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Operations Research

2,210 missions · 1,106 completed

The discipline of applying mathematical analysis to complex decision problems in operations: allocating scarce resources, scheduling, routing, inventory, and the design of service and production systems. Drawing on mathematical programming, stochastic modeling, queueing, simulation, and game-theoretic reasoning, it seeks policies that perform provably well in systems shaped by constraints, congestion, and uncertainty.

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Algorithmic Game TheoryCombinatorics·Captain: mikedeng1

Theory of Games and Economic Behavior II: Games with Perfect Information Are Strictly DeterminedTextbook

Motivation

Chess, checkers, Go and Backgammon share a feature that card games such as Poker lack: whenever a player moves, the player knows everything that has happened so far. von Neumann and Morgenstern call this perfect information and devote §15 of Theory of Games and Economic Behavior (1944; 3rd ed. 1953) to it. Their result is that such a game, viewed as a zero-sum two-person game, is strictly determined: it has a value that each player can secure with a pure strategy, without any randomization. For Chess this means that exactly one of three statements is true: White can force a win, Black can force a win, or both can force at least a draw ((15:D:a)–(15:D:c)).

Timeline. Zermelo (1913, Über eine Anwendung der Mengenlehre auf die Theorie des Schachspiels) showed for Chess that either one side can force a win or both can avoid losing; his argument is not phrased in terms of strategies and a value, and was later corrected and completed by König (1927) and Kalmár (1928/29). von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944, §15) proved strict determinateness for every finite zero-sum two-person game with perfect information, including chance moves (15.7.1), and gave the explicit formula (15:12) for the value. Kuhn (1953, Extensive games and the problem of information, Annals of Mathematics Studies 28) recast games in tree form and extended the pure-strategy existence result to general-sum games with perfect information (subgame-perfect equilibria by backward induction).

Setting

A game tree Γ\GammaΓ is a finite rooted tree. Each leaf is a finished play π\piπ and carries the payoff F1(π)∈R\mathfrak F_1(\pi) \in \mathbb RF1​(π)∈R to player 1; player 2 receives −F1(π)-\mathfrak F_1(\pi)−F1​(π). Each internal node is a move M\mathfrak MM of one of three kinds kkk, with alternatives σ=1,…,α\sigma = 1, \dots, \alphaσ=1,…,α leading to subtrees Γσ\Gamma_\sigmaΓσ​:

  • k=0k = 0k=0, a chance move, where alternative σ\sigmaσ occurs with probability p(σ)≧0p(\sigma) \geqq 0p(σ)≧0, ∑σp(σ)=1\sum_\sigma p(\sigma) = 1∑σ​p(σ)=1;
  • k=1k = 1k=1, a personal move of player 1, with α≧1\alpha \geqq 1α≧1;
  • k=2k = 2k=2, a personal move of player 2, with α≧1\alpha \geqq 1α≧1.

A pure strategy τ1\tau_1τ1​ of player 1 is a complete plan choosing an alternative at every node of kind 1; τ2\tau_2τ2​ does the same at every node of kind 2. The normalized form H(τ1,τ2)\mathcal H(\tau_1, \tau_2)H(τ1​,τ2​) is the expected payoff to player 1, the expectation being over the chance moves. With the maxima and minima taken over the finitely many pure strategies,

v1=Max⁡τ1Min⁡τ2H(τ1,τ2),v2=Min⁡τ2Max⁡τ1H(τ1,τ2).v_1 = \operatorname{Max}_{\tau_1} \operatorname{Min}_{\tau_2} \mathcal H(\tau_1, \tau_2), \qquad v_2 = \operatorname{Min}_{\tau_2} \operatorname{Max}_{\tau_1} \mathcal H(\tau_1, \tau_2).v1​=Maxτ1​​Minτ2​​H(τ1​,τ2​),v2​=Minτ2​​Maxτ1​​H(τ1​,τ2​).

Always v1≦v2v_1 \leqq v_2v1​≦v2​; the game is strictly determined when v1=v2v_1 = v_2v1​=v2​ (14.4.2).

For a function f(σ1)f(\sigma_1)f(σ1​) of the alternatives of the first move M1\mathfrak M_1M1​, of kind k1k_1k1​, the operation Mσ1k1M^{k_1}_{\sigma_1}Mσ1​k1​​ of (15:8) is ∑σ1p1(σ1)f(σ1)\sum_{\sigma_1} p_1(\sigma_1) f(\sigma_1)∑σ1​​p1​(σ1​)f(σ1​), Max⁡σ1f(σ1)\operatorname{Max}_{\sigma_1} f(\sigma_1)Maxσ1​​f(σ1​) or Min⁡σ1f(σ1)\operatorname{Min}_{\sigma_1} f(\sigma_1)Minσ1​​f(σ1​) for k1=0,1,2k_1 = 0, 1, 2k1​=0,1,2. Applying these operations from the leaves back to the root gives the backward-induction value v(Γ)v(\Gamma)v(Γ).

Formalization targets

Goal: 15.6.1 with (15:12)

For every finite game tree Γ\GammaΓ,

v1=v2=v=Mσ1k1Mσ2k2(σ1)⋯Mσνkν(σ1,…,σν−1)F1(π(σ1,…,σν)).v_1 = v_2 = v = M^{k_1}_{\sigma_1} M^{k_2(\sigma_1)}_{\sigma_2} \cdots M^{k_\nu(\sigma_1, \dots, \sigma_{\nu-1})}_{\sigma_\nu} \mathfrak F_1(\pi(\sigma_1, \dots, \sigma_\nu)).v1​=v2​=v=Mσ1​k1​​Mσ2​k2​(σ1​)​⋯Mσν​kν​(σ1​,…,σν−1​)​F1​(π(σ1​,…,σν​)).

Both the equality v1=v2v_1 = v_2v1​=v2​ and the value formula are part of the goal.

Milestones

  • (13:E): for finite nonempty domains and fff ranging over all functions of xxx, Max⁡xMin⁡fψ(x,f(x))=Min⁡fMax⁡xψ(x,f(x))\operatorname{Max}_x \operatorname{Min}_f \psi(x, f(x)) = \operatorname{Min}_f \operatorname{Max}_x \psi(x, f(x))Maxx​Minf​ψ(x,f(x))=Minf​Maxx​ψ(x,f(x)); and (13:G): Max⁡xMin⁡fψ(x,f(x))=Max⁡xMin⁡uψ(x,u)\operatorname{Max}_x \operatorname{Min}_f \psi(x, f(x)) = \operatorname{Max}_x \operatorname{Min}_u \psi(x, u)Maxx​Minf​ψ(x,f(x))=Maxx​Minu​ψ(x,u).
  • (15:2)–(15:7): vk=Mσ1k1vσ1/kv_k = M^{k_1}_{\sigma_1} v_{\sigma_1/k}vk​=Mσ1​k1​​vσ1​/k​ for k=1,2k = 1, 2k=1,2, one milestone for each kind of first move, without assuming that any game is strictly determined.
  • (15:C:a): a game of length 000 is strictly determined with value www; (15:C:b): if every Γσ1\Gamma_{\sigma_1}Γσ1​​ is strictly determined, so is Γ\GammaΓ.
  • (15:13), (15:D:a)–(15:D:c): for games without chance moves whose plays end in 1,0,−11, 0, -11,0,−1, the value is one of these three numbers, and it decides which player can force a win or whether both can force a tie.

Significance

The theorem is the first existence result for the value of a class of games in pure strategies. It shows that the whole difficulty of the general zero-sum two-person game, the need for mixed strategies (§17), comes from imperfect information. It gives a construction as well as an existence proof: the value and optimal strategies are computed by backward induction, the procedure behind retrograde analysis of endgames, minimax search in game-playing programs, and the dynamic programming recursions of sequential decision problems with an adversary. The Chess trichotomy (15:D) is its best-known consequence.

Formalizing it adds a checked account of the passage from the extensive to the normalized form for a whole class of games, which the book carries out informally (15.4.2, 15.5.1: "the reader may verify it from the formalistic point of view"). The result is classical and fully proved in the book; the work is to formalize that proof on a tree model. Mathlib has saddle points (Order/SaddlePoint) and the minimax theorem for continuous functions (Topology/Sion), but no game trees, strategies of extensive games, or backward induction. No machine-checked version of this theorem with chance moves and the normalized form over complete plans is known to the mission.

Difficulty

The recursions (15:2)–(15:7) are not formal consequences of the definitions: v1v_1v1​ and v2v_2v2​ are extrema over whole plans of Γ\GammaΓ, while the right-hand sides are extrema over plans of the separate games Γσ1\Gamma_{\sigma_1}Γσ1​​. At a personal move of player 1, v2=Max⁡σ1vσ1/2v_2 = \operatorname{Max}_{\sigma_1} v_{\sigma_1/2}v2​=Maxσ1​​vσ1​/2​ requires interchanging a Min over player 2's plans, which are functions of player 1's first choice, with a Max over that choice: this is exactly (13:E), a max-min equality that fails for general functions of two variables and holds here because the minimizing variable is a function of the maximizing one. A proof that treats the Max over τ1\tau_1τ1​ and the Min over τ2\tau_2τ2​ as interchangeable without this step is circular.

A second difficulty is the strategy spaces themselves. A complete plan chooses at nodes the plan itself excludes, so the pure strategies of Γ\GammaΓ are not simply pairs of a first choice and one strategy of the chosen subgame; the identification the book uses in 15.5.1 has to be justified by showing that the extra coordinates do not change H\mathcal HH.

Formalization scope

A game is an inductive type GameTree with constructors leaf w, chance α p next hp hsum, move1 α hα next, move2 α hα next; alternatives are Fin α (numbered from 000). The conditions p≧0p \geqq 0p≧0, ∑p=1\sum p = 1∑p=1 and α≧1\alpha \geqq 1α≧1 at personal moves are constructor fields, so every tree is a legitimate game. Pure strategies are dependent types Strategy1 t, Strategy2 t defined by recursion on the tree (complete plans), with Fintype and Nonempty instances; H\mathcal HH is payoff t τ₁ τ₂, the expected leaf payoff; v1, v2 are Finset.sup'/Finset.inf' over all strategies, so every Max and Min is attained.

Standing hypotheses and conventions taken from the book:

  • finite strategy sets and attained extrema (13.2.1, 14.1.1): finite trees with finitely many alternatives at every move;
  • perfect information, i.e. preliminarity equals anteriority (6.4.1, (15:B)): built into the tree model, which is the sequence of games (15:1);
  • zero-sum two-person (15.3.1): one payoff F1\mathfrak F_1F1​, player 2 receives −F1-\mathfrak F_1−F1​ and minimizes H\mathcal HH;
  • chance probabilities nonnegative and summing to one (15.4.2, 10.1.1); α≧1\alpha \geqq 1α≧1 at every move;
  • (15:D) additionally assumes no chance moves and outcomes 1,0,−11, 0, -11,0,−1 (15.7.1).

The book's formal model is the set-theoretic one of §§9–10, with partitions of the set of plays; the tree restates it for the perfect-information case and does not formalize §§9–10. The book fixes one length ν\nuν for all plays; trees with plays of different lengths contain the book's games as a special case, so the goal is at least as strong as the book's theorem.

Strategies are plans, never responses: a strategy of player 1 is fixed before play and cannot depend on player 2's strategy, which would make v1=v2v_1 = v_2v1​=v2​ trivial. Chance moves are part of the goal; a version without them proves only the Chess case and is weaker than the book.

Reusable beyond this mission: the tree model, its strategy types and the normalized form, which later chapters on extensive games can import. Welcome contributions: proofs of the milestones, and a lemma identifying the strategies of Γ\GammaΓ with the book's recursive description (15.4.2, 15.5.1).

Selected references

  • J. von Neumann, O. Morgenstern, Theory of Games and Economic Behavior, 60th-anniversary edition, Princeton University Press, 2007 (reprint of the 3rd ed., 1953), §§6, 11, 13–15. https://doi.org/10.1515/9781400829460
  • E. Zermelo, Über eine Anwendung der Mengenlehre auf die Theorie des Schachspiels, Proc. Fifth International Congress of Mathematicians, vol. II, 1913, pp. 501–504.
  • U. Schwalbe, P. Walker, Zermelo and the early history of game theory, Games and Economic Behavior 34 (2001), 123–137. https://doi.org/10.1006/game.2000.0794
  • H. W. Kuhn, Extensive games and the problem of information, in Contributions to the Theory of Games II, Annals of Mathematics Studies 28, Princeton, 1953, 193–216. https://doi.org/10.1515/9781400881970-012
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Convex OptimizationOptimization·Captain: mikedeng1

Analysis and Algorithms for Service Parts Supply Chains VIII: Bounds on Optimal Stock AllocationsTextbook

Motivation

Military and commercial service parts systems keep repairable parts at a central depot warehouse and at a set of operating bases. Chapter 10 of Muckstadt's Analysis and Algorithms for Service Parts Supply Chains (Springer 2005, DOI 10.1007/b138879) turns from the planning models of the earlier chapters to execution. Each period, the stock that is at the depot or arriving there must be divided among the bases. The planner knows what is already in the pipeline and faces random demand at each base. The chapter's models are solved in a rolling-horizon manner. Each period's decisions are the first step of an optimal plan over a short horizon. That plan has to be computable at scale, for thousands of items and dozens of bases.

What makes this possible is a structural fact. In an optimal allocation, the cumulative stock sent to a base never exceeds what a single-period newsvendor problem at that base would ask for. This bound shrinks the allocation integer programs to linear programs of manageable size. This mission formalizes that bound and the facts it rests on.

Setting

Fix one item. Time is counted in whole periods t=0,1,2,…t = 0, 1, 2, \dotst=0,1,2,…, and JJJ is the finite set of bases. For each base jjj:

  • Ti0T_{i0}Ti0​ is the repair lead time, so shipments are decided in periods t=0,…,Ti0t = 0, \dots, T_{i0}t=0,…,Ti0​;
  • TijrT^r_{ij}Tijr​ and TijeT^e_{ij}Tije​ are the regular and expedited transportation times from the depot to base jjj, integers with 1≤Tije<Tijr1 \le T^e_{ij} < T^r_{ij}1≤Tije​<Tijr​;
  • S~i0t\tilde S_{i0t}S~i0t​ is the known cumulative supply at the depot through period ttt (stock on hand plus arrivals already in the pipeline), and S~ijt\tilde S_{ijt}S~ijt​ the known cumulative supply at base jjj. The latter is constant for t≥Tijrt \ge T^r_{ij}t≥Tijr​, since nothing not yet shipped can arrive earlier than TijrT^r_{ij}Tijr​ by regular transport;
  • XijtX_{ijt}Xijt​ is the cumulative demand at base jjj through period ttt, a nonnegative integer random variable, nondecreasing in ttt, with finite mean;
  • hij>0h_{ij} > 0hij​>0, bij>0b_{ij} > 0bij​>0 and eij≥0e_{ij} \ge 0eij​≥0 are the incremental holding, shortage and expediting costs.

If SijtS_{ijt}Sijt​ units have arrived at base jjj by period ttt, the expected cost of that period is

Gijt(S)=hij E[S−Xijt]++bij E[Xijt−S]+,G_{ijt}(S) = h_{ij}\,E[S - X_{ijt}]^+ + b_{ij}\,E[X_{ijt} - S]^+,Gijt​(S)=hij​E[S−Xijt​]++bij​E[Xijt​−S]+,

and stock left at the end of the horizon costs

Qij(S)=hij∑t>Tijr+Ti0E[S−Xijt]+.Q_{ij}(S) = h_{ij}\sum_{t > T^r_{ij} + T_{i0}} E[S - X_{ijt}]^+ .Qij​(S)=hij​t>Tijr​+Ti0​∑​E[S−Xijt​]+.

The stock allocation model SAMi\mathrm{SAM}_iSAMi​ chooses nonnegative integer regular shipments yijtry^r_{ijt}yijtr​, t=0,…,Ti0t = 0, \dots, T_{i0}t=0,…,Ti0​, with cumulative shipments never exceeding cumulative depot supply. The cumulative stock at base jjj is Sijt=S~ij(Tijr−1)+∑t′≤t−Tijryijt′rS_{ijt} = \tilde S_{ij(T^r_{ij}-1)} + \sum_{t' \le t - T^r_{ij}} y^r_{ijt'}Sijt​=S~ij(Tijr​−1)​+∑t′≤t−Tijr​​yijt′r​, and the model minimizes ∑j{∑t=TijrTijr+Ti0Gijt(Sijt)+Qij(Sij(Tijr+Ti0))}\sum_j \{\sum_{t=T^r_{ij}}^{T^r_{ij}+T_{i0}} G_{ijt}(S_{ijt}) + Q_{ij}(S_{ij(T^r_{ij}+T_{i0})})\}∑j​{∑t=Tijr​Tijr​+Ti0​​Gijt​(Sijt​)+Qij​(Sij(Tijr​+Ti0​)​)}. The extended model ESAMi\mathrm{ESAM}_iESAMi​ adds expedited shipments yijtey^e_{ijt}yijte​, which arrive after TijeT^e_{ij}Tije​ periods at an extra cost eije_{ij}eij​ per unit.

The constrained newsvendor problem CNijt\mathrm{CN}_{ijt}CNijt​ minimizes Gijt(S)G_{ijt}(S)Gijt​(S) over integers S≥S~ijtS \ge \tilde S_{ijt}S≥S~ijt​. Its largest optimal solution is written S^ijt\hat S_{ijt}S^ijt​.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 15 (p. 237)

In every optimal solution of SAMi\mathrm{SAM}_iSAMi​, for every base jjj and every t∈[Tijr,Tijr+Ti0]t \in [T^r_{ij}, T^r_{ij} + T_{i0}]t∈[Tijr​,Tijr​+Ti0​],

S~ij(Tijr−1)  ≤  Sijt∗  ≤  S^ijt.\tilde S_{ij(T^r_{ij}-1)} \;\le\; S^*_{ijt} \;\le\; \hat S_{ijt}.S~ij(Tijr​−1)​≤Sijt∗​≤S^ijt​.

The bound is uniform over optimal solutions and uses nothing but the single-period problems.

Milestones

  1. Separability (Section 10.4.1, p. 236). The multi-item problem SAM\mathrm{SAM}SAM splits into the SAMi\mathrm{SAM}_iSAMi​: its optimal solutions are exactly the tuples of optimal item solutions, and Z∗=∑iZi∗Z^* = \sum_i Z^*_iZ∗=∑i​Zi∗​.
  2. Convexity of QijQ_{ij}Qij​ (p. 234) and of GijtG_{ijt}Gijt​ (p. 237), in the discrete sense of nondecreasing first differences on Z\mathbb ZZ.
  3. The newsvendor solution (10.19). S^ijt=max⁡(S~ijt,s0)\hat S_{ijt} = \max(\tilde S_{ijt}, s^0)S^ijt​=max(S~ijt​,s0) with s0s^0s0 the least integer such that P(Xijt≤s0)>bij/(bij+hij)P(X_{ijt} \le s^0) > b_{ij}/(b_{ij}+h_{ij})P(Xijt​≤s0)>bij​/(bij​+hij​).
  4. Monotonicity (10.20). S^ij(t−1)≤S^ijt\hat S_{ij(t-1)} \le \hat S_{ijt}S^ij(t−1)​≤S^ijt​ on [Tijr,Tijr+Ti0][T^r_{ij}, T^r_{ij} + T_{i0}][Tijr​,Tijr​+Ti0​].
  5. Theorem 16, corrected (p. 244). In every optimal solution of ESAMi\mathrm{ESAM}_iESAMi​, S~ijt≤Sijt∗\tilde S_{ijt} \le S^*_{ijt}S~ijt​≤Sijt∗​. Writing Mjt=max⁡k∈[Tije,t](S^ijk−S~ijk)M_{jt} = \max_{k \in [T^e_{ij}, t]}(\hat S_{ijk} - \tilde S_{ijk})Mjt​=maxk∈[Tije​,t]​(S^ijk​−S~ijk​), also Sijt∗≤S~ijt+MjtS^*_{ijt} \le \tilde S_{ijt} + M_{jt}Sijt∗​≤S~ijt​+Mjt​, provided Tijr=Tije+1T^r_{ij} = T^e_{ij} + 1Tijr​=Tije​+1 or t<Tije+Ti0t < T^e_{ij} + T_{i0}t<Tije​+Ti0​.

Two supporting items state that SAMi\mathrm{SAM}_iSAMi​ and ESAMi\mathrm{ESAM}_iESAMi​ have optimal solutions. A third, theorem16_counterexample, exhibits an instance in which Theorem 16's upper bound, as printed, fails.

Significance

Theorem 15 is what allows the book (pp. 238–239) to rewrite SAMi\mathrm{SAM}_iSAMi​ with 0–1 variables δijtk\delta_{ijtk}δijtk​ indicating Sijt=kS_{ijt} = kSijt​=k. Only kkk between S~ij(Tijr−1)\tilde S_{ij(T^r_{ij}-1)}S~ij(Tijr​−1)​ and S^ijt\hat S_{ijt}S^ijt​ is needed, so the number of variables is governed by the newsvendor quantities rather than by the total depot supply. Theorem 16 plays the same role for the model with expediting. Both bounds also justify the greedy heuristics of Sections 10.4.3 and 10.5.3. Those heuristics never raise a base's stock above its newsvendor level.

The book proves both theorems in half a page each by an exchange argument. This mission produces machine-checked versions and, in doing so, settles the exact scope of Theorem 16. As printed it is false. With Tijr≥Tije+2T^r_{ij} \ge T^e_{ij} + 2Tijr​≥Tije​+2, an expedited shipment in the last decision period can be the only way to cover a later period's demand, and the optimal plan then overstocks an earlier period. The mission states the corrected theorem and the counterexample; the counterexample was checked in Lean during drafting. None of the chapter's results has been formalized before, as far as the platform's catalogue shows.

Difficulty

The central step is the exchange. Take the first period kkk in which an optimal plan overshoots its bound, and delay by one period one unit that arrives at kkk. This must be shown feasible, to change only SijkS_{ijk}Sijk​, and to lower the objective strictly. That in turn needs strict decrease of a convex function to the right of its largest minimizer, and an argument for the last period, where there is no later period to delay into. The indexing is heavy: two lead times, truncated sums min⁡(t−Tije,Ti0)\min(t - T^e_{ij}, T_{i0})min(t−Tije​,Ti0​), and cumulative constraints across bases.

The first idea, that a plan above the newsvendor level can always be improved by shipping less, fails. Shipping less changes the stock in every later period too, and later periods may need the unit. The bound follows only from a delay that affects exactly one period. For ESAMi\mathrm{ESAM}_iESAMi​ even such a delay is sometimes unavailable, which is where the book's Theorem 16 breaks.

Formalization scope

  • One item at a time: ItemModel J Ω P bundles the data of one item with the cumulative demands on a probability space (Ω,P)(\Omega, P)(Ω,P), [IsProbabilityMeasure P]. Bases form a Fintype. Periods are ℕ. Stock levels and supplies are ℤ, since net inventory may be negative. Shipments are functions J → ℕ → ℕ, so nonnegativity and integrality are built in. Costs are in ℝ.
  • GGG and QQQ are defined from the demand as in the book: Bochner integrals of (S−X)+(S - X)^+(S−X)+ and (X−S)+(X - S)^+(X−S)+, and a tsum for QQQ. The item model requires finite means and convergence of the series for QQQ at every stock level, so that no integral or sum takes Lean's junk value 000.
  • "The largest optimal solution" is the predicate IsLargestCNSolution (feasible, minimizing, and above every feasible minimizer). Theorems take S^\hat SS^ as a function satisfying it. Milestone (10.19) shows it exists.
  • "An optimal solution" means a feasible plan with objective at most that of every feasible plan. The theorems hold for every optimal plan.
  • Pinned conventions and additions. The following are not written in the book: hij,bij>0h_{ij}, b_{ij} > 0hij​,bij​>0 and eij≥0e_{ij} \ge 0eij​≥0; nonnegative, nondecreasing depot supply; nondecreasing base supply (used in the book's proof of Theorem 16); finite mean demand; convergence of QQQ's series. (10.19) is read with the critical fractile "least sss with F(s)>b/(b+h)F(s) > b/(b+h)F(s)>b/(b+h)", the book's ⌈F−1⌉\lceil F^{-1}\rceil⌈F−1⌉/⌊F−1⌋\lfloor F^{-1}\rfloor⌊F−1⌋ with ties broken upward. Theorem 16 carries the proviso "Tijr=Tije+1T^r_{ij} = T^e_{ij} + 1Tijr​=Tije​+1 or t<Tije+Ti0t < T^e_{ij} + T_{i0}t<Tije​+Ti0​". Separability is stated both for optimal plans and for optimal values.
  • Ruled out. The feasible sets of SAMi\mathrm{SAM}_iSAMi​ and ESAMi\mathrm{ESAM}_iESAMi​ impose no upper bound on the cumulative stock, and S^\hat SS^ is defined from GGG alone, never from the allocation problem. The bounds are therefore not true by definition.
  • Omitted. The LP reformulations (10.22)–(10.28) and (10.45)–(10.52) and the integrality of their relaxations, which the book asserts with a reference to [68]; the greedy algorithms and their optimality conditions (asserted); the book's claim that QijQ_{ij}Qij​ is strictly increasing (p. 238), which fails when P(Xijt≤S)=0P(X_{ijt} \le S) = 0P(Xijt​≤S)=0 beyond the horizon and is not needed; the dynamic program of Section 10.3 and the repair model of Section 10.6.
  • The discrete-convexity and newsvendor facts are reusable for any single-location inventory model on Z\mathbb ZZ. Contributions are welcome on the convexity lemmas, the critical-fractile characterization, and a reusable exchange lemma for cumulative-shipment models.

Selected references

  • J. A. Muckstadt, Analysis and Algorithms for Service Parts Supply Chains, Springer Series in Operations Research and Financial Engineering, Springer, 2005, Chapter 10, pp. 225–246. DOI 10.1007/b138879
  • K. J. Arrow, T. Harris, J. Marschak, "Optimal inventory policy", Econometrica 19(3), 1951, 250–272 (the newsvendor critical fractile). DOI 10.2307/1906813
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Markov ChainProbabilityStochastic Systems·Captain: mikedeng1

Analysis and Algorithms for Service Parts Supply Chains VI: The Shortfall Distribution of Capacity-Limited SystemsTextbook

Motivation

Service parts supply chains are often limited by a capacitated resource, such as a production line or a repair shop, instead of by lead times alone. Once capacity binds, the classical tools for setting stock levels (Palm's theorem and the Poisson distribution of units in resupply) no longer apply, and the quantity that determines how much stock is needed is the shortfall: the amount by which the end-of-period inventory falls below its target because capacity was insufficient. Chapter 8 of Muckstadt, Analysis and Algorithms for Service Parts Supply Chains (Springer 2005, DOI 10.1007/b138879) builds its tactical planning models for capacity-limited systems on the distribution of this random variable, and on a continuous-time repair queue in which item counts are geometric.

The shortfall recursion is the Lindley recursion of queueing theory (Lindley 1952), so its stationary law is the law of the maximum of a random walk with negative drift. The exponential tail of that maximum goes back to Cramér's work on ruin probabilities; for capacitated production–inventory systems it was stated by Glasserman (1997), whose theorem the book quotes as Theorem 11. Glasserman and Tayur (1995) used the shortfall to optimize base-stock levels in multi-echelon capacitated systems, and Roundy and Muckstadt (2000) studied the mass-exponential approximation that the theorem motivates.

Setting

A single item is produced in periods n=1,2,…n = 1, 2, \dotsn=1,2,… of an infinite horizon; at most ccc units can be produced per period. The demand of period nnn is DnD_nDn​; the demands are nonnegative, independent and identically distributed, with generic demand DDD and E[D]<cE[D] < cE[D]<c (the standing assumption of Section 8.1.1).

Under the modified (s−1,s)(s-1, s)(s−1,s) policy with target level sss, the facility observes DnD_nDn​ and produces min⁡{c,s−In−1+Dn}\min\{c, s - I_{n-1} + D_n\}min{c,s−In−1​+Dn​} units, where InI_nIn​ is the end-of-period net inventory and I0=sI_0 = sI0​=s. The shortfall Vn=s−InV_n = s - I_nVn​=s−In​ satisfies V0=0V_0 = 0V0​=0 and

Vn=[Vn−1+Dn−c]+.(8.1)V_n = \left[V_{n-1} + D_n - c\right]^+ . \tag{8.1}Vn​=[Vn−1​+Dn​−c]+.(8.1)

With the random walk Sn=∑k=1n(Dk−c)S_n = \sum_{k=1}^{n} (D_k - c)Sn​=∑k=1n​(Dk​−c) (S0=0S_0 = 0S0​=0), the stationary shortfall is

V=sup⁡n≥0Sn.V = \sup_{n \ge 0} S_n .V=n≥0sup​Sn​.

A law on R\mathbb RR is lattice if it is concentrated on a progression a+dZa + d\mathbb Za+dZ with d>0d > 0d>0.

In the discrete case (ccc and DDD integer valued) (Vn)(V_n)(Vn​) is a Markov chain on {0,1,2,… }\{0, 1, 2, \dots\}{0,1,2,…} with transition probabilities pijp_{ij}pij​ (p. 185). In the repair model of Section 8.3.1, reparable units of item iii arrive at rate λi\lambda_iλi​, λ=∑iλi\lambda = \sum_i \lambda_iλ=∑i​λi​, a single exponential server repairs at rate μ>λ\mu > \lambdaμ>λ, NNN is the number of units in repair and NiN_iNi​ the number of item-iii units, and ηi=λi/(μ−λ+λi)\eta_i = \lambda_i/(\mu - \lambda + \lambda_i)ηi​=λi​/(μ−λ+λi​).

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 11, corrected (p. 191)

Assume E[eαD]<∞E[e^{\alpha D}] < \inftyE[eαD]<∞ for all α<δ\alpha < \deltaα<δ, with δ>0\delta > 0δ>0; P[D>c]>0P[D > c] > 0P[D>c]>0; the law of DDD is non-lattice; and E[e−α(c−D)]=1E[e^{-\alpha(c-D)}] = 1E[e−α(c−D)]=1 has a root in (0,δ)(0, \delta)(0,δ). Then there are β>0\beta > 0β>0 and α>0\alpha > 0α>0 with

P{V>v}βe−αv→1(v→∞),α the unique positive root of E[e−α(c−D)]=1.\frac{P\{V > v\}}{\beta e^{-\alpha v}} \to 1 \quad (v \to \infty), \qquad \alpha \text{ the unique positive root of } E\left[e^{-\alpha(c - D)}\right] = 1 .βe−αvP{V>v}​→1(v→∞),α the unique positive root of E[e−α(c−D)]=1.

The constant β\betaβ is left unspecified, as in the book.

Milestones, in attack order

  1. Eq. (8.1): under the modified policy, s−In=Vns - I_n = V_ns−In​=Vn​ for every nnn, independently of sss.
  2. Section 8.1.1: V<∞V < \inftyV<∞ almost surely, P{Vn>v}→P{V>v}P\{V_n > v\} \to P\{V > v\}P{Vn​>v}→P{V>v} for every vvv, and the law of VVV is stationary for (8.1).
  3. Eq. (8.2): for v>0v > 0v>0, P{Vn>v}=P{Dn>v+c}+ED[1(d≤v+c) P{Vn−1>v+c−d}]P\{V_n > v\} = P\{D_n > v + c\} + E_D[1(d \le v + c)\, P\{V_{n-1} > v + c - d\}]P{Vn​>v}=P{Dn​>v+c}+ED​[1(d≤v+c)P{Vn−1​>v+c−d}].
  4. Theorem 11, second sentence: E[e−α(c−D)]=1E[e^{-\alpha(c-D)}] = 1E[e−α(c−D)]=1 has at most one positive root.
  5. Section 8.1.2: with integer demand, (Vn)(V_n)(Vn​) is a Markov chain with transition probabilities pijp_{ij}pij​.
  6. Section 8.1.2: πi=lim⁡nP{Vn=i}\pi_i = \lim_n P\{V_n = i\}πi​=limn​P{Vn​=i} exists and solves πP=π\pi\mathcal P = \piπP=π, ∑iπi=1\sum_i \pi_i = 1∑i​πi​=1, πi≥0\pi_i \ge 0πi​≥0.
  7. Section 8.3.1: if NNN is geometric with parameter λ/μ\lambda/\muλ/μ and NiN_iNi​ given N=jN = jN=j is binomial(j,λi/λ)(j, \lambda_i/\lambda)(j,λi​/λ), then P[Ni=j]=(1−ηi)ηijP[N_i = j] = (1 - \eta_i)\eta_i^jP[Ni​=j]=(1−ηi​)ηij​.
  8. Section 8.3.1: ∑j>spi(j)=ηis+1\sum_{j > s} p_i(j) = \eta_i^{s+1}∑j>s​pi​(j)=ηis+1​, and the smallest cost-minimising stock level is the smallest sss with ηis+1≤hi/(hi+b)\eta_i^{s+1} \le h_i/(h_i + b)ηis+1​≤hi​/(hi​+b).

Significance

The exponential tail is the justification the book gives for approximating the shortfall by a mass-exponential law (an atom at zero plus an exponential tail), from which target stock levels and fill rates are computed in closed form. The decay rate α\alphaα depends only on the demand law and the capacity, so the theorem also says how the stock needed for a given service level grows as utilization approaches one. The discrete-chain milestones justify the exact computation of the shortfall distribution behind the book's Table 8.1 and Figures 8.3–8.8. The geometric law of NiN_iNi​ reduces the multi-item repair problem to independent newsvendor problems with an explicit solution.

The asymptotics of the random-walk maximum are proved in the literature (Cramér–Lundberg theory, Feller Vol. II, XII.5; Asmussen, Applied Probability and Queues, XIII.5); no machine-checked proof is known to exist. Mathlib has neither the Lindley recursion, nor ladder-height decompositions, nor the key renewal theorem for non-lattice laws. The printed Theorem 11 is not correct as stated (see Formalization scope), so the mission also records a corrected statement.

Difficulty

The central step of the goal is the passage from the random walk to an exact asymptotic. An exponential change of measure (Esscher tilt) with the root α\alphaα turns P{V>v}P\{V > v\}P{V>v} into an expectation under a law with positive drift, but it only yields the upper bound P{V>v}≤e−αvP\{V > v\} \le e^{-\alpha v}P{V>v}≤e−αv (Lundberg's inequality); it does not show that eαvP{V>v}e^{\alpha v}P\{V > v\}eαvP{V>v} converges, nor that the limit is positive. Convergence needs a renewal theorem for the overshoot of the tilted walk, which fails for lattice laws. That is why the non-lattice hypothesis cannot be dropped. For the milestones, the existence of the stationary law needs the reversal argument that identifies the law of VnV_nVn​ with that of max⁡k≤nSk\max_{k \le n} S_kmaxk≤n​Sk​, plus the strong law of large numbers to show V<∞V < \inftyV<∞ from E[D]<cE[D] < cE[D]<c.

Formalization scope

  • Model. Demands are real, nonnegative, measurable, i.i.d. (iIndepFun plus IdentDistrib with D1D_1D1​), integrable, with E[D]<cE[D] < cE[D]<c; these are fields of ShortfallModel. Periods are numbered from 111 as in the book (demand 0 is an unused i.i.d. copy). The discrete case is a separate structure with N\mathbb NN-valued demand and capacity.
  • Stationary shortfall. The book's "stationary distribution ... Let VVV represent this random variable" is pinned to V=sup⁡n≥0SnV = \sup_{n \ge 0} S_nV=supn≥0​Sn​, taken in [0,∞][0, \infty][0,∞] and converted to a real number; milestone 2 proves that it is the limit law of VnV_nVn​ from V0=0V_0 = 0V0​=0 and a stationary law of (8.1). The discrete πi\pi_iπi​ is pinned to lim⁡nP{Vn=i}\lim_n P\{V_n = i\}limn​P{Vn​=i}.
  • Corrections to Theorem 11. The printed theorem is false. For integer demand P{V>v}P\{V > v\}P{V>v} is a step function, and no βe−αv\beta e^{-\alpha v}βe−αv is asymptotic to it. If E[eαD]E[e^{\alpha D}]E[eαD] is finite only for α<δ\alpha < \deltaα<δ, the equation E[e−α(c−D)]=1E[e^{-\alpha(c-D)}] = 1E[e−α(c−D)]=1 may have no root in (0,δ)(0,\delta)(0,δ). The goal therefore adds two labelled hypotheses: a non-lattice demand law, and a root in (0,δ)(0, \delta)(0,δ). The mass-exponential demand of Section 8.1.3 (an atom at 000 plus a density) is non-lattice. The approximation β≈e−2(.583)(c−E(D))/σ\beta \approx e^{-2(.583)(c-E(D))/\sigma}β≈e−2(.583)(c−E(D))/σ is not stated.
  • Repair model. The M/M/1 queue is not built. The geometric law of NNN (asserted on p. 202) and the binomial split of NNN (quoted from Chapter 3) enter milestone 7 as hypotheses, exactly as the page's proof uses them. The stability condition λ<μ\lambda < \muλ<μ, not written on the page, is a hypothesis. "The optimal sis_isi​" is read as the smallest minimiser of the cost.
  • Ruled out. Stating Theorem 11 with α\alphaα or β\betaβ allowed to depend on vvv, with β=0\beta = 0β=0 (the ratio would be a division by zero, which Lean evaluates to 000), or for a VVV postulated to have an exponential tail proves nothing. Here β,α\beta, \alphaβ,α are quantified before vvv, both are asserted positive, and VVV is constructed from the demands.
  • Not formalized. The mass-exponential approximations (8.3)–(8.4), the Roundy–Muckstadt refinement, the fill-rate formula η(s)\eta(s)η(s) (a definition, whose steady-state identity needs uniform integrability the book does not discuss), the random-capacity chain on p. 186, and the monotonicity of sis_isi​ in μ\muμ.
  • Reusable infrastructure. Welcome: the Lindley recursion and its reversal identity, the Loynes existence theorem, Lundberg's inequality, and a non-lattice renewal theorem. All of these are needed well beyond this mission, in queueing (GI/G/1 waiting times) and ruin theory.

