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Operations Research

2,232 missions · 1,107 completed

The discipline of applying mathematical analysis to complex decision problems in operations: allocating scarce resources, scheduling, routing, inventory, and the design of service and production systems. Drawing on mathematical programming, stochastic modeling, queueing, simulation, and game-theoretic reasoning, it seeks policies that perform provably well in systems shaped by constraints, congestion, and uncertainty.

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OptimizationTheoretical Computer Science·Captain: mikedeng1

Joint Assortment Optimization and Customization under a Mixture of Multinomial Logit Models 1: Augmented Greedy Earns a (1 − 1/e) Fraction of the Optimal Revenue from the Complete Customer TypesResearch Paper

Motivation

Retailers that carry a limited range of products often know something about a customer before choosing which of those products to display. The customized assortment problem asks which products to carry when the displayed assortment may be tailored to the arriving customer's type. This separates the first-stage capacity decision from the later offer decision. El Housni and Topaloglu study the problem under a mixture of multinomial logit choice models and develop an approximation framework for it in their SSRN paper. This mission isolates their structural guarantee for Augmented Greedy, Theorem 4.2 of the PDF version dated 7 December 2021. The theorem identifies the revenue recovered from customer types whose optimal personalized offers agree with a chosen product subset.

The paper contrasts this setting with ordinary assortment optimization, where every type sees the same products. Its later approximation results use the structural guarantee here as a component. The classical comparison is the cardinality-constrained greedy bound for monotone submodular functions, associated with Nemhauser, Wolsey and Fisher (1978). The paper's Appendix B gives an instance in which the customized revenue function lacks global submodularity, so that classical result does not apply directly. El Housni and Topaloglu, §§4 and App. B.

Setting

Let N={1,…,n}N=\{1,\ldots,n\}N={1,…,n} be a finite product set. Product iii has positive revenue rir_iri​, and products are indexed with r1≥⋯≥rn>0r_1\ge\cdots\ge r_n>0r1​≥⋯≥rn​>0. Let M={1,…,m}M=\{1,\ldots,m\}M={1,…,m} be customer types. A type-jjj customer arrives with probability θj≥0\theta_j\ge0θj​≥0, with ∑j∈Mθj=1\sum_{j\in M}\theta_j=1∑j∈M​θj​=1, and assigns each product iii a nonnegative preference weight vijv_{ij}vij​. The no-purchase option has weight one. Offering an assortment T⊆NT\subseteq NT⊆N to that customer gives MNL expected revenue

Rev⁡j(T)=∑i∈Trivij1+∑i∈Tvij.\operatorname{Rev}_j(T)= \frac{\sum_{i\in T}r_i v_{ij}}{1+\sum_{i\in T}v_{ij}}.Revj​(T)=1+∑i∈T​vij​∑i∈T​ri​vij​​.

If the retailer initially carries only S⊆NS\subseteq NS⊆N, it can still choose the best offer to each customer type. Thus fj(S)=max⁡T⊆SRev⁡j(T)f_j(S)=\max_{T\subseteq S}\operatorname{Rev}_j(T)fj​(S)=maxT⊆S​Revj​(T). For C⊆MC\subseteq MC⊆M, write fC(S)=∑j∈Cθjfj(S)f^C(S)=\sum_{j\in C}\theta_j f_j(S)fC(S)=∑j∈C​θj​fj​(S), and abbreviate f=fMf=f^Mf=fM. The first-stage capacity is KKK; an optimal solution S∗S^*S∗ of CAP maximizes f(S)f(S)f(S) among sets with at most KKK products. These definitions and the standing data assumptions are stated in §2 and §4 of the paper.

For each product iii, the prefix Vi={1,…,i}V_i=\{1,\ldots,i\}Vi​={1,…,i} contains products at least as early in the revenue ordering. Greedy starts at the empty set, repeatedly adds an available product that maximizes the new objective value, and stops at cardinality kkk or when the prefix is exhausted. Augmented Greedy runs Greedy on ViV_iVi​ for each iii, using S↦∑j∈Cθjmin⁡(fj(S),ri)S\mapsto\sum_{j\in C}\theta_j\min(f_j(S),r_i)S↦∑j∈C​θj​min(fj​(S),ri​), and returns whichever candidate has the greatest fCf^CfC value. Both stages may break ties arbitrarily. El Housni and Topaloglu, §4.1.

For type jjj, use the optimal personalized assortment Sj∗={i∈S∗:ri≥fj(S∗)}S_j^*=\{i\in S^*:r_i\ge f_j(S^*)\}Sj∗​={i∈S∗:ri​≥fj​(S∗)}, characterized by Lemma E.1. A type j∈Cj\in Cj∈C is complete with respect to P⊆NP\subseteq NP⊆N when P∩Sj∗=P∩S∗P\cap S_j^*=P\cap S^*P∩Sj∗​=P∩S∗; let CPC_PCP​ collect these types. The threshold choice matters because zero-weight products can be present in other optimal offers without helping a customer. El Housni and Topaloglu, Definition 4.1 and App. E.

Formalization targets

Theorem 4.2: complete-type revenue

For every C⊆MC\subseteq MC⊆M, P⊆NP\subseteq NP⊆N, kkk with ∣P∩S∗∣≤k|P\cap S^*|\le k∣P∩S∗∣≤k, and every output Δ\DeltaΔ of Augmented Greedy on C,kC,kC,k,

fC(Δ)≥(1−1/e) fCP(P∩S∗).f^C(\Delta)\ge(1-1/e)\,f^{C_P}(P\cap S^*).fC(Δ)≥(1−1/e)fCP​(P∩S∗).

This is the mission goal, the structural performance statement of Theorem 4.2, p. 11. It does not assert a constant-factor approximation to all of CAP: it identifies the contribution from complete customer types.

Supporting targets

The milestone list follows the results used with this bound: monotonicity of fjf_jfj​ from Appendix C; the MNL threshold assortment of Lemma E.1; submodularity of S↦min⁡(fj(S),ri)S\mapsto\min(f_j(S),r_i)S↦min(fj​(S),ri​) on ViV_iVi​ from Lemma 4.3; and the cited 1−1/e1-1/e1−1/e Greedy guarantee for a nonnegative monotone submodular objective. The greedy milestone compares its output against every feasible set of cardinality at most kkk.

Significance

The theorem says that one algorithmic output captures a fixed fraction of the benchmark supplied by complete types, despite the absence of global submodularity of fff. It connects the local behavior of truncated type revenues to the full customized assortment objective. The paper uses this result in the development of later algorithms; without it, the standard submodular greedy theorem gives no immediate conclusion for CAP. El Housni and Topaloglu, §§4–5.

The mathematical results are proved in the 2021 paper. The formalization work here is to give machine-checkable statements for the objective, the algorithm with all its legal tie choices, and the four supporting targets, then supply proofs. The MNL revenue formula is already available as a published platform definition; the local CAP and algorithm definitions specify the extra model needed by this theorem. A completed development could also support later CAP missions that use the same threshold and submodularity properties.

Difficulty

The tempting argument applies the classical greedy guarantee directly to fff, since fff increases when more products are carried. Appendix B of the paper shows that this fails: even for one customer type, fff need not be submodular. Restricting the ground set to a revenue prefix and truncating each fjf_jfj​ at that prefix's revenue level changes the submodularity question, but the final guarantee must still concern the untruncated fCf^CfC objective. The threshold condition in the definition of CPC_PCP​ is what makes that comparison meaningful. El Housni and Topaloglu, App. B, Lemma 4.3 and Theorem 4.2.

Formalization scope

Products and types are Fin n and Fin m; their zero-based Lean indices correspond to the paper's indices plus one. Assortments and type groups are finite sets. The model assumes ri>0r_i>0ri​>0, vij≥0v_{ij}\ge0vij​≥0, θj≥0\theta_j\ge0θj​≥0, ∑jθj=1\sum_j\theta_j=1∑j​θj​=1, and decreasing revenue order. The no-purchase weight is exactly one. CAP and personalized revenue use maxima over nonempty finite powersets, so empty input sets have their intended value rather than an arbitrary real supremum. The theorem keeps the source's optimality assumption on S∗S^*S∗, even though its particular inequality uses less.

The Greedy predicate describes each successive maximizer and the exact stopping rule. Augmented Greedy requires a Greedy output at every prefix and an fCf^CfC-maximizing choice among them. Thus the output is constrained by the printed algorithm, and the statement covers every tie-break. The type-jjj assortment is defined from S∗S^*S∗ by the Lemma E.1 threshold, rather than supplied as a free set. These choices rule out a size-only output condition, an arbitrarily chosen Sj∗S_j^*Sj∗​, a vacuous run predicate, and real supremum defaults. The target includes the corner cases k=0k=0k=0, C=∅C=\varnothingC=∅, and P∩S∗=∅P\cap S^*=\varnothingP∩S∗=∅, where its right side is zero. Arrival probabilities summing to one force m≥1m\ge1m≥1; Augmented Greedy has an output only when at least one product exists.

The reusable parts are the MNL threshold characterization, finite-set submodularity and the general Greedy bound. Contributions toward those lemmas, the paper's case analysis for Lemma 4.3, and the final structural theorem are in scope. Runtime claims, the paper's later logarithmic approximation theorems and its computational experiments are outside this mission.

Selected references

  • Omar El Housni and Huseyin Topaloglu, Joint Assortment Optimization and Customization under a Mixture of Multinomial Logit Models: Value of Personalized Assortments, SSRN 3830082, version of 7 December 2021; published as Operations Research 71(4), 2023. SSRN preprint. The mission's numbering and page citations use the pinned 2021 PDF.
  • George L. Nemhauser, Laurence A. Wolsey and Marshall L. Fisher, An Analysis of Approximations for Maximizing Submodular Set Functions—I, Mathematical Programming 14, 265–294, 1978. DOI.
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Algorithmic Game TheoryTheoretical Computer Science·Captain: mikedeng1

Prophet Inequalities Made Easy: Stochastic Optimization by Pricing Nonstochastic Inputs III: Under a Consistent Allocation Rule, (α, β)-Balanced Prices Are Closed Under Maxima of ValuationsResearch Paper

Motivation

Posted prices turn an offline allocation problem into a sequential choice process: each agent sees a menu of outcomes and prices, then chooses an outcome without revealing its full valuation. The balanced prices framework of Dütting, Feldman, Kesselheim, and Lucier gives welfare guarantees by comparing the revenue collected from an allocation with the welfare that remains feasible after it. Its appeal is that the comparison can be checked in a deterministic full-information setting before any probability distribution over valuations enters the analysis. Dütting et al., 2020

One valuation class at a time would make that framework difficult to reuse. Combinatorial auction valuations are often built by taking pointwise maxima of simpler valuations or by adding values from separate markets. Section 5 of the paper asks whether a price construction balanced for the simple class remains balanced after these operations. Theorem 5.3 gives the maximum closure result; Theorem 5.4 gives addition across markets. Appendix B extends both to the weaker balancing condition used elsewhere in the paper. Dütting et al., 2020, §5 and Appendix B

Setting

There are nnn agents in a fixed order. Agent iii receives an outcome xix_ixi​ from a space XiX_iXi​ containing a null outcome. A profile x=(xi)ix=(x_i)_ix=(xi​)i​ is feasible when it lies in F\mathcal FF. The model assumes downward closure: removing the outcomes of any group of agents from a feasible profile keeps it feasible. For a set of agents SSS, write xSx_SxS​ for the profile retaining xix_ixi​ on SSS and assigning the null outcome elsewhere. The prefix x[i−1]x_{[i-1]}x[i−1]​ retains only the agents before iii. Dütting et al., 2020, §2

A valuation profile vvv assigns each agent a function vi:Xi→Rv_i:X_i\to\mathbb Rvi​:Xi​→R. The welfare of xxx is v(x)=∑ivi(xi)v(x)=\sum_i v_i(x_i)v(x)=∑i​vi​(xi​). Every base valuation takes values in [0,1][0,1][0,1], the normalization stated in §2. For any set SSS of profiles, v(OPT⁡(v,S))v(\operatorname{OPT}(v,S))v(OPT(v,S)) denotes the best welfare achievable in SSS. An allocation rule ALG chooses a feasible profile from a valuation profile. A pricing rule assigns a nonnegative, possibly infinite price pi(xi∣y)p_i(x_i\mid y)pi​(xi​∣y) to outcome xix_ixi​ when the partial profile is yyy; an infeasible extension has infinite price. Dütting et al., 2020, pp. 547–548

An exchange-compatible family (Fx)x∈X(\mathcal F_x)_{x\in X}(Fx​)x∈X​ specifies a set of comparison profiles for each profile xxx. It is exchange compatible when replacing any one coordinate of xxx by the corresponding coordinate of any y∈Fxy\in\mathcal F_xy∈Fx​ gives a feasible profile. This property is required for every xxx in the full outcome space. A rule pvp^vpv is (α,β)(\alpha,\beta)(α,β)-balanced for valuation vvv, ALG, and that family, for constants α>0\alpha>0α>0 and β≥0\beta\ge0β≥0 (Definition 3.1), when both inequalities hold for every feasible xxx and every x′∈Fxx'\in\mathcal F_xx′∈Fx​:

v(ALG⁡(v))−v(OPT⁡(v,Fx))α≤∑ipiv(xi∣x[i−1]),∑ipiv(xi′∣x[i−1])≤βv(OPT⁡(v,Fx)).\frac{v(\operatorname{ALG}(v))-v(\operatorname{OPT}(v,\mathcal F_x))}{\alpha} \le \sum_i p_i^v(x_i\mid x_{[i-1]}), \qquad \sum_i p_i^v(x'_i\mid x_{[i-1]}) \le \beta v(\operatorname{OPT}(v,\mathcal F_x)).αv(ALG(v))−v(OPT(v,Fx​))​≤i∑​piv​(xi​∣x[i−1]​),i∑​piv​(xi′​∣x[i−1]​)≤βv(OPT(v,Fx​)).

The maximum extension Vimax⁡V_i^{\max}Vimax​ of a base valuation space ViV_iVi​ consists of nonempty finite pointwise maxima of elements of ViV_iVi​. A base profile v~\tilde vv~ supports an extended profile vvv at xxx if v~i≤vi\tilde v_i\le v_iv~i​≤vi​ at every outcome and v~i(xi)=vi(xi)\tilde v_i(x_i)=v_i(x_i)v~i​(xi​)=vi​(xi​) for every agent. ALG is consistent when v~(ALG⁡(v~))≥v~(ALG⁡(v))\tilde v(\operatorname{ALG}(\tilde v))\ge\tilde v(\operatorname{ALG}(v))v~(ALG(v~))≥v~(ALG(v)) whenever v~\tilde vv~ supports vvv at ALG⁡(v)\operatorname{ALG}(v)ALG(v). The optimal allocation rule has this property by Lemma 5.2. Dütting et al., 2020, p. 554

Formalization targets

Closure under maxima

The goal is Theorem 5.3. Given one exchange-compatible family and a collection (pw)w∈V(p^w)_{w\in V}(pw)w∈V​ balanced for every base profile, consistency of ALG preserves the same constants for every extended profile and every corresponding supporting base profile:

v∈Vmax⁡,v~∈V supports v at ALG⁡(v)⟹pv~ is (α,β)-balanced for v.v\in V^{\max},\quad \tilde v\in V\text{ supports }v\text{ at }\operatorname{ALG}(v) \quad\Longrightarrow\quad p^{\tilde v}\text{ is }(\alpha,\beta)\text{-balanced for }v.v∈Vmax,v~∈V supports v at ALG(v)⟹pv~ is (α,β)-balanced for v.

The milestone list records the welfare supremum comparison and the two price inequalities in the paper's proof. The family Fx\mathcal F_xFx​ remains the same for all base and extended profiles. Dütting et al., 2020, Theorem 5.3 and proof

Closure under addition and weak balancedness

Theorem 5.4 treats mmm separate allocation problems. The joint outcome and feasible set are products; values and prices add across components; ALG applies each component's rule. It asserts balancedness with the same α\alphaα and β\betaβ. Appendix B changes the second balancedness bound to β1v(OPT⁡(v,Fx))+β2v(ALG⁡(v))\beta_1v(\operatorname{OPT}(v,\mathcal F_x))+\beta_2v(\operatorname{ALG}(v))β1​v(OPT(v,Fx​))+β2​v(ALG(v)) and requires strong consistency for maximum closure. Theorems B.2 and B.3 preserve α,β1,β2\alpha,\beta_1,\beta_2α,β1​,β2​ under maxima and addition, respectively. Dütting et al., 2020, Theorems 5.4, B.2, B.3

Significance

The maximum closure theorem lets a balanced-price construction for a simple valuation class cover finite maxima of that class without worsening its balancing constants. The addition theorem lets separately priced markets be combined by summing prices. Together these two operations account for the XOS composition discussed immediately after Theorem 5.4; the paper uses the results to connect its general framework to combinatorial auctions and multidimensional matroid settings. Dütting et al., 2020, p. 555

These results have paper proofs. The work here is to state their exact deterministic content in Lean so later formalizations of the price constructions can import the closure theorems. The definitions of supporting valuations, exchange-compatible families, and extended-real prices are reusable beyond this mission. The companion statements keep the product-market and weak-balancedness variants alongside the central theorem, while their proofs remain to be formalized.

Difficulty

For maximum closure, the prices are indexed by a base profile v~\tilde vv~ but must be balanced for a different profile vvv that is pointwise larger. A supporting profile agrees with vvv only at ALG's outcome ALG⁡(v)\operatorname{ALG}(v)ALG(v), while condition (a) refers to ALG⁡(v~)\operatorname{ALG}(\tilde v)ALG(v~), an outcome ALG chooses for a different input, and both conditions refer to optimal welfare over Fx\mathcal F_xFx​, where v~\tilde vv~ and vvv can differ. Balancedness of pv~p^{\tilde v}pv~ for v~\tilde vv~ therefore says nothing about vvv on its own; without a hypothesis tying ALG's choices for vvv and v~\tilde vv~ together the statement is false, which is why consistency (Definition 5.1) is part of the theorem. The formal statement must keep the real-valued optimum meaningful for maxima of base valuations, so the [0,1][0,1][0,1] normalization of §2 is carried through to Vmax⁡V^{\max}Vmax. Dütting et al., 2020, Definition 5.1 and Theorem 5.3

For addition, a direct product of the component comparison families has an edge case: a component family can be empty while another is nonempty. The paper's displayed product family then makes the lower balancedness inequality too strong. The theorem statements ask for an exchange-compatible family to exist, as the printed theorems do; they do not require that failing product family. This discrepancy is recorded for review. Dütting et al., 2020, proof of Theorem 5.4

Formalization scope

Agents and markets use zero-based finite indices; the paper writes agent indices from one. A profile's prefix contains exactly the agents with smaller indices. Valuations are functions to R\mathbb RR with base values in [0,1][0,1][0,1]. The maximum extension uses a nonempty finite set of base functions, so its maximum is defined at every outcome. Optimal welfare is a real supremum; bounded valuations keep it finite, and the empty set has value zero. Prices are extended nonnegative reals so +∞+\infty+∞ is retained. The lower balancedness inequality embeds its real right side using ofReal, which handles a negative lower bound consistently with nonnegative prices. The upper inequality keeps the price sum in extended reals.

The maximum theorem quantifies over every extended profile and every supporting base profile, including genuinely new maxima. It keeps one exchange-compatible family for all valuations. The maximum-closure theorems require every base price to satisfy the pricing-rule condition and conclude it for the supporting price. ALG feasibility is assumed on Vmax⁡V^{\max}Vmax, which contains the base profiles. The product theorems construct joint outcomes, additive values, componentwise ALG, and summed prices from the component data; they do not admit an unrelated joint allocation rule. Downward closure and a zero price for the null outcome at feasible partial allocations are included for the product statements. The latter is a disclosed assumption satisfied by the paper's pricing examples and needed to handle empty component families. No distribution or posted-price run is part of this deterministic mission. Lemma 5.2 and the strong-consistency companion take an optimal rule to be one that attains the welfare supremum over F\mathcal FF on every profile in Vmax⁡V^{\max}Vmax, the profiles to which Definitions 5.1 and B.1 apply it; the product companions additionally conclude that the summed prices form a pricing rule (infinite off F\mathcal FF). Their ALG feasibility premise concerns the component profiles supplied in the theorem.

The development needs finite dependent products and sums, finite maxima, real suprema of bounded sets, and extended nonnegative arithmetic. Contributions proving the three maximum-closure milestones, the goal, or the product-market companions are all within scope. A proof that specializes the supporting profile to v~=v\tilde v=vv~=v would lose the intended maximum extension and does not satisfy the goal's universal quantification.

Selected references

  • P. Dütting, M. Feldman, T. Kesselheim, and B. Lucier, Prophet Inequalities Made Easy: Stochastic Optimization by Pricing Nonstochastic Inputs, SIAM Journal on Computing 49(3):540–582, 2020. DOI: 10.1137/20M1323850.
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Machine LearningOptimizationProbability·Captain: mikedeng1

Stochastic First- and Zeroth-Order Methods for Nonconvex Stochastic Programming 3: The Two-Phase RSG Method Finds an (ε, Λ)-Solution within S(Λ)[N(ε) + T(ε, Λ)] Oracle CallsResearch Paper

Motivation

Stochastic optimization methods often see only noisy gradients. For a nonconvex objective, a useful guarantee is that an output point has a small gradient: this is a first-order stationarity certificate, even when there is no claim that the point is globally optimal. A guarantee on the expected squared gradient leaves open how often one particular run succeeds. The two-phase randomized stochastic gradient method of Ghadimi and Lan (2013) addresses that question by generating several candidates and using further oracle calls to select one. The paper gives an explicit bound on the probability of failure and on the number of oracle calls needed for a prescribed accuracy and confidence.

The work sits within stochastic approximation, where the objective may be a population expectation or another function accessible through noisy observations. The 2013 paper develops first- and zeroth-order methods for smooth nonconvex problems. This mission concerns its two-phase first-order result, Theorem 2.4, rather than the Gaussian smoothing results in its later section. The source for every index here is the arXiv v1 preprint; the printed page and PDF page coincide.

Setting

The objective is a differentiable function f:Rn→Rf:\mathbb R^n\to\mathbb Rf:Rn→R bounded below, with true optimal value f∗=inf⁡xf(x)f^*=\inf_x f(x)f∗=infx​f(x). Its gradient map g=∇fg=\nabla fg=∇f is LLL-Lipschitz: ∥g(y)−g(x)∥≤L∥y−x∥\|g(y)-g(x)\|\le L\|y-x\|∥g(y)−g(x)∥≤L∥y−x∥ for all x,yx,yx,y. The mission uses L>0L>0L>0. No convexity is assumed.

A stochastic first-order oracle returns a vector G(xk,ξk)G(x_k,\xi_k)G(xk​,ξk​) when called at the current iterate xkx_kxk​. Assumption A1 says that the oracle is unbiased at that iterate and has squared error of expectation at most σ2\sigma^2σ2. The noise may depend on earlier calls. In the formal model, the mean is conditional on the past, and the oracle and squared-error random variables are integrable. This makes explicit the probabilistic assumptions used when the paper takes expectations. The model takes σ>0\sigma>0σ>0 because the paper's displayed stepsize and post-optimization sample size otherwise degenerate under Lean's total division convention.

A randomized stochastic gradient run starts at x1x_1x1​ and uses xk+1=xk−γkG(xk,ξk)x_{k+1}=x_k-\gamma_k G(x_k,\xi_k)xk+1​=xk​−γk​G(xk​,ξk​). It chooses an output index R∈{1,…,N}R\in\{1,\ldots,N\}R∈{1,…,N} with the probability mass function in equation (2.3), independently of that run's oracle noise, and outputs xRx_RxR​. For a parameter D~>0\widetilde D>0D>0, the constant stepsize in equation (2.13) is γk=min⁡{1/L,D~/(σN)}\gamma_k=\min\{1/L,\widetilde D/(\sigma\sqrt N)\}γk​=min{1/L,D/(σN​)}. The paper writes Df=2(f(x1)−f∗)/LD_f=\sqrt{2(f(x_1)-f^*)/L}Df​=2(f(x1​)−f∗)/L​ and

BN=LDf2N+(D~+Df2D~)σN.\mathcal B_N=\frac{LD_f^2}{N}+\left(\widetilde D+\frac{D_f^2}{\widetilde D}\right)\frac{\sigma}{\sqrt N}.BN​=NLDf2​​+(D+DDf2​​)N​σ​.

The two-phase method makes SSS independent RSG runs, yielding xˉ1,…,xˉS\bar x_1,\ldots,\bar x_Sxˉ1​,…,xˉS​. For each candidate it averages TTT fresh oracle outputs into an estimated gradient g^s\widehat g_sg​s​. It selects a candidate xˉ∗\bar x^*xˉ∗ whose estimated-gradient norm is minimal. The post-optimization samples for different candidates may be recycled; the paper explicitly permits this. The candidate itself is known when its post-optimization samples are taken, so the conditional oracle assumption is stated relative to a filtration that contains it at time zero.

