A Case Study on Stochastic Games on Large Graphs in Mean Field and Sparse Regimes II: Large-Graph Limits of the Equilibrium Through the Laplacian Eigenvalue DistributionResearch Paper
Motivation
Mean field games describe large populations of agents who interact symmetrically: every agent sees the same average of all the others. Many populations interact instead along a network, where each agent responds only to its neighbours. Lacker and Soret (arXiv:2005.14102v2, 2021; Math. Oper. Res. 2022) study a linear-quadratic stochastic differential game on a finite graph that is simple enough to solve explicitly on every vertex-transitive graph, and then ask what happens to the equilibrium as the graph grows. The question is the network analogue of the classical convergence problem for mean field games: does the -player equilibrium have a limit, and does that limit depend on the graph only through a small amount of information?
The answer of the paper is that the limit is governed by the empirical eigenvalue distribution of the graph Laplacian. Dense graph sequences (degrees tending to infinity) all have the same limit, the mean field game; sparse ones (bounded degrees) have limits that depend on the graph, through its spectrum. This mission formalizes that large-graph limit theorem, Theorem 2.6 of the paper. Mission I of the series formalizes the explicit equilibrium on a fixed transitive graph (Theorem 2.5), on which this mission builds.
Setting
Let be a finite simple graph on vertex set with adjacency matrix and degree matrix . Its Laplacian is . is transitive if every vertex can be mapped to every other one by a graph automorphism; such a graph is regular, of degree , and is then symmetric with eigenvalues . The empirical eigenvalue distribution is .
Fix a horizon , a volatility and a weight . Player controls the state
driven by independent Brownian motions, with Markovian feedback controls , and pays
On a transitive graph without isolated vertices, Theorem 2.5 gives an explicit Nash equilibrium: with and the solution of , on , the feedback is with . The resulting equilibrium state process is Gaussian, and the value is .
For a probability measure define , so that .
Formalization targets
Goal: Theorem 2.6
Let be finite transitive graphs without isolated vertices, , with , and suppose weakly for a probability measure . Then (1) the ODE , has a unique solution on ; (2) for every vertex sequence and ,
(3) the empirical measure converges weakly in probability to ; (4)
Milestones
The milestones are the statements the paper's proof (§3, §6, §7.1) relies on: the stability of in (Proposition 3.2, last sentence); the finite-graph variance formula (2.7); monotonicity and concavity of (Proposition 3.3, first sentence); correlation decay (Proposition 2.12) for distinct vertices; the relation between degrees and the spectral limit (Lemma 7.1); the Gaussian Poincaré bound (7.3) and the concentration (7.1) of the empirical measure; and the spectral form (2.9) of the value.
Significance
Theorem 2.6 reduces the large-population behaviour of a network game to one spectral object. For complete graphs and the limit is the mean field game; for sparse sequences such as cycles, tori, or random regular graphs, is a non-degenerate measure and the limiting variance and value differ from the mean field ones. The theorem thereby gives a quantitative criterion for when a mean field approximation of a network game is accurate, and it shows propagation of chaos in both regimes: in the dense case because interactions are weak, in the sparse case because typical players are far apart in the graph.
The result is proved in the paper; none of it has been machine-checked. A complete formalization requires a Lean account of Gaussian laws of linear SDEs with additive noise, of weak convergence of spectral measures of graph Laplacians, and of a Gaussian Poincaré inequality, none of which is currently in Mathlib in the needed form. Each of these is reusable well beyond this mission.
Difficulty
Parts (2) and (4) follow from the finite-graph formulas once uniformly, but that convergence requires stability of a nonlinear ODE whose vector field is defined through the spectral measure, uniformly over a class of measures. The harder step is (3). Convergence of one player's law does not imply convergence of the empirical measure: the players are correlated, and on sparse graphs every player has a bounded number of strong neighbours, so the correlations do not vanish uniformly. Bounding them requires an estimate that decays in the graph distance and in the degree, and combining it with the growth of graph balls, which is controlled differently in the dense and in the sparse regime. The usual mean field route is closed: unless the graph is complete, the state vector is not exchangeable, so propagation-of-chaos arguments based on exchangeability do not apply.
Formalization scope
The Lean development lives in namespace GraphLQGame.Asymptotics.
- Vertices are
Fin n; a graph sequence isG : ∀ k, SimpleGraph (Fin (N k))with . - is the random-walk Laplacian above, not Mathlib's
lapMatrix. is built from the real roots of the characteristic polynomial of , with multiplicity. - Weak convergence of measures on is convergence of for every bounded continuous . Weak convergence in probability of the empirical measure is convergence in probability of for every bounded continuous .
- A state process is a pathwise strong solution of (2.1) on its own probability space, driven by a standard Brownian motion and adapted to its completed filtration. Statements about several graphs are statements about laws.
- Costs are -valued lower integrals; the value is computed after asserting finiteness.
- In , is written as its ODE value . ODE solutions are constrained on (or on for Propositions 3.2 and 3.3), with uniqueness stated on that domain.
- The Gaussian law is
gaussianReal 0 V.toNNReal; .
The goal quantifies over every solution , and every equilibrium state process, and also asserts that the graph ODE solutions and the state processes exist, so it cannot be discharged vacuously. Proposition 2.12 is stated for distinct vertices: as printed, (2.17) is also claimed for , where it fails on complete graphs of large degree; the off-diagonal case is the one the proof of Theorem 2.6 uses. Theorem 2.5 (mission I) is not restated here; a solver proves what is needed of it.
Contributions are welcome at every level: Gaussian laws of linear SDEs, spectral measures of graph matrices, ODE stability, a Gaussian Poincaré inequality, and the milestones themselves.
Selected references
- D. Lacker, A. Soret, A case study on stochastic games on large graphs in mean field and sparse regimes, arXiv:2005.14102v2, 2021; published in Math. Oper. Res., 2022, https://doi.org/10.1287/moor.2021.1179. https://arxiv.org/abs/2005.14102
- F. Chung, Spectral Graph Theory, CBMS Regional Conference Series in Mathematics 92, AMS, 1997. https://doi.org/10.1090/cbms/092
- S. Boucheron, G. Lugosi, P. Massart, Concentration Inequalities: A Nonasymptotic Theory of Independence, Oxford University Press, 2013 (Theorem 3.20, Gaussian Poincaré inequality). https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199535255.001.0001
- R. Carmona, F. Delarue, Probabilistic Theory of Mean Field Games with Applications I, Springer, 2018. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-58920-6