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Economics

523 missions · 401 completed

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🏆Completed
Convex OptimizationOperations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

Generalized Stochastic Arbitrage Opportunities: No Stochastic Arbitrage Opportunity Exists iff Some Mixture of Marginal-Utility SDFs Prices the Base Assets Inside the Polar Cone of the Overlay SetResearch Paper

An investor can improve a portfolio by adding a zero-cost combination of long and short positions. Ordinary arbitrage asks whether such a combination pays nonnegatively in every outcome and positively in some outcomes. That test is restrictive when payoffs have both gains and losses. Arvanitis and Post instead ask whether one overlay portfolio raises…

9 thms7 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Operations ResearchProbability·Captain: mikedeng1

Capability Building in Sluggish Organizations: Under Myopic Adjustment the Lowest Long-Run Capability Is at Most 2μ − 1, Attained by a Perturbed Rest/High-Intensity CycleResearch Paper

Organizations, athletes and students build capability gradually: a team can raise or lower its skill level only a little from one period to the next, while the demands placed on it can change abruptly. A trainer (a coach, a manager, a curriculum designer) who controls the sequence of demands, subject to a budget on their average intensity, wants to know…

13 thms6 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Algorithmic Game TheoryOperations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

Competitive Equilibrium and Trading Networks: A Network Flow Approach: Every Chain-Stable Outcome Is Supported by Competitive Equilibrium PricesResearch Paper

Markets in which goods pass through intermediaries (supply chains, interbank lending, procurement networks) do not fit the two-sided buyer–seller models of matching theory: one firm can buy inputs on some trades and sell outputs on others. Trading networks model such markets as a directed graph of possible bilateral trades. Hatfield, Kominers, Nichifor,…

12 thms6 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Operations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

Dynamic Information Regimes in Financial Markets: For Any Fraction Informed, a Market Equilibrium with Linear Prices and a Self-Consistent Price Variance ExistsResearch Paper

Investors pay for information, and the amount of information they produce changes over time. In periods when many investors are informed, more information becomes available, which makes being informed cheaper and attracts still more informed investors; when few are informed, the reverse happens. Glasserman, Mamaysky and Shen, Dynamic Information Regimes in…

11 thms6 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Dynamic ProgrammingMarkov ChainOperations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

An Analysis of “Buy X, Get One Free” Reward Programs: Without Transaction Utility, a Redemption Threshold Alone Cannot Raise the Firm's Long-Run Profit Above max{λqv, λ(v − v̄)}Research Paper

"Buy XXX, get one free" (BXGO) programs are among the most common loyalty schemes: coffee shops, car washes, golf courses and hotel chains hand out a free unit after a fixed number of paid purchases. A long empirical literature documents that such programs change behaviour, most visibly through point pressure, the acceleration of purchases as a customer…

19 thms5 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Operations ResearchOptimization·Captain: mikedeng1

A Model of Product Line Marketing: When the Transformed Marketing Cost Is Concave, the Optimal Marketing Effort Allocation Concentrates on a Single Flagship ProductResearch Paper

Firms with several products often put most of their marketing behind one. The resulting product can become the line's flagship even when another product has a higher unit markup. He, Ke, and Zhang give a supply-side model in which this allocation follows from the relation between consumer taste dispersion and the cost of raising a product's perceived…

11 thms5 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Operations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

A Theory of Assurance: Balancing Costly Formal Control with Tone at the Top: The Authority's Optimal Formal Control and the High-Type CEO's Tipping Point in the Diversion ModelResearch Paper

Boards and audit committees use formal controls to limit the resources that an executive can divert. Controls can also change the executive's decision: a CEO who values her future reputation may comply when the remaining opportunity to divert is too small. Penno's diversion model puts these two effects in one decision problem. It asks how much costly…

9 thms5 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Operations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

Managing Opportunistic Consumer Returns in Retail Operations: A Menu of Refunds Earns the Targeted-Refunds Profit if and only if the Optimal Uniform Refund Is at Least the Salvage ValueResearch Paper

Generous return policies raise demand, but they also invite opportunistic returns: customers who buy a product intending to use it briefly and return it for a refund. Retail-industry surveys put the share of such "wardrobing" or renting customers near a tenth of all customers, and retailers answer with restocking fees, return windows, or analytics services…

14 thms5 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Algorithmic Game TheoryOperations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

Incentives and Gaming in Collaborative Projects Under Risk-Sharing Partnerships: Exact Conditions Under Which Information Asymmetry Shortens the Project with Time-Dependent Delay PenaltiesResearch Paper