Formalization targets

The first target is the one-run mean bound of Corollary 2.2, L−1E∥g(xR)∥2≤BNL^{-1}\mathbb E\|g(x_R)\|^2\le\mathcal B_NL−1E∥g(xR​)∥2≤BN​, followed by the one-run tail bound (2.19). Lemma 2.3(a) controls the squared norm of a sum of vector martingale differences. Equation (2.28) relates a selected candidate's true gradient to the best candidate and the estimation errors. Equation (2.29) factors the probability of simultaneous failure across independent runs and bounds it, while (2.30) bounds the other source of failure: every optimization run performing poorly, and at least one estimated gradient being inaccurate.

For arbitrary positive S,N,TS,N,TS,N,T, Theorem 2.4(a) states the stronger quantitative tail bound

Pr⁡{∥g(xˉ∗)∥2≥2(4LBN+3λσ2T)}≤S+1λ+2−S(λ>0).\Pr\left\{\|g(\bar x^*)\|^2\ge2\left(4L\mathcal B_N+\frac{3\lambda\sigma^2}{T}\right)\right\}\le\frac{S+1}{\lambda}+2^{-S}\qquad(\lambda>0).Pr{∥g(xˉ∗)∥2≥2(4LBN​+T3λσ2​)}≤λS+1​+2−S(λ>0).

The goal, Theorem 2.4(b), specializes those parameters to an accuracy ε>0\varepsilon>0ε>0 and failure probability 0<Λ<10<\Lambda<10<Λ<1. It sets

S=⌈log⁡22Λ⌉,N=⌈max⁡{32L2Df2ε,(32L(D~+Df2/D~)σε)2}⌉,T=⌈24(S+1)σ2Λε⌉.S=\left\lceil\log_2\frac2\Lambda\right\rceil,\qquad N=\left\lceil\max\left\{\frac{32L^2D_f^2}{\varepsilon},\left(\frac{32L(\widetilde D+D_f^2/\widetilde D)\sigma}{\varepsilon}\right)^2\right\}\right\rceil,\qquad T=\left\lceil\frac{24(S+1)\sigma^2}{\Lambda\varepsilon}\right\rceil.S=⌈log2​Λ2​⌉,N=​max⎩⎨⎧​ε32L2Df2​​,(ε32L(D+Df2​/D)σ​)2⎭⎬⎫​​,T=⌈Λε24(S+1)σ2​⌉.

An (ε,Λ)(\varepsilon,\Lambda)(ε,Λ)-solution is a point satisfying Pr⁡{∥g(xˉ∗)∥2≤ε}≥1−Λ\Pr\{\|g(\bar x^*)\|^2\le\varepsilon\}\ge1-\LambdaPr{∥g(xˉ∗)∥2≤ε}≥1−Λ. With those parameter values, the method computes such a point using at most S(N+T)S(N+T)S(N+T) stochastic first-order oracle calls. The formulas and constants above are those of equations (2.24)–(2.27) of the preprint.

Significance

The result turns a mean stationarity bound into a confidence guarantee for one returned point, with an explicit accounting of both candidate generation and candidate assessment. It identifies how the number of independent runs, iterations per run, and gradient estimates scale with the requested accuracy and failure probability. Without the post-optimization phase, the paper's direct Markov estimate (2.19) gives a less favorable dependence on the failure probability for a single run.

The mathematical theorem is proved in the 2013 paper; the Lean declarations in this proposal are statements awaiting machine-checked proofs. A completed formalization would give reusable definitions for a dependent-noise gradient oracle, a random-output stochastic-gradient run, and a post-optimization selection procedure. The vector martingale estimate and finite-candidate inequality could also serve later stochastic-optimization developments. Contributions to the probability and measurability infrastructure, as well as the final rate proof, are within scope.

Difficulty

Selecting the candidate with the smallest estimated gradient need not select the one with the smallest true gradient. The estimates are random and are evaluated at candidates that are themselves random outputs of earlier oracle runs. A bound for a fixed point does not address this dependence. The argument needs a conditional oracle contract at each candidate and a separate guarantee that the optimization runs supply a sufficiently good candidate. The paper's intermediate display (2.31) applies a fixed-candidate tail estimate to the selected candidate even though the selection examines the same estimates; that step is not justified by the stated assumptions. The final bound can be phrased without treating (2.31) as a separate target.

Formalization scope

The space Rn\mathbb R^nRn is EuclideanSpace ℝ (Fin n). Iterations and oracle samples retain the paper's one-based indexing; candidate runs use Fin S, which reindexes the paper's 1,…,S1,\ldots,S1,…,S. The objective's true infimum is carried by IsGLB (Set.range f) fstar, so DfD_fDf​ cannot be weakened by substituting an arbitrary lower bound. Each candidate is generated by the RSG recursion and the mass function (2.3); the one-run performance bound is a theorem, not a hypothesis of the two-phase model. Independent candidate outputs are required for (2.29). The selected candidate may be any minimizer of the estimated-gradient norm, with any tie rule; no measurability of the selection is assumed.

All expectations are Bochner integrals, with integrability included in the oracle assumptions and in the one-run conclusion. Probabilities are ℝ≥0∞ values. The noise carrier is generalized from the paper's Borel subsets of Euclidean space to a measurable type. The general vector martingale lemma omits the paper's Polish-space and trivial-time-zero conditions; neither is needed for its squared-norm bound, and the latter would conflict with a candidate known at time zero. Its non-strict tail statement is restricted to a positive sum of variance bounds, because the printed version is false when every bound is zero. The goal reads the logarithm in (2.24) as base two, matching the paper's final 2−S≤Λ/22^{-S}\le\Lambda/22−S≤Λ/2 comparison. Positive σ\sigmaσ and D~\widetilde DD avoid zero steps and an empty post-optimization average.

The formal goal states the probability guarantee. The S(N+T)S(N+T)S(N+T) oracle-call bound follows directly from the algorithm's two loops and is recorded in the theorem's prose rather than in a separate operational semantics for calls. A complete proof may use Mathlib's conditional expectations, independent random variables, finite sums, and real logarithm and ceiling libraries. No assumption may simply postulate the one-run gradient bound or the final success probability.

Selected references

  • Saeed Ghadimi and Guanghui Lan, Stochastic First- and Zeroth-Order Methods for Nonconvex Stochastic Programming, SIAM Journal on Optimization 23(4), 2013. arXiv:1309.5549v1.
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OptimizationProbabilityStatistics·Captain: mikedeng1

Recovering Best Statistical Guarantees via the Empirical Divergence-Based Distributionally Robust Optimization 1: Empirical Burg-Ball DRO Bounds Cover E[h(x;ξ)] with Probability Tending to 1 − αResearch Paper

Motivation

Stochastic programs and chance-constrained models in operations research contain expectations of the form

Z0(x)=E0[h(x;ξ)],Z_0(x)=\mathbb E_0[h(x;\xi)],Z0​(x)=E0​[h(x;ξ)],

where ξ\xiξ is a random input under an unknown distribution P0P_0P0​, xxx is a decision and hhh is a known loss. In practice P0P_0P0​ is seen only through i.i.d. data ξ1,…,ξn\xi_1,\dots,\xi_nξ1​,…,ξn​. Distributionally robust optimization (DRO) replaces the unknown expectation by the worst case over a set of plausible distributions, and a recurring question is how large that set should be so that the robust value is a statistically valid bound, without being needlessly conservative.

The usual answer, for divergence-based sets on a finite support of size kkk, sets the radius from a χk−12\chi^2_{k-1}χk−12​ quantile (Ben-Tal et al. 2013). This guarantee holds simultaneously for every function of the distribution, and so it is loose for a single expectation, and it degrades as kkk grows. H. Lam (arXiv:1605.09349, Operations Research 2019) observed that if the ball is placed around the empirical distribution and measured with the Burg entropy, the right radius uses one degree of freedom, whatever the support. The DRO bounds then form an asymptotically exact confidence interval for Z0(x)Z_0(x)Z0​(x). The mechanism is the empirical likelihood method of Owen (Owen 1988; Owen 2001).

Timeline:

  • 1988: Owen proves the empirical likelihood theorem for a mean (−2 log of the profile likelihood ratio tends to χ12\chi^2_1χ12​), the nonparametric analogue of Wilks' theorem.
  • 2013: Ben-Tal, den Hertog, De Waegenaere, Melenberg and Rennen calibrate φ\varphiφ-divergence balls on a finite support with χk−12\chi^2_{k-1}χk−12​ quantiles.
  • 2016: Lam (this paper) connects the empirical Burg-ball DRO to empirical likelihood, with pointwise (Theorem 2) and uniform (Theorem 4) coverage.
  • 2016–2021: Duchi, Glynn and Namkoong (arXiv:1610.03425) develop the general fff-divergence version and exact coverage of optimal values.

Setting

Data: ξ1,ξ2,…\xi_1,\xi_2,\dotsξ1​,ξ2​,… are i.i.d. random elements of a measurable space Ξ\XiΞ under P0P_0P0​. A decision x∈Rmx\in\mathbb R^mx∈Rm is fixed, and h(x;⋅):Ξ→Rh(x;\cdot):\Xi\to\mathbb Rh(x;⋅):Ξ→R is measurable with 0<Var⁡0h(x;ξ)<∞0<\operatorname{Var}_0 h(x;\xi)<\infty0<Var0​h(x;ξ)<∞.

The empirical Burg-entropy divergence ball of radius η\etaη is the set of weight vectors on the nnn data points

Un(η)={w∈Rn: −1n∑i=1nlog⁡(nwi)≤η, ∑i=1nwi=1, wi≥0},\mathcal U_n(\eta)=\Big\{w\in\mathbb R^n:\ -\frac1n\sum_{i=1}^n\log(nw_i)\le\eta,\ \sum_{i=1}^n w_i=1,\ w_i\ge0\Big\},Un​(η)={w∈Rn: −n1​i=1∑n​log(nwi​)≤η, i=1∑n​wi​=1, wi​≥0},

with log⁡0=−∞\log 0=-\inftylog0=−∞. It is the φ\varphiφ-divergence ball around the uniform weights 1/n1/n1/n for the Burg generator φ(t)=−log⁡t+t−1\varphi(t)=-\log t+t-1φ(t)=−logt+t−1. Let χ1,1−α2\chi^2_{1,1-\alpha}χ1,1−α2​ be the (1−α)(1-\alpha)(1−α)-quantile of the χ12\chi^2_1χ12​ law, i.e. P(Y2≤χ1,1−α2)=1−αP(Y^2\le\chi^2_{1,1-\alpha})=1-\alphaP(Y2≤χ1,1−α2​)=1−α for Y∼N(0,1)Y\sim N(0,1)Y∼N(0,1). The empirical DRO bounds are

Z‾n(x)=min⁡w∈Un(χ1,1−α2/(2n))∑i=1nh(x;ξi)wi,Z‾n(x)=max⁡w∈Un(χ1,1−α2/(2n))∑i=1nh(x;ξi)wi.\underline Z_n(x)=\min_{w\in\mathcal U_n(\chi^2_{1,1-\alpha}/(2n))}\sum_{i=1}^n h(x;\xi_i)w_i,\qquad \overline Z_n(x)=\max_{w\in\mathcal U_n(\chi^2_{1,1-\alpha}/(2n))}\sum_{i=1}^n h(x;\xi_i)w_i .Z​n​(x)=w∈Un​(χ1,1−α2​/(2n))min​i=1∑n​h(x;ξi​)wi​,Zn​(x)=w∈Un​(χ1,1−α2​/(2n))max​i=1∑n​h(x;ξi​)wi​.

For a sample z∈Rnz\in\mathbb R^nz∈Rn and a value μ\muμ, the profile empirical likelihood statistic is

−2log⁡R(μ)=min⁡{−2∑i=1nlog⁡(nwi): ∑iwizi=μ, ∑iwi=1, wi≥0},-2\log R(\mu)=\min\Big\{-2\sum_{i=1}^n\log(nw_i):\ \sum_i w_iz_i=\mu,\ \sum_i w_i=1,\ w_i\ge0\Big\},−2logR(μ)=min{−2i=1∑n​log(nwi​): i∑​wi​zi​=μ, i∑​wi​=1, wi​≥0},

equal to +∞+\infty+∞ when no weight vector is feasible.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 2 (p. 11)

lim⁡n→∞P(Z‾n(x)≤Z0(x)≤Z‾n(x))=1−α.\lim_{n\to\infty}P\big(\underline Z_n(x)\le Z_0(x)\le\overline Z_n(x)\big)=1-\alpha .n→∞lim​P(Z​n​(x)≤Z0​(x)≤Zn​(x))=1−α.

The event is two-sided and joint. No rate is claimed.

Milestones

  • Proposition 2 (p. 23). For every data vector and κ≥0\kappa\ge0κ≥0,
min⁡Un(κ/(2n))∑iwizi≤μ≤max⁡Un(κ/(2n))∑iwizi  ⟺  −2log⁡R(μ)≤κ.\min_{\mathcal U_n(\kappa/(2n))}\textstyle\sum_i w_iz_i\le\mu\le\max_{\mathcal U_n(\kappa/(2n))}\sum_i w_iz_i\iff -2\log R(\mu)\le\kappa .Un​(κ/(2n))min​∑i​wi​zi​≤μ≤maxUn​(κ/(2n))​∑i​wi​zi​⟺−2logR(μ)≤κ.
  • Theorem 1, the empirical likelihood theorem (p. 10). −2log⁡R(Z0(x))⇒χ12-2\log R(Z_0(x))\Rightarrow\chi^2_1−2logR(Z0​(x))⇒χ12​.
  • The pointwise steps of the paper's proof of Theorem 1 (the proof of Theorem 5 with a one-point index set): Lemma 3 (p. 38), max⁡i≤n∣Yi∣=o(n1/2)\max_{i\le n}|Y_i|=o(n^{1/2})maxi≤n​∣Yi​∣=o(n1/2) a.s. for square-integrable i.i.d. YiY_iYi​; the closed form (49)–(50) (pp. 25–26) of the optimal weights; the multiplier bound (52) (p. 27); the expansion (68) (p. 30), −2log⁡R=ns−1hˉ2+op(1)-2\log R=n s^{-1}\bar h^2+o_p(1)−2logR=ns−1hˉ2+op​(1).

Significance

Theorem 2 says that a robust optimization formulation with a data-driven Burg ball of radius χ1,1−α2/(2n)\chi^2_{1,1-\alpha}/(2n)χ1,1−α2​/(2n) yields an asymptotically exact (1−α)(1-\alpha)(1−α) confidence interval for an expected loss, independently of the support size of ξ\xiξ. Proposition 2 is the bridge: it identifies the DRO interval with the empirical likelihood confidence region, so any distributional result on −2log⁡R-2\log R−2logR transfers to the DRO bounds. This is the pointwise basis of the paper's later results on feasibility of chance and expectation constraints.

The result is proved in the paper, and Theorem 1 is classical. To our knowledge none of these statements has a machine-checked proof. Formalizing them requires the empirical likelihood theorem in Lean, which is reusable well beyond DRO (empirical likelihood tests and intervals for means). The Open platform theorem GenEmpLik.Coverage.theorem_3 (Duchi, Glynn and Namkoong) implies the goal when its decision set is the single point {x}\{x\}{x} and its generator is 2φ2\varphi2φ with radius χ1,1−α2\chi^2_{1,1-\alpha}χ1,1−α2​; it is a different, more general statement and is not proved. Likewise the Open GenEmpLik.Expansion.lemma_7 implies Lemma 3, and the Proved NumStochOpt.ListScheduling.lemma_8_1_i_max_over_sqrt_ae gives Lemma 3 after passing to ∣Yi∣|Y_i|∣Yi​∣.

Difficulty

Proposition 2 is a finite-dimensional convexity statement, but it needs attainment of the minimum defining −2log⁡R-2\log R−2logR, which holds only because the objective blows up at the boundary of the simplex. The central difficulty is Theorem 1. The optimal weights are explicit only through a Lagrange multiplier λ\lambdaλ that solves a nonlinear equation; to expand −2log⁡R-2\log R−2logR one must first show λ=Op(n−1/2)\lambda=O_p(n^{-1/2})λ=Op​(n−1/2), which requires controlling the largest observation by Lemma 3 together with the law of large numbers for sss, and then bound the cubic Taylor remainder of log⁡(1+λh~i)\log(1+\lambda\tilde h_i)log(1+λh~i​) uniformly in iii. A direct appeal to the central limit theorem for the sample mean does not suffice, since −2log⁡R-2\log R−2logR is an implicitly defined optimal value, not a smooth function of the mean.

Formalization scope

  • The sample is a sequence ξ : ℕ → Ω → Ξ, measurable, mutually independent and identically distributed, indexed from 000; the size-nnn sample is fun i : Fin n => h x (ξ i ω).
  • The moment assumption is MemLp (h x ∘ ξ 0) 2 together with 0 < variance. Positive variance cannot be dropped: for a constant loss the coverage is 111.
  • The quantile is pinned by gaussianReal 0 1 {y | y^2 ≤ q} = ofReal (1 - α) with 0<α<10<\alpha<10<α<1; it is not a free parameter, and it is not the normal quantile.
  • The upper bound is the published GenEmpLik.Expansion.robustMean burg (q/2) (its ball has radius ρ/n\rho/nρ/n, so ρ=q/2\rho=q/2ρ=q/2); the lower bound is its infimum twin robustLower. The ball uses the published probUncertaintySet and phiDiv.
  • The Burg generator is +∞+\infty+∞ at t≤0t\le0t≤0, and the statistic elStat minimizes over strictly positive weights with the empty infimum equal to +∞+\infty+∞. Lean's junk value log⁡0=0\log 0=0log0=0 therefore never enters: a formalization with wi≥0w_i\ge0wi​≥0 and real logarithms would admit boundary weights with spurious finite divergence and is ruled out. For n≥1n\ge1n≥1 the value sets of the DRO bounds are nonempty and bounded, so the real infimum and supremum are not junk values.
  • The decision set Θ\ThetaΘ is dropped (the statements are pointwise in xxx). Theorem 1 is stated as convergence of distribution functions at every ttt, which is equivalent to ⇒χ12\Rightarrow\chi^2_1⇒χ12​ since the limit is continuous. Proposition 2 is stated for general κ≥0\kappa\ge0κ≥0 and every data vector, as displayed on p. 11. Milestones (49)–(50), (52), (68) are the one-point (Θ={x}\Theta=\{x\}Θ={x}) specialisations of the proof of Theorem 5.
  • Probabilities of events are outer probabilities; no measurability of events is assumed, as the paper ignores these issues (p. 14).
  • Not posed: the headline Theorem 4 (uniform calibration over Θ\ThetaΘ by the quantile of a χ2\chi^2χ2-process supremum), Theorem 5 and Lemma 2, which need Donsker classes and weak convergence in ℓ∞(Θ)\ell^\infty(\Theta)ℓ∞(Θ), for which Mathlib has no substrate.

Contributions welcome: proofs of Proposition 2 and Lemma 3 (from the Proved reference), the KKT analysis (49)–(52), and a Lean empirical likelihood theorem.

Selected references

  • H. Lam, Recovering Best Statistical Guarantees via the Empirical Divergence-Based Distributionally Robust Optimization, arXiv:1605.09349v1, 2016; Operations Research 67(4), 2019. https://arxiv.org/abs/1605.09349v1
  • A. B. Owen, Empirical likelihood ratio confidence intervals for a single functional, Biometrika 75(2), 1988. https://doi.org/10.1093/biomet/75.2.237
  • A. B. Owen, Empirical Likelihood, Chapman & Hall/CRC, 2001. https://doi.org/10.1201/9781420036152
  • A. Ben-Tal, D. den Hertog, A. De Waegenaere, B. Melenberg, G. Rennen, Robust solutions of optimization problems affected by uncertain probabilities, Management Science 59(2), 2013. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.1120.1641
  • J. C. Duchi, P. W. Glynn, H. Namkoong, Statistics of robust optimization: a generalized empirical likelihood approach, Mathematics of Operations Research 46(3), 2021. https://arxiv.org/abs/1610.03425
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Mechanism DesignProbabilityStochastic Systems·Captain: mikedeng1

Pricing and Matching with Forward-Looking Buyers and Sellers 1: Waiting-Adjusted Fixed Prices with Greedy Matching Earn at Least 1 − (1 + 2(b+h)T/(3(p*−w*)))/√µ* of the Fluid Profit BoundResearch Paper

Why this market matters

An intermediary such as a ride platform must attract buyers and sellers who arrive at different times. A buyer may wait for a seller; a seller may wait for a buyer. Both sides can choose when to request a match, so an ask price and a bid price affect participation as well as the intermediary's margin. Chen and Hu study whether a simple posted-price policy remains profitable despite this waiting and the uncertainty of arrivals. Their submitted manuscript proves a finite-market guarantee and an asymptotic rate for the policy used here. The proof appears in its Supplemental Note, while the model and theorem are in the main text.

Market and benchmarks

Buyers arrive during a horizon [0,T][0,T][0,T] as a Poisson process of rate λd>0\lambda^d>0λd>0, and sellers arrive independently at rate λs>0\lambda^s>0λs>0. A buyer's valuation vvv has density fdf^dfd on [v‾,v‾][\underline v,\overline v][v​,v] and a seller's cost ccc has density fsf^sfs on [c‾,c‾][\underline c,\overline c][c​,c]. Marks are independent of arrival times. A buyer and a seller each trade at most one unit. If they wait after arrival, they incur costs bbb and hhh per unit time, respectively. The paper assumes regularity: the buyer's virtual value Vd(v)=v−Fˉd(v)/fd(v)V^d(v)=v-\bar F^d(v)/f^d(v)Vd(v)=v−Fˉd(v)/fd(v) and the seller's virtual cost Vs(c)=c+Fs(c)/fs(c)V^s(c)=c+F^s(c)/f^s(c)Vs(c)=c+Fs(c)/fs(c) are weakly increasing on their supports. Here Fˉd=1−Fd\bar F^d=1-F^dFˉd=1−Fd.

A clairvoyant assignment knows all arrivals through TTT. For each possible buyer–seller pair it assigns virtual surplus Vd(v)−Vs(c)V^d(v)-V^s(c)Vd(v)−Vs(c) less the waiting cost determined by their arrival order. It chooses a partial matching with greatest total value, denoted Jˉ(HT)\bar J(H^T)Jˉ(HT). A separate fluid program chooses a measurable, nonnegative pair of price trajectories that clears demand and supply at every time. Its optimal value is Jˉ∗\bar J^*Jˉ∗. These are different objects: Jˉ(HT)\bar J(H^T)Jˉ(HT) is random and uses indivisible agents, whereas Jˉ∗\bar J^*Jˉ∗ is a deterministic continuous-flow optimum. Lemma 2 of the manuscript compares their values in expectation.

Let μ∗\mu^*μ∗ be the greatest volume in [0,min⁡{λdT,λsT}][0,\min\{\lambda^dT,\lambda^sT\}][0,min{λdT,λsT}] with nonnegative marginal virtual surplus. The buyer and seller prices p∗,w∗p^*,w^*p∗,w∗ are inverse-distribution prices at that volume. Proposition 1 states that these constant prices attain the fluid optimum and Jˉ∗=(p∗−w∗)μ∗\bar J^*=(p^*-w^*)\mu^*Jˉ∗=(p∗−w∗)μ∗.

Formalization targets

The greedy matching policy pairs requests first come, first served. Under the waiting-adjusted fixed-price policy, a buyer's posted ask is p∗p^*p∗ minus bbb times a conditional expected wait per match probability; the seller's posted bid is w∗w^*w∗ plus the corresponding hhh term. The buyer adjustment is conditioned on the observed pre-arrival inventory signal. Agents request immediately exactly when their valuation or cost crosses the base-price threshold. The policy's expected profit JJJ is computed from posted prices paid by successfully matched agents.

The first target is the paper's finite-market bound:

JJˉ∗≥1−(1+2(b+h)T3(p∗−w∗))1μ∗.\frac{J}{\bar J^*}\ge 1-\left(1+\frac{2(b+h)T}{3(p^*-w^*)}\right)\frac{1}{\sqrt{\mu^*}}.Jˉ∗J​≥1−(1+3(p∗−w∗)2(b+h)T​)μ∗​1​.

When J≥0J\ge0J≥0, the benchmark comparison also gives J/E[Jˉ(HT)]≥J/Jˉ∗J/\mathbb E[\bar J(H^T)]\ge J/\bar J^*J/E[Jˉ(HT)]≥J/Jˉ∗. For scaled systems with arrival rates nαdλdn^{\alpha_d}\lambda^dnαd​λd and nαsλsn^{\alpha_s}\lambda^snαs​λs, where both exponents are positive, the second target is a constant CCC independent of nnn such that

J(n)Jˉ∗,(n)≥1−Cnmin⁡{αd,αs}(n≥1).\frac{J^{(n)}}{\bar J^{*,(n)}}\ge 1-\frac{C}{\sqrt{n^{\min\{\alpha_d,\alpha_s\}}}}\qquad(n\ge1).Jˉ∗,(n)J(n)​≥1−nmin{αd​,αs​}​C​(n≥1).