Selected references

  • J. A. Muckstadt, Analysis and Algorithms for Service Parts Supply Chains, Springer, 2005, Chapter 8. https://doi.org/10.1007/b138879
  • P. Glasserman, Bounds and asymptotics for planning critical safety stocks, Operations Research 45(2), 244–257, 1997. https://doi.org/10.1287/opre.45.2.244
  • P. Glasserman and S. Tayur, Sensitivity analysis for base-stock levels in multiechelon production-inventory systems, Management Science 41(2), 263–281, 1995 (the book's reference [97]). https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.41.2.263
  • R. O. Roundy and J. A. Muckstadt, Heuristic computation of periodic-review base stock inventory policies, Management Science 46(1), 104–109, 2000. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.46.1.104.15131
  • D. V. Lindley, The theory of queues with a single server, Mathematical Proceedings of the Cambridge Philosophical Society 48(2), 277–289, 1952. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0305004100027638
  • W. Feller, An Introduction to Probability Theory and Its Applications, Vol. II, 2nd ed., Wiley, 1971, Chapter XII.
  • S. Asmussen, Applied Probability and Queues, 2nd ed., Springer, 2003, Chapter XIII. https://doi.org/10.1007/b97236
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Convex OptimizationOptimization·Captain: mikedeng1

Analysis and Algorithms for Service Parts Supply Chains V: Marginal Allocation and Risk PoolingTextbook

Motivation

Service parts networks (spare parts for aircraft, military systems, industrial equipment) hold stock at several echelons: a depot, intermediate stocking facilities, and bases or warehouses that face demand. Two questions recur in their planning. First, how should a given amount of stock be split among locations whose expected costs are convex in the stock they hold? Second, does adding an echelon, a depot that pools the demand of several warehouses, raise or lower the stock the system needs?

Chapter 7 of Muckstadt, Analysis and Algorithms for Service Parts Supply Chains (Springer 2005, DOI 10.1007/b138879), treats both. For the second it follows Eppen and Schrage (1981, reference [78] of the book): with normal demands, a depot that places orders every period and allocates stock so that all warehouses face the same stockout probability reduces the choice of system stock to a single critical-fractile equation. For the first, the chapter's multi-echelon pooling model (Section 7.3) evaluates nested cost functions of the form "holding and shortage cost plus the minimum over allocations of a sum of convex costs", and its appendix (Section 7.4) gives the marginal allocation algorithm AllocOpt that computes these minima exactly for every stock level at once.

Marginal analysis for separable convex resource allocation is classical (Fox, Management Science, 1966); the monograph of Ibaraki and Katoh (MIT Press, 1988) surveys it.

Setting

Allocation data (Section 7.4). There is a set M={1,…,Mˉ}M = \{1, \dots, \bar M\}M={1,…,Mˉ} of locations and an augmented set M0={0}∪MM_0 = \{0\} \cup MM0​={0}∪M. Each location m∈M0m \in M_0m∈M0​ has integer gridpoints 0=r0m<r1m<⋯<rn(m)m0 = r^m_0 < r^m_1 < \dots < r^m_{n(m)}0=r0m​<r1m​<⋯<rn(m)m​. For m∈Mm \in Mm∈M, the value cnmc^m_ncnm​ of a convex function is given at each gridpoint. The slopes (7.19) are c^nm=(cn+1m−cnm)/(rn+1m−rnm)\hat c^m_n = (c^m_{n+1} - c^m_n)/(r^m_{n+1} - r^m_n)c^nm​=(cn+1m​−cnm​)/(rn+1m​−rnm​) for n<n(m)n < n(m)n<n(m), and c^n(m)m\hat c^m_{n(m)}c^n(m)m​ repeats the last one. The piecewise linear approximation C~m\tilde C_mC~m​ of (7.20)–(7.21) interpolates the values cnmc^m_ncnm​ at the gridpoints and continues with slope c^n(m)m\hat c^m_{n(m)}c^n(m)m​ beyond the last one. A convex function fff on R+\mathbb R_+R+​ is also given.

The allocation optimization (7.22) asks, for each n∈N0={0,…,n(0)}n \in N_0 = \{0, \dots, n(0)\}n∈N0​={0,…,n(0)}, for

cn0=f(rn0)+min⁡{∑m∈MC~m(rm):rm≥0 integer, ∑m∈Mrm=rn0}.c^0_n = f(r^0_n) + \min\Bigl\{ \sum_{m \in M} \tilde C_m(r_m) : r_m \ge 0 \text{ integer},\ \sum_{m \in M} r_m = r^0_n \Bigr\}.cn0​=f(rn0​)+min{m∈M∑​C~m​(rm​):rm​≥0 integer, m∈M∑​rm​=rn0​}.

Algorithm AllocOpt (Definition 4) keeps a current gridpoint index n∗(m)n^*(m)n∗(m) and allocation r∗(m)r^*(m)r∗(m) per location. For each increment rn0−rn−10r^0_n - r^0_{n-1}rn0​−rn−10​ of the target, it repeatedly gives units to a location m∗m^*m∗ whose current slope c^n∗(m∗)m∗\hat c^{m^*}_{n^*(m^*)}c^n∗(m∗)m∗​ is minimal, up to that location's next gridpoint, and records the accumulated cost.

Pooling system (Section 7.2.1). One depot supplies mmm warehouses. The demand djtd_{jt}djt​ at warehouse jjj in period ttt is normal with mean μj\mu_jμj​ and variance σj2\sigma_j^2σj2​, independent across periods and warehouses. The supplier-to-depot lead time is DDD periods, the depot-to-warehouse lead time AAA periods, and holding and backorder costs h,bh, bh,b are equal at all warehouses. Positions IjI_jIj​ are in balance when Φ((Ij−Aμj)/(A σj))\Phi((I_j - A\mu_j)/(\sqrt A\,\sigma_j))Φ((Ij​−Aμj​)/(A​σj​)) is the same for all jjj. For system inventory position sss, with Y0Y_0Y0​ the system demand over DDD periods and YjY_jYj​ the demand at jjj over the next A+1A + 1A+1 periods, the balanced allocation gives each warehouse a share proportional to σj\sigma_jσj​, and zjz_jzj​ is its end-of-period net inventory.

Formalization targets

Goal: Proposition 2 (correctness)

For every tie-breaking rule in its arg min steps, AllocOpt returns values cn0c^0_ncn0​ that satisfy (7.22) for every n∈N0n \in N_0n∈N0​: some feasible integer allocation attains cn0−f(rn0)c^0_n - f(r^0_n)cn0​−f(rn0​), and no feasible integer allocation does better.

Milestones

  1. Slope monotonicity (p. 178): c^nm≥c^n−1m\hat c^m_n \ge \hat c^m_{n-1}c^nm​≥c^n−1m​ for 0<n≤n(m)0 < n \le n(m)0<n≤n(m).
  2. Convexity of C~m\tilde C_mC~m​ on [0,∞)[0, \infty)[0,∞) (proof of Proposition 2, p. 179).
  3. Remark 2 (p. 179): with the inner loop run only while the current slope is ≤0\le 0≤0, AllocOpt solves (7.22) with ∑mrm≤rn0\sum_m r_m \le r^0_n∑m​rm​≤rn0​.
  4. Lemma 3 (p. 152): if the positions are in balance and
∑jdj,t−1≥max⁡i{∑j≠idj,t+D−1+di,t+D−1(1−∑jσjσi)},\sum_{j} d_{j,t-1} \ge \max_{i} \Bigl\{ \sum_{j \ne i} d_{j,t+D-1} + d_{i,t+D-1}\Bigl(1 - \frac{\sum_j \sigma_j}{\sigma_i}\Bigr)\Bigr\},j∑​dj,t−1​≥imax​{j=i∑​dj,t+D−1​+di,t+D−1​(1−σi​∑j​σj​​)},

then a nonnegative allocation of the arriving ∑jdj,t−1\sum_j d_{j,t-1}∑j​dj,t−1​ units restores balance. 5. Net inventory law (pp. 156–157): zjz_jzj​ is normal with mean (s−(D+A+1)∑iμi) σj/∑iσi(s - (D + A + 1)\sum_i \mu_i)\,\sigma_j / \sum_i \sigma_i(s−(D+A+1)∑i​μi​)σj​/∑i​σi​ and variance (A+1)σj2+(σj/∑iσi)2D∑iσi2(A + 1)\sigma_j^2 + (\sigma_j / \sum_i \sigma_i)^2 D \sum_i \sigma_i^2(A+1)σj2​+(σj​/∑i​σi​)2D∑i​σi2​. 6. Critical fractile (pp. 157–158): sss minimizes ∑jE[h(zj)++b(zj)−]\sum_j E[h (z_j)^+ + b (z_j)^-]∑j​E[h(zj​)++b(zj​)−] if and only if Φ(z)=b/(b+h)\Phi(z) = b/(b+h)Φ(z)=b/(b+h), where

z=s−(D+A+1)∑iμi[(A+1)(∑iσi)2+D∑iσi2]1/2.z = \frac{s - (D + A + 1)\sum_i \mu_i}{\bigl[(A + 1)(\sum_i \sigma_i)^2 + D \sum_i \sigma_i^2\bigr]^{1/2}}.z=[(A+1)(∑i​σi​)2+D∑i​σi2​]1/2s−(D+A+1)∑i​μi​​.

Significance

The goal certifies an algorithm that the chapter uses as a subroutine three times: in the pool cost (7.14), the subsystem cost (7.15) and the system cost (7.17), and hence in the claim of Section 7.3 that the system-wide cost function can be computed in time nlog⁡nn \log nnlogn in the number of locations. Because AllocOpt produces the whole vector (cn0)n∈N0(c^0_n)_{n \in N_0}(cn0​)n∈N0​​ in one pass, its correctness gives the nested value functions at every gridpoint of the next echelon, which is what allows the recursion up the echelons. The Eppen–Schrage milestones give the classical quantitative form of risk pooling: the system stock is set by one critical fractile, and the standard deviation term (A+1)(∑iσi)2+D∑iσi2(A + 1)(\sum_i \sigma_i)^2 + D \sum_i \sigma_i^2(A+1)(∑i​σi​)2+D∑i​σi2​ is what the book compares with the single-warehouse and the decentralized systems.

On formalization: the book states Proposition 2 with a two-sentence argument and Remark 2 without proof. The Eppen–Schrage computations are displayed derivations. None of these results has a machine-checked proof on the platform. A verified AllocOpt, stated for an explicit algorithm rather than for an abstract greedy procedure, is reusable for any separable convex integer allocation with a sum constraint.

Difficulty

The usual greedy exchange argument assumes that units are allocated one at a time. AllocOpt allocates in blocks, up to the next gridpoint of the chosen location, and it carries its state across successive targets rn−10→rn0r^0_{n-1} \to r^0_nrn−10​→rn0​ without restarting. The proof must therefore show that the state after each outer step is itself an optimal allocation for the current target, and that block moves never step past a breakpoint where the arg min would change. The slopes can be negative, and the equality constraint forces allocation even when every marginal cost is positive. Remark 2 needs an additional argument: under the inequality constraint the loop may stop before uuu reaches zero, and that point is optimal only because the slopes are nondecreasing.

For the pooling results, the balanced allocation mixes the depot-lead-time demand Y0Y_0Y0​ of all warehouses with the local demand YjY_jYj​, and the Gaussian law of zjz_jzj​ rests on the independence of disjoint blocks of periods. The fractile statement requires strict monotonicity of each warehouse's expected cost derivative in sss, not only a first-order condition.

Formalization scope

  • Indices and types. Locations of MMM are Fin Mbar; gridpoints are integers, values and slopes real numbers; allocations are functions Fin Mbar → ℕ. The standing assumptions of Section 7.4 form the predicate WellFormed: Mˉ≥1\bar M \ge 1Mˉ≥1, n(m)≥1n(m) \ge 1n(m)≥1 for m∈Mm \in Mm∈M (a slope (7.19) needs two gridpoints), gridpoints starting at 000 and strictly increasing at every location of M0M_0M0​, each cnmc^m_ncnm​ the value of a function convex on [0,∞)[0, \infty)[0,∞), and fff convex on [0,∞)[0, \infty)[0,∞).
  • The minimum in (7.22) is stated as attainment plus a lower bound over the finite, nonempty set of feasible integer allocations, never as an unconstrained infimum.
  • Ties. The book's arg min fixes no tie-breaking rule. Results are stated for every selection rule that returns a minimizing location.
  • Termination. AllocOpt is a total Lean function. The inner loop is given more passes than it can use, so it always exits through its own condition.
  • Not stated. The operation count of Proposition 2, O((1+log⁡2Mˉ)∑m∈M0n(m))O((1 + \log_2 \bar M)\sum_{m \in M_0} n(m))O((1+log2​Mˉ)∑m∈M0​​n(m)), and Proposition 1 and Remark 1 (p. 177) are operation counts with no machine model and are left out.
  • Corrections. The first expected-cost display on p. 157 has + b∫−∞0z dFzj(z)+\,b\int_{-\infty}^0 z\,dF_{z_j}(z)+b∫−∞0​zdFzj​​(z), which is negative. The formalization uses b E[(zj)−]b\,E[(z_j)^-]bE[(zj​)−], as in the book's next display.
  • Pinnings. Lemma 3 is deterministic: the demands are arbitrary reals, and "in balance following the allocation" means that some xj≥0x_j \ge 0xj​≥0 with ∑jxj=∑jdj,t−1\sum_j x_j = \sum_j d_{j,t-1}∑j​xj​=∑j​dj,t−1​ exists. The critical-fractile milestone is the characterization "minimizer if and only if Φ(z)=b/(b+h)\Phi(z) = b/(b+h)Φ(z)=b/(b+h)" of the book's "can be found by setting".
  • Trivialization ruled out. The allocation problem (7.22) is defined independently of the algorithm, as a minimum over explicit integer allocations, and the C~m\tilde C_mC~m​ are built from the data by (7.19)–(7.21). Neither (7.22) nor the C~m\tilde C_mC~m​ are defined as, or required to agree with, what AllocOpt returns.
  • Welcome contributions. Lemmas on the invariants of AllocOpt, in particular that after each outer step the allocation r∗r^*r∗ is feasible for rn0r^0_nrn0​ with cost zzz and all slopes to the left of n∗(m)n^*(m)n∗(m) are at most those to the right. Also Gaussian sum lemmas over finite index sets and a general newsvendor first-order characterization.

Selected references

  • J. A. Muckstadt, Analysis and Algorithms for Service Parts Supply Chains, Springer Series in Operations Research and Financial Engineering, Springer, 2005. DOI 10.1007/b138879
  • G. D. Eppen and L. Schrage, "Centralized ordering policies in a multi-warehouse system with lead times and random demand", in L. B. Schwarz (ed.), Multi-Level Production/Inventory Control Systems: Theory and Practice, Studies in the Management Sciences, North-Holland, Amsterdam, 1981, pp. 51–67.
  • G. D. Eppen, "Effects of centralization on expected costs in a multi-location newsboy problem", Management Science 25(5), 1979, 498–501. DOI 10.1287/mnsc.25.5.498
  • B. Fox, "Discrete optimization via marginal analysis", Management Science 13(3), 1966, 210–216. DOI 10.1287/mnsc.13.3.210
  • T. Ibaraki and N. Katoh, Resource Allocation Problems: Algorithmic Approaches, MIT Press, 1988.
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ProbabilityStochastic Systems·Captain: mikedeng1

Analysis and Algorithms for Service Parts Supply Chains III: Palm's Theorem for (s–1, s) PoliciesTextbook

Motivation

Service parts (spare engines, avionics modules, repairable components) are usually managed one unit at a time: whenever a customer order removes a unit from stock, a replacement is ordered at once, from a repair shop or an outside supplier. This is the (s–1, s) policy, under which the inventory position (on hand plus on order minus backorders) stays constant at the stock level sss. Every performance measure of such a system (fill rate, expected backorders, availability) is a function of one random variable: the number of units in resupply, i.e. ordered but not yet returned. Chapter 3 of Muckstadt, Analysis and Algorithms for Service Parts Supply Chains (Springer 2005) computes its distribution, and the rest of the book (the METRIC-type multi-echelon models of Chapters 4 and 5, the stock-level optimization of Section 3.4) is built on that computation.

Timeline. C. Palm (1938) showed, in the setting of telephone traffic, that in an infinite-server system with Poisson arrivals the number of busy servers has, in steady state, a Poisson law whose mean is the arrival rate times the mean service time, whatever the service-time distribution. Feeney and Sherbrooke (1966) carried the result to (s–1, s) inventory systems with compound Poisson demand, and treated the lost-sales case. Sherbrooke's METRIC model (1968) made the Poisson law of units in resupply the basis of multi-echelon spare-parts planning.

Setting

A single item is stocked at one location. Customer orders arrive at epochs T0<T1<⋯T_0 < T_1 < \cdotsT0​<T1​<⋯ of a Poisson process with rate λ>0\lambda > 0λ>0, started empty at time 000: the interarrival times AkA_kAk​ are independent and exponential with rate λ\lambdaλ, and Tk=A0+⋯+AkT_k = A_0 + \cdots + A_kTk​=A0​+⋯+Ak​. The kkk-th order triggers a resupply order with resupply time Lk≥0L_k \ge 0Lk​≥0. The resupply times are independent and identically distributed, independent of the arrival process, with a density ggg, distribution function G(u)=P[L≤u]G(u) = P[L \le u]G(u)=P[L≤u] and finite mean

τˉ=E[L]=∫0∞[1−G(u)] du.\bar\tau = E[L] = \int_0^\infty [1 - G(u)]\,du .τˉ=E[L]=∫0∞​[1−G(u)]du.

With backorders allowed, the number of units in resupply at time ttt is

X(t)=#{k:Tk≤t<Tk+Lk},X(t) = \#\{k : T_k \le t < T_k + L_k\},X(t)=#{k:Tk​≤t<Tk​+Lk​},

and N(t)=#{k:Tk≤t}N(t) = \#\{k : T_k \le t\}N(t)=#{k:Tk​≤t} counts the orders placed in [0,t][0,t][0,t]. On-hand stock and backorders at time ttt are (s−X(t))+(s - X(t))^+(s−X(t))+ and (X(t)−s)+(X(t) - s)^+(X(t)−s)+.

In the compound Poisson version the kkk-th order asks for Xk≥1X_k \ge 1Xk​≥1 units, the sizes are i.i.d. with uj=P[Xk=j]u_j = P[X_k = j]uj​=P[Xk​=j], independent of arrivals and resupply times, and all units of one order share its resupply time LkL_kLk​. The units in resupply are Y(t)=∑k:Tk≤t<Tk+LkXkY(t) = \sum_{k : T_k \le t < T_k + L_k} X_kY(t)=∑k:Tk​≤t<Tk​+Lk​​Xk​. Writing un(y)u^{(y)}_nun(y)​ for the probability that yyy orders ask for nnn units in total, the compound Poisson probabilities with parameter μ\muμ are

p(n∣μ)=∑y=0nμye−μy! un(y).p(n \mid \mu) = \sum_{y=0}^{n} \frac{\mu^y e^{-\mu}}{y!}\,u^{(y)}_n .p(n∣μ)=y=0∑n​y!μye−μ​un(y)​.

In the lost-sales version an order that finds no stock on hand is lost, so at most sss units are ever in resupply.

Formalization targets

Goal: Palm's theorem (Theorem 6, p. 39)

For every x≥0x \ge 0x≥0,

lim⁡t→∞P[X(t)=x]=e−λτˉ(λτˉ)xx!.\lim_{t\to\infty} P[X(t) = x] = e^{-\lambda\bar\tau}\frac{(\lambda\bar\tau)^x}{x!}.t→∞lim​P[X(t)=x]=e−λτˉx!(λτˉ)x​.

The resupply-time law enters only through its mean. This is the statement the book's proof establishes and every later chapter uses.

The proof's milestones (pp. 38–41)

  1. Eq. (3.5): P[N(t)=n]=e−λt(λt)n/n!P[N(t) = n] = e^{-\lambda t}(\lambda t)^n/n!P[N(t)=n]=e−λt(λt)n/n!.
  2. Eq. (3.3): given N(t)=nN(t) = nN(t)=n, the epochs (T0,…,Tn−1)(T_0, \dots, T_{n-1})(T0​,…,Tn−1​) have density n!/tnn!/t^nn!/tn on 0<t1<⋯<tn<t0 < t_1 < \cdots < t_n < t0<t1​<⋯<tn​<t.
  3. Eq. (3.7): given N(t)=nN(t) = nN(t)=n, X(t)X(t)X(t) is binomial with parameters nnn and p=1t∫0t[1−G(u)] dup = \frac1t\int_0^t[1-G(u)]\,dup=t1​∫0t​[1−G(u)]du.
  4. Eq. (3.8): for every t>0t > 0t>0, X(t)X(t)X(t) is Poisson with mean λ∫0t[1−G(u)] du\lambda\int_0^t[1-G(u)]\,duλ∫0t​[1−G(u)]du.
  5. Eq. (3.10): ∫0t[1−G(u)] du→τˉ\int_0^t[1-G(u)]\,du \to \bar\tau∫0t​[1−G(u)]du→τˉ.

Extensions in Section 3.1

  1. Theorem 7 (pp. 43–44): with compound Poisson demand, lim⁡t→∞P[Y(t)=n]=p(n∣λτˉ)\lim_{t\to\infty}P[Y(t) = n] = p(n \mid \lambda\bar\tau)limt→∞​P[Y(t)=n]=p(n∣λτˉ).
  2. Theorem 8 (p. 44): in the lost-sales system with exponential resupply times of rate β\betaβ, the probability vectors solving the balance equations are exactly the truncated Poisson law πx∝(λ/β)x/x!\pi_x \propto (\lambda/\beta)^x/x!πx​∝(λ/β)x/x!, 0≤x≤s0 \le x \le s0≤x≤s.
  3. Theorem 9 (pp. 46–47): for a due-date delay T≥0T \ge 0T≥0, the units in resupply that have been there for at least TTT satisfy lim⁡t→∞P[YT(t)=n]=p(n∣λτˉα)\lim_{t\to\infty}P[Y_T(t) = n] = p(n \mid \lambda\bar\tau\alpha)limt→∞​P[YT​(t)=n]=p(n∣λτˉα) with α=1τˉ∫T∞[1−G(t)] dt\alpha = \frac1{\bar\tau}\int_T^\infty[1-G(t)]\,dtα=τˉ1​∫T∞​[1−G(t)]dt.

Significance

The result. Palm's theorem turns an infinite-dimensional object (the whole resupply-time distribution) into one number, τˉ\bar\tauτˉ. This insensitivity is what makes spare-parts planning computable: the expected backorders at stock level sss are ∑x>s(x−s) p(x∣λτˉ)\sum_{x > s}(x - s)\,p(x \mid \lambda\bar\tau)∑x>s​(x−s)p(x∣λτˉ), the fill rate is P[X≤s−1]P[X \le s - 1]P[X≤s−1], and both can be optimized over sss with only the demand rate and mean repair time as data. Theorem 7 extends this to batch demand, Theorem 9 to systems allowed a response time, and Theorem 8 gives the exact law when shortages are lost instead of backordered.

Formalizing it. All of these results are classical and proved. None of them is formalized on the platform, and Mathlib has Poisson and exponential distributions but no Poisson process, no thinning theorem and no infinite-server queue. The mission produces a Poisson arrival stream built from i.i.d. exponential gaps, the conditional-uniformity property of its epochs, independent thinning, and the M/G/∞ transient law, all reusable in queueing and inventory missions.

Difficulty

The algebra of the proof (summing the binomial against the Poisson law of N(t)N(t)N(t)) is short. The work is in the probabilistic step the book treats in a sentence: that, given N(t)=nN(t) = nN(t)=n, the nnn orders behave like independent uniform epochs, each of which independently is still in resupply at time ttt with the same probability ppp. This needs the joint law of the partial sums of exponential variables (Eq. (3.3)), and then a symmetrization argument, since the epochs are ordered while the resupply times are attached to order indices. The naive route of computing P[X(t)=x]P[X(t) = x]P[X(t)=x] by conditioning on individual epochs does not go through without that exchangeability step. The limit t→∞t \to \inftyt→∞ is then elementary; stating a stationary version directly is not a substitute, since the book's "steady state" is exactly this limit.

Formalization scope

The model is a structure on a probability space (Ω,P)(\Omega, P)(Ω,P): exponential interarrival times with rate λ>0\lambda > 0λ>0, nonnegative resupply times with a density and an integrable first coordinate, and mutual independence of the whole family. Orders are indexed from 000, so the book's X1,…,XnX_1, \dots, X_nX1​,…,Xn​ are T0,…,Tn−1T_0, \dots, T_{n-1}T0​,…,Tn−1​. Counts are cardinalities of sets of order indices, with value 000 on the probability-zero event where infinitely many orders fall in a bounded interval.

Commitments and pinnings:

  • "Steady state probability" (Theorems 6, 7, 9) is lim⁡t→∞P[⋅(t)=x]\lim_{t\to\infty}P[\cdot(t) = x]limt→∞​P[⋅(t)=x] for the system empty at time 000, which is what the proofs compute via (3.8)–(3.11).
  • Independence of resupply times from arrivals is not written in Theorem 6 but is used on p. 40; it is part of the model.
  • The stock level sss does not enter the backorder model; it matters only in Theorem 8.
  • Theorem 8 is stated algebraically: a vector on {0,…,s}\{0, \dots, s\}{0,…,s} solves the balance equations (3.26), (3.25) for 0<j<s0 < j < s0<j<s and (3.32), and sums to one, if and only if it is the truncated Poisson law. The book obtains these equations by letting t→∞t \to \inftyt→∞ in the forward equations under the unproved assumption Pj′(t)→0P_j'(t) \to 0Pj′​(t)→0. The book writes (3.25) "for 0≤j≤s0 \le j \le s0≤j≤s", which at j=sj = sj=s contradicts its own (3.32); the boundary equation (3.32) is used. The sentence on p. 46 extending Theorem 8 to arbitrary resupply densities is asserted without proof and is not stated.
  • Theorem 7 identifies the limit law by its probabilities (3.22)–(3.23); its mean λτˉuˉ\lambda\bar\tau\bar uλτˉuˉ is a property of that law. Theorem 9 is stated for compound demand as the book states it, although the book's proof covers only the Poisson case.

A model in which X(t)X(t)X(t) is postulated through its law, or in which resupply times may depend on the arrival epochs, makes the goal empty or false; here X(t)X(t)X(t) is computed from the primitive arrival and resupply times, whose joint law is fully specified.

Welcome contributions: a general Poisson-process library (construction from exponential gaps, Poisson marginals, order-statistics property), independent thinning, and proofs of the milestones in the listed order.

Selected references

  • J. A. Muckstadt, Analysis and Algorithms for Service Parts Supply Chains, Springer Series in Operations Research and Financial Engineering, 2005, Chapter 3. https://doi.org/10.1007/b138879
  • C. Palm, "Analysis of the Erlang traffic formula for busy-signal arrangements", Ericsson Technics 5, 1938, 39–58.
  • G. J. Feeney and C. C. Sherbrooke, "The (s–1, s) inventory policy under compound Poisson demand", Management Science 12(5), 1966, 391–411. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.12.5.391
  • C. C. Sherbrooke, "METRIC: A multi-echelon technique for recoverable item control", Operations Research 16(1), 1968, 122–141. https://doi.org/10.1287/opre.16.1.122
  • S. M. Ross, Stochastic Processes, 2nd ed., Wiley, 1996, Section 2.3 (conditional distribution of arrival times) and Section 2.4 (the M/G/∞ queue).
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Dynamic ProgrammingOptimization·Captain: mikedeng1

Analysis and Algorithms for Service Parts Supply Chains I: Optimality of Order-Up-To Policies by Dynamic ProgrammingTextbook

Motivation

A stocking point that reviews its inventory once per period and must decide how much to order is the basic unit of every service parts supply chain: each warehouse, each repair depot and each forward location in the networks studied later in Muckstadt's Analysis and Algorithms for Service Parts Supply Chains (Springer 2005, DOI 10.1007/b138879) faces this decision for thousands of items. The practical rule used everywhere is the order-up-to (base-stock) rule: bring the inventory position up to a fixed target level whenever it falls below it, and order nothing otherwise. Chapter 2 of the book justifies this rule for a single item with linear costs, following the dynamic-programming argument of Karlin and Scarf, and the rest of the book takes the rule as given.

Timeline. Arrow, Harris and Marschak posed the periodic-review inventory problem as a dynamic program in 1951 (Econometrica). Bellman, Glicksberg and Gross showed in 1955 that with linear ordering cost and convex expected holding and shortage costs the optimal policy has a critical-number form (Management Science). Karlin and Scarf (1958) extended the analysis to a positive lead time, the setting of the book's Theorems 1–3. Veinott (1965) gave conditions under which a base-stock policy is optimal in multi-product, nonstationary models (Management Science).

Setting

One item is stocked at one location. At the start of each period the inventory position yyy is observed and a quantity u≥0u \ge 0u≥0 is ordered; with lead time one period it arrives at the start of the next period. Demand in each period is independent of other periods and has a density ggg on (0,∞)(0,\infty)(0,∞) that is positive and continuous. Unmet demand is backordered. Costs are linear: ccc per unit ordered, hhh per unit on hand at the end of a period, bbb per unit backordered at the end of a period, and future costs are discounted by α∈(0,1)\alpha \in (0,1)α∈(0,1). The one-period cost is

L(y)={h∫0y(y−x)g(x) dx+b∫y∞(x−y)g(x) dx,y>0,b∫0∞(x−y)g(x) dx,y≤0.L(y) = \begin{cases} h\displaystyle\int_0^y (y-x)g(x)\,dx + b\int_y^\infty (x-y)g(x)\,dx, & y > 0,\\[1mm] b\displaystyle\int_0^\infty (x-y)g(x)\,dx, & y \le 0. \end{cases}L(y)=⎩⎨⎧​h∫0y​(y−x)g(x)dx+b∫y∞​(x−y)g(x)dx,b∫0∞​(x−y)g(x)dx,​y>0,y≤0.​

The book assumes throughout that b>1−αα cb > \frac{1-\alpha}{\alpha}\,cb>α1−α​c: the backorder cost outweighs the saving from deferring a purchase.

The nnn-period value functions are f1=Lf_1 = Lf1​=L and, for n≥2n \ge 2n≥2,

fn(y)=min⁡u≥0{c u+L(y)+α∫0∞fn−1(y+u−x) g(x) dx}.f_n(y) = \min_{u \ge 0}\Big\{ c\,u + L(y) + \alpha\int_0^\infty f_{n-1}(y+u-x)\,g(x)\,dx \Big\}.fn​(y)=u≥0min​{cu+L(y)+α∫0∞​fn−1​(y+u−x)g(x)dx}.

An order uuu is optimal at yyy if it attains this minimum over all u≥0u \ge 0u≥0. The order-up-to rule with level sss orders u(y)=max⁡{0,s−y}u(y) = \max\{0, s-y\}u(y)=max{0,s−y}. The marginal function of eq. (2.8) is Fn(w)=c+α∫0∞fn′(w−x) g(x) dxF_n(w) = c + \alpha\int_0^\infty f_n'(w-x)\,g(x)\,dxFn​(w)=c+α∫0∞​fn′​(w−x)g(x)dx. In Lean these are Model, Model.L, Model.f, Model.IsOptimalOrder, Model.IsOrderUpToOptimal and Model.F in the namespace ServiceParts.BaseStock.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 2 (p. 18) in its nnn-period form

For every horizon n≥2n \ge 2n≥2, either there is a real level sn∗s_n^*sn∗​ with

un∗(y)=max⁡{0, sn∗−y} optimal for every y,u_n^*(y) = \max\{0,\ s_n^* - y\} \ \text{optimal for every } y,un∗​(y)=max{0, sn∗​−y} optimal for every y,

or ordering nothing is optimal for every yyy (level −∞-\infty−∞); and there is N≥2N \ge 2N≥2 such that the level is real for all n≥Nn \ge Nn≥N. No value of sn∗s_n^*sn∗​ is fixed: the goal asserts the shape of the optimal policy only.

Milestones, in attack order

  1. LLL is convex (p. 21).
  2. Every fnf_nfn​, n≥1n \ge 1n≥1, is convex (p. 19, property (c)).
  3. Every fnf_nfn​ is differentiable with −(c+b)≤fn′≤h/(1−α)-(c+b) \le f_n' \le h/(1-\alpha)−(c+b)≤fn′​≤h/(1−α) (p. 20).
  4. Property (b): given an optimal real level sss for horizon n≥2n \ge 2n≥2, fn′=−c+L′f_n' = -c + L'fn′​=−c+L′ below sss and fn′=L′+α∫0∞fn−1′(⋅−x)g(x) dxf_n' = L' + \alpha\int_0^\infty f_{n-1}'(\cdot - x)g(x)\,dxfn′​=L′+α∫0∞​fn−1′​(⋅−x)g(x)dx from sss on (p. 19).
  5. Given such a level, Fn(w)→(1−α)c−bα<0F_n(w) \to (1-\alpha)c - b\alpha < 0Fn​(w)→(1−α)c−bα<0 as w→−∞w \to -\inftyw→−∞ (p. 19).
  6. Property (a): optimal real levels are nondecreasing in the horizon, sn∗≤sn+1∗s_n^* \le s_{n+1}^*sn∗​≤sn+1∗​ (p. 18).

Significance

The theorem reduces an infinite-dimensional control problem, a choice of order quantity for every possible inventory position, to one number per period. Every later chapter of the book (Palm's theorem for (s−1,s)(s-1,s)(s−1,s) policies, METRIC-type stock level optimization, allocation in multi-echelon systems) parameterizes policies by such stock levels; this is where the book justifies that parameterization.

The result is classical and proved in many texts. On Prove2Me the mission produces a machine-checked finite-horizon version with a continuous demand density, including the calculus the proof needs: convexity of an expected cost defined by integrals against a density, differentiation under the integral sign in the recursion, and the one-sided behaviour of the value function at the order-up-to level. Existing platform results on base-stock optimality (Veinott's multi-product model, advance demand information) use different models and different arguments; none covers this recursion.

Difficulty

The argument is an induction on nnn whose hypothesis carries convexity, the derivative formula (b), and bounds on fn′f_n'fn′​. The delicate step is the existence of a finite root of FnF_nFn​: its limit at −∞-\infty−∞ depends on whether the previous level was finite. For n=1n = 1n=1 nothing is ordered and the limit is c−bαc - b\alphac−bα, which the assumption b>1−ααcb > \frac{1-\alpha}{\alpha}cb>α1−α​c does not make negative. The book's base case ("left to the reader") therefore fails when c>αbc > \alpha bc>αb: with α=12\alpha = \tfrac12α=21​, c=1c = 1c=1, b=32b = \tfrac32b=23​ the two-period problem never orders. The goal is corrected accordingly.

Two properties the book's induction also carries are not usable as printed. Property (d), fn′≤fn−1′f_n' \le f_{n-1}'fn′​≤fn−1′​, is false: for large yyy, fn′(y)f_n'(y)fn′​(y) approaches h(1+α+⋯+αn−1)h(1 + \alpha + \dots + \alpha^{n-1})h(1+α+⋯+αn−1), which increases with nnn. The second-derivative clause of property (c) fails at y=0y = 0y=0 whenever g(0+)>0g(0^+) > 0g(0+)>0. A solver cannot follow the printed induction step for step; property (a), which the book derives from (d), is true and is a milestone in its own right.

Formalization scope

  • Horizon. The book states Theorem 2 for "the optimal policy" without a horizon. Its proof is an induction on a finite horizon, and the passage n→∞n \to \inftyn→∞ is left as a conjecture (p. 21). The goal is the finite-horizon theorem; no infinite-horizon value function is constructed.
  • Lead time. The proof sets τ=1\tau = 1τ=1 "to simplify notation"; so does the formalization. Theorem 1 (dependence on the inventory position only) and Theorem 3 (general τ\tauτ, whose level equation is the conjectured infinite-horizon one) are not stated.
  • Level −∞-\infty−∞. The goal allows "never order" as the order-up-to rule with level −∞-\infty−∞ and adds eventual finiteness; see Difficulty.
  • Added hypotheses. c≥0c \ge 0c≥0, h>0h > 0h>0 (the book uses lim⁡w→∞fn′(w−x)>0\lim_{w\to\infty} f_n'(w - x) > 0limw→∞​fn′​(w−x)>0), 0<α0 < \alpha0<α (the book divides by α\alphaα), and a finite mean ∫0∞x g(x) dx<∞\int_0^\infty x\,g(x)\,dx < \infty∫0∞​xg(x)dx<∞ (without it LLL is infinite). All are fields of Model, together with positivity and continuity of ggg on (0,∞)(0,\infty)(0,∞), ∫0∞g=1\int_0^\infty g = 1∫0∞​g=1, and b>1−ααcb > \frac{1-\alpha}{\alpha}cb>α1−α​c.
  • Minimum and derivatives. fnf_nfn​ is defined with the infimum over u≥0u \ge 0u≥0 of a nonnegative quantity; optimality is always against every u′≥0u' \ge 0u′≥0. Statements about fn′f_n'fn′​ assert differentiability (Differentiable, HasDerivAt) and do not read deriv as evidence of it.
  • Levels. The book's sn∗s_n^*sn∗​ is "the unique solution of (2.6)"; milestones take any real level at which the order-up-to rule is optimal.

