain-optimal quantity Q0 maximizes Π; the retailer's and supplier's
optimal quantities Qr∗, Qs∗ maximize their own profits. A contract coordinates the
chain when Qr∗=Qs∗=Q0, stated here as equality of the sets of maximizers, and is a
coordinating contract type when some choice of its parameters does this with both profits
positive.
The four contracts are their transfer payments. Wholesale price: T=wQ. Buyback:
T=wQ−bI(Q), the supplier crediting b per unsold unit, with 0≤b≤r−v+pr
and w=w(b) of (14.22). Revenue sharing: the retailer keeps a fraction ϕ of sales
and salvage revenue, T=(w+(1−ϕ)v)Q+(1−ϕ)(r−v)S(Q), with w=w(ϕ) of
(14.34). Quantity flexibility: the supplier reimburses the retailer's loss w+cr−v on
unsold units up to δQ, T=wQ−(w+cr−v)∫(1−δ)QQF(t)dt, with
w=w(δ) of (14.46). For buyback, λ=(r−v+pr−b)/(r−v+p) is the
retailer's share of the chain profit (buybackShare), and b1<b2 (buybackB1,
buybackB2) are the credits at which one party earns everything.
Formalization targets
Goal: Theorem 14.5
Under buyback with w(b) at the chain-optimal Q0, the retailer's profit is decreasing and
the supplier's increasing in b∈[0,r−v+pr], with 0<b1<b2<r−v+pr and
the supplier losing money for b<b1, both earning positive profit for b1<b<b2, and
the retailer losing money for b>b2. This is buyback_allocation.
Supporting targets
Equation (14.8), Q0 maximizes Π iff Fˉ(Q0)=(c−v)/(r−v+p); Theorem 14.1,
the wholesale price contract coordinates iff w=cs−r−v+pc−vps, at which the
supplier's profit is negative; Theorem 14.2, Qr∗<Q0 whenever w>cs; Theorem 14.3,
for IGFR demand the supplier's induced profit πs(Q,w(Q)) is unimodal; the identities
(14.27) and (14.28), πr=λΠ+μ(λp−pr) and its complement under
buyback; Theorem 14.4, buyback with w(b) coordinates; Theorem 14.6, revenue sharing with
w(ϕ) coordinates; Theorem 14.7, quantity flexibility with w(δ) makes Q0 optimal
for the retailer.
Significance
The chapter's theorems are the analytical basis of contract design in newsvendor supply
chains. Theorem 14.1 and 14.2 make double marginalization precise: coordination by price alone
is possible only at a price the supplier rejects, and any acceptable price makes the retailer
under-order. Theorem 14.3 is what lets the supplier optimize the wholesale price at all, and
is the reason the IGFR class of Lariviere and Porteus
(2001) is standard in the field. Theorems 14.4 to
14.6 show that buyback and revenue sharing coordinate and, through the share λ, that
the chain profit can be split arbitrarily, so a coordinating contract can be made acceptable
to both parties. Theorem 14.7 shows the limits: quantity flexibility coordinates the retailer
but not necessarily the supplier.
None of these results has a machine-checked proof. The book proves Theorems 14.1, 14.3, 14.4,
14.5, 14.6 and 14.7 and leaves 14.2 as an exercise. The formalization of the fractile
characterization and of the affine profit identities is reusable for the many contract types
(sales rebates, quantity discounts) the chapter cites but does not analyze.
Difficulty
The wholesale price results are first-order conditions on concave functions, and the difficulty
is entirely in the analysis: S(Q)=E[min{Q,D}] has derivative Fˉ(Q) for
every Q when F is continuous, which is a differentiation under the integral that has to be
carried out for a Lipschitz integrand and an arbitrary law, and the maximizers of the concave
profit must then be identified with the solutions of the fractile equation, including existence
by the intermediate value theorem. Theorem 14.1's "only if" direction requires that a coincidence
of maximizer sets pins the fractile and hence the price, which is where strict monotonicity of
F enters.
Theorem 14.3 is the delicate one. The obvious approach, concavity of πs(Q,w(Q)), fails:
the book stresses the function is not concave in general. The proof is a sign-change argument
on the derivative (14.16), which is Fˉ(Q) times a bracket that IGFR makes decreasing,
minus a constant; one must show the derivative is positive near 0, eventually negative, and
crosses zero exactly once, and that the last needs both Fˉ strictly decreasing and the
bracket positive at the crossing. Working with a density in Mathlib means relating the
withDensity law to the distribution function throughout.
The buyback, revenue sharing and quantity flexibility theorems are algebra once the right
identity is found: πr is an affine function of Π with slope λ. The
formalization must handle the boundary cases the book glosses over, where λ=0 or
λ=1 and one party is indifferent among all quantities, so "the same Q maximizes"
holds only in one direction. Theorem 14.5 also needs Π(Q0)≤μ(r−c), a Jensen-type
bound S(Q)≤min{Q,μ}, for b1>0, and the ordering b1<b2 needs
Π(Q0)>0, which the book's proof does not isolate.
Formalization scope
Demand is an arbitrary probability law on R with finite mean, not assumed
nonnegative; the book's own examples use normal demand. Optimal quantities are maximizers over
all of R (IsMaxOn … Set.univ), and coordination is the coincidence of maximizer
sets, with the degenerate endpoints of the parameter ranges stated as one-directional. Where the
book uses a density, continuity of the distribution function (NullSingletonClass) is assumed
instead, except in Theorem 14.3, where the density f is explicit, continuous on [0,∞)
(so the exponential law is included), positive on (0,∞), and IGFR on (0,∞).
Strict monotonicity of F on R is never assumed, since it would rule out every
nonnegative demand law. Theorem 14.1 assumes ps>0 and a positive chain
optimum, Fˉ(0)>(c−v)/(r−v+p), both implicit in the book's proof.
The transfer payments are functions of Q and the profits are defined for every Q, so the
theorems compare values of one family of functions; the book's Fˉ is 1−F with
Mathlib's cdf, and the quantity flexibility integral is an interval integral. Theorem 14.5
takes Π(Q0)>0, μ>0 and ps,pr>0 as hypotheses. Without positive goodwill costs
its strict inequalities 0<b1 and b2<r−v+pr fail (at ps=0, b1=0; at
pr=0, b2=r−v+pr).
The definition module is shared by all eleven items. The equivalence (14.42)-(14.43) of
revenue sharing and buyback, the supplier's stationarity under quantity flexibility (Problem
14.11) and the allocation results for revenue sharing (14.40)-(14.41) are natural extensions on
the same definitions.
M. A. Lariviere and E. L. Porteus, Selling to the newsvendor: an analysis of price-only contracts, Manufacturing & Service Operations Management 3(4), 2001. https://doi.org/10.1287/msom.3.4.293.9971
G. P. Cachon and M. A. Lariviere, Supply chain coordination with revenue-sharing contracts, Management Science 51(1), 2005. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.1040.0215
J. J. Spengler, Vertical integration and antitrust policy, Journal of Political Economy 58(4), 1950. https://doi.org/10.1086/256964
The Theory and Practice of Revenue Management I: Single-Resource Capacity ControlTextbook
Which fares to open, and when to close them
An airline sells one flight, a hotel one night, a car-rental firm one day of one car: a fixed
capacity, perishable at a deadline, sold to customers who arrive over time and are willing to
pay different amounts. Chapter 2 of Talluri and van Ryzin's The Theory and Practice of Revenue
Management (2004) is the theory of that single resource. Its
three models answer the same question with increasing generality: Littlewood's two-class rule,
the n-class static model and its dynamic-arrival version give the seller a protection level
per class, a booking limit or a bid price, all three equivalent; the discrete-choice model,
in which customers buy down when a cheaper fare is open, replaces classes by offer sets and
shows that only the efficient sets, ordered by their purchase probability, are ever offered,
with a higher set the more capacity or the less time remains. This mission formalizes that last
result, Theorem 2.3, together with the structural results of the two earlier models that it
generalizes.
Setting
Static model. Classes 1,…,n with prices p1≥⋯≥pn≥0 arrive in
stages, lowest class first, with demands Dj distributed on N. With x units left at
stage j the seller observes Dj and accepts u≤min{Dj,x} units; the value function
is the Bellman equation (2.3), Vj(x)=E[maxu{pju+Vj−1(x−u)}], V0=0
(staticValue), and ΔVj(x)=Vj(x)−Vj(x−1) is the marginal value of capacity. The
protection level yj∗=max{x:pj+1<ΔVj(x)} (protLevel), the booking limit
bj∗=C−yj−1∗ (bookLimit) and the bid price πj+1(x)=ΔVj(x)
(bidPrice) define the three controls of Theorem 2.1.
Dynamic model. Over T periods at most one request arrives per period, of class j with
probability λj(t); the value function (2.17) is
Vt(x)=Vt+1(x)+E[maxu∈{0,1}(R(t)−ΔVt+1(x))u]
(dynValue), with time-dependent protection levels (2.19), booking limits (2.20) and bid
prices (2.18).
Choice model. When the set S of classes is open an arriving customer buys class j∈S
with probability Pj(S); Q(S)=∑j∈SPj(S) is the purchase probability and
R(S)=∑j∈SPj(S)pj the expected revenue (purchaseProb, expRevenue). The value
function (2.26) is Vt(x)=maxSλt(R(S)−Q(S)ΔVt+1(x))+Vt+1(x)
(choiceValue). A set T is inefficient (Definition 2.1, IsInefficient) if a
randomization α over the subsets has ∑Sα(S)Q(S)≤Q(T) and
∑Sα(S)R(S)>R(T), and efficient otherwise.
Formalization targets
Goal: Theorem 2.3
In every period with capacity left, some efficient set maximizes (2.26); and, the efficient
sets being ordered by Q, the largest optimal set is nondecreasing in the remaining capacity
x and nondecreasing in the period t: choice_optimal_policy. Monotonicity is stated as
"every efficient optimal set at (t,x) is matched by one at (t,x′), x′≥x, with at
least as large a purchase probability", and likewise in t.
Supporting targets
Littlewood's rule (2.1), ΔV1(x)=p1P(D1≥x) and the acceptance
criterion; Proposition 2.1, the marginal values of the static model are decreasing in x and
increasing in the stages remaining; Theorem 2.1, nested protection levels, nested booking limits
and bid-price tables each attain the Bellman maximum at every stage; Proposition 2.2 and Theorem
2.2, the same two results for the dynamic model, with marginal values now decreasing in time;
Proposition 2-2.A.4 of the appendix, the marginal values of the choice model are decreasing in
x and in t; Proposition 2.3, an inefficient set is never optimal; and the ordering of
efficient sets, Q(S)≤Q(S′) implies R(S)≤R(S′) when S′ is efficient.
The continuous-demand optimality conditions (2.9) of Sect. 2.2.2.3, stated without proof, the
computational and heuristic methods of Sects. 2.2.3-2.2.4, the overbooking models of Sect. 2.7
and the nested-policy characterization of Sect. 2.6.2.5 are not targets.
Significance
Theorem 2.3 is the structural result behind choice-based revenue management: it reduces the
2n offer sets to the efficient frontier of (Q(S),R(S)), orders that frontier, and shows
the optimal policy walks up it as capacity grows or the deadline nears. It was the analytical
core of Talluri and van Ryzin's
(2004) choice-model paper and is the reason the
efficient sets, not the fare classes, are the unit of control when customers substitute between
fares. The static and dynamic results, from Littlewood
(1972) and Brumelle and McGill
(1993) to Lee and Hersh
(1993), are the foundation of every airline seat
inventory control system; the equivalence of protection levels, booking limits and bid prices is
what lets the same optimal policy be implemented on any of the three kinds of reservation
system. None of these results has a machine-checked proof.