The milestone list follows the source's Proposition 1, Lagrangian relaxation, Lemma 2, Poisson request counts, policy profit identity, Gallego–van Ryzin moment bound, and Lemma S.5 on arrival-rate monotonicity. The last three supply the finite bound and its scaling statement in the Supplemental Note.

What the result gives

The finite bound quantifies the cost of using fixed base prices and greedy matching instead of the fluid ideal. Its two terms separate the loss from random mismatch and the extra waiting adjustment. The scaled bound says that, as both sides' arrival rates grow, the fraction of the fluid value lost by this policy vanishes at a rate governed by the slower-growing side. This offers a concrete reason to use a simple policy when the market is large, while keeping the smaller-market correction visible.

The paper already proves these claims. This mission asks for machine-checked proofs of their precise statements. The fluid optimizer, the clairvoyant matching problem, the marked Poisson arrival model, and the policy-profit identity are reusable mathematical objects beyond this theorem. The positive-part moment bound is an already published theorem and is referenced rather than posed again.

Where the argument is difficult

The obvious comparison between posted-price profit and fluid revenue misses the cost of requests that wait or never match. The price corrections themselves are conditional expectations divided by conditional match probabilities; their effect cannot be captured by simply subtracting a constant waiting charge. The proof must connect those corrections to the time integral of the queue imbalance, then control the imbalance of two Poisson request streams. A second difficulty is that the fluid optimum and the expected clairvoyant optimum are defined through different feasible sets, so their comparison needs a separate relaxation argument. These obstacles are visible in the source's proof of Lemma 2 and Theorem 2.

Formalization scope

The density and virtual-value environment is the published bilateral-trade definition, imported through a local name alias required by the frozen shared market module. Lean represents arrivals by independent Poisson counts and independent identically distributed time-and-value marks. This is equal in law to the paper's homogeneous marked Poisson processes on [0,T][0,T][0,T]. Arrival time marks are uniform probability laws, and valuation and cost marks use the source densities. Simultaneous requests are ordered by index; such ties have probability zero. The deterministic program ranges over measurable, nonnegative, market-clearing paths with interval-integrable objective terms. Its value is the supremum of their objectives, not a formula involving p∗p^*p∗ and w∗w^*w∗; Proposition 1 must establish that formula. The clairvoyant value uses the published partial-assignment-game worth, so negative-weight pairs may remain unmatched.

The density functions are continuous on their supports, an explicit addition needed for the inverse prices and maximum volume used by Proposition 1. The lower support endpoints are nonnegative so the constant prices belong to the nonnegative fluid price domain; this fills an implicit domain convention in the manuscript. For Theorem 2 the overlap condition is strict, c‾<v‾\underline c<\overline vc​<v, ensuring positive μ∗\mu^*μ∗ and p∗−w∗p^*-w^*p∗−w∗. The printed chain comparing J/E[Jˉ]J/\mathbb E[\bar J]J/E[Jˉ] and J/Jˉ∗J/\bar J^*J/Jˉ∗ is stated under J≥0J\ge0J≥0: when the numerator is negative, the claimed direction fails. Both expectations used as finite numbers are accompanied by integrability conclusions. Division by a zero match probability at the terminal time uses a zero convention on a set of arrival times with probability zero.

The policy model builds in the myopic request behavior that Theorem 1 identifies as an equilibrium; its strategic proof is outside this mission. The policy profit is the expectation of actual posted-price payments, and the waiting compensations are literal tagged-arrival conditional ratios. Contributions that prove the inverse-distribution properties, Poisson thinning, queue profit identity, fluid optimization, or final moment estimate all address parts of the stated target.

Selected references

  • Y. Chen and M. Hu, Pricing and Matching with Forward-Looking Buyers and Sellers, Manufacturing & Service Operations Management 22(4), 2020; submitted manuscript, SSRN 2859864.
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Numerical AnalysisOptimization·Captain: mikedeng1

An Augmented Lagrangian Based Algorithm for Distributed Nonconvex Optimization 1: With ρ = 0, the ALADIN Dual Update Equals the Levenberg–Marquardt Dual Newton Step of Dual DecompositionResearch Paper

Motivation

Large optimization problems often split into blocks owned by different agents (subsystems of a power grid, vehicles in a formation, scenarios of a stochastic program) that are coupled only through a few linear constraints. Distributed optimization methods solve such problems by letting each agent work on its own block and exchanging a small amount of information, typically a vector of prices for the coupling constraints. The classical method of this kind is dual decomposition (Everett 1963; Bertsekas and Tsitsiklis, Parallel and Distributed Computation, 1989): fix the prices, let every agent solve its own subproblem, then update the prices by a gradient or Newton step on the concave dual function. Dual decomposition is reliable for strictly convex problems but has no convergence guarantee for nonconvex ones.

Houska, Frasch and Diehl (SIAM J. Optim. 26 (2016)) proposed ALADIN (augmented Lagrangian based alternating direction inexact Newton), which adds a proximal term to the agents' subproblems and replaces the price update by a coupled equality-constrained quadratic program. ALADIN is used in distributed model predictive control and in power-system optimization. Remark 4.2 and Appendix A of the paper explain where it sits relative to the classical method: if the proximal term is switched off (ρ=0\rho = 0ρ=0), the price update of ALADIN is exactly a regularized Newton step of dual decomposition. Lemma 5 is the precise statement of that equivalence, and it is the goal of this mission.

Setting

The problem (1.1) has NNN blocks xi∈Rnx_i\in\mathbb R^nxi​∈Rn:

min⁡x ∑i=1Nfi(xi)s.t.∑i=1NAixi=b,hi(xi)≤0,\min_x\ \sum_{i=1}^N f_i(x_i)\quad\text{s.t.}\quad \sum_{i=1}^N A_i x_i = b,\qquad h_i(x_i)\le 0,xmin​ i=1∑N​fi​(xi​)s.t.i=1∑N​Ai​xi​=b,hi​(xi​)≤0,

with fi:Rn→Rf_i:\mathbb R^n\to\mathbb Rfi​:Rn→R, hi:Rn→Rnhh_i:\mathbb R^n\to\mathbb R^{n_h}hi​:Rn→Rnh​ twice continuously differentiable, Ai∈Rm×nA_i\in\mathbb R^{m\times n}Ai​∈Rm×n and b∈Rmb\in\mathbb R^mb∈Rm. One iteration of Algorithm 2 (ALADIN) starts from a primal point xxx and prices λ∈Rm\lambda\in\mathbb R^mλ∈Rm and does the following.

  1. Each agent solves the decoupled problem min⁡yifi(yi)+λ⊤Aiyi+ρ2∥yi−xi∥Σi2\min_{y_i} f_i(y_i) + \lambda^\top A_i y_i + \frac\rho2\|y_i-x_i\|^2_{\Sigma_i}minyi​​fi​(yi​)+λ⊤Ai​yi​+2ρ​∥yi​−xi​∥Σi​2​ subject to hi(yi)≤0h_i(y_i)\le 0hi​(yi​)≤0, returning a minimizer yiy_iyi​ and a multiplier κi≥0\kappa_i\ge 0κi​≥0. With ρ=0\rho = 0ρ=0 this is the dual-decomposition subproblem (A.2).
  2. Each agent forms the active-constraint Jacobian Ci∗C^*_iCi∗​ (rows ∇(hi)j(yi)⊤\nabla(h_i)_j(y_i)^\top∇(hi​)j​(yi​)⊤ for active jjj, zero rows otherwise), chooses an approximation CiC_iCi​ and a symmetric Hessian approximation HiH_iHi​, and computes the modified gradient gi=∇fi(yi)+(Ci∗−Ci)⊤κig_i = \nabla f_i(y_i) + (C^*_i - C_i)^\top\kappa_igi​=∇fi​(yi​)+(Ci∗​−Ci​)⊤κi​.
  3. For a parameter μ>0\mu>0μ>0, a coordinator solves the coupled QP (3.3)
min⁡Δy,s ∑i{12Δyi⊤HiΔyi+gi⊤Δyi}+λ⊤s+μ2∥s∥22  s.t.  ∑iAi(yi+Δyi)=b+s ∣ λQP,CiΔyi=0,\min_{\Delta y, s}\ \sum_i\Big\{\tfrac12\Delta y_i^\top H_i\Delta y_i + g_i^\top\Delta y_i\Big\} + \lambda^\top s + \tfrac\mu2\|s\|_2^2\ \ \text{s.t.}\ \ \sum_i A_i(y_i+\Delta y_i) = b + s\ \mid\ \lambda_{\mathrm{QP}},\quad C_i\Delta y_i = 0,Δy,smin​ i∑​{21​Δyi⊤​Hi​Δyi​+gi⊤​Δyi​}+λ⊤s+2μ​∥s∥22​  s.t.  i∑​Ai​(yi​+Δyi​)=b+s ∣ λQP​,Ci​Δyi​=0,

and the new prices are λ+=λ+α3(λQP−λ)\lambda^+ = \lambda + \alpha_3(\lambda_{\mathrm{QP}}-\lambda)λ+=λ+α3​(λQP​−λ).

On the dual-decomposition side, ∇V(λ)=∑iAiyi−b\nabla V(\lambda) = \sum_i A_i y_i - b∇V(λ)=∑i​Ai​yi​−b (A.3) is the gradient of the dual function at λ\lambdaλ, and the (inexact) dual Newton step (A.4) with a symmetric negative semidefinite scaling matrix MMM and step size α∈(0,1]\alpha\in(0,1]α∈(0,1] is

λDD+=λ−α(M−1μI)−1∇V(λ),\lambda^+_{\mathrm{DD}} = \lambda - \alpha\Big(M - \frac1\mu I\Big)^{-1}\nabla V(\lambda),λDD+​=λ−α(M−μ1​I)−1∇V(λ),

where 1/μ1/\mu1/μ plays the role of a Levenberg–Marquardt regularization parameter.

Formalization targets

Goal: Lemma 5 (p. 1123)

Assume every fif_ifi​ strictly convex, every hih_ihi​ convex, CiC_iCi​ of full row rank, HiH_iHi​ positive definite, ρ=0\rho = 0ρ=0 and α3=α\alpha_3 = \alphaα3​=α. Then for every μ>0\mu>0μ>0, with

M=−∑i=1NAi[Hi−1−Hi−1Ci⊤[CiHi−1Ci⊤]−1CiHi−1]Ai⊤,M = -\sum_{i=1}^N A_i\Big[H_i^{-1} - H_i^{-1}C_i^\top\big[C_iH_i^{-1}C_i^\top\big]^{-1}C_iH_i^{-1}\Big]A_i^\top,M=−i=1∑N​Ai​[Hi−1​−Hi−1​Ci⊤​[Ci​Hi−1​Ci⊤​]−1Ci​Hi−1​]Ai⊤​,

the matrix M−1μIM - \frac1\mu IM−μ1​I is invertible and

λ+=λDD+.\lambda^+ = \lambda^+_{\mathrm{DD}} .λ+=λDD+​.

Milestones (the steps of the proof, pp. 1123–1124)

  1. Slack elimination: min⁡sμ2∥s∥22−(λQP−λ)⊤s=−12μ∥λQP−λ∥22\min_s \frac\mu2\|s\|_2^2 - (\lambda_{\mathrm{QP}}-\lambda)^\top s = -\frac1{2\mu}\|\lambda_{\mathrm{QP}}-\lambda\|_2^2mins​2μ​∥s∥22​−(λQP​−λ)⊤s=−2μ1​∥λQP​−λ∥22​, attained only at s=(λQP−λ)/μs = (\lambda_{\mathrm{QP}}-\lambda)/\mus=(λQP​−λ)/μ.
  2. Stationarity: with ρ=0\rho = 0ρ=0, 0=∇fi(yi)+Ai⊤λ+(Ci∗)⊤κi=gi+Ai⊤λ+Ci⊤κi0 = \nabla f_i(y_i) + A_i^\top\lambda + (C^*_i)^\top\kappa_i = g_i + A_i^\top\lambda + C_i^\top\kappa_i0=∇fi​(yi​)+Ai⊤​λ+(Ci∗​)⊤κi​=gi​+Ai⊤​λ+Ci⊤​κi​.
  3. Explicit minimization over Δy\Delta yΔy: for H≻0H\succ 0H≻0 and CCC of full row rank, −Pw-Pw−Pw with P=H−1−H−1C⊤(CH−1C⊤)−1CH−1P = H^{-1} - H^{-1}C^\top(CH^{-1}C^\top)^{-1}CH^{-1}P=H−1−H−1C⊤(CH−1C⊤)−1CH−1 minimizes 12Δ⊤HΔ+w⊤Δ\frac12\Delta^\top H\Delta + w^\top\Delta21​Δ⊤HΔ+w⊤Δ on {CΔ=0}\{C\Delta = 0\}{CΔ=0}, with value −12w⊤Pw≤0-\frac12 w^\top Pw\le 0−21​w⊤Pw≤0.
  4. Argmax display: for MMM symmetric negative semidefinite, λ−(M−1μI)−1g\lambda - (M - \frac1\mu I)^{-1}gλ−(M−μ1​I)−1g is the unique maximizer of 12(ν−λ)⊤M(ν−λ)+ν⊤g−12μ∥ν−λ∥22\frac12(\nu-\lambda)^\top M(\nu-\lambda) + \nu^\top g - \frac1{2\mu}\|\nu-\lambda\|_2^221​(ν−λ)⊤M(ν−λ)+ν⊤g−2μ1​∥ν−λ∥22​.

Significance

The result. Lemma 5 places ALADIN on a known map. With ρ=0\rho=0ρ=0 it inherits the convergence theory of dual decomposition for strictly convex problems for small step sizes, independently of how crude the approximations HiH_iHi​, CiC_iCi​ are, as long as Hi≻0H_i\succ 0Hi​≻0. It also reinterprets the augmented-Lagrangian parameter μ\muμ as the inverse of a dual Levenberg–Marquardt parameter, and it isolates the proximal term ρ2∥yi−xi∥Σi2\frac\rho2\|y_i - x_i\|^2_{\Sigma_i}2ρ​∥yi​−xi​∥Σi​2​ as the only ingredient that distinguishes ALADIN from dual decomposition and makes the nonconvex analysis of the paper possible.

Formalizing it. The lemma is proved in the paper; to our knowledge no machine-checked proof exists. A formal proof certifies an identity whose printed form contains a typo (see below), and produces reusable linear-algebra facts: the closed-form solution of an equality-constrained strictly convex quadratic program via the reduced inverse PPP, the semidefiniteness of PPP, and the closed-form maximizer of a regularized concave quadratic.

Difficulty

The proof is a chain of exact eliminations, and the work is in carrying each one out without losing a sign or a hypothesis. The step most easily done wrong is the minimization over Δy\Delta yΔy: the constraint CiΔyi=0C_i\Delta y_i = 0Ci​Δyi​=0 couples the block coordinates, the minimizer is expressed through the inverse of CiHi−1Ci⊤C_iH_i^{-1}C_i^\topCi​Hi−1​Ci⊤​ (invertible only because CiC_iCi​ has full row rank). A second trap is the sign convention for λQP\lambda_{\mathrm{QP}}λQP​: it must agree with footnote 4 (λ+μs−λQP=0\lambda + \mu s - \lambda_{\mathrm{QP}} = 0λ+μs−λQP​=0), or the conclusion flips. The tempting shortcut of treating the max–min dual of (3.3) abstractly runs into the fact that strong duality and attainment are not free; working from the KKT system of (3.3) avoids that.

Formalization scope

Vectors are Fin n → ℝ; blocks are indexed by Fin N; matrices are Mathlib Matrix over Fin index types; the gradient is the vector of partial derivatives computed with fderiv. The step-1 output (yi,κi)(y_i,\kappa_i)(yi​,κi​) is a local minimizer of the decoupled problem together with KKT multipliers (the paper assumes LICQ for the lower-level constraints). The QP (3.3) and λQP\lambda_{\mathrm{QP}}λQP​ enter through the KKT system of (3.3), not through a closed-form expression: defining λQP\lambda_{\mathrm{QP}}λQP​ or Δy\Delta yΔy by the formula of the conclusion would make the goal true by definition and is ruled out. ∇V(λ)\nabla V(\lambda)∇V(λ) is the formula (A.3); that it is the gradient of the dual function is a cited fact the lemma does not use. The invertibility of M−1μIM - \frac1\mu IM−μ1​I is part of the conclusion, because Mathlib's matrix inverse returns 000 on a singular matrix.

Correction of (A.6). As printed, (A.6) has the bracket [CiHiCi⊤]†[C_iH_iC_i^\top]^\dagger[Ci​Hi​Ci⊤​]†. This is a typo for [CiHi−1Ci⊤]†[C_iH_i^{-1}C_i^\top]^\dagger[Ci​Hi−1​Ci⊤​]†, as in (A.5) on the same page and as the explicit minimization over Δy\Delta yΔy forces; with the printed bracket the identity fails already for N=1N = 1N=1, H1=diag(1,2)H_1 = \mathrm{diag}(1,2)H1​=diag(1,2), C1=(1,1)C_1 = (1,1)C1​=(1,1), A1=IA_1 = IA1​=I. The mission uses the corrected matrix and writes the pseudo-inverse as an inverse, which it is under the hypotheses.

The hypotheses of strict convexity of fif_ifi​, convexity of hih_ihi​ and α∈(0,1]\alpha\in(0,1]α∈(0,1] are kept as on the page although the identity does not use them. The related platform draft GoldfarbIdnani.DualQP.properties_2_6_to_2_9 (not proved) states properties of the same reduced inverse; it is not imported. Proofs of the four milestones and of the goal are welcome; the milestones are self-contained matrix and calculus facts and can be attacked independently.

Selected references

  • B. Houska, J. Frasch, M. Diehl, An augmented Lagrangian based algorithm for distributed nonconvex optimization, SIAM J. Optim. 26(2) (2016), 1101–1127. https://doi.org/10.1137/140975991
  • D. P. Bertsekas, J. N. Tsitsiklis, Parallel and Distributed Computation: Numerical Methods, Prentice-Hall, 1989.
  • H. Everett, Generalized Lagrange multiplier method for solving problems of optimum allocation of resources, Oper. Res. 11(3) (1963), 399–417. https://doi.org/10.1287/opre.11.3.399
  • D. P. Bertsekas, Nonlinear Programming, 2nd ed., Athena Scientific, 1999.
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Numerical AnalysisOptimization·Captain: mikedeng1

Variable Metric Method for Minimization: Davidon's Rank-One Variable-Metric Update Recovers the Inverse Hessian of a Quadratic in N Steps and Then Steps to the Exact MinimumResearch Paper

Motivation

Quasi-Newton methods minimize a smooth function f:Rn→Rf:\mathbb R^n\to\mathbb Rf:Rn→R using gradients only, while building up an approximation to the inverse of the Hessian matrix from the changes of gradient they observe. They are the default algorithms of unconstrained nonlinear optimization: BFGS and its limited-memory variant L-BFGS sit inside most numerical optimization libraries and most large-scale fitting codes in statistics and machine learning.

The family starts with William C. Davidon's Argonne report ANL-5990 of 1959, Variable Metric Method for Minimization, rejected by a journal in 1957 and published only in 1991 as the first article of the SIAM Journal on Optimization, with a preface by the author (DOI 10.1137/0801001). The report's body describes a flowchart algorithm; its Appendix describes "a simplified method embodying some of the ideas" of that algorithm, in one and a half pages. That simplified method is what is now called the symmetric rank-one (SR1) update, and the Appendix contains its quadratic-termination property: on a quadratic, after at most nnn steps the trial matrix equals the inverse Hessian, and the next step lands at the minimum.

Timeline.

  • 1952: Hestenes and Stiefel's conjugate gradient method minimizes a strictly convex quadratic in at most nnn steps (J. Res. NBS 49); Davidon cites it as [2].
  • 1959: Davidon's ANL-5990, including the Appendix method treated here.
  • 1963: Fletcher and Powell simplify the body's method into the DFP update and prove its quadratic termination with exact line searches (Comput. J. 6).
  • 1967: Broyden's survey of quasi-Newton methods discusses the symmetric rank-one update (Math. Comp. 21); textbooks later analyse it under the name SR1.
  • 1980: Nocedal's limited-storage BFGS, whose termination on quadratics with exact line searches is a separate Prove2Me mission (Math. Comp. 35).

Setting

Vectors are elements of Rn\mathbb R^nRn and matrices are real n×nn\times nn×n. Fix a symmetric positive definite matrix GGG and a point ξ\xiξ, and let

f(x)=12 (x−ξ)TG (x−ξ)+c,f(x)=\tfrac12\,(x-\xi)^{\mathsf T}G\,(x-\xi)+c ,f(x)=21​(x−ξ)TG(x−ξ)+c,

a quadratic with constant Hessian GGG and minimum point ξ\xiξ. Its gradient is ∇(x)=G(x−ξ)\nabla(x)=G(x-\xi)∇(x)=G(x−ξ), display (6) of the Appendix.

The method keeps a point xkx_kxk​ and a symmetric trial matrix HkH_kHk​, which plays the role of G−1G^{-1}G−1. Write ∇k=∇(xk)\nabla_k=\nabla(x_k)∇k​=∇(xk​). One iteration is

xk+1=xk−Hk∇k(2),Hk+1=Hk+ak (Hk∇k+1)(Hk∇k+1)T(3),x_{k+1}=x_k-H_k\nabla_k \quad\text{(2)},\qquad H_{k+1}=H_k+a_k\,(H_k\nabla_{k+1})(H_k\nabla_{k+1})^{\mathsf T}\quad\text{(3)},xk+1​=xk​−Hk​∇k​(2),Hk+1​=Hk​+ak​(Hk​∇k+1​)(Hk​∇k+1​)T(3),

a full step with no line search followed by a symmetric rank-one update. With the two scalars

Nk=∇k+1THk∇k+1,Mk=∇k+1THk∇k,N_k=\nabla_{k+1}^{\mathsf T}H_k\nabla_{k+1},\qquad M_k=\nabla_{k+1}^{\mathsf T}H_k\nabla_k ,Nk​=∇k+1T​Hk​∇k+1​,Mk​=∇k+1T​Hk​∇k​,

footnote 2 of the Appendix fixes the coefficient on a quadratic to ak=(Mk−Nk)−1a_k=(M_k-N_k)^{-1}ak​=(Mk​−Nk​)−1, which makes the paper's quality measure Δ\DeltaΔ of (4) vanish. Write Sk=xk+1−xkS_k=x_{k+1}-x_kSk​=xk+1​−xk​ for the step and Dk=∇k+1−∇kD_k=\nabla_{k+1}-\nabla_kDk​=∇k+1​−∇k​ for the change of gradient. The paper writes xxx, HHH, ∇\nabla∇ for the current quantities and x+x^{+}x+, H+H^{+}H+, ∇+\nabla^{+}∇+ for the updated ones, and uses the letter NNN both for the number of variables and for the scalar NkN_kNk​; here the number of variables is nnn.

Formalization targets

Goal: termination in nnn steps

If H0H_0H0​ is symmetric and Mk≠NkM_k\ne N_kMk​=Nk​ for every k<nk<nk<n, then

Hn=G−1andxn+1=ξ.H_n=G^{-1}\qquad\text{and}\qquad x_{n+1}=\xi .Hn​=G−1andxn+1​=ξ.

This is the sentence after (8) on p. 17: "After no more than NNN steps (for which Δ=0\Delta=0Δ=0), HHH will equal G−1G^{-1}G−1 and the following step will be to the exact minimum."

Milestones

  1. Display (6): the gradient of fff is G(x−ξ)G(x-\xi)G(x−ξ).
  2. Display (8): with a=(M−N)−1a=(M-N)^{-1}a=(M−N)−1 and M≠NM\ne NM=N, H+GS=H+D=SH^{+}GS=H^{+}D=SH+GS=H+D=S.
  3. Display (7): if HGu=uHGu=uHGu=u then H+Gu=uH^{+}Gu=uH+Gu=u, for any coefficient aaa.
  4. The sentence "so that SSS becomes another such eigenvector", read along the run: if Mi≠NiM_i\ne N_iMi​=Ni​ for i<ki<ki<k, then HkGSj=SjH_kGS_j=S_jHk​GSj​=Sj​ for every j<kj<kj<k.

Further statements of the Appendix

  • Condition 1 (p. 16): if HHH is positive definite and R−1≤det⁡H+/det⁡H≤RR^{-1}\le\det H^{+}/\det H\le RR−1≤detH+/detH≤R with R>1R>1R>1, then H+H^{+}H+ is positive definite.
  • The constraint remark (p. 17): for any function and any coefficients, if H0H_0H0​ is symmetric and H0b=0H_0b=0H0​b=0, then every step is perpendicular to bbb and b⋅xkb\cdot x_kb⋅xk​ is conserved.
  • Table (5) (p. 16): for general (non-quadratic) fff, the coefficient aaa that minimizes Δ\DeltaΔ subject to condition 1, and the minimum value, on each of five ranges of MMM.