A recursion in which ordering is restricted to order-up-to rules, or in which fnf_nfn​ is defined through sn∗s_n^*sn∗​, would make the goal a tautology; here fnf_nfn​ is defined by minimization over all u≥0u \ge 0u≥0 and optimality is checked against all orders.

Needed infrastructure: convexity and differentiation of parametric integrals against a density on (0,∞)(0,\infty)(0,∞), and minimization of a differentiable convex function over a half-line. Both are reusable for the other stochastic inventory missions on the platform. Proofs of individual milestones are welcome independently of the goal.

Selected references

  • J. A. Muckstadt, Analysis and Algorithms for Service Parts Supply Chains, Springer Series in Operations Research and Financial Engineering, 2005, Chapter 2, Section 2.1. https://doi.org/10.1007/b138879
  • S. Karlin and H. Scarf, Inventory models of the Arrow–Harris–Marschak type with time lag, in K. J. Arrow, S. Karlin and H. Scarf (eds.), Studies in the Mathematical Theory of Inventory and Production, Stanford University Press, 1958 (no DOI).
  • K. J. Arrow, T. Harris and J. Marschak, Optimal inventory policy, Econometrica 19(3), 1951, 250–272. https://doi.org/10.2307/1906814
  • R. Bellman, I. Glicksberg and O. Gross, On the optimal inventory equation, Management Science 2(1), 1955, 83–104. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2.1.83
  • A. F. Veinott Jr., Optimal policy for a multi-product, dynamic, nonstationary inventory problem, Management Science 12(3), 1965, 206–222. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.12.3.206
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CombinatoricsOptimizationProbability·Captain: mikedeng1

Numerical Techniques for Stochastic Optimization V: Asymptotic Optimality of List Scheduling for the Machine Investment ProblemTextbook

Motivation

Two-stage stochastic integer programs combine the two hardest features of mathematical programming: uncertainty in the data and integrality of the decisions. Even evaluating the objective of such a program at a single first-stage decision requires the expected optimal value of an NP-hard combinatorial problem. Chapter 8 of Ermoliev and Wets (eds.), Numerical Techniques for Stochastic Optimization (Springer 1988), by A. H. G. Rinnooy Kan and L. Stougie, argues that for many such problems the way forward is probabilistic analysis: the random optimal value of the second-stage problem often converges, after normalization, to a simple function of the problem parameters, and that function can replace the intractable expectation.

The chapter illustrates this on the machine investment problem: first buy mmm identical machines at cost ccc each, knowing only the distribution of the processing times of nnn jobs, then schedule the jobs once their processing times are revealed so as to minimize the makespan. This mission formalizes the chapter's analysis of that example: the almost sure asymptotics of the optimal makespan (8.13), its expectation version, and the asymptotic clairvoyance of the resulting two-stage heuristic.

Setting

Let p1,p2,…p_1, p_2, \dotsp1​,p2​,… be processing times: independent, identically distributed, nonnegative random variables on a probability space (Ω,F,P)(\Omega, \mathcal F, P)(Ω,F,P) with mean μ=Ep1>0\mu = \mathbb E p_1 > 0μ=Ep1​>0 and finite second moment Ep12<∞\mathbb E p_1^2 < \inftyEp12​<∞. The instance with nnn jobs uses the first nnn of them.

An assignment of the nnn jobs to m≥1m \ge 1m≥1 identical machines is a map σ:{1,…,n}→{1,…,m}\sigma : \{1, \dots, n\} \to \{1, \dots, m\}σ:{1,…,n}→{1,…,m}. The load of machine iii is ∑j:σ(j)=ipj\sum_{j : \sigma(j) = i} p_j∑j:σ(j)=i​pj​ and the makespan of σ\sigmaσ is its largest load. The minimum makespan is

Cn∗(m)=min⁡σmax⁡i=1,…,m∑j: σ(j)=ipj,C^*_n(m) = \min_{\sigma} \max_{i=1,\dots,m} \sum_{j:\ \sigma(j) = i} p_j ,Cn∗​(m)=σmin​i=1,…,mmax​j: σ(j)=i∑​pj​,

and the machine investment problem is to minimize Zn(m)=cm+E Cn∗(m)Z_n(m) = cm + \mathbb E\, C^*_n(m)Zn​(m)=cm+ECn∗​(m) over integers mmm (8.9).

List scheduling takes the jobs in the order 1,…,n1, \dots, n1,…,n and assigns each to the first available machine, a machine of least current load (lowest index on ties). Its makespan is CnH(m)C^H_n(m)CnH​(m). Write Sn=∑j=1npjS_n = \sum_{j=1}^n p_jSn​=∑j=1n​pj​ and pmax⁡=max⁡j≤npjp_{\max} = \max_{j \le n} p_jpmax​=maxj≤n​pj​.

For §8.3, the estimate Zn′(m)=cm+nμ/mZ'_n(m) = cm + n\mu/mZn′​(m)=cm+nμ/m is minimized over integers by the heuristic first-stage decision mnH1m^{H1}_nmnH1​, the better of ⌊nμ/c⌋\lfloor\sqrt{n\mu/c}\rfloor⌊nμ/c​⌋ and ⌈nμ/c⌉\lceil\sqrt{n\mu/c}\rceil⌈nμ/c​⌉. A clairvoyant decision maker who sees the processing times first chooses mn∘(ω)≥1m^\circ_n(\omega) \ge 1mn∘​(ω)≥1 minimizing cm+Cn∗(m)cm + C^*_n(m)cm+Cn∗​(m).

Formalization targets

Goal: Eq. (8.13)

For machine counts m=m(n)≥1m = m(n) \ge 1m=m(n)≥1 with m(n)=O(n)m(n) = O(\sqrt n)m(n)=O(n​),

P{lim⁡n→∞Cn∗(m)nμ/m=1}=1.P\Bigl\{ \lim_{n\to\infty} \frac{C^*_n(m)}{n\mu/m} = 1 \Bigr\} = 1 .P{n→∞lim​nμ/mCn∗​(m)​=1}=1.

The machine count is allowed to grow with nnn; this is the regime the first-stage heuristic lives in, since mnH1m^{H1}_nmnH1​ is of exact order n\sqrt nn​.

Milestones

  1. Eq. (8.10): the deterministic sandwich Sn/m≤Cn∗(m)≤CnH(m)≤Sn/m+pmax⁡S_n/m \le C^*_n(m) \le C^H_n(m) \le S_n/m + p_{\max}Sn​/m≤Cn∗​(m)≤CnH​(m)≤Sn​/m+pmax​, divided by nμ/mn\mu/mnμ/m.
  2. Eq. (8.11): the strong law of large numbers, (Sn−nμ)/(nμ)→0(S_n - n\mu)/(n\mu) \to 0(Sn​−nμ)/(nμ)→0 almost surely (a published platform theorem).
  3. Lemma 8.1 (i): pmax⁡/n→0p_{\max}/\sqrt n \to 0pmax​/n​→0 almost surely.
  4. Eq. (8.12): m pmax⁡/(nμ)→0m\, p_{\max}/(n\mu) \to 0mpmax​/(nμ)→0 almost surely when m=O(n)m = O(\sqrt n)m=O(n​).
  5. Lemma 8.1 (ii): E pmax⁡/n→0\mathbb E\, p_{\max}/\sqrt n \to 0Epmax​/n​→0.
  6. p. 207: E Cn∗(m)/(nμ/m)→1\mathbb E\, C^*_n(m)/(n\mu/m) \to 1ECn∗​(m)/(nμ/m)→1 when m=O(n)m = O(\sqrt n)m=O(n​).
  7. p. 211, asymptotic clairvoyance: almost surely
lim⁡n→∞c mnH1+CnH2(mnH1)c mn∘+Cn∗(mn∘)=1,\lim_{n\to\infty} \frac{c\, m^{H1}_n + C^{H2}_n(m^{H1}_n)}{c\, m^\circ_n + C^*_n(m^\circ_n)} = 1 ,n→∞lim​cmn∘​+Cn∗​(mn∘​)cmnH1​+CnH2​(mnH1​)​=1,

where CnH2C^{H2}_nCnH2​ is the list-scheduling makespan.

Significance

Result (8.13) says that the optimal value of an NP-hard problem, rescaled, is almost surely asymptotic to the elementary function nμ/mn\mu/mnμ/m of the data and the first-stage decision. Its expectation version replaces the intractable term E Cn∗(m)\mathbb E\,C^*_n(m)ECn∗​(m) in (8.9) by nμ/mn\mu/mnμ/m, and the clairvoyance statement shows that the heuristic built on that replacement loses asymptotically nothing, not even against a decision maker with full information. The chapter presents the example as the template for vehicle routing and location problems preceded by an investment decision.

All results here are classical and proved in the literature cited by the chapter (Lemma 8.1 is quoted from Feller without proof; the chapter refers to Dempster et al. for the asymptotic optimality of the two-stage heuristic and to Lenstra et al. for the notion of asymptotic clairvoyance). None of them has, to our knowledge, a machine-checked proof. The mission produces a formal model of identical-machine makespan scheduling and of list scheduling, the extreme-value estimates of Lemma 8.1 for square-integrable i.i.d. sequences, and the full chain from the strong law to (8.13).

Difficulty

The deterministic part is elementary on paper, but list scheduling is a recursively defined procedure, and its makespan bound has to be established for that recursion rather than for a picture like the chapter's Figure 8.3. The probabilistic core is Lemma 8.1: the strong law controls Sn/nS_n/nSn​/n, but the error term m pmax⁡/(nμ)m\, p_{\max}/(n\mu)mpmax​/(nμ) is of order pmax⁡/np_{\max}/\sqrt npmax​/n​ once mmm grows like n\sqrt nn​, and the strong law says nothing about maxima. With a fixed number of machines the whole statement would reduce to the strong law; the growth m(n)=O(n)m(n) = O(\sqrt n)m(n)=O(n​) is exactly where the second moment is needed. For the clairvoyance statement, the clairvoyant choice mn∘m^\circ_nmn∘​ is a random, unstructured minimizer, so its value must be bounded below without knowing where the minimum is attained.

Formalization scope

Processing times are one sequence p : ℕ → Ω → ℝ, 0-based (the book's pjp_jpj​ is p (j-1)), with each p j measurable, the family mutually independent (iIndepFun), identically distributed with p 0, pointwise nonnegative, p 0 ^ 2 integrable and ∫ p 0 = μ with μ > 0. Nonnegativity and μ>0\mu > 0μ>0 are not printed in the book; they are implicit in "processing times" and in the division by nμn\munμ. Machines are Fin m; a schedule is an assignment Fin n → Fin m, which is faithful because jobs are non-preemptive, machines identical and there are no precedence constraints.

The book writes "m=0(n)m = 0(\sqrt n)m=0(n​)"; this is read as mmm a function of nnn with m(n)≥1m(n) \ge 1m(n)≥1 and (fun n => (m n : ℝ)) =O[atTop] (fun n => √n). Stating (8.13) for a fixed mmm would trivialize it into the strong law and is ruled out. "Pr⁡{lim⁡⋯=1}=1\Pr\{\lim \dots = 1\} = 1Pr{lim⋯=1}=1" means that almost surely the limit exists and equals 111. Expectations are Bochner integrals of functions that are measurable and bounded by SnS_nSn​, hence integrable. List scheduling uses the index order and breaks ties towards the lowest machine index; both are admissible instances of the book's "arbitrary fixed order" and "first available machine". In the clairvoyance statement the minimum is over m≥1m \ge 1m≥1 (the book writes m∈Nm \in \mathbb Nm∈N; no machine cannot process any job, and the Lean value Cn∗(0)C^*_n(0)Cn∗​(0) is an empty-infimum convention). No explicit constants replace an O(·): the statements are limits and the O-hypothesis is carried as stated.

Out of scope: (8.14) and the p. 210 expectation statement, which need a positive density at 000 and whose proof the book calls "far from easy", and the dynamic programming recursion of §8.3.

Needed infrastructure: finite maxima and minima of measurable functions, extreme-value estimates for square-integrable i.i.d. sequences (Lemma 8.1), and Mathlib's strong law. The makespan and list-scheduling definitions are reusable for other identical-machine scheduling results; alternative proofs of Lemma 8.1 and sharper forms of the clairvoyance statement are welcome.

Selected references

  • A. H. G. Rinnooy Kan, L. Stougie, "Stochastic Integer Programming", in Yu. Ermoliev, R. J-B Wets (eds.), Numerical Techniques for Stochastic Optimization, Springer Series in Computational Mathematics 10, Springer 1988, Ch. 8, pp. 201–213. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-61370-8
  • W. Feller, An Introduction to Probability Theory and Its Applications, Vol. 1, 3rd edition, Wiley, 1968 (cited by the chapter for Lemma 8.1).
  • M. A. H. Dempster, M. L. Fisher, L. Jansen, B. J. Lageweg, J. K. Lenstra, A. H. G. Rinnooy Kan, "Analysis of heuristics for stochastic programming: results for hierarchical scheduling problems", Mathematics of Operations Research 8 (1983) 525–537. https://doi.org/10.1287/moor.8.4.525
  • J. K. Lenstra, A. H. G. Rinnooy Kan, L. Stougie, "A framework for the design and analysis of hierarchical planning systems", Annals of Operations Research 1 (1984) 23–42. https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01874451
  • R. L. Graham, "Bounds on multiprocessing timing anomalies", SIAM Journal on Applied Mathematics 17 (1969) 416–429. https://doi.org/10.1137/0117039
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Convex OptimizationOptimizationProbability·Captain: mikedeng1

Numerical Techniques for Stochastic Optimization III: Stochastic Quasi-Féjer Sequences and the Stochastic Quasigradient Projection MethodTextbook

Motivation

Many optimization problems in operations research have an objective that is an expectation, F0(x)=Ef0(x,ω)F^0(x)=E f^0(x,\omega)F0(x)=Ef0(x,ω), over a random parameter ω\omegaω whose distribution is known only through samples or is too complex to integrate. Two-stage stochastic programs, inventory and reliability models, and simulation-based design all have this form. Neither F0F^0F0 nor its subgradients can be evaluated exactly, but a random vector whose conditional mean is close to a subgradient is often cheap to compute: a sample subgradient of f0(⋅,ω)f^0(\cdot,\omega)f0(⋅,ω), or a finite-difference quotient of two sampled values.

Stochastic quasigradient (SQG) methods, developed by Ermoliev and co-workers in Kiev from the late 1960s, use such vectors in place of subgradients. They extend the stochastic approximation procedures of Robbins–Monro (1951) and Kiefer–Wolfowitz (1952) to nonsmooth convex objectives, general convex constraints, and directions whose conditional mean is biased by a vanishing amount. This mission formalizes the basic convergence theory of the simplest SQG method, the projection method, as presented by Yu. Ermoliev in Chapter 6 of the IIASA volume Numerical Techniques for Stochastic Optimization (Springer 1988).

Timeline (as cited in the chapter's bibliography).

  • 1951–1954: Robbins and Monro, Kiefer and Wolfowitz, Dvoretzky and Blum prove convergence of stochastic approximation for unconstrained smooth problems.
  • 1962–1967: Shor introduces the generalized gradient (subgradient) method; Ermoliev (Kibernetika 4, 1966) and Polyak (Soviet Math. Doklady 8, 1967) prove its convergence.
  • 1967–1969: Ermoliev and Nekrylova introduce stochastic subgradients; Ermoliev ("On the stochastic quasi-gradient method and stochastic quasi-Feyer sequences", Kibernetika 2, 1969) introduces stochastic quasi-Féjer sequences.
  • 1976: Ermoliev's monograph Stochastic Programming Methods (Nauka) contains the proof of Theorem 6.1 (p. 98).
  • 1988: the survey chapter formalized here presents the projection method, Theorems 6.1 and 6.2, and an efficiency estimate for the averaged iterate.

Setting

Let X⊆RnX\subseteq\mathbb R^nX⊆Rn be a nonempty convex compact set and F0:Rn→RF^0:\mathbb R^n\to\mathbb RF0:Rn→R convex and continuous on XXX. The optimal set is X∗={x∈X:F0(x)≤F0(y) ∀y∈X}X^*=\{x\in X: F^0(x)\le F^0(y)\ \forall y\in X\}X∗={x∈X:F0(x)≤F0(y) ∀y∈X}. The projection onto XXX is πX(y)=argmin⁡{∥y−x∥2:x∈X}\pi_X(y)=\operatorname{argmin}\{\|y-x\|^2:x\in X\}πX​(y)=argmin{∥y−x∥2:x∈X}.

On a probability space, the stochastic quasigradient projection method produces random vectors x0,x1,…x^0,x^1,\dotsx0,x1,… by

xs+1=πX[xs−ρs ξ0(s)],s=0,1,…(6.11)x^{s+1}=\pi_X\big[x^s-\rho_s\,\xi^0(s)\big],\qquad s=0,1,\dots \tag{6.11}xs+1=πX​[xs−ρs​ξ0(s)],s=0,1,…(6.11)

where ρs≥0\rho_s\ge0ρs​≥0 is a step size and ξ0(s)\xi^0(s)ξ0(s) a random direction. Write E{⋅∣x0,…,xs}E\{\cdot\mid x^0,\dots,x^s\}E{⋅∣x0,…,xs} for conditional expectation given the history σ(x0,…,xs)\sigma(x^0,\dots,x^s)σ(x0,…,xs). The direction is a stochastic quasigradient if, for every x∗∈X∗x^*\in X^*x∗∈X∗,

F0(x∗)−F0(xs)≥⟨E{ξ0(s)∣x0,…,xs}, x∗−xs⟩+γ0(s)a.s.,(6.12)F^0(x^*)-F^0(x^s)\ge\big\langle E\{\xi^0(s)\mid x^0,\dots,x^s\},\,x^*-x^s\big\rangle+\gamma_0(s)\quad\text{a.s.}, \tag{6.12}F0(x∗)−F0(xs)≥⟨E{ξ0(s)∣x0,…,xs},x∗−xs⟩+γ0​(s)a.s.,(6.12)

where the error γ0(s)\gamma_0(s)γ0​(s) is a function of the history. If the conditional mean of ξ0(s)\xi^0(s)ξ0(s) is a subgradient plus a bias b0(s)b^0(s)b0(s), then (6.12) holds with γ0(s)=−⟨b0(s),x∗−xs⟩\gamma^0(s)=-\langle b^0(s),x^*-x^s\rangleγ0(s)=−⟨b0(s),x∗−xs⟩ (6.13).

A sequence of random vectors z0,z1,…z^0,z^1,\dotsz0,z1,… is a stochastic quasi-Féjer sequence for Z⊆RnZ\subseteq\mathbb R^nZ⊆Rn if E∥z0∥2<∞E\|z^0\|^2<\inftyE∥z0∥2<∞ and there are random rs≥0r_s\ge0rs​≥0 with ∑sErs<∞\sum_s E r_s<\infty∑s​Ers​<∞ such that for all z∈Zz\in Zz∈Z

E{∥z−zs+1∥2∣z0,…,zs}≤∥z−zs∥2+rs.(6.14)E\{\|z-z^{s+1}\|^2\mid z^0,\dots,z^s\}\le\|z-z^s\|^2+r_s. \tag{6.14}E{∥z−zs+1∥2∣z0,…,zs}≤∥z−zs∥2+rs​.(6.14)

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 6.2

If, with probability 1, ρs≥0\rho_s\ge0ρs​≥0 and ∑sρs=∞\sum_s\rho_s=\infty∑s​ρs​=∞, and

∑s=0∞E{ρs∣γ0(s)∣+ρs2∥ξ0(s)∥2}<∞,(6.15)\sum_{s=0}^\infty E\{\rho_s|\gamma_0(s)|+\rho_s^2\|\xi^0(s)\|^2\}<\infty, \tag{6.15}s=0∑∞​E{ρs​∣γ0​(s)∣+ρs2​∥ξ0(s)∥2}<∞,(6.15)

then with probability 1 the iterates converge and lim⁡sxs∈X∗\lim_s x^s\in X^*lims​xs∈X∗.

Milestones

  1. Theorem 6.1 (a)–(c). For a stochastic quasi-Féjer sequence for ZZZ: ∥z−zs+1∥2\|z-z^{s+1}\|^2∥z−zs+1∥2 converges a.s. and E∥z−zs∥2E\|z-z^s\|^2E∥z−zs∥2 is bounded, for each z∈Zz\in Zz∈Z; accumulation points exist a.s. (for Z≠∅Z\ne\emptysetZ=∅); and a.s. ZZZ lies in the hyperplane equidistant from any two distinct accumulation points outside ZZZ.
  2. Eq. (6.13). Biased stochastic subgradients satisfy (6.12).
  3. One-step inequality (p. 145): E{∥x∗−xs+1∥2∣⋅}≤∥x∗−xs∥2+2ρs⟨E{ξ0(s)∣⋅},x∗−xs⟩+E{ρs2∥ξ0(s)∥2∣⋅}E\{\|x^*-x^{s+1}\|^2\mid\cdot\}\le\|x^*-x^s\|^2+2\rho_s\langle E\{\xi^0(s)\mid\cdot\},x^*-x^s\rangle+E\{\rho_s^2\|\xi^0(s)\|^2\mid\cdot\}E{∥x∗−xs+1∥2∣⋅}≤∥x∗−xs∥2+2ρs​⟨E{ξ0(s)∣⋅},x∗−xs⟩+E{ρs2​∥ξ0(s)∥2∣⋅} for x∗∈Xx^*\in Xx∗∈X.
  4. Quasi-Féjer property (p. 145): the iterates of (6.11) form a stochastic quasi-Féjer sequence for X∗X^*X∗.
  5. Efficiency estimate (p. 147), for deterministic ρk\rho_kρk​ and xˉs=∑k≤sρkxk/∑k≤sρk\bar x^s=\sum_{k\le s}\rho_kx^k/\sum_{k\le s}\rho_kxˉs=∑k≤s​ρk​xk/∑k≤s​ρk​:
EF0(xˉs)−F0(x∗)≤(2∑k=0sρk)−1[E∥x∗−x0∥2+∑k=0sE(2ρk∣γ0(k)∣+ρk2∥ξ0(k)∥2)].E F^0(\bar x^s)-F^0(x^*)\le\Big(2\sum_{k=0}^s\rho_k\Big)^{-1}\Big[E\|x^*-x^0\|^2+\sum_{k=0}^s E\big(2\rho_k|\gamma_0(k)|+\rho_k^2\|\xi^0(k)\|^2\big)\Big].EF0(xˉs)−F0(x∗)≤(2k=0∑s​ρk​)−1[E∥x∗−x0∥2+k=0∑s​E(2ρk​∣γ0​(k)∣+ρk2​∥ξ0(k)∥2)].

Significance

Theorem 6.2 is the prototype convergence theorem for SQG methods. Its hypotheses allow random step sizes chosen from the history, nonsmooth objectives, and directions with a bias that vanishes fast enough; its conclusion is convergence of the iterates themselves to a single optimal point, not only convergence of function values or of dist⁡(xs,X∗)\operatorname{dist}(x^s,X^*)dist(xs,X∗). The later chapters of the same volume (adaptive step sizes, Chapters 17–18; nonstationary problems, §6.4) reuse the same framework. Theorem 6.1 isolates the probabilistic content in a form that applies to any algorithm with a quasi-Féjer inequality. The efficiency estimate gives a non-asymptotic accuracy bound for the averaged iterate.

The results are classical and proved in the literature: Theorem 6.1 in Ermoliev (1976, p. 98), Theorem 6.2 in this chapter (pp. 145–146). To our knowledge none of them has a machine-checked proof. Mathlib has conditional expectations and the a.s. martingale convergence theorem, but no Robbins–Siegmund-type almost-supermartingale lemma and no stochastic subgradient method. A formal proof of this mission would supply both.

Difficulty

The deterministic argument for projected subgradient methods compares ∥x∗−xs+1∥\|x^*-x^{s+1}\|∥x∗−xs+1∥ with ∥x∗−xs∥\|x^*-x^s\|∥x∗−xs∥ for a fixed x∗x^*x∗. In the stochastic setting this comparison holds only in conditional mean, with a perturbation rsr_srs​ that is random, and the distances converge only almost surely, with an exceptional null set that depends on x∗x^*x∗. Since X∗X^*X∗ is typically uncountable, "for every x∗x^*x∗, almost surely" does not immediately give "almost surely, for every x∗x^*x∗", and it is the second form that identifies a single limit. A second difficulty is that ∑ρs(F0(xs)−F0(x∗))<∞\sum\rho_s(F^0(x^s)-F^0(x^*))<\infty∑ρs​(F0(xs)−F0(x∗))<∞ only yields a subsequence along which F0F^0F0 approaches its minimum; passing from there to convergence of the whole sequence is exactly what part (c) of Theorem 6.1 is for.

Formalization scope

  • Rn\mathbb R^nRn is EuclideanSpace ℝ (Fin n). The probability space is an arbitrary measurable space with a probability measure. πX\pi_XπX​ is a chosen minimizer of ∥y−x∥2\|y-x\|^2∥y−x∥2 over XXX (unique for nonempty closed convex XXX). The history is the σ\sigmaσ-algebra generated by x0,…,xsx^0,\dots,x^sx0,…,xs; ρs\rho_sρs​ and γ0(s)\gamma_0(s)γ0​(s) are measurable with respect to it.
  • Directions ξ0(s)\xi^0(s)ξ0(s) are integrable and random vectors are measurable; conditional expectations are Mathlib's condExp. The quasi-Féjer definition requires square integrability of every zsz^szs (implied by the book's definition when Z≠∅Z\ne\emptysetZ=∅), so no conditional expectation is taken of a non-integrable function.
  • X≠∅X\ne\emptysetX=∅ and x0∈Xx^0\in Xx0∈X are stated; Z≠∅Z\ne\emptysetZ=∅ is added in Theorem 6.1 (b), which is false without it.
  • γ0(s)\gamma_0(s)γ0​(s) does not depend on x∗x^*x∗; the x∗x^*x∗-dependent error of (6.13) is dominated on a bounded XXX by ∥b0(s)∥diam⁡X\|b^0(s)\|\operatorname{diam}X∥b0(s)∥diamX.
  • (6.15) keeps its mixed form: ρs≥0\rho_s\ge0ρs​≥0 and ∑ρs=∞\sum\rho_s=\infty∑ρs​=∞ almost surely, and a deterministic sum of expectations (lower Lebesgue integrals) finite.
  • Explicit constants. The book's "CCC" in the efficiency estimate is instantiated from its proof: 222 on ρk∣γ0(k)∣\rho_k|\gamma_0(k)|ρk​∣γ0​(k)∣ and 111 on ρk2∥ξ0(k)∥2\rho_k^2\|\xi^0(k)\|^2ρk2​∥ξ0(k)∥2. The unspecified CCC before the quasi-Féjer sentence is replaced by the existence of summable rsr_srs​.
  • Typo corrections. The one-step inequality on p. 145 prints ρsE{∥ξ0(s)∥2∣⋅}\rho_sE\{\|\xi^0(s)\|^2\mid\cdot\}ρs​E{∥ξ0(s)∥2∣⋅}; it is ρs2\rho_s^2ρs2​. The efficiency estimate on p. 147 omits EEE before the last sum; it is restored. "ρk\rho_kρk​ independent of (x0,…,xk)(x^0,\dots,x^k)(x0,…,xk)" is read as deterministic step sizes.
  • A trivializing formalization is excluded: the goal does not replace ξ0(s)\xi^0(s)ξ0(s) by an exact subgradient, does not set γ0≡0\gamma_0\equiv0γ0​≡0, and concludes convergence of xsx^sxs to a point of X∗X^*X∗ rather than dist⁡(xs,X∗)→0\operatorname{dist}(x^s,X^*)\to0dist(xs,X∗)→0.
  • Reusable infrastructure: a Robbins–Siegmund lemma for nonnegative almost-supermartingales, the nonexpansiveness of πX\pi_XπX​, and Theorem 6.1 itself, which applies to any quasi-Féjer algorithm (Chapter 6 §6.4 and Chapters 17–18 of the same book). Contributions of these general lemmas are welcome.

Selected references

  • Yu. Ermoliev, "Stochastic Quasigradient Methods", in Yu. Ermoliev and R. J-B Wets (eds.), Numerical Techniques for Stochastic Optimization, Springer Series in Computational Mathematics 10, Springer 1988, Ch. 6, §6.1–6.2 (pp. 141–147). https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-61370-8
  • Yu. Ermoliev, "On the stochastic quasi-gradient method and stochastic quasi-Feyer sequences", Kibernetika 2 (1969) (in Russian; English translation in Cybernetics). Reference [3] of the chapter.
  • Yu. Ermoliev, Stochastic Programming Methods, Nauka, Moscow, 1976 (in Russian); Theorem 6.1 is on p. 98. Reference [5] of the chapter.
  • H. Robbins and D. Siegmund, "A convergence theorem for non negative almost supermartingales and some applications", in J. S. Rustagi (ed.), Optimizing Methods in Statistics, Academic Press, 1971, 233–257. https://doi.org/10.1016/B978-0-12-604550-5.50015-8
  • H. Robbins and S. Monro, "A stochastic approximation method", Annals of Mathematical Statistics 22 (1951) 400–407. https://doi.org/10.1214/aoms/1177729586
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OptimizationProbability·Captain: mikedeng1

Introduction to the Scenario Approach V: Support Sets Certify the Violation of Nonconvex Scenario SolutionsTextbook

Why certify nonconvex scenario solutions

The scenario approach replaces an optimization problem with uncertain constraints θ∈Θδ\theta\in\Theta_\deltaθ∈Θδ​, δ∈Δ\delta\in\Deltaδ∈Δ, by the program that enforces only NNN constraints Θδ1,…,ΘδN\Theta_{\delta_1},\dots,\Theta_{\delta_N}Θδ1​​,…,ΘδN​​ drawn at random from the distribution P\mathbb PP of the uncertainty. Its solution θ∗\theta^*θ∗ is then judged by its violation, the probability that a new instance δ\deltaδ is not satisfied. For convex programs in Rd\mathbb R^dRd the violation is controlled by the dimension ddd alone (Calafiore and Campi 2006; Campi and Garatti 2008), because a convex program has at most ddd support constraints. Many problems where the scenario approach is used in practice are not convex: control with quantized inputs, mixed-integer design, classification with nonconvex losses, and decisions over infinite-dimensional or unstructured sets. For those programs no a priori bound on the number of constraints that determine the solution exists.

Timeline, as recorded in Chapter 8 of Campi and Garatti's textbook:

  • 2006–2008: the violation of convex scenario solutions is bounded, and then characterized exactly, in terms of ddd.
  • 2018: the wait-and-judge theory (Campi and Garatti, Math. Programming 2018) evaluates the violation from the number of support constraints counted after solving the program; it extends to nonconvex programs but requires a nondegeneracy assumption.
  • 2018: Campi, Garatti and Ramponi (IEEE TAC 2018) prove a bound in terms of the size of any support set, with no convexity and no nondegeneracy assumption. This is the result formalized here, stated in the book as Eq. (8.15).

Setting

Let Θ\ThetaΘ be a generic set; it may be an infinite-dimensional space or a set with no algebraic structure. Let f:Θ→Rf:\Theta\to\mathbb Rf:Θ→R be a cost and Θδ⊆Θ\Theta_\delta\subseteq\ThetaΘδ​⊆Θ constraint sets indexed by δ∈Δ\delta\in\Deltaδ∈Δ, where Δ\DeltaΔ carries a probability P\mathbb PP. Neither fff nor the Θδ\Theta_\deltaΘδ​ is required to be convex. With a sample δ1,…,δN\delta_1,\dots,\delta_Nδ1​,…,δN​ drawn independently from P\mathbb PP, the scenario program is

min⁡θ∈Θf(θ)subject toθ∈⋂i=1,…,NΘδi,(8.12)\min_{\theta\in\Theta} f(\theta)\quad\text{subject to}\quad \theta\in\bigcap_{i=1,\dots,N}\Theta_{\delta_i},\tag{8.12}θ∈Θmin​f(θ)subject toθ∈i=1,…,N⋂​Θδi​​,(8.12)

and θ∗\theta^*θ∗ denotes its solution, assumed to exist and be unique for every sample.

The violation of a decision is V(θ)=P{δ∈Δ:θ∉Θδ}V(\theta)=\mathbb P\{\delta\in\Delta:\theta\notin\Theta_\delta\}V(θ)=P{δ∈Δ:θ∈/Θδ​} (Definition 3.1).

A support set (Definition 8.8) is a subset {Θδi1,…,Θδik}\{\Theta_{\delta_{i_1}},\dots,\Theta_{\delta_{i_k}}\}{Θδi1​​​,…,Θδik​​​} of the constraints such that the program with only these constraints in place has the same solution θ∗\theta^*θ∗ as the program with all constraints. The full set of constraints is always a support set; a support set need not be minimal (of smallest cardinality) or irreducible (with no removable element). Let σ∗\sigma^*σ∗ be the cardinality of the support set returned, for every sample, by some fixed algorithm.

Formalization targets

Goal: the support-set bound, Eq. (8.15)

For every function ϵ:{0,1,…,N}→[0,1]\epsilon:\{0,1,\dots,N\}\to[0,1]ϵ:{0,1,…,N}→[0,1] with ϵ(N)=1\epsilon(N)=1ϵ(N)=1,

PN{V(θ∗)>ϵ(σ∗)}≤∑k=0N−1(Nk) (1−ϵ(k))N−k.\mathbb P^N\{V(\theta^*)>\epsilon(\sigma^*)\}\le\sum_{k=0}^{N-1}\binom Nk\,(1-\epsilon(k))^{N-k}.PN{V(θ∗)>ϵ(σ∗)}≤k=0∑N−1​(kN​)(1−ϵ(k))N−k.

The level function ϵ\epsilonϵ is free: the statement is one inequality per admissible ϵ\epsilonϵ, and it holds for any algorithm producing support sets. This is the weakest form that carries the whole result.

Milestone: the level function for a confidence β\betaβ, Eq. (8.16)

For β∈[0,1]\beta\in[0,1]β∈[0,1] let

ϵ(k)={1k=N,1−βN(Nk)N−kotherwise.\epsilon(k)=\begin{cases}1 & k=N,\\ 1-\sqrt[N-k]{\dfrac{\beta}{N\binom Nk}} & \text{otherwise.}\end{cases}ϵ(k)=⎩⎨⎧​11−N−kN(kN​)β​​​k=N,otherwise.​

The arithmetic half states that ϵ\epsilonϵ maps {0,…,N}\{0,\dots,N\}{0,…,N} into [0,1][0,1][0,1], ϵ(N)=1\epsilon(N)=1ϵ(N)=1, and the right-hand side of (8.15) equals β\betaβ (for N≥1N\ge1N≥1). The probabilistic half states PN{V(θ∗)>ϵ(σ∗)}≤β\mathbb P^N\{V(\theta^*)>\epsilon(\sigma^*)\}\le\betaPN{V(θ∗)>ϵ(σ∗)}≤β.

Significance

The result turns the size of a support set, a quantity observed after the program is solved, into a certificate on the violation of the solution, for any optimization or decision problem whose solution is determined by a subset of the data. With the choice (8.16), a user who finds a support set of size σ∗\sigma^*σ∗ can assert V(θ∗)≤ϵ(σ∗)V(\theta^*)\le\epsilon(\sigma^*)V(θ∗)≤ϵ(σ∗) with confidence 1−β1-\beta1−β. The book's Figure 8.12 shows that ϵ(k)\epsilon(k)ϵ(k) for β=10−6\beta=10^{-6}β=10−6 remains well below 111 for kkk up to a sizeable fraction of NNN. Because the algorithm that finds the support set is arbitrary, cheap heuristics that return non-minimal support sets still give valid, if weaker, guarantees. The result does not recover the tight convex bound (3.4); for convex programs the Chapter 3 theory remains sharper.

The statement is proved in [31] and is the probabilistic core of the sample-compression arguments of learning theory (Floyd and Warmuth 1995) in the form used by the scenario approach. To the best of available knowledge it has no machine-checked proof. The platform's UnderstandingML.compression_bound proves a sample-compression bound for a fixed compression size with a different constant; it does not cover a data-dependent size σ∗\sigma^*σ∗ or an arbitrary level function. A formal proof here provides a reusable bound for data-dependent support sets over arbitrary decision sets.