Difficulty
The two marginal-value propositions are inductions in which the inductive step is the discrete
concavity of a max-plus convolution, Lemma 2-2.A.1 of the appendix: x↦max0≤a≤m{ap+g(x−a)} is concave when g is, which in Lean requires reasoning about the
argmax on N and the truncated subtraction. The static model's expectation is a
tsum against a pmf, so every step also needs summability of a bounded family. The
protection-level theorems then need the down-set structure of {x:pj+1<ΔVj(x)}
under monotonicity of ΔVj, and the three controls have to be shown to coincide unit by
unit. For the choice model, Proposition 2.3 is a one-line convexity argument once
ΔV≥0 is known, and the monotonicity in Theorem 2.3 is a monotone comparative-statics
argument on the objective R(S)−Q(S)Δ, which is easy in Δ but must be combined
with Proposition 2-2.A.4 in both x and t; the existence of an efficient maximizer uses
Proposition 2.3 and the finiteness of the subsets.
Formalization scope
Capacities, stages and periods are natural numbers, the value functions recurse on the stage or
on the number of periods to go, and the book's ranges (x≤C, t≤T, j≤n) are
hypotheses of the theorems. Demand in the static model is a pmf on N rather than a
random variable, so the expectation in (2.3) is a tsum; the dynamic model's expectation over
R(t) is written out, including the no-arrival term, which vanishes under nonnegative prices.
The choice model is defined by its compact form (2.26), and the maximization includes the empty
offer set. Optimality of a control means attaining the inner maximum of the Bellman equation at
every state, which is what the book's proofs establish. The bid-price control is formalized with
the bid price πj+1(x+1−z) of the z-th unit allocated; the book prints x−z,
which is one unit off from (2.5). The appendix's Proposition 2-2.A.4 prints its time
monotonicity in the reverse direction; the formal statement is the direction consistent with
Proposition 2.2 and Theorem 2.3. The ordering of efficient sets is stated with non-strict
inequalities, since Definition 2.1 admits ties in revenue.
Selected references
K. T. Talluri and G. J. van Ryzin, The Theory and Practice of Revenue Management, Kluwer/Springer, 2004, Chapter 2. https://doi.org/10.1007/b139000
K. Littlewood, Forecasting and control of passenger bookings, AGIFORS Symposium Proceedings 12, 1972; reprinted in Journal of Revenue and Pricing Management 4(2), 2005. https://doi.org/10.1057/palgrave.rpm.5170134
S. L. Brumelle and J. I. McGill, Airline seat allocation with multiple nested fare classes, Operations Research 41(1), 1993. https://doi.org/10.1287/opre.41.1.127
T. C. Lee and M. Hersh, A model for dynamic airline seat inventory control with multiple seat bookings, Transportation Science 27(3), 1993. https://doi.org/10.1287/trsc.27.3.252
K. T. Talluri and G. J. van Ryzin, Revenue management under a general discrete choice model of consumer behavior, Management Science 50(1), 2004. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.1030.0147
C. J. Lautenbacher and S. Stidham, The underlying Markov decision process in the single-leg airline yield-management problem, Transportation Science 33(2), 1999. https://doi.org/10.1287/trsc.33.2.136
The Theory and Practice of Revenue Management II: OverbookingTextbook
How far to oversell
Every airline, hotel and car-rental firm sells more reservations than it has capacity, because
some customers cancel or do not show. Chapter 4 of Talluri and van Ryzin's The Theory and
Practice of Revenue Management (2004) is the theory of that
decision. Its static models pick one overbooking limit from the show distribution; its dynamic
model, a simplification of Chatwin's (1998), follows
reservations, cancellations and refunds period by period and proves that the optimal control is
still a limit, one that declines toward the deadline and falls when more demand is expected; and
its substitutable-capacity model, from Karaesmen and van Ryzin
(2004), sets joint limits for several classes whose
oversold customers can be moved between resources, showing the expected net revenue is concave
in each limit and submodular across them. This mission formalizes the chapter's four
propositions and the corollary the book draws from the last.
Setting
Dynamic overbooking (Sect. 4.3.1). With y reservations on hand in period t, Dt new
requests arrive; the firm books up to x∈[y,y+Dt] at revenue p(t) each, and every
reservation survives the period with probability qt, a cancellation refunding r(t). At the
deadline T+1 the firm pays the convex denied-service cost c(y−C) on reservations beyond
capacity C, Eq. (4.11). The recursion is
vt+1(x)=E[Vt+1(Zt(x))−(x−Zt(x))r(t)] with
Zt(x)∼Bin(x,qt) and
Vt(y)=E[maxy≤x≤y+Dt{vt+1(x)+(x−y)p(t)}] (value,
postValue). The greatest optimal overbooking limit x∗(t) (overbookingLimit) is the
largest level at which vt+1(x)+xp(t) is at least its value at every smaller level, an
element of N∪{∞}; the limit policy books min{y+Dt,max{y,x∗}}
(limitPolicy).
Substitutable capacity (Sect. 4.5). Classes j=1,…,n hold yj reservations and
are overbooked to levels xj; in the service period Zj∼Poisson(qjxj)
customers show and are assigned to resources i=1,…,m of capacities Ci, or to the
virtual resource 0 (denied service), at net benefit hji, by the transportation problem
(TP) with value V(z,C) (serviceValue). The expected net revenue (4.21) is
G(x)=p⊤(x−y)−E[s⊤(x−Z(x))]+E[V(Z(x),C)] (expNetRevenue),
and jointLimit is the greatest optimal limit of one class with the others fixed.
Formalization targets
Goal: Proposition 4.4
With Poisson show demands, G has decreasing first differences in every direction:
G(x+ei+ej)−G(x+ei)≤G(x+ej)−G(x) for all x and all classes i,j, which
is component-wise concavity (i=j) and submodularity (i=j):
joint_overbooking_concave_submodular.
Supporting targets
Proposition 4.1, with a convex denied-service cost the limit policy with the greatest optimal
limit attains the maximum of the recursion at every state; Proposition 4.2, under
qt(p(t)−p(t+1))+(1−qt)(p(t)−r(t))≥0 the greatest optimal limits decline with
time; Proposition 4.3, stochastically larger demand to come gives limits that are no larger; and
the corollary of Sect. 4.5.2, the greatest optimal limit of class i is nonincreasing in the
level of any other class.
The static overbooking models of Sect. 4.2 (binomial, normal and Gram-Charlier
approximations, Type 1 and Type 2 service levels), the net-bookings heuristics of Sect. 4.3.2,
the combined capacity-control models of Sect. 4.4 and the stochastic-gradient algorithm of
Appendix 4.A carry no numbered results and are not targets.
Significance
Proposition 4.4 is the structural fact that makes joint overbooking of related resources
tractable: concavity gives each class a critical booking level and submodularity makes those
levels move in opposite directions, so a stochastic-gradient or coordinate search on the limits
is well behaved, and the pattern of Example 4.5, overbooking an early flight aggressively
because its oversold passengers can be moved to later ones, is a consequence rather than a
heuristic. The dynamic propositions are the theoretical support for the overbooking curves that
reservation systems post, limits that fall as departure approaches, and they quantify the sense
in which a static model, which ignores future demand, overbooks too much. The proof of
Proposition 4.4 passes through the discrete concavity of the transportation problem's value in
its supply vector, an M-natural-concavity fact in the sense of Murota, and the
Poisson-expectation identity for second differences; none of this has a machine-checked proof.
Difficulty
The dynamic model needs the concavity of Vt on N to be propagated through two
operations, the binomial thinning x↦E[V(Bin(x,q))] and the windowed
maximum y↦maxy≤x≤y+Dg(x), both of which preserve discrete concavity
but require explicit manipulation of binomial sums and of the argmax; Propositions 4.2 and 4.3
then compare greatest maximizers of concave sequences through lower bounds on marginal values,
with the value ∞ handled in ℕ∞. The substitutable-capacity goal is harder: the value of
(TP) as a function of the integer supply vector must be shown to have decreasing differences,
which is the submodularity of a max-weight transportation value in its supplies, a linear
programming duality argument (or Murota's M-natural-concavity of min-cost flow), and the
Poisson expectation of it, a tsum over Nn, must be differenced in two coordinates
using the identity E[f(Nμ+δ)]−E[f(Nμ)] for Poisson pmfs.
The linear terms of G cancel in second differences and the refund term is linear in x.
Formalization scope
Periods are natural numbers with value t the value with T+1−t periods to go, and the
book's ranges 1≤t≤T are hypotheses. The denied-service cost is normalized, c(0)=0
and c≥0, as a cost "penalizing denied service" is. Convexity of the sequence alone is not
enough, because (4.11) never reads c(0). Demands are pmfs on N and cancellations
exact binomial sums. The greatest optimal limit lives in N∪{∞} because a
mild denied-service cost can make accepting every request optimal, in which case the book's
critical value is +∞; the limit policy then accepts everything. Proposition 4.3 is stated
for two demand families ordered by first-order stochastic dominance rather than a parametrized
family. In the substitutable-capacity model the virtual resource is uncapacitated, the book's
"finite but very high" C0 taken as infinite so that (TP) is feasible for every Poisson
realization, and (TP) is over real assignments, whose optimum at integer supplies is integral.
Eq. (4.21) is printed with −E[V(Z(x),C)]; V being the maximum net benefit, the
expected net revenue adds it, and the definition uses +, without which Proposition 4.4 fails
numerically on every sampled instance.
Selected references
K. T. Talluri and G. J. van Ryzin, The Theory and Practice of Revenue Management, Kluwer/Springer, 2004, Chapter 4. https://doi.org/10.1007/b139000
I. Karaesmen and G. J. van Ryzin, Overbooking with substitutable inventory classes, Operations Research 52(1), 2004. https://doi.org/10.1287/opre.1030.0079
Fundamentals of Supply Chain Theory IX: Facility Location ModelsTextbook
Where to put the warehouses
Choosing where to open distribution centers is the strategic decision that fixes a supply
chain's shape for years. The basic model, the uncapacitated fixed-charge location problem
(UFLP) of Balinski (1965), trades the fixed cost of
opening sites against the cost of transporting demand from open sites to customers. It is
NP-hard, yet routinely solved to optimality, and the reason is a fact about its relaxations:
the LP relaxation is unusually tight, and Lagrangian relaxation, which Cornuejols, Fisher and
Nemhauser (1977) brought to location problems, gives
the same bound with a subproblem solvable by inspection. Chapter 8 of Snyder and Shen's
Fundamentals of Supply Chain Theory (2019) develops
the UFLP, its Lagrangian relaxation and Erlenkotter's (1978)
DUALOC dual-ascent method, then the p-median problem with Hakimi's
(1965) node-optimality theorem and the covering
models. This mission formalizes the chapter's numbered results, with the equality of the
Lagrangian and LP bounds as its goal.
Setting
Customers i∈I have demands hi; candidate sites j∈J have fixed costs fj; shipping
one unit from j to i costs cij. A solution opens sites (xj∈{0,1}) and assigns
demand fractions (yij≥0, ∑jyij=1, yij≤xj); its cost is
∑jfjxj+∑i∑jhicijyij (uflpCost, UFLPFeasible). The optimal value is
z∗ (uflpOpt); relaxing xj∈{0,1} to 0≤xj≤1 gives the LP relaxation with
value zLP (uflpLP).
Lagrangian relaxation removes the assignment constraints and charges λi per unit of
violation. For fixed multipliers λ the subproblem (UFLP-LRλ) minimizes
∑jfjxj+∑i∑j(hicij−λi)yij+∑iλi over yij≤xj,
x binary, y≥0 (lagrObjective, LagrFeasible), with value zLR(λ) (zLR). It
separates by site: the benefit of opening j is βj=∑imin{0,hicij−λi}
(benefit), and j is opened iff βj+fj<0. The best bound is the Lagrangian dual
value zLR=maxλzLR(λ) (zLRbest).
