Understanding and Using Linear Programming VI: The Minimax Theorem for Zero-Sum GamesTextbook
Why zero-sum games belong in a linear programming course
A two-player zero-sum game models any situation in which one party's gain is exactly the other party's loss: a military allocation in the spirit of Colonel Blotto, a sealed-bid contest, rock–paper–scissors. The central question is what each player should do when the opponent is also reasoning about them. John von Neumann answered it in 1928 with the minimax theorem (von Neumann 1928): each player has a strategy guaranteeing the same number, the value of the game, whatever the opponent does. The theorem underlies modern game theory, robust decision making, and the analysis of online learning algorithms, where regret bounds are routinely derived from it.
Section 8.1 of Matoušek and Gärtner's Understanding and Using Linear Programming (Springer 2007) presents the theorem as an application of linear programming duality. This mission is the sixth of a series formalizing the capstone results of the book.
Setting
Alice has pure strategies and Bob has . A real payoff matrix records Alice's gain, and Bob's loss, when Alice plays her th and Bob his th pure strategy. A mixed strategy of Alice is a probability vector , , ; a mixed strategy of Bob is a probability vector . When the players randomize independently, Alice's expected payoff is
The worst-case payoffs are
over mixed strategies. A mixed strategy of Bob is a best response against if it minimizes ; a mixed strategy of Alice is a best response against if it maximizes it. A pair is a mixed Nash equilibrium (Definition 8.1.1) if each is a best response against the other. Alice's is worst-case optimal if ; Bob's is worst-case optimal if .
The proof in the book passes through three linear programs: the dual of (8.1), which for a fixed maximizes subject to ; program (8.2), the same with as variables subject to , ; and program (8.4), which minimizes subject to , , .
Formalization targets
Goal: Theorem 8.1.3 (minimax theorem for zero-sum games)
For every payoff matrix with : worst-case optimal mixed strategies exist for both players; for any worst-case optimal of Alice and of Bob, the pair is a mixed Nash equilibrium; and there is a single number , the value of the game, with
for every such pair. The third clause is what distinguishes the theorem from the existence of some saddle point.
Milestones
- and are attained minima and maxima (p. 135).
- Lemma 8.1.2(i): for all mixed , hence .
- Lemma 8.1.2(ii): both strategies of a mixed Nash equilibrium are worst-case optimal.
- Lemma 8.1.2(iii): implies that is a mixed Nash equilibrium.
- The dual of (8.1) has optimal value (p. 137).
- Eq. (8.3): an optimal solution of (8.2) satisfies .
- Eq. (8.5): an optimal solution of (8.4) satisfies .
- Programs (8.2) and (8.4) both have optimal solutions, and their optimum values coincide (p. 138).
- The minimax equality (p. 137):
Significance
The theorem gives a complete prescription for zero-sum play: a worst-case optimal strategy secures at least the value against any opponent, and a worst-case optimal opponent holds the player to at most the value, so both players can announce their strategies in advance without loss. With Lemma 8.1.2(ii) it yields a characterization: a pair of mixed strategies is a Nash equilibrium if and only if both are worst-case optimal. The minimax equality is used downstream in online learning (regret-to-value arguments), in robust optimization, and in Yao's principle for randomized algorithms.
The mathematics is classical and proved; what this mission adds is a machine-checked version in the book's own formulation. The platform already has AGT.zero_sum_minimax (Algorithmic Game Theory I), which proves the existence of a saddle point, and the general FamousTheorems.sion_minimax_theorem. Neither states that every pair of worst-case optimal strategies is an equilibrium with a common value, and neither exhibits the LP route: the dual of (8.1), the programs (8.2) and (8.4), and their duality. The mission records that route statement by statement, so that it can be reused as a worked instance of LP duality.
Difficulty
Lemma 8.1.2 is routine; the entire content is the reverse inequality . The obvious attack, maximizing directly, fails because is a minimum of linear functions and hence not linear, so its maximization is not a linear program as written. The obstacle is removed only by an appeal to LP duality in the proof, together with the facts that the simplices are nonempty and compact, and that the relevant programs are feasible and bounded so that optima exist. None of this is supplied by the pure-strategy structure of the game: pure Nash equilibria need not exist (rock–paper–scissors has none).
Formalization scope
Pure strategies are indexed by Fin m and Fin n, with the book's standing assumption carried as hypotheses 1 ≤ m, 1 ≤ n by every theorem; the book's indices become . Mixed strategies are Mathlib's stdSimplex ℝ (Fin m), the payoff is x ⬝ᵥ (M *ᵥ y). is the real sInf and the real sSup of the payoffs over the opponent's simplex; milestone 1 states that these are attained. A mixed Nash equilibrium is defined in the verbal form of Definition 8.1.1 (mutual best responses). Worst-case optimality is defined against all mixed strategies, never as a saddle-point condition, so the goal is not circular with Lemma 8.1.2(iii). LP optimality is stated as "feasible and at least as good as every feasible point", so no supremum over a possibly empty or unbounded feasible set is used.
The book's clause that worst-case optimal strategies "can be efficiently computed by linear programming" is algorithmic and is not part of the formal statement; there is no complexity model. A goal asserting only the existence of worst-case optimal strategies, or only the existence of some equilibrium, would drop the theorem's third clause and is ruled out: the common value is quantified before all pairs of worst-case optimal strategies.
A complete development needs compactness of the standard simplex, continuity of the bilinear payoff, and a strong duality theorem for linear programs in the form of the programs (8.2)/(8.4); the latter is reusable across the whole series. Proofs by other routes (Sion's theorem, a separating hyperplane argument, fixed points) are welcome for the goal; the LP milestones stand on their own as statements about the programs.
Selected references
- J. Matoušek, B. Gärtner, Understanding and Using Linear Programming, Springer Universitext, 2007, §8.1, pp. 131–142. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-30717-4
- J. von Neumann, "Zur Theorie der Gesellschaftsspiele", Mathematische Annalen 100 (1928), 295–320. https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01448847
- M. Sion, "On general minimax theorems", Pacific Journal of Mathematics 8 (1958), 171–176. https://doi.org/10.2140/pjm.1958.8.171