Significance

The termination theorem says that on a quadratic the rank-one update recovers the exact inverse Hessian from nnn gradient differences, without line searches and without positive definiteness of the trial matrix, and then takes the Newton step. This is the property that justifies the name "variable metric": the metric HkH_kHk​ converges to the one that makes the problem trivial. The secant equation (8) and the persistence of earlier secant equations (7) are the template for the analysis of every later quasi-Newton update, and the SR1 update remains in use in trust-region methods because it does not force positive definiteness.

The result is classical and its proof is short; what this mission adds is a machine-checked version stated in the paper's own form. In particular the hypothesis is the paper's: only that each of the first nnn coefficients is defined. Textbook statements of SR1 termination often assume in addition that the steps are linearly independent; the paper does not, and the formal goal does not either. No Lean formalization of SR1, DFP or BFGS termination was found in Mathlib or on Prove2Me. On Prove2Me, the related open targets are L-BFGS termination (Nocedal 1980) and conjugate-gradient termination (Hestenes–Stiefel 1952); the definitions here are independent of theirs.

Difficulty

Each update changes HHH by a rank-one term, and nothing in a single step forces HnH_nHn​ to be G−1G^{-1}G−1: the coefficient aka_kak​ depends on the current iterate and the update could, a priori, destroy what earlier steps achieved, as general rank-one updates do. The obvious count — nnn steps, nnn conditions — does not by itself give nnn independent conditions on HnH_nHn​; the steps produced by the method are not chosen to be independent, and the only hypothesis available is that the denominators Mk−NkM_k-N_kMk​−Nk​ are nonzero. The difficulty is to get the full conclusion from that hypothesis alone, without assuming independence, positive definiteness of H0H_0H0​, or a line search.

Formalization scope

Vectors are Fin n → ℝ with 0-based indices, matrices Matrix (Fin n) (Fin n) ℝ; uTHvu^{\mathsf T}HvuTHv is u ⬝ᵥ (H *ᵥ v) and (Hg)(Hg)T(Hg)(Hg)^{\mathsf T}(Hg)(Hg)T is vecMulVec (H *ᵥ g) (H *ᵥ g). The definition file DavidonVM.Termination.Method provides quad, grad, Nval, Mval, the run predicate IsRunWith for an arbitrary gradient field and coefficients, and IsQuadRun for the quadratic with ak=(Mk−Nk)−1a_k=(M_k-N_k)^{-1}ak​=(Mk​−Nk​)−1; DavidonVM.Termination.Delta provides the update and the quantity Δ\DeltaΔ of (4).

Committed conventions, each a reading of something the paper leaves implicit:

  • The function is an explicit quadratic with constant symmetric positive definite GGG ("in the neighborhood of a minimum"); the run's gradient field is G(x−ξ)G(x-\xi)G(x−ξ), and milestone 1 ties it to the quadratic. The goal uses positive definiteness; milestones use only symmetry where that suffices; the secant milestone needs nothing on GGG.
  • Only H0H_0H0​ is assumed symmetric (the paper, p. 4: "It is to be symmetric"); positive definiteness of H0H_0H0​ is not assumed.
  • "Steps for which Δ=0\Delta=0Δ=0" is read through footnote 2 as Mk≠NkM_k\ne N_kMk​=Nk​. Lean's real inverse gives 0−1=00^{-1}=00−1=0, so without this hypothesis the update would silently leave HHH unchanged.
  • The stopping rule "provided that NNN is greater than some preassigned ε\varepsilonε" is not modelled; the run continues for every kkk, and the goal looks at steps 0,…,n0,\dots,n0,…,n only.
  • G−1G^{-1}G−1 is Mathlib's matrix inverse, the true inverse since GGG is positive definite.

A statement of the goal with the extra hypothesis "S0,…,Sn−1S_0,\dots,S_{n-1}S0​,…,Sn−1​ are linearly independent", or with HkGSj=SjH_k G S_j=S_jHk​GSj​=Sj​ assumed, would be a weaker theorem than the paper's and is ruled out. The case n=0n=0n=0 is trivial; the hypotheses are jointly satisfiable for n=1n=1n=1 (checked locally).

Welcome contributions: proofs of the four milestones and the goal; general facts about rank-one updates (determinant and positive definiteness, Sherman–Morrison form of the inverse) that the further statements need and that are reusable for DFP, BFGS and trust-region analyses.

Selected references

  • W. C. Davidon, Variable Metric Method for Minimization, SIAM J. Optim. 1(1) (1991) 1–17 (Argonne report ANL-5990, 1959). https://doi.org/10.1137/0801001
  • M. R. Hestenes and E. Stiefel, Methods of conjugate gradients for solving linear systems, J. Res. Nat. Bur. Standards 49 (1952) 409–436. https://doi.org/10.6028/jres.049.044
  • R. Fletcher and M. J. D. Powell, A rapidly convergent descent method for minimization, Comput. J. 6 (1963) 163–168. https://doi.org/10.1093/comjnl/6.2.163
  • C. G. Broyden, Quasi-Newton methods and their application to function minimisation, Math. Comp. 21 (1967) 368–381. https://doi.org/10.1090/S0025-5718-1967-0224273-2
  • J. Nocedal, Updating quasi-Newton matrices with limited storage, Math. Comp. 35 (1980) 773–782. https://doi.org/10.1090/S0025-5718-1980-0572855-7
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Linear OptimizationOptimization·Captain: mikedeng1

Obtaining Lower Bounds from the Progressive Hedging Algorithm for Stochastic Mixed-Integer Programs: The Dual Prices Give a Lower Bound on the Optimal Value in Every IterationResearch Paper

Why lower bounds matter for progressive hedging

Progressive hedging separates a stochastic optimization problem by scenario, solves those smaller problems, and coordinates their first-stage decisions through weighted aggregation and price updates. It is useful when the full extensive formulation is too large to solve directly. For stochastic mixed-integer programs, its iterates can provide feasible decisions, but a feasible cost alone does not reveal how far that cost is from the global optimum. A lower bound gives the missing comparison: the difference between a feasible cost and a valid lower bound is an optimality gap. Branch-and-bound methods also use lower bounds to discard regions whose best possible cost cannot improve the current solution. These are the reasons the authors seek a bound available during a progressive-hedging run, rather than only after convergence. Gade et al., author manuscript, §§1–3.

The paper establishes lower bounds for two-stage stochastic mixed-integer programs, extends them to scenario bundles, and studies their behavior computationally. The mission concerns the mathematical statement that the price vector produced at each completed iteration is eligible for a decomposed lower bound. The paper was published in Mathematical Programming in 2016; the theorem and page labels here follow the authors' SAND2013-9195J manuscript. Gade et al., author manuscript.

Finite-scenario two-stage setting

Let Ξ\XiΞ be a finite set of scenarios and let pξ>0p_\xi>0pξ​>0 be their probabilities, with ∑ξ∈Ξpξ=1\sum_{\xi\in\Xi}p_\xi=1∑ξ∈Ξ​pξ​=1. A first-stage decision x∈Rn1x\in\mathbb R^{n_1}x∈Rn1​ is made before the scenario is known. Its first p1p_1p1​ coordinates are nonnegative integers; the others are unrestricted reals. It incurs cost c⊤xc^\top xc⊤x and must satisfy Ax≥bAx\ge bAx≥b. After scenario ξ\xiξ is observed, a second-stage decision y(ξ)∈Rn2y(\xi)\in\mathbb R^{n_2}y(ξ)∈Rn2​ incurs cost g(ξ)⊤y(ξ)g(\xi)^\top y(\xi)g(ξ)⊤y(ξ). Its first p2p_2p2​ coordinates are nonnegative integers, and it must satisfy Wy(ξ)≥r(ξ)−T(ξ)xWy(\xi)\ge r(\xi)-T(\xi)xWy(ξ)≥r(ξ)−T(ξ)x. The recourse matrix WWW is common to all scenarios. The scenario feasible set X(ξ)X(\xi)X(ξ) contains pairs (x,y)(x,y)(x,y) satisfying these restrictions for one ξ\xiξ. Gade et al., §2, pp. 3–5.

In the extensive scenario formulation, each scenario has a copy x(ξ)x(\xi)x(ξ) of the first-stage vector, and a common vector x^\hat xx^ enforces implementability through pξx(ξ)−pξx^=0p_\xi x(\xi)-p_\xi\hat x=0pξ​x(ξ)−pξ​x^=0. Its optimum is z∗z^*z∗. Algorithm 1 starts with zero prices w0(ξ)=0w^0(\xi)=0w0(ξ)=0, solves unpenalized scenario problems, and at iteration ν\nuν computes x^ν=∑ξpξxν(ξ)\hat x^\nu=\sum_\xi p_\xi x^\nu(\xi)x^ν=∑ξ​pξ​xν(ξ) and wν(ξ)=wν−1(ξ)+ρ(xν(ξ)−x^ν)w^\nu(\xi)=w^{\nu-1}(\xi)+\rho(x^\nu(\xi)-\hat x^\nu)wν(ξ)=wν−1(ξ)+ρ(xν(ξ)−x^ν). Later scenario solves add both wν(ξ)⊤xw^\nu(\xi)^\top xwν(ξ)⊤x and (ρ/2)∥x−x^ν∥22(\rho/2)\|x-\hat x^\nu\|_2^2(ρ/2)∥x−x^ν∥22​ to their objectives. Here ρ\rhoρ is the algorithm's scalar parameter. Gade et al., Algorithm 1, p. 6.

Formalization targets

Scenario price bound

For any scenario prices w(ξ)w(\xi)w(ξ), define the decomposed dual value by

Dξ(w(ξ))=inf⁡(x,y)∈X(ξ)(c⊤x+g(ξ)⊤y+w(ξ)⊤x),D(w)=∑ξ∈ΞpξDξ(w(ξ)).D_\xi(w(\xi))=\inf_{(x,y)\in X(\xi)}\left(c^\top x+g(\xi)^\top y+w(\xi)^\top x\right),\qquad D(w)=\sum_{\xi\in\Xi}p_\xi D_\xi(w(\xi)).Dξ​(w(ξ))=(x,y)∈X(ξ)inf​(c⊤x+g(ξ)⊤y+w(ξ)⊤x),D(w)=ξ∈Ξ∑​pξ​Dξ​(w(ξ)).

Proposition 1 states that prices with ∑ξpξw(ξ)=0\sum_\xi p_\xi w(\xi)=0∑ξ​pξ​w(ξ)=0 satisfy D(w)≤z∗D(w)\le z^*D(w)≤z∗. The price invariant in §3.1 states that the update maintains this weighted zero sum. The mission's goal combines these source claims at every completed iteration N≥1N\ge1N≥1 of Algorithm 1:

∑ξ∈ΞpξwN(ξ)=0,D(wN)≤z∗.\sum_{\xi\in\Xi}p_\xi w^N(\xi)=0,\qquad D(w^N)\le z^*.ξ∈Ξ∑​pξ​wN(ξ)=0,D(wN)≤z∗.

The formal goal is the lower-bound inequality; the zero-sum statement and Proposition 1 are its two milestones. Gade et al., Proposition 1, p. 6, and §3.1, p. 7.

Bundle extension

For a partition BBB of the scenarios, a bundle β\betaβ has probability Pβ=∑ξ∈βpξP_\beta=\sum_{\xi\in\beta}p_\xiPβ​=∑ξ∈β​pξ​. A bundle subproblem uses one first-stage vector for its scenarios and second-stage weights pξ/Pβp_\xi/P_\betapξ​/Pβ​. Proposition 3 gives the corresponding inequality DB(w)≤z∗D_B(w)\le z^*DB​(w)≤z∗ when ∑β∈BPβw(β)=0\sum_{\beta\in B}P_\beta w(\beta)=0∑β∈B​Pβ​w(β)=0. The proposal also records the bundle price invariant and the resulting inequality at each completed bundled iteration as companion statements. Gade et al., §3.3, pp. 9–10.

What the results provide

The scenario bound turns each price vector into an independent set of optimization problems whose weighted values certify a lower bound on the original mixed-integer optimum. The bound does not require the scenario first-stage decisions to agree at that iteration. The bundle result gives the same kind of certificate when several scenarios are solved together. These are the paper's known results, not new open mathematical conjectures. Gade et al., §§3.1 and 3.3.

Formalizing them requires a reusable interface for finite-support stochastic mixed-integer models, their scenario feasible sets, implementability equations, price systems, and finite prefixes of both algorithms. It also separates the general price-feasibility inequality from the algorithmic invariant. The mission currently proposes statements with open Lean proofs; it does not claim a machine-checked proof of these paper results.

Main mathematical difficulty

An iteration of progressive hedging solves scenario problems with a quadratic proximal term, while the lower-bound calculation uses scenario problems without that term. Their objective values cannot simply be identified. The relevant connection is the price vector: to apply Proposition 1 at an arbitrary iteration, its weighted zero-sum condition must follow from the actual aggregation and price-update rules. The bundle version adds normalization by PβP_\betaPβ​, so every bundle must have positive mass and the bundle weights must cover the full scenario distribution. Gade et al., §§3.1 and 3.3.

Formalization scope

Lean represents vectors as Fin n → ℝ, linear constraints componentwise, and the extensive formulation with the weighted implementability equation printed in (15). The dimensions satisfy p1≤n1p_1\le n_1p1​≤n1​ and p2≤n2p_2\le n_2p2​≤n2​, as required by the paper's spaces Z+pi×Rni−pi\mathbb Z_+^{p_i}\times\mathbb R^{n_i-p_i}Z+pi​​×Rni​−pi​. The finite scenario weights are positive and sum to one. The first integer coordinates are nonnegative; every remaining real coordinate is free. The paper's assumptions that the SMIP has an attained finite optimum and each X(ξ)X(\xi)X(ξ) is nonempty are explicit in the goal and Propositions 1 and 3. The scenario and bundle subproblem values, and z∗z^*z∗, live in the extended reals: an unbounded-below subproblem retains −∞-\infty−∞ rather than acquiring an arbitrary real infimum. Gade et al., §§2–3.

An algorithm run is a finite prefix through its last aggregation and price update, with exact minimizers recorded as conditions on its sequences; a stopping test truncates the prefix. The proximal term is the Euclidean sum of squared coordinate differences. No positivity condition on ρ\rhoρ is added to the lower-bound statements, since the page does not require one for these claims. Bundles form a partition, but equal bundle sizes are not required for the inequalities. Algorithm 2's printed w^ν(i) at initialization and Σ_i P_β x^ν(β) at aggregation are read with bundle indices. A bundle recourse vector is represented as a function on all scenarios, with only its coordinates inside the bundle constrained or used.

The exact equations of the scenario model and runs prevent a trivial encoding that assumes dual feasibility or the desired bound as part of a run. Contributions to the model, the price invariants, the extended-real weak-duality arguments, and the bundle extension are all within scope. The paper's convexified limit result (Proposition 2), its cited Theorem 1, and multi-stage Algorithm 3 are outside this mission.

Selected references

  • D. Gade, G. Hackebeil, S. M. Ryan, J.-P. Watson, R. J-B Wets, and D. L. Woodruff, Obtaining Lower Bounds from the Progressive Hedging Algorithm for Stochastic Mixed-Integer Programs, author manuscript SAND2013-9195J; published in Mathematical Programming, 2016. OSTI manuscript; DOI.
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Logic-Based Benders Decomposition: With Valid Benders Cuts (B1), the Generic Benders Algorithm Stops Only at an Optimal Solution, an Infeasible Problem or an Unbounded OneResearch Paper

Motivation

Benders decomposition solves an optimization problem in two groups of variables by fixing one group, solving the remaining subproblem, and turning what the subproblem's solution proves into a constraint, the Benders cut, on the fixed variables. In the classical method of Benders (1962) the subproblem is a linear program and the cut comes from its LP dual. Many problems that decompose naturally have subproblems that are not linear programs: scheduling, satisfiability, 0-1 and constraint programs. Hooker and Ottosson (Math. Program. 96, 2003) replaced the LP dual by the inference dual, the problem of inferring the strongest bound on the objective from the constraints, and obtained a Benders scheme in which any sound inference method produces cuts. This logic-based Benders decomposition has since become a standard technique for planning and scheduling problems that combine an assignment master problem with combinatorial subproblems.

The correctness of the generic scheme rests on two short theorems of the paper. Theorem 1 says that if every cut is valid, then each of the algorithm's three ways of stopping reports the right answer. Theorem 2 says that the algorithm stops when the fixed variables range over a finite set. This mission formalizes both theorems, together with the facts used in the proof of Theorem 1.

Setting

An optimization problem (1) has a domain DDD, a feasible set SSS and a real-valued objective fff; its value is inf⁡x∈Sf(x)\inf_{x\in S} f(x)infx∈S​f(x). Optimal values lie in [−∞,+∞][-\infty,+\infty][−∞,+∞]: an infeasible minimization has value +∞+\infty+∞, an unbounded one −∞-\infty−∞, and the reverse holds for maximization. For propositions P,QP,QP,Q about xxx, PPP implies QQQ with respect to DDD, written P→DQP\xrightarrow{D}QPD​Q, if Q(x)Q(x)Q(x) holds at every x∈Dx\in Dx∈D where P(x)P(x)P(x) holds. The inference dual (2) of (1) is

max⁡ βs.t.x∈S→Df(x)≥β.\max\ \beta\quad\text{s.t.}\quad x\in S\xrightarrow{D} f(x)\ge\beta .max βs.t.x∈SD​f(x)≥β.

In Benders decomposition the variables are pairs (x,y)(x,y)(x,y) with x∈Dxx\in D_xx∈Dx​, y∈Dyy\in D_yy∈Dy​, and problem (6) is min⁡f(x,y)\min f(x,y)minf(x,y) over (x,y)∈S(x,y)\in S(x,y)∈S. Fixing yyy at a trial value yˉ\bar yyˉ​ gives the subproblem (7), min⁡f(x,yˉ)\min f(x,\bar y)minf(x,yˉ​) over (x,yˉ)∈S(x,\bar y)\in S(x,yˉ​)∈S, with inference dual (8): max⁡β\max\betamaxβ s.t. (x,yˉ)∈S→Dxf(x,yˉ)≥β(x,\bar y)\in S\xrightarrow{D_x} f(x,\bar y)\ge\beta(x,yˉ​)∈SDx​​f(x,yˉ​)≥β. A bounding function βyˉ:Dy→[−∞,+∞]\beta_{\bar y}:D_y\to[-\infty,+\infty]βyˉ​​:Dy​→[−∞,+∞] defines the cut z≥βyˉ(y)z\ge\beta_{\bar y}(y)z≥βyˉ​​(y). The cut satisfies

(B1) if every feasible (x,y)(x,y)(x,y) of (6) satisfies f(x,y)≥βyˉ(y)f(x,y)\ge\beta_{\bar y}(y)f(x,y)≥βyˉ​​(y), and

(B2) if βyˉ(yˉ)=β\beta_{\bar y}(\bar y)=\betaβyˉ​​(yˉ​)=β, the value obtained in the subproblem dual.

The cuts generated so far form the master problem (9): min⁡z\min zminz s.t. z≥βyk(y)z\ge\beta_{y^k}(y)z≥βyk​(y) for every cut kkk, y∈Dyy\in D_yy∈Dy​.

The generic Benders algorithm (Figure 1 of the paper) starts with zˉ=−∞\bar z=-\inftyzˉ=−∞ and some yˉ∈Dy\bar y\in D_yyˉ​∈Dy​. While the subproblem dual at yˉ\bar yyˉ​ has a feasible β>zˉ\beta>\bar zβ>zˉ, it formulates βyˉ\beta_{\bar y}βyˉ​​ with βyˉ(yˉ)=β\beta_{\bar y}(\bar y)=\betaβyˉ​​(yˉ​)=β and adds its cut. If the master is then infeasible, it stops and reports (6) infeasible. Otherwise it takes an optimal solution (zˉ,yˉ)(\bar z,\bar y)(zˉ,yˉ​) of the master and repeats. When the loop exits, the optimal value of (6) is reported as zˉ\bar zzˉ.

In Lean, LogicBenders.Generic.Setting defines all of these objects: optVal, subVal, IsDualFeasible, ValidCut, masterLHS, IsMasterOptimal and MasterInfeasible, and a Run with the predicates IsRun, StopsAtWhile and StopsAtMaster.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 1 (p. 9)

Assume (B1) for every cut the run has added. Then three statements hold.

  1. If the run stops at the While test with a finite master value zˉ\bar zzˉ, then (6) has an optimal solution (xˉ,yˉ)(\bar x,\bar y)(xˉ,yˉ​) with f(xˉ,yˉ)=zˉf(\bar x,\bar y)=\bar zf(xˉ,yˉ​)=zˉ.
  2. If it stops with an infeasible master, then S=∅S=\varnothingS=∅.
  3. If it stops because the subproblem dual has no real feasible β\betaβ, then (6) is unbounded.
(B1) ⟹ [finite stop⇒∃ xˉ: f(xˉ,yˉ)=zˉ=min⁡Sf]∧[master infeasible⇒S=∅]∧[dual infeasible⇒inf⁡Sf=−∞].\text{(B1)}\ \Longrightarrow\ \bigl[\text{finite stop}\Rightarrow \exists\,\bar x:\ f(\bar x,\bar y)=\bar z=\min_{S} f\bigr]\wedge\bigl[\text{master infeasible}\Rightarrow S=\varnothing\bigr]\wedge\bigl[\text{dual infeasible}\Rightarrow \inf_S f=-\infty\bigr].(B1) ⟹ [finite stop⇒∃xˉ: f(xˉ,yˉ​)=zˉ=Smin​f]∧[master infeasible⇒S=∅]∧[dual infeasible⇒Sinf​f=−∞].

Milestones (statements used in the proof)

  • §3, p. 6: strong inference duality, inf⁡x∈Sf(x)=sup⁡{β:x∈S→Df(x)≥β}\inf_{x\in S}f(x)=\sup\{\beta: x\in S\xrightarrow{D}f(x)\ge\beta\}infx∈S​f(x)=sup{β:x∈SD​f(x)≥β}.
  • The subproblem value at any yˉ\bar yyˉ​ bounds the value of (6) from above.
  • Under (B1), the value zˉ\bar zzˉ of a master optimum bounds the value of (6) from below.
  • At a terminating master optimum, β∗=zˉ\beta^*=\bar zβ∗=zˉ.
  • Under (B1), an infeasible master implies that (6) is infeasible.
  • An infeasible subproblem dual makes the subproblem, and hence (6), unbounded.

Companion: Theorem 2 (p. 10)

If (B1) and (B2) hold, DyD_yDy​ is finite, and the subproblem dual is solved to optimality, then no run of the algorithm continues forever.

Further items

Lemma 3 (p. 20) gives a criterion for a 0-1 inequality ax≥αax\ge\alphaax≥α to imply the branching clause (29). The §4 statement (p. 7) characterizes when a feasible linear system implies cx≥βcx\ge\betacx≥β.

Significance

Theorem 1 is what allows any sound inference method to supply Benders cuts. Correctness needs only (B1), so the method that derives the cuts (resolution, constraint propagation, a branch-and-bound proof, LP duality) never has to be re-verified at the level of the decomposition. The paper's specializations to satisfiability, 0-1 programming and machine scheduling, and much of the later literature on logic-based Benders, rely on this theorem when they check validity of their cuts and nothing more. Theorem 2 is the matching termination guarantee, and the example on p. 10 shows that the finiteness of DyD_yDy​ cannot be dropped.

Both theorems are proved in the paper, and to the extent known no machine-checked version exists. A formalization makes the paper's implicit conventions precise: values in [−∞,+∞][-\infty,+\infty][−∞,+∞], what "the subproblem dual is infeasible" means when −∞-\infty−∞ is always a feasible bound, and exactly which cuts the master contains at each iteration. It also exposes two gaps in the printed proofs. Theorem 1's first clause uses the attainment of the subproblem optimum without stating it. Theorem 2's printed proof claims the subproblem value increases at every iteration, which is false, although the theorem itself is true. The definitions form a small reusable layer for later formalizations of specific logic-based Benders schemes.

Difficulty

The mathematics is elementary, and the difficulty lies in stating it faithfully. Several readings of the statements are wrong. A "run" whose (zˉ,yˉ)(\bar z,\bar y)(zˉ,yˉ​) are not master optima for exactly the cuts generated so far makes Theorem 1 false. Optimal values taken as real infima turn the infeasible case into junk. Defining "dual infeasible" over the extended reals makes clause 3 vacuous. For Theorem 2, the obvious argument is the printed one, that β\betaβ (or zˉ\bar zzˉ) increases strictly. It fails: with three values of yyy and cuts equal to −100-100−100 away from their own yˉ\bar yyˉ​, the subproblem value can decrease between iterations while zˉ\bar zzˉ stays fixed. The printed argument therefore cannot be transcribed, and the theorem needs a proof the page does not give.