DUALOC works with the condensed dual of the LP relaxation, whose variables vi satisfy
∑imax{0,vi−c^ij}≤fj with c^ij=hicij. A dual solution v and
a site set J+ form a primal-dual pair (PDP) when these constraints are tight on J+ and
every customer has a site in J+ with c^ij≤vi; the primal solution opens J+ and
assigns each customer to its nearest open site j+(i) (NearestIn, primalX, primalY).
For the p-median problem on a network, the customers are the nodes, d is the shortest-path
distance between nodes, and a facility may sit at position t along an edge (u,w) of length
ℓ, at distance min{d(i,u)+tℓ,d(i,w)+(1−t)ℓ} from node i (NetPoint, netDist).
The p-center problem minimizes the largest distance from a customer to its nearest of p
open sites; pCenterValue c p is its optimal value.
Formalization targets
Goal: Corollary 8.2
For every instance with at least one candidate site,
zLP=zLR=λsupzLR(λ).
This is lagrangian_equals_lp.
Supporting targets
Theorem 8.1, the closed form zLR(λ)=∑jmin{0,βj+fj}+∑iλi with
its optimal solution; the bounds (8.16) zLR(λ)≤z∗ and (8.19) zLP≤zLR≤z∗;
Theorem 8.3, the variable-fixing tests; Lemma 8.4, the DUALOC duality gap
zP+−zD+=∑i∑j∈J+,j=j+(i)max{0,vi−c^ij}; Lemma 8.6, the
characterization of complementary slackness violations; Theorem 8.7, Hakimi's theorem that some
p nodes are optimal among all p-point sets; Lemma 8.8, the equivalence between the p-center
value being at most r and a set cover of radius r with at most p sites. Proposition 8.5,
which concerns the output of a specific procedure, is not a target.
Significance
Corollary 8.2 explains the behavior of every Lagrangian location code: the bound cannot beat the
LP bound, so its value lies in the ease of the subproblem and in extensions to nonlinear
location models (the location model with risk pooling of Chapter 12) where no LP is available.
Theorem 8.1 is the subproblem solution those codes use; Theorem 8.3 is the variable-fixing
device of Daskin, Snyder and others that shrinks branch-and-bound trees. Lemmas 8.4 and 8.6 are
the analytical core of DUALOC, the method that made large UFLP instances solvable in the 1970s.
Hakimi's theorem is the reason the p-median problem is a discrete problem at all, and Lemma
8.8 is the reason p-center problems are solved by bisection over covering problems rather
than by their weak MIP formulation.
None of these results has a machine-checked proof. The book proves Theorems 8.1 and 8.3 and
Lemma 8.6, cites Corollary 8.2 to Appendix D and Theorem 8.7 to Hakimi, and leaves Lemmas 8.4
and 8.8 as exercises. The formal treatment of the integrality property and of Lagrangian
duality for a linear objective over a product of boxes is reusable for the p-median and
capacitated variants the chapter goes on to discuss.
Difficulty
The goal is an LP duality statement in disguise, and the obvious idea, that zLR(λ) is
the dual function of the LP relaxation, is exactly what needs proof. Two facts must be
established: that for fixed λ the subproblem over binary x has the same value as over
x∈[0,1], because after the optimal y is substituted the objective is linear in x; and that
the supremum over λ of the resulting concave piecewise-linear function equals the LP
minimum. The second is strong duality for a linear program, which Mathlib does not provide
ready-made; it has to be obtained either through a Farkas-type argument or by exhibiting, for
the LP optimum, a multiplier vector that attains it, which for this problem can be read off the
LP dual. The book proves none of this; it invokes Lemma D.3.
The bounds (8.16) and (8.19) are easier but not free: the infima and suprema defining z∗,
zLP and zLR must be shown attained, which needs finiteness of the binary choices and
compactness of the assignment polytope. Theorem 8.3 depends on the value of the subproblem with
one variable forced, which is Theorem 8.1 applied to a modified instance. Hakimi's theorem needs
a concavity argument in each point's position and a bookkeeping step, since moving several
points to nodes may merge them and the result must still have exactly p nodes. Lemma 8.8 is
combinatorial and short once the p-center value is identified with a minimum over p-subsets.
Formalization scope
Customers and sites are Fin n and Fin m; demands, costs and fixed costs are arbitrary
reals, as the book's formulations are, and the theorems that need it assume m≥1. Optimal
values are infima or suprema of the sets of attainable objective values, all of which are
nonempty and bounded under the stated hypotheses. The Lagrangian dual value is a supremum over
all real multiplier vectors, so Corollary 8.2 asserts in particular that the supremum equals the
attained LP value.
The DUALOC statements take the nearest-facility assignment j+(i) as a function a with the
defining property, so ties are resolved by the hypothesis, and the complementary slackness
violation is written exactly as (8.51) with (x+,y+) substituted. Hakimi's theorem is stated
for a family of p points with repetition allowed, which is stronger than for a set. It assumes
what the book's network supplies: the node distances satisfy the triangle inequality, since they
are shortest-path distances, and every edge carrying a point is at least as long as the distance
between its endpoints. The argument needs both: they make the ends of an edge coincide with its
nodes, and without them a point on a short fictitious edge can beat every node. The
set covering value in Lemma 8.8 is expressed through the existence of a cover with at most p
sites rather than as a natural-number infimum, whose value 0 on infeasible instances would
falsify the equivalence.
The definition module is shared by all ten items. The Lagrangian relaxation of the p-median
problem (Sect. 8.3.2.2), the continuous knapsack subproblem of the capacitated problem, and
Proposition 8.5 on the dual-ascent procedure are natural extensions on the same definitions.
G. Cornuejols, M. L. Fisher and G. L. Nemhauser, Location of bank accounts to optimize float, Management Science 23(8), 1977. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.23.8.789
S. L. Hakimi, Optimum distribution of switching centers in a communication network and some related graph theoretic problems, Operations Research 13(3), 1965. https://doi.org/10.1287/opre.13.3.462
A. M. Geoffrion, Lagrangean relaxation for integer programming, Mathematical Programming Study 2, 1974. https://doi.org/10.1007/BFb0120690
Fundamentals of Supply Chain Theory X: Supply UncertaintyTextbook
When the supplier is the risk
Every model in the earlier chapters of this series treats demand as the uncertain quantity and
supply as given. Chapter 9 of Snyder and Shen's Fundamentals of Supply Chain Theory
(2019) reverses the roles: demand is deterministic and
the supplier fails. A disruption is a binary event, modeled as a two-state Markov process
between up and down periods, during which nothing can be ordered. The chapter's thesis, from
Snyder and Shen (2006), is that supply uncertainty is
a mirror image of demand uncertainty: the optimal base-stock level has the same critical-fractile
form as the newsvendor solution but with the fractile taken over the disruption-length
distribution (Tomlin 2006), and consolidation, which
pools demand risk, now does nothing to expected cost and multiplies its variance, the
risk-diversification effect of Schmitt, Sun, Snyder and Shen
(2015). The chapter closes with the reliable
fixed-charge location problem of Snyder and Daskin (2005).
This mission formalizes the chapter's theorems on disruptions, with the risk-diversification
theorem as its goal.
Setting
A supplier that is up is disrupted next period with probability α; one that is down
recovers with probability β. The disruption chain records 0 when the supplier is up
and n≥1 in the n-th consecutive period of a disruption; its stationary distribution is
π0=β/(α+β) and πn=α+βαβ(1−β)n−1 (disruptionPmf),
with distribution function F(n)=∑i≤nπi (disruptionCdf).
A single location faces demand d per period, pays h per unit held and p per unit
backordered per period, and follows a base-stock policy: it orders up to S in every up
period and nothing in down periods. In the n-th period of a disruption it has S−(n+1)d
units on hand or backordered, so its cost is g^(S,n)=h[S−(n+1)d]++p[(n+1)d−S]+
(periodCost), and the expected cost per period is g(S)=∑nπng^(S,n)
(meanCost), with variance V(S) over the disruption state (varCost). The critical fractile
γ=p/(p+h) and F−1(γ), the smallest n with F(n)≥γ, determine the
optimal level.
In the reliable fixed-charge location problem (RFLP), sites fail independently with
probability q and each customer is assigned to a chain of facilities: its level-r facility
serves it when the r closer facilities are disrupted, until it is assigned to an emergency
facility u that never fails and charges the penalty θi. The objective (9.61) is fixed
cost plus expected transportation cost, with coefficients ψijr=hicijqr(1−q)
(rflpPsi, rflpCost) under the constraints (9.62)-(9.67) (RFLPFeasible).
Formalization targets
Goal: Theorem 9.9
For N identical locations and the centralized location formed by merging them (demand Nd):
SC∗=NS∗,gC∗=gD∗=Ng∗,VC∗=NVD∗=N2V∗,
that is, an optimal single-location level S scales to the optimal centralized level NS,
the centralized expected cost at NS is N times the single-location cost, and its variance is
N2 times the single-location variance. This is risk_diversification.
Supporting targets
Lemma 9.2, the stationary distribution and distribution function of the disruption chain;
Lemma 9.4, that the optimal base-stock level is a multiple of d; Theorem 9.5,
S∗=d+dF−1(p/(p+h)), as the least minimizer of g; and Theorem 9.10, that in every
optimal RFLP solution consecutive backup assignments are ordered by cost. Theorem 9.3, the
optimality of base-stock policies, is cited by the book to Song and Zipkin without a model of
the policy space and is not a target; Proposition 9.1 and the multisupplier results of Sect. 9.4
are left for a later mission, as discussed below.
Significance
Theorem 9.5 is the supply-side newsvendor formula: it says exactly how much inventory buys
protection against disruptions of a given length, and it underlies the disruption models used in
practice for raw-material buffers. Theorem 9.9 is the chapter's central insight and the reason
supply and demand uncertainty call for opposite strategies: pooling reduces expected cost under
demand uncertainty but only redistributes risk under supply uncertainty, concentrating it. Its
three identities are what a risk-averse planner needs to compare the two designs by a
mean-variance criterion. Theorem 9.10 is what lets the RFLP be formulated without ordering
constraints and solved by Lagrangian relaxation like the UFLP.
None of these results has a machine-checked proof. The book proves Theorem 9.5 and the
identities behind Theorem 9.9, sketches Lemma 9.4, and leaves Lemma 9.2 and Theorem 9.10 as
exercises. The formal treatment of the piecewise-linear cost g and its finite differences is
reusable for the yield-uncertainty and multi-supplier models of the same chapter.
Difficulty
The cost g is an infinite series whose terms grow linearly in n against a geometric weight,
so every statement about it begins with summability, and the finite-difference identity
Δg(S)=d[(h+p)F(S/d−1)−p] requires exchanging a difference with a sum. Theorem 9.5
then needs the convexity and piecewise linearity of g to pass from a sign condition on slopes
at multiples of d to a global minimum over all real S, and the identification of the least
minimizer needs the slopes to be strictly negative below S∗. The obvious idea, treating the
problem as a discrete newsvendor over multiples of d, is only half of the argument: it does
not by itself exclude non-multiple minimizers, which is what Lemma 9.4 asserts.
Lemma 9.2 is elementary but the stationary equations involve a series over all down states, and
the proof must establish summability before manipulating it. Theorem 9.9's scaling identities
are termwise, but the optimality transfer in part 1 requires the scaling to preserve minimizers,
which follows from the cost identity holding for every S.
Theorem 9.10 is an exchange argument on a binary program with layered constraints. The delicate
case is the emergency facility: swapping it into a lower level is infeasible, and the correct
move is to promote it and drop the later assignment, which changes the constraints for every
higher level; the argument must show feasibility of the modified solution level by level.
