Theory of Games and Economic Behavior III: Mixed Strategies, the Minimax Theorem and Good StrategiesTextbook
Motivation
A zero-sum two-person game in normalized form is a real matrix : player 1 chooses a row , player 2 simultaneously chooses a column , and player 2 pays player 1 the amount . Matrix games are the base case of non-cooperative game theory, the prototype of every minimax statement in optimization, statistics (Wald's decision theory) and online learning, and, through their equivalence with linear programming, a standard tool of operations research.
Chapter III of von Neumann and Morgenstern's Theory of Games and Economic Behavior (1944; third edition 1953) gives the book's complete solution of these games. Timeline:
- 1928. J. von Neumann, "Zur Theorie der Gesellschaftsspiele", Math. Annalen 100, proves that every matrix game has a value in mixed strategies (the minimax theorem), by a topological argument. https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01448847
- 1937. von Neumann's growth-model paper gives a second proof via a fixed-point argument, later generalized by Kakutani (1941).
- 1938. J. Ville gives the first elementary proof, based on convexity.
- 1944. The Theory of Games presents Ville's route: a theorem of the alternative for matrices (§16) yields the minimax theorem (17:6), from which §17 derives the structure of the sets of good strategies.
- 1951. Gale, Kuhn and Tucker, and Dantzig, relate matrix games to linear-programming duality.
Setting
Player 1 has pure strategies , player 2 has pure strategies , and is an arbitrary real matrix (14.1.1). A mixed strategy of player 1 is a probability vector in the simplex
and similarly for player 2. The pure strategy is the coordinate vector . The expected payoff is the bilinear form (17:2)
The good strategies of player 1 form the set of those at which assumes its maximum; those of player 2 form the set of those at which assumes its minimum ((17:B:a), (17:B:b)). A saddle point of is a pair with for all . With pure strategies alone one has and ; the game is specially strictly determined when .
For a general real function (§13) the same notions are , , saddle points, and the sets (maximizers of ) and (minimizers of ), always under the book's standing hypothesis that these maxima and minima exist.
Formalization targets
Goal: (17:D), good strategies characterized by their supports
For all and : and if and only if
The statement fixes no value and no constant; it says which pairs of mixed strategies are optimal.
Milestones, in attack order
- (13:A*) .
- (13:D*) If , the saddle points of are exactly .
- (17:A) , and dually for .
- (16:C) For every matrix exactly one of: some with for all ; some with for all .
- (16:F) The weak form with in place of .
- (17:6) The minimax theorem: a saddle point of exists (already on the platform as
AGT.zero_sum_minimax, proved). - (17:C:f) and iff is a saddle point of .
After the goal: (17:E) the game is specially strictly determined iff each player has a pure good strategy.
Significance
(17:D) is the complementary-slackness description of the optimal strategy pairs of a matrix game: a good strategy puts weight only on pure strategies that are best replies to the opponent's good strategy, and conversely any pair of mutually supported best replies is optimal. It is the basis of support-enumeration methods for matrix games, of the equalizing arguments used to solve small games by hand (the book's Chapter IV applies it to Matching Pennies, Stone–Paper–Scissors and Poker), and of the rectangular structure of the set of optimal pairs. (17:E) connects the mixed-strategy solution to the pure-strategy theory of §14 and to the perfect-information games of §15.
The results are classical and proved in the book. The minimax theorem itself is already machine-checked on the platform (AGT.zero_sum_minimax), and Mathlib contains Sion's minimax theorem and the basic saddle-point lemmas for extended-real functions on sets. This mission adds the book's own chain: the §13 saddle-point calculus under its standing attainment hypothesis, the theorems of the alternative (16:C) and (16:F) in the simplex-normalized form the book uses, the reduction (17:A) to pure strategies, and the characterizations (17:C:f), (17:D), (17:E) of good strategies, which are not on the platform in any form.
Difficulty
The "if" direction of (17:D) cannot be proved from the support conditions alone by local reasoning: that a pair of mutual best replies consists of good strategies uses that the value equals , i.e. the minimax theorem. Without that equality the "if" direction of (13:D*) fails (points of exist but are not saddle points), so the calculus of §13 alone does not suffice. Likewise (16:C) is not a direct instance of the Farkas lemma forms on the platform: its alternatives are normalized to the simplex and the second one is strict, and both the existence and the mutual exclusion must be shown.
Formalization scope
Lean conventions, fixed throughout:
- Pure strategies are
Fin β₁,Fin β₂(numbered from ), the matrix isH : Fin β₁ → Fin β₂ → ℝ, and is Mathlib'sstdSimplex ℝ (Fin β). - Nonempty strategy sets (, from "τ = 1, …, β" in 14.1.1): every theorem assumes
0 < β₁,0 < β₂, or mixed strategies , , which force it. The theorems of the alternative assume (a matrix with rows and columns). - Standing hypothesis of 13.2.1 ("we are restricting our considerations to such functions, for which Max and Min exist"): the §13 results (13:A*), (13:D*) are stated for an arbitrary under the predicate
MaxMinAttained φ, which says that , , and are attained. (13:D*) also carries the hypothesis of 13.5.2 that saddle points exist, stated as . - and are the real
⨆,⨅; they are the book's attained values under the hypotheses above (compactness of the simplex and continuity of for the mixed game). (17:A) asserts attainment explicitly (IsLeast,IsGreatest). "Does not assume its maximum at " in the goal is written without any Max operator. - , are defined as maximizers and minimizers directly from , not through an assumed value .
A trivializing formalization is ruled out: and are not taken as hypotheses or defined through the support conditions, strategy sets cannot be empty, and no Max over an empty or unbounded set occurs.
Contributions welcome: proofs of the milestones, especially (16:C) (from Mathlib's convex separation or from a platform Farkas lemma) and the bridge from AGT.zero_sum_minimax to (17:C:f). The §13 lemmas and the (17:A) reduction are reusable by any mission about matrix games or bilinear saddle points.
Selected references
- J. von Neumann and O. Morgenstern, Theory of Games and Economic Behavior, 60th-anniversary edition, Princeton University Press, 2007 (reprint of the 3rd edition, 1953), §§13, 16, 17. https://doi.org/10.1515/9781400829460
- J. von Neumann, "Zur Theorie der Gesellschaftsspiele", Mathematische Annalen 100 (1928), 295–320. https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01448847
- J. Ville, "Sur la théorie générale des jeux où intervient l'habileté des joueurs", in É. Borel, Traité du calcul des probabilités et de ses applications, IV.2, Gauthier-Villars, 1938, 105–113.
- S. Kakutani, "A generalization of Brouwer's fixed point theorem", Duke Mathematical Journal 8 (1941), 457–459. https://doi.org/10.1215/S0012-7094-41-00838-4
- D. Gale, H. W. Kuhn and A. W. Tucker, "Linear programming and the theory of games", in Activity Analysis of Production and Allocation, Wiley, 1951, 317–329.