Formalization scope

  • Domains and values. Domains are Lean types: X stands for DxD_xDx​, Y for DyD_yDy​ and D for DDD. The feasible set is S : Set (X × Y) and the objective is f : X → Y → ℝ. Optimal values are EReal infima and suprema, with +∞+\infty+∞ for infeasible and −∞-\infty−∞ for unbounded problems.
  • Dual feasibility and the master problem. Dual feasibility ranges over EReal, so β=−∞\beta=-\inftyβ=−∞ is always feasible. "The subproblem dual is infeasible" is therefore stated as "no real β\betaβ is feasible". A master optimum (z,yˉ)(z,\bar y)(z,yˉ​) means z=max⁡j≤kβ(j)(yˉ)<+∞z=\max_{j\le k}\beta^{(j)}(\bar y)<+\inftyz=maxj≤k​β(j)(yˉ​)<+∞ and zzz is at most that maximum at every yyy; the value z=−∞z=-\inftyz=−∞ means the master is unbounded.
  • Iterations. Iterations are 0-based: iteration kkk works at ybar k, has bound zbar k, and adds cut k. The structure IsRun encodes Figure 1 exactly: zbar 0 = ⊥, every iteration finds a dual-feasible beta k > zbar k with cut k (ybar k) = beta k, and the next (zˉ,yˉ)(\bar z,\bar y)(zˉ,yˉ​) is a master optimum for exactly the cuts 0, …, k. An unconstrained "run", or a dual infeasibility that −∞-\infty−∞ satisfies vacuously, would trivialize the goal, and both are ruled out by these definitions.
  • Added hypotheses. Theorem 1's first clause assumes that the subproblem optimum at the terminal yˉ\bar yyˉ​ is attained whenever it is finite. The printed proof uses this fact ("some optimal solution xˉ\bar xxˉ"), and the clause is false without it. Lemma 3 adds J0∩J1=∅J_0\cap J_1=\varnothingJ0​∩J1​=∅, which branching guarantees. No other hypotheses are added.
  • Contributions welcome. Proofs of all items, especially a correct proof of Theorem 2.

Selected references

  • J. N. Hooker and G. Ottosson, Logic-based Benders decomposition, Mathematical Programming 96(1):33–60, 2003. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10107-003-0375-9 (statements cited from the authors' revised manuscript of November 2000).
  • J. F. Benders, Partitioning procedures for solving mixed-variables programming problems, Numerische Mathematik 4:238–252, 1962. https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01386316
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Retail Assortment Planning in the Presence of Consumer Search II: Under MNL Without Search, the Profit Change from Adding a Variant Is Quasi-Convex in Its PreferenceResearch Paper

Motivation

A retailer that sells a product in many variants (colours, sizes, flavours) has to decide which variants to stock. This is the assortment planning problem. Each variant added to the shelf brings new demand. It also cannibalizes demand from the variants already stocked, and it lowers their cost efficiency, because operational costs (shelf space, handling, holding) usually show economies of scale. Cachon, Terwiesch and Xu, in Retail Assortment Planning in the Presence of Consumer Search (Wharton working paper, December 2002), study this trade-off under the multinomial logit (MNL) model of consumer choice. They compare a model without consumer search with two models in which consumers may leave to search elsewhere.

There are 2n−12^n - 12n−1 nonempty assortments of nnn variants, so full enumeration is impractical. The retailer wants to know whether attention can be restricted to the popular assortments {1},{1,2},…,{1,…,n}\{1\}, \{1,2\}, \dots, \{1,\dots,n\}{1},{1,2},…,{1,…,n}, the assortments made of the most preferred variants.

Timeline. Van Ryzin and Mahajan (Management Science 45(11), 1999, doi:10.1287/mnsc.45.11.1496) showed that, without search and with a cost derived from the newsvendor model, the profit change from adding a variant is quasi-convex in that variant's preference. As a consequence, the optimal assortment is a popular one. Cachon, Terwiesch and Xu (working paper 2002; Manufacturing & Service Operations Management 7(4), 2005, doi:10.1287/msom.1050.0088) extended the quasi-convexity to any concave increasing cost (Theorem 4 of the working paper), and then to search with independent assortments (Theorem 5). This mission formalizes Theorem 4.

Setting

Let N={1,…,n}N = \{1, \dots, n\}N={1,…,n} be the possible variants. Variant iii has a preference vi>0v_i > 0vi​>0; in the paper vi=exp⁡((ui−pi)/μ)v_i = \exp((u_i - p_i)/\mu)vi​=exp((ui​−pi​)/μ), where ui−piu_i - p_iui​−pi​ is the variant's expected net utility and μ>0\mu > 0μ>0 is the Gumbel scale. The no-purchase option has preference v0>0v_0 > 0v0​>0. With assortment S⊆NS \subseteq NS⊆N, the MNL demand of variant i∈Si \in Si∈S is

qim(S)=vi∑k∈Svk+v0.(2)q_i^m(S) = \frac{v_i}{\sum_{k \in S} v_k + v_0}. \qquad (2)qim​(S)=∑k∈S​vk​+v0​vi​​.(2)

Variant iii has margin mi=pi−cim_i = p_i - c_imi​=pi​−ci​ (price minus purchase cost). Stocking it incurs an operational cost c(qi(S))c(q_i(S))c(qi​(S)), where the cost function ccc is concave and increasing on [0,1][0,1][0,1] (the consumer population is normalised to 111, so demands lie in [0,1][0,1][0,1]). The profit of variant iii is πi(S)=miqi(S)−c(qi(S))\pi_i(S) = m_i q_i(S) - c(q_i(S))πi​(S)=mi​qi​(S)−c(qi​(S)), and the retailer's profit is π(S)=∑i∈Sπi(S)\pi(S) = \sum_{i \in S} \pi_i(S)π(S)=∑i∈S​πi​(S).

Fix SSS and a variant j∉Sj \notin Sj∈/S, and let Sj=S∪{j}S_j = S \cup \{j\}Sj​=S∪{j}. Treat jjj's preference vjv_jvj​ as a variable. Write qi(vj)q_i(v_j)qi​(vj​) for variant iii's demand with assortment SjS_jSj​, and πi(vj)=miqi(vj)−c(qi(vj))\pi_i(v_j) = m_i q_i(v_j) - c(q_i(v_j))πi​(vj​)=mi​qi​(vj​)−c(qi​(vj​)) for its profit. The loss on the variants already stocked is

L(vj)=∑i∈Sπi(S)−∑i∈Sπi(vj),L(v_j) = \sum_{i \in S} \pi_i(S) - \sum_{i \in S} \pi_i(v_j),L(vj​)=i∈S∑​πi​(S)−i∈S∑​πi​(vj​),

and the net profit change from adding jjj is hm(vj)=πjm(vj)−Lm(vj)h^m(v_j) = \pi_j^m(v_j) - L^m(v_j)hm(vj​)=πjm​(vj​)−Lm(vj​). Adding jjj is profitable exactly when hm(vj)>0h^m(v_j) > 0hm(vj​)>0. Write VS=v0+∑i∈SviV_S = v_0 + \sum_{i \in S} v_iVS​=v0​+∑i∈S​vi​.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 4 (p. 13)

hm(vj)=πjm(vj)−Lm(vj)  is quasi-convex in vj on [0,∞),h^m(v_j) = \pi_j^m(v_j) - L^m(v_j) \ \text{ is quasi-convex in } v_j \text{ on } [0, \infty),hm(vj​)=πjm​(vj​)−Lm(vj​)  is quasi-convex in vj​ on [0,∞),

that is, every sublevel set {vj≥0:hm(vj)≤r}\{v_j \ge 0 : h^m(v_j) \le r\}{vj​≥0:hm(vj​)≤r} is an interval. The goal holds for every concave increasing ccc and every choice of margins, and assumes no differentiability.

Milestones (proof of Theorem 4, p. 14)

  1. (6). For vj>0v_j > 0vj​>0 and ccc differentiable on (0,1)(0,1)(0,1),
hm′(vj)=[mjVS−c′(vjvj+VS)VS]−[∑i∈Smivi−∑i∈Sc′(vivj+VS)vi](vj+VS)2.h^{m\prime}(v_j) = \frac{\big[m_j V_S - c'\big(\tfrac{v_j}{v_j+V_S}\big)V_S\big] - \big[\sum_{i\in S} m_i v_i - \sum_{i\in S} c'\big(\tfrac{v_i}{v_j+V_S}\big)v_i\big]}{(v_j+V_S)^2}.hm′(vj​)=(vj​+VS​)2[mj​VS​−c′(vj​+VS​vj​​)VS​]−[∑i∈S​mi​vi​−∑i∈S​c′(vj​+VS​vi​​)vi​]​.
  1. The numerator of (6) is nondecreasing in vjv_jvj​ on (0,∞)(0,\infty)(0,∞).
  2. Single crossing. hm′h^{m\prime}hm′ is either ≤0\le 0≤0 on all of (0,∞)(0,\infty)(0,∞), or ≤0\le 0≤0 before some threshold a≥0a \ge 0a≥0 and ≥0\ge 0≥0 after it.

Significance

The result. A quasi-convex function on an interval attains its maximum at an endpoint. So if adding a less preferred variant kkk to SSS is profitable, adding a more preferred variant jjj (with vj>vkv_j > v_kvj​>vk​) is at least as profitable. With monotone margins, this exchange argument shows that an optimal assortment with xxx variants consists of the xxx most popular variants. The search for the optimal assortment then reduces from 2n−12^n - 12n−1 candidates to nnn. The paper uses this structure again for the search model with independent assortments (Theorem 5) and in its analysis of a heuristic equilibrium (Theorem 8).

Formalizing it. The theorem is proved in the paper, and is not known to have been formalized anywhere. The mission produces a machine-checked proof for an arbitrary concave increasing cost, with per-variant margins. The paper's proof differentiates ccc and writes a single common margin. A formal proof settles that neither assumption is needed. Van Ryzin and Mahajan's newsvendor-specific Lemma 1 is posed separately on Prove2Me (RetailVariety.Structure.lemma_1). It concerns a different function, a ratio g/fg/fg/f on [0,v1][0, v_1][0,v1​], and is not a special case of the statement here.

Difficulty

Adding jjj changes every demand at once: jjj's own demand rises while all of SSS's demands fall, each through the shared denominator vj+VSv_j + V_Svj​+VS​. The obvious approach is to show that hmh^mhm is convex, and it fails: hmh^mhm is in general not convex in vjv_jvj​, for example, when c(q)=aq+bc(q) = aq + bc(q)=aq+b is linear and every margin equals some m>am > am>a, hmh^mhm is a positive multiple of the concave demand vj/(vj+VS)v_j/(v_j+V_S)vj​/(vj​+VS​) plus a constant. The paper's own argument goes through the derivative (6). It needs a derivative of ccc, and its last step ("at most one vjv_jvj​ with hm′(vj)=0h^{m\prime}(v_j) = 0hm′(vj​)=0") is literally false when the numerator of (6) vanishes on an interval, for instance when ccc is linear with slope equal to a common margin, so that hmh^mhm is constant. A rigorous proof must handle a non-differentiable concave ccc, the endpoint vj=0v_j = 0vj​=0 where jjj's demand is 000, and a numerator that may be constant on stretches.

Formalization scope

  • Variants are Fin n, 0-based (the paper's variant iii is index i−1i-1i−1). The no-purchase option is not a variant: v0v_0v0​ is a separate real, with v0>0v_0 > 0v0​>0 and vi>0v_i > 0vi​>0 for all iii.
  • The demand qim(S)q_i^m(S)qim​(S) is the published definition RetailVariety.Structure.share (from RetailVariety.Structure.Model), with assortments as Finset (Fin n). qi(vj)q_i(v_j)qi​(vj​) is share applied to the preference vector with jjj's entry replaced by the variable, on insert j S, and j∉Sj \notin Sj∈/S is assumed.
  • The cost c:R→Rc : \mathbb R \to \mathbb Rc:R→R is assumed concave and monotone on [0,1][0,1][0,1] only (ConcaveOn ℝ (Set.Icc 0 1) c, MonotoneOn c (Set.Icc 0 1)). Nothing is assumed about c(0)c(0)c(0), so hm(0)=−c(0)h^m(0) = -c(0)hm(0)=−c(0).
  • Margins m : Fin n → ℝ are arbitrary reals. The monotone-margin assumption of §3 is not needed and not imposed.
  • Quasi-convexity is Mathlib's QuasiconvexOn ℝ (Set.Ici 0). The domain is the closed half-line, including vj=0v_j = 0vj​=0.
  • The milestones (6), monotone numerator and single crossing add differentiability of ccc on (0,1)(0,1)(0,1), because they are stated with c′=c' =c′= deriv c. The goal does not.

The following formalizations would trivialize the problem and are ruled out: a specific cost (newsvendor, power, linear); convexity instead of quasi-convexity; hmh^mhm only on (0,∞)(0,\infty)(0,∞); or a common margin imposed without need.

Contributions welcome: proofs of the milestones, a proof of the goal that avoids derivatives, and general lemmas on quasi-convex functions of one variable and on the algebra of MNL shares, which the companion missions of this series (I and III–V) can reuse.

Selected references

  • G. P. Cachon, C. Terwiesch, Y. Xu, Retail Assortment Planning in the Presence of Consumer Search, working paper, The Wharton School, December 20, 2002. Published in Manufacturing & Service Operations Management 7(4):330–346, 2005. doi:10.1287/msom.1050.0088
  • G. van Ryzin, S. Mahajan, On the Relationship Between Inventory Costs and Variety Benefits in Retail Assortments, Management Science 45(11):1496–1509, 1999. doi:10.1287/mnsc.45.11.1496
  • S. P. Anderson, A. de Palma, J.-F. Thisse, Discrete Choice Theory of Product Differentiation, MIT Press, 1992 (Chapter 2: the MNL formula (2)). doi:10.7551/mitpress/2450.001.0001
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Convex OptimizationOptimizationStatistics·Captain: mikedeng1

Sparse Regression at Scale: Branch-and-Bound rooted in First-Order Optimization 3: The Big-M Relaxation Is at Least as Strong as PR(∞) for M ≤ ½√(λ0/λ2) and at Most as Strong for M ≥ √(λ0/λ2)Research Paper

Motivation

Best subset selection with a ridge term, the ℓ0ℓ2\ell_0\ell_2ℓ0​ℓ2​-regularized least squares problem

min⁡β∈Rp 12∥y−Xβ∥22+λ0∥β∥0+λ2∥β∥22,\min_{\beta\in\mathbb R^p}\ \tfrac12\|y - X\beta\|_2^2 + \lambda_0\|\beta\|_0 + \lambda_2\|\beta\|_2^2,β∈Rpmin​ 21​∥y−Xβ∥22​+λ0​∥β∥0​+λ2​∥β∥22​,

is a standard model for sparse linear regression. It can be solved to certified optimality by branch-and-bound (BnB) over a mixed integer formulation, and the speed of BnB depends on how tight the lower bounds of its node relaxations are. Two mixed integer formulations are in common use: the Big-M formulation, which links each coefficient to a binary indicator through a box ∣βi∣≤Mzi|\beta_i| \le M z_i∣βi​∣≤Mzi​ (Bertsimas, King and Mazumder, 2016), and the perspective formulation, which replaces βi2\beta_i^2βi2​ by an auxiliary variable constrained by a rotated second-order cone (Frangioni and Gentile, 2006; Günlük and Linderoth, 2010). Which formulation gives the stronger continuous relaxation decides which one a solver should be built on.

Hazimeh, Mazumder and Saab (2021) compare the relaxations in Section 2. Their Proposition 2 compares the interval relaxation of the Big-M formulation with that of the perspective formulation without a box, PR(∞)\mathrm{PR}(\infty)PR(∞), studied by Dong, Chen and Linderoth (2015). This mission formalizes that comparison.

Setting

Fix a design matrix X∈Rn×pX \in \mathbb R^{n\times p}X∈Rn×p, a response y∈Rny \in \mathbb R^ny∈Rn, parameters λ0,λ2>0\lambda_0, \lambda_2 > 0λ0​,λ2​>0 and a bound M>0M > 0M>0. Write [p]={1,…,p}[p] = \{1,\dots,p\}[p]={1,…,p} and ∥β∥∞≤M\|\beta\|_\infty \le M∥β∥∞​≤M for ∣βi∣≤M|\beta_i| \le M∣βi​∣≤M for every i∈[p]i \in [p]i∈[p].

The Big-M formulation (2) is

min⁡β,z 12∥y−Xβ∥22+λ0∑i∈[p]zi+λ2∥β∥22s.t.−Mzi≤βi≤Mzi, zi∈{0,1}.\min_{\beta, z}\ \tfrac12\|y - X\beta\|_2^2 + \lambda_0\sum_{i\in[p]} z_i + \lambda_2\|\beta\|_2^2 \quad\text{s.t.}\quad -Mz_i \le \beta_i \le Mz_i,\ z_i\in\{0,1\}.β,zmin​ 21​∥y−Xβ∥22​+λ0​i∈[p]∑​zi​+λ2​∥β∥22​s.t.−Mzi​≤βi​≤Mzi​, zi​∈{0,1}.

Its interval relaxation replaces zi∈{0,1}z_i \in \{0,1\}zi​∈{0,1} by zi∈[0,1]z_i \in [0,1]zi​∈[0,1]; its optimal value is VB(M)V_{B(M)}VB(M)​. Eliminating zzz gives the equivalent form (37),

VB(M)=min⁡∥β∥∞≤MH(β),H(β)=12∥y−Xβ∥22+∑i∈[p](λ0M∣βi∣+λ2βi2).V_{B(M)} = \min_{\|\beta\|_\infty\le M} H(\beta),\qquad H(\beta) = \tfrac12\|y - X\beta\|_2^2 + \sum_{i\in[p]}\Big(\frac{\lambda_0}{M}|\beta_i| + \lambda_2\beta_i^2\Big).VB(M)​=∥β∥∞​≤Mmin​H(β),H(β)=21​∥y−Xβ∥22​+i∈[p]∑​(Mλ0​​∣βi​∣+λ2​βi2​).

The reverse Huber penalty is B(t)=∣t∣\mathcal B(t) = |t|B(t)=∣t∣ for ∣t∣≤1|t| \le 1∣t∣≤1 and B(t)=(t2+1)/2\mathcal B(t) = (t^2+1)/2B(t)=(t2+1)/2 for ∣t∣≥1|t| \ge 1∣t∣≥1, and ψ1(b;λ0,λ2)=2λ0B(bλ2/λ0)\psi_1(b;\lambda_0,\lambda_2) = 2\lambda_0\mathcal B(b\sqrt{\lambda_2/\lambda_0})ψ1​(b;λ0​,λ2​)=2λ0​B(bλ2​/λ0​​). The interval relaxation of PR(∞)\mathrm{PR}(\infty)PR(∞) has the value (6),

VPR(∞)=min⁡β∈RpG(β),G(β)=12∥y−Xβ∥22+∑i∈[p]ψ1(βi;λ0,λ2).V_{PR(\infty)} = \min_{\beta\in\mathbb R^p} G(\beta),\qquad G(\beta) = \tfrac12\|y - X\beta\|_2^2 + \sum_{i\in[p]}\psi_1(\beta_i;\lambda_0,\lambda_2).VPR(∞)​=β∈Rpmin​G(β),G(β)=21​∥y−Xβ∥22​+i∈[p]∑​ψ1​(βi​;λ0​,λ2​).

Let S(λ2)\mathcal S(\lambda_2)S(λ2​) be the set of minimizers of GGG, and, as in (9),

L(M)={λ2>0  :  ∃β∈S(λ2) with ∥β∥∞≤M}.\mathcal L(M) = \{\lambda_2 > 0 \;:\; \exists\beta\in\mathcal S(\lambda_2) \text{ with } \|\beta\|_\infty \le M\}.L(M)={λ2​>0:∃β∈S(λ2​) with ∥β∥∞​≤M}.

The comparison runs through the scalar function t(b)=2λ0B(bλ2/λ0)−λ0M∣b∣−λ2b2=ψ1(b)−(λ0M∣b∣+λ2b2)t(b) = 2\lambda_0\mathcal B(b\sqrt{\lambda_2/\lambda_0}) - \frac{\lambda_0}{M}|b| - \lambda_2 b^2 = \psi_1(b) - \big(\tfrac{\lambda_0}{M}|b| + \lambda_2 b^2\big)t(b)=2λ0​B(bλ2​/λ0​​)−Mλ0​​∣b∣−λ2​b2=ψ1​(b)−(Mλ0​​∣b∣+λ2​b2) and through v∗(M)=min⁡∥β∥∞≤MG(β)v^*(M) = \min_{\|\beta\|_\infty\le M} G(\beta)v∗(M)=min∥β∥∞​≤M​G(β).

Formalization targets

Goal: Proposition 2 (p. 7)

VB(M)≥VPR(∞)if M≤12λ0/λ2,(10)V_{B(M)} \ge V_{PR(\infty)}\quad\text{if } M \le \tfrac12\sqrt{\lambda_0/\lambda_2},\qquad (10)VB(M)​≥VPR(∞)​if M≤21​λ0​/λ2​​,(10) VB(M)≤VPR(∞)if M≥λ0/λ2 and λ2∈L(M).(11)V_{B(M)} \le V_{PR(\infty)}\quad\text{if } M \ge \sqrt{\lambda_0/\lambda_2} \text{ and } \lambda_2 \in \mathcal L(M).\qquad (11)VB(M)​≤VPR(∞)​if M≥λ0​/λ2​​ and λ2​∈L(M).(11)

Milestones, in the order of the paper's proof

  1. (37): VB(M)=min⁡∥β∥∞≤MH(β)V_{B(M)} = \min_{\|\beta\|_\infty\le M} H(\beta)VB(M)​=min∥β∥∞​≤M​H(β), attained.
  2. (10) on its own.
  3. Lemma 1: for M≥λ0/λ2M \ge \sqrt{\lambda_0/\lambda_2}M≥λ0​/λ2​​ and b∈[−M,M]b \in [-M, M]b∈[−M,M], t(b)≥0t(b) \ge 0t(b)≥0.
  4. (41): for M≥λ0/λ2M \ge \sqrt{\lambda_0/\lambda_2}M≥λ0​/λ2​​, v∗(M)≥VB(M)v^*(M) \ge V_{B(M)}v∗(M)≥VB(M)​.

The mission also contains the scalar inequality (39) as a supporting statement (not a milestone): for M≤12λ0/λ2M \le \frac12\sqrt{\lambda_0/\lambda_2}M≤21​λ0​/λ2​​ and ∣b∣≤M|b| \le M∣b∣≤M, t(b)=(2λ0λ2−λ0/M)∣b∣−λ2b2≤0t(b) = (2\sqrt{\lambda_0\lambda_2} - \lambda_0/M)|b| - \lambda_2 b^2 \le 0t(b)=(2λ0​λ2​​−λ0​/M)∣b∣−λ2​b2≤0.

Significance

Proposition 2 says that neither relaxation dominates the other. For a tight Big-M bound the Big-M relaxation yields the larger lower bound; for a loose one, provided some optimal solution of PR(∞)\mathrm{PR}(\infty)PR(∞) lies in the box, the perspective relaxation does. Equivalently, with the other data fixed, a small λ2\lambda_2λ2​ favours the Big-M relaxation and a large λ2\lambda_2λ2​ favours PR(∞)\mathrm{PR}(\infty)PR(∞) (p. 8). Together with Proposition 1 of the same paper, which shows that the box-constrained perspective relaxation PR(M)\mathrm{PR}(M)PR(M) beats both when λ0/λ2>M\sqrt{\lambda_0/\lambda_2} > Mλ0​/λ2​​>M, this motivates the paper's choice of PR(M)\mathrm{PR}(M)PR(M) as the formulation on which its BnB solver is built.

The proposition is proved in the paper (Appendix A, pp. 29–30). No machine-checked proof of it, of the reformulation (37), or of any property of the reverse Huber penalty exists on the platform. The mission produces a formal statement of both inequalities with every hypothesis explicit, and the definitions of the two relaxation values in a form that later missions on perspective relaxations can reuse.

Difficulty

The scalar inequalities (39) and Lemma 1 are elementary but split into cases at the kink of the reverse Huber penalty, ∣b∣=λ0/λ2|b| = \sqrt{\lambda_0/\lambda_2}∣b∣=λ0​/λ2​​, and at the sign of 2λ0λ2−λ0/M2\sqrt{\lambda_0\lambda_2} - \lambda_0/M2λ0​λ2​​−λ0​/M. The passage from coordinatewise inequalities to optimal values is where care is needed. VB(M)V_{B(M)}VB(M)​ is defined over pairs (β,z)(\beta, z)(β,z), and its identification with a minimum of HHH over a compact box requires eliminating zzz and showing attainment. For (11) a pointwise comparison of GGG and HHH on the box only bounds VB(M)V_{B(M)}VB(M)​ by the box-restricted value v∗(M)v^*(M)v∗(M), not by VPR(∞)V_{PR(\infty)}VPR(∞)​, which is an infimum over all of Rp\mathbb R^pRp; the hypothesis λ2∈L(M)\lambda_2 \in \mathcal L(M)λ2​∈L(M) is what closes this gap, and dropping it gives a statement the paper does not prove.