Difficulty

The natural first step is: condition on the support set being a particular index set III with ∣I∣=k|I|=k∣I∣=k, and argue that the solution is then a function of the kkk sampled constraints in III alone, while the other N−kN-kN−k samples are independent of it and must all be satisfied. The difficulty is that the event "the algorithm returns III" depends on all NNN samples, and the solution of the reduced program on III is defined only where that program has a unique solution; the decomposition of the probability therefore has to be carried out on sections of the product space, with a measurability argument for each piece. A second point is that σ∗\sigma^*σ∗ is random and data-dependent: a bound for each fixed kkk does not directly give a bound at the random level ϵ(σ∗)\epsilon(\sigma^*)ϵ(σ∗), and the role of the condition ϵ(N)=1\epsilon(N)=1ϵ(N)=1 must be accounted for at k=Nk=Nk=N.

Formalization scope

Lean representation and committed conventions:

  • Θ\ThetaΘ and Δ\DeltaΔ are arbitrary types with measurable structures; P\mathbb PP is a probability measure on Δ\DeltaΔ; a sample is ω : Fin N → Δ with law Measure.pi (fun _ : Fin N => P); indices run over 0,…,N−10,\dots,N-10,…,N−1.
  • A subset of constraints is a Finset (Fin N); the reduced program with index set III has feasible set ⋂i∈IΘδi\bigcap_{i\in I}\Theta_{\delta_i}⋂i∈I​Θδi​​ (all of Θ\ThetaΘ for I=∅I=\emptysetI=∅).
  • The solution map θ∗\theta^*θ∗ is a parameter with the hypothesis that θ∗(ω)\theta^*(\omega)θ∗(ω) is the unique solution of the full program for every sample.
  • "Has the same solution" in Definition 8.8 means: the reduced program has a unique solution and it equals the unique solution of the full program. Existence of solutions is not assumed for reduced programs in general, only for those that are support sets.
  • The algorithm is an arbitrary map alg : (Fin N → Δ) → Finset (Fin N) returning a support set for every sample; σ∗\sigma^*σ∗ is the cardinality of its output. The goal is universal over such maps.
  • ϵ\epsilonϵ is a real function on N\mathbb NN with ϵ(k)∈[0,1]\epsilon(k)\in[0,1]ϵ(k)∈[0,1] for k≤Nk\le Nk≤N and ϵ(N)=1\epsilon(N)=1ϵ(N)=1.
  • The violation is real-valued in [0,1][0,1][0,1]; the probability of the event is compared in [0,∞][0,\infty][0,∞] with ENNReal.ofReal of the real right-hand side.

Implicit hypotheses of the page, made explicit (the book states on p. 33 that measurability issues are glossed over): the constraint relation {(θ,δ):θ∈Θδ}\{(\theta,\delta):\theta\in\Theta_\delta\}{(θ,δ):θ∈Θδ​} is measurable in Θ×Δ\Theta\times\DeltaΘ×Δ; the solution map is measurable; each event {ω:the algorithm returns J}\{\omega:\text{the algorithm returns }J\}{ω:the algorithm returns J} is measurable; θ∗\theta^*θ∗ exists and is unique for every sample; N≥1N\ge1N≥1 in the arithmetic half of (8.16).

A trivializing formalization is ruled out: the algorithm is not existentially quantified and is not the minimal support set, the reduced programs are not all assumed solvable (which would be unsatisfiable when fff has no unconstrained minimizer), and the support-set property requires uniqueness of the reduced solution, without which the bound is false.

Needed infrastructure: product measures on Fin N → Δ, splitting of such products along a subset of coordinates, and Fubini/Tonelli for sections. These pieces are reusable for other compression-type bounds. Contributions welcome: proofs of the two milestones and of the goal, and lemmas on splitting Measure.pi over a Finset of coordinates.

Selected references

  • M. C. Campi, S. Garatti, Introduction to the Scenario Approach, MOS-SIAM Series on Optimization 26, SIAM/MOS, 2018, §8.6, pp. 101–105. https://doi.org/10.1137/1.9781611975444
  • M. C. Campi, S. Garatti, F. A. Ramponi, A general scenario theory for nonconvex optimization and decision making, IEEE Transactions on Automatic Control, 2018. https://doi.org/10.1109/TAC.2018.2808446
  • M. C. Campi, S. Garatti, Wait-and-judge scenario optimization, Mathematical Programming, 2018. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10107-016-1056-9
  • G. C. Calafiore, M. C. Campi, The scenario approach to robust control design, IEEE Transactions on Automatic Control, 2006. https://doi.org/10.1109/TAC.2006.875041
  • M. C. Campi, S. Garatti, The exact feasibility of randomized solutions of uncertain convex programs, SIAM Journal on Optimization, 2008. https://doi.org/10.1137/07069821X
  • S. Floyd, M. Warmuth, Sample compression, learnability, and the Vapnik–Chervonenkis dimension, Machine Learning, 1995. https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00993593
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Algorithmic Game TheoryLinear OptimizationTheoretical Computer Science·Captain: mikedeng1

Online Primal-Dual Algorithms for Maximizing Ad-Auctions Revenue: The Competitive Ratio of the Primal-Dual Allocation AlgorithmResearch Paper

Motivation

Search engines sell advertisement slots next to their results through ad-auctions. Advertisers bid on keywords, and each advertiser also sets a daily budget: the most it is willing to pay in a day. Queries arrive one at a time and each must be assigned to an advertiser at once, with no knowledge of the queries still to come. The seller's revenue from an advertiser is capped by its budget, so an allocation rule that ignores budgets can exhaust a high bidder early and forgo revenue that a more even allocation would have collected. The question is how much of the offline optimum an online rule can guarantee against every arrival sequence.

Mehta, Saberi, Vazirani and Vazirani (FOCS 2005 / J. ACM 2007) gave a deterministic algorithm whose competitive ratio tends to 1−1/e1 - 1/e1−1/e when bids are small compared with budgets, and showed that no deterministic algorithm does better. Their algorithm builds on online bipartite matching (Karp, Vazirani and Vazirani, STOC 1990) and online bbb-matching (Kalyanasundaram and Pruhs, 2000). Buchbinder, Jain and Naor (ESA 2007) rederived the 1−1/e1 - 1/e1−1/e bound with an online primal-dual algorithm, which gives the ratio in closed form for every value of the bid-to-budget ratio and extends to multiple slots, stochastic information, bounded degree and budget flexibility. This mission formalizes the basic algorithm of that paper and its Theorem 1.

Setting

There is a finite nonempty set III of buyers. Buyer iii has a known budget B(i)>0B(i) > 0B(i)>0. Products j=1,…,mj = 1, \dots, mj=1,…,m arrive one by one; when product jjj arrives, every buyer's bid b(i,j)≥0b(i,j) \ge 0b(i,j)≥0 on it is revealed. The bid-to-budget ratio is

Rmax⁡=max⁡i∈I, jb(i,j)B(i).R_{\max} = \max_{i \in I,\, j} \frac{b(i,j)}{B(i)} .Rmax​=i∈I,jmax​B(i)b(i,j)​.

A fractional allocation y(i,j)≥0y(i,j) \ge 0y(i,j)≥0 assigns fractions of products to buyers; the revenue from buyer iii is the minimum of ∑jb(i,j) y(i,j)\sum_j b(i,j)\,y(i,j)∑j​b(i,j)y(i,j) and B(i)B(i)B(i).

The offline fractional problem is the packing LP, which the paper calls the dual:

max⁡∑j∑ib(i,j) y(i,j)s.t.∑iy(i,j)≤1  ∀j,∑jb(i,j) y(i,j)≤B(i)  ∀i,y≥0.\max \sum_{j}\sum_{i} b(i,j)\,y(i,j) \quad\text{s.t.}\quad \sum_i y(i,j) \le 1 \ \ \forall j,\qquad \sum_j b(i,j)\,y(i,j) \le B(i)\ \ \forall i,\qquad y \ge 0 .maxj∑​i∑​b(i,j)y(i,j)s.t.i∑​y(i,j)≤1  ∀j,j∑​b(i,j)y(i,j)≤B(i)  ∀i,y≥0.

Its LP dual, the paper's primal, is the covering LP:

min⁡∑iB(i) x(i)+∑jz(j)s.t.b(i,j) x(i)+z(j)≥b(i,j)  ∀i,j,x,z≥0.\min \sum_i B(i)\,x(i) + \sum_j z(j) \quad\text{s.t.}\quad b(i,j)\,x(i) + z(j) \ge b(i,j)\ \ \forall i,j,\qquad x, z \ge 0 .mini∑​B(i)x(i)+j∑​z(j)s.t.b(i,j)x(i)+z(j)≥b(i,j)  ∀i,j,x,z≥0.

The Allocation Algorithm has a parameter c>1c > 1c>1 and starts from x≡0x \equiv 0x≡0. When product jjj arrives it takes a buyer iii maximizing b(i,j)(1−x(i))b(i,j)(1 - x(i))b(i,j)(1−x(i)). If x(i)≥1x(i) \ge 1x(i)≥1, the product is not sold. Otherwise it charges iii the minimum of b(i,j)b(i,j)b(i,j) and iii's remaining budget, sets y(i,j)←1y(i,j) \leftarrow 1y(i,j)←1 and z(j)←b(i,j)(1−x(i))z(j) \leftarrow b(i,j)(1 - x(i))z(j)←b(i,j)(1−x(i)), and updates

x(i)←x(i)(1+b(i,j)B(i))+b(i,j)(c−1) B(i).x(i) \leftarrow x(i)\Big(1 + \frac{b(i,j)}{B(i)}\Big) + \frac{b(i,j)}{(c-1)\,B(i)} .x(i)←x(i)(1+B(i)b(i,j)​)+(c−1)B(i)b(i,j)​.

Its revenue is the total amount charged.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 1

For every instance and every bound R>0R > 0R>0 with b(i,j)≤R B(i)b(i,j) \le R\,B(i)b(i,j)≤RB(i) for all i,ji, ji,j, the Allocation Algorithm run with c=(1+R)1/Rc = (1+R)^{1/R}c=(1+R)1/R, under any tie-breaking of the maximum, satisfies for every feasible y′y'y′ of the packing LP

Revenue  ≥  (1−1c)(1−R)∑j∑ib(i,j) y′(i,j).\mathrm{Revenue} \;\ge\; \Big(1 - \frac1c\Big)(1 - R)\sum_{j}\sum_{i} b(i,j)\,y'(i,j).Revenue≥(1−c1​)(1−R)j∑​i∑​b(i,j)y′(i,j).

With R=Rmax⁡R = R_{\max}R=Rmax​ this is the paper's statement that the algorithm is (1−1/c)(1−Rmax⁡)(1 - 1/c)(1 - R_{\max})(1−1/c)(1−Rmax​)-competitive; the fractional optimum bounds every integral offline allocation.

Milestones

The proof of Theorem 1 rests on three claims and three auxiliary facts, each a milestone:

  1. the inequality ln⁡(1+x)/x≥ln⁡(1+y)/y\ln(1+x)/x \ge \ln(1+y)/yln(1+x)/x≥ln(1+y)/y for 0<x≤y≤10 < x \le y \le 10<x≤y≤1;
  2. Claim (1): the final (x,z)(x, z)(x,z) is feasible for the covering LP;
  3. Claim (2): the covering cost of the run equals (1+1/(c−1))(1 + 1/(c-1))(1+1/(c−1)) times the packing value of the run's own yyy;
  4. Inequality (1): x(i)≥1c−1(c∑jb(i,j)y(i,j)/B(i)−1)x(i) \ge \frac{1}{c-1}\big(c^{\sum_j b(i,j) y(i,j)/B(i)} - 1\big)x(i)≥c−11​(c∑j​b(i,j)y(i,j)/B(i)−1) at every stage of the run;
  5. Claim (3): ∑jb(i,j) y(i,j)≤B(i)+max⁡jb(i,j)\sum_j b(i,j)\,y(i,j) \le B(i) + \max_j b(i,j)∑j​b(i,j)y(i,j)≤B(i)+maxj​b(i,j), and the amount charged to iii is at least (1−R)∑jb(i,j) y(i,j)(1 - R)\sum_j b(i,j)\,y(i,j)(1−R)∑j​b(i,j)y(i,j);
  6. weak duality for the LP pair above;

and, separately, the second sentence of Theorem 1,

lim⁡R→0+(1−1(1+R)1/R)(1−R)=1−1e.\lim_{R\to 0^+}\Big(1 - \frac{1}{(1+R)^{1/R}}\Big)(1-R) = 1 - \frac1e .R→0+lim​(1−(1+R)1/R1​)(1−R)=1−e1​.

Significance

Theorem 1 gives an explicit ratio for every value of Rmax⁡R_{\max}Rmax​, not only in the limit. It tends to the optimal deterministic ratio 1−1/e1 - 1/e1−1/e as bids become small, and it quantifies how the guarantee degrades as single bids become a larger share of a budget. The primal-dual analysis is the template for the paper's later sections and for a line of work on online packing and covering problems, surveyed in Buchbinder and Naor's monograph The Design of Competitive Online Algorithms via a Primal-Dual Approach (Foundations and Trends in TCS, 2009).

The result is proved in the paper, and the proof is short. What this mission adds is a machine-checked proof about an algorithm that is defined, not described: the run is computed by recursion from the instance, and the guarantee is proved for that run and every tie-breaking. A related private mission on the platform, The Design of Competitive Online Algorithms via a Primal-Dual Approach VI: Maximizing Ad-Auctions Revenue, states the monograph's Theorem 10.1, which is this theorem, in a form that takes the analysis's intermediate inequalities as hypotheses over arbitrary lists of won bids; the present mission states it for the algorithm itself. No machine-checked proof of Theorem 1 is known to this mission.

Difficulty

Each step of the proof is elementary; the difficulty is the bookkeeping of an online process. Claims (1) and (2) are statements about a single iteration that must be lifted to the whole run: Claim (1) uses that xxx only increases, and Claim (2) that each product is processed once. Inequality (1) is an induction over the iterations that allocate to one buyer, interleaved with iterations that allocate to others and is the only place where the value of ccc matters. Claim (3) needs a further invariant: the amount charged equals the minimum of the allocated bids and the budget.

A tempting shortcut is to take Inequality (1) and the "at most one undercharge" fact as hypotheses about some list of bids. That does not describe the algorithm and is not the theorem; here the only hypotheses are on the instance and on the tie-breaking rule.

Formalization scope

Buyers are a type I with [Fintype I] and [Nonempty I]; products are Fin m, whose order is the arrival order. Bids and budgets are real, with B(i)>0B(i) > 0B(i)>0 and b(i,j)≥0b(i,j) \ge 0b(i,j)≥0. The state of the algorithm records xxx, the amounts charged, yyy and zzz; one iteration is step, the run after kkk products is runPrefix, and revenue sums the charges of the final state. The tie-breaking rule is a function sel of the current xxx and the product, required to return a maximizer of b(i,j)(1−x(i))b(i,j)(1-x(i))b(i,j)(1−x(i)); the theorem holds for every such rule. The constant c=(1+R)1/Rc = (1+R)^{1/R}c=(1+R)1/R is a real power and requires R>0R > 0R>0. The theorem is stated for any bound RRR on the ratios, of which the exact maximum is one instance. Claims (1) and (2) are stated for every c>1c > 1c>1, which covers the paper's choice. The paper's inequality for ln⁡(1+x)/x\ln(1+x)/xln(1+x)/x allows x=0x = 0x=0, read as a limit; the Lean statement requires x>0x > 0x>0.

A statement over an unconstrained allocation, or one conditioned on the proof's own intermediate inequalities, would be trivially true or false; the targets here concern only the run the definitions compute.

The development needs finite sums, real powers and logarithms from Mathlib and an induction principle for the run. The LP pair and weak duality are reusable for the paper's extensions, and the run invariants for any primal-dual online algorithm with multiplicative updates. Proofs of any milestone are welcome, as are sharper variants, such as the exact-Rmax⁡R_{\max}Rmax​ form or the bound against integral allocations.

Selected references

  • N. Buchbinder, K. Jain, J. Naor, Online Primal-Dual Algorithms for Maximizing Ad-Auctions Revenue, Algorithms – ESA 2007, LNCS 4698, 2007. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-75520-3_24
  • A. Mehta, A. Saberi, U. Vazirani, V. Vazirani, AdWords and Generalized Online Matching, Journal of the ACM 54(5), 2007. https://doi.org/10.1145/1284320.1284321
  • R. M. Karp, U. V. Vazirani, V. V. Vazirani, An Optimal Algorithm for On-line Bipartite Matching, STOC 1990. https://doi.org/10.1145/100216.100262
  • B. Kalyanasundaram, K. R. Pruhs, An Optimal Deterministic Algorithm for Online b-Matching, Theoretical Computer Science 233(1–2), 2000. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0304-3975(99)00140-1
  • N. Buchbinder, J. Naor, The Design of Competitive Online Algorithms via a Primal-Dual Approach, Foundations and Trends in Theoretical Computer Science 3(2–3), 2009. https://doi.org/10.1561/0400000024
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Algorithmic Game TheoryOptimizationProbability·Captain: mikedeng1

Information Sharing in a Supply Chain with a Common Retailer 2: Under Production Economy the Retailer Earns Weakly More from Sequential Information Contracting and the Manufacturers from ConcurrentResearch Paper

Motivation

Large retailers hold point-of-sale and loyalty-card data that their suppliers cannot observe, and many of them sell access to it through data-sharing programs; others share the same data for free, or with only some suppliers (Shang, Ha & Tong 2016, §1). When two competing manufacturers sell through one common retailer, sharing a demand signal with a manufacturer changes how he sets his wholesale price, which in turn changes the retailer's margins and the rival's demand. Whether the retailer wants to share, with how many manufacturers, and at what price, is therefore a question about a multistage game with incomplete information.

Shang, Ha and Tong answer it for linear demand, a linear-expectation signal and quadratic production costs, under two contracting protocols. This mission covers the production economy case (marginal cost decreasing in volume, §6 of the paper), in which the retailer may have an incentive to share information even without payment. A companion mission covers production diseconomy (§5).

Setting

Two manufacturers i∈{0,1}i \in \{0,1\}i∈{0,1} sell substitutable products through a common retailer. Demand for product iii is

qi=a+θ−(1+ϕ)pi+ϕpj,q_i = a + \theta - (1+\phi)p_i + \phi p_j ,qi​=a+θ−(1+ϕ)pi​+ϕpj​,

where pip_ipi​ is the retail price, ϕ>0\phi > 0ϕ>0 measures competition intensity and θ\thetaθ is a demand shock with mean 000 and variance σ2>0\sigma^2 > 0σ2>0. The retailer observes a demand signal YYY with E[Y∣θ]=θE[Y \mid \theta] = \thetaE[Y∣θ]=θ and a linear-expectation structure E[θ∣Y]=βYE[\theta \mid Y] = \beta YE[θ∣Y]=βY, where β=β(t,σ)\beta = \beta(t,\sigma)β=β(t,σ) is the signal weight. Producing qqq units costs bq−ceq2bq - c_e q^2bq−ce​q2 with ce>0c_e > 0ce​>0; the paper writes c=−cec = -c_ec=−ce​ and assumes ce<2/(1+ϕ)c_e < 2/(1+\phi)ce​<2/(1+ϕ) (the Assumption, p. 251). Retailing is costless.

The game has three stages.

  1. Information contracting. Under concurrent contracting the retailer offers both manufacturers the same payment T≥0T \ge 0T≥0 for the signal; they decide simultaneously and play a Pareto-optimal pure equilibrium. Under sequential contracting she offers a payment TfT_fTf​ to a first manufacturer kkk and, after his decision, a payment TsT_sTs​ to the other; the outcome is a subgame-perfect equilibrium (SPE). The retailer commits not to share for free after a rejection (§6.2).
  2. Pricing. Given the information statuses Xi∈{I,U}X_i \in \{I, U\}Xi​∈{I,U}, each manufacturer sets a wholesale price wiw_iwi​ (a function of YYY if informed, a constant otherwise), then the retailer sets retail prices; the solution concept is Bayesian Nash equilibrium.
  3. Demand realizes and profits are collected.

The ex ante profits of the pricing equilibrium are denoted πM(0)\pi_M(0)πM​(0), πMU(1)\pi_M^U(1)πMU​(1), πMI(1)\pi_M^I(1)πMI​(1), πM(2)\pi_M(2)πM​(2) for a manufacturer and πR(n)\pi_R(n)πR​(n) for the retailer, nnn the number of informed manufacturers. neNn_e^NneN​, neCn_e^CneC​, neSn_e^SneS​ denote the equilibrium number of informed manufacturers without contracting, under concurrent and under sequential contracting.

Formalization targets

Goal: Proposition 8(d)

For every ϕ>0\phi > 0ϕ>0 and 0<ce<2/(1+ϕ)0 < c_e < 2/(1+\phi)0<ce​<2/(1+ϕ), pricing equilibria exist, concurrent outcomes and sequential SPEs exist, and for every concurrent outcome and every SPE (either first mover)

ΠRC≤ΠRS,ΠMS≤ΠMC,\Pi_R^C \le \Pi_R^S, \qquad \Pi_M^S \le \Pi_M^C ,ΠRC​≤ΠRS​,ΠMS​≤ΠMC​,

where ΠR\Pi_RΠR​ is the retailer's profit after side payments and ΠM\Pi_MΠM​ the manufacturers' total profit net of them. The second inequality is asserted for all cec_ece​ except at most two values depending only on ϕ\phiϕ. The comparisons about every pricing equilibrium family exclude the single value ce∗=(2+3ϕ)/[(1+2ϕ)(1+ϕ)]c_e^* = (2+3\phi)/[(1+2\phi)(1+\phi)]ce∗​=(2+3ϕ)/[(1+2ϕ)(1+ϕ)] (see Formalization scope). The paper says "higher"; the inequalities are weak because both sides coincide on intervals of positive length.

Milestones

  1. Lemma 1: the pricing equilibrium exists and, for ce≠ce∗c_e \ne c_e^*ce​=ce∗​, is unique and linear in YYY with explicit coefficients.
  2. §4.2: the ex ante profits πM(⋅)\pi_M(\cdot)πM​(⋅) and πR(⋅)\pi_R(\cdot)πR​(⋅) in closed form.
  3. Lemma 5(a)–(c) and Lemma 5(d): sign comparisons of these profits in cec_ece​, with thresholds 1/(1+ϕ)1/(1+\phi)1/(1+ϕ), (4+5ϕ)/[(2+3ϕ)(1+ϕ)](4+5\phi)/[(2+3\phi)(1+\phi)](4+5ϕ)/[(2+3ϕ)(1+ϕ)], ceac_e^acea​ and ceNc_e^NceN​.
  4. Proposition 7: thresholds ceCc_e^CceC​, ceSc_e^SceS​ such that
neZ=0 for ce<11+ϕ,neZ=2 for 11+ϕ≤ce<ceZ,neZ=1 for ceZ≤ce<21+ϕ.n_e^Z = 0 \text{ for } c_e < \tfrac{1}{1+\phi}, \quad n_e^Z = 2 \text{ for } \tfrac{1}{1+\phi} \le c_e < c_e^Z, \quad n_e^Z = 1 \text{ for } c_e^Z \le c_e < \tfrac{2}{1+\phi}.neZ​=0 for ce​<1+ϕ1​,neZ​=2 for 1+ϕ1​≤ce​<ceZ​,neZ​=1 for ceZ​≤ce​<1+ϕ2​.
  1. Proposition 6(b): the same structure for neNn_e^NneN​ with a threshold ceNc_e^NceN​.
  2. Proposition 8(a): ceN<ceS≤ceCc_e^N < c_e^S \le c_e^CceN​<ceS​≤ceC​.

Significance

Proposition 8(d) says that a common retailer who sells information prefers to sell it sequentially, and that the manufacturers bear the cost: sequential offers let her extract a larger payment from the first manufacturer, because his outside option depends on what she will do with the second. Together with Propositions 6 and 7 it explains why retailers under production economy share with only a subset of suppliers once economies of scale or competition are strong, and why a retailer may share data for free, a practice the diseconomy model cannot produce.

The results are proved in the paper, partly by "it is straightforward" arguments (the proofs of Lemmas 2–5 are omitted). No part of the paper is formalized. A formalization adds a machine-checked account of the equilibrium selection at the boundary payments, where the paper's case analysis is informal, and of the points at which the retailer is indifferent between outcomes.

Difficulty

The pricing stage is a Bayesian game with a continuum of strategies: an informed manufacturer's strategy is an arbitrary square-integrable function of the signal. Lemma 1's uniqueness needs the Assumption (without it the manufacturer's problem is not concave) and a conditional-expectation argument, not a finite-dimensional computation. The comparisons of Lemma 5 are sign conditions on rational functions of (ce,ϕ)(c_e, \phi)(ce​,ϕ) whose thresholds ceac_e^acea​, ceNc_e^NceN​ are implicit roots. The contracting stage is where the naive argument fails: at the boundary payments several equilibria give the retailer the same payoff but the manufacturers different payoffs, so "the" outcome is not well defined there, and a direct comparison of closed-form profits at the paper's selected equilibria does not cover every equilibrium.

Formalization scope

Lean represents manufacturers by Fin 2, statuses by an inductive type with informed and uninformed, and a pricing strategy by a function of the signal value. The committed conventions are these.

  1. Admissible strategies are measurable with square-integrable wi(Y)w_i(Y)wi​(Y), and constant for an uninformed manufacturer; ex ante optimality over them is the Bayesian equilibrium condition.
  2. The retailer's rule is a best response for every wholesale price pair and signal value, off path included.
  3. The production cost is the uncapped quadratic bq−ceq2bq - c_e q^2bq−ce​q2. The paper caps the quantity at qˉ=b/(2ce)\bar q = b/(2c_e)qˉ​=b/(2ce​) but assumes the cap is reached with negligible probability (footnote 11, p. 251) and computes every result of §4.2 and §6 without it. The condition b<ab < ab<a of that footnote is not imposed.
  4. Contracting uses pure strategies, nonnegative payments, and no free-sharing move after a rejection.
  5. A concurrent outcome is a payment and a pure equilibrium whose retailer payoff equals the supremum of her payoffs over Pareto-optimal equilibria. The supremum is not always attained: for large cec_ece​ the paper's optimal payment πMI(1)−πM(0)\pi_M^I(1) - \pi_M(0)πMI​(1)−πM​(0) makes (U,U)(U,U)(U,U) an equilibrium that Pareto-dominates the one-informed outcome it selects.
  6. Threshold statements take the two-clause form: the stated value of nnn is attained on each region with its printed endpoints, and is the only value on the region's interior. Thresholds depend only on ϕ\phiϕ and are quantified before all other parameters.
  7. The manufacturers' comparison in the goal excludes at most two values of cec_ece​. At the thresholds ceCc_e^CceC​, ceSc_e^SceS​ outcomes with different manufacturer totals coexist, and the universal comparison fails.
  8. A correction of the paper. At ce∗=(2+3ϕ)/[(1+2ϕ)(1+ϕ)]c_e^* = (2+3\phi)/[(1+2\phi)(1+\phi)]ce∗​=(2+3ϕ)/[(1+2ϕ)(1+ϕ)], which lies in (1/(1+ϕ),2/(1+ϕ))(1/(1+\phi), 2/(1+\phi))(1/(1+ϕ),2/(1+ϕ)), the slope of the best-response wholesale price (2) is exactly −1-1−1. The equations wi=w^i(wj)w_i = \hat w_i(w_j)wi​=w^i​(wj​) are then singular, and every status profile has a continuum of pricing equilibria (for n=0n = 0n=0, w1,2=wˉ±tw_{1,2} = \bar w \pm tw1,2​=wˉ±t for every ttt) whose ex ante profits differ. Lemma 1's uniqueness claim fails there, so do the §4.2 identities for every equilibrium family, and so does every statement built on them. Each statement that quantifies over all pricing equilibria therefore assumes ce≠ce∗c_e \ne c_e^*ce​=ce∗​; existence is still asserted at ce∗c_e^*ce∗​.

The ex ante profits in every statement are those of an equilibrium of the pricing game on the signal model, not the §4.2 closed forms; a formalization that defined them by the closed forms would reduce the goal to algebra and a 2×22 \times 22×2 game, and is ruled out. The model layer (signal model, pricing equilibrium, payoff table, both contracting games) is shared, name for name, with the production diseconomy mission. Contributions are welcome on each milestone, and on reusable pieces: linear-expectation signals, and pointwise optimization under conditional expectation.

Selected references

  • Shang W., Ha A. Y., Tong S., Information Sharing in a Supply Chain with a Common Retailer, Management Science 62(1):245–263, 2016. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2014.2127
  • Ericson W. A., A note on the posterior mean of a population mean, Journal of the Royal Statistical Society B 31(2):332–334, 1969 (cited for the formula of β(t,σ)\beta(t,\sigma)β(t,σ), which this mission does not use).
  • Vives X., Oligopoly Pricing: Old Ideas and New Tools, MIT Press, 1999, §2.7.2.
  • Li L., Information sharing in a supply chain with horizontal competition, Management Science 48(9):1196–1212, 2002. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.48.9.1196.177
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Algorithmic Game TheoryConvex OptimizationOptimization·Captain: mikedeng1

Value of Information in Bayesian Routing Games I: Sign and Monotonicity of the Relative Value of Information Across Size RegimesResearch Paper

Motivation

Traffic information systems (TIS) such as navigation apps send drivers noisy signals about the state of a road network: incidents, weather, closures. When several such systems coexist, each with its own subscriber base and its own information, a natural question for operators and regulators is whether subscribing to one system rather than another actually lowers a driver's expected travel cost in equilibrium, and how this advantage depends on how many drivers use each system. More information for one population also changes the congestion everybody else faces, so the answer is not simply "more information is better".

Wu, Amin and Ozdaglar (Operations Research 69(1), 2021) answer this question for nonatomic routing games with heterogeneous, possibly correlated information. Their model builds on the weighted potential game framework of Sandholm (2001) and on sensitivity analysis of convex programs. This mission formalizes their Section 5 result: for any two populations the sign of the relative value of information is determined by which of three explicitly computable size regimes the population sizes lie in, and the relative value decreases as one population grows at the expense of the other.

Setting

A Bayesian routing game has a finite set of populations I\mathcal II, one per TIS, a finite set of network states S\mathcal SS, and for each population iii a finite nonempty type space Ti\mathcal T^iTi of signals. A common prior π\piπ is a probability distribution on S×T\mathcal S\times\mathcal TS×T, T=∏iTi\mathcal T=\prod_i\mathcal T^iT=∏i​Ti. A network with a single origin–destination pair has edges E\mathcal EE and a finite nonempty set of routes R\mathcal RR; each edge has a state-dependent cost cesc^s_eces​ that is positive, strictly increasing and differentiable. The total demand is D>0D>0D>0, and population iii carries the fraction λi\lambda^iλi of it, with λi≥0\lambda^i\ge0λi≥0 and ∑iλi=1\sum_i\lambda^i=1∑i​λi=1.

A strategy profile qqq assigns to each population iii and type tit^iti a split qri(ti)≥0q^i_r(t^i)\ge0qri​(ti)≥0 of its demand λiD\lambda^iDλiD over routes. It induces the route flow fr(t)=∑iqri(ti)f_r(t)=\sum_iq^i_r(t^i)fr​(t)=∑i​qri​(ti) and the edge load we(t)=∑r∋efr(t)w_e(t)=\sum_{r\ni e}f_r(t)we​(t)=∑r∋e​fr​(t). With the belief βi(s,t−i∣ti)=π(s,ti,t−i)/Pr⁡(ti)\beta^i(s,t^{-i}\mid t^i)=\pi(s,t^i,t^{-i})/\Pr(t^i)βi(s,t−i∣ti)=π(s,ti,t−i)/Pr(ti), type tit^iti evaluates route rrr by its expected cost E[cr(q)∣ti]\mathbb E[c_r(q)\mid t^i]E[cr​(q)∣ti]. A Bayesian Wardrop equilibrium (BWE) is a feasible qqq in which every type uses only routes of minimal expected cost. The equilibrium population cost is Ci∗(λ)=∑tiPr⁡(ti)min⁡rE[cr(q)∣ti]C^{i*}(\lambda)=\sum_{t^i}\Pr(t^i)\min_r\mathbb E[c_r(q)\mid t^i]Ci∗(λ)=∑ti​Pr(ti)minr​E[cr​(q)∣ti] at a BWE qqq.

The game has a weighted potential Φ(q)=∑s,e,tπ(s,t)∫0we(t)ces(z) dz\Phi(q)=\sum_{s,e,t}\pi(s,t)\int_0^{w_e(t)}c^s_e(z)\,dzΦ(q)=∑s,e,t​π(s,t)∫0we​(t)​ces​(z)dz; its minimum over feasible profiles is the equilibrium potential value Ψ(λ)\Psi(\lambda)Ψ(λ). For two populations i≠ji\ne ji=j, the direction zijz^{ij}zij moves demand share from jjj to iii, and ∣λ−ij∣|\lambda^{-ij}|∣λ−ij∣ is the total share of the other populations. The impact of information J^i(f)\widehat J^i(f)Ji(f) measures how much of population iii's demand is moved by its signal. Two thresholds λ‾i≤λ‾i\underline\lambda^i\le\overline\lambda^iλ​i≤λi are computed from the optimal set Fij,†\mathcal F^{ij,\dagger}Fij,† of an auxiliary convex program over route flows in which the separate information constraints of iii and jjj are merged. They define three regimes: Λ1ij\Lambda^{ij}_1Λ1ij​ (λi<λ‾i\lambda^i<\underline\lambda^iλi<λ​i), Λ2ij\Lambda^{ij}_2Λ2ij​ (λ‾i≤λi≤λ‾i\underline\lambda^i\le\lambda^i\le\overline\lambda^iλ​i≤λi≤λi) and Λ3ij\Lambda^{ij}_3Λ3ij​ (λi>λ‾i\lambda^i>\overline\lambda^iλi>λi). The relative value of information is Vij∗(λ)=Cj∗(λ)−Ci∗(λ)V^{ij*}(\lambda)=C^{j*}(\lambda)-C^{i*}(\lambda)Vij∗(λ)=Cj∗(λ)−Ci∗(λ).

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 3

For i≠ji\ne ji=j and admissible λ\lambdaλ (in the simplex with λi,λj>0\lambda^i,\lambda^j>0λi,λj>0), and every BWE of Γ(λ)\Gamma(\lambda)Γ(λ),

Vij∗(λ)>0 on Λ1ij,Vij∗(λ)=0 on Λ2ij,Vij∗(λ)<0 on Λ3ij,V^{ij*}(\lambda)>0 \text{ on } \Lambda^{ij}_1,\qquad V^{ij*}(\lambda)=0 \text{ on } \Lambda^{ij}_2,\qquad V^{ij*}(\lambda)<0 \text{ on } \Lambda^{ij}_3,Vij∗(λ)>0 on Λ1ij​,Vij∗(λ)=0 on Λ2ij​,Vij∗(λ)<0 on Λ3ij​,

and Vij∗V^{ij*}Vij∗ is nonincreasing along zijz^{ij}zij: Vij∗(λ+εzij)≤Vij∗(λ)V^{ij*}(\lambda+\varepsilon z^{ij})\le V^{ij*}(\lambda)Vij∗(λ+εzij)≤Vij∗(λ) for ε>0\varepsilon>0ε>0 with both endpoints admissible.

Milestones

The route to the goal follows the paper: Lemma 1 (weighted potential), Lemma 2 (strict convexity of the edge-load potential), Theorem 1 (equilibria are the minimizers of Φ\PhiΦ; unique edge load), Lemma 3 (unique Lagrange multipliers), Proposition 1 (the feasible route flows form a polytope F(λ)\mathcal F(\lambda)F(λ)), Proposition 2 (equilibrium route flows minimize Φ^\widehat\PhiΦ over F(λ)\mathcal F(\lambda)F(λ)), Lemma 4 (0≤λ‾i≤λ‾i≤1−∣λ−ij∣0\le\underline\lambda^i\le\overline\lambda^i\le1-|\lambda^{-ij}|0≤λ​i≤λi≤1−∣λ−ij∣), Theorem 2 (equilibrium flows in each regime), Proposition 3 (Ψ\PsiΨ decreases, stays constant, increases along zijz^{ij}zij in the three regimes) and Lemma 5 (Ψ\PsiΨ is convex and directionally differentiable, and Vij∗(λ)=−1D∇zijΨ(λ)V^{ij*}(\lambda)=-\frac1D\nabla_{z^{ij}}\Psi(\lambda)Vij∗(λ)=−D1​∇zij​Ψ(λ)).

Significance

Theorem 3 says that a population has an advantage over another exactly when it is the minor population of the pair, relative to thresholds that depend only on the other populations' sizes. Both populations face the same equilibrium cost in the middle regime. It gives a procedure for comparing two information systems without computing equilibria for each size vector: solve one convex program, read off two thresholds, and locate λi\lambda^iλi. The paper's Section 6 uses the same machinery, through Lemma 5, to characterize the equilibrium adoption rates of information systems.

The paper proves these results with the main proofs in the article and the sensitivity-analysis lemmas (Lemmas EC.1–EC.4) in its e-companion. None of them has a machine-checked proof. The formalization requires a Lean account of Bayesian Wardrop equilibria, of the equivalence between equilibria and a convex program, and of directional derivatives of the optimal value of a parametric convex program. Parts of this are reusable for any nonatomic routing or congestion game.