Formalization scope
The disruption distribution is given by Lemma 9.2's formula rather than defined as the
stationary distribution, and Lemma 9.2 shows it satisfies the stationary equations; the
theorems assume 0<α≤1 and 0<β≤1, under which every series is a geometric
series times a polynomial and is summable. The quantity F−1(γ) enters Theorem 9.5 as a
natural number k characterized by F(k)≥γ and F(n)<γ for n<k, which
exists since F(n)→1>γ; the conclusion asserts both optimality and leastness of
d+dk among all real levels.
Theorem 9.9 is stated as the scaling of the single-location functions; the decentralized totals
Ng∗ and NV∗ are the mean and variance of a sum of N independent copies, which the book
asserts rather than derives, and are not modeled separately. In the RFLP, levels are indexed by
Fin m, the emergency facility is a designated index u whose data satisfy the book's
conventions through the hypotheses, and demands are positive with 0<q<1, both needed:
with q=0 or hi=0 backup assignments are free and any order is optimal.
The EOQ with disruptions (Proposition 9.1) is a renewal-reward derivation without a formal
model of the renewal process in the book, and the multisupplier newsvendor of Sect. 9.4
(Lemma 9.6, Theorems 9.7 and 9.8) rests on differentiability conditions the book defers to Dada
et al. and on a lemma it leaves as an exercise; both are natural extensions on the same
definitions rather than targets here.
B. Tomlin, On the value of mitigation and contingency strategies for managing supply chain disruption risks, Management Science 52(5), 2006. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.1060.0515
A. J. Schmitt, S. A. Sun, L. V. Snyder and Z.-J. M. Shen, Centralization versus decentralization: risk pooling, risk diversification, and supply chain disruptions, Omega 52, 2015. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.omega.2014.10.010
L. V. Snyder and M. S. Daskin, Reliability models for facility location: the expected failure cost case, Transportation Science 39(3), 2005. https://doi.org/10.1287/trsc.1040.0107
L. V. Snyder and Z.-J. M. Shen, Supply and demand uncertainty in multi-echelon supply chains, working paper, 2006. https://doi.org/10.1287/msom.1080.0224
The Theory and Practice of Revenue Management III: Dynamic PricingTextbook
Prices that respond to inventory
A retailer marking down a seasonal line, an airline raising fares as seats sell, a manufacturer
pricing while restocking: each sets prices over time against a finite and changing inventory.
Chapter 5 of Talluri and van Ryzin's The Theory and Practice of Revenue Management
(2004) collects the structural theory of that problem. Without
replenishment, the Bernoulli-arrival model of Gallego and van Ryzin
(1994) gives a marginal value of capacity that falls
with inventory and with time, hence prices that jump up at each sale and drift down between
sales, and the deterministic fluid model bounds it from above. With replenishment, the model of
Federgruen and Heching (1999) has a jointly concave and
supermodular continuation value, from which the base-stock, posted-price policy follows: below
a base-stock level order up to it and post a fixed price, above it order nothing and discount,
more the higher the inventory. This mission formalizes those results with Proposition 5.3 as
the goal.
Setting
Bernoulli demand (Sect. 5.2.2.2). One customer arrives per period with a random
willingness to pay; the firm's decision is the demand rate d∈[0,1], the probability of a
sale at the inverse-demand price p(t,d), with revenue rate r(t,d)=dp(t,d)
(revenueRate). The value function (5.12) is
Vt(x)=maxd{r(t,d)−dΔVt+1(x)}+Vt+1(x), VT+1=0, Vt(0)=0
(bernoulliValue), and ΔVt(x)=Vt(x)−Vt(x−1) (bernoulliDelta). The
deterministic model (5.1) maximizes ∑tr(t,d(t)) over rates with ∑td(t)≤C
(deterministicValue).
Pricing with replenishment (Sect. 5.3.2). Inventory may be negative (backorders). In
period t with inventory x the firm orders up to y≥x at unit cost ct, chooses a
rate d∈[0,dˉ], sells the random demand D(t,d,ξt)=at(ξt)d+bt(ξt)
(additive, multiplicative or mixed noise), and pays the convex cost ht on ending inventory.
The value function (5.20) is Vt(x)=supy≥x,d{r(t,d)−ct(y−x)+Gt+1(y,d)}
with the continuation value
Gt+1(y,d)=E[Vt+1(y−D(t,d,ξt))−ht(y−D(t,d,ξt))]
(ReplPricing.value, contValue). Assumption 7.2, marginal revenue decreasing, is the
concavity of r(t,⋅).
Formalization targets
Goal: Proposition 5.3
For every period, Gt+1 is jointly concave on R×[0,dˉ], Vt is
concave on R, and Gt+1 has increasing differences in (y,d), the supermodularity
that the book states through its partial derivatives: replenishment_concave_supermodular.
Supporting targets
Proposition 5.2, the marginal value of capacity in the Bernoulli model decreases in t and in
x; the upper bound of Sect. 5.2.2.3, the optimal deterministic revenue dominates the optimal
expected stochastic revenue; and the base-stock, posted-price structure of Sect. 5.3.2.1,
derived from Proposition 5.3: below the unconstrained optimum y0 order up to it and use
d0, above it order nothing and use a rate at least d0 that is nondecreasing in the
inventory.
Proposition 5.1 and Lemma 5-5.A.1 (the continuous-demand model without replenishment) are not
targets; see the formalization scope. The deterministic sections (efficient prices, discrete
price sets), the asymptotic optimality of the deterministic heuristic, the infinite-horizon
stationary problem and the multiproduct and finite-population models carry no numbered
results.
Significance
Proposition 5.3 is the structural core of joint pricing and inventory control: joint concavity
makes the period problem a concave program, and supermodularity is what turns its solution
into a policy, the base-stock, posted-price rule that Federgruen and Heching showed optimal and
that later work on pricing with inventory builds on. Proposition 5.2 is the reason optimal
dynamic prices in the stochastic single-item model rise at every sale and fall while inventory
sits, the behaviour of Figure 5.5, and the deterministic upper bound is what justifies the
fluid model as a benchmark and a heuristic, the pattern quantified in Table 5.6. None of these
has a machine-checked proof; the replenishment result in particular needs the interplay of
concavity, expectation and partial maximization on all of R.
Difficulty
Proposition 5.2 is an induction whose step compares suprema over the rate interval, with the
boundary condition Vt(0)=0 breaking the recursion at x=1 and requiring
r(t,0)=0. The deterministic bound is an induction on periods that uses the concavity of
the deterministic value in the inventory (a concave program's value) to absorb the two branches
of the Bernoulli recursion. The goal needs: integrability and continuity of
Vt+1(y−D)−ht(y−D) under bounded noise; that the expectation of a concave function
of an affine map is jointly concave, and its increasing differences from those of the concave
integrand; that a partial supremum of a jointly concave function over the convex feasible set
{y≥x} is concave in x; and the boundedness of the objective so that every supremum
is a real number. The base-stock item is the segment argument that moves an unconstrained
maximizer onto the boundary y=x and a monotone comparative-statics argument on the
supermodular objective, with maxima attained by continuity on the compact rate interval.
Formalization scope
Periods are natural numbers with value t the value with T+1−t periods to go, the
maxima are suprema, and the book's ranges are hypotheses. The demand is affine in the rate,
which is the additive and multiplicative models the book names; with a merely convex demand
(Assumption 5.1) the joint concavity of Proposition 5.3 fails when Vt+1−ht is not
monotone, and the noise has bounded support, strengthening Assumption 7.6. The
partial-derivative statements (iii)-(iv) are in difference form. Proposition 5.1 is not
formalized: its model (5.11) evaluates Vt+1(x−D) at negative inventories the model
does not define while truncating revenue at x, and its Lemma 5-5.A.1 (joint concavity of
r+) is false as stated, its Hessian argument mistaking an indefinite matrix for a negative
definite one; a counterexample is in the mission's check. The deterministic model restricts
rates to [0,1], the rates the Bernoulli model can realize.
Selected references
K. T. Talluri and G. J. van Ryzin, The Theory and Practice of Revenue Management, Kluwer/Springer, 2004, Chapter 5. https://doi.org/10.1007/b139000
G. Gallego and G. J. van Ryzin, Optimal dynamic pricing of inventories with stochastic demand over finite horizons, Management Science 40(8), 1994. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.40.8.999
A. Federgruen and A. Heching, Combined pricing and inventory control under uncertainty, Operations Research 47(3), 1999. https://doi.org/10.1287/opre.47.3.454
The Theory and Practice of Revenue Management IV: AuctionsTextbook
Why a reserve price, and why it does not matter which auction
Airlines selling last seats, Priceline's name-your-own-price, procurement of supply contracts:
Chapter 6 of Talluri and van Ryzin's The Theory and Practice of Revenue Management
(2004) treats auctions as pricing mechanisms and asks what
revenue they earn and how to design them. Its centre is Myerson's
(1981) theory for independent private values: whatever
the mechanism, so long as bidders with higher valuations are more likely to win and the lowest
type gains nothing, the firm's expected revenue is the expected virtual value∑iJ(vi)yi(v) of the winners, with J(v)=v−(1−F(v))/f(v) (Theorem 6.1, the
revenue equivalence theorem). Maximizing that expression pointwise gives the optimal auction:
the standard first- or second-price auction with a reserve price v∗ at the zero of J
(Theorem 6.2). This mission formalizes the second-price form of Theorem 6.2 as its goal, with
the dominant-strategy and first-price equilibria of the informal analysis, Theorem 6.1, the
optimal allocation and Proposition 6.1 on list prices as supporting results.
Setting
N customers have i.i.d. valuations on [0,vˉ] with a continuously differentiable,
strictly increasing distribution F and positive density f (PrivateValues, IsRegular); the
joint law is the product measure (joint). A direct-revelation mechanism (Mechanism) maps
reported valuations to allocations yi(v)∈{0,1}, at most C units in total, and
payments pi(v). For a report w by customer i, Pi(w) is the win probability, Ri(w)
the expected payment and Si(w)=wPi(w)−Ri(w) the surplus (winProb, expPayment,
expSurplus); incentive compatibility, Si(w)≥wPi(w′)−Ri(w′), is the equilibrium
condition of the direct mechanism (IsIncentiveCompatible). The chapter's mechanisms are the
C-unit second-price auction with reserve price r (secondPriceReserve: the C highest
valuations above r win and pay the larger of r and the highest losing valuation), the
list-price mechanism for N≤C (listPrice), and the single-unit first-price auction with
its equilibrium bid b∗(v)=v−∫0vP(s)ds/P(v), P=FN−1 (firstPriceBid).
Formalization targets
Goal: Theorem 6.2
With J strictly increasing (Assumption 7.2) and v∗ its zero, the C-unit second-price
auction with reserve price v∗ is a feasible, incentive-compatible mechanism with monotone
allocations and zero surplus at zero, and its expected revenue is at least that of every such
mechanism: reserve_price_auction_optimal.
Supporting targets
Bidding one's valuation is dominant in the second-price auction (Sect. 6.2.2.1); the bid (6.4)
solves the first-order condition (6.3), is a symmetric equilibrium of the first-price auction
and shades below the valuation (Sect. 6.2.2.2); Theorem 6.1, revenue equals expected virtual
surplus and each expected payment is wPi(w)−∫0wPi; the pointwise optimal allocation
of Sect. 6.2.5; and Proposition 6.1, a list price at v∗ is optimal when N≤C.
Proposition 6.2 (asymptotic optimality of list prices, a law-of-large-numbers statement about
scaled auctions), the first-price form of Theorem 6.2 with its equilibrium (6.9) stated without
proof, and the dynamic, replenishment and network auctions of Sects. 6.3-6.5 (Propositions
6.3-6.11, from Vulcano, van Ryzin and Maglaras and from Cooper and Menich) are not targets of
this mission.