Formalization scope

All declarations live in the namespace L0BnB.BigMvsPR. Vectors are Fin p → ℝ, XXX is a Matrix (Fin n) (Fin p) ℝ, and XβX\betaXβ is X *ᵥ β. Every norm is an explicit sum: ∥v∥22=∑ivi2\|v\|_2^2 = \sum_i v_i^2∥v∥22​=∑i​vi2​, and ∥β∥∞≤M\|\beta\|_\infty \le M∥β∥∞​≤M is ∀i, ∣βi∣≤M\forall i,\ |\beta_i| \le M∀i, ∣βi​∣≤M. The reverse Huber penalty is an if on ∣t∣≤1|t| \le 1∣t∣≤1.

Optimal values are real infima (sInf): VB(M)V_{B(M)}VB(M)​ over the feasible pairs (β,z)(\beta, z)(β,z) of the interval relaxation, VPR(∞)V_{PR(\infty)}VPR(∞)​ over all of Rp\mathbb R^pRp, v∗(M)v^*(M)v∗(M) over the box. For λ0,λ2>0\lambda_0, \lambda_2 > 0λ0​,λ2​>0 each set of values is nonempty (β=z=0\beta = z = 0β=z=0) and bounded below by 000, so no infimum takes Lean's junk value. VPR(∞)V_{PR(\infty)}VPR(∞)​ is defined as the displayed minimum (6); its identification with the interval relaxation of PR(∞)\mathrm{PR}(\infty)PR(∞) is a result of Dong, Chen and Linderoth that the paper cites and does not prove, and it is not part of this mission. S(λ2)\mathcal S(\lambda_2)S(λ2​) is the set of minimizers of GGG, as the paper uses it in the proof of (11).

All theorems assume λ0,λ2,M>0\lambda_0, \lambda_2, M > 0λ0​,λ2​,M>0. The paper remarks that Proposition 2 applies for any M≥0M \ge 0M≥0; M=0M = 0M=0 is excluded because HHH and ttt divide by MMM. The goal is stated for optimal values, not for the objective functions at a single point: a pointwise comparison of HHH and GGG is a milestone, not the proposition. Milestone (37) is stated with IsLeast, so it asserts attainment as well as the value.

The paper states no O(⋅)O(\cdot)O(⋅) bounds in this result, so no constants are instantiated. Contributions welcome: proofs of the scalar lemmas, of (37) (which needs compactness of the box and continuity of HHH), and of the goal.

Selected references

  • H. Hazimeh, R. Mazumder, A. Saab, Sparse Regression at Scale: Branch-and-Bound rooted in First-Order Optimization, arXiv:2004.06152v2, 2021; Mathematical Programming, 2022. https://arxiv.org/abs/2004.06152
  • H. Dong, K. Chen, J. Linderoth, Regularization vs. Relaxation: A conic optimization perspective of statistical variable selection, arXiv preprint, 2015. https://arxiv.org/abs/1510.06083
  • D. Bertsimas, A. King, R. Mazumder, Best subset selection via a modern optimization lens, The Annals of Statistics 44(2), 813–852, 2016. https://doi.org/10.1214/15-AOS1388
  • A. Frangioni, C. Gentile, Perspective cuts for a class of convex 0–1 mixed integer programs, Mathematical Programming 106(2), 225–236, 2006. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10107-005-0594-3
  • O. Günlük, J. Linderoth, Perspective reformulations of mixed integer nonlinear programs with indicator variables, Mathematical Programming 124(1–2), 183–205, 2010. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10107-010-0360-z
  • A. B. Owen, A robust hybrid of lasso and ridge regression, Contemporary Mathematics 443, 59–72, 2007 (the reverse Huber penalty).
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Algorithmic Game TheoryOptimization·Captain: mikedeng1

Quality in Supply Chain Encroachment IV: Without Quality Commitment in the Direct Channel, Quality Differentiation Across Channels Is Always OptimalResearch Paper

Motivation

A manufacturer that sells through an independent retailer may also open its own direct channel, an online store or a factory outlet. This is called supply chain encroachment. The operations literature has asked whether encroachment helps or hurts the two firms. The usual approach compares the double-marginalization cost of a pure retail channel with the competition the direct channel creates. With quality exogenous and uniform across channels, Arya, Mittendorf and Sappington (2007) showed that encroachment can lead to a win–win outcome when the manufacturer's direct selling cost is large, because it pushes the wholesale price down.

Ha, Long and Nasiry (Quality in Supply Chain Encroachment, MSOM 18(2), 2016; authors' manuscript SSRN 3970373) make product quality a decision of the manufacturer. Their main model lets her commit to the qualities of both channels before the retailer orders. In that model quality differentiation is not always optimal: for some parameters she sells the same quality in both channels (their Proposition 4).

Commitment is a modelling assumption. When design lead times are short, the manufacturer can redesign the direct-channel product after seeing the retailer's order, so she cannot credibly announce its quality in advance. Section 6.3 of the paper studies this fast-design case. Its only analytical result is Proposition 7: without commitment, quality differentiation across channels is always optimal. This mission formalizes that proposition and the three steps of its proof.

Setting

Consumers. A consumer has quality sensitivity θ\thetaθ, uniform on [0,1][0,1][0,1], and obtains surplus θu−p\theta u - pθu−p from one unit of quality u>0u>0u>0 at price ppp. The manufacturer sells qMq_MqM​ units of quality uMu_MuM​ directly and the retailer sells qRq_RqR​ units of quality uRu_RuR​. Each consumer buys at most one unit, and the market-clearing prices depend on which product has the higher quality:

  • if uR≤uMu_R\le u_MuR​≤uM​:   pM=uM(1−qM)−uRqR,pR=uR(1−qM−qR)\;p_M = u_M(1-q_M)-u_Rq_R,\quad p_R = u_R(1-q_M-q_R)pM​=uM​(1−qM​)−uR​qR​,pR​=uR​(1−qM​−qR​);
  • if uM<uRu_M<u_RuM​<uR​:   pM=uM(1−qM−qR),pR=uR(1−qR)−uMqM\;p_M = u_M(1-q_M-q_R),\quad p_R = u_R(1-q_R)-u_Mq_MpM​=uM​(1−qM​−qR​),pR​=uR​(1−qR​)−uM​qM​.

At uM=uR=uu_M=u_R=uuM​=uR​=u both channels clear at u(1−qM−qR)u(1-q_M-q_R)u(1−qM​−qR​).

Costs. One unit of quality vvv costs the manufacturer kv2kv^2kv2, with k>0k>0k>0. She pays a selling cost c≥0c\ge0c≥0 for each unit sold directly; the retailer's selling cost is 000.

Profits. For a wholesale price www,

ΠR=(pR−w) qR,ΠM=(w−kuR2) qR+(pM−c−kuM2) qM.\Pi_R = (p_R-w)\,q_R,\qquad \Pi_M = (w-ku_R^2)\,q_R + (p_M-c-ku_M^2)\,q_M .ΠR​=(pR​−w)qR​,ΠM​=(w−kuR2​)qR​+(pM​−c−kuM2​)qM​.

Timing without commitment.

  1. The manufacturer announces the retailer's quality uRu_RuR​ and the wholesale price www.
  2. The retailer chooses its order qRq_RqR​.
  3. The manufacturer chooses the direct-channel quality uMu_MuM​ and quantity qMq_MqM​.

The game has perfect information and is solved by backward induction. A strategy profile σ\sigmaσ has three parts: a stage-1 choice (w,uR)(w,u_R)(w,uR​), a retailer rule (w,uR)↦qR(w,u_R)\mapsto q_R(w,uR​)↦qR​, and a stage-3 rule (w,uR,qR)↦(uM,qM)(w,u_R,q_R)\mapsto(u_M,q_M)(w,uR​,qR​)↦(uM​,qM​). The profile is a subgame perfect equilibrium (SPE) when, at every history on or off the path, the mover's action is feasible and no feasible alternative gives the mover more. The manufacturer encroaches when qM>0q_M>0qM​>0 on the equilibrium path.

Formalization targets

Goal: Proposition 7 (p. 21)

For every k>0k>0k>0, c≥0c\ge0c≥0 and every SPE σ\sigmaσ whose equilibrium path has qM>0q_M>0qM​>0 and qR>0q_R>0qR​>0,

uM≠uRon the equilibrium path.u_M \neq u_R \quad\text{on the equilibrium path.}uM​=uR​on the equilibrium path.

Milestones (proof of Proposition 7, p. 37)

Write uM=τuRu_M=\tau u_RuM​=τuR​ with τ>0\tau>0τ>0.

  1. Stage-3 value functions. For τ≥1\tau\ge1τ≥1 the optimal direct quantity is qM(τ,qR,uR)=((−c−qRuR−kτ2uR2+τuR)/(2τuR))+q_M(\tau,q_R,u_R)=\big((-c-q_Ru_R-k\tau^2u_R^2+\tau u_R)/(2\tau u_R)\big)^+qM​(τ,qR​,uR​)=((−c−qR​uR​−kτ2uR2​+τuR​)/(2τuR​))+. When it is positive the optimal profit is
ΠMHF=(c+uR(qR+τ(kτuR−1)))24τuR+qR(w−kuR2).\Pi^{HF}_M=\frac{(c+u_R(q_R+\tau(k\tau u_R-1)))^2}{4\tau u_R}+q_R(w-ku_R^2).ΠMHF​=4τuR​(c+uR​(qR​+τ(kτuR​−1)))2​+qR​(w−kuR2​).

The case τ≤1\tau\le1τ≤1 gives ΠMLF\Pi^{LF}_MΠMLF​ in the same way, and the two agree at τ=1\tau=1τ=1. 2. Derivatives (31)–(32). The τ\tauτ-derivatives of ΠMHF\Pi^{HF}_MΠMHF​ and ΠMLF\Pi^{LF}_MΠMLF​, their values at τ=1\tau=1τ=1, and the equivalence

qM(1,qR,uR)>0  ⟺  c+uR(qR+kuR−1)<0.q_M(1,q_R,u_R)>0\iff c+u_R(q_R+ku_R-1)<0.qM​(1,qR​,uR​)>0⟺c+uR​(qR​+kuR​−1)<0.
  1. Stage-3 contradiction. At any history with uR>0u_R>0uR​>0 and qR>0q_R>0qR​>0, no optimal stage-3 choice has both uM=uRu_M=u_RuM​=uR​ and qM>0q_M>0qM​>0.

Milestone 3 is stronger than the goal: it holds at every stage-3 history, not only on the equilibrium path.

Significance

The result. Proposition 7 shows that the structure of the optimal product line depends on the timing of design decisions. With commitment, the manufacturer sometimes keeps a single quality. A lower-quality direct product would draw a larger retail order but forgo market segmentation, and with some parameter values she accepts that trade. Without commitment, the direct-channel quality can no longer influence the retailer's order. She then always differentiates, so whenever both channels sell, consumers face a two-product line. The paper's numerical work (Figure 6) compares the two regimes. The analytical statement that differentiation is universal without commitment is this proposition.

Formalizing it. The proposition has a short, informal proof in the e-Companion. That proof argues through first-order conditions, "given that τ=1\tau=1τ=1 is optimal". It uses the strict signs printed in (31) and (32), although optimality gives only weak inequalities. Its contradiction relies on the retailer's order being positive, which the statement leaves implicit. A machine-checked proof pins down exactly which hypotheses the result needs. It also contributes reusable facts about Cournot-type stage games with vertically differentiated products. No part of this paper has been formalized before.

Difficulty

The stage-3 problem is a joint choice of quality uMu_MuM​ and quantity qMq_MqM​, and the demand system changes form at uM=uRu_M=u_RuM​=uR​, so the manufacturer's profit is not differentiable in uMu_MuM​ there. The value function after optimizing qMq_MqM​ is a piecewise expression: ΠMHF\Pi^{HF}_MΠMHF​ to the right of τ=1\tau=1τ=1, ΠMLF\Pi^{LF}_MΠMLF​ to the left, and the linear profit qR(w−kuR2)q_R(w-ku_R^2)qR​(w−kuR2​) wherever the optimal qMq_MqM​ is zero. An argument that τ=1\tau=1τ=1 is not optimal has to work with one-sided derivatives of this function at a kink. It must also check that the optimal quantity stays positive on both sides near τ=1\tau=1τ=1.

An obvious shortcut is to argue that differentiation is optimal because segmentation always pays. That argument fails at qR=0q_R=0qR​=0. There the manufacturer is a one-product monopolist, and uM=uRu_M=u_RuM​=uR​ is optimal whenever uRu_RuR​ happens to equal her monopoly quality. The positive retail order is therefore essential.

Formalization scope

All definitions live in the namespace QualityEncroach.NoCommit. They are real-valued throughout, and the formalization fixes the following conventions:

  • the wholesale price www ranges over R\mathbb RR, since the paper states no sign restriction;
  • qualities satisfy uR,uM>0u_R,u_M>0uR​,uM​>0, and quantities satisfy qR,qM≥0q_R,q_M\ge0qR​,qM​≥0;
  • the inverse demand is the formula above for all nonnegative quantities, as in the paper;
  • the paper derives the case uM<uRu_M<u_RuM​<uR​ "similarly" (p. 15), and its explicit form is the one stated above;
  • τ\tauτ is not named in the paper's text; its formulas read uM=τuRu_M=\tau u_RuM​=τuR​;
  • subgame perfection is stated in one-shot-deviation form at every history, which in this three-stage game is equivalent to subgame perfection;
  • the goal adds the hypothesis qR>0q_R>0qR​>0 on the path, reading "across channels" as both channels selling (see Difficulty).

A trivializing formalization is ruled out: the stage-3 rule maps (w,uR,qR)(w,u_R,q_R)(w,uR​,qR​) to (uM,qM)(u_M,q_M)(uM​,qM​), so uMu_MuM​ is chosen after the order. Putting uMu_MuM​ at stage 1 would give the committed game, where the proposition is false. The goal is conditional on an SPE existing, which the paper does not prove. A verification file checks the price formulas on hand instances in both branches. At k=1k=1k=1, c=0.05c=0.05c=0.05, uR=0.3u_R=0.3uR​=0.3, qR=0.1q_R=0.1qR​=0.1 and w=0.15w=0.15w=0.15, it checks that the basic parameter conditions hold and a uniform stage-3 choice is strictly beaten by uM=0.33u_M=0.33uM​=0.33. The numerical check does not establish the existence of an optimal stage-3 choice or an SPE.

A complete development needs elementary real analysis only: maximization of concave quadratics, one-variable derivatives, and one-sided optimality conditions at a kink. Proofs of any milestone, and proofs of the goal from milestone 3, are welcome.

Selected references

  • A. Y. Ha, X. Long, J. Nasiry, Quality in Supply Chain Encroachment, Manufacturing & Service Operations Management 18(2), 2016. https://doi.org/10.1287/msom.2015.0562 (authors' manuscript: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3970373)
  • A. Arya, B. Mittendorf, D. E. M. Sappington, The Bright Side of Supplier Encroachment, Marketing Science 26(5), 651–659, 2007. https://doi.org/10.1287/mksc.1070.0280
  • M. Mussa, S. Rosen, Monopoly and Product Quality, Journal of Economic Theory 18(2), 301–317, 1978. https://doi.org/10.1016/0022-0531(78)90085-6
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Convex OptimizationOptimizationStatistics·Captain: mikedeng1

Sparse Regression at Scale: Branch-and-Bound rooted in First-Order Optimization 2: When √(λ0/λ2) > M the Perspective Relaxation Is at Least as Strong as the Big-M and PR(∞) RelaxationsResearch Paper

Motivation

Best subset selection with ridge shrinkage asks for a coefficient vector β∈Rp\beta\in\mathbb R^pβ∈Rp that fits a response y∈Rny\in\mathbb R^ny∈Rn through a design matrix X∈Rn×pX\in\mathbb R^{n\times p}X∈Rn×p while using few nonzero coefficients:

min⁡β∈Rp 12∥y−Xβ∥22+λ0∥β∥0+λ2∥β∥22.\min_{\beta\in\mathbb R^p}\ \tfrac12\|y-X\beta\|_2^2 + \lambda_0\|\beta\|_0 + \lambda_2\|\beta\|_2^2 .β∈Rpmin​ 21​∥y−Xβ∥22​+λ0​∥β∥0​+λ2​∥β∥22​.

This ℓ0ℓ2\ell_0\ell_2ℓ0​ℓ2​-regularized least squares problem is NP-hard, and exact methods solve it as a mixed integer program by branch-and-bound (BnB). The speed of BnB is governed by the strength of the continuous relaxation solved at every node: a larger relaxation value prunes more nodes. Hazimeh, Mazumder and Saab (arXiv:2004.06152, Mathematical Programming 2022) build the solver L0BnB on a perspective formulation and compare its relaxation with two standard alternatives. Their Proposition 1 quantifies that comparison, and their experiments (Section 4.2.1 of the paper) report speed-ups of more than 90× from using the perspective formulation with a tight bound MMM instead of the bound-free formulation.

The mission formalizes Proposition 1 together with the three steps of its proof in the paper's Appendix A.

Setting

Fix XXX, yyy, regularization parameters λ0,λ2>0\lambda_0,\lambda_2>0λ0​,λ2​>0 and a bound M>0M>0M>0 on ∥β∥∞\|\beta\|_\infty∥β∥∞​; write [p]={1,…,p}[p]=\{1,\dots,p\}[p]={1,…,p}.

The Big-M formulation B(M)B(M)B(M) introduces indicators ziz_izi​ and minimizes 12∥y−Xβ∥22+λ0∑izi+λ2∥β∥22\tfrac12\|y-X\beta\|_2^2+\lambda_0\sum_i z_i+\lambda_2\|\beta\|_2^221​∥y−Xβ∥22​+λ0​∑i​zi​+λ2​∥β∥22​ subject to −Mzi≤βi≤Mzi-Mz_i\le\beta_i\le Mz_i−Mzi​≤βi​≤Mzi​, zi∈{0,1}z_i\in\{0,1\}zi​∈{0,1}. Its interval relaxation lets zi∈[0,1]z_i\in[0,1]zi​∈[0,1]; its optimal value is VB(M)V_{B(M)}VB(M)​.

The reverse Huber penalty is B(t)=∣t∣\mathcal B(t)=|t|B(t)=∣t∣ for ∣t∣≤1|t|\le1∣t∣≤1 and (t2+1)/2(t^2+1)/2(t2+1)/2 for ∣t∣≥1|t|\ge1∣t∣≥1. Put

ψ1(b;λ0,λ2)=2λ0 B(bλ2/λ0),ψ2(b;λ0,λ2,M)=(λ0M+λ2M)∣b∣,\psi_1(b;\lambda_0,\lambda_2)=2\lambda_0\,\mathcal B\big(b\sqrt{\lambda_2/\lambda_0}\big),\qquad \psi_2(b;\lambda_0,\lambda_2,M)=\Big(\frac{\lambda_0}{M}+\lambda_2M\Big)|b|,ψ1​(b;λ0​,λ2​)=2λ0​B(bλ2​/λ0​​),ψ2​(b;λ0​,λ2​,M)=(Mλ0​​+λ2​M)∣b∣,

and let ψ=ψ1\psi=\psi_1ψ=ψ1​ if λ0/λ2≤M\sqrt{\lambda_0/\lambda_2}\le Mλ0​/λ2​​≤M and ψ=ψ2\psi=\psi_2ψ=ψ2​ if λ0/λ2>M\sqrt{\lambda_0/\lambda_2}>Mλ0​/λ2​​>M. The paper's Theorem 1 shows that the interval relaxation of the perspective formulation PR(M)\mathrm{PR}(M)PR(M) is equivalent to

min⁡∥β∥∞≤MF(β),F(β)=12∥y−Xβ∥22+∑i∈[p]ψ(βi;λ0,λ2,M),(5)\min_{\|\beta\|_\infty\le M} F(\beta),\qquad F(\beta)=\tfrac12\|y-X\beta\|_2^2+\sum_{i\in[p]}\psi(\beta_i;\lambda_0,\lambda_2,M), \tag{5}∥β∥∞​≤Mmin​F(β),F(β)=21​∥y−Xβ∥22​+i∈[p]∑​ψ(βi​;λ0​,λ2​,M),(5)

and VPR(M)V_{PR(M)}VPR(M)​ denotes the optimal value of (5). Without a bound, the relaxation value of PR(∞)\mathrm{PR}(\infty)PR(∞) is

VPR(∞)=min⁡β∈RpG(β),G(β)=12∥y−Xβ∥22+∑i∈[p]ψ1(βi;λ0,λ2).(6)V_{PR(\infty)}=\min_{\beta\in\mathbb R^p}G(\beta),\qquad G(\beta)=\tfrac12\|y-X\beta\|_2^2+\sum_{i\in[p]}\psi_1(\beta_i;\lambda_0,\lambda_2). \tag{6}VPR(∞)​=β∈Rpmin​G(β),G(β)=21​∥y−Xβ∥22​+i∈[p]∑​ψ1​(βi​;λ0​,λ2​).(6)

Finally h(λ0,λ2,M)=λ0/M+λ2M−2λ0λ2h(\lambda_0,\lambda_2,M)=\lambda_0/M+\lambda_2M-2\sqrt{\lambda_0\lambda_2}h(λ0​,λ2​,M)=λ0​/M+λ2​M−2λ0​λ2​​, and β∗\beta^*β∗ denotes an optimal solution of (5).

Formalization targets

Goal: Proposition 1

For λ0/λ2>M\sqrt{\lambda_0/\lambda_2}>Mλ0​/λ2​​>M,

VPR(M) ≥ VB(M)+λ2(M∥β∗∥1−∥β∗∥22),(7)V_{PR(M)}\ \ge\ V_{B(M)}+\lambda_2\big(M\|\beta^*\|_1-\|\beta^*\|_2^2\big), \tag{7}VPR(M)​ ≥ VB(M)​+λ2​(M∥β∗∥1​−∥β∗∥22​),(7) VPR(M) ≥ VPR(∞)+h(λ0,λ2,M) ∥β∗∥1.(8)V_{PR(M)}\ \ge\ V_{PR(\infty)}+h(\lambda_0,\lambda_2,M)\,\|\beta^*\|_1. \tag{8}VPR(M)​ ≥ VPR(∞)​+h(λ0​,λ2​,M)∥β∗∥1​.(8)

Milestones

  1. (37): VB(M)=min⁡∥β∥∞≤MH(β)V_{B(M)}=\min_{\|\beta\|_\infty\le M}H(\beta)VB(M)​=min∥β∥∞​≤M​H(β) with H(β)=12∥y−Xβ∥22+∑i(λ0M∣βi∣+λ2βi2)H(\beta)=\tfrac12\|y-X\beta\|_2^2+\sum_i\big(\tfrac{\lambda_0}{M}|\beta_i|+\lambda_2\beta_i^2\big)H(β)=21​∥y−Xβ∥22​+∑i​(Mλ0​​∣βi​∣+λ2​βi2​); the Big-M relaxation expressed in β\betaβ alone. It holds for every M>0M>0M>0.
  2. (7) alone.
  3. The linear case of ψ1\psi_1ψ1​: if ∣b∣≤M<λ0/λ2|b|\le M<\sqrt{\lambda_0/\lambda_2}∣b∣≤M<λ0​/λ2​​ then ψ1(b;λ0,λ2)=2∣b∣λ0λ2\psi_1(b;\lambda_0,\lambda_2)=2|b|\sqrt{\lambda_0\lambda_2}ψ1​(b;λ0​,λ2​)=2∣b∣λ0​λ2​​.
  4. (8) alone (the paper's (38)).

The goal is the conjunction of milestones 2 and 4.

Significance

In the regime λ0/λ2>M\sqrt{\lambda_0/\lambda_2}>Mλ0​/λ2​​>M both added terms are nonnegative: M∥β∗∥1≥∥β∗∥22M\|\beta^*\|_1\ge\|\beta^*\|_2^2M∥β∗∥1​≥∥β∗∥22​ because ∥β∗∥∞≤M\|\beta^*\|_\infty\le M∥β∗∥∞​≤M, and h>0h>0h>0 because λ0/M+λ2M>2λ0λ2\lambda_0/M+\lambda_2M>2\sqrt{\lambda_0\lambda_2}λ0​/M+λ2​M>2λ0​λ2​​ whenever M≠λ0/λ2M\ne\sqrt{\lambda_0/\lambda_2}M=λ0​/λ2​​. So the perspective relaxation is at least as strong as both the Big-M relaxation and PR(∞)\mathrm{PR}(\infty)PR(∞), strictly so as soon as one coordinate of β∗\beta^*β∗ lies strictly inside (0,M)(0,M)(0,M) in absolute value (for (7)) or β∗≠0\beta^*\ne0β∗=0 (for (8)). The bounds are explicit in the relaxation's own solution, so they can be evaluated at a BnB node. This is the theoretical justification for the paper's design choice of building its solver on PR(M)\mathrm{PR}(M)PR(M) with a valid, tight MMM; the regime λ0/λ2≤M\sqrt{\lambda_0/\lambda_2}\le Mλ0​/λ2​​≤M, where (5) is (6) with the additional box constraint ∥β∥∞≤M\|\beta\|_\infty\le M∥β∥∞​≤M, is complementary.