Collaborative projects often assign different tasks to different firms while making each firm bear part of the cost of a late project. A supplier's decision to spend more time on its task can therefore impose delay costs on a manufacturer, and the manufacturer's own schedule can impose costs on the supplier. The incentives differ from those of one firm…

14 thms5 active users
🏆Completed
Operations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

Dynamic Probabilistic Selling When Customers Have Boundedly Rational Expectations: The Optimal Two-Period Pricing and Product-Offering Policy When Each Customer Draws One AnecdoteResearch Paper

Probabilistic selling, also called opaque selling, offers a customer a product whose exact version is revealed only after purchase: a "mystery box", an unnamed hotel on a travel site, a flight whose carrier is announced after booking. The firm controls the price and the probability with which each version is delivered. The classical analyses (Fay and Xie…

19 thms5 active users
🏆Completed
Operations ResearchOptimizationProbability·Captain: mikedeng1

Is Price Commitment a Better Solution to Control Carbon Emissions and Promote Technology Investment?: Correlation Thresholds for Consumer Surplus and Emissions, Carbon Tax vs Cap-and-TradeResearch Paper

Carbon pricing changes both a manufacturer's production decisions and its incentive to invest in cleaner technology. A carbon tax fixes the price of emissions in advance. Cap-and-trade fixes an emissions quota while the price of permits changes with market conditions. The comparison is especially sensitive to whether high product demand tends to coincide…

10 thms5 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Algorithmic Game TheoryCombinatoricsOperations Research+1·Captain: mikedeng1

Endogenous Risk Exposure and Systemic Instability II: Banks Take More Risk in the Least Equilibrium of a Complete Network than of a Ring NetworkResearch Paper

Banks lend to one another, and the shape of the resulting network decides how a loss at one bank reaches the others. A long line of work, starting with Allen and Gale (2000) and continued by Acemoglu, Ozdaglar and Tahbaz-Salehi (2015), compares the ring network, where each bank is owed money by one neighbour, with the complete network, where every bank…

15 thms5 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Algorithmic Game TheoryOperations ResearchProbability·Captain: mikedeng1

Imperfect Targeting and Advertising Strategies: With Costless Advertising and A < 1/4, Equilibrium Industry Profit Falls as Targeting Improves, Jumps Up at α̂₂(A), Then Stays ConstantResearch Paper

Online advertising lets a firm aim its messages at the consumers most likely to want its product, but the data behind that aim is noisy: a platform's prediction of who belongs to a demographic or interest segment is right only with some probability. A natural expectation is that sharper targeting raises firms' profits, since fewer messages are wasted. Karle…

10 thms5 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Algorithmic Game TheoryOperations Research·Captain: iris

Negotiations in Competing Supply Chains: The Kalai-Smorodinsky Bargaining Solution: Simultaneous KS Wholesale Prices Equal the Nash Bargaining Prices at Retailer Power 0.6Research Paper

Wholesale prices between a supplier and a retailer are usually negotiated, not posted. Models of such negotiations almost always use the Nash bargaining solution (Nash, 1950), often in the generalized form with a bargaining power θ\thetaθ (Binmore, Rubinstein, Wolinsky, 1986). The Nash solution satisfies independence of irrelevant alternatives, which is the…

13 thms4 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Operations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

Sales Information Transparency and Trust in Repeated Vertical Relationships: Sharing Past Sales Information Benefits the Retailer if and only if Its Discount Factor Is at Most 1/(1+√(1+p))Research Paper

A manufacturer that sells through a retailer usually knows less about end-customer demand than the retailer does. In the classical one-shot screening model (Laffont and Martimort, 2002) the manufacturer offers a menu of quantity–payment pairs, pays the well-informed retailer an information rent to reveal high demand, and distorts the low-demand quantity…

12 thms4 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Mechanism DesignOperations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

Simple and Approximately Optimal Contracts for Payment for Ecosystem Services: A Linear Contract with Per-Unit Price k/2 Achieves at Least Half of the Optimal Contract PayoffResearch Paper

Payments for ecosystem services compensate landowners for conservation that a program values but cannot directly provide. A contract designer must decide how to pay when landowners differ in the amount of forest they would conserve without a payment. That baseline conservation type is privately known, so a contract can pay for forest that would have…

6 thms4 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Algorithmic Game TheoryOperations ResearchOptimization·Captain: mikedeng1

Multimarket Cournot Equilibria with Heterogeneous Resource-Constrained Firms: The Unique Equilibrium in Closed Form via Augmented and Cutoff BudgetsResearch Paper