Significance
Theorem 6.1 is the tool that lets revenue be computed from allocations alone, which is why the
first- and second-price auctions of Examples 6.1-6.3 earn the same (N−1)/(N+1) and why any
dynamic pricing scheme that ends with the same winners earns the same as the optimal auction
(Sect. 6.2.6.3). Theorem 6.2 says a firm with private-value customers cannot do better than a
standard auction with the right reserve price, and Proposition 6.1 that with enough capacity a
list price already does it: auctions are a small-numbers phenomenon. These are the foundations
on which the chapter's dynamic auctions and the list-price comparisons of Sects. 6.3-6.4 rest,
and Myerson's optimal auction has no machine-checked proof in its multi-unit form.
Difficulty
Theorem 6.1 is an envelope argument in measure-theoretic clothing: incentive compatibility
gives the two-sided inequalities of Appendix 6.A, monotonicity of Pi makes Si convex with
derivative Pi almost everywhere, so Si(w)=∫0wPi, and then an integration by parts
against the density converts ∫(wPi(w)−Si(w))f(w)dw into ∫J(w)Pi(w)f(w)dw;
the win probabilities are integrals over a product measure with one coordinate replaced, and
Fubini is needed to return to E[J(vi)yi(v)]. The goal then needs the reserve-price
auction shown incentive compatible (a dominant-strategy argument on the threshold payment),
measurable, monotone and with zero surplus at zero, and the pointwise optimal allocation
integrated. The first-price item is calculus on an interval integral with a vanishing
denominator at 0 and a monotone comparative-statics argument for the equilibrium
inequality.
Formalization scope
Mechanisms are direct-revelation mechanisms on [0,vˉ]N, as the book reduces to in
Sect. 6.2.3.1; expectations over the other customers are integrals over the joint law with
customer i's coordinate overwritten by the report. Payments are assumed bounded on reports in
[0,vˉ]N (not on all of RN, where the second-price payment is unbounded) and
the rules measurable. Ties in the second-price auction are broken by index, a null event, and when every
customer wins the losing supremum is 0 so the winner pays the reserve. Theorem 6.2 is stated
for the second-price auction; the first-price version with reserve price, whose equilibrium
(6.9) the book asserts without proof, is left out and noted. Optimality is over mechanisms
satisfying conditions (i) and (ii) of Theorem 6.1 and incentive compatibility, which is the
class the book compares against. The virtual value's zero v∗ is a parameter with J(v∗)=0
rather than the maximum of (6.8), which under strict monotonicity is the same point.
Selected references
K. T. Talluri and G. J. van Ryzin, The Theory and Practice of Revenue Management, Kluwer/Springer, 2004, Chapter 6. https://doi.org/10.1007/b139000
Fundamentals of Supply Chain Theory XI: The Traveling Salesman ProblemTextbook
The problem every routing model contains
A salesman must visit n cities and return home by the shortest route. The traveling
salesman problem is the prototype of combinatorial optimization: easy to state, NP-hard
(Karp 1972), and solved to optimality on
instances with tens of thousands of nodes by branch-and-cut. In a supply chain it is the core of
every vehicle routing model and of the location-routing models of the chapters that follow.
Chapter 10 of Snyder and Shen's Fundamentals of Supply Chain Theory
(2019) covers the symmetric metric TSP, in which
distances satisfy the triangle inequality: the cutting planes of branch-and-cut (comb
inequalities), the construction heuristics with their worst-case guarantees, culminating in
Christofides' (1976) 3/2-approximation, and the
lower bounds of Little et al. and of Held and Karp
(1970). This mission formalizes those results, with
Christofides' theorem as its goal.
Setting
Nodes are N={1,…,n} with distances cij that are symmetric, nonnegative, zero on
the diagonal and satisfy the triangle inequality cij≤cik+ckj (IsMetric). A
tour is a visiting order τ of all the nodes, of length z(τ)=∑kc(τk,τk+1)
with indices mod n (tourLength); z∗ is the least tour length (optTourLength). A tour has
an edge set (tourEdges), and for a node set S the counts of tour edges inside S and leaving
S (edgesWithin, edgesLeaving) are the sums ∑i,j∈Sxij and ∑i∈S,j∈/Sxij
of the integer programming formulation. A comb is a handle H with an odd number s≥3 of
pairwise disjoint teeth, each meeting both H and its complement (IsComb); when every tooth
has exactly two nodes the comb is a 2-matching configuration.
The nearest neighbor heuristic always moves to a nearest unvisited node
(IsNearestNeighborTour); the nearest insertion heuristic grows a partial tour by inserting
the unvisited node nearest to it at the cheapest position (IsNearestInsertionRun, with
cycleLength and distToTour). The minimum spanning tree heuristic doubles an MST
(IsMST, graphWeight), takes an Eulerian tour of the doubled tree and shortcuts it,
visiting the nodes in order of first appearance (IsShortcut). Christofides' heuristic
instead adds to the MST a minimum-weight perfect matching on its odd-degree nodes
(oddNodes, IsMinMatchingOn) before taking the Eulerian tour. A 1-tree rooted at r is a
spanning tree on the other nodes plus two edges at r (Is1Tree); the revised distancescij′=cij+λi+λj (revisedCost) define the Held-Karp bound.
Formalization targets
Goal: Theorem 10.13
For every metric instance, every minimum spanning tree T∗, every minimum-weight perfect
matching M on the odd-degree nodes of T∗, every Eulerian tour of T∗+M and its shortcut
τ,
z(τ)≤23z∗.
This is christofides_bound.
Supporting targets
Theorem 10.1, the reduced-matrix bound ∑iρi+∑jκj≤z∗; Theorem 10.2,
Proposition 10.3 and Theorem 10.4, the 2-matching and comb inequalities valid for every tour;
Theorem 10.6, zNN≤21(⌈log2n⌉+1)z∗; Theorem 10.7, zNI≤2z∗;
Lemma 10.9, z(T∗)≤z∗; Theorem 10.10, Euler's theorem; Theorem 10.11, zMST≤2z∗;
Lemma 10.12, the handshaking lemma; Lemma 10.15, the 1-tree bound; Lemma 10.16, the revised
distance identities; Theorem 10.17, the Held-Karp bound. Theorem 10.5 (no constant-factor
approximation unless P = NP), Theorem 10.8 and the second part of Theorem 10.6 (tightness
instances), Lemma 10.14 (Euclidean tours do not cross), Lemma 10.18 (the integrality gap) and
Theorem 10.19 (the Beardwood-Halton-Hammersley asymptotics) are not targets.
Significance
Christofides' bound was the best approximation guarantee for the metric TSP for over forty
years, until the 3/2−10−36 of Karlin, Klein and Oveis Gharan
(2021), and it is the reference point against
which every heuristic in the chapter is measured: nearest neighbor has no constant bound,
nearest insertion and the MST heuristic achieve 2, Christofides 3/2. The comb inequalities
are the cuts that make branch-and-cut work, and the Held-Karp bound is the lower bound that
tells a practitioner how far a heuristic tour is from optimal. Theorem 10.1 is the historical
bounding rule of the first branch-and-bound algorithm.
None of these results has a machine-checked proof. The book proves Theorems 10.2, 10.11,
10.13 and 10.17 and Proposition 10.3 and Lemma 10.9, cites Theorems 10.6, 10.7 and 10.10, and
leaves Theorem 10.4 and Lemmas 10.12 and 10.16 as exercises. The formal infrastructure for
tours, shortcutting and Eulerian walks is reusable for the vehicle routing chapter.
Difficulty
Christofides' argument has three steps and each has a formal obstacle. The MST bound is a
spanning-path argument that needs the removal of an edge from a tour to yield a tree, in
Mathlib's terms a connected acyclic subgraph of the complete graph. The matching bound is the
subtle one: the optimal tour shortcut to the odd-degree nodes, of length at most z∗ by the
triangle inequality, is an even cycle whose alternate edges form two perfect matchings on those
nodes, the cheaper of which costs at most z∗/2; formalizing the decomposition of a cycle on an
even node set into two matchings, and the shortcut's length bound, is the bulk of the work. The
final step, that shortcutting an Eulerian walk does not lengthen it, is an induction along the
walk using the triangle inequality on the skipped stretches, and it needs the first-occurrence
order to be handled explicitly.
The obvious approach to the heuristic bounds, comparing the heuristic tour directly with the
optimal tour, fails; every proof goes through a spanning tree. For nearest insertion the tree is
Prim's, grown in the same order as the insertions, and the bound charges each insertion cost to
a tree edge; for nearest neighbor the argument of Rosenkrantz et al. bounds the sum of the k
largest steps by 2z∗ for each k and sums a geometric series, which is where the logarithm
comes from.
The comb inequalities are counting arguments on degrees, but the general comb of Theorem 10.4
needs the case analysis of how a tour enters and leaves each tooth. Euler's theorem in the
sufficiency direction is Hierholzer's construction, which is not in Mathlib.
Formalization scope
Tours are permutations of Fin n, so a tour is an ordering rather than an edge set, and every
tie-breaking of a heuristic is covered by a predicate on its output rather than by an algorithm.
Graphs are Mathlib SimpleGraphs on Fin n; the multigraphs of the two tree heuristics are
represented by closed walks with prescribed edge multisets, and shortcutting is the
first-occurrence order along the walk's node sequence. All degree and edge-set computations use
classical decidability. Theorems on tours assume n≥3 where a tour must have distinct
edges, n≥1 otherwise.
Theorem 10.1 is stated for the reduction of the full off-diagonal matrix, because the book's
upper-triangular version is false: a random metric instance violates it, since the last row and
first column of a triangular matrix are empty and the two edges at a node need not be one row
and one column entry. The full-matrix version is the statement of Little et al. It is stated for
n≥2, because a one-node "tour" is a self-loop that no off-diagonal entry constrains.
Theorem 10.4 is stated with the comb inequality's right-hand side corrected to
∣H∣+∑k(∣Tk∣−1)−21(s+1), the standard form. The book prints
+21(s−1), which contradicts its own 2-matching special case (10.15) and is weaker by
s. The corrected statement implies the printed one.
The 1-tree root is an explicit node r, the book's node 1. The nearest insertion run is a
sequence of lists indexed by iteration, and the theorem compares the n-th list's closed length
with z∗; a run always exists, so the hypothesis is satisfiable.
The definition module is shared by all fifteen items. Theorem 10.8 and Problem 10.12
(tightness of the bounds of 2), the second part of Theorem 10.6, and Lemma 10.18 on the
integrality gap are natural extensions on the same definitions.
N. Christofides, Worst-case analysis of a new heuristic for the travelling salesman problem, Report 388, GSIA, Carnegie Mellon University, 1976; reprinted in Operations Research Forum 3, 2022. https://doi.org/10.1007/s43069-021-00101-z
D. J. Rosenkrantz, R. E. Stearns and P. M. Lewis II, An analysis of several heuristics for the traveling salesman problem, SIAM Journal on Computing 6(3), 1977. https://doi.org/10.1137/0206041
M. Held and R. M. Karp, The traveling-salesman problem and minimum spanning trees, Operations Research 18(6), 1970. https://doi.org/10.1287/opre.18.6.1138
J. D. C. Little, K. G. Murty, D. W. Sweeney and C. Karel, An algorithm for the traveling salesman problem, Operations Research 11(6), 1963. https://doi.org/10.1287/opre.11.6.972
M. Grötschel and M. W. Padberg, On the symmetric travelling salesman problem I and II, Mathematical Programming 16, 1979. https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01582116
Fundamentals of Supply Chain Theory XII: The Vehicle Routing ProblemTextbook
Many vehicles, one depot
The vehicle routing problem asks for the cheapest set of delivery routes from a depot to a set
of customers when each vehicle can carry only so much. It generalizes the traveling salesman
problem, which is the case of a single vehicle of unlimited capacity, and it is the operational
problem behind every distribution fleet. Exact methods reach a few hundred customers; the
questions that shape fleet design are structural: how does the optimal routing cost compare with
the cost of a single grand tour, and how does it grow with the number of customers? Haimovich
and Rinnooy Kan (1985) answered both for unit demands
by bounding the optimal cost above and below in terms of the optimal TSP tour and the average
distance to the depot. Chapter 11 of Snyder and Shen's Fundamentals of Supply Chain Theory
(2019) presents that result with its full proof as
Theorem 11.6, and it is the goal of this mission.