Proposition 1 is proved in the paper; it has no machine-checked proof. The mission produces one, together with reusable Lean definitions of the three relaxation values and of the reverse Huber penalty that other statements about perspective relaxations of sparse regression can be stated against.

Difficulty

The arithmetic of the coordinate-wise penalties is short. The substance is in comparing optimal values that are defined as infima over different feasible sets. The obvious argument "VPR(M)−VB(M)≥F(β∗)−H(β∗)V_{PR(M)}-V_{B(M)}\ge F(\beta^*)-H(\beta^*)VPR(M)​−VB(M)​≥F(β∗)−H(β∗)" requires that the Big-M relaxation, which is posed over pairs (β,z)(\beta,z)(β,z), have value at most H(β∗)H(\beta^*)H(β∗); that is the content of (37), a statement about a different feasible set in more variables. Likewise (8) needs VPR(∞)≤G(β∗)V_{PR(\infty)}\le G(\beta^*)VPR(∞)​≤G(β∗), i.e. that the infimum in (6) is a genuine lower bound of a set bounded below, and both inequalities use the regime λ0/λ2>M\sqrt{\lambda_0/\lambda_2}>Mλ0​/λ2​​>M, in which ψ=ψ2\psi=\psi_2ψ=ψ2​. Dropping the regime hypothesis makes (8) false in general: for λ0/λ2≤M\sqrt{\lambda_0/\lambda_2}\le Mλ0​/λ2​​≤M one has ψ=ψ1\psi=\psi_1ψ=ψ1​ and h≥0h\ge0h≥0, and the right side can exceed VPR(M)=VPR(∞)V_{PR(M)}=V_{PR(\infty)}VPR(M)​=VPR(∞)​.

Formalization scope

All objects live in the namespace L0BnB.Strength. Data are X : Matrix (Fin n) (Fin p) ℝ, y : Fin n → ℝ, reals lam0 lam2 M with 0 < lam0, 0 < lam2, 0 < M as hypotheses; [p][p][p] is Fin p. Norms are explicit sums: ∥v∥22\|v\|_2^2∥v∥22​ is ∑ i, v i ^ 2, ∥β∥1\|\beta\|_1∥β∥1​ is ∑ i, |β i|, and ∥β∥∞≤M\|\beta\|_\infty\le M∥β∥∞​≤M is ∀ i, |β i| ≤ M. The regime is written M < Real.sqrt (lam0 / lam2).

Optimal values are sInf of the image of the feasible set in ℝ. Each set is nonempty (β=0\beta=0β=0, z=0z=0z=0) and bounded below by 000 under the positivity hypotheses, so sInf is the true infimum and never a junk value. VB(M)V_{B(M)}VB(M)​ is defined over pairs (β,z)(\beta,z)(β,z) with zi∈[0,1]z_i\in[0,1]zi​∈[0,1], not through HHH; (37) is a theorem. VPR(∞)V_{PR(\infty)}VPR(∞)​ is (6) as printed: the paper attributes to its reference [21] the identification of (6) with the interval relaxation of PR(∞)\mathrm{PR}(\infty)PR(∞) in (β,z,s)(\beta,z,s)(β,z,s) variables, and that identification is not part of the mission. VPR(M)V_{PR(M)}VPR(M)​ is the value of (5), which is the paper's definition; Theorem 1 (the equivalence of (5) with the (β,z,s)(\beta,z,s)(β,z,s) relaxation) belongs to a sibling mission.

The optimal solution β∗\beta^*β∗ is a binder with the hypotheses ∥β∗∥∞≤M\|\beta^*\|_\infty\le M∥β∗∥∞​≤M and F(β∗)≤F(β)F(\beta^*)\le F(\beta)F(β∗)≤F(β) for every β\betaβ in the box. A formalization in which β∗\beta^*β∗ is an arbitrary feasible point, or in which VB(M)V_{B(M)}VB(M)​ or VPR(∞)V_{PR(\infty)}VPR(∞)​ is defined through a chosen minimizer, would change the statement and is ruled out. The paper uses no O(⋅)O(\cdot)O(⋅) in this result, so no constant is instantiated.

Needed infrastructure is light: continuity of HHH and compactness of the box for the attainment in (37), and csInf lemmas on ℝ. Contributions of proofs of any milestone, and of the attainment of the infimum in (5), are welcome.

Selected references

  • H. Hazimeh, R. Mazumder, A. Saab, Sparse Regression at Scale: Branch-and-Bound rooted in First-Order Optimization, arXiv:2004.06152v2, 2021; Mathematical Programming (2022). https://arxiv.org/abs/2004.06152
  • H. Hazimeh, R. Mazumder, Fast Best Subset Selection: Coordinate Descent and Local Combinatorial Optimization Algorithms, Operations Research 68(5), 1517–1537, 2020. https://doi.org/10.1287/opre.2019.1919
  • H. Dong, K. Chen, J. Linderoth, Regularization vs. Relaxation: A conic optimization perspective of statistical variable selection, arXiv e-prints, 2015 (the paper's reference [21], source of (6) for PR(∞)\mathrm{PR}(\infty)PR(∞)). https://arxiv.org/abs/1510.06083
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CombinatoricsOptimal TransportOptimization·Captain: mikedeng1

Computational Optimal Transport VI: On Termination the Auction Algorithm Returns an Assignment Whose Cost Is Within nε of the OptimumTextbook

Motivation

The optimal assignment problem asks for a one-to-one matching of nnn points to nnn objects of least total cost. It is the discrete optimal transport problem between two uniform measures with the same number of atoms, and by the Birkhoff–von Neumann theorem it coincides with the Kantorovich linear program on that instance (Peyré and Cuturi, Computational Optimal Transport, Proposition 2.1). Assignment solvers are therefore the inner routine of exact discrete optimal transport, of matching-based estimators in statistics and of many combinatorial optimization pipelines.

The auction algorithm was introduced by Bertsekas in 1981 (Bertsekas 1981) and refined with ε-scaling by Bertsekas and Eckstein in 1988 (Bertsekas & Eckstein 1988). It is a dual coordinate method with an economic reading: unassigned points bid for objects, prices of contested objects move, and an object changes hands when outbid. Its practical appeal is that each iteration is local and cheap, and that it parallelizes well. Peyré and Cuturi present it in §3.7 of their monograph (pp. 417–422) as an alternative use of the machinery of C-transforms, and as a precursor to the Sinkhorn algorithm of Chapter 4.

Setting

Fix n≥2n\ge 2n≥2, write [ ⁣[n] ⁣]={1,…,n}[\![n]\!]=\{1,\dots,n\}[[n]]={1,…,n}, and let C∈Rn×n\mathbf C\in\mathbb R^{n\times n}C∈Rn×n be a cost matrix: Ci,j\mathbf C_{i,j}Ci,j​ is the cost of assigning point iii to object jjj. A permutation σ\sigmaσ of [ ⁣[n] ⁣][\![n]\!][[n]] is an assignment, of cost ∑iCi,σi\sum_i \mathbf C_{i,\sigma_i}∑i​Ci,σi​​.

A dual vector (price vector) g∈Rn\mathbf g\in\mathbb R^ng∈Rn is indexed by the objects. Its Cˉ\bar{\mathbf C}Cˉ-transform is (gCˉ)i=min⁡jCi,j−gj(\mathbf g^{\bar{\mathbf C}})_i=\min_j \mathbf C_{i,j}-\mathbf g_j(gCˉ)i​=minj​Ci,j​−gj​, the best adjusted cost available to point iii; a pair (f,g)(\mathbf f,\mathbf g)(f,g) is dual feasible if fi+gj≤Ci,j\mathbf f_i+\mathbf g_j\le \mathbf C_{i,j}fi​+gj​≤Ci,j​ for all i,ji,ji,j.

The algorithm maintains a triplet (S,ξ,g)(S,\xi,\mathbf g)(S,ξ,g): a set S⊆[ ⁣[n] ⁣]S\subseteq[\![n]\!]S⊆[[n]] of assigned points, a partial assignment vector ξ\xiξ (an injective map from SSS to [ ⁣[n] ⁣][\![n]\!][[n]]) and a dual vector g\mathbf gg. The state satisfies ε-complementary slackness (ε-CS) if

∀i∈S,Ci,ξi−gξi≤ε+min⁡j(Ci,j−gj).\forall i\in S,\qquad \mathbf C_{i,\xi_i}-\mathbf g_{\xi_i}\le \varepsilon+\min_j\big(\mathbf C_{i,j}-\mathbf g_j\big).∀i∈S,Ci,ξi​​−gξi​​≤ε+jmin​(Ci,j​−gj​).

One iteration picks a point i∉Si\notin Si∈/S, a lowest adjusted cost index ji1∈argmin⁡jCi,j−gjj^1_i\in\operatorname{argmin}_j \mathbf C_{i,j}-\mathbf g_jji1​∈argminj​Ci,j​−gj​ and a second lowest ji2∈argmin⁡j≠ji1Ci,j−gjj^2_i\in\operatorname{argmin}_{j\neq j^1_i}\mathbf C_{i,j}-\mathbf g_jji2​∈argminj=ji1​​Ci,j​−gj​, and performs

gji1←Ci,ji1−(Ci,ji2−gji2)−ε,(3.9)\mathbf g_{j^1_i}\leftarrow \mathbf C_{i,j^1_i}-\big(\mathbf C_{i,j^2_i}-\mathbf g_{j^2_i}\big)-\varepsilon, \tag{3.9}gji1​​←Ci,ji1​​−(Ci,ji2​​−gji2​​)−ε,(3.9)

removes from SSS the point i′i'i′ with ξi′=ji1\xi_{i'}=j^1_iξi′​=ji1​ (if there is one), sets ξi=ji1\xi_i=j^1_iξi​=ji1​ and adds iii to SSS. The algorithm starts from S=∅S=\emptysetS=∅, g=0n\mathbf g=0_ng=0n​, and terminates when S=[ ⁣[n] ⁣]S=[\![n]\!]S=[[n]].

Formalization targets

Goal: Proposition 3.9 (p. 422)

For every ε>0\varepsilon>0ε>0 and every run of the algorithm that terminates, the final ξ\xiξ is a permutation and

∑iCi,ξi  ≤  ∑iCi,σi+nεfor every permutation σ.\sum_i \mathbf C_{i,\xi_i}\;\le\;\sum_i \mathbf C_{i,\sigma_i}+n\varepsilon\qquad\text{for every permutation }\sigma.i∑​Ci,ξi​​≤i∑​Ci,σi​​+nεfor every permutation σ.

The goal fixes no particular tie-breaking rule and no order in which unassigned points bid: it holds for all of them.

Milestones

  1. (3.8), p. 419. If Ci,σi−gσi=min⁡jCi,j−gj\mathbf C_{i,\sigma_i}-\mathbf g_{\sigma_i}=\min_j \mathbf C_{i,j}-\mathbf g_jCi,σi​​−gσi​​=minj​Ci,j​−gj​ for every iii, then σ\sigmaσ is an optimal assignment and (gCˉ,g)(\mathbf g^{\bar{\mathbf C}},\mathbf g)(gCˉ,g) is an optimal dual pair.
  2. Properties (b)–(c), pp. 419–420. At each iteration the size of SSS does not decrease, some price decreases by at least ε\varepsilonε, and no price increases.
  3. Proposition 3.7, p. 420. Every state of every run satisfies ε-CS.

Companion: Proposition 3.8 (p. 421), corrected

For C≥0\mathbf C\ge 0C≥0, every run has at most n(⌊∥C∥∞/ε⌋+1)n\big(\lfloor\|\mathbf C\|_\infty/\varepsilon\rfloor+1\big)n(⌊∥C∥∞​/ε⌋+1) iterations. This is the termination statement; the goal does not depend on it.

Significance

Proposition 3.9 is the accuracy guarantee of the auction algorithm. With integer costs and ε<1/n\varepsilon<1/nε<1/n it yields an exactly optimal assignment, which is how the algorithm is used as an exact solver; combined with ε-scaling it gives the complexity bounds quoted in Remark 3.3. The argument is also the template for every ε-relaxed primal–dual method: an approximate optimality certificate maintained by local moves, turned into a global suboptimality bound by weak duality.

The results are classical and proved in the book and in Bertsekas's monographs; they are not open. What this mission adds is a machine-checked account of the algorithm with all of its nondeterminism (ties in the argmins, the order of bidders) quantified explicitly, together with the corrected iteration bound. To the best of the mission's prior-art search, no Lean formalization of the auction algorithm exists on the platform or in Mathlib, which has the assignment problem only implicitly (through permutations and doubly stochastic matrices).

Difficulty

The obvious argument for the goal sums the ε-CS inequality over iii and compares with an arbitrary permutation σ\sigmaσ. The sum telescopes only if the final ξ\xiξ is a bijection, so the proof must carry, through every iteration, the invariant that ξ\xiξ is injective on SSS, and this invariant interacts with the removal of the displaced point in step 2: the set update has to remove exactly the point holding ji1j^1_iji1​, which needs injectivity at the previous step.

Preserving ε-CS for the points that are not bidding relies on prices only ever decreasing, which in turn needs ε≥0\varepsilon\ge 0ε≥0 and the specific form of (3.9); preserving it for the bidder needs the second-best index ji2j^2_iji2​ to realize the minimum over j≠ji1j\neq j^1_ij=ji1​, including in the presence of ties. The printed termination bound is false (see below), so the companion requires reconstructing the counting argument: an object that is still unassigned has never been bid on and keeps price 000, which caps the number of bids on any other object.

Formalization scope

  • [ ⁣[n] ⁣][\![n]\!][[n]] is Fin n; C\mathbf CC is a Matrix (Fin n) (Fin n) ℝ; prices are Fin n → ℝ; min⁡j\min_jminj​ is the infimum over the finite nonempty index set.
  • A state is a structure with fields S : Finset (Fin n), ξ : Fin n → Fin n and g : Fin n → ℝ. Only the values of ξ on S are meaningful; injectivity on S is a property to be proved, not a field.
  • An iteration is a relation between consecutive states (AuctionStep), with the choice of bidder, of ji1j^1_iji1​ and of ji2j^2_iji2​ existential. A run of TTT iterations is a sequence of states starting from S=∅S=\emptysetS=∅, g=0\mathbf g=0g=0; it is terminated when S=[ ⁣[n] ⁣]S=[\![n]\!]S=[[n]] at step TTT. The results hold for every run, whatever the tie-breaking.
  • Costs are the unnormalized sums ∑iCi,σi\sum_i \mathbf C_{i,\sigma_i}∑i​Ci,σi​​, as in the book's proof of Proposition 3.9. Under the 1n\frac1nn1​ normalization of (2.2) the gap nεn\varepsilonnε becomes ε\varepsilonε.
  • Added hypotheses: n≥2n\ge2n≥2 in the goal (the second-best index requires it); ε>0\varepsilon>0ε>0 throughout; C≥0\mathbf C\ge0C≥0 in the corrected Proposition 3.8, which its proof uses.
  • Printed slips. Proposition 3.8 as printed (N=n∥C∥∞/εN=n\|\mathbf C\|_\infty/\varepsilonN=n∥C∥∞​/ε) fails for C=0\mathbf C=0C=0; the companion states the bound the proof gives. Property (b) "can only increase" is stated as non-decrease; property (c) refers to an object index jjj.
  • Trivialization ruled out. The run predicate forces the initial state, the exact update (3.9) and the set update of step 2 at every iteration, and the goal requires S=[ ⁣[n] ⁣]S=[\![n]\!]S=[[n]] at the end; a terminated run exists already for n=2n=2n=2, so the goal is not vacuous.

Contributions welcome: the injectivity invariant of ξ on S as a reusable lemma; the milestones in any order; a proof of termination (the companion) and of the existence of a terminated run for every n≥2n\ge2n≥2.

Selected references

  • G. Peyré and M. Cuturi, Computational Optimal Transport, Foundations and Trends in Machine Learning 11(5–6):355–607, 2019, §3.7. https://doi.org/10.1561/2200000073
  • D. P. Bertsekas, A new algorithm for the assignment problem, Mathematical Programming 21:152–171, 1981. https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01584237
  • D. P. Bertsekas and J. Eckstein, Dual coordinate step methods for linear network flow problems, Mathematical Programming 42:203–243, 1988. https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01589417
  • D. P. Bertsekas, Auction algorithms for network flow problems: A tutorial introduction, Computational Optimization and Applications 1:7–66, 1992. https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00247653
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Numerical AnalysisOptimization·Captain: mikedeng1

The Proximal Alternating Direction Method of Multipliers in the Nonconvex Setting: Convergence Analysis and Rates 1: Bounded Iterates Converge to a KKT Point with Finite Length Under the KL PropertyResearch Paper

Motivation

Many problems in signal processing, statistics and machine learning are of the form min⁡x{g(Ax)+h(x)}\min_x \{g(Ax)+h(x)\}minx​{g(Ax)+h(x)}: a smooth data-fitting term hhh, plus a possibly nonsmooth and nonconvex regularizer ggg applied to a linear image AxAxAx of the variable. Examples are total-variation-type penalties with nonconvex potentials, ℓ0\ell_0ℓ0​-type sparsity terms, and constraints Ax∈CAx\in CAx∈C with CCC nonconvex. The alternating direction method of multipliers (ADMM) treats ggg and hhh separately, which makes it the method of choice for this class. For convex problems its convergence theory is classical. For nonconvex problems it was long used as a heuristic, and the Kurdyka–Łojasiewicz (KŁ) framework of Attouch, Bolte, Redont, Soubeyran and Svaiter, and of Bolte, Sabach and Teboulle, is now the standard tool for proving that such methods converge.

Timeline. Li and Pong (SIAM J. Optim. 2015) proved global convergence of a proximal ADMM with ρ=1\rho=1ρ=1 for twice differentiable hhh under a KŁ hypothesis. Hong, Luo and Razaviyayn (SIAM J. Optim. 2016) studied related nonconvex ADMM schemes under other assumptions. Boţ and Nguyen (arXiv:1801.01994v2, Math. Oper. Res. 45(2), 2020) extended this in three directions. Their scheme uses variable metrics M1kM_1^kM1k​, M2kM_2^kM2k​. It allows a relaxation parameter ρ∈(0,2)\rho\in(0,2)ρ∈(0,2) in the dual step. It covers both a proximal and a proximal-linearized xxx-update. Under these conditions they proved that bounded iterates have finite length and converge to a KKT point whenever a regularized augmented Lagrangian has the KŁ property. This mission formalizes that theorem.

Setting

Let g:Rm→R∪{+∞}g:\mathbb R^m\to\mathbb R\cup\{+\infty\}g:Rm→R∪{+∞} be proper and lower semicontinuous, let h:Rn→Rh:\mathbb R^n\to\mathbb Rh:Rn→R be differentiable with LLL-Lipschitz gradient, and let A:Rn→RmA:\mathbb R^n\to\mathbb R^mA:Rn→Rm be linear. The augmented Lagrangian with parameter r>0r>0r>0 is

Lr(x,z,y)=g(z)+h(x)+⟨y,Ax−z⟩+r2∥Ax−z∥2.L_r(x,z,y)=g(z)+h(x)+\langle y,Ax-z\rangle+\tfrac r2\|Ax-z\|^2 .Lr​(x,z,y)=g(z)+h(x)+⟨y,Ax−z⟩+2r​∥Ax−z∥2.

Let M1kM_1^kM1k​ and M2kM_2^kM2k​ be symmetric positive semidefinite matrices, and write ∥v∥M2=⟨Mv,v⟩\|v\|_M^2=\langle Mv,v\rangle∥v∥M2​=⟨Mv,v⟩. Fix 0<ρ<20<\rho<20<ρ<2. From an arbitrary starting point (x0,z0,y0)(x^0,z^0,y^0)(x0,z0,y0), Algorithm 1 generates

  • zk+1∈arg⁡min⁡z{g(z)+⟨yk,Axk−z⟩+r2∥Axk−z∥2+12∥z−zk∥M2k2}z^{k+1}\in\arg\min_z\{g(z)+\langle y^k,Ax^k-z\rangle+\frac r2\|Ax^k-z\|^2+\frac12\|z-z^k\|^2_{M_2^k}\}zk+1∈argminz​{g(z)+⟨yk,Axk−z⟩+2r​∥Axk−z∥2+21​∥z−zk∥M2k​2​},
  • xk+1∈arg⁡min⁡x{h(x)+⟨yk,Ax−zk+1⟩+r2∥Ax−zk+1∥2+12∥x−xk∥M1k2}x^{k+1}\in\arg\min_x\{h(x)+\langle y^k,Ax-z^{k+1}\rangle+\frac r2\|Ax-z^{k+1}\|^2+\frac12\|x-x^k\|^2_{M_1^k}\}xk+1∈argminx​{h(x)+⟨yk,Ax−zk+1⟩+2r​∥Ax−zk+1∥2+21​∥x−xk∥M1k​2​},
  • yk+1=yk+ρr(Axk+1−zk+1)y^{k+1}=y^k+\rho r(Ax^{k+1}-z^{k+1})yk+1=yk+ρr(Axk+1−zk+1).

Algorithm 2 is the same, except that h(x)h(x)h(x) in the xxx-update is replaced by its linearization ⟨x−xk,∇h(xk)⟩\langle x-x^k,\nabla h(x^k)\rangle⟨x−xk,∇h(xk)⟩. Assumption 1 asks for four things:

  1. ggg and hhh are bounded below;
  2. AAA is surjective;
  3. μi=sup⁡k∥Mik∥<∞\mu_i=\sup_k\|M_i^k\|<\inftyμi​=supk​∥Mik​∥<∞;
  4. r≥4T0L>0r\ge4T_0L>0r≥4T0​L>0 and 2M1k+rA∗A⪰(L+CM/r)Id2M_1^k+rA^*A\succeq(L+C_M/r)\mathrm{Id}2M1k​+rA∗A⪰(L+CM​/r)Id, where T0T_0T0​ and CMC_MCM​ are explicit in ρ\rhoρ, LLL, μ1\mu_1μ1​ and λmin⁡(AA∗)\lambda_{\min}(AA^*)λmin​(AA∗).

With the constants T1T_1T1​ and C1C_1C1​ of §2.2 of the paper, the regularized augmented Lagrangian is

Fr(x,z,y,x′,y′)=Lr(x,z,y)+T1∥A∗(y−y′)∥2+C12∥x−x′∥2.F_r(x,z,y,x',y')=L_r(x,z,y)+T_1\|A^*(y-y')\|^2+\tfrac{C_1}2\|x-x'\|^2 .Fr​(x,z,y,x′,y′)=Lr​(x,z,y)+T1​∥A∗(y−y′)∥2+2C1​​∥x−x′∥2.

A KKT point of the problem is a triple (x^,z^,y^)(\hat x,\hat z,\hat y)(x^,z^,y^​) with −A∗y^=∇h(x^)-A^*\hat y=\nabla h(\hat x)−A∗y^​=∇h(x^), y^∈∂g(z^)\hat y\in\partial g(\hat z)y^​∈∂g(z^) and z^=Ax^\hat z=A\hat xz^=Ax^, where ∂\partial∂ is the limiting subdifferential. A proper lower semicontinuous Ψ\PsiΨ is a KŁ function if, near every point of dom⁡∂Ψ\operatorname{dom}\partial\Psidom∂Ψ, a concave desingularizing function φ\varphiφ satisfies φ′(Ψ(u)−Ψ(u^))dist⁡(0,∂Ψ(u))≥1\varphi'(\Psi(u)-\Psi(\hat u))\operatorname{dist}(0,\partial\Psi(u))\ge1φ′(Ψ(u)−Ψ(u^))dist(0,∂Ψ(u))≥1.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 14

Under Assumption 1, let {(xk,zk,yk)}\{(x^k,z^k,y^k)\}{(xk,zk,yk)} be a bounded sequence generated by Algorithm 1 or Algorithm 2. If FrF_rFr​ is a KŁ function, then

∑k≥0∥xk+1−xk∥<∞,∑k≥0∥zk+1−zk∥<∞,∑k≥0∥yk+1−yk∥<∞,\sum_{k\ge0}\|x^{k+1}-x^k\|<\infty,\quad\sum_{k\ge0}\|z^{k+1}-z^k\|<\infty,\quad\sum_{k\ge0}\|y^{k+1}-y^k\|<\infty,k≥0∑​∥xk+1−xk∥<∞,k≥0∑​∥zk+1−zk∥<∞,k≥0∑​∥yk+1−yk∥<∞,

and (xk,zk,yk)→(x^,z^,y^)(x^k,z^k,y^k)\to(\hat x,\hat z,\hat y)(xk,zk,yk)→(x^,z^,y^​) for some KKT point (x^,z^,y^)(\hat x,\hat z,\hat y)(x^,z^,y^​).