Cournot competition is the standard model of firms that compete by choosing quantities: each firm picks an output, the total output sets the market price, and an equilibrium is a profile in which no firm can gain by changing its own output alone. In practice firms rarely compete in one market. A manufacturer allocates a limited production capacity across…

11 thms4 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Algorithmic Game TheoryOperations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

Cyberattacks, Operational Disruption, and Investment in Resilience Measures: Weakly Competing Firms Share Attack Signals When Impact Is High, Not When Low; Strongly Competing Firms Never ShareResearch Paper

Operational cyberattacks can interrupt production and raise the cost of serving customers. A firm can invest in resilience before an attack, but it must choose the investment while the likelihood of an attack is uncertain. Sharing a private warning signal may help a rival choose its investment. The rival's changed costs and subsequent prices may then affect…

5 thms4 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Operations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

Market Freeze and Bank Capital Structure Heterogeneity: With Interbank Loan Trading, the Unique Equilibrium Is Heterogeneous Exactly for Intermediate Boom ProbabilitiesResearch Paper

Banks that can sell loans after origination may face different incentives to screen them before lending. A buyer that has invested in screening can inspect a seller's loan and buy it when its quality is high. That opportunity can make screening more valuable and reduce the equity a buyer needs to commit. At the same time, a seller may prefer to avoid the…

13 thms4 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Operations ResearchOptimization·Captain: mikedeng1

Utility Tokens, Network Effects, and Pricing Power: An ICO Beats Traditional Sales Exactly When Network Intensity Exceeds a Threshold That Falls with Entrepreneurial AbilityResearch Paper

Between 2017 and 2019 thousands of start-ups sold utility tokens in initial coin offerings (ICOs): digital vouchers that grant access to a product that does not yet exist, sold before launch and often enforced by a smart contract. The financial literature mostly treats ICOs as a way to raise capital. Shakhnov and Zaccaria (SSRN 3613261; published in Manageme…

12 thms4 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Operations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

External Financing and Customer Capital: A Financial Theory of Markups: A Firm's Optimal Markup Is η/(η−1) Times One Minus the Markup Wedge βAμ/(Rν)Research Paper

Why do financially constrained firms charge different markups from otherwise similar firms? A firm can use a low price to attract customers today, but it may also need current cash to pay for production and avoid costly outside financing. Dou and Ji put these two incentives into a dynamic model in which the customer base affects future demand and cash…

6 thms4 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Operations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

Buy-One-Get-One Promotions in a Two-Echelon Supply Chain: Without Stockpiling, BOGO Earns the Retailer and the Supply Chain More Than Price Reduction While the Manufacturer Is IndifferentResearch Paper

Retailers run two kinds of temporary promotion on staple products. A price reduction (PR) cuts the price of every unit for a while; a buy-one-get-one (BOGO) offer leaves the price of the first unit alone and discounts a second unit bought at the same time. Both are common in grocery retail, and in practice the manufacturer sets the wholesale price before…

11 thms4 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Operations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

Rotation as Contagion Mitigation: Frequent Rotation Is Optimal if Half the Reaction Time Is Shorter than the Time to Infect Half a Group, and Activating One Group Throughout Is Optimal OtherwiseResearch Paper

When social-distancing rules cap how many members of an organization may be physically present, a school, office or plant of 2K2K2K members can host only KKK at a time. A common response is rotation: split the members into two fixed groups and alternate which group is on site. How often to alternate is a design choice, and it matters because an infection that…

10 thms4 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Algorithmic Game TheoryOperations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

Shareholder Short-Termism, Corporate Control and Voluntary Disclosure: The Manager Discloses Good and Bad News Below a Short-Termism Threshold and Only Good News Above ItResearch Paper

A manager's voluntary report can change more than investors' estimate of a firm. It can change what a controlling shareholder does to the firm. Jia and Menon study a shareholder who privately knows the value of an alternative strategy and may replace the current strategy. Investors observe intervention but do not observe that private value. A shareholder…

9 thms4 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
AnalysisOperations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

Dual Moments and Risk Attitudes: The Rank-Dependent Utility Risk Premium of a Small Risk Is Variance Times Utility Risk Aversion Plus Maxiance Times Probability-Weighting Risk AversionResearch Paper

The Pratt–Arrow risk premium is the basic local measure of risk aversion under expected utility (EU): a decision-maker with a twice differentiable utility UUU facing a small zero-mean risk ε~\tilde\varepsilonε~ at wealth w0w_0w0​ pays approximately

8 thms4 active usersReviewed
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