Setting
Nodes are the depot 0 and customers 1,…,n, with distances cij that are symmetric,
nonnegative and satisfy the triangle inequality (VRPMetric). Every customer has demand 1 and
every vehicle capacity C, so a route is a sequence of at most C distinct customers,
served by one vehicle that leaves the depot, visits them in order and returns; its length is
routeCost c L. A solution is a family of routes visiting every customer exactly once
(IsVRPSolution), with total length solutionCost; the number of routes is free. The
optimal VRP valuez∗ (vrpOpt c C) is the least total length, the optimal TSP valuezT (tspOpt c) is the least length of a single route through all customers, and
cˉ (avgDepotDist) is the average distance from the depot to a customer.
Formalization targets
Goal: Theorem 11.6
For every metric instance with n≥1 customers and capacity C≥1,
max{2Cncˉ,zT}≤z∗≤2⌈Cn⌉cˉ+(1−C1)zT.
This is vrp_tsp_bounds.
Supporting targets
The three steps of the book's proof: the radial bound 2Cncˉ≤z∗, obtained
route by route from the triangle inequality and the capacity; the routing bound zT≤z∗;
and the iterated optimal tour partition bound (11.59), that for any tour Γ through all
customers some partition of its customer sequence into ⌈n/C⌉ consecutive routes
costs at most 2⌈n/C⌉cˉ+(1−⌈n/C⌉/n)z(Γ).
The chapter's other numbered results are not targets: Proposition 11.1 (state-space relaxation
of the routing dynamic program) and Theorem 11.2 (the capacitated comb inequality, proof
omitted, which needs the bin-packing function v(S)), and Theorems 11.3, 11.5, 11.7 and Lemma
11.4 (almost-sure asymptotics of random instances and the location-based heuristic), whose
proofs the book cites.
Significance
Theorem 11.6 is the quantitative link between routing and the two things a planner can estimate
without solving anything: the TSP length, which grows like n for random customers, and
the average depot distance. It says that the VRP cost is the TSP cost plus a radial term
2cˉ per vehicle, and that this decomposition is exact up to a factor bounded by the
capacity. The radial term explains Theorem 11.7, that the optimal cost grows linearly in n
for fixed capacity, and the tour partition heuristic in the proof is a practical
route-first-cluster-second method with a provable guarantee. The bounds are the basis of the
continuous approximation formulas used in strategic distribution design.
None of these results has a machine-checked proof. The book proves Theorem 11.6 in full. The
formal treatment of routes as lists and of the averaging argument over rotations of a tour is
reusable for the capacitated heuristics of Sect. 11.3.
Difficulty
The upper bound is an averaging argument that is easy to state and fiddly to formalize: for each
of the n rotations of the tour's customer sequence, the sequence is cut into blocks of C, and
one must count, across all rotations, how often each customer is the first or last of a block
and how often each tour edge is cut. The counts, ℓ=⌈n/C⌉ each, hold only after
the rotations are indexed carefully, and the passage from the average to the best rotation needs
the sum of the n solution costs computed exactly.
The lower bound has two parts with different flavors. The radial part needs, for each route,
that the closed route from the depot is at least twice the largest depot distance among its
customers, which is the triangle inequality applied along the route, followed by an averaging
step that uses the capacity. The routing part is a shortcutting argument: the routes of a
solution concatenate into a closed walk that revisits the depot, and removing the repeated depot
visits must not increase the length. The obvious idea, that a VRP solution is itself a tour, is
false, and the shortcut has to be constructed.
Formalization scope
Routes are lists of customers, solutions are lists of routes, and the feasibility predicate
requires nonempty routes of length at most C avoiding the depot, with the concatenation of
all routes a duplicate-free list containing every customer. Costs use the closed walk through
the depot followed by the route. The optimal values are infima of finite nonempty sets of reals,
nonempty because singleton routes are feasible when C≥1. The ceiling ⌈n/C⌉ is
Mathlib's Nat.ceil of the real quotient. The number of vehicles is unrestricted, as the
section assumes; the fixed-fleet version of the problem is not modeled.
The TSP value zT is defined as the least route cost over all orderings of the customers, so no
separate tour model is needed and the mission does not depend on the TSP mission of this series.
The definition module is shared by all five items. Problem 11.18 (tightness of both bounds) and
Theorem 11.7 for deterministic instance families are natural extensions on the same definitions.
M. Haimovich and A. H. G. Rinnooy Kan, Bounds and heuristics for capacitated routing problems, Mathematics of Operations Research 10(4), 1985. https://doi.org/10.1287/moor.10.4.527
The Theory and Practice of Revenue Management V: CompetitionTextbook
When competing firms settle on prices and allocations
Revenue management is practised by firms that compete: airlines matching fares while allocating
seats, retailers ordering stock and then pricing to clear it, hotels protecting rooms for
late high-paying guests. Chapter 8 of Talluri and van Ryzin's The Theory and Practice of
Revenue Management (2004) surveys the economics behind
these situations: monopoly pricing and mechanism design, the Coase problem, advance-purchase
discounts, and oligopoly in quantities (Cournot), in prices (Bertrand, Bertrand–Edgeworth with
capacities), in newsvendor capacities and in RM allocations. Most of its numbered results are
quoted from the literature; what the book itself establishes is a family of equilibrium
arguments built on Talluri's equilibrium graph: when each firm's best response moves
monotonically with the rival's action, following best-response arcs must end in an
equilibrium pair. This mission formalizes those arguments, with Proposition 8.3, existence of
an equilibrium in offer sets under the multinomial-logit choice model, as the goal.
Setting
A two-firm game on finite chains of strategies has payoffs u1,u2, best responses and
pure Nash equilibria (IsBestResponse1, IsNashEquilibrium); its equilibrium graph has
no crossing arcs (NoCrossing1) when best-response arcs (k2,k1), (l2,l1) with
k2<l2 always have k1≤l1. The chapter's games are: the RM duopoly of Sect.
8.4.1.3, two firms with capacity C and fares pL<pH whose high-fare demand spills over
to the rival beyond its protection level (spilloverDemand), each firm answering with
Littlewood's protection level (littlewoodResponse); the duopoly newsvendor of Example
8.16 with effective demands R1=D1+(D2−x2)+ (effectiveDemand); linear Cournot
(cournotPayoff); Bertrand–Edgeworth price competition with capacity C per firm, linear
demand and efficient rationing (beSales, bePayoff, IsBEEquilibrium); the advance-purchase
model of Sect. 8.3.6 (peakLoadRevenue, advancePurchaseRevenue); and the one-period
offer-set game of Sect. 8.4.3.2, where a firm offering its first k products earns
g(Ck)/(W1(k)+W2(l)+w0) with g(Ck)=∑j≤kwj(pj−Δ)−w0δ
(OfferFirm, offerPayoff1, CaseI, CaseII).
Formalization targets
Goal: Proposition 8.3
If both firms are in Case I (g(G∗)≥0) or both in Case II (g<0 on every complete
set), the offer-set game has a pure-strategy equilibrium in complete sets:
mnl_offer_set_equilibrium.
Supporting targets
The equilibrium-graph lemma, monotone best responses for both firms give an equilibrium
(Sect. 8.4.1.3); Proposition 8.1, Littlewood responses in the RM duopoly are monotone in the
rival's protection level, and the resulting equilibrium of the RM duopoly game; Example 8.16,
duopoly newsvendor capacities total at least the monopoly capacity; Example 8.15, the
symmetric Cournot equilibrium and its price; Theorem 8.5 (i)-(ii), the pure-strategy
Bertrand–Edgeworth equilibria; and the advance-purchase comparison of Sect. 8.3.6,
w2<w^ and VAPD(w^)≥Vpeak(w2).
Not targets: Theorems 8.1-8.2 (the Coase problem, subgame-perfect equilibria of an
infinite-horizon game, proofs in von der Fehr and Kühn), Theorem 8.3 (Harris–Raviv priority
pricing, stated with a garbled price formula), Theorem 8.4 (existence via quasiconcavity,
cited), Theorem 8.5 (iii), 8.6 and 8.7-8.8 (mixed-strategy and supergame equilibria of Kreps
and Scheinkman and Benoit and Krishna), Proposition 8.2 and Proposition 8.4 (the dynamic
offer-set game under condition (8.32), proved in Talluri's paper), and the Kreps–Scheinkman
derivation of Sect. 8.4.1.6, which rests on Theorem 8.6.
Significance
The equilibrium graph is the chapter's own contribution: a bipartite picture of best responses
on chains in which monotonicity, the absence of crossing arcs, forces an equilibrium. It is
the finite, combinatorial form of the monotone comparative-statics route to Nash equilibrium
(Tarski's fixed point on a chain), and it is what makes RM allocation games tractable: the
two-class duopoly with Littlewood responses always has an equilibrium, and the offer-set
duopoly does whenever the two firms face the same sign of g, while Example 8.18 shows a
best-response cycle when they do not. The Bertrand–Edgeworth, Cournot and newsvendor results
are the benchmarks the book uses to interpret RM competition: capacity constraints soften
Bertrand's zero-profit outcome, competing in allocations tends to raise total capacity above
the monopoly level, and advance-purchase discounts dominate peak-load pricing as a
self-selection mechanism. None of these has a machine-checked proof.
Difficulty
The lemma and the goal are fixed-point arguments on finite chains: the largest best response
is a monotone map of the rival's index, the composition of two monotone (or two antitone)
maps on a finite chain has a fixed point, and for the offer-set game the monotonicity itself
must be extracted from the ratio structure g(Ck)/(W(k)+a) as in the appendix's inequalities
(8.A.3)-(8.A.5), separately in the two cases. Proposition 8.1 is a monotonicity of
tail probabilities under the pointwise order of effective demands. Example 8.16 is a short
probabilistic argument that needs the identity {D>x1+x2}={R1>x1}∩{R2>x2}
and the strict monotonicity of the tail. Theorem 8.5 requires computing efficient-rationing
sales for every unilateral deviation from a symmetric profile, through the recursive
definition of residual demand, and a quadratic inequality for upward deviations in part (ii).
The advance-purchase item reduces to the identity VAPD(w)−Vpeak(w)=(1−α)w and
the strict decrease of the first-order-condition function.
Formalization scope
Products, protection levels and complete sets are natural numbers; the offer-set game's
strategies are the complete sets C1,…,Cn of the book, and its payoff is (8.31) up to
the positive factor λ and the terms independent of both offer sets. Prices decreasing
in the product index are a hypothesis, as the nested-by-revenue order of Sect. 8.4.3.2. The
RM duopoly is modeled through Littlewood's response, as the book's appendix argues, rather
than through expected revenues. Efficient rationing is defined recursively over the firms
priced strictly below a given firm, with equal sharing among firms at the same price.