Difficulty

The equilibrium strategy profile is not unique and changes discontinuously with λ\lambdaλ. Differentiating equilibrium costs in λ\lambdaλ directly therefore fails. The paper instead works with the optimal value Ψ(λ)\Psi(\lambda)Ψ(λ), whose one-sided directional derivative is expressed through Lagrange multipliers. That requires a sensitivity theorem for convex programs whose constraints depend affinely on the parameter, together with uniqueness of multipliers, which fails for populations of size zero. The regime analysis also needs a characterization of the route flows that are induced by feasible strategy profiles. That set is described by the nonlinear-looking constraint J^i(f)≤λiD\widehat J^i(f)\le\lambda^iDJi(f)≤λiD, a minimum over types inside a sum over routes. Strict monotonicity of Ψ\PsiΨ in the side regimes needs the tightness of an information constraint at every equilibrium, not only at one.

Formalization scope

The model is a Lean structure BayesRouting.VOI.Game over finite types of populations, type spaces, states, edges and routes. Routes are given by their edge sets, and the directed-graph structure is not used. Type spaces and the route set are nonempty. The prior is a probability distribution, D>0D>0D>0, and costs are positive on nonnegative loads, strictly increasing and differentiable on R\mathbb RR. One assumption is added: every type profile has positive probability. It makes beliefs well defined and the equilibrium edge load unique, and it excludes perfectly correlated signals.

Conventions: Ci∗C^{i*}Ci∗ is the last form of eq. (7), which does not divide by λiD\lambda^iDλiD. J^i\widehat J^iJi is the maximum of eq. (16) over the reference profile, so that J^i(f)≤λiD\widehat J^i(f)\le\lambda^iDJi(f)≤λiD is exactly (14d). Ψ\PsiΨ and the thresholds are sInf/sSup over sets that are nonempty and compact for size vectors in the simplex, and every statement keeps size vectors there. Statements about "the" equilibrium are stated for every BWE, and existence of a BWE is a separate item, so they are not vacuous. The thresholds are defined from the optimal set of the auxiliary program, not assumed as parameters. Taking them as parameters constrained only by Lemma 4 would give a different theorem.

Disclosed deviations: Lemma 2's C2C^2C2 clause assumes C1C^1C1 costs; Lemma 3 is stated for populations of positive size; Lemma 5 assumes λj>0\lambda^j>0λj>0; Proposition 3 is stated with strict monotonicity in the side regimes, as used in the proof of Theorem 3. Contributions of reusable infrastructure are welcome: interval-integral potentials of monotone costs, KKT theory for polyhedral constraints, and directional derivatives of parametric optimal values.

Selected references

  • M. Wu, S. Amin, A. Ozdaglar, Value of Information in Bayesian Routing Games, Operations Research 69(1):148–163, 2021. https://doi.org/10.1287/opre.2020.1999
  • W. H. Sandholm, Potential Games with Continuous Player Sets, Journal of Economic Theory 97(1):81–108, 2001. https://doi.org/10.1006/jeth.2000.2696
  • R. T. Rockafellar, Directional Differentiability of the Optimal Value Function in a Nonlinear Programming Problem, in Sensitivity, Stability and Parametric Analysis (Mathematical Programming Studies 21), Springer, 1984, pp. 213–226.
  • A. V. Fiacco, J. Kyparisis, Convexity and Concavity Properties of the Optimal Value Function in Parametric Nonlinear Programming, Journal of Optimization Theory and Applications 48(1):95–126, 1986.
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Dynamic ProgrammingStochastic Systems·Captain: mikedeng1

Computing Optimal (s, S) Inventory Policies II: Bounds on the Optimal s and S of the n-Period Model from the One-Period CostResearch Paper

Motivation

The (s,S)(s, S)(s,S) policy is the standard ordering rule for a single stocked item with a fixed charge per order: when the stock position falls below a reorder point sss, order up to a level SSS; otherwise order nothing. Scarf (1960) proved that when the expected one-period cost is convex, some (s,S)(s, S)(s,S) policy is optimal in every period of a finite-horizon model with set-up cost. Iglehart (1963) extended this to the infinite horizon. These results establish existence only. They give no procedure for finding the optimal pair.

Veinott and Wagner (1965) gave such a procedure. Its first step is to bound the optimal sss and SSS by four integers s‾≤sˉ≤S‾≤Sˉ\underline{s} \le \bar{s} \le \underline{S} \le \bar{S}s​≤sˉ≤S​≤Sˉ computed from the one-period cost alone. This reduces the search for an optimal policy to a finite box. Their Theorem 4(a) proves that the bounds hold for the first-period parameters of an optimal (s,S)(s, S)(s,S) policy in every nnn-period model. This mission formalizes that theorem and the four comparison lemmas (Lemmas 2–5 of the paper's Appendix §2) from which the paper derives it.

Setting

Demands ξ1,ξ2,…\xi_1, \xi_2, \dotsξ1​,ξ2​,… in periods 1,2,…1, 2, \dots1,2,… are independent, non-negative integer random variables with common distribution φ(k)=Pr⁡(ξt=k)\varphi(k) = \Pr(\xi_t = k)φ(k)=Pr(ξt​=k) and finite mean. Unfilled demand is backlogged, so stock levels are arbitrary integers. In period ttt, XtX_tXt​ is the stock on hand plus on order before ordering and Yt≥XtY_t \ge X_tYt​≥Xt​ the level after ordering. Then X1=xX_1 = xX1​=x and Xt+1=Yt−ξtX_{t+1} = Y_t - \xi_tXt+1​=Yt​−ξt​.

A policy chooses YtY_tYt​ as any integer function of the information available at the start of period ttt. Given X1=xX_1 = xX1​=x, that information is determined by xxx and ξ1,…,ξt−1\xi_1, \dots, \xi_{t-1}ξ1​,…,ξt−1​. Policies may therefore depend on the whole history; they are not required to be Markov.

Costs are summarized by a set-up cost K≥0K \ge 0K≥0, a discount factor 0≤α≤10 \le \alpha \le 10≤α≤1 and a one-period cost Gα:Z→RG_\alpha : \mathbb Z \to \mathbb RGα​:Z→R. The paper reduces the model with purchase cost ccc, lead time λ\lambdaλ and holding–penalty cost LLL to these data by its Eq. (2), with Gα(y)=(1−α)cy+L(y)G_\alpha(y) = (1 - \alpha) c y + L(y)Gα​(y)=(1−α)cy+L(y). The nnn-period cost of a policy YYY from X1=xX_1 = xX1​=x is

fn(x∣Y)=∑t=1nαt−1[K E δ(Yt−Xt)+E Gα(Yt)],f_n(x \mid Y) = \sum_{t=1}^{n} \alpha^{t-1}\bigl[K\,E\,\delta(Y_t - X_t) + E\,G_\alpha(Y_t)\bigr],fn​(x∣Y)=t=1∑n​αt−1[KEδ(Yt​−Xt​)+EGα​(Yt​)],

where δ(0)=0\delta(0) = 0δ(0)=0 and δ(z)=1\delta(z) = 1δ(z)=1 for z>0z > 0z>0. A policy is optimal if it minimizes fn(x∣⋅)f_n(x \mid \cdot)fn​(x∣⋅) for every xxx simultaneously. The standing assumptions are that GαG_\alphaGα​ is convex on the integers (non-decreasing forward differences) and Gα(y)→∞G_\alpha(y) \to \inftyGα​(y)→∞ as ∣y∣→∞|y| \to \infty∣y∣→∞.

The bounds (p. 537) are defined as follows. S‾\underline{S}S​ is the smallest minimizer of GαG_\alphaGα​. Sˉ\bar SSˉ is the smallest integer ≥S‾\ge \underline{S}≥S​ with Gα(Sˉ+1)≥Gα(S‾)+αKG_\alpha(\bar S + 1) \ge G_\alpha(\underline S) + \alpha KGα​(Sˉ+1)≥Gα​(S​)+αK (21). s‾\underline ss​ is the smallest integer with Gα(s‾)≤Gα(S‾)+KG_\alpha(\underline s) \le G_\alpha(\underline S) + KGα​(s​)≤Gα​(S​)+K (22). sˉ\bar ssˉ is the smallest integer with Gα(sˉ)≤Gα(S‾)+(1−α)KG_\alpha(\bar s) \le G_\alpha(\underline S) + (1 - \alpha)KGα​(sˉ)≤Gα​(S​)+(1−α)K (23).

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 4(a)

For every n≥2n \ge 2n≥2 there is an optimal (s,S)(s, S)(s,S) policy for the nnn-period model whose first-period rule (sn,Sn)(s_n, S_n)(sn​,Sn​) satisfies

s‾≤sn≤sˉ≤S‾≤Sn≤Sˉ.\underline{s} \le s_n \le \bar{s} \le \underline{S} \le S_n \le \bar{S}.s​≤sn​≤sˉ≤S​≤Sn​≤Sˉ.

Optimality is against all history-dependent policies and for every starting level. The existence of an optimal (s,S)(s, S)(s,S) policy is part of the conclusion.

Milestones

  1. The characterization of S‾\underline SS​ by ΔGα(S‾−1)<0≤ΔGα(S‾)\Delta G_\alpha(\underline S - 1) < 0 \le \Delta G_\alpha(\underline S)ΔGα​(S​−1)<0≤ΔGα​(S​), and the existence of the parameters of (21)–(23).
  2. Lemma 2: S‾≤Sn\underline{S} \le S_nS​≤Sn​ for any optimal policy using (sn,Sn)(s_n, S_n)(sn​,Sn​) in period 1.
  3. Lemma 3: if sˉ<sn\bar s < s_nsˉ<sn​, some policy using (sˉ,Sn)(\bar s, S_n)(sˉ,Sn​) in period 1 costs no more, from every xxx.
  4. Lemma 4: if Sˉ<Sn\bar S < S_nSˉ<Sn​ (and sn≤sˉs_n \le \bar ssn​≤sˉ), some policy using (sn,S‾)(s_n, \underline S)(sn​,S​) in period 1 costs no more, from every xxx.
  5. Lemma 5: s‾≤sn\underline{s} \le s_ns​≤sn​ for any optimal policy using (sn,Sn)(s_n, S_n)(sn​,Sn​) in period 1.

Significance

The theorem turns the optimization over (s,S)(s, S)(s,S) policies into a search over a finite box that depends only on GαG_\alphaGα​, KKK and α\alphaα. The paper's Section 4 procedure for the infinite-horizon problem (Theorem 4(b), Step i) is built on this box, and the bounds also give an interpretation of sss and SSS: S‾\underline SS​ is the single-period optimum, and sˉ\bar ssˉ, s‾\underline ss​, Sˉ\bar SSˉ mark where the one-period cost exceeds that optimum by the fractions (1−α)K(1 - \alpha)K(1−α)K, KKK and αK\alpha KαK of the set-up cost.

The results are proved in the paper. None of them has a machine-checked proof as far as is known; no discrete-state finite-horizon inventory model with set-up cost is on the platform. A formal proof would provide a reusable finite-horizon dynamic-programming model with history-dependent policies and extended-real expected costs, and a machine-checked version of the existence of optimal (s,S)(s, S)(s,S) policies in the discrete setting, which Theorem 4(a) contains.

Difficulty

The four lemmas compare an optimal policy with an explicit modification of it. The modification in Lemmas 2 and 5 raises the stock in period 1 and then orders max⁡(Xt′,Ytn)\max(X'_t, Y^n_t)max(Xt′​,Ytn​), where YtnY^n_tYtn​ is the original policy's decision along the original demand path. This comparison policy is history-dependent even when the original policy is not, so the argument cannot be carried out inside the class of Markov or (s,S)(s, S)(s,S) policies. Expectations must be handled over finite demand histories, and costs can be infinite for general policies.

The goal also contains the existence of an optimal (s,S)(s, S)(s,S) policy for the nnn-period model. The paper cites this from Scarf and Zabel rather than proving it. Applying Lemma 3 or 4 yields an optimal policy whose later periods are no longer of (s,S)(s, S)(s,S) form. Restoring the (s,S)(s, S)(s,S) form requires the dynamic-programming principle of optimality together with the KKK-convexity argument.

Formalization scope

The Lean model (VeinottWagnerSS.Bounds.Model) uses the reduced model of Eq. (2): G : ℤ → ℝ is a primitive, and ccc, λ\lambdaλ and LLL do not appear. Stock levels are integers and demands are natural numbers; the demand law is a PMF ℕ with finite mean. A policy is Y : (t : ℕ) → ℤ → (Fin t → ℕ) → ℤ: period t+1t + 1t+1's level as a function of xxx and the first ttt demands, so it cannot see current or future demand. Periods are numbered from 000 in Lean. Expectations are sums over demand histories weighted by ∏iφ(ξi)\prod_i \varphi(\xi_i)∏i​φ(ξi​). E Gα(Yt)E\,G_\alpha(Y_t)EGα​(Yt​) is the difference of the expectations of the positive and negative parts, and fnf_nfn​ is valued in EReal. Under the standing assumptions GαG_\alphaGα​ is bounded below, so the negative part is finite and no ∞−∞\infty - \infty∞−∞ arises. Both α=1\alpha = 1α=1 and α=0\alpha = 0α=0 are allowed.

The bounds SLow, SHigh, sLow, sHigh are infima of the sets in (21)–(23); a milestone proves they are the least elements. A trivializing formalization is ruled out as follows. Optimality is over all admissible policies and for every xxx. The bounds are the least integers of (21)–(23). The goal requires an optimal policy, not only a bounded pair. Existence of an optimal policy is proved, not assumed.

Printed statements corrected. Lemma 4 as printed has no hypothesis on sns_nsn​. Its proof begins "By lemma 3 we may assume that sn≤sˉs_n \le \bar ssn​≤sˉ", and without that assumption (sn,S‾)(s_n, \underline S)(sn​,S​) need not be an (s,S)(s, S)(s,S) rule. The Lean statement adds sn≤sˉs_n \le \bar ssn​≤sˉ. The last display of the proof of Lemma 5 reads Gα(s‾+1)G_\alpha(\underline s + 1)Gα​(s​+1) where Gα(s‾−1)G_\alpha(\underline s - 1)Gα​(s​−1) is meant; this affects only the proof. The milestone texts are verbatim.

Useful contributions include lemmas on convex functions on Z\mathbb ZZ (monotonicity on either side of a minimizer), expectation lemmas for sums over Fin t → ℕ, and the finite-horizon principle of optimality for this model.

Selected references

  • A. F. Veinott, Jr. and H. M. Wagner, Computing Optimal (s, S) Inventory Policies, Management Science 11(5), 525–552, 1965. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.11.5.525
  • H. Scarf, The Optimality of (S, s) Policies in the Dynamic Inventory Problem, in Mathematical Methods in the Social Sciences, Stanford University Press, 1960.
  • E. Zabel, A Note on the Optimality of (S, s) Policies in Inventory Theory, Management Science 9(1), 123–125, 1962. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.9.1.123
  • D. L. Iglehart, Optimality of (s, S) Policies in the Infinite Horizon Dynamic Inventory Problem, Management Science 9(2), 259–267, 1963. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.9.2.259
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CombinatoricsDiscrete Geometry·Captain: mikedeng1

Extremal Problems in Discrete Geometry: The Szemerédi–Trotter Incidence BoundResearch Paper

Motivation

How many times can nnn points and ttt lines in the plane meet? The question is the prototype of incidence geometry, and the answer controls a long list of problems in discrete and computational geometry: the number of lines rich in points, the number of distinct distances or unit distances among nnn points, the complexity of arrangements, and sum–product estimates in additive combinatorics. Erdős asked for the order of magnitude when t=nt = nt=n and conjectured that the answer is n4/3n^{4/3}n4/3; Erdős and Purdy asked for the matching bound on the number of lines containing at least kkk of the points.

Szemerédi and Trotter settled both questions in Extremal Problems in Discrete Geometry (Combinatorica 3 (1983) 381–392, doi:10.1007/BF02579194). Their principal theorem bounds the number of point–line incidences by c1n2/3t2/3c_1 n^{2/3} t^{2/3}c1​n2/3t2/3 over the whole range n≤t≤(n2)\sqrt n \le t \le \binom n2n​≤t≤(2n​), and the same paper derives from it the Erdős–Purdy bound on kkk-rich lines, a version of Dirac's conjecture (proved independently by Beck, Combinatorica 3 (1983)), and a bound on the number of sequences of line densities.

Timeline.

  • Erdős conjectures O(n4/3)O(n^{4/3})O(n4/3) incidences for nnn points and nnn lines, and shows by a grid construction that this order would be sharp.
  • 1983: Szemerédi and Trotter prove the bound c1n2/3t2/3c_1 n^{2/3} t^{2/3}c1​n2/3t2/3 for n≤t≤(n2)\sqrt n \le t \le \binom n2n​≤t≤(2n​), with c1=1060c_1 = 10^{60}c1​=1060, by a minimal-counterexample argument and a covering lemma for squares from their earlier paper.
  • 1990: Clarkson, Edelsbrunner, Guibas, Sharir and Welzl give a second proof by cuttings, with a far smaller constant (Discrete Comput. Geom. 5 (1990) 99–160).
  • 1997: Székely derives the bound in a few lines from the crossing lemma (Combin. Probab. Comput. 6 (1997) 353–358).

Setting

Work in the Euclidean plane R2\mathbb R^2R2, written Plane in the Lean development. A line is an affine subspace l⊆R2l \subseteq \mathbb R^2l⊆R2 whose direction space has dimension one (IsLine l). Let P\mathcal PP be a finite set of nnn points and L\mathcal LL a finite family of ttt distinct lines. The number of incidences is

I(P,L)=#{(p,l)∈P×L:p∈l},I(\mathcal P, \mathcal L) = \#\{(p, l) \in \mathcal P \times \mathcal L : p \in l\},I(P,L)=#{(p,l)∈P×L:p∈l},

written incidences P L. The degree did_idi​ of a point pip_ipi​ is the number of lines of L\mathcal LL through it (degree L p), and the density yjy_jyj​ of a line ljl_jlj​ is the number of points of P\mathcal PP on it (density P l); so I=∑idi=∑jyjI = \sum_i d_i = \sum_j y_jI=∑i​di​=∑j​yj​.

For the covering lemma, coordinate axes are fixed and a square is a closed axis-parallel square Q(a,b,s)=[a,a+s]×[b,b+s]Q(a,b,s) = [a, a+s] \times [b, b+s]Q(a,b,s)=[a,a+s]×[b,b+s] with side s>0s > 0s>0 (closedSquare (a, b, s)); its interior is the open square (a,a+s)×(b,b+s)(a, a+s) \times (b, b+s)(a,a+s)×(b,b+s) (openSquare). A square contains the points of P\mathcal PP in the closed square, and a family of squares covers the points lying in at least one of them.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 1 (p. 381, restated and proved on p. 383)

There is an absolute constant c1c_1c1​ such that for every finite point set P\mathcal PP with ∣P∣=n|\mathcal P| = n∣P∣=n and every finite family L\mathcal LL of ttt distinct lines,

n≤t≤(n2)⟹I(P,L)≤c1 n2/3 t2/3.\sqrt n \le t \le \binom n2 \quad\Longrightarrow\quad I(\mathcal P, \mathcal L) \le c_1\, n^{2/3}\, t^{2/3}.n​≤t≤(2n​)⟹I(P,L)≤c1​n2/3t2/3.

The goal leaves c1c_1c1​ unspecified. The paper's proof gives c1=1060c_1 = 10^{60}c1​=1060, and later proofs give much smaller values; any improvement of the constant still proves this statement.

Milestones, in the order the proof uses them

  1. Section 3, display on p. 383. Two distinct lines meet in at most one point, so the number of good intersections is at most the number of pairs of lines:
∑i(di2)≤(t2),I22n−I2≤t22.\sum_{i} \binom{d_i}{2} \le \binom t2, \qquad \frac{I^2}{2n} - \frac I2 \le \frac{t^2}{2}.i∑​(2di​​)≤(2t​),2nI2​−2I​≤2t2​.
  1. Section 3, inequality (1), p. 384. 0.6 x+(1−x)2/3≤10.6\,x + (1-x)^{2/3} \le 10.6x+(1−x)2/3≤1 for 0<x≤1/20 < x \le 1/20<x≤1/2.
  2. Section 3, inequality (5), p. 385. x2/3+(1−x)/100+2−1/3(1−x)2/3≤1x^{2/3} + (1-x)/100 + 2^{-1/3}(1-x)^{2/3} \le 1x2/3+(1−x)/100+2−1/3(1−x)2/3≤1 for 0<x≤0.10 < x \le 0.10<x≤0.1, and the reverse strict inequality holds somewhere in (0.1,0.2)(0.1, 0.2)(0.1,0.2).
  3. Section 3, display on p. 387. With M=1010M = 10^{10}M=1010, 2i/3(1−2/M)4i/3≥200/((0.1)1/322/3)2^{i/3}(1 - 2/M)^{4i/3} \ge 200/((0.1)^{1/3} 2^{2/3})2i/3(1−2/M)4i/3≥200/((0.1)1/322/3) for every integer i≥30i \ge 30i≥30.
  4. Section 2, Lemma (covering lemma), p. 382. For integers 1≤r1≤n1 \le r_1 \le n1≤r1​≤n and r2≥256r1r_2 \ge 256 r_1r2​≥256r1​, every set of nnn points is covered, to at least n/16n/16n/16 of its points, by a family of squares with pairwise disjoint interiors, each containing between r1r_1r1​ and r2r_2r2​ of the points.

Significance

The result. The bound n2/3t2/3n^{2/3} t^{2/3}n2/3t2/3 is sharp up to the constant throughout the range n≤t≤(n2)\sqrt n \le t \le \binom n2n​≤t≤(2n​), as integer-grid configurations show. Outside that range the trivial bounds n+t2n + t^2n+t2 and t+n2t + n^2t+n2 take over. Theorem 1 is the source of the O(n2/k3)O(n^2/k^3)O(n2/k3) bound on kkk-rich lines (the paper's Theorem 2), of Beck's theorem (Theorem 3), and, through them, of the unit-distance bound O(n4/3)O(n^{4/3})O(n4/3), of the Elekes sum–product estimate and of many algorithmic bounds on arrangements. It is the first nontrivial case of the polynomial-partitioning incidence theory developed since 2010.

Formalizing it. The theorem has been proved, and reproved in several ways, for four decades. To the best of the mission's knowledge Mathlib has no statement of it, of the crossing lemma, or of any point–line incidence bound in the Euclidean plane. This mission produces a checked statement of the theorem with lines as genuine one-dimensional affine subspaces and an absolute constant. It also produces checked statements of the auxiliary facts the 1983 proof uses. A complete proof may follow the original argument, the cutting argument or Székely's crossing-lemma argument; any of them closes the goal.

Difficulty

Counting pairs of lines through common points (milestone 1) gives only I≲n1/2t+nI \lesssim n^{1/2} t + nI≲n1/2t+n, and its dual gives I≲t1/2n+tI \lesssim t^{1/2} n + tI≲t1/2n+t. These Cauchy–Schwarz bounds use only the fact that two lines meet at most once, a property shared by lines in finite projective planes, where the incidence count genuinely reaches order n3/2n^{3/2}n3/2. Any proof of the n2/3t2/3n^{2/3} t^{2/3}n2/3t2/3 bound must therefore use a property of the real plane that the finite geometries lack: order, continuity, or the planarity of drawings. Szemerédi and Trotter use it through a covering lemma for axis-parallel squares, whose proof is only cited in the paper ([7]). The remaining difficulty is keeping the constants of a multi-stage minimal-counterexample argument under control.

Formalization scope

The plane is EuclideanSpace ℝ (Fin 2). A line is an AffineSubspace ℝ Plane whose direction has Module.finrank equal to 111. Every statement requires IsLine of each member of L\mathcal LL, so neither the whole plane nor a single point counts as a line. The points form a Finset Plane and the lines a Finset (AffineSubspace ℝ Plane), which makes the ttt lines distinct. Incidences, degrees and densities are Finset.filter cardinalities under classical decidability. Powers n2/3n^{2/3}n2/3, t2/3t^{2/3}t2/3 are Real.rpow of the counts cast to R\mathbb RR, and (n2)\binom n2(2n​) is Nat.choose.

In the goal, the constant c1c_1c1​ is quantified before the points and the lines. The form "for every configuration there is a c1c_1c1​" is trivially true (take c1=I+1c_1 = I + 1c1​=I+1) and is not this theorem. Both ends of the range n≤t≤(n2)\sqrt n \le t \le \binom n2n​≤t≤(2n​) are kept exactly: without the lower end, a single line through nnn collinear points has nnn incidences, more than c1n2/3c_1 n^{2/3}c1​n2/3 for large nnn.

The goal follows the wording of p. 381 ("at most"). The restatement on p. 383 says "less than", which fails at n=t=0n = t = 0n=t=0 and is equivalent for n≥1n \ge 1n≥1 after doubling c1c_1c1​. The covering lemma is stated with the added non-degeneracy hypotheses 1≤r1≤n1 \le r_1 \le n1≤r1​≤n. As printed it fails when 0<n<r10 < n < r_10<n<r1​ (no square can hold r1r_1r1​ points), and when r1=r2=0r_1 = r_2 = 0r1​=r2​=0 with n>0n > 0n>0.

A full development needs a real-plane incidence toolkit: a crossing lemma or a cutting lemma, or the covering lemma with its quadtree proof. That toolkit is reusable for kkk-rich lines, Beck's theorem, unit distances and sum–product bounds, and contributions of such infrastructure as separate theorems are welcome. The three numerical milestones are self-contained real-analysis exercises.

Selected references

  • E. Szemerédi, W. T. Trotter, Jr., Extremal problems in discrete geometry, Combinatorica 3 (1983) 381–392. https://doi.org/10.1007/BF02579194
  • E. Szemerédi, W. T. Trotter, Jr., A combinatorial distinction between the Euclidean and projective planes, European J. Combin. 4 (1983) 385–394. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0195-6698(83)80036-5
  • J. Beck, On the lattice property of the plane and some problems of Dirac, Motzkin and Erdős in combinatorial geometry, Combinatorica 3 (1983) 281–297. https://doi.org/10.1007/BF02579184
  • K. L. Clarkson, H. Edelsbrunner, L. J. Guibas, M. Sharir, E. Welzl, Combinatorial complexity bounds for arrangements of curves and spheres, Discrete Comput. Geom. 5 (1990) 99–160. https://doi.org/10.1007/BF02187783
  • L. A. Székely, Crossing numbers and hard Erdős problems in discrete geometry, Combin. Probab. Comput. 6 (1997) 353–358. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0963548397002976
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CombinatoricsGraph TheoryLinear Optimization·Captain: mikedeng1

The Matroids with the Max-Flow Min-Cut Property: Binary Mengerian Clutters and the Q6 MinorResearch Paper

Motivation

Several classical theorems of combinatorial optimization say that a family of sets arising from a graph packs: the maximum number of pairwise disjoint members equals the minimum size of a set meeting every member. König's theorem on bipartite graphs, Menger's theorem, the max-flow min-cut theorem of Ford and Fulkerson, Edmonds' branching theorem and the Lucchesi–Younger theorem all have this form (Seymour 1977, (1.1)–(1.5)). In the capacitated version (weights on elements, integral flows) the max-flow min-cut theorem says more: the packing property survives every deletion and replication of elements. Clutters with this stronger property are called Mengerian. For each 000–111 matrix they are exactly the systems whose covering linear program and its dual have integral optima for every integral weight vector, which is why the notion matters to integer programming and polyhedral combinatorics.

Seymour's paper answers the question for the class of binary clutters, the clutters coming from binary matroids, which includes path collections, cut collections and odd-circuit collections of graphs. Earlier, Gallai's theorem implied that ports of regular matroids are Mengerian (Seymour 1977, p. 200); combined with Tutte's excluded-minor characterization of regular matroids, this showed that binary clutters without Q6Q_6Q6​ or b(Q6)b(Q_6)b(Q6​) minors are Mengerian. Seymour shows that the second excluded minor is unnecessary, so a single small clutter is the only obstruction.

Setting

All sets are finite. A clutter L\mathbf LL is a finite collection of finite sets, no member of which is contained in another; ∅\emptyset∅ and {∅}\{\emptyset\}{∅} are the two trivial clutters. Its ground set is E(L)=⋃A∈LAE(\mathbf L)=\bigcup_{A\in\mathbf L}AE(L)=⋃A∈L​A. The blocker b(L)b(\mathbf L)b(L) is the collection of minimal subsets of E(L)E(\mathbf L)E(L) that meet every member of L\mathbf LL, and τ(L)\tau(\mathbf L)τ(L) is the minimum cardinality of a member of b(L)b(\mathbf L)b(L).

L\mathbf LL is Mengerian if L={∅}\mathbf L=\{\emptyset\}L={∅}, or if for every weight map w:E(L)→Z+w:E(\mathbf L)\to\mathbb Z^+w:E(L)→Z+ there is an integral packing q:L→Z+q:\mathbf L\to\mathbb Z^+q:L→Z+ with ∑A∋xq(A)≤w(x)\sum_{A\ni x}q(A)\le w(x)∑A∋x​q(A)≤w(x) for each x∈E(L)x\in E(\mathbf L)x∈E(L) and

∑A∈Lq(A)=min⁡B∈b(L)∑x∈Bw(x).\sum_{A\in\mathbf L}q(A)=\min_{B\in b(\mathbf L)}\sum_{x\in B}w(x).A∈L∑​q(A)=B∈b(L)min​x∈B∑​w(x).

For a set ZZZ, the deletion is L∖Z={A∈L:A∩Z=∅}\mathbf L\setminus Z=\{A\in\mathbf L:A\cap Z=\emptyset\}L∖Z={A∈L:A∩Z=∅} and the contraction L/Z\mathbf L/ZL/Z is the collection of minimal members of {A−Z:A∈L}\{A-Z:A\in\mathbf L\}{A−Z:A∈L} (minimal, not minimal nonempty). A minor of L\mathbf LL is any clutter obtained by a finite sequence of deletions and contractions.

A clutter is binary if ∣A∩B∣|A\cap B|∣A∩B∣ is odd for all A∈LA\in\mathbf LA∈L and B∈b(L)B\in b(\mathbf L)B∈b(L); this is condition (3.2)(ii) of the paper, which is equivalent to being a port of a binary matroid. Finally

Q6={{1,3,5},{1,4,6},{2,3,6},{2,4,5}},Q_6=\{\{1,3,5\},\{1,4,6\},\{2,3,6\},\{2,4,5\}\},Q6​={{1,3,5},{1,4,6},{2,3,6},{2,4,5}},

the triangles of K4K_4K4​ with its edges labelled 1,…,61,\dots,61,…,6.

For the structure theory, a circuit of a binary clutter is a minimal nonempty C⊆E(L)C\subseteq E(\mathbf L)C⊆E(L) with ∣C∩B∣|C\cap B|∣C∩B∣ even for every B∈b(L)B\in b(\mathbf L)B∈b(L); xxx and yyy are parallel when {x,y}\{x,y\}{x,y} is a circuit, and the point ⟨x⟩\langle x\rangle⟨x⟩ is the parallel class of xxx. With mb(L)={B∈b(L):∣B∣=τ(L)}mb(\mathbf L)=\{B\in b(\mathbf L):|B|=\tau(\mathbf L)\}mb(L)={B∈b(L):∣B∣=τ(L)}, L\mathbf LL is critical if E(mb(L))=E(L)E(mb(\mathbf L))=E(\mathbf L)E(mb(L))=E(L). In a critical binary clutter, x→yx\to yx→y means that every member of mb(L)mb(\mathbf L)mb(L) containing xxx contains yyy while y∉⟨x⟩y\notin\langle x\rangley∈/⟨x⟩, and yyy is initial if no xxx has x→yx\to yx→y. MBC abbreviates "Mengerian binary clutter".

Formalization targets

Goal: Seymour's theorem (p. 209)

For every binary clutter L\mathbf LL,

L is Mengerian  ⟺  L has no minor isomorphic to Q6.\mathbf L\ \text{is Mengerian}\iff \mathbf L\ \text{has no minor isomorphic to } Q_6 .L is Mengerian⟺L has no minor isomorphic to Q6​.

Milestones

In the order the proof uses them:

  • (2.3) Every minor of a Mengerian clutter is Mengerian.
  • Section 1, p. 193. Q6Q_6Q6​ is not Mengerian. With (2.3) this is the "only if" direction.
  • (3.6)(i) Circuits of a binary clutter have at least two elements.
  • (3.6)(iii) If Z⊆E(L)Z\subseteq E(\mathbf L)Z⊆E(L) meets every member of b(L)b(\mathbf L)b(L) evenly, then ZZZ is a disjoint union of circuits. If it meets every member oddly, then ZZZ is a disjoint union of circuits and one member of L\mathbf LL.
  • (4.3) In a critical MBC, x→yx\to yx→y implies y↛xy\not\to xy→x.
  • (4.4) In a critical MBC, x→yx\to yx→y gives a circuit C∋x,yC\ni x,yC∋x,y with ∣C∣≥3|C|\ge3∣C∣≥3, z→yz\to yz→y for z∈C−{y}z\in C-\{y\}z∈C−{y}, and ∣B−(C−{y})∣≥τ(L)−1|B-(C-\{y\})|\ge\tau(\mathbf L)-1∣B−(C−{y})∣≥τ(L)−1 for B∈b(L)B\in b(\mathbf L)B∈b(L).
  • (4.5) In a critical MBC, a non-initial xxx lies on a circuit CCC with ∣C∣≥3|C|\ge3∣C∣≥3 whose other elements are initial and point to xxx, and ∣B∩(C−{x})∣≤1|B\cap(C-\{x\})|\le1∣B∩(C−{x})∣≤1 for B∈mb(L)B\in mb(\mathbf L)B∈mb(L).
  • (4.6) A nontrivial critical MBC has a member consisting of initial elements.
  • (5.1) A binary clutter with six elements x1,y1,x2,y2,x3,y3x_1,y_1,x_2,y_2,x_3,y_3x1​,y1​,x2​,y2​,x3​,y3​ whose only circuits are the three sets {xi,yi,xj,yj}\{x_i,y_i,x_j,y_j\}{xi​,yi​,xj​,yj​}, together with a member AAA that meets each pair {xi,yi}\{x_i,y_i\}{xi​,yi​} once and satisfies a minimality condition, has a Q6Q_6Q6​ minor.

Significance

The theorem is an excluded-minor characterization of the max-flow min-cut property. For binary clutters it decides exactly when the covering system Mx≥1Mx\ge1Mx≥1, x≥0x\ge0x≥0 has integral optimal primal and dual solutions for every integral cost vector, and it identifies Q6Q_6Q6​ as the single obstruction. Its matroid form (the Corollary, p. 220) states that for a matroid MMM the port Ω(M)\Omega(M)Ω(M) is Mengerian for every element Ω\OmegaΩ if and only if MMM is binary and has no F7∗F_7^*F7∗​ minor. Consequences discussed in the paper include the two-commodity setting of (3.5): the clutter of minimal edge sets joining sss to s′s's′ or ttt to t′t't′ is Mengerian exactly when the graph does not reduce to the configuration of its Figure 2. The theorem is also a basis for later work on ideal and Mengerian clutters, such as Cornuéjols' book Combinatorial Optimization: Packing and Covering (SIAM, 2001).

The result has been proved since 1977. To our knowledge no machine-checked proof exists. Mathlib at the pinned revision has matroids but no clutters, blockers, clutter minors, or matroids representable over GF(2). This mission builds that layer. The minor-closedness of the Mengerian property (2.3), the parity decomposition (3.6)(iii) and the structure theory of critical Mengerian binary clutters (4.3)–(4.6) are results in their own right and are useful beyond the main theorem.

Difficulty

The "only if" direction is short: minors of Mengerian clutters are Mengerian, and Q6Q_6Q6​ fails with unit weights. The "if" direction is, in the author's words, "very much harder". A natural first idea is to show directly, by LP duality, that the covering polyhedron of a Q6Q_6Q6​-free binary clutter is integral. This does not work: integrality of the polyhedron is the weak max-flow min-cut property, and Q6Q_6Q6​ itself has that property while not being Mengerian, so no argument that sees only fractional optima can separate the two cases. The paper's proof works with a minimal counterexample and derives the Q6Q_6Q6​ minor from the structure of critical Mengerian binary clutters in Section 4; its intermediate claims (5.2)–(5.39) hold only for that minimal counterexample, which is why they are not milestones here.

Formalization scope

Elements form a type α with decidable equality. A clutter is L : Finset (Finset α) with the clutter axiom as a hypothesis, E(L)E(\mathbf L)E(L) is the union of members, and deletion and contraction take an arbitrary finite set ZZZ. Weights www and packings qqq are N\mathbb NN-valued. The minimum in the Mengerian condition is expressed as "some B∈b(L)B\in b(\mathbf L)B∈b(L) of least weight has weight equal to the packing value", never as an infimum. {∅}\{\emptyset\}{∅} is Mengerian by the paper's convention, and τ({∅})\tau(\{\emptyset\})τ({∅}), which the paper leaves undefined, has the junk value 000 in Lean; every item reading τ\tauτ excludes {∅}\{\emptyset\}{∅} or is vacuous there. "Minor" is the reflexive–transitive closure of single deletions and contractions. "Has a Q6Q_6Q6​ minor" means that some minor equals the image of Q6Q_6Q6​ (on Fin 6, with the paper's labels shifted down by one) under an injective relabelling Fin 6 ↪ α. Binary clutters are defined by (3.2)(ii); the paper defines them as ports of binary matroids and quotes (3.2) [15, 28] for the equivalence, and Mathlib has no GF(2)-representable matroids at this revision. Circuits are defined intrinsically, which makes (3.6)(ii) hold by definition.

