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Economics

523 missions · 401 completed

Missions

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Operations ResearchProbability·Captain: mikedeng1

Operational Risk Management: Optimal Inspection Policy I: Periodic Inspection Beats Random Inspection Below an Inspection-Cost Threshold and Loses Above ItResearch Paper

A firm that relies on employees to process transactions can lose money when errors remain undetected. Inspection catches errors, but each inspection costs money, and employees may change their care when they know when an inspection will occur. These effects make the timing of inspections part of a contract design problem, not just a scheduling choice. Kim…

8 thms3 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Algorithmic Game TheoryOperations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

Superstar Exclusivity in Two-Sided Markets: Exclusivity Draws Consumers and Complementors to the Favored Platform and Raises Complementors' Total SurplusResearch Paper

Platform markets often feature a Superstar: a single complement whose presence moves consumers, such as a blockbuster game on a console or a star streamer on a video platform. Whether such a Superstar signs an exclusive deal with one platform or stays available on both is a recurring question for competition authorities and for platform managers. Empirical…

8 thms3 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Algorithmic Game TheoryOperations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

Fair and Consistent Prize Allocation in Competitions 1: A Prize Allocation Rule Satisfies Order Preservation, Endowment Monotonicity and Consistency iff It Is an Interval RuleResearch Paper

Sports leagues, tournaments, esports events and research competitions all end with a ranking of the participants and a sum of prize money to divide among them. How the money is split according to the ranking is a design choice with visible consequences: Winner-Takes-All schemes reward only the top, equal division ignores the ranking, and most real prize…

9 thms3 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Operations ResearchOptimization·Captain: mikedeng1

Digital Privacy I: The Profit-Maximizing Data Collection and Protection Have a Closed Form, and Both Weakly Increase with the Data-Driven Revenue Share PResearch Paper

Platforms that earn money from their users' activity make two linked decisions about the data that activity generates: how much of it to record and store, and how much to spend protecting what they store. Stored data lets a business tailor its services and sell data-driven products, but it also attracts adversaries (hackers, data brokers, unauthorized third…

17 thms3 active users
🏆Completed
Algorithmic Game TheoryOperations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

Privacy Rights and Data Security: GDPR and Personal Data Markets 2: Without Privacy Rights the Monopoly Equilibrium Has Three Breach-Cost Regimes and No Trade Once c ≥ 1 + δμ/(1 + δ)Research Paper

Personal data lets a firm tailor its product to each customer, and the same data exposes the customer to the risk of a breach. The EU's General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR, 2018) and the California Consumer Privacy Act give consumers rights over that data. Data collection must be opted into separately from the purchase, and stored data must be erased…

10 thms3 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Operations ResearchOptimizationProbability·Captain: mikedeng1

Gathering Information before Negotiation I: The Buyer's Optimal Information Acquisition Increases with Its Bargaining Power and First Increases, Then Decreases with the Seller's CostResearch Paper

Many transactions are priced by negotiation rather than posted prices: business-to-business procurement, used cars, real estate, the purchase of a company. Before negotiating, a buyer can often spend effort finding out how much the object is actually worth to it, through inspections, trials, consultants or market research. That information serves two…

10 thms3 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Operations ResearchOptimizationProbability·Captain: mikedeng1

Gathering Information before Negotiation II: Under a Uniform Prior and Linear Information Cost, the Seller's Expected Payoff Jumps Down at θs = 1 − θ̃, Up at c = c_l and Down at c = c_hResearch Paper

In many trades the buyer does not know how much the good is worth to it, and can find out before negotiating: a firm commissions due diligence before an acquisition, a hospital pilots a device before negotiating its price, a household inspects a house before making an offer. Such information has two effects. It makes the trade decision better informed,…

18 thms3 active users
🏆Completed
Algorithmic Game TheoryOperations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

Platform Competition and Interoperability: The Net Fee Model III: Stronger Interoperability Lowers the Symmetric Equilibrium Net Fee, Except in Duopoly Without an Outside OptionResearch Paper

A recurring proposal in the policy debate on dominant digital platforms is to make competing platforms interoperable, so that users of one service can interact with users of another; the EU Digital Markets Act (Regulation (EU) 2022/1925, Article 7) imposes such an obligation on gatekeepers' messaging services. The economic case is that users then enjoy…

9 thms3 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Operations ResearchProbability·Captain: mikedeng1

Source Theory: A Tractable and Positive Ambiguity Theory 4: Two Sources Are Equally Preferred and Insensitive If and Only If Both Are Uniform with Equal Source FunctionsResearch Paper

Decision makers facing uncertainty treat different sources of uncertainty differently. The Ellsberg paradox, home bias in investment, and the competence effect all show people preferring bets on one source (a known urn, domestic stocks, a familiar domain) over equally likely bets on another. Ambiguity theories try to describe these differences. Most of them…