Example 8.16 is stated with the equilibrium conditions (8.23) and the strictly increasing
distribution of aggregate demand as hypotheses. The advance-purchase item takes the
first-order conditions (8.13) and (8.15) and the book's uniqueness assumption as hypotheses,
the latter as (v−w)−F(w)/f(w) strictly decreasing in w (the page prints "increasing",
but its footnote identifies it with the monotone marginal-revenue assumption, which is
decreasing in the waiting cost).
Theorem 8.5 is stated for its pure-strategy parts (i) and (ii) only.
Selected references
K. T. Talluri and G. J. van Ryzin, The Theory and Practice of Revenue Management, Kluwer/Springer, 2004, Chapter 8. https://doi.org/10.1007/b139000
D. M. Kreps and J. A. Scheinkman, Quantity precommitment and Bertrand competition yield Cournot outcomes, Bell Journal of Economics 14(2), 1983. https://doi.org/10.2307/3003636
S. Netessine and R. A. Shumsky, Revenue management games: horizontal and vertical competition, Management Science 51(5), 2005. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.1040.0356
I. L. Gale and T. J. Holmes, Advance-purchase discounts and monopoly allocation of capacity, American Economic Review 83(1), 1993. https://www.jstor.org/stable/2117500
Fundamentals of Supply Chain Theory XIII: AuctionsTextbook
When is the auctioneer's revenue acceptable?
The Vickrey-Clarke-Groves auction is the textbook mechanism for selling several objects at once:
bidders report valuations for bundles, the auctioneer computes the welfare-maximizing
allocation, and each winner pays the externality it imposes on the others. Truthful bidding is a
dominant strategy and the outcome is efficient. Yet Ausubel and Milgrom
(2006) catalogued its practical defects:
revenue can be zero when the objects are valuable, revenue can fall when bidders or bids are
added, losing bidders can profit by colluding, and a bidder can profit from false identities.
Chapter 15 of Snyder and Shen's Fundamentals of Supply Chain Theory
(2019) reproduces those examples and then gives the
cooperative-game answer to when they cannot occur: the VCG payoff vector should lie in the
core, the set of outcomes no coalition of auctioneer and bidders can improve upon, and it
does so for every set of participants exactly when the coalitional value function is
bidder-submodular. This mission formalizes that characterization, Theorem 15.3, together
with the lemma and theorem leading to it.
Setting
Players are the auctioneer 0 and bidders 1,…,n. A coalitional value functionV
assigns to each coalition T the value it can create by trading among themselves: 0 if the
auctioneer, who owns the objects, is not in T, and otherwise the optimal value of the
auctioneer's allocation problem among the bidders of T, each bidder receiving at most one
bundle and bundles disjoint (capValue). Two properties of V are all the theory uses:
coalitions without the auctioneer are worthless, and adding players never lowers the value
(IsCoalitionalValue).
A payoff vectorπ gives each player a payoff. It lies in the core of the game on a
coalition S∋0 (InCore V S π) if the payoffs of S sum to V(S) and no sub-coalition
T⊆S is paid less than V(T). The VCG payoff vectorπˉ(S) (vcgPayoff)
pays each bidder k its marginal contribution V(S)−V(S∖k), which is its valuation
minus its VCG payment, and the auctioneer the remainder. A core vector is bidder dominant
(BidderDominant) if every bidder weakly prefers it to every other core vector. V is
bidder-submodular (BidderSubmodular) if each bidder's marginal contribution weakly
decreases as the coalition grows.
Formalization targets
Goal: Theorem 15.3
For a coalitional value function V, the following are equivalent: (i) V is
bidder-submodular; (ii) for every coalition S∋0 the core equals
ΠS={π:∑k∈Sπk=V(S),0≤πk≤πˉk(S)∀k∈S∖0};
(iii) for every coalition S∋0, πˉ(S) lies in the core of S. This is
vcg_core_characterization.
Supporting targets
That the combinatorial auction's V is a coalitional value function; Lemma 15.1, the core is
nonempty and each bidder's VCG payoff is the largest it receives at any core point; Theorem
15.2, the VCG vector is the bidder-dominant core point when it is in the core, and otherwise no
bidder-dominant point exists and the auctioneer's VCG payoff is below every core payoff.
The English auction of Sect. 15.2, presented as a primal-dual interpretation of a linear
program, and the combinatorial allocation problem of Sect. 15.3 carry no numbered results and
are not targets.
Significance
Theorem 15.3 is the criterion an auction designer can check before running a VCG auction: when
the bidders' valuations make V bidder-submodular (for instance when objects are substitutes),
the VCG outcome is a competitive outcome, its revenue meets the core benchmark, and none of the
defects of Sect. 15.4.2 can arise; when they do not, Theorem 15.2 says the auctioneer's revenue
is strictly below every competitive outcome. The result underlies the ascending package
auctions proposed as VCG alternatives and the procurement auctions used in supply chains, such
as the combinatorial reverse auctions of the chapter's case study.
None of these results has a machine-checked proof. The book proves all three. The formal
treatment of the core and of marginal-contribution vectors is reusable for the cooperative-game
models of cost allocation in supply chains.
Difficulty
The theorems are combinatorial statements about a function on finite sets, and the difficulty
is entirely in the bookkeeping of coalitions. Lemma 15.1 needs the explicit core vector of its
proof to be verified against every sub-coalition, which splits into cases on whether the
sub-coalition contains the auctioneer and the distinguished bidder. The implication (i)
⇒ (ii) telescopes marginal contributions along a chain of coalitions between a
sub-coalition and S, and the chain has to be built and its sum computed. The implication
(iii) ⇒ (i) is the delicate one: a failure of submodularity is a pair of nested
coalitions, and the proof needs to extract from it a single-element step at which a bidder's
marginal contribution increases, then show the two-bidder sub-coalition blocks the VCG vector.
The obvious idea, that submodularity can be checked only on single-element extensions, is
correct but must itself be proved.
Formalization scope
Coalitions are finite sets of Fin (n+1) and payoff vectors are functions on all players; the
core and ΠS constrain only the players of S, so vectors differing outside S are
interchangeable. The core's budget equation sums over all players of the coalition, including
the auctioneer, which is what the book's proofs use although its displayed definition sums over
the bidders. The theorems take V as any function with the two properties, and the auction's
V is shown to have them; the VCG vector is defined by the formulas (15.23) and (15.24) rather
than through the payment rule, whose equivalence is the book's derivation. Bidder-submodularity
is stated for S⊆S′ rather than proper inclusion, which changes nothing.
The definition module is shared by all five items. The single-item English auction as a
primal-dual algorithm and the condition on individual preferences (substitutes) that implies
bidder-submodularity are natural extensions on the same definitions.
Multi-armed Bandit Allocation Indices I: The Gittins Index, Optimal Stopping and MonotonicityTextbook
Motivation
A decision-maker has n projects, each a Markov reward process, and at every decision time may advance exactly one of them; the others stay frozen. Which project to advance so as to maximize the expected total discounted reward? Posed as a dynamic program the problem has a state space that is the product of the n state spaces, and the size of that product defeats every general method. The index theorem of Gittins and Jones (1974) says the dynamic program is solved exactly by an index policy: there is a real number ν(B,x), computable for each bandit process B from its own data and its own current state x, such that always advancing a process of greatest index is optimal. Chapter 2 of Gittins, Glazebrook and Weber, Multi-armed Bandit Allocation Indices (2nd ed., doi:10.1002/9780470980033), introduces the index, proves the theorem three times, and works out the properties of the index that the rest of the book, from jobs and superprocesses to restless bandits, is built on: which stopping time attains it, how it is computed, how it moves with the discount factor, and when it collapses to the myopic rule.
The index theorem itself is already on the platform, proved, as BanditAlgorithm.gittins_index_theorem in the Bandit Algorithms series (Lattimore and Szepesvári, Theorem 35.9). This mission cites it and formalizes what Chapter 2 establishes around it.
Setting
A bandit processB (§2.3–2.4) is a Markov reward process on a countable state space E: transition probabilities P(y∣x), a bounded reward r(x) received each time the continuation control is applied in state x, and a discount factor a∈(0,1); the freeze control leaves the state unchanged and yields nothing. The law of the process started at x is Px and x(t) is its state at process time t=0,1,2,…. A stopping timeτ is a past-measurable rule for switching from continuation to freezing, taking values in {1,2,…}∪{∞}. For such τ, Rτ(B,x)=Ex[∑t<τatr(x(t))] is the expected discounted reward and Wτ(B,x)=Ex[∑t<τat] the expected discounted time; their ratio ντ(B,x) (2.7) is the equivalent constant reward rate of that portion of B. The Gittins index is
ν(B,x)=τ>0supWτ(B,x)Rτ(B,x)(2.6)
and, equivalently, the fair charge (2.5): the greatest rent λ per period for which continuing B for one or more periods, paying λ each period, can be done without expected loss. A simple family of alternative bandit processes (SFABP) is n such processes with a common discount factor, one of which is continued at each decision time; an index policy continues a process of greatest index. In the Lean development the single-arm model is the platform's (GittinsIndex): the chain law is built by the Ionescu–Tulcea construction, stopping times are adapted N∪{∞}-valued maps on trajectories, and gittinsIndex P r a x is (2.6).
Formalization targets
Goal: Lemma 2.2, the optimal stopping set
The supremum in (2.6) is attained. For the initial state ξ, the attaining stopping rule may be taken to be "stop at the first time t≥1 at which the state lies in Σ0" for any set Σ0 with
{x:ν(B,x)<ν(B,ξ)}⊆Σ0⊆{x:ν(B,x)≤ν(B,ξ)},
and every such rule has ντ(B,ξ)=ν(B,ξ).
Milestones
Theorem 2.1 as a reference to the proved platform theorem; Eq. (2.5), the fair-charge characterization of the index; the restart-in-state formulation of §2.6.4 as the convergence of the Katehakis–Veinott value iteration; Theorem 2.3, monotonicity in the discount factor; Lemma 2.4, the interchange of two bandit portions; Propositions 2.5–2.8, the monotone-index cases in which the index is the immediate reward, or is attained only after the first step, or only at τ=∞.
Significance
Lemma 2.2 is the working form of the index: it turns the supremum over all stopping times into a specific rule, the first time the index falls below its starting value, and it is what the interchange proof of §2.7, the modified-forwards-induction policies of §2.6.6, the monotone-index propositions of §2.11 and the treatment of jobs in Chapter 3 all use. The fair-charge form (2.5) is the prevailing-charge proof of the theorem (Weber 1992) and the interpretation that carries over to superprocesses and restless bandits. The restart formulation is how indices are computed in practice (Katehakis and Veinott 1987), and Theorem 2.3 is the first of the comparative statics used throughout Chapters 7 and 8. Lemma 2.4 is the elementary inequality behind the original proof of Gittins and Jones.
Of these, only the index theorem has a machine-checked proof today. Formalizing the rest gives the platform the index as a usable object: a characterization of the optimal stopping rule, a convergent algorithm for it, and the monotonicity facts, all stated against the existing model so that every later mission of this series and every future use of the L&S model can build on them.
Difficulty
The obvious first move for Lemma 2.2, "take the stopping time that achieves the supremum", is what has to be proved: the supremum is over an uncountable family, and attainment comes from the optimal stopping problem with charge λ=ν(B,ξ), whose value function satisfies φ(x)=max{0,r(x)−λ+aE[φ(x(1))∣x(0)=x]}, together with the fact that its optimal stopping set is characterized by the strict and non-strict inequalities λ>ν(B,x) and λ≥ν(B,x). That last step is the content: it identifies the local decision "stop or continue" with a comparison of indices, which is why any set between the two level sets works. On the platform's model this requires the dynamic-programming theory of discounted optimal stopping on a countable space (Theorem 2.10 of the book), the identification of fairChargeProfit with that value function, and the strong Markov property of markovChainMeasure at a trajectory stopping time. Theorem 2.3 needs randomized stopping times (a geometric kill) and the fact that they do not enlarge the supremum. The restart iteration is monotone and bounded but its operator is not a contraction in the restart value, so its limit has to be identified with the restart problem's value directly; that value is max(0,ν/(1−a)), not ν/(1−a), because restarting forever is free.