Four readings would change the theorem and are ruled out: real-valued packings qqq (the weak max-flow min-cut property, which Q6Q_6Q6​ has, so the goal would be false), a non-minimal blocker or one not restricted to E(L)E(\mathbf L)E(L), dropping the {∅}\{\emptyset\}{∅} exception, and reading "Q6Q_6Q6​ minor" as literal equality instead of isomorphism.

A complete development needs the blocker calculus ((2.1), (2.2), cited from [28] with proofs omitted), the parity theory of binary clutters, and the replication operation Lw\mathbf L_wLw​. The clutter layer (blocker, minors, Mengerian, binary, circuits) is reusable for later work on ideal clutters, Lehman's theorem and the Corollary's matroid form. Proofs of any milestone, of the helper facts b(b(L))=Lb(b(\mathbf L))=\mathbf Lb(b(L))=L, (2.1) and (2.2), and of the equivalences in (3.2) are welcome.

Selected references

  • P. D. Seymour, The Matroids with the Max-Flow Min-Cut Property, J. Combin. Theory Ser. B 23 (1977) 189–222. https://doi.org/10.1016/0095-8956(77)90031-4
  • J. Edmonds and D. R. Fulkerson, Bottleneck extrema, J. Combin. Theory 8 (1970) 299–306. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0021-9800(70)80083-7
  • L. R. Ford and D. R. Fulkerson, Maximal flow through a network, Canad. J. Math. 8 (1956) 399–404. https://doi.org/10.4153/CJM-1956-045-5
  • G. Cornuéjols, Combinatorial Optimization: Packing and Covering, CBMS-NSF Regional Conf. Ser. in Appl. Math. 74, SIAM, 2001. https://doi.org/10.1137/1.9780898717105
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Algorithmic Game TheoryMechanism DesignOptimization·Captain: mikedeng1

Algorithmic Mechanism Design VI: With Verification, the Compensation-and-Bonus Mechanism Is a Strongly Truthful Optimal ImplementationResearch Paper

Motivation

Scheduling tasks on machines owned by self-interested parties is the running example of Nisan and Ronen's Algorithmic Mechanism Design (Games and Economic Behavior 35, 2001), the paper that introduced the study of mechanisms whose allocation rule is an algorithm with a computational objective. Each machine (agent) privately knows how long it needs for each task; the designer wants to minimize the make-span, the completion time of the last machine, and can only influence the agents through payments.

Without further information the designer is in a weak position: the paper shows that no mechanism approximates the optimal make-span within a factor below 2 (Theorem 4.6), and that the natural truthful mechanism, MinWork, only achieves a factor nnn. Section 5 of the paper observes that in many applications the designer learns more than the agents' reports: it can pay after the work is done and observe how long each task actually took. It introduces mechanisms with verification and shows that, with this extra information, the make-span can be minimized exactly by a strongly truthful mechanism. This mission formalizes that result, Theorem 5.1, together with the steps of its proof and the participation variant, Theorem 5.4.

Setting

There are kkk tasks and nnn agents. The type of agent iii is the vector ti=(t1i,…,tki)t^i = (t^i_1,\dots,t^i_k)ti=(t1i​,…,tki​) of positive numbers, tjit^i_jtji​ being the least time in which agent iii can perform task jjj. An allocation xxx gives each task to one agent; xix^ixi is the set of tasks of agent iii. For a type vector ttt and for a vector t~\tilde tt~ of actual execution times the make-spans are

g(x,t)=max⁡i∑j∈xitji,g(x,t~)=max⁡i∑j∈xit~j.g(x,t) = \max_i \sum_{j\in x^i} t^i_j, \qquad g(x,\tilde t) = \max_i \sum_{j\in x^i} \tilde t_j .g(x,t)=imax​j∈xi∑​tji​,g(x,t~)=imax​j∈xi∑​t~j​.

A mechanism with verification is a pair (x,p)(x, p)(x,p). The allocation x(d)x(d)x(d) is computed from the agents' declarations d=(d1,…,dn)d = (d^1,\dots,d^n)d=(d1,…,dn) only. Each agent then performs its tasks, in any times t~j≥tji\tilde t_j \ge t^i_jt~j​≥tji​ it chooses, and the mechanism pays agent iii the amount pi(d,t~)p^i(d, \tilde t)pi(d,t~), which may depend on the declarations and on the observed actual times. Agent iii's utility is pi(d,t~)−∑j∈xit~jp^i(d,\tilde t) - \sum_{j \in x^i} \tilde t_jpi(d,t~)−∑j∈xi​t~j​. A strategy of agent iii therefore has two parts: a declaration did^idi and an execution plan eie^iei that says, for every allocation, how long the agent takes on each of its tasks.

A strategy is dominant if it maximizes the agent's utility against all declarations and all execution plans of the other agents. The mechanism is truthful if, for every agent and type, declaring the true type (with a suitable execution plan) is dominant, and strongly truthful if the only dominant strategy is to declare the true type and to execute every task in minimal time.

The Compensation-and-Bonus mechanism uses an optimal allocation algorithm x(⋅)x(\cdot)x(⋅) and pays

pi(d,t~)=∑j∈xi(d)t~j⏟compensation ci  − g(x(d),corri(x(d),d,t~))⏟bonus bi,p^i(d,\tilde t) = \underbrace{\sum_{j \in x^i(d)} \tilde t_j}_{\text{compensation } c^i} \;\underbrace{-\, g\big(x(d), \mathrm{corr}^i(x(d), d, \tilde t)\big)}_{\text{bonus } b^i},pi(d,t~)=compensation cij∈xi(d)∑​t~j​​​bonus bi−g(x(d),corri(x(d),d,t~))​​,

where the corrected time vector corri\mathrm{corr}^icorri lists agent iii's own tasks at their actual times and every other task at the time declared by the agent it was given to.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 5.1

For n≥2n \ge 2n≥2 agents and every optimal allocation algorithm (ties broken arbitrarily), the Compensation-and-Bonus mechanism is a strongly truthful implementation of task scheduling:

strongly truthfulandg(x(D),t~)≤min⁡yg(y,t) whenever every agent plays a dominant strategy for its true type.\text{strongly truthful} \quad\text{and}\quad g\big(x(D), \tilde t\big) \le \min_y g(y, t) \text{ whenever every agent plays a dominant strategy for its true type.}strongly truthfulandg(x(D),t~)≤ymin​g(y,t) whenever every agent plays a dominant strategy for its true type.

Milestones (proof of Claim 5.2)

  1. The utility of every agent equals its bonus.
  2. For every allocation, the bonus of agent iii is maximized by executing its tasks in minimal time.
  3. With t=(d−i,ti)t = (d^{-i}, t^i)t=(d−i,ti), for every declaration t′it'^it′i,
−g(x(t),corr∗(x(t),t))≥−g(x(t′i,d−i),corr∗(x(t′i,d−i),t)).-g\big(x(t), \mathrm{corr}^*(x(t), t)\big) \ge -g\big(x(t'^i, d^{-i}), \mathrm{corr}^*(x(t'^i, d^{-i}), t)\big).−g(x(t),corr∗(x(t),t))≥−g(x(t′i,d−i),corr∗(x(t′i,d−i),t)).
  1. Declaring the true type and executing in minimal time is dominant.
  2. Claim 5.2: the mechanism is strongly truthful.

Further target: Theorem 5.4

For n≥2n \ge 2n≥2 there is a strongly truthful mechanism with an optimal allocation algorithm that satisfies participation constraints: an agent that performs its tasks in its declared times never ends with negative utility.

Significance

The result. Theorem 5.1 shows that the lower bound of 2 for task scheduling (Theorem 4.6) is an artefact of the information structure, not of incentives as such: once execution times are observable, the exact optimum is achievable in dominant strategies, and the agents have a unique rational behaviour. The construction also isolates a general principle, used again in §5.6 of the paper: an agent paid by the global objective value, computed with the others' declarations, has the designer's incentives. Theorem 5.4 shows that the bonus can be shifted to make participation individually rational, which the plain mechanism violates (its bonus is negative).

Formalizing it. The theorem is proved in the paper, in a few lines, and has no machine-checked version. A formalization has to settle what the paper leaves informal: what a strategy with an execution part is, over which strategies of the others dominance is quantified, what "the only dominant strategy" demands of the execution plan on allocations that seem never to arise, and which hypotheses on the number of agents the uniqueness needs. The model built here is also the base of two companion missions of the same series (Compensation-and-Bonus with a non-optimal allocation algorithm, and the rounding mechanism with verification).

Difficulty

Truthfulness (milestones 1–4) is short once the model is right. The difficulty is uniqueness. For a misreport or a slow execution to be excluded, one must exhibit, for every alternative strategy, declarations of the other agents under which that strategy is strictly worse. The declarations must be positive, the optimal allocation algorithm breaks ties arbitrarily, and agent iii's slower execution only hurts it when agent iii is the bottleneck. The paper's proof dismisses this step with "clearly, … there are circumstances"; the naive reading ("the others declare +∞+\infty+∞ elsewhere") is not available in a model with finite positive times, and the uniqueness clause must also cover the execution plan on every allocation, not only on the allocation produced by truthful play.

Formalization scope

  • Agents are Fin n, tasks Fin k, allocations functions Fin k → Fin n; both make-spans are Finset.sup' over the nonempty set of agents ([NeZero n]).
  • Types and declarations are positive real vectors; declarations range over this type space (Definition 18's "unrestricted" declaration is any element of it).
  • An execution plan is a function from allocations to actual times; feasibility for type tit^iti requires t~j≥tji\tilde t_j \ge t^i_jt~j​≥tji​ on the agent's own tasks only. In the dominance quantifier the other agents' plans are arbitrary.
  • Payments are amounts handed to the agent; utility is quasi-linear.
  • The optimal allocation algorithm is a parameter with the hypothesis that it minimizes g(⋅,d)g(\cdot, d)g(⋅,d) on every positive ddd; every theorem holds for every such algorithm.
  • Strong truthfulness constrains both parts of the strategy: the declaration equals the type, and the plan executes every task in minimal time under every allocation.
  • Thresholds made explicit: n≥2n \ge 2n≥2 in Claim 5.2, Theorem 5.1 and Theorem 5.4 (not printed; with one agent every declaration is dominant, and the construction of Theorem 5.4 needs a second agent).
  • Printed slips: the displayed inequality prints >=; Theorem 5.4 prints "strongly truthfulmechanism"; Definition 28 writes t~j=tj\tilde t_j = t_jt~j​=tj​ for t~j=tji\tilde t_j = t^i_jt~j​=tji​.
  • Running time is out of scope.
  • A formalization in which dominance is checked only against truthful other agents, in which the mechanism ignores executions, in which strong truthfulness constrains only the declaration, or in which the implementation clause is stated only at the truthful profile, is not the theorem and is ruled out by the statements.

Welcome contributions: proofs of the milestones, the uniqueness witnesses as reusable lemmas, and the contribution-based mechanism behind Theorem 5.4. Theorem 5.3 (generalized Compensation-and-Bonus) is not stated in this mission.

Selected references

  • N. Nisan, A. Ronen, Algorithmic Mechanism Design, Games and Economic Behavior 35 (2001) 166–196. https://doi.org/10.1006/game.1999.0790
  • T. Groves, Incentives in Teams, Econometrica 41 (1973) 617–631. https://doi.org/10.2307/1914085
  • A. Mas-Colell, M. D. Whinston, J. R. Green, Microeconomic Theory, Oxford University Press, 1995.
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Algorithmic Game TheoryMechanism DesignOptimization+1·Captain: mikedeng1

Algorithmic Mechanism Design V: The Randomly Biased Min Work Mechanism Is a Strongly Truthful 7/4-Approximation for Two AgentsResearch Paper

Motivation

Algorithmic mechanism design, introduced by Nisan and Ronen (Games Econ. Behav. 35, 2001), studies optimization problems whose input is held by self-interested agents. Each agent reports its private data to a protocol, and the protocol must choose an output and payments so that reporting the truth is in every agent's interest while the chosen output is close to optimal.

The paper's test case is task scheduling on unrelated machines: kkk tasks must be assigned to nnn agents, agent iii needs time tjit^i_jtji​ for task jjj, and the goal is to minimize the make-span. For deterministic mechanisms the paper shows that truthfulness is costly: the MinWork mechanism achieves ratio nnn, and no mechanism achieves a ratio below 222 (Theorem 4.6). Section 4.4 asks whether randomization helps and answers yes for two agents: a randomized mechanism, truthful for every outcome of its coins, achieves expected ratio 7/4<27/4 < 27/4<2.

Timeline.

  • 1979: Roberts characterizes weighted (affine) maximizers; the weighted Vickrey–Groves–Clarke (VGC) mechanisms are truthful.
  • 1999: Lehmann supplies the case analysis that improves the authors' original bound of 1.8231.8231.823 to 7/47/47/4 (acknowledged on p. 182).
  • 2001: Nisan and Ronen publish the randomly biased min work mechanism and Theorem 4.16.

Setting

There are two agents, 111 and 222, and kkk tasks. A type vector t=(t1,t2)t = (t^1, t^2)t=(t1,t2) gives, for each agent iii and task jjj, the positive time tjit^i_jtji​ agent iii needs for task jjj. An allocation xxx assigns each task to one agent; xix^ixi is the set of tasks of agent iii. The make-span of xxx is

g(x,t)=max⁡i∈{1,2}∑j∈xitji.g(x, t) = \max_{i \in \{1,2\}} \sum_{j \in x^i} t^i_j .g(x,t)=i∈{1,2}max​j∈xi∑​tji​.

A direct mechanism receives declared types ddd and returns an allocation x(d)x(d)x(d) and payments pi(d)p^i(d)pi(d) handed to the agents. Agent iii with true type tit^iti gets utility pi(d)−∑j∈xi(d)tjip^i(d) - \sum_{j \in x^i(d)} t^i_jpi(d)−∑j∈xi(d)​tji​. The mechanism is truthful if declaring the true type maximizes an agent's utility whatever the other agent declares, and strongly truthful if in addition every false declaration is strictly worse for some declaration of the other agent.

A randomized mechanism is a probability distribution over deterministic mechanisms; its objective is the expected make-span. It is universally truthful if every mechanism in its support is truthful, and universally strongly truthful if moreover truth-telling is the only strategy dominant in every mechanism of the support.

The biased min work mechanism with parameters β≥1\beta \ge 1β≥1 and s∈{1,2}ks \in \{1,2\}^ks∈{1,2}k treats each task jjj separately. With i=sji = s_ji=sj​ the favoured agent and i′=3−ii' = 3 - ii′=3−i the other: if tji≤β⋅tji′t^i_j \le \beta \cdot t^{i'}_jtji​≤β⋅tji′​, task jjj goes to iii, who is paid β⋅tji′\beta \cdot t^{i'}_jβ⋅tji′​; otherwise it goes to i′i'i′, who is paid β−1⋅tji\beta^{-1} \cdot t^i_jβ−1⋅tji​. The randomly biased min work mechanism draws sss uniformly from {1,2}k\{1,2\}^k{1,2}k and uses β=4/3\beta = 4/3β=4/3. Its expected make-span is

Es g(xs(t),t)=12k∑s∈{1,2}kg(xs(t),t).\mathbb{E}_s\, g(x_s(t), t) = \frac{1}{2^k} \sum_{s \in \{1,2\}^k} g(x_s(t), t).Es​g(xs​(t),t)=2k1​s∈{1,2}k∑​g(xs​(t),t).

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 4.16

For every kkk: the randomly biased min work mechanism is universally strongly truthful, and for every positive type vector ttt and every allocation yyy,

12k∑s∈{1,2}kg(xs(t),t)≤74 g(y,t).\frac{1}{2^k} \sum_{s \in \{1,2\}^k} g(x_s(t), t) \le \frac74\, g(y, t).2k1​s∈{1,2}k∑​g(xs​(t),t)≤47​g(y,t).

Milestones

  • Theorem 3.2 (Roberts): for positive weights βi\beta^iβi, a mechanism whose output maximizes ∑iβivi(ti,o)\sum_i \beta^i v^i(t^i, o)∑i​βivi(ti,o) and whose payments are pi=1βi∑j≠iβjvj(tj,o)+hi(t−i)p^i = \frac{1}{\beta^i}\sum_{j \ne i}\beta^j v^j(t^j, o) + h^i(t^{-i})pi=βi1​∑j=i​βjvj(tj,o)+hi(t−i) is truthful.
  • Lemma 4.15: for every β≥1\beta \ge 1β≥1 and every sss, the biased min work mechanism is strongly truthful.
  • Lemma 4.17: the randomly biased min work mechanism is universally strongly truthful.
  • Claim 4.19, part 5: allocating two tasks independently at random gives an expected make-span no larger than allocating their merge at random.
  • Reduced case (Fig. 2, Cases 1–3): for a,b,c,d≥0a, b, c, d \ge 0a,b,c,d≥0 with a+c=43b+da + c = \frac43 b + da+c=34​b+d,
14(max⁡(a+b+c+43d,0)+max⁡(a+b+c,d)+max⁡(a+b+43d,43c)+max⁡(a+b,43c+d))≤74(a+c).\tfrac14\Big(\max(a+b+c+\tfrac43 d, 0) + \max(a+b+c, d) + \max(a+b+\tfrac43 d, \tfrac43 c) + \max(a+b, \tfrac43 c + d)\Big) \le \tfrac74 (a+c).41​(max(a+b+c+34​d,0)+max(a+b+c,d)+max(a+b+34​d,34​c)+max(a+b,34​c+d))≤47​(a+c).
  • Lemma 4.18: the 7/47/47/4 bound on the expected make-span.

Significance

The result. Theorem 4.16 separates randomized from deterministic truthful mechanisms for scheduling two unrelated machines: 7/47/47/4 against the deterministic lower bound of 222. The notion of truthfulness it uses is the strong one, dominance for every coin outcome, so the separation does not rest on agents being risk-neutral or knowing the distribution. Later work on truthful randomized scheduling, and on the gap between deterministic and randomized truthful mechanisms, starts from this construction.

Formalizing it. The theorem is proved in the paper; no machine-checked proof of it is known. A formalization produces a checked definition of universal truthfulness for randomized mechanisms, a checked weighted VGC theorem usable for any affine-maximizer mechanism, and a checked version of the reduction argument (Claim 4.19), which the paper states in five informal instance transformations, one of them a limiting argument.

Difficulty

Truthfulness reduces to one task at a time, where the mechanism is a weighted VGC mechanism; the difficulty lies in the approximation bound. A naive task-by-task comparison with the optimum fails: the bound is on a maximum of two loads averaged over 2k2^k2k coin vectors, and the maximum does not decompose over tasks. The paper reduces an arbitrary instance to four tasks through transformations that each move the ratio in one direction, and the reduced instance still needs a three-way case analysis. Making the reduction rigorous is the main work: part 1 of Claim 4.19 replaces a ratio "arbitrarily close to β\betaβ" by β\betaβ, and under the mechanism's tie rule a task with ratio exactly β\betaβ is allocated by the coin rather than to the efficient agent.

Formalization scope

  • Agents are Fin 2 (agent 111 is 0, agent 222 is 1); the other agent is other i = 1 - i. Tasks are Fin k; allocations are functions Fin k → Fin 2. The statements hold for every kkk, including k=0k = 0k=0.
  • Types are positive: every truthfulness quantifier ranges over positive declarations, true types and misreports, and the approximation bound is stated on positive type vectors. The reduced-case and merging milestones are pure real inequalities with nonnegative times, since the paper represents missing tasks by zero times.
  • Payments are handed to the agent; utility is quasi-linear.
  • The make-span is a finite maximum (Finset.sup') over the two agents. The expected make-span is the average over all 2k2^k2k vectors sss, which is exactly the expectation of Definition 15 for the uniform distribution; no measure theory is used.
  • Universal (strong) truthfulness quantifies over all s∈{1,2}ks \in \{1,2\}^ks∈{1,2}k, the support of the uniform distribution. Truthfulness in expectation over sss is weaker and is not the notion stated.
  • The tie rule of Fig. 1 (≤\le≤: ties go to the favoured agent) is kept.
  • The goal fixes β=4/3\beta = 4/3β=4/3; only Lemma 4.15 is stated for every β≥1\beta \ge 1β≥1. The ratio is compared with every allocation yyy, not with one fixed allocation, and the average is over all sss, not the best sss.
  • Roberts' theorem is stated for arbitrary output sets, type sets and valuations, with positive weights.
  • "Polynomial time computable" in Theorem 4.16 is not formalized; running time is out of scope.
  • Claim 4.19 (the reduction to the four-task case) is not a separate item beyond its part 5, because its parts are instance transformations with a limiting step, not a single statement; a solver may formalize the reduction in any form that proves Lemma 4.18.

Contributions welcome: proofs of the milestones, and reusable lemmas on averages of maxima over product coin spaces.

Selected references

  • N. Nisan, A. Ronen, Algorithmic Mechanism Design, Games and Economic Behavior 35 (2001) 166–196. https://doi.org/10.1006/game.1999.0790
  • K. Roberts, The characterization of implementable choice rules, in J.-J. Laffont (ed.), Aggregation and Revelation of Preferences, North-Holland, 1979, pp. 321–349.
  • T. Groves, Incentives in teams, Econometrica 41 (1973) 617–631. https://doi.org/10.2307/1914085
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Algorithmic Game TheoryMechanism DesignOptimization·Captain: mikedeng1

Algorithmic Mechanism Design IV: No Local Truthful Mechanism Achieves a c-Approximation for Task Scheduling for Any c < nResearch Paper

Motivation

Nisan and Ronen's Algorithmic Mechanism Design (Games and Economic Behavior 35, 2001) asks how well a computational task can be carried out when its inputs are held by self-interested agents who may lie about them. Their test case is scheduling on unrelated machines: tasks must be assigned to agents (machines), each agent privately knows how long it needs for each task, and the planner wants to minimize the time at which the last agent finishes. The paper shows that the mechanism MinWork, which gives each task to the fastest agent and pays it the second-fastest time, is truthful and loses a factor of at most nnn against the optimum, and that no truthful mechanism can do better than a factor 222. It then conjectures (Conjecture 4.9) that the factor nnn cannot be improved by any truthful mechanism.

That conjecture became the Nisan–Ronen conjecture, one of the central questions of algorithmic mechanism design. A sequence of papers raised the general lower bound from 222 to 1+21 + \sqrt 21+2​ (Christodoulou, Koutsoupias and Vidali), to 1+φ≈2.6181 + \varphi \approx 2.6181+φ≈2.618 (Koutsoupias and Vidali) and to larger constants, and Christodoulou, Koutsoupias and Kovács (STOC 2023) finally proved the conjecture for all deterministic truthful mechanisms. In the original paper, Nisan and Ronen confirm the conjecture for two restricted classes of mechanisms, with short direct arguments. This mission concerns the second class, local mechanisms (Theorem 4.12).

Setting

There are kkk tasks j∈{1,…,k}j \in \{1, \dots, k\}j∈{1,…,k} and nnn agents i∈{1,…,n}i \in \{1, \dots, n\}i∈{1,…,n}. A type vector ttt records, for every agent iii and task jjj, the positive time tjit^i_jtji​ agent iii needs for task jjj. An allocation xxx assigns every task to one agent; xix^ixi is the set of tasks of agent iii. For a set XXX of tasks write ti(X)=∑j∈Xtjit^i(X) = \sum_{j \in X} t^i_jti(X)=∑j∈X​tji​. The make-span of xxx is g(x,t)=max⁡iti(xi)g(x, t) = \max_i t^i(x^i)g(x,t)=maxi​ti(xi).

A direct mechanism (x,p)(x, p)(x,p) asks every agent for its type, computes an allocation x(t)x(t)x(t) from the declarations, and hands agent iii the payment pi(t)p^i(t)pi(t). Agent iii's utility is pi(t)−ti(xi(t))p^i(t) - t^i(x^i(t))pi(t)−ti(xi(t)) measured with its true times. The mechanism is truthful if declaring the true type maximizes each agent's utility whatever the other agents declare. The allocation rule is a ccc-approximation if g(x(t),t)≤c⋅g(y,t)g(x(t), t) \le c \cdot g(y, t)g(x(t),t)≤c⋅g(y,t) for every type vector ttt and every allocation yyy.

For a truthful mechanism the payment to agent iii depends only on the set it receives and on the declarations t−it^{-i}t−i of the others (Proposition 4.4). This gives the price offered to agent iii for a set XXX (Definition 12):

pi(X,t−i)={pi(t′i,t−i)if some t′i gives xi(t′i,t−i)=X,0otherwise.p^i(X, t^{-i}) = \begin{cases} p^i(t'^i, t^{-i}) & \text{if some } t'^i \text{ gives } x^i(t'^i, t^{-i}) = X, \\ 0 & \text{otherwise.} \end{cases}pi(X,t−i)={pi(t′i,t−i)0​if some t′i gives xi(t′i,t−i)=X,otherwise.​

A mechanism is local (Definition 14) if pi(X,t−i)p^i(X, t^{-i})pi(X,t−i) depends only on the other agents' times {tjl:l≠i,j∈X}\{t^l_j : l \ne i, j \in X\}{tjl​:l=i,j∈X} on the tasks of XXX. MinWork is local: its price for XXX is ∑j∈Xmin⁡l≠itjl\sum_{j \in X} \min_{l \ne i} t^l_j∑j∈X​minl=i​tjl​.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 4.12

For every n≥1n \ge 1n≥1, every k≥n2k \ge n^2k≥n2 and every real c<nc < nc<n, no truthful local mechanism is a ccc-approximation:

∀(x,p) truthful and local, ∀c<n:∃ t, yg(x(t),t)>c⋅g(y,t).\forall (x, p) \text{ truthful and local},\ \forall c < n:\quad \exists\, t,\ y \quad g(x(t), t) > c \cdot g(y, t).∀(x,p) truthful and local, ∀c<n:∃t, yg(x(t),t)>c⋅g(y,t).

The bound holds for every c<nc < nc<n, so together with MinWork it shows that nnn is the exact best ratio for local truthful mechanisms.

Milestones

  1. Proposition 4.4 (Independence). Payments depend only on the allocated set and on t−it^{-i}t−i.
  2. Proposition 4.5 (Maximization). xi(t)x^i(t)xi(t) maximizes pi(X,t−i)−ti(X)p^i(X, t^{-i}) - t^i(X)pi(X,t−i)−ti(X) over the sets XXX that agent iii can obtain.
  3. Lemma 4.13. Every type vector has type vectors arbitrarily close to it at which each agent's maximizing set is unique.
  4. Claim 4.14, first step. If xi(t)x^i(t)xi(t) is the unique maximizer, lowering agent iii's times on xi(t)x^i(t)xi(t) keeps xi(t)x^i(t)xi(t).
  5. Ratio step. An allocation that gives one agent nnn tasks of time about 111, while every other agent's own tasks are nearly free, has make-span about nnn, while splitting those nnn tasks gives make-span about 111.

Significance

The result. Theorem 4.12 settles the Nisan–Ronen conjecture for a natural class of mechanisms. Locality captures the mechanisms in which the price for a bundle of tasks is set only by the competition for those tasks. It includes MinWork and, more generally, every mechanism that prices tasks separately using the other agents' bids on them. The theorem says that for this class the trivial per-task auction is already optimal, so any improvement over the ratio nnn must use prices that depend on the other agents' times on tasks outside the bundle.

Formalizing it. The statement is not open: it follows from the 2023 proof of the Nisan–Ronen conjecture, and Nisan and Ronen's own argument is much shorter. That argument is a sketch, though. Lemma 4.13 rests on an informal measure-theoretic appeal, and the core claim relies on a maximization property stated over all sets of tasks. A machine-checked proof pins down exactly which properties of truthful mechanisms the short argument needs. None of these results is known to have been formalized. The definitions (type vectors, truthful mechanisms, prices, locality) are shared with the other missions of this series.

Difficulty

An argument that looks at one agent at a time does not go through. Changing one agent's declaration changes the prices offered to every other agent, so an allocation that is stable for one agent can shift for another. The argument needs a type vector at which every agent's choice is strict, and only then can it lower times agent by agent and follow the allocation. Producing such a type vector is Lemma 4.13. The printed argument for it applies a "for almost every type vector" statement to sets defined by the price functions of an arbitrary mechanism, which need not be measurable. A proof must therefore work without any regularity of the mechanism. A second difficulty is Definition 12's convention that a set the agent cannot obtain has price 000. Locality constrains these zero prices too, and the argument has to account for sets that are obtainable at one type vector and not at a nearby one.

Formalization scope

Agents are Fin n, tasks Fin k. An allocation is a function Fin k → Fin n, a type vector is Fin n → Fin k → ℝ, and a mechanism is a pair of functions alloc (declarations to allocation) and pay (declarations to the payment handed to each agent). Utilities are quasi-linear. All types, declarations and misreports are positive, and every truthfulness, locality and approximation quantifier ranges over positive type vectors. The make-span is a Finset.sup' over the nonempty set of agents ([NeZero n]).

Conventions and explicit thresholds:

  • k≥n2k \ge n^2k≥n2. The theorem is printed without a bound on the number of tasks, and its proof begins "Let k≥n2k \ge n^2k≥n2". The goal carries k≥n2k \ge n^2k≥n2 as a hypothesis.
  • Truthfulness is assumed. §4.3 assumes throughout that the mechanism is truthful (by the revelation principle this is no loss). The goal quantifies over all truthful local mechanisms.
  • Prices use Definition 12 literally, including the value 000 for sets the agent cannot obtain, and locality is Definition 14 applied to that price function over all sets XXX, not only single tasks. When several declarations give the same set, the price uses one chosen witness; by Proposition 4.4 the choice does not matter for truthful mechanisms.
  • Proposition 4.5 is stated over the sets the agent can obtain. As printed, over all subsets, it is false for a truthful mechanism that never leaves an agent idle and pays it negative amounts. Uniqueness of maximizers (Lemma 4.13, Claim 4.14) refers to the same family.
  • Lemma 4.13 uses Mathlib's norm on Fin n → Fin k → ℝ, the sup norm. No measurability of the mechanism is assumed.
  • Claim 4.14 is printed at tji=1t^i_j = 1tji​=1 with 0<ε<10 < \varepsilon < 10<ε<1. The first step is stated at any type vector, with 0<ε≤tji0 < \varepsilon \le t^i_j0<ε≤tji​ on the lowered tasks.
  • Running time and computability are out of scope.

Ruled-out trivializations: locality is not restricted to single tasks; the goal does not assume that maximizers are unique at every type vector (that is Lemma 4.13's conclusion at one point, not a hypothesis); and the bound holds for every c<nc < nc<n, not for some.

Needed infrastructure: finite sums over allocation fibres, sup norms on function spaces, and a genericity argument for finitely many affine functions (Lemma 4.13). The model file and the price and locality definitions are reusable in the other missions of the series. Proofs of individual milestones are welcome independently.

Selected references

  • N. Nisan, A. Ronen, Algorithmic Mechanism Design, Games and Economic Behavior 35 (2001) 166–196. https://doi.org/10.1006/game.1999.0790
  • A. Mas-Colell, M. D. Whinston, J. R. Green, Microeconomic Theory, Oxford University Press, 1995 (pp. 876–880, basic properties of truthful mechanisms).
  • G. Christodoulou, E. Koutsoupias, A. Vidali, A lower bound for scheduling mechanisms, Algorithmica 55 (2009).
  • E. Koutsoupias, A. Vidali, A lower bound of 1+φ for truthful scheduling mechanisms, Algorithmica 66 (2013).
  • G. Christodoulou, E. Koutsoupias, A. Kovács, A proof of the Nisan–Ronen conjecture, STOC 2023.
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Algorithmic Game TheoryMechanism DesignOptimization·Captain: mikedeng1

Algorithmic Mechanism Design II: A Lower Bound for Truthful Task SchedulingResearch Paper

Motivation

Algorithms deployed on the Internet often take their inputs from parties who own them and who may lie when lying pays. Nisan and Ronen's Algorithmic Mechanism Design (Games and Economic Behavior 35, 2001) proposed studying optimization problems in this setting: the algorithm designer may hand out payments, and must guarantee that the intended output is produced when every participant acts in its own interest. The paper's central test case is scheduling on unrelated machines, a standard problem of combinatorial optimization, in which the machines are the selfish participants and only they know how long each job takes them.

For this problem the paper shows that incentives cost a factor of two at least: with two or more machines, no mechanism can guarantee a make-span below twice the optimum. This was the first lower bound separating what incentive-compatible mechanisms can achieve from what ordinary approximation algorithms can achieve, and it started a line of work on the "Nisan–Ronen conjecture" (that the right factor for nnn machines is nnn), with improved lower bounds by Christodoulou, Koutsoupias and Vidali (Algorithmica, 2009) and by Koutsoupias and Vidali (Algorithmica, 2013), and a resolution announced by Christodoulou, Koutsoupias and Kovács (STOC 2023).

Setting

There are nnn agents (machines) i=1,…,ni = 1,\dots,ni=1,…,n and kkk tasks j=1,…,kj = 1,\dots,kj=1,…,k. Agent iii's private type is the vector ti=(t1i,…,tki)t^i = (t^i_1,\dots,t^i_k)ti=(t1i​,…,tki​) of positive real numbers, tjit^i_jtji​ being the time agent iii needs for task jjj; a type vector is t=(t1,…,tn)t = (t^1,\dots,t^n)t=(t1,…,tn). An allocation xxx assigns every task to one agent; xix^ixi is the set of tasks given to agent iii. For a set XXX of tasks write ti(X)=∑j∈Xtjit^i(X) = \sum_{j\in X} t^i_jti(X)=∑j∈X​tji​. The objective is the make-span

g(x,t)=max⁡iti(xi),g(x,t) = \max_{i} t^i(x^i),g(x,t)=imax​ti(xi),

and an allocation rule is a ccc-approximation if its make-span is at most ccc times that of every allocation, on every type vector.

A mechanism m=(o,p)m = (o,p)m=(o,p) gives each agent iii a set AiA^iAi of strategies. On a strategy profile a=(a1,…,an)a = (a^1,\dots,a^n)a=(a1,…,an) it outputs an allocation o(a)o(a)o(a) and hands agent iii a payment pi(a)p^i(a)pi(a). An agent of type tit^iti has utility pi(a)−ti(oi(a))p^i(a) - t^i(o^i(a))pi(a)−ti(oi(a)). A strategy is dominant if it maximizes the agent's utility whatever the others play. The mechanism implements a ccc-approximation if every agent of every type has a dominant strategy and every profile of dominant strategies yields a ccc-approximate allocation.

A direct mechanism (x,p)(x,p)(x,p) has AiA^iAi equal to the set of types, and is truthful if reporting the true type is dominant. For a truthful mechanism, the price pi(X,t−i)p^i(X,t^{-i})pi(X,t−i) is the payment agent iii receives when, against the others' reports t−it^{-i}t−i, some report of its own makes it receive exactly XXX (and 000 if none does); the price difference is Δi(A,B)=pi(A∪B,t−i)−pi(A,t−i)\Delta^i(A,B) = p^i(A\cup B,t^{-i}) - p^i(A,t^{-i})Δi(A,B)=pi(A∪B,t−i)−pi(A,t−i).

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 4.6

For every n≥2n\ge 2n≥2, k≥3k\ge3k≥3 and c<2c<2c<2, no mechanism with any strategy sets implements a ccc-approximation:

∀ (A,o,p):¬ Implements(o,p,c).\forall\, (A, o, p):\quad \neg\ \mathrm{Implements}(o,p,c).∀(A,o,p):¬ Implements(o,p,c).

Milestones

  1. Proposition 2.1 (revelation principle): a mechanism implementing a ccc-approximation yields a truthful direct mechanism whose allocation rule is a ccc-approximation.
  2. Theorem 4.6 for truthful mechanisms (§4.3): no truthful direct mechanism has a ccc-approximate allocation rule for c<2c<2c<2. With milestone 1 it gives the goal.
  3. Proposition 4.4 (independence): for a truthful mechanism, t1−i=t2−it_1^{-i}=t_2^{-i}t1−i​=t2−i​ and xi(t1)=xi(t2)x^i(t_1)=x^i(t_2)xi(t1​)=xi(t2​) imply pi(t1)=pi(t2)p^i(t_1)=p^i(t_2)pi(t1​)=pi(t2​).
  4. Proposition 4.5 (maximization): xi(t)x^i(t)xi(t) maximizes pi(X,t−i)−ti(X)p^i(X,t^{-i}) - t^i(X)pi(X,t−i)−ti(X) over attainable XXX.
  5. Lemma 4.7: the price-difference inequalities satisfied by xi(t)x^i(t)xi(t), and the uniqueness statement for sets satisfying them strictly.
  6. Claim 4.8: for two agents, all-ones types and 0<ε<10<\varepsilon<10<ε<1, moving agent 1's times to ε\varepsilonε on its own bundle and 1+ε1+\varepsilon1+ε elsewhere leaves the allocation unchanged.
  7. The even case of the ratio: at that perturbed instance the mechanism's make-span is ∣x2(t)∣|x^2(t)|∣x2(t)∣ while some allocation achieves 12∣x2(t)∣+kε\tfrac12|x^2(t)| + k\varepsilon21​∣x2(t)∣+kε.