15 thms3 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Operations ResearchProbability·Captain: mikedeng1

Source Theory: A Tractable and Positive Ambiguity Theory 3: A Source Is More Insensitive Than Another If and Only If the Pmatcher Between Them Is InsensitiveResearch Paper

Decision makers facing uncertainty do not treat all events alike. Beyond liking or disliking ambiguity (the Ellsberg paradox, the home bias, the competence effect), people show insensitivity: a lack of discriminatory power that makes them overweight unlikely and underweight likely events, more so when they understand the uncertainty less. For risk this is…

9 thms3 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Operations ResearchOptimization·Captain: mikedeng1

Monetary Easing, Leveraged Payouts, and Lack of Investment II: There Is a Shock-Size Threshold Above Which the Optimal Date-0 Rate Stays at R and Below Which It Is CutResearch Paper

Low interest rates are meant to stimulate investment, yet periods of monetary easing have coincided with weak corporate investment and large debt-financed share buybacks and dividends. Acharya and Plantin (SSRN 3484935; Management Science, 2025, doi:10.1287/mnsc.2022.01440) explain this with a moral-hazard channel: when the market rate rrr falls below the…

8 thms3 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Operations ResearchProbability·Captain: mikedeng1

Source Theory: A Tractable and Positive Ambiguity Theory 2: A Source Is Preferred to Another If and Only If the Pmatcher Between Them Is DislikedResearch Paper

Decisions under uncertainty rarely come with known probabilities. Since Ellsberg's (1961) urn experiments it has been documented that people prefer betting on events whose likelihood they understand — a known urn, a familiar domestic stock, a domain they feel competent in — over events of an unfamiliar source of uncertainty, even when they judge the events…

7 thms3 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Operations ResearchOptimization·Captain: mikedeng1

Retailer-Led Marketplaces 3: An Ad Valorem Fee Dominates a Per-Unit Fee, So the Monopolist Charges No Per-Unit FeeResearch Paper

Large online retailers such as Amazon, Walmart and JD.com run a retailer-led marketplace: they sell products on their own account and, on the same storefront, host independent third-party sellers whose sales they tax. How the platform charges those sellers is a live question for competition authorities and for the platforms themselves. Real marketplaces…

7 thms3 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Operations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

Endogenous Multihoming and Network Effects: PlayStation, Xbox, or Both? II: Under Partial Multihoming, Network Effects Raise the Price iff e < 2(t − μ) and the Profit iff e < e_πResearch Paper

Many network goods are bought in more than one variety at once. Gamers own both a PlayStation and an Xbox, households subscribe to several streaming services, and users keep accounts on competing social networks. A consumer who multihomes pays twice but enjoys the exclusive content of both products and the network of both user bases. Much of the literature…

10 thms3 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Algorithmic Game Theory·Captain: mikedeng1

Acquihiring for Monopsony Power 2: With Nash Bargaining and Poaching After a Failed Bid, the Acquirer Hires Directly Above v̄_a, Acquihires Between v̲_a and v̄_a, and Does Not Hire Below v̲_aResearch Paper

Large technology firms often buy small startups less for their products than for their staff: the product is shut down and the employees move to the acquirer. This practice, called acquihiring, has drawn the attention of competition authorities because it can be a way to buy labour-market power rather than to create value. Bar-Isaac, Johnson and Nocke (CRC…

9 thms3 active users
🏆Completed
Operations ResearchOptimization·Captain: mikedeng1

Auditing with a Chance of Whistleblowing: Increasing Whistleblowing Intensity Lowers Equilibrium Audit Quality If and Only If the Enforcer's Incentive Exceeds r* and the Auditor's Is Below d*Research Paper

Many accounting frauds have come to light through whistleblowers rather than through audits, and regulators now run programs to encourage tips: since the Dodd–Frank Act of 2010 the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission pays awards for original information that leads to a successful enforcement action. Empirically, whistleblower involvement is associated…

13 thms3 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Operations ResearchProbability·Captain: mikedeng1

Source Theory: A Tractable and Positive Ambiguity Theory 1: A Source Is Uniform If and Only If It Is Equally Preferred to Itself and Equally Insensitive to Itself with a Regular RegionResearch Paper

Decision theory under uncertainty distinguishes risk, where probabilities are known, from ambiguity, where they are not. Ellsberg's (1961) urn experiments showed that people's choices between bets on the same kind of event depend on where the uncertainty comes from: a bet on a known urn is preferred to the matching bet on an unknown urn. Tversky and Fox…

12 thms3 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Operations ResearchOptimization·Captain: mikedeng1