Formalization scope
The state space is a countable type with measurable singletons, so every subset is measurable; rewards are bounded; a∈(0,1). The chain law, stopping times, the discounted stopped sums and the index are the platform's, unchanged. Expectations are Bochner integrals; with bounded rewards they are finite and no total-function default value enters. IsPositiveStoppingTime fixes τ≥1 everywhere, so Wτ≥1 and the ratio (2.7) is a genuine quotient. The stopping rule of Lemma 2.2 is the hitting time from time 1 of a set, with ∞ when the set is never hit. The fair-charge profit is a real supremum over the nonempty bounded family of positive stopping times, and (2.5) is stated with the outer supremum over {λ:profit(λ)≥0}, a nonempty set bounded above. The restart iteration is stated as a limit, with the value max(0,ν(B,ξ)/(1−a)): for a nonnegative index this is the book's ν/(1−a), and the maximum is forced by a one-state example with negative reward. The propositions' hypotheses are almost-sure events under Px, written as events of measure one.
Two trivializing readings are excluded: the index is never taken over all N∪{∞}-valued maps but over adapted stopping times, and the stopping set of the goal is not restricted to the two extreme level sets. Contributions welcome: the optimal-stopping dynamic program on markovChainMeasure (value iteration, the strong Markov property at a stopping time), the equivalence of randomized and non-randomized stopping times for the supremum, and the monotone convergence of the restart iteration.
Selected references
J. Gittins, K. Glazebrook, R. Weber, Multi-armed Bandit Allocation Indices, 2nd ed., Wiley, 2011, Chapter 2. doi:10.1002/9780470980033
J. C. Gittins, D. M. Jones, A dynamic allocation index for the sequential design of experiments, in Progress in Statistics (Gani, ed.), North-Holland, 1974.
R. Weber, On the Gittins index for multiarmed bandits, Annals of Applied Probability 2(4), 1992. doi:10.1214/aoap/1177005588
M. N. Katehakis, A. F. Veinott, The multi-armed bandit problem: decomposition and computation, Mathematics of Operations Research 12(2), 1987. doi:10.1287/moor.12.2.262
T. Lattimore, C. Szepesvári, Bandit Algorithms, Cambridge University Press, 2020, Chapter 35. doi:10.1017/9781108571401
Introduction to Multi-Armed Bandits XI: Bandits and Agents, Incentivized Exploration via Hidden ExplorationTextbook
Motivation
A recommendation system learns from the users it serves: the diner who tries a restaurant produces the review the next diner reads. Each user would rather exploit what is already known than explore for the benefit of those who come later, so a population of self-interested agents under-explores, and an alternative that looks bad on sparse early evidence may never be tried again even when it is the best. Chapter 11 of Slivkins, Introduction to Multi-Armed Bandits (arXiv:1904.07272), treats incentivized exploration: a principal who cannot force the agents but can recommend, and who, because it aggregates what earlier agents observed, knows more than any one of them. The question is whether recommendations alone can induce enough exploration to learn as fast as an ordinary bandit algorithm. The model is that of Kremer, Mansour and Perry (JPE 2014) and the results are those of Mansour, Slivkins and Syrgkanis (EC 2015, Operations Research 2020), specialized to two arms; the single-round problem is Bayesian persuasion in the sense of Kamenica and Gentzkow (AER 2011).
Setting
There are K arms and T rounds. A mean reward vector μ∈[0,1]K is drawn from a known priorP, and each pull of arm a yields a reward drawn from a known family Dμa with mean μa. In round t the principal recommends an arm rect; agent t, who knows the prior, the family, the algorithm and the round but not the past, sees only rect, chooses at, collects rt∼Dμat and leaves; the principal observes (at,rt). The chapter works with two arms, ordered so that the prior means satisfy μ10≥μ20, with a prior of finite support and finitely many reward values.
An algorithm is Bayesian incentive-compatible (BIC, Definition 11.4) if following its recommendation is in every agent's interest given what the agent knows: for every round t and arms a=a′ with Pr[rect=a,Et−1]>0,
E[μa−μa′∣rect=a,Et−1]≥0,(11.1)
where Et−1 is the event that all previous agents complied. A BIC algorithm is then an ordinary bandit algorithm whose recommendations are followed, and the run has the law of the Bayesian bandit of Chapter 3. Two contrasting policies frame the chapter. GREEDY reveals the history and lets agents exploit, at∈argmaxaE[μa∣Ht] (11.2); it is BIC and it fails. HiddenExploration (Algorithm 11.1) hides a little exploration in a lot of exploitation: on a signal sig, with probability ε it recommends a target arm atrg(sig), otherwise the arm maximizing E[μa∣sig], ties to arm 1. Its posterior gap is G=E[μ2−μ1∣sig]. RepeatedHE (Algorithm 11.2) runs it round after round with an arbitrary bandit algorithm ALG as the target: N0 initial rounds recommend arm 1; afterwards, with probability ε the round is an exploration round in which ALG chooses (and is fed the reward), and otherwise the exploitation branch recommends minargmaxaE[μa∣St], where St is the data of all exploration rounds so far (11.10). The quantity that governs everything is G1,n=E[μ2−μ1∣S1,n] (11.11), the posterior gap after n samples of arm 1, and Property (11.12), that Pr[G1,n>0]>0 for some n: arm 2 can appear better after enough samples of arm 1.
Formalization targets
Goal: Theorem 11.15
RepeatedHE with exploration probability ε>0 and N0 initial samples of arm 1 is BIC as long as
ε<31E[G⋅1{G>0}],G=GN0+1=E[μ2−μ1∣S1,N0],
for any bandit algorithm ALG and any horizon. The threshold depends on the prior alone.
Milestones
Theorem 11.7 (GREEDY never chooses arm 2 with probability at least μ10−μ20) and Corollary 11.8 (linear Bayesian regret of GREEDY under independent priors); Lemma 11.10 (HiddenExploration is BIC when ε≤31E[G1{G>0}]) with Claim 11.12 (the arm-2 side of the constraint suffices); Corollary 11.14 (RepeatedHE is BIC under the round-by-round condition); Theorem 11.19 (without Property (11.12) no BIC algorithm ever plays arm 2, ties to arm 1).
Significance
The results say when exploration can be incentivized at all and how. Theorem 11.7 shows that revealing everything is not a solution: the greedy dynamics gets stuck on arm 1 with a probability that does not shrink with T, and Corollary 11.8 turns that into Ω(T) Bayesian regret. Theorem 11.15 shows that a recommendation-only principal can induce any amount of exploration it wants, with ALG arbitrary, at a per-round rate ε fixed by the prior; Theorem 11.17 (stated with a proof sketch, and omitted here) then transfers ALG's regret to RepeatedHE up to the prior-dependent factors N0 and 1/ε, so O~(T) regret is attainable subject to incentives. Theorem 11.19 closes the picture: Property (11.12) is necessary as well as sufficient. Together they characterize which priors admit incentivized exploration and give an algorithm that works for all of them.
Nothing of this is machine-checked. The mission adds to the Bayesian layer of mission III (prior, posterior by Bayes' rule, Bayesian regret) the BIC constraint on a joint law, GREEDY as a policy, the single-round HiddenExploration on an abstract finite signal, and the law of RepeatedHE; all of it is reusable for the K-arm and the "explore all explorable arms" extensions of the literature review.
Difficulty
Theorem 11.7 is a martingale argument: the posterior gap along the history is a Doob martingale, the first round in which arm 2 is chosen is a bounded stopping time, and optional stopping gives E[Zτ]=μ10−μ20; all of this has to be set up on the joint law of (μ,HT) of mission III, where the posterior is defined by Bayes' rule and the identification with a conditional expectation is itself a theorem (posterior_eq_condProb). Lemma 11.10 is the heart of the chapter and is not a computation about rec: it works with F(E)=E[G1E], splits along the two branches, uses that the exploitation branch recommends arm 2 exactly when G>0, and closes with F(G>0)+F(G<0)=E[μ2−μ1]≤0; the only place where the analysis uses that both branches are functions of the signal is the step E[μ2−μ1∣rec=2]=E[G∣rec=2], and a formalization has to make that step explicit. Theorem 11.15 requires seeing each later round of RepeatedHE as a HiddenExploration with signal St, where ALG's choice is a randomized function of St, and then the monotonicity of E[Gt1{Gt>0}] in t, a two-line consequence of St+1 determining St that presupposes the posterior given St is the Bayes posterior of the exploration data alone, which is true because the exploration decisions do not depend on μ given that data. Corollary 11.8 needs the independence of the event "μ1<1−2α and arm 2 is never chosen" from μ2. Theorem 11.19 is an induction in which the inductive hypothesis is a probability-zero statement about all earlier rounds.
Formalization scope
Arms are Fin 2, the book's arm 1 being index 0; rounds are Fin T. The prior is a probability measure on mean vectors supported on a finite set F⊆[0,1]2, with μ10≥μ20 as a hypothesis; the reward family is mission III's RewardFamily (finitely many values, mean ν for ν∈[0,1]). BIC is defined on a joint law of (μ,record) of the run in which every agent complies, with the recommendation of each round read off the record; the compliance event Et−1 of (11.1) is the sure event of that law, which is the standard reading of "the agents believe all previous agents complied". For a bandit policy the law is mission III's jointMeasure. Conditional expectations are written as finite sums over F, so there are no integrals and no integrability side conditions; a posterior mean off the support is a junk 0 that never enters a theorem. GREEDY allows arbitrary tie-breaking; HiddenExploration's exploitation branch breaks ties toward arm 1 as Algorithm 11.1 does; the tie convention of Theorem 11.19 is the strict form of BIC for arm 2. The law of RepeatedHE is an explicit finitely supported measure, μ and record weighted by the prior times the product of the round probabilities (initial rounds forced to arm 1, then the ε-coin, ALG's kernel on its own history, or the exploitation arm, then Dμat); it is written this way because ALG is fed a history of variable length. Two conditions are stated exactly as printed: Lemma 11.10 with ε≤31E[G1{G>0}] (non-strict, checked at equality) and Theorem 11.15 with the strict inequality.
Trivializations are excluded: ε>0 throughout; the BIC condition is asserted only where the recommendation has positive probability, and the sums in it are over the finite support, so an unsatisfiable hypothesis cannot hide in a measure-zero set. Welcome contributions: the optional-stopping argument on jointMeasure, the identification of explPostMean with the conditional expectation given the exploration data, the Bayes-rule algebra behind Lemma 11.10, and the counting lemmas on heRecords.
Selected references
A. Slivkins, Introduction to Multi-Armed Bandits, Foundations and Trends in Machine Learning 12(1-2), 2019, Chapter 11. arXiv:1904.07272, doi:10.1561/2200000068
I. Kremer, Y. Mansour, M. Perry, Implementing the "Wisdom of the Crowd", Journal of Political Economy 122(5), 2014. doi:10.1086/676597
Y. Mansour, A. Slivkins, V. Syrgkanis, Bayesian Incentive-Compatible Bandit Exploration, Operations Research 68(4), 2020 (EC 2015). doi:10.1287/opre.2019.1919
E. Kamenica, M. Gentzkow, Bayesian Persuasion, American Economic Review 101(6), 2011. doi:10.1257/aer.101.6.2590
M. Sellke, A. Slivkins, The Price of Incentivizing Exploration: A Characterization via Thompson Sampling and Sample Complexity, Operations Research 71(5), 2023. doi:10.1287/opre.2022.2401