Significance

The result. Theorem 4.6 shows that the requirement of dominant-strategy incentive compatibility, by itself, rules out approximation ratios below 222 for scheduling on unrelated machines, a problem for which polynomial-time 222-approximation algorithms that ignore incentives exist (Lenstra, Shmoys, Tardos 1990) and for which the exact optimum is computable in exponential time. Combined with the MinWork mechanism of the same paper (an nnn-approximation), it determines the optimal ratio for two machines. It is the base case of the Nisan–Ronen conjecture and the prototype of the "characterize truthful mechanisms by prices" technique used throughout later work on the conjecture.

Formalizing it. The theorem has been proved since 1999, but no machine-checked version is known to exist. The mission produces a formal account of general mechanisms with arbitrary strategy sets, dominant-strategy implementation, the revelation principle in that generality, and the price characterization of truthful mechanisms (independence and maximization). These are reusable for every other lower bound in this paper and for the later literature on the conjecture.

Difficulty

The statement quantifies over all mechanisms, with arbitrary strategy sets and arbitrary payment functions, so no finite search settles it. The revelation principle reduces to truthful direct mechanisms, but even these are an infinite-dimensional family: the allocation rule may break ties in any way, and prices may be any functions of the other agents' reports.

The printed argument also has two places that need care. Proposition 4.5 and Lemma 4.7, as printed, range over all sets of tasks, while Definition 12 gives unattainable sets price 000; the statements hold only over attainable sets, and are formalized that way. And the case where agent 2's bundle has odd size is dispatched in one sentence ("which still yields the same allocation"), which the preceding lemma does not justify when agent 2's best bundle at the perturbed prices is not unique. A complete formal proof of the goal must supply an argument for that case.

Formalization scope

  • Agents are Fin n, tasks Fin k; an allocation is a function Fin k → Fin n; bundles may be empty. The make-span is a finite maximum and assumes n≥1n\ge1n≥1 (NeZero n).
  • Types, declarations and misreports are strictly positive reals throughout (Definition 10). Utility is quasi-linear; payments are handed to the agent and may have either sign.
  • A general mechanism has strategy sets A : Fin n → Type u (any universe), output ooo and payments ppp on dependent strategy profiles. Implements requires both that every agent of every positive type has a dominant strategy and that every profile of dominant strategies yields a ccc-approximate allocation. Dominance is against every profile of the others, not only dominant ones. Without the existence clause, a mechanism with no dominant strategies would implement vacuously; the definition excludes that.
  • Thresholds made explicit: n≥2n\ge2n≥2 and k≥3k\ge3k≥3, both taken from the proof ("We prove the theorem for the case of two agents"; "Let k≥3k\ge3k≥3"). The goal holds for each fixed nnn and kkk and every c<2c<2c<2, for every mechanism, with no restriction on tie-breaking and no requirement of strong truthfulness. At n=1n=1n=1 the claim is false.
  • Proposition 2.1 is stated for task scheduling with the ccc-approximation specification; "truthful implementation" is read as truth-telling dominant and the truthful output ccc-approximate.
  • Printed slips: Proposition 4.5 and Lemma 4.7 are stated over attainable sets; the "Moreover" of Lemma 4.7 requires YYY attainable. The odd case of the ratio step is not a milestone.
  • The reduction from n>2n>2n>2 to two agents ("having the other agents be much slower") is not a separate milestone; the goal covers every n≥2n\ge2n≥2.
  • Running time ("polynomial-time computable") is out of scope and not modelled.

Contributions of any of the milestones are welcome, as are alternative proofs of the goal that avoid the terse odd case.

Selected references

  • N. Nisan, A. Ronen, Algorithmic Mechanism Design, Games and Economic Behavior 35 (2001) 166–196. https://doi.org/10.1006/game.1999.0790
  • A. Mas-Colell, M. D. Whinston, J. R. Green, Microeconomic Theory, Oxford University Press, 1995 (revelation principle, p. 871).
  • J. K. Lenstra, D. B. Shmoys, É. Tardos, Approximation algorithms for scheduling unrelated parallel machines, Mathematical Programming 46 (1990) 259–271. https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01585745
  • G. Christodoulou, E. Koutsoupias, A. Vidali, A lower bound for scheduling mechanisms, Algorithmica 55 (2009).
  • E. Koutsoupias, A. Vidali, A lower bound of 1+φ for truthful scheduling mechanisms, Algorithmica 66 (2013).
  • G. Christodoulou, E. Koutsoupias, A. Kovács, A proof of the Nisan–Ronen conjecture, STOC 2023.
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CombinatoricsDiscrete GeometryOptimization·Captain: Shuze Chen

Discrete Convex Analysis XIV: The König-Egerváry Theorem for Mixed MatricesTextbook

Motivation

Every physical or engineering model built from linear relations mixes two kinds of numbers. Some coefficients are exact — the ±1\pm 1±1 entries recording Kirchhoff's current and voltage laws in an electrical network, or the incidence structure of a mechanical linkage — because they come from a topological or combinatorial fact, not a measurement. Others are physical parameters: resistances, masses, spring constants, reaction rates. These are known only approximately, and different parameters are, for modeling purposes, independent of one another. Classical linear algebra treats every entry of a coefficient matrix alike, so it cannot express this distinction, and a numerical computation on a matrix with noisy parameter entries can accidentally hit a non-generic coincidence — a determinant that would vanish only for a measure-zero set of parameter values, but that plain Gaussian elimination has no way to certify is not actually structurally forced to vanish. Murota and collaborators (see the bibliographical notes to chapter 12; the underlying theory is developed at length in Murota's Matrices and Matroids for Systems Analysis, 2000) formalized this distinction through mixed matrices, and showed that their key structural questions — is the matrix nonsingular, and what is its rank — reduce to a combinatorial optimization problem solvable by the discrete convex analysis this book develops. This mission formalizes that reduction and its capstone consequence, a generalization of the classical König–Egerváry theorem.

Setting

Fix two fields K⊆FK \subseteq FK⊆F: typically K=QK = \mathbb{Q}K=Q and FFF a field large enough to hold every number in the problem. A family t1,…,tm∈Ft_1, \dots, t_m \in Ft1​,…,tm​∈F is algebraically independent over KKK if no nonzero polynomial with coefficients in KKK vanishes at (t1,…,tm)(t_1, \dots, t_m)(t1​,…,tm​) — informally, the tit_iti​ behave as free, unconstrained parameters relative to KKK. Fix finite row and column index sets RRR and CCC. A matrix A=(Aij)i∈R,j∈CA = (A_{ij})_{i \in R, j \in C}A=(Aij​)i∈R,j∈C​ over FFF is a mixed matrix with respect to (K,F)(K, F)(K,F) if it decomposes as

A=Q+TA = Q + TA=Q+T

where Q=(Qij)Q = (Q_{ij})Q=(Qij​) has every entry in KKK, and T=(Tij)T = (T_{ij})T=(Tij​) has entries in FFF whose nonzero values, taken together as one family, are algebraically independent over KKK. QQQ models the exact, structural part of the system; TTT models the independent physical parameters. For I⊆RI \subseteq RI⊆R and J⊆CJ \subseteq CJ⊆C, write A[I,J]A[I,J]A[I,J] for the submatrix with rows III and columns JJJ. The rank of AAA is its rank over FFF — equivalently, the size of the largest nonvanishing-determinant square submatrix. Write ρ(I,J)=rank⁡Q[I,J]\rho(I,J) = \operatorname{rank} Q[I,J]ρ(I,J)=rankQ[I,J], τ(I,J)=rank⁡T[I,J]\tau(I,J) = \operatorname{rank} T[I,J]τ(I,J)=rankT[I,J], and γ(I,J)\gamma(I,J)γ(I,J) for the number of rows of III that contain a nonzero entry of TTT in some column of JJJ. A mixed polynomial matrix A(s)=Q(s)+T(s)A(s) = Q(s) + T(s)A(s)=Q(s)+T(s) is the same decomposition applied entrywise to matrices whose entries are polynomials in an indeterminate sss (used to model the Laplace- or zzz-transform variable of a linear time-invariant system): Q(s)Q(s)Q(s) has every coefficient of every entry in KKK, and the coefficients of T(s)T(s)T(s)'s entries, taken together, are algebraically independent over KKK.

Formalization targets

Theorem 12.9 (goal).For a mixed matrix A=Q+T, ∃ I⊆R, J⊆C:∣I∣+∣J∣−rank⁡Q[I,J]=∣R∣+∣C∣−rank⁡A  and  rank⁡T[I,J]=0.\textbf{Theorem 12.9 (goal).}\quad \text{For a mixed matrix } A=Q+T,\ \exists\, I \subseteq R,\ J \subseteq C:\quad |I|+|J|-\operatorname{rank} Q[I,J] = |R|+|C|-\operatorname{rank} A \ \ \text{and}\ \ \operatorname{rank} T[I,J] = 0.Theorem 12.9 (goal).For a mixed matrix A=Q+T, ∃I⊆R, J⊆C:∣I∣+∣J∣−rankQ[I,J]=∣R∣+∣C∣−rankA  and  rankT[I,J]=0.

This is the König–Egerváry theorem for mixed matrices: a combinatorial certificate of AAA's rank deficiency, generalizing the classical theorem relating the maximum matching size of a bipartite graph (equivalently, the rank of a 0-1 matrix) to a minimum vertex cover. It is reached via three supporting results, each a genuine theorem in its own right: Proposition 12.6 (nonsingularity of AAA reduces to nonsingularity of a QQQ-part and a TTT-part on complementary index splits), Theorem 12.7 (the resulting rank max-formula), and Theorem 12.8 (the three dual min-formulas Theorem 12.9 is extracted from). Theorem 12.13 extends the max-formula to the degree of the determinant of a mixed polynomial matrix.

Significance

The result itself. Theorem 12.9 gives a certificate, not just a number: a pair (I,J)(I,J)(I,J) that simultaneously proves the exact numeric rank contribution of QQQ and exhibits a submatrix of TTT that vanishes identically. Because ρ\rhoρ (via Gaussian elimination on QQQ) and γ\gammaγ, τ\tauτ (via maximum bipartite matching on TTT's nonzero pattern) are each individually cheap to evaluate, and the min-max structure of Theorem 12.8 is exactly the kind of problem Edmonds's matroid intersection theorem (a special case of this book's Theorem 4.18) and this book's discrete convexity machinery solve efficiently, the whole rank computation for a mixed matrix — and hence the generic solvability test for a physical system modeled by one — is polynomial-time, despite Theorem 12.7's formula naively ranging over exponentially many index-set pairs.

Formalizing it. All five results in this mission are proved in the source text (this is textbook, not open, mathematics). What formalization adds is a machine-checked confirmation that the genericity hypothesis — "the nonzero entries of TTT are algebraically independent" — is precisely what the printed proofs use, expressed through Mathlib's own AlgebraicIndependent rather than an informal paraphrase such as "generic" or "random" values, which would be either meaningless or a different (probabilistic) condition.

Difficulty

The naive approach to testing whether A=Q+TA = Q+TA=Q+T is nonsingular is to expand det⁡A\det AdetA directly and check whether the resulting expression, as a polynomial in TTT's free parameters, is the zero polynomial. This is exactly what genericity is supposed to let you avoid: Proposition 12.6's proof observes that the Laplace-type expansion det⁡A=∑∣I∣=∣J∣±det⁡Q[I,J]⋅det⁡T[R∖I,C∖J]\det A = \sum_{|I|=|J|} \pm \det Q[I,J] \cdot \det T[R\setminus I, C\setminus J]detA=∑∣I∣=∣J∣​±detQ[I,J]⋅detT[R∖I,C∖J] has no cancellation between distinct terms, precisely because the nonzero entries of TTT are algebraically independent — a coincidental cancellation would be a nontrivial polynomial relation among free parameters, which cannot happen. This turns a determinant computation with symbolic entries into a purely combinatorial search over row/column splits, each of whose two pieces is checked in the "easy" arithmetic appropriate to it (numeric determinant for QQQ, a nonzero-pattern-only matching argument for TTT). Missing this point — e.g. by treating TTT's entries as merely "distinct" or "typically nonzero" rather than algebraically independent — reintroduces exactly the cancellation risk the theorem is built to rule out.

Formalization scope

Row and column index sets RRR, CCC are general finite types (Fintype, with DecidableEq where needed for Finset operations), not fixed to Fin n\mathrm{Fin}\ nFin n. No constant appears in any statement in this mission — every quantity (ranks, cardinalities, γ\gammaγ) is instance-dependent, so rule 7's explicit-constant obligation does not apply here. "Nonsingular" for a (possibly rectangular, cross-type-indexed) submatrix M[I,J]M[I,J]M[I,J] is formalized as I.card = J.card together with rank M[I,J] = I.card (full rank) rather than via Matrix.det, because Mathlib's determinant requires both index sets to be the same Lean type, which I : Finset R and J : Finset C are not in general even when equinumerous; this coincides with ordinary nonsingularity whenever the ambient matrix is genuinely square. The degree of the determinant of a submatrix in Theorem 12.13 is computed the same way, via an arbitrary reindexing bijection between the row- and column-index subtypes — a choice that changes the determinant by at most a sign and hence never changes its degree. A formalization that replaced the genericity hypothesis on TTT with mere distinctness of its nonzero entries would admit spurious cancellations in the determinant expansion and would not prove Proposition 12.6 or any of its consequences; AlgebraicIndependent K is the precise, non-trivializing condition the book's proofs use. This chapter is self-contained: no definitions from any other mission in this series are imported. Reusable beyond this mission: MatrixSubRank, IsNonsingularSub, and SubDegDet apply to any pair of matrices over any field, not only to mixed-matrix decompositions.

Selected references

  • Murota, K. Discrete Convex Analysis. SIAM, 2003. DOI: 10.1137/1.9780898718508. (Chapter 12.)
  • Murota, K. Matrices and Matroids for Systems Analysis. Springer, 2000.
  • Murota, K. "Systems Analysis by Graphs and Matroids: Structural Solvability and Controllability." Springer, 1987.
  • König, D. "Gráfok és mátrixok" (Graphs and matrices). Matematikai és Fizikai Lapok 38, 1931, 116–119.
  • Egerváry, J. "Matrixok kombinatorius tulajdonságairól" (On combinatorial properties of matrices). Matematikai és Fizikai Lapok 38, 1931, 16–28.
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Convex OptimizationDiscrete GeometryOptimization·Captain: Shuze Chen

Discrete Convex Analysis XXXIV: Conjugate ScalingTextbook

Motivation

This mission continues chapter 10's algorithmic account across its remaining two sections: finishing the Iwata-Fleischer-Fujishige fixing algorithm for submodular minimization (§10.2.3's tail), the steepest descent algorithm for L-convex function minimization (§10.3), and — the capstone of chapter 10's account of the M-convex submodular flow problem (§10.4) — conjugate scaling, the operation that finally makes the primal-dual algorithm run in polynomial time. As in mission 34-ch10b-algorithms, most of this block's numbered results are asymptotic complexity bounds; this mission places the results that are ordinary mathematical propositions.

Setting

The IFF fixing algorithm (mission 34-ch10b-algorithms) builds an acyclic graph D=(U,F) and partition Z,H,Γ certifying the maximal minimizer of a submodular ρ once η≤0 (Eq. (10.26)); this mission places the case-independent inequality its own legitimacy rests on, and restates its correctness conclusion. The steepest descent algorithm for an L-convex function g repeatedly minimizes the submodular set function ρ_p(X)=g(p+χ_X)-g(p) and moves to p+χ_X for its minimal minimizer X (the tie-breaking rule (10.33)); this mission places the resulting monotonicity fact and a domain-size bound for the L♮^\natural♮-convex adaptation. Conjugate scaling replaces a dual-integral M-convex function's conjugate g with g_α(p)=g(αp)/α, defining f⟨α⟩ via the resulting sup-formula (Eq. (10.77)) — a scaling operation compatible with M-convexity where the naive ⌈f(·)/α⌉ is not.

Formalization targets

Goal: Conjugate scaling preserves M-convexity (Proposition 10.41)

For a dual-integral polyhedral M-convex function f (represented as the mixed real-primal/ integer-dual conjugate of an L♮^\natural♮-convex g), the conjugate scaling f⟨α⟩ is again dual-integral M-convex, witnessed by g_α itself being L♮^\natural♮-convex, provided f⟨α⟩>-∞. Chosen as goal: this is the fact the whole conjugate scaling algorithm — chapter 10's final and most refined algorithm for the M-convex submodular flow problem — depends on, and the book's own text singles it out as the "compatible scaling operation" that makes M-convex cost scaling work where a naive approach provably does not.

Supporting structural targets

Proposition 10.26 (the case-independent inequality underlying the IFF fixing algorithm's own legitimacy) and Proposition 10.28 (that algorithm's correctness conclusion) close out mission 34-ch10b-algorithms's coverage of §10.2.3. Proposition 10.30 gives the steepest descent algorithm's monotonicity property under its tie-breaking rule; Proposition 10.32 (found by direct reading) bounds the L♮^\natural♮-convex adaptation's domain-size parameter in terms of the original function's.

Significance

Conjugate scaling is chapter 10's demonstration that M-convexity, while a combinatorial rather than a numeric-magnitude notion, still admits a genuine scaling technique compatible with its own structure — completing the book's account of the M-convex submodular flow problem with an algorithm whose polynomial running time depends on exactly this compatibility. Propositions 10.26/10.28 complete the correctness/legitimacy argument for the strongly polynomial submodular- minimization algorithm mission 34-ch10b-algorithms began placing, and Propositions 10.30/10.32 are the analogous structural facts for L-convex function minimization, chapter 10's third major algorithmic thread.

None of these results are open — they are Murota's own account of submodular-function- minimization (§10.2 continued), L-convex minimization (§10.3), and conjugate scaling (§10.4.5). What this mission contributes is a faithful, machine-checked formal statement of each, including one result (Proposition 10.32) the platform's own automated extractor missed; no comparable formalization exists on the platform (see Formalization scope).

Difficulty

As in mission 34-ch10b-algorithms, several numbered results in this block are excluded as hard for being pure algorithmic-complexity bounds (Propositions 10.25, 10.27, 10.31); see HARD.md. A further three (Propositions 10.37-10.39, on the primal-dual algorithm's maximum submodular flow subproblem) are excluded for a distinct reason: the source text's own OCR extraction demonstrably cannot distinguish the two visually different capacity-bound symbols (c* overlined vs. underlined) central to their shared defining formula, confirmed directly against the raw extracted bytes, making faithful reconstruction of that formula impossible from the available text; see HARD.md.

Formalization scope

Ground-set elements are a Fintype V with DecidableEq. All apparatus needed for Propositions 10.26/10.28 (Submodular, GammaSet, RhoTilde, ReachSet, Eta, IsMaximalMinimizer) is redeclared fresh from mission 34-ch10b-algorithms, genericized over an arbitrary ground type where the original was V-specific, since this draft cannot import that sibling. Proposition 10.26 is placed as the case-independent core inequality its own proof establishes, rather than by replicating the three-case verification against Proposition 10.24's own internal proof objects (Cases (i)-(iii)); see HARD.md. Proposition 10.30 omits its own trailing iteration-count corollary (a pure complexity bound); see HARD.md. Six numbered results (Propositions 10.25, 10.27, 10.31, 10.37, 10.38, 10.39) are hard. Contributions completing any of the five sorrys are welcome; the goal carries the most independent proof content (via the conjugacy theorem and Theorem 7.10(2), both established elsewhere in this series).

Selected references

  • K. Murota, Discrete Convex Analysis, SIAM, 2003. DOI: 10.1137/1.9780898718508.
  • S. Iwata, "A faster scaling algorithm for minimizing submodular functions," SIAM Journal on Computing, 32 (2003), pp. 833-840 [99] (conjugate scaling's origin).
  • A. Frank, "A weighted matroid intersection algorithm," Journal of Algorithms, 2 (1981), pp. 328-336 [55] (the primal-dual framework this mission's Proposition 10.28 continues, via mission 34-ch10b-algorithms's own Proposition 10.24).
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Convex OptimizationOptimizationProbability·Captain: mikedeng1

The Distributionally Robust Chance-Constrained Vehicle Routing Problem V: Worst-Case Value-at-Risk over Covariance Ambiguity Sets as a Quadratically Constrained ProgramResearch Paper

Motivation

In the capacitated vehicle routing problem (CVRP) a fleet of mmm vehicles of capacity QQQ leaves a depot and serves nnn customers; every customer is visited once, and the load of each route must not exceed QQQ. In practice customer demands are uncertain at planning time. The chance-constrained CVRP asks that each route respect the capacity with probability at least 1−ϵ1-\epsilon1−ϵ, but this presupposes a known demand distribution, which is rarely available. Ghosal and Wiesemann (Oper. Res. 68(3), 2020) require the chance constraints to hold for every distribution in an ambiguity set P\mathcal PP built from the information that can actually be estimated: support, means and dispersion bounds.

Their branch-and-cut method separates rounded capacity inequalities whose right-hand side is the worst-case value-at-risk of the total demand of a customer set SSS. This quantity is evaluated thousands of times during the search, so it matters whether it has a closed form or a small convex reformulation. This mission concerns the paper's covariance ambiguity sets (§5.2), which bound the whole covariance matrix of the demands and can therefore express that demands of nearby customers are correlated, as happens with geographically clustered demand. The covariance bound can be derived from data, for example analytically through McDiarmid's inequality (Delage and Ye, 2010) or by bootstrapping.

Setting

Customers are indexed by i∈{1,…,n}i\in\{1,\dots,n\}i∈{1,…,n} and their random demand vector is q~∈Rn\tilde{\boldsymbol q}\in\mathbb R^nq~​∈Rn. Fix a box Q=[q‾,q‾]\mathcal Q=[\underline{\boldsymbol q},\overline{\boldsymbol q}]Q=[q​,q​] with q‾≥0\underline{\boldsymbol q}\ge\mathbf 0q​≥0, a mean vector μ\boldsymbol\muμ in the interior of Q\mathcal QQ, and a symmetric positive definite matrix Σ≻0\Sigma\succ0Σ≻0. The covariance ambiguity set is

P={P∈P0(Rn): P[q~∈Q]=1, EP[q~]=μ, EP[(q~−μ)(q~−μ)⊤]⪯Σ},(16)\mathcal P=\Big\{\mathbb P\in\mathcal P_0(\mathbb R^n):\ \mathbb P[\tilde{\boldsymbol q}\in\mathcal Q]=1,\ \mathbb E_{\mathbb P}[\tilde{\boldsymbol q}]=\boldsymbol\mu,\ \mathbb E_{\mathbb P}\big[(\tilde{\boldsymbol q}-\boldsymbol\mu)(\tilde{\boldsymbol q}-\boldsymbol\mu)^\top\big]\preceq\Sigma\Big\},\tag{16}P={P∈P0​(Rn): P[q~​∈Q]=1, EP​[q~​]=μ, EP​[(q~​−μ)(q~​−μ)⊤]⪯Σ},(16)

where P0(Rn)\mathcal P_0(\mathbb R^n)P0​(Rn) is the set of all probability distributions on Rn\mathbb R^nRn and A⪯ΣA\preceq\SigmaA⪯Σ means that Σ−A\Sigma-AΣ−A is positive semidefinite.

For a distribution P\mathbb PP and a real random variable X~\tilde XX~, the value-at-risk at level 1−ϵ1-\epsilon1−ϵ, ϵ∈(0,1)\epsilon\in(0,1)ϵ∈(0,1), is P-VaR1−ϵ[X~]=inf⁡{x∈R:P[X~≤x]≥1−ϵ}\mathbb P\text{-VaR}_{1-\epsilon}[\tilde X]=\inf\{x\in\mathbb R:\mathbb P[\tilde X\le x]\ge1-\epsilon\}P-VaR1−ϵ​[X~]=inf{x∈R:P[X~≤x]≥1−ϵ}. For a customer set SSS, the worst-case value-at-risk is sup⁡P∈PP-VaR1−ϵ[∑i∈Sq~i]\sup_{\mathbb P\in\mathcal P}\mathbb P\text{-VaR}_{1-\epsilon}[\sum_{i\in S}\tilde q_i]supP∈P​P-VaR1−ϵ​[∑i∈S​q~​i​]. A route serving SSS satisfies the chance constraint for every P∈P\mathbb P\in\mathcal PP∈P exactly when this number is at most QQQ.

Two componentwise bounds appear in the answer:

qℓ=max⁡{−1−ϵϵ(q‾−μ), q‾−μ},qu=min⁡{1−ϵϵ(μ−q‾), q‾−μ}.\boldsymbol q^\ell=\max\Big\{-\tfrac{1-\epsilon}{\epsilon}(\overline{\boldsymbol q}-\boldsymbol\mu),\ \underline{\boldsymbol q}-\boldsymbol\mu\Big\},\qquad\boldsymbol q^u=\min\Big\{\tfrac{1-\epsilon}{\epsilon}(\boldsymbol\mu-\underline{\boldsymbol q}),\ \overline{\boldsymbol q}-\boldsymbol\mu\Big\}.qℓ=max{−ϵ1−ϵ​(q​−μ), q​−μ},qu=min{ϵ1−ϵ​(μ−q​), q​−μ}.

A route set is an ordered partition of the customers into mmm nonempty ordered routes. It is feasible in the distributionally robust problem RVRP(P\mathcal PP) if every route satisfies the chance constraint for every P∈P\mathbb P\in\mathcal PP∈P, and feasible in a deterministic instance with capacity Q′Q'Q′ and demands q\boldsymbol qq if every route's total demand is at most Q′Q'Q′.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 7

For every customer set SSS,

sup⁡P∈PP-VaR1−ϵ[∑i∈Sq~i]=max⁡{1S⊤μ+1S⊤q: q⊤Σ−1q≤1−ϵϵ, q∈[qℓ,qu]}.(17)\sup_{\mathbb P\in\mathcal P}\mathbb P\text{-VaR}_{1-\epsilon}\Big[\sum_{i\in S}\tilde q_i\Big]=\max\Big\{\mathbf 1_S^\top\boldsymbol\mu+\mathbf 1_S^\top\boldsymbol q:\ \boldsymbol q^\top\Sigma^{-1}\boldsymbol q\le\tfrac{1-\epsilon}{\epsilon},\ \boldsymbol q\in[\boldsymbol q^\ell,\boldsymbol q^u]\Big\}.\tag{17}P∈Psup​P-VaR1−ϵ​[i∈S∑​q~​i​]=max{1S⊤​μ+1S⊤​q: q⊤Σ−1q≤ϵ1−ϵ​, q∈[qℓ,qu]}.(17)

The right-hand side maximizes an affine function over the intersection of an ellipsoid and a box.

Milestone: Corollary 4 (corrected)

For a diagonal bound Σ=diag⁡(σ12,…,σn2)\Sigma=\operatorname{diag}(\sigma_1^2,\dots,\sigma_n^2)Σ=diag(σ12​,…,σn2​), program (17) collapses to a search over one parameter θ≥0\theta\ge0θ≥0 with S(θ)={i∈S:σi2>θqiu}S(\theta)=\{i\in S:\sigma_i^2>\theta q^u_i\}S(θ)={i∈S:σi2​>θqiu​}:

sup⁡θ 1S⊤μ+∑i∈S(θ)qiu+[1−ϵϵ−∑i∈S(θ)(qiuσi)2][∑i∈S∖S(θ)σi2],(18)\sup_{\theta}\ \mathbf 1_S^\top\boldsymbol\mu+\sum_{i\in S(\theta)}q^u_i+\sqrt{\Big[\tfrac{1-\epsilon}{\epsilon}-\sum_{i\in S(\theta)}\big(\tfrac{q^u_i}{\sigma_i}\big)^2\Big]\Big[\sum_{i\in S\setminus S(\theta)}\sigma_i^2\Big]},\tag{18}θsup​ 1S⊤​μ+i∈S(θ)∑​qiu​+[ϵ1−ϵ​−i∈S(θ)∑​(σi​qiu​​)2][i∈S∖S(θ)∑​σi2​]​,(18)

over the θ\thetaθ for which the first bracket is nonnegative and the point of (17) that θ\thetaθ induces respects qu\boldsymbol q^uqu (see Formalization scope).

Milestone: Theorem 6

For some instance with the ambiguity set (16), no deterministic CVRP instance on the same customers and fleet has the same set of feasible route sets.

Significance

Theorem 7 makes the worst-case value-at-risk over (16) computable in polynomial time as a convex quadratically constrained program. With it, the rounded capacity inequalities of the two-index vehicle flow formulation can be separated for covariance information. Theorem 2 of the same paper shows that the resulting demand estimator is subadditive, so this formulation is exact. Corollary 4 gives a closed form for the diagonal case, which the paper uses to evaluate the estimator in time linear in ∣S∣|S|∣S∣ after sorting. Theorem 6 explains why the paper needs this machinery: the robust feasible region cannot be reproduced by any deterministic demand vector and capacity.

The results are proved in the paper's online supplement. No part of them is formalized anywhere to our knowledge; the platform has no worst-case value-at-risk and no moment-based ambiguity set. A complete development would give machine-checked worst-case VaR bounds over moment sets with second-order information. These are used well beyond routing, in distributionally robust portfolio and inventory models.

Difficulty

The supremum ranges over an infinite-dimensional set of distributions, while (17) ranges over vectors. The inequality "≥\ge≥" requires, for every feasible q\boldsymbol qq of (17), a sequence of distributions in (16) whose value-at-risk approaches 1S⊤(μ+q)\mathbf 1_S^\top(\boldsymbol\mu+\boldsymbol q)1S⊤​(μ+q). The value-at-risk is a lower quantile, so a distribution placing mass exactly ϵ\epsilonϵ on a high point does not attain the value: the construction has to be a limit. The inequality "≤\le≤" is harder. It must rule out every distribution, not only two-point ones, and a bound through the one-dimensional Chebyshev–Cantelli inequality for ∑i∈Sq~i\sum_{i\in S}\tilde q_i∑i∈S​q~​i​ alone ignores the box: it yields 1−ϵϵ1S⊤Σ1S\sqrt{\frac{1-\epsilon}{\epsilon}\mathbf 1_S^\top\Sigma\mathbf 1_S}ϵ1−ϵ​1S⊤​Σ1S​​, which is too large whenever the support bounds bind. The interaction between the Loewner constraint and the componentwise support bounds, which produces the unusual bound qℓ\boldsymbol q^\ellqℓ, is where the work lies. For Theorem 6 the difficulty is to exhibit the instance and to evaluate enough chance constraints exactly.

Formalization scope

Customers are Fin n (0-based) and demand vectors are Fin n → ℝ. Distributions are measures on Fin n → ℝ. The set (16) is covarianceSet qlo qhi μ Sig: a probability measure with P (Set.Icc qlo qhi) = 1, coordinate means μ, and Sig - M positive semidefinite, where M is the matrix of integrals ∫(qi−μi)(qj−μj) dP\int(q_i-\mu_i)(q_j-\mu_j)\,d\mathbb P∫(qi​−μi​)(qj​−μj​)dP. The covariance bound is called Sig because Σ is Lean syntax. The side conditions q‾≥0\underline{\boldsymbol q}\ge\mathbf 0q​≥0, μ∈int⁡Q\boldsymbol\mu\in\operatorname{int}\mathcal Qμ∈intQ, Σ≻0\Sigma\succ0Σ≻0 (Sig.PosDef) and 0<ϵ<10<\epsilon<10<ϵ<1 are hypotheses of every theorem. The value-at-risk is the published MultistageStochastic.valueAtRisk P Y (1 - ε). The worst-case value-at-risk is a real sSup over the image of the set. That image is nonempty (the Dirac measure at μ\boldsymbol\muμ lies in (16)) and bounded (the box), so the supremum is genuine. "The optimal objective value" of a maximization is stated as a supremum; attainment is not part of any claim. Σ−1\Sigma^{-1}Σ−1 is Mathlib's matrix inverse.

The paper states Theorem 7 and Corollary 4 with "P\mathbb PP-VaR" without a level; the level 1−ϵ1-\epsilon1−ϵ, used in the sentence introducing Theorem 7 and everywhere else, is read in. Corollary 4 as printed is false. It maximizes over every θ≥0\theta\ge0θ≥0 with a nonnegative bracket. For n=1n=1n=1, every large θ\thetaθ then gives the value μ1+σ1(1−ϵ)/ϵ\mu_1+\sigma_1\sqrt{(1-\epsilon)/\epsilon}μ1​+σ1​(1−ϵ)/ϵ​, which can exceed q‾1\overline q_1q​1​ and hence every value-at-risk. The formal statement adds the condition that makes each θ\thetaθ a feasible point of (17): σi2s(θ)≤qiu∑k∈S∖S(θ)σk2\sigma_i^2\sqrt{s(\theta)}\le q^u_i\sqrt{\sum_{k\in S\setminus S(\theta)}\sigma_k^2}σi2​s(θ)​≤qiu​∑k∈S∖S(θ)​σk2​​ for i∈S∖S(θ)i\in S\setminus S(\theta)i∈S∖S(θ), where s(θ)s(\theta)s(θ) is the first bracket. With this condition the statement is the diagonal case of Theorem 7.

A theorem about the Lean set is trivial if the set is empty or the supremum is a junk value. Neither happens here, and replacing the Loewner constraint by a scalar variance bound on ∑i∈Sq~i\sum_{i\in S}\tilde q_i∑i∈S​q~​i​ would state a different theorem. The dual second-order cone program printed after Theorem 7 is not a target: as printed it has the all-ones vector where Lagrangian duality gives 1S\mathbf 1_S1S​, and it has no multiplier for q≥qℓ\boldsymbol q\ge\boldsymbol q^\ellq≥qℓ.

Needed infrastructure: quantiles of pushforward measures, the Loewner order on moment matrices, and finite-support (two-point) distributions. The value-at-risk lemmas and the moment-matrix lemmas are reusable beyond this mission, and contributions of either kind are welcome. Theorem 6 needs only the route-set layer defined here and one explicit instance.

Selected references

  • S. Ghosal and W. Wiesemann, The Distributionally Robust Chance-Constrained Vehicle Routing Problem, Operations Research 68(3):716–732, 2020. https://doi.org/10.1287/opre.2019.1924
  • E. Delage and Y. Ye, Distributionally Robust Optimization Under Moment Uncertainty with Application to Data-Driven Problems, Operations Research 58(3):595–612, 2010. https://doi.org/10.1287/opre.1090.0741
  • S. Boyd and L. Vandenberghe, Convex Optimization, Cambridge University Press, 2004. https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511804441
  • G. Laporte, Y. Nobert and M. Desrochers, Optimal Routing under Capacity and Distance Restrictions, Operations Research 33(5):1050–1073, 1985. https://doi.org/10.1287/opre.33.5.1050
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Convex OptimizationOptimizationProbability·Captain: mikedeng1

The Distributionally Robust Chance-Constrained Vehicle Routing Problem IV: Worst-Case Value-at-Risk over First-Order Generic Moment Ambiguity Sets as a Convex ProgramResearch Paper

Motivation

In the capacitated vehicle routing problem (CVRP) a depot serves customers VC={1,…,n}V_C=\{1,\dots,n\}VC​={1,…,n} with mmm vehicles of capacity QQQ, and every route must respect the capacity. When customer demands are uncertain, the distributionally robust chance-constrained CVRP of Ghosal and Wiesemann (Oper. Res. 68(3), 2020) requires every route to meet its capacity with probability at least 1−ϵ1-\epsilon1−ϵ under every distribution in an ambiguity set P\mathcal PP, a family of distributions consistent with what is known about the demands. Such constraints are handled in a branch-and-cut scheme through rounded capacity inequalities, whose right-hand sides require one quantity for each customer subset SSS: the worst-case value-at-risk of the cumulative demand of SSS.

For ambiguity sets that describe each customer separately (marginal moment sets), this quantity is additive over customers and the problem reduces to a deterministic CVRP. Such sets cannot express that the demands of customers in the same municipality, county or state vary jointly within limits. The first-order generic moment ambiguity set does express this: it bounds the mean absolute deviation of the cumulative demand of prescribed customer groups. The mean absolute deviation is a standard robust dispersion measure, less sensitive to outliers than the standard deviation (see Casella and Berger, Statistical Inference, 2002). This mission formalizes the paper's description of the worst-case value-at-risk over such sets.