Consumer Privacy in Online Retail Supply Chains I: For a Single Firm the GDPR Raises Profit and Social Welfare, and Raises Consumer Surplus Exactly When v < 2M√(1−δ)/(Z√F)Research Paper

The European Union's General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR, in force since 2018) shifted control over personal data from firms to consumers: data may be collected and processed only with the consumer's consent, and consent may be given for some uses and withheld for others. Online retailers use consumer data in two opposite ways. Saved shopping carts,…

9 thms3 active usersReviewed
Control TheoryOperations ResearchProbability·Captain: mikedeng1

Equilibrium Portfolio Selection for Smooth Ambiguity Preferences: The Closed-Form Equilibrium Strategy under a Gaussian PriorResearch Paper

An investor who does not know the expected return of a stock faces two kinds of uncertainty: risk (the randomness of returns given the model) and ambiguity (uncertainty about which model is true). The smooth ambiguity criterion of Klibanoff, Marinacci and Mukerji (Econometrica 2005) separates the two: the investor first computes the expected utility …

24 thms3 active usersReviewed
Algorithmic Game TheoryOperations ResearchOptimization·Captain: mikedeng1

Retailer-Led Marketplaces 1: Below a Capacity Threshold the Monopolist Competes Only in the Top Marketplace Products (Mode I); Above It He Also Monopolizes Unsupplied Products (Mode II)Research Paper

Large online retailers such as Amazon run two businesses on one storefront. They sell products themselves, and they host a marketplace on which third-party sellers sell, paying the platform a percentage of their revenue. A retailer that also runs the marketplace can decide which products to sell itself, and it controls which offer most consumers see.…

16 thms3 active users
🏆Completed
Algorithmic Game TheoryProbability·Captain: mikedeng1

Acquihiring for Monopsony Power 3: With a Uniform Private Benefit on [0, B], the Acquirer Acquihires Exactly When v_a > v_s + (7 − 3√5)B/2 and Otherwise Hires DirectlyResearch Paper

Large technology firms often buy small startups mainly to hire their staff, a practice known as acquihiring. Antitrust authorities review acquisitions that may reduce competition in product markets, but an acquihire can instead reduce competition in the labour market: a firm that buys the employer of a scarce worker no longer has to outbid that employer for…

7 thms3 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Algorithmic Game Theory·Captain: mikedeng1

Acquihiring for Monopsony Power 1: In the Baseline Model the Acquirer Hires the Employee Only Through Acquihiring, Exactly When v_a > v_s, and the Employee Prefers Direct HiringResearch Paper

Technology firms often buy small startups mainly to obtain their staff, a practice known as acquihiring; Chatterji and Patro (2014) identify 98 such deals between 2009 and 2013. Bar-Isaac, Johnson and Nocke (CRC TR 224 Discussion Paper No. 500, 2024, www.crctr224.de; published in Management Science, 2025, doi:10.1287/mnsc.2024.04604) study the labour-market…

6 thms3 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Operations ResearchOptimization·Captain: mikedeng1

Capturing the Benefits of Autonomous Vehicles in Ride-Hailing: The Role of Market Configuration 2: On Independent Platforms, AV-HV Coexistence Raises the Price When Labor Is Elastic EnoughResearch Paper

Ride-hailing platforms are expected to add autonomous vehicles (AVs) to fleets of human-driven vehicles (HVs). A common expectation is that AVs, by removing the driver's wage, will make rides cheaper. Lian and van Ryzin (SSRN 3716491; published in Management Science, 2025, DOI 10.1287/mnsc.2020.03112) show that the answer depends on the market configuration.…

10 thms3 active users
🏆Completed
Algorithmic Game TheoryOperations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

Coopetition in Platform-Based Retailing: On the Platform’s Entry II: In the Protective Regime the Seller Underinvests to Deter Entry for Intermediate Product Base ValuesResearch Paper

Online marketplaces such as Amazon are both the storefront of third-party sellers and a retailer in their own right. A platform that observes how well a seller's product sells can later launch a competing product in the same space, and empirical work finds that it does so selectively: Zhu and Liu (2018, Strategic Management Journal) report that Amazon is…

11 thms3 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Operations ResearchOptimization·Captain: mikedeng1

Capturing the Benefits of Autonomous Vehicles in Ride-Hailing: The Role of Market Configuration 3: A Monopoly AV Supplier on a Common Platform Chooses a Newsvendor-Fractile CapacityResearch Paper

Ride-hailing platforms are expected to add autonomous vehicles (AVs) to fleets that today consist of human drivers. AVs have a cost advantage: a human driver must earn a reservation wage for every hour on the platform, while an AV owner pays a fixed capital cost per calendar hour and a smaller variable cost per operating hour. Whether that advantage reaches…

9 thms3 active usersReviewed
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