Setting

Demands form a random vector q~\tilde{\boldsymbol q}q~​ on Rn\mathbb R^nRn. The data are a support box Q=[q‾,q‾]\mathcal Q=[\underline{\boldsymbol q},\overline{\boldsymbol q}]Q=[q​,q​] with q‾≥0\underline{\boldsymbol q}\ge\mathbf 0q​≥0, a mean vector μ\boldsymbol\muμ in the interior of Q\mathcal QQ, customer subsets S1,…,Sp⊆VCS_1,\dots,S_p\subseteq V_CS1​,…,Sp​⊆VC​ and bounds ν>0\boldsymbol\nu>\mathbf 0ν>0. For A⊆VCA\subseteq V_CA⊆VC​, 1A∈{0,1}n\mathbf 1_A\in\{0,1\}^n1A​∈{0,1}n is its indicator vector. The first-order generic moment ambiguity set, Eq. (12) of the paper, is

P={P∈P0(Rn): P[q~∈Q]=1, EP[q~]=μ, EP[1Si⊤∣q~−μ∣]≤νi  ∀i=1,…,p},\mathcal P=\Bigl\{\mathbb P\in\mathcal P_0(\mathbb R^n):\ \mathbb P[\tilde{\boldsymbol q}\in\mathcal Q]=1,\ \mathbb E_{\mathbb P}[\tilde{\boldsymbol q}]=\boldsymbol\mu,\ \mathbb E_{\mathbb P}\bigl[\mathbf 1_{S_i}^\top|\tilde{\boldsymbol q}-\boldsymbol\mu|\bigr]\le\nu_i\ \ \forall i=1,\dots,p\Bigr\},P={P∈P0​(Rn): P[q~​∈Q]=1, EP​[q~​]=μ, EP​[1Si​⊤​∣q~​−μ∣]≤νi​  ∀i=1,…,p},

where P0(Rn)\mathcal P_0(\mathbb R^n)P0​(Rn) is the set of probability distributions on Rn\mathbb R^nRn and ∣⋅∣|\cdot|∣⋅∣ acts componentwise. The subsets are arbitrary: they may overlap and need not cover VCV_CVC​.

For a risk level ϵ∈(0,1)\epsilon\in(0,1)ϵ∈(0,1) and a random variable X~\tilde XX~, the value-at-risk is P-VaR1−ϵ[X~]=inf⁡{x∈R:P[X~≤x]≥1−ϵ}\mathbb P\text{-VaR}_{1-\epsilon}[\tilde X]=\inf\{x\in\mathbb R:\mathbb P[\tilde X\le x]\ge1-\epsilon\}P-VaR1−ϵ​[X~]=inf{x∈R:P[X~≤x]≥1−ϵ}. For a customer subset SSS the quantity of interest is

sup⁡P∈P P-VaR1−ϵ[∑i∈Sq~i].\sup_{\mathbb P\in\mathcal P}\ \mathbb P\text{-VaR}_{1-\epsilon}\Bigl[\sum_{i\in S}\tilde q_i\Bigr].P∈Psup​ P-VaR1−ϵ​[i∈S∑​q~​i​].

Write q^=min⁡{q‾−μ, 1−ϵϵ(μ−q‾)}\hat{\boldsymbol q}=\min\{\overline{\boldsymbol q}-\boldsymbol\mu,\ \frac{1-\epsilon}{\epsilon}(\boldsymbol\mu-\underline{\boldsymbol q})\}q^​=min{q​−μ, ϵ1−ϵ​(μ−q​)} (componentwise) and [⋅]+[\cdot]_+[⋅]+​ for the componentwise positive part. A route set R=(R1,…,Rm)\mathbf R=(\mathbf R_1,\dots,\mathbf R_m)R=(R1​,…,Rm​) partitions VCV_CVC​ into mmm nonempty ordered routes. It is feasible in the deterministic CVRP with demands q\boldsymbol qq if ∑i∈Rkqi≤Q\sum_{i\in\mathbf R_k}q_i\le Q∑i∈Rk​​qi​≤Q for all kkk, and feasible in the distributionally robust CVRP if P[∑i∈Rkq~i≤Q]≥1−ϵ\mathbb P[\sum_{i\in\mathbf R_k}\tilde q_i\le Q]\ge1-\epsilonP[∑i∈Rk​​q~​i​≤Q]≥1−ϵ for all P∈P\mathbb P\in\mathcal PP∈P and all kkk.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 5 (p. 726)

For every customer subset SSS,

sup⁡P∈PP-VaR1−ϵ[∑i∈Sq~i]=inf⁡γ∈R+p 1S⊤μ+q^⊤[1S−2∑i=1pγi1Si]++1ϵν⊤γ.\sup_{\mathbb P\in\mathcal P}\mathbb P\text{-VaR}_{1-\epsilon}\Bigl[\sum_{i\in S}\tilde q_i\Bigr]=\inf_{\boldsymbol\gamma\in\mathbb R^p_+}\ \mathbf 1_S^\top\boldsymbol\mu+\hat{\boldsymbol q}^\top\Bigl[\mathbf 1_S-2\sum_{i=1}^p\gamma_i\mathbf 1_{S_i}\Bigr]_+ +\frac1\epsilon\boldsymbol\nu^\top\boldsymbol\gamma .P∈Psup​P-VaR1−ϵ​[i∈S∑​q~​i​]=γ∈R+p​inf​ 1S⊤​μ+q^​⊤[1S​−2i=1∑p​γi​1Si​​]+​+ϵ1​ν⊤γ.

The right-hand side is the optimal value of the paper's problem (13). The statement holds for every family of subsets and all data satisfying the standing assumptions, so it is the general form of which the milestones are special cases.

Corollary 2 (p. 726, Eq. (14))

If S1,…,Sp−1S_1,\dots,S_{p-1}S1​,…,Sp−1​ are pairwise disjoint and cover VCV_CVC​ and Sp=VCS_p=V_CSp​=VC​, then

sup⁡P∈PP-VaR1−ϵ[∑i∈Sq~i]=1S⊤μ+min⁡{νp2ϵ, ∑i=1p−1min⁡{1S∩Si⊤q^, νi2ϵ}}.\sup_{\mathbb P\in\mathcal P}\mathbb P\text{-VaR}_{1-\epsilon}\Bigl[\sum_{i\in S}\tilde q_i\Bigr]=\mathbf 1_S^\top\boldsymbol\mu+\min\Bigl\{\frac{\nu_p}{2\epsilon},\ \sum_{i=1}^{p-1}\min\Bigl\{\mathbf 1_{S\cap S_i}^\top\hat{\boldsymbol q},\ \frac{\nu_i}{2\epsilon}\Bigr\}\Bigr\}.P∈Psup​P-VaR1−ϵ​[i∈S∑​q~​i​]=1S⊤​μ+min{2ϵνp​​, i=1∑p−1​min{1S∩Si​⊤​q^​, 2ϵνi​​}}.

Corollary 3 (pp. 726–727, Eq. (15))

If p=n+1p=n+1p=n+1, Si={i}S_i=\{i\}Si​={i} for i≤ni\le ni≤n and Sn+1=VCS_{n+1}=V_CSn+1​=VC​, then

sup⁡P∈PP-VaR1−ϵ[∑i∈Sq~i]=1S⊤μ+min⁡{νn+12ϵ, ∑i∈Smin⁡{q^i, νi2ϵ}}.\sup_{\mathbb P\in\mathcal P}\mathbb P\text{-VaR}_{1-\epsilon}\Bigl[\sum_{i\in S}\tilde q_i\Bigr]=\mathbf 1_S^\top\boldsymbol\mu+\min\Bigl\{\frac{\nu_{n+1}}{2\epsilon},\ \sum_{i\in S}\min\Bigl\{\hat q_i,\ \frac{\nu_i}{2\epsilon}\Bigr\}\Bigr\}.P∈Psup​P-VaR1−ϵ​[i∈S∑​q~​i​]=1S⊤​μ+min{2ϵνn+1​​, i∈S∑​min{q^​i​, 2ϵνi​​}}.

Theorem 4 (p. 726)

For some instance with an ambiguity set of the form (12), no deterministic CVRP instance on the same customers and vehicles (capacity Q′≥0Q'\ge0Q′≥0, demands q′≥0\boldsymbol q'\ge\mathbf 0q′≥0) has the same set of feasible route sets.

Significance

Theorem 5 makes the worst-case value-at-risk over (12) computable in polynomial time as the value of a nonsmooth convex problem over the nonnegative orthant, which the paper notes can be written as a linear program. This gives the right-hand sides of the rounded capacity inequalities in a branch-and-cut scheme for the distributionally robust CVRP. Corollaries 2 and 3 give closed forms for two structured families of groups, evaluable in time linear in ∣S∣|S|∣S∣. Theorem 4 shows the gain in modelling power has a cost: unlike the marginal case, the problem cannot in general be replaced by a deterministic CVRP with altered demands. With a single customer and S1={1}S_1=\{1\}S1​={1}, Theorem 5 reduces to the closed form μ+min⁡{q^,ν/(2ϵ)}\mu+\min\{\hat q,\nu/(2\epsilon)\}μ+min{q^​,ν/(2ϵ)} for marginalized first-order sets, so it extends that single-customer formula to joint dispersion constraints.

All four results are proved in the paper's online supplement. As far as a platform search shows, none has been machine-checked. The mission produces checked proofs of the equality in Theorem 5, the two closed forms, and an explicit instance for Theorem 4.

Difficulty

The supremum ranges over an infinite-dimensional set of joint distributions, and the value-at-risk is neither convex nor concave in the distribution. Bounding the value-at-risk of each group separately and adding the bounds does not work when groups overlap, and it ignores the total-dispersion constraint. It gives only an upper bound, and in the setting of Corollary 2 that bound is strict whenever the total bound νp/(2ϵ)\nu_p/(2\epsilon)νp​/(2ϵ) is the binding term. Showing that the infimum in (13) is attained in the limit needs distributions that saturate several overlapping dispersion constraints at once while keeping the mean fixed and the support inside the box. For Theorem 4, the witness must separate the feasible-route-set family of the robust instance from every family defined by a single linear capacity inequality with nonnegative weights.

Formalization scope

Customers are Fin n (0-based), subsets are Sfam : Fin p → Finset (Fin n), and a distribution is a Measure (Fin n → ℝ) that is required to be a probability measure. Support is P (Set.Icc qlo qhi) = 1, the mean condition is ∫ q, q j ∂P = μ j, and the dispersion condition is ∫ q, ∑ j ∈ Sfam l, |q j - μ j| ∂P ≤ ν l. The integrability clauses stated alongside are automatic for measures carried by the box. The value-at-risk is the published MultistageStochastic.valueAtRisk P Y (1 - ε). The worst-case value-at-risk is the real sSup of its image over the set; under the standing assumptions this image is nonempty (the Dirac at μ\boldsymbol\muμ lies in the set) and bounded (bounded support), so the real supremum is the paper's. The optimal value of (13) is the real sInf of the objective over {γ≥0}\{\boldsymbol\gamma\ge\mathbf 0\}{γ≥0}, a nonempty set on which the objective is bounded below by 1S⊤μ\mathbf 1_S^\top\boldsymbol\mu1S⊤​μ. Attainment is not claimed. All statements carry the standing assumptions q‾≥0\underline{\boldsymbol q}\ge\mathbf 0q​≥0, q‾<μ<q‾\underline{\boldsymbol q}<\boldsymbol\mu<\overline{\boldsymbol q}q​<μ<q​, ν>0\boldsymbol\nu>\mathbf 0ν>0 and 0<ϵ<10<\epsilon<10<ϵ<1. Corollary 2 writes p=r+1p=r+1p=r+1 with the last subset Sfam (Fin.last r). Corollary 3 indexes the singleton of customer iii by Fin.castSucc i. In Theorem 4 route sets are Fin m → List (Fin n) and only feasibility is modelled; costs play no role.

The theorems are not trivialized by an empty ambiguity set or a junk supremum: membership of the Dirac distribution at μ\boldsymbol\muμ is checked locally with a sorry-free proof. Theorem 4 needs a genuinely separating instance: an instance in which no route set is robustly feasible, for example, is matched by a deterministic instance in which none is feasible either.

Needed infrastructure: two-point and finitely supported distributions on Rn\mathbb R^nRn and their value-at-risk; weak duality for moment problems over the box; the positive-part calculus of (13). The value-at-risk lemmas for finitely supported measures are reusable in the sibling missions on this paper. Contributions of any of the milestones, of lemmas for these building blocks, or of either inequality of Theorem 5 on its own are welcome.

Selected references

  • S. Ghosal and W. Wiesemann, The Distributionally Robust Chance-Constrained Vehicle Routing Problem, Operations Research 68(3):716–732, 2020. https://doi.org/10.1287/opre.2019.1924
  • G. Casella and R. L. Berger, Statistical Inference, 2nd ed., Duxbury, 2002.
  • S. Boyd and L. Vandenberghe, Convex Optimization, Cambridge University Press, 2004. https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511804441
  • G. Laporte, Y. Nobert and M. Desrochers, Optimal routing under capacity and distance restrictions, Operations Research 33(5):1050–1073, 1985. https://doi.org/10.1287/opre.33.5.1050
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Convex OptimizationOptimizationProbability·Captain: mikedeng1

The Distributionally Robust Chance-Constrained Vehicle Routing Problem III: Worst-Case Value-at-Risk Is Additive over Marginalized Moment Ambiguity SetsResearch Paper

Motivation

The capacitated vehicle routing problem (CVRP) assigns customers to a fleet of mmm identical vehicles of capacity QQQ and orders each vehicle's visits so as to minimize transportation cost, subject to each vehicle's total load not exceeding QQQ. In practice the customers' demands are not known when the routes are planned. Two classical responses are the robust CVRP, which requires feasibility for every demand vector in an uncertainty set, and the chance-constrained CVRP, which requires each capacity constraint to hold with probability at least 1−ϵ1-\epsilon1−ϵ under a known demand distribution. The first ignores all distributional information; the second assumes a distribution that is rarely known and usually requires independent demands.

Ghosal and Wiesemann (Oper. Res. 68(3), 2020) study the distributionally robust chance-constrained CVRP, RVRP(P\mathcal PP), in which each capacity constraint must hold with probability at least 1−ϵ1-\epsilon1−ϵ under every distribution of an ambiguity set P\mathcal PP. Whether this problem can be solved with existing CVRP technology depends on how the worst-case value-at-risk of a customer set's total demand behaves as a set function. This mission formalizes §4 of the paper, which treats ambiguity sets that only constrain each customer's demand separately.

Setting

There are nnn customers VC={1,…,n}V_C=\{1,\dots,n\}VC​={1,…,n} with random demand vector q~∈Rn\tilde{\boldsymbol q}\in\mathbb R^nq~​∈Rn and a risk level ϵ∈(0,1)\epsilon\in(0,1)ϵ∈(0,1). For a probability distribution P\mathbb PP and a real random variable X~\tilde XX~, the value-at-risk is

P-VaR1−ϵ[X~]=inf⁡{x∈R: P[X~≤x]≥1−ϵ}.\mathbb P\text{-VaR}_{1-\epsilon}[\tilde X]=\inf\{x\in\mathbb R:\ \mathbb P[\tilde X\le x]\ge1-\epsilon\}.P-VaR1−ϵ​[X~]=inf{x∈R: P[X~≤x]≥1−ϵ}.

For an ambiguity set P\mathcal PP and a customer subset SSS, the worst-case value-at-risk of SSS is sup⁡P∈PP-VaR1−ϵ[∑i∈Sq~i]\sup_{\mathbb P\in\mathcal P}\mathbb P\text{-VaR}_{1-\epsilon}[\sum_{i\in S}\tilde q_i]supP∈P​P-VaR1−ϵ​[∑i∈S​q~​i​].

Fix a support box Q=[q‾,q‾]\mathcal Q=[\underline{\boldsymbol q},\overline{\boldsymbol q}]Q=[q​,q​] with q‾≥0\underline{\boldsymbol q}\ge\mathbf 0q​≥0, a mean vector μ\boldsymbol\muμ in the interior of Q\mathcal QQ, and for each customer iii a componentwise convex dispersion measure φi:R→Rpi\boldsymbol\varphi_i:\mathbb R\to\mathbb R^{p_i}φi​:R→Rpi​ with bound σi>φi(μi)\boldsymbol\sigma_i>\boldsymbol\varphi_i(\mu_i)σi​>φi​(μi​). The marginalized moment ambiguity set (5) is

P={P∈P0(Rn): P(q~∈Q)=1, EP[q~]=μ, EP[φi(q~i)]≤σi ∀i∈VC}.\mathcal P=\Big\{\mathbb P\in\mathcal P_0(\mathbb R^n):\ \mathbb P(\tilde{\boldsymbol q}\in\mathcal Q)=1,\ \mathbb E_{\mathbb P}[\tilde{\boldsymbol q}]=\boldsymbol\mu,\ \mathbb E_{\mathbb P}[\boldsymbol\varphi_i(\tilde q_i)]\le\boldsymbol\sigma_i\ \forall i\in V_C\Big\}.P={P∈P0​(Rn): P(q~​∈Q)=1, EP​[q~​]=μ, EP​[φi​(q~​i​)]≤σi​ ∀i∈VC​}.

It constrains marginal moments only, and so contains joint distributions of every dependence structure, from independent to perfectly correlated demands. Three special cases have their own closed forms: the first-order set (6), where σi>0\sigma_i>0σi​>0 bounds the mean absolute deviation E∣q~i−μi∣\mathbb E|\tilde q_i-\mu_i|E∣q~​i​−μi​∣; the variance set (8), where σi>0\sigma_i>0σi​>0 bounds E(q~i−μi)2\mathbb E(\tilde q_i-\mu_i)^2E(q~​i​−μi​)2; and the semivariance set (10), where σi+,σi−>0\sigma_i^+,\sigma_i^->0σi+​,σi−​>0 bound E[q~i−μi]+2\mathbb E[\tilde q_i-\mu_i]_+^2E[q~​i​−μi​]+2​ and E[μi−q~i]+2\mathbb E[\mu_i-\tilde q_i]_+^2E[μi​−q~​i​]+2​.

A route set R=(R1,…,Rm)∈P(VC,m)\mathbf R=(R_1,\dots,R_m)\in\mathfrak P(V_C,m)R=(R1​,…,Rm​)∈P(VC​,m) partitions the customers into mmm nonempty ordered routes. It is feasible in RVRP(P\mathcal PP) if P[∑i∈Rkq~i≤Q]≥1−ϵ\mathbb P[\sum_{i\in R_k}\tilde q_i\le Q]\ge1-\epsilonP[∑i∈Rk​​q~​i​≤Q]≥1−ϵ for all P∈P\mathbb P\in\mathcal PP∈P and all kkk, and feasible in the deterministic CVRP with demands q\boldsymbol qq if ∑i∈Rkqi≤Q\sum_{i\in R_k}q_i\le Q∑i∈Rk​​qi​≤Q for all kkk.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 3 (p. 723)

For every marginalized moment ambiguity set (5) and every nonempty S⊆VCS\subseteq V_CS⊆VC​,

sup⁡P∈PP-VaR1−ϵ[∑i∈Sq~i]=∑i∈Ssup⁡P∈PP-VaR1−ϵ[q~i].\sup_{\mathbb P\in\mathcal P}\mathbb P\text{-VaR}_{1-\epsilon}\Big[\sum_{i\in S}\tilde q_i\Big]=\sum_{i\in S}\sup_{\mathbb P\in\mathcal P}\mathbb P\text{-VaR}_{1-\epsilon}[\tilde q_i].P∈Psup​P-VaR1−ϵ​[i∈S∑​q~​i​]=i∈S∑​P∈Psup​P-VaR1−ϵ​[q~​i​].

The dispersion measures are left arbitrary (convex, componentwise, any number of components), so the goal covers every set of the form (5).

Milestones

  • Proposition 2 (p. 724, Eq. (7)), first-order sets: sup⁡PP-VaR1−ϵ[q~i]=μi+min⁡{q‾i−μi,1−ϵϵ(μi−q‾i),12ϵσi}\sup_{\mathbb P}\mathbb P\text{-VaR}_{1-\epsilon}[\tilde q_i]=\mu_i+\min\{\overline q_i-\mu_i,\frac{1-\epsilon}{\epsilon}(\mu_i-\underline q_i),\frac1{2\epsilon}\sigma_i\}supP​P-VaR1−ϵ​[q~​i​]=μi​+min{q​i​−μi​,ϵ1−ϵ​(μi​−q​i​),2ϵ1​σi​}.
  • Proposition 3 (p. 725, Eq. (9)), variance sets: the same with last term 1−ϵϵσi\sqrt{\frac{1-\epsilon}{\epsilon}\sigma_i}ϵ1−ϵ​σi​​.
  • Proposition 4 (p. 725, Eq. (11)), semivariance sets: the four-term minimum with σi+/ϵ\sqrt{\sigma_i^+/\epsilon}σi+​/ϵ​ and (1−ϵ)σi−/ϵ\sqrt{(1-\epsilon)\sigma_i^-}/\epsilon(1−ϵ)σi−​​/ϵ.
  • Corollary 1 (p. 723): a route set is feasible in RVRP(P\mathcal PP) over (5) if and only if it is feasible in the deterministic CVRP with demands qi=sup⁡P∈PP-VaR1−ϵ[q~i]q_i=\sup_{\mathbb P\in\mathcal P}\mathbb P\text{-VaR}_{1-\epsilon}[\tilde q_i]qi​=supP∈P​P-VaR1−ϵ​[q~​i​].

Significance

Theorem 3 says that over (5) the worst case of a sum is the sum of the worst cases. Because the value-at-risk is not additive for a fixed distribution, and the online supplement exhibits distributions in such a set for which the individual values-at-risk are not additive, the statement is about the ambiguity set, not about any of its members. Its consequence, Corollary 1, is that RVRP(P\mathcal PP) over (5) is a deterministic CVRP with inflated demands, so existing branch-and-cut and branch-and-cut-and-price codes solve it unchanged. Propositions 2–4 make those inflated demands explicit for three standard dispersion measures, so that the whole reduction is in closed form. The corollary also exposes a limitation: under (5) the worst-case distribution does not depend on the route set, and the model cannot represent known dependencies between customers.

The results are proved in the paper's online supplement; none has a machine-checked proof. A formalization produces a checked worst-case value-at-risk calculus over moment sets with support constraints, including sharp one-sided Chebyshev-type bounds under mean-absolute-deviation, variance and semivariance constraints, which are reusable in distributionally robust optimization beyond vehicle routing.

Difficulty

The value-at-risk is neither subadditive nor superadditive in general, so neither inequality of Theorem 3 follows from properties of a single distribution. The inequality "≥\ge≥" requires combining near-worst-case distributions of the individual customers into one joint distribution in P\mathcal PP that is simultaneously near-worst for the sum; the inequality "≤\le≤" requires bounding the value-at-risk of the sum for an arbitrary joint law using only marginal information. In Propositions 2–4 the supremum is typically not attained: the distribution concentrating mass at the claimed worst-case value violates the mean constraint, and the value is reached only as a limit of distributions in P\mathcal PP. An argument that exhibits a single maximizer therefore fails, and the statements must be proved as equalities of suprema.

Formalization scope

Customers are Fin n (0-based) and demand vectors are Fin n → ℝ. An ambiguity set is a set of measures on Fin n → ℝ, each required to be a probability measure; the support condition is P (Set.Icc qlo qhi) = 1 and expectations are Bochner integrals. The sets are sets of joint laws on Rn\mathbb R^nRn, never products of marginals. In (5) each expectation EP[φi,l(q~i)]\mathbb E_{\mathbb P}[\varphi_{i,l}(\tilde q_i)]EP​[φi,l​(q~​i​)] is required to exist; this is automatic for convex φi,l\varphi_{i,l}φi,l​ on the bounded support. The value-at-risk is the published definition MultistageStochastic.valueAtRisk P Y (1 - ε), and the worst-case value-at-risk is the real supremum of its values over the ambiguity set; under the standing assumptions that set of values is nonempty (the Dirac law at μ\boldsymbol\muμ belongs to P\mathcal PP) and bounded (by the support), so the supremum is not a default value. The single-customer quantity is the case S={i}S=\{i\}S={i}. The standing assumptions (q‾≥0\underline{\boldsymbol q}\ge\mathbf 0q​≥0, q‾<μ<q‾\underline{\boldsymbol q}<\boldsymbol\mu<\overline{\boldsymbol q}q​<μ<q​, convexity of φi,l\varphi_{i,l}φi,l​, φi,l(μi)<σi,l\varphi_{i,l}(\mu_i)<\sigma_{i,l}φi,l​(μi​)<σi,l​, σ,σ±>0\boldsymbol\sigma,\boldsymbol\sigma^\pm>\mathbf 0σ,σ±>0, 0<ϵ<10<\epsilon<10<ϵ<1) are explicit hypotheses. Routes are lists of customers; a route set has nonempty routes whose concatenation is a permutation of all customers. Costs are not formalized, since both routing problems minimize the same cost over their feasible route sets.

All targets are equalities or equivalences; a one-sided inequality, a statement asserting that some distribution attains the value, or a formulation over product measures is a different theorem and does not count.

Contributions welcome: the reduction of the chance constraint to a value-at-risk bound, the right-continuity lemmas for the value-at-risk of a measure on Rn\mathbb R^nRn, two-point constructions in the ambiguity sets, and one-sided Chebyshev-type bounds with support constraints.

Selected references

  • S. Ghosal and W. Wiesemann, The Distributionally Robust Chance-Constrained Vehicle Routing Problem, Operations Research 68(3):716–732, 2020. https://doi.org/10.1287/opre.2019.1924
  • G. Laporte, Y. Nobert and M. Desrochers, Optimal routing under capacity and distance restrictions, Operations Research 33(5):1050–1073, 1985. https://doi.org/10.1287/opre.33.5.1050
  • G. Casella and R. L. Berger, Statistical Inference, 2nd ed., Duxbury, 2002.
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Convex OptimizationOptimizationProbability·Captain: mikedeng1

The Distributionally Robust Chance-Constrained Vehicle Routing Problem II: Moment Ambiguity Sets Give Subadditive Demand EstimatorsResearch Paper

Motivation

The capacitated vehicle routing problem (CVRP) asks for a set of minimum-cost routes by which a fleet of identical vehicles of capacity QQQ, based at a depot, serves every customer exactly once without any vehicle carrying more than its capacity. In practice customer demands are not known when routes are planned. Ghosal and Wiesemann (Oper. Res. 68(3), 2020) study the distributionally robust CVRP: the demand vector q~\tilde{\boldsymbol q}q~​ is random, its distribution is known only to lie in an ambiguity set P\mathcal PP, and every route must respect its capacity with probability at least 1−ϵ1-\epsilon1−ϵ under every distribution in P\mathcal PP.

Exact CVRP solvers rely on compact two-index vehicle flow formulations strengthened by rounded capacity inequalities, which bound from below the number of vehicles entering any customer subset SSS by a demand estimator d(S)d(S)d(S). The paper shows (its Theorem 1) that the robust two-index formulation is exact whenever the demand estimator is subadditive and demands are nonnegative, and that this fails for some natural ambiguity sets: sets that fix the marginal distribution of each customer's demand violate it (Example 1). This mission formalizes the paper's positive result for the most widely used class of ambiguity sets, the moment ambiguity sets of distributionally robust optimization (see El Ghaoui et al. 2003, Delage and Ye 2010, Wiesemann et al. 2014).

Setting

There are nnn customers, indexed i=1,…,ni=1,\dots,ni=1,…,n; the demand vector is q~∈Rn\tilde{\boldsymbol q}\in\mathbb R^nq~​∈Rn. Fix

  • a rectangular support Q=[q‾,q‾]\mathcal Q=[\underline{\boldsymbol q},\overline{\boldsymbol q}]Q=[q​,q​] with q‾≥0\underline{\boldsymbol q}\ge\mathbf 0q​≥0;
  • a mean vector μ∈Rn\boldsymbol\mu\in\mathbb R^nμ∈Rn;
  • a dispersion measure φ=(φ1,…,φp):Rn→Rp\boldsymbol\varphi=(\varphi_1,\dots,\varphi_p):\mathbb R^n\to\mathbb R^pφ=(φ1​,…,φp​):Rn→Rp (for example mean absolute deviations ∣qi−μi∣|q_i-\mu_i|∣qi​−μi​∣, variances (qi−μi)2(q_i-\mu_i)^2(qi​−μi​)2 or Huber losses) and bounds σ∈Rp\boldsymbol\sigma\in\mathbb R^pσ∈Rp.

The moment ambiguity set is

P={P∈P0(Rn): P(q~∈Q)=1,  EP[q~]=μ,  EP[φ(q~)]≤σ},\mathcal P=\Big\{\mathbb P\in\mathcal P_0(\mathbb R^n):\ \mathbb P(\tilde{\boldsymbol q}\in\mathcal Q)=1,\ \ \mathbb E_{\mathbb P}[\tilde{\boldsymbol q}]=\boldsymbol\mu,\ \ \mathbb E_{\mathbb P}[\boldsymbol\varphi(\tilde{\boldsymbol q})]\le\boldsymbol\sigma\Big\},P={P∈P0​(Rn): P(q~​∈Q)=1,  EP​[q~​]=μ,  EP​[φ(q~​)]≤σ},

where P0(Rn)\mathcal P_0(\mathbb R^n)P0​(Rn) denotes all probability distributions on Rn\mathbb R^nRn. The paper's standing assumptions are μ∈int⁡Q\boldsymbol\mu\in\operatorname{int}\mathcal Qμ∈intQ, each φl\varphi_lφl​ closed and convex, and φ(μ)<σ\boldsymbol\varphi(\boldsymbol\mu)<\boldsymbol\sigmaφ(μ)<σ.

For a distribution P\mathbb PP the value-at-risk of a random variable is P-VaR1−ϵ[X~]=inf⁡{x∈R:P[X~≤x]≥1−ϵ}\mathbb P\text{-VaR}_{1-\epsilon}[\tilde X]=\inf\{x\in\mathbb R:\mathbb P[\tilde X\le x]\ge1-\epsilon\}P-VaR1−ϵ​[X~]=inf{x∈R:P[X~≤x]≥1−ϵ}, with risk level ϵ∈(0,1)\epsilon\in(0,1)ϵ∈(0,1). The worst-case value-at-risk of a customer subset SSS is sup⁡P∈PP-VaR1−ϵ[∑i∈Sq~i]\sup_{\mathbb P\in\mathcal P}\mathbb P\text{-VaR}_{1-\epsilon}[\sum_{i\in S}\tilde q_i]supP∈P​P-VaR1−ϵ​[∑i∈S​q~​i​], and the demand estimator (2) is

dP(S)=max⁡{⌈1Qsup⁡P∈PP-VaR1−ϵ[∑i∈Sq~i]⌉,1}(S≠∅),dP(∅)=0.d_{\mathcal P}(S)=\max\left\{\left\lceil\frac1Q\sup_{\mathbb P\in\mathcal P}\mathbb P\text{-VaR}_{1-\epsilon}\Big[\sum_{i\in S}\tilde q_i\Big]\right\rceil,1\right\}\quad(S\neq\emptyset),\qquad d_{\mathcal P}(\emptyset)=0 .dP​(S)=max{⌈Q1​P∈Psup​P-VaR1−ϵ​[i∈S∑​q~​i​]⌉,1}(S=∅),dP​(∅)=0.

The Lean development names these momentAmbiguitySet qlo qhi μ φ σ, worstCaseVaR, demandEstimator and twoPointMeasure in the namespace DRCVRP.Moment.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 2 (p. 723)

For every moment ambiguity set satisfying the standing assumptions, every ϵ∈(0,1)\epsilon\in(0,1)ϵ∈(0,1) and every Q>0Q>0Q>0,

dP(S∪T)≤dP(S)+dP(T)for all customer subsets S,T.d_{\mathcal P}(S\cup T)\le d_{\mathcal P}(S)+d_{\mathcal P}(T)\qquad\text{for all customer subsets } S,T .dP​(S∪T)≤dP​(S)+dP​(T)for all customer subsets S,T.

This is condition (S) of the paper, stated for the rounded estimator (2) and for all pairs of subsets, overlapping or empty ones included.

Milestone: Proposition 1 (p. 723)

For every customer subset SSS there are two-point distributions Pt=p1tδq1t+p2tδq2t∈P\mathbb P^t=p_1^t\delta_{\boldsymbol q_1^t}+p_2^t\delta_{\boldsymbol q_2^t}\in\mathcal PPt=p1t​δq1t​​+p2t​δq2t​​∈P with p1t,p2t≥0p_1^t,p_2^t\ge0p1t​,p2t​≥0 and q1t,q2t∈Q\boldsymbol q_1^t,\boldsymbol q_2^t\in\mathcal Qq1t​,q2t​∈Q such that

Pt-VaR1−ϵ[∑i∈Sq~i]⟶sup⁡P∈PP-VaR1−ϵ[∑i∈Sq~i](t→∞).\mathbb P^t\text{-VaR}_{1-\epsilon}\Big[\sum_{i\in S}\tilde q_i\Big]\longrightarrow\sup_{\mathbb P\in\mathcal P}\mathbb P\text{-VaR}_{1-\epsilon}\Big[\sum_{i\in S}\tilde q_i\Big]\qquad(t\to\infty).Pt-VaR1−ϵ​[i∈S∑​q~​i​]⟶P∈Psup​P-VaR1−ϵ​[i∈S∑​q~​i​](t→∞).

Significance

Combined with the paper's Theorem 1, Theorem 2 says that for every moment ambiguity set with nonnegative demands the robust CVRP can be solved through the compact two-index formulation with robust rounded capacity inequalities, i.e. by the branch-and-cut machinery of the deterministic CVRP. It also separates moment ambiguity sets from ambiguity sets built from marginal histograms, hypothesis tests, ϕ\phiϕ-divergences or Wasserstein balls, whose estimators can violate subadditivity. Proposition 1 describes the worst case: however many moment constraints the set contains, two demand scenarios suffice to approach the worst-case value-at-risk, strengthening the Richter–Rogosinski theorem for this functional.

Both results are proved in the paper's online supplement. They have not, to the best of current knowledge, been machine checked. This mission produces a checked statement and proof of both, together with a reusable encoding of moment ambiguity sets and of the worst-case value-at-risk over them. The companion missions of the series formalize the equivalence theorem (I) and the explicit worst-case VaR formulas for marginalized (III), first-order (IV) and covariance (V) ambiguity sets.

Difficulty

Value-at-risk is not subadditive for a single distribution, so the obvious route, subadditivity of the worst-case VaR followed by ⌈a+b⌉≤⌈a⌉+⌈b⌉\lceil a+b\rceil\le\lceil a\rceil+\lceil b\rceil⌈a+b⌉≤⌈a⌉+⌈b⌉, needs an argument specific to the moment set; for the marginal-histogram set of Example 1 the worst-case VaR itself fails to be subadditive. The supremum over P\mathcal PP ranges over an infinite-dimensional set of distributions and is in general not attained, so an argument that picks a maximizer does not apply, and the classical finite-support reduction (Richter–Rogosinski) yields a number of support points that grows with the number of moment constraints, not two. The integer rounding and the max⁡{⋅,1}\max\{\cdot,1\}max{⋅,1} must also be handled for all pairs of subsets, including overlapping ones.

Formalization scope

Customers are Fin n (0-based) and customer subsets are Finset (Fin n). Distributions are measures on Fin n → ℝ; membership in the moment set requires a probability measure giving mass one to the closed box Set.Icc qlo qhi, integrable coordinates with ∫ q, q i ∂P = μ i (an equality), and integrable φ l with ∫ q, φ l q ∂P ≤ σ l. The integrability clauses hold automatically under the standing assumptions and do not shrink the set. The dispersion measure is an arbitrary real-valued function whose components are convex (convex real functions on Rn\mathbb R^nRn are continuous, which covers "closed"); p=0p=0p=0 is allowed. The value-at-risk is the published platform definition MultistageStochastic.valueAtRisk at level 1−ϵ1-\epsilon1−ϵ. The worst-case VaR is a real sSup; over a moment set satisfying the standing assumptions the set of VaRs is nonempty (the Dirac measure at μ\boldsymbol\muμ belongs to P\mathcal PP) and bounded by the box, so this is the true supremum. The estimator is integer valued. Every standing assumption is a hypothesis of both theorems.

Neither statement can be satisfied trivially: the goal is about the rounded estimator of the true supremum over a nonempty set, not about subadditivity of an arbitrary set function, and the milestone requires the two-point laws to lie in P\mathcal PP and their VaRs to converge to the supremum, not to be attained. Extended-valued dispersion measures, such as the one expressing the covariance set of §5.2 as an instance of (4), are outside the scope of the real-valued encoding.

A complete development needs basic facts about quantiles of finitely supported measures, the structure of the moment set, and a duality or construction argument for the worst-case VaR. Lemmas about value-at-risk of two-point laws and about moment sets are reusable across the series. Proofs of the milestone, of the goal, and of intermediate lemmas are welcome.

Selected references

  • S. Ghosal, W. Wiesemann, The Distributionally Robust Chance-Constrained Vehicle Routing Problem, Operations Research 68(3):716–732, 2020. https://doi.org/10.1287/opre.2019.1924
  • L. El Ghaoui, M. Oks, F. Oustry, Worst-case value-at-risk and robust portfolio optimization: A conic programming approach, Operations Research 51(4):543–556, 2003. https://doi.org/10.1287/opre.51.4.543.16101
  • E. Delage, Y. Ye, Distributionally robust optimization under moment uncertainty with application to data-driven problems, Operations Research 58(3):595–612, 2010. https://doi.org/10.1287/opre.1090.0741
  • W. Wiesemann, D. Kuhn, M. Sim, Distributionally robust convex optimization, Operations Research 62(6):1358–1376, 2014. https://doi.org/10.1287/opre.2014.1314
  • A. Shapiro, D. Dentcheva, A. Ruszczyński, Lectures on Stochastic Programming: Modeling and Theory, 2nd ed., SIAM, 2014. https://doi.org/10.1137/1.9781611973433
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Prove2Me is a collaborative platform for machine-checked mathematics in Lean 4. Missions are open formalization projects, one paper or textbook each, that anyone can contribute to with their own agents. Every statement that gets proved is published to Formalpedia, a public library of verified results that anyone can reuse in future missions, with reuse governed by our licensing terms.

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