Milestones

The milestones follow the order in which the paper's proof uses them:

  1. the descent lemma (Remark 1, already proved on the platform);
  2. the monotonicity inequality for Lr+T1∥A∗Δy∥2L_r+T_1\|A^*\Delta y\|^2Lr​+T1​∥A∗Δy∥2 (Lemma 4);
  3. the increment estimates (Lemma 5);
  4. the Lyapunov property and convergence of FkF_kFk​ (Theorem 7);
  5. explicit subgradients of LrL_rLr​ and FrF_rFr​ with bounds (Lemma 8, Lemma 9, Corollary 10);
  6. the limit-set properties (Lemmas 11 and 12);
  7. the uniformized KŁ property (Lemma 13, shared with the PALM mission);
  8. a summability lemma for three-step recursions (Lemma 3).

Theorem 6, the boundedness of the iterates under coercivity, is included as a supporting item that discharges the boundedness hypothesis.

Significance

The theorem gives global convergence of the whole sequence, not just subsequences, for a broad family of nonconvex splitting methods. The family includes full-splitting variants, in which M1k=tkId−rA∗AM_1^k=t_k\mathrm{Id}-rA^*AM1k​=tk​Id−rA∗A makes the xxx-update explicit. The KŁ hypothesis on FrF_rFr​ holds, for example, whenever ggg and hhh are semi-algebraic. The finite length conclusion is also the starting point for the rates of Section 3 of the paper, which are the subject of the companion mission.

The paper result is proved; this mission formalizes the known proof. As far as the platform records go, no machine-checked proof of convergence of a nonconvex ADMM exists. The Li–Pong ADMM theorems on the platform are open statements about a different algorithm. A completed development would supply the following reusable pieces:

  • the Lyapunov analysis of a variable-metric ADMM with relaxed dual step;
  • subdifferential calculus for an augmented Lagrangian on a product space;
  • a second instance of the generic KŁ finite-length argument.

Difficulty

The obvious Lyapunov candidate, LrL_rLr​ itself, does not decrease along the iterates: the dual step increases it by 1ρr∥yk+1−yk∥2\frac1{\rho r}\|y^{k+1}-y^k\|^2ρr1​∥yk+1−yk∥2. That increase has to be paid for by primal progress, and this is possible only because surjectivity of AAA lets the dual increment be controlled by xxx-increments over two consecutive steps. This is where the specific constants T0T_0T0​, T1T_1T1​, C1C_1C1​ and the coupling condition (15) come from. The KŁ argument must therefore be run on the lifted function FrF_rFr​ in five variables, whose subgradient bound (Corollary 10) involves three past increments and two telescoping terms. The textbook one-step KŁ argument therefore does not apply directly, and the recursion has to be closed with the three-step summability Lemma 3. For ρ≠1\rho\ne1ρ=1 the dual update is relaxed, and the estimates must handle ∣1−ρ∣|1-\rho|∣1−ρ∣ in both regimes ρ<1\rho<1ρ<1 and ρ>1\rho>1ρ>1.

Formalization scope

Spaces are EuclideanSpace ℝ (Fin n), and products such as Rn×Rm×Rm\mathbb R^n\times\mathbb R^m\times\mathbb R^mRn×Rm×Rm and the 5-fold domain of FrF_rFr​ are nested WithLp 2 products. Their norm is the Euclidean product norm the paper uses, not the sup norm. The function ggg and the functions LrL_rLr​, FrF_rFr​ take values in EReal. The data are bundled in a structure Data, and the algorithm is a parameter Variant (prox for Algorithm 1, linearized for Algorithm 2), so every statement covers both algorithms. A run is a relation: any minimizer may be selected at each step, and existence of minimizers is not claimed. λmin⁡(AA∗)\lambda_{\min}(AA^*)λmin​(AA∗) and μ1,μ2\mu_1,\mu_2μ1​,μ2​ are replaced by parameters with the inequalities the proofs use (lam ∥y∥2≤∥A∗y∥2\mathrm{lam}\,\|y\|^2\le\|A^*y\|^2lam∥y∥2≤∥A∗y∥2 with lam>0\mathrm{lam}>0lam>0, and ∥Mik∥≤μi\|M_i^k\|\le\mu_i∥Mik​∥≤μi​). The paper's statements are the instance lam=λmin⁡(AA∗)\mathrm{lam}=\lambda_{\min}(AA^*)lam=λmin​(AA∗), μi=sup⁡k∥Mik∥\mu_i=\sup_k\|M_i^k\|μi​=supk​∥Mik​∥. The subdifferential is the published limiting subdifferential, and "KŁ function" is the published IsKLFunction. In that definition, dist⁡(0,∂Ψ(u))\operatorname{dist}(0,\partial\Psi(u))dist(0,∂Ψ(u)) is read as a bound for every subgradient, so dist⁡(0,∅)=+∞\operatorname{dist}(0,\emptyset)=+\inftydist(0,∅)=+∞. Corrections read past: the paper indexes {Fk}k≥0\{F_k\}_{k\ge0}{Fk​}k≥0​ although FkF_kFk​ exists only for k≥1k\ge1k≥1, and it writes "defined in Assumption 1" for T1T_1T1​ and C1C_1C1​, which are defined on p. 10.

There are three ways to formalize the statement trivially, and all are excluded:

  • a run predicate that no sequence satisfies, or a junk value making T0=0T_0=0T0​=0 so that Assumption 1 cannot hold (a sorry-free check shows that Assumption 1 and the run relation are jointly satisfiable for both algorithms);
  • a KŁ hypothesis on an arbitrary function: the hypothesis is on the specific FrF_rFr​ built from T1T_1T1​ and C1C_1C1​;
  • the weaker conclusion "x^\hat xx^ is stationary": the conclusion is the full KKT triple.

Contributions are welcome at every milestone. Lemma 3 and the subdifferential calculus behind Lemmas 8–9 are independent of the algorithm, and are good entry points.

Selected references

  • R. I. Boţ, D.-K. Nguyen, The proximal alternating direction method of multipliers in the nonconvex setting: convergence analysis and rates, arXiv:1801.01994v2, 2020; Math. Oper. Res. 45(2), 2020. https://arxiv.org/abs/1801.01994, https://doi.org/10.1287/moor.2019.1008
  • J. Bolte, S. Sabach, M. Teboulle, Proximal alternating linearized minimization for nonconvex and nonsmooth problems, Math. Program. 146, 2014. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10107-013-0701-9
  • H. Attouch, J. Bolte, B. F. Svaiter, Convergence of descent methods for semi-algebraic and tame problems, Math. Program. 137, 2013. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10107-011-0484-9
  • G. Li, T. K. Pong, Global convergence of splitting methods for nonconvex composite optimization, SIAM J. Optim. 25(4), 2015. https://doi.org/10.1137/140998135
  • M. Hong, Z.-Q. Luo, M. Razaviyayn, Convergence analysis of alternating direction method of multipliers for a family of nonconvex problems, SIAM J. Optim. 26(1), 2016. https://doi.org/10.1137/140990309
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Convex OptimizationOptimization·Captain: mikedeng1

Proximal Algorithms II: The Proximal Operator of a Norm Is v − λΠ_B(v/λ), B the Unit Ball of the Dual NormResearch Paper

Motivation

Norms are the most common nonsmooth terms in convex optimization models. The ℓ1\ell_1ℓ1​ norm promotes sparsity in the lasso and in compressed sensing, the Euclidean norm of blocks of variables promotes group sparsity in the group lasso, and the nuclear norm promotes low rank. First-order methods for such models, notably the proximal gradient method, ADMM and their accelerated and parallel variants, handle a norm term through a single operation: its proximal operator. Each iteration of these methods needs prox⁡λ∥⋅∥(v)\operatorname{prox}_{\lambda\|\cdot\|}(v)proxλ∥⋅∥​(v) for some point vvv and step λ>0\lambda>0λ>0, so a description of this operator for an arbitrary norm is needed in practice.

The monograph of N. Parikh and S. Boyd, Proximal Algorithms (Found. Trends Optim. 1(3), 2014), records this description twice. In §2.5 it derives it from Moreau decomposition, and in §6.5 it states the general scaled form: the proximal operator of a norm is the identity minus a scaled Euclidean projection onto the unit ball of the dual norm. The underlying decomposition is due to J.-J. Moreau (Proximité et dualité dans un espace hilbertien, Bull. SMF 93, 1965). The norm case is standard in convex analysis texts; Parikh and Boyd present it as the bridge between proximal operators of norms and projections onto norm balls.

Setting

Work in Rn\mathbb R^nRn with the Euclidean inner product zTxz^TxzTx and Euclidean norm ∥⋅∥2\|\cdot\|_2∥⋅∥2​.

A function f:Rn→R∪{+∞}f:\mathbb R^n\to\mathbb R\cup\{+\infty\}f:Rn→R∪{+∞} is closed proper convex if its epigraph {(x,t)∣f(x)≤t}\{(x,t)\mid f(x)\le t\}{(x,t)∣f(x)≤t} is a nonempty closed convex set. For such fff and λ>0\lambda>0λ>0, the proximal operator is

prox⁡λf(v)=argmin⁡x(f(x)+12λ∥x−v∥22),\operatorname{prox}_{\lambda f}(v)=\operatorname*{argmin}_x\Big(f(x)+\tfrac{1}{2\lambda}\|x-v\|_2^2\Big),proxλf​(v)=xargmin​(f(x)+2λ1​∥x−v∥22​),

which has a unique minimizer for every vvv. The convex conjugate is f∗(y)=sup⁡x(yTx−f(x))f^*(y)=\sup_x\big(y^Tx-f(x)\big)f∗(y)=supx​(yTx−f(x)). For a set CCC, the indicator function ICI_CIC​ is 000 on CCC and +∞+\infty+∞ off CCC, and the Euclidean projection onto a nonempty closed convex CCC is ΠC(v)=argmin⁡x∈C∥x−v∥2\Pi_C(v)=\operatorname{argmin}_{x\in C}\|x-v\|_2ΠC​(v)=argminx∈C​∥x−v∥2​.

Let ∥⋅∥\|\cdot\|∥⋅∥ be a general norm on Rn\mathbb R^nRn, possibly different from ∥⋅∥2\|\cdot\|_2∥⋅∥2​. Its dual norm and the dual unit ball are

∥z∥∗=sup⁡{zTx∣∥x∥≤1},B={x∣∥x∥∗≤1}.\|z\|_*=\sup\{z^Tx\mid \|x\|\le 1\},\qquad \mathcal B=\{x\mid \|x\|_*\le 1\}.∥z∥∗​=sup{zTx∣∥x∥≤1},B={x∣∥x∥∗​≤1}.

In the Lean development the space is EuclideanSpace ℝ (Fin n), the general norm is a seminorm N with the definiteness hypothesis IsNorm N, ∥z∥∗\|z\|_*∥z∥∗​ is dualNorm N z, B\mathcal BB is dualBall N, ICI_CIC​ is indicator C, and f=∥⋅∥f=\|\cdot\|f=∥⋅∥ is normFun N.

Formalization targets

Goal: (6.8), §6.5, p. 187

For every general norm f=∥⋅∥f=\|\cdot\|f=∥⋅∥ on Rn\mathbb R^nRn, every λ>0\lambda>0λ>0 and every v∈Rnv\in\mathbb R^nv∈Rn,

prox⁡λf(v)=v−λ ΠB(v/λ).\operatorname{prox}_{\lambda f}(v)=v-\lambda\,\Pi_{\mathcal B}(v/\lambda).proxλf​(v)=v−λΠB​(v/λ).

Stated as: v−λw=prox⁡λf(v)v-\lambda w=\operatorname{prox}_{\lambda f}(v)v−λw=proxλf​(v) if and only if w=ΠB(v/λ)w=\Pi_{\mathcal B}(v/\lambda)w=ΠB​(v/λ), for all v,wv,wv,w.

Milestones, in attack order

  1. Moreau decomposition (2.4), p. 133: v=prox⁡f(v)+prox⁡f∗(v)v=\operatorname{prox}_f(v)+\operatorname{prox}_{f^*}(v)v=proxf​(v)+proxf∗​(v) for closed proper convex fff. This is the published, proved theorem MoreauProx.Decomposition.moreau_decomposition.
  2. §2.5, p. 134: for a norm, f∗=IBf^*=I_{\mathcal B}f∗=IB​ as functions on all of Rn\mathbb R^nRn.
  3. §2.5, p. 134: the case λ=1\lambda=1λ=1, v=prox⁡f(v)+ΠB(v)v=\operatorname{prox}_f(v)+\Pi_{\mathcal B}(v)v=proxf​(v)+ΠB​(v).
  4. (6.7), p. 187: prox⁡λf(v)=v−λprox⁡f∗/λ(v/λ)\operatorname{prox}_{\lambda f}(v)=v-\lambda\operatorname{prox}_{f^*/\lambda}(v/\lambda)proxλf​(v)=v−λproxf∗/λ​(v/λ) for a general norm fff and λ>0\lambda>0λ>0, as printed.

Significance

The goal reduces evaluating the proximal operator of any norm to projecting onto one convex set, the unit ball of the dual norm. All the familiar closed forms are instances: soft thresholding for ℓ1\ell_1ℓ1​ (whose dual ball is the ℓ∞\ell_\inftyℓ∞​ box), block soft thresholding for ∥⋅∥2\|\cdot\|_2∥⋅∥2​ (whose dual ball is the Euclidean ball), and the ℓ∞\ell_\inftyℓ∞​ prox via projection onto the ℓ1\ell_1ℓ1​ ball. Conversely, it lets a projection onto a norm ball be computed from the norm's proximal operator. Milestone 4, the scaled Moreau decomposition, is here stated for norms; its general form is an identity used throughout splitting methods whenever a dual or conjugate prox is cheaper than the primal one.

The results are classical and proved in the literature; the work here is formalization. Moreau's decomposition is already formalized on the platform (Moreau 1965 series, proved). Several norm-specific corollaries are posed as open problems in other series: soft thresholding (BoydADMM.Prox.prox_l1_eq_softThreshold), block soft thresholding (BoydADMM.L1.group_lasso_z_update) and projection onto a Euclidean ball (Pegasos.Analysis.projBall_isProj). A proof of the goal here gives a uniform route to such statements for any norm. The general-norm statements, the conjugate of a norm and the scaled decomposition are not formalized elsewhere on the platform.

Difficulty

The derivation in the monograph is two lines, but each line hides a step. Computing f∗f^*f∗ for a norm requires the inequality yTx≤∥x∥ ∥y∥∗y^Tx\le\|x\|\,\|y\|_*yTx≤∥x∥∥y∥∗​ and, for ∥y∥∗>1\|y\|_*>1∥y∥∗​>1, a direction along which yTx−∥x∥y^Tx-\|x\|yTx−∥x∥ grows without bound; the dual norm is a supremum, so finiteness and attainment have to be argued from finite dimensionality and definiteness of the norm. The scaling step requires knowing how the conjugate and the proximal operator transform under f↦λff\mapsto\lambda ff↦λf and v↦v/λv\mapsto v/\lambdav↦v/λ, in extended-real arithmetic where +∞+\infty+∞ values must be tracked. The proximal operator of an indicator being the projection is an unfolding of definitions, but the minimizer predicates on both sides must be matched, including the factor 12\tfrac1221​ and squared versus unsquared distances.

A tempting shortcut is to work only with the Euclidean norm, where B\mathcal BB is the Euclidean unit ball; that proves a special case, not the goal.

Formalization scope

  • Space and norms. Rn\mathbb R^nRn is EuclideanSpace ℝ (Fin n) for arbitrary nnn, including n=0n=0n=0. The general norm is an arbitrary Seminorm ℝ (EuclideanSpace ℝ (Fin n)) with definiteness (IsNorm); the Euclidean norm of the space is used only in the proximal objective and the projection, as in (1.1) and (1.3).
  • Extended values. Functions Rn→R∪{+∞}\mathbb R^n\to\mathbb R\cup\{+\infty\}Rn→R∪{+∞} take values in EReal. The dual norm is computed in EReal as the supremum of the printed set, so it has no junk value. λf\lambda fλf and f∗/λf^*/\lambdaf∗/λ are products with the positive reals λ\lambdaλ, λ−1\lambda^{-1}λ−1, and λ>0\lambda>0λ>0 is a hypothesis everywhere (p. 124).
  • Proximal operator and projection as predicates. "x=prox⁡g(z)x=\operatorname{prox}_g(z)x=proxg​(z)" is IsProx g z x (xxx minimizes 12∥u−z∥22+g(u)\tfrac12\|u-z\|_2^2+g(u)21​∥u−z∥22​+g(u)) and "x=ΠC(z)x=\Pi_C(z)x=ΠC​(z)" is IsProj C z x. With g=λfg=\lambda fg=λf, Moreau's objective 12∥u−z∥22+λf(u)\tfrac12\|u-z\|_2^2+\lambda f(u)21​∥u−z∥22​+λf(u) is λ\lambdaλ times the objective of (1.2), so it has the same minimizers. Both minimizers exist and are unique, so an equivalence over all candidate points states the printed equations exactly.
  • Standing assumption. Every function whose proximal operator appears is closed proper convex (p. 124); a norm is, so no statement needs an extra hypothesis. Every statement, milestone 4 included, is about a general norm, as on the page.
  • Ruling out trivializations. The dual unit ball is defined through the printed supremum sup⁡{zTx∣∥x∥≤1}\sup\{z^Tx\mid\|x\|\le1\}sup{zTx∣∥x∥≤1}, never by a closed form or as "the set that makes (6.8) hold", and the projection is not pre-solved.
  • Imported objects. The conjugate conj, IsProx and IsProj come from the published Moreau 1965 series definitions MoreauProx.Decomposition.ConvexDuality and MoreauProx.Decomposition.Cones.
  • Source. The PDF used is the authors' copy of the published monograph in the journal's format (printed pages 123–231); page numbers are those of this copy.

Useful contributions include lemmas on conjugates of positively homogeneous functions, on the behaviour of IsProx under scaling, and the identity prox⁡IC=ΠC\operatorname{prox}_{I_C}=\Pi_CproxIC​​=ΠC​ in the predicate form; all are reusable beyond this mission.

Selected references

  • N. Parikh and S. Boyd, Proximal Algorithms, Foundations and Trends in Optimization 1(3), 2014. https://doi.org/10.1561/2400000003
  • J.-J. Moreau, Proximité et dualité dans un espace hilbertien, Bulletin de la Société Mathématique de France 93:273–299, 1965. https://doi.org/10.24033/bsmf.1625
  • H. H. Bauschke and P. L. Combettes, Convex Analysis and Monotone Operator Theory in Hilbert Spaces, 2nd ed., Springer, 2017. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-48311-5
  • S. Boyd, N. Parikh, E. Chu, B. Peleato and J. Eckstein, Distributed Optimization and Statistical Learning via the Alternating Direction Method of Multipliers, Foundations and Trends in Machine Learning 3(1), 2011. https://doi.org/10.1561/2200000016
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Linear OptimizationOptimization·Captain: mikedeng1

Constrained Assortment Optimization for the Nested Logit Model 6: Under Space Constraints, the Linear Program (13) over Knapsack-Relaxation Solutions Bounds the Optimal Expected RevenueResearch Paper

Motivation

A retailer that sells products in several categories has to decide which products to put on display. Under the nested logit model a customer first picks a category (a nest) and then a product inside it, so offering a product changes the purchase probabilities of every other product. Choosing the assortment that maximizes expected revenue is assortment optimization, a standard problem of revenue management. Gallego and Topaloglu (Management Science, 2014) study it when every nest carries its own constraint on the assortment. With a limit on the shelf space of each nest the problem is NP-hard even for a single nest, so the paper builds an assortment that is guaranteed to earn at least half of the optimum.

A worst-case factor of two says little about one concrete instance. For its computational study (§7.1) the paper therefore needs, instance by instance, a number that is provably at least the optimal expected revenue, and it obtains one from a linear program, (13), whose constraints come from the linear programming relaxations of knapsack problems. Proposition 7 (Online Supplement A, p. 33) proves that this linear program does give an upper bound. This mission formalizes that proposition.

Setting

There are nests M={1,…,m}M = \{1, \dots, m\}M={1,…,m} and products N={1,…,n}N = \{1, \dots, n\}N={1,…,n} in each nest. Product jjj of nest iii has a preference weight vij>0v_{ij} > 0vij​>0 and a revenue rijr_{ij}rij​ (any real number); v0v_0v0​ is the preference weight of buying nothing, and γi∈(0,1]\gamma_i \in (0, 1]γi​∈(0,1] is the dissimilarity parameter of nest iii. For an assortment Si⊆NS_i \subseteq NSi​⊆N of nest iii put

Vi(Si)=∑j∈Sivij,Ri(Si)=∑j∈SivijrijVi(Si),V_i(S_i) = \sum_{j \in S_i} v_{ij}, \qquad R_i(S_i) = \frac{\sum_{j \in S_i} v_{ij} r_{ij}}{V_i(S_i)},Vi​(Si​)=j∈Si​∑​vij​,Ri​(Si​)=Vi​(Si​)∑j∈Si​​vij​rij​​,

with Ri(0ˉ)=0R_i(\bar 0) = 0Ri​(0ˉ)=0 for the empty assortment 0ˉ\bar 00ˉ. The expected revenue of (S1,…,Sm)(S_1, \dots, S_m)(S1​,…,Sm​) is

Π(S1,…,Sm)=∑i∈MVi(Si)γiRi(Si)v0+∑i∈MVi(Si)γi.\Pi(S_1, \dots, S_m) = \frac{\sum_{i \in M} V_i(S_i)^{\gamma_i} R_i(S_i)}{v_0 + \sum_{i \in M} V_i(S_i)^{\gamma_i}}.Π(S1​,…,Sm​)=v0​+∑i∈M​Vi​(Si​)γi​∑i∈M​Vi​(Si​)γi​Ri​(Si​)​.

Under space constraints product jjj of nest iii uses wijw_{ij}wij​ units of space and nest iii has capacity cic_ici​, with wij≤ciw_{ij} \le c_iwij​≤ci​ for every product, so the feasible assortments are Ci={Si:∑j∈Siwij≤ci}\mathcal C_i = \{S_i : \sum_{j \in S_i} w_{ij} \le c_i\}Ci​={Si​:∑j∈Si​​wij​≤ci​}. Problem (1) is Z∗=max⁡{Π(S1,…,Sm):Si∈Ci ∀i}Z^* = \max\{\Pi(S_1, \dots, S_m) : S_i \in \mathcal C_i \ \forall i\}Z∗=max{Π(S1​,…,Sm​):Si​∈Ci​ ∀i}.

For a scalar uuu, the knapsack problem (10) of nest iii maximizes ∑jvij(rij−u)xj\sum_j v_{ij}(r_{ij} - u) x_j∑j​vij​(rij​−u)xj​ over x∈{0,1}nx \in \{0,1\}^nx∈{0,1}n with ∑jwijxj≤ci\sum_j w_{ij} x_j \le c_i∑j​wij​xj​≤ci​. Its linear programming relaxation allows x∈[0,1]nx \in [0,1]^nx∈[0,1]n. The paper partitions u≥0u \ge 0u≥0 into finitely many intervals Iig\mathcal I_i^gIig​, g∈Gig \in \mathcal G_ig∈Gi​, on each of which one vector xigx_i^gxig​ solves the relaxation. For a fractional vector xxx it writes Vi(x)=∑jvijxjV_i(x) = \sum_j v_{ij} x_jVi​(x)=∑j​vij​xj​ and Ri(x)=∑jvijrijxj/Vi(x)R_i(x) = \sum_j v_{ij} r_{ij} x_j / V_i(x)Ri​(x)=∑j​vij​rij​xj​/Vi​(x).

The linear program (13) in the variables (z,y1,…,ym)(z, y_1, \dots, y_m)(z,y1​,…,ym​) is

min⁡{z:v0z≥∑i∈Myi,  yi≥Vi(xig)γi(Ri(xig)−z)  ∀g∈Gi, i∈M}.\min\Big\{ z : v_0 z \ge \sum_{i \in M} y_i,\ \ y_i \ge V_i(x_i^g)^{\gamma_i}\big(R_i(x_i^g) - z\big)\ \ \forall g \in \mathcal G_i,\ i \in M \Big\}.min{z:v0​z≥i∈M∑​yi​,  yi​≥Vi​(xig​)γi​(Ri​(xig​)−z)  ∀g∈Gi​, i∈M}.

Formalization targets

Goal: Proposition 7

If (z^,y^)(\hat z, \hat y)(z^,y^​) is an optimal solution of (13), then

z^≥Z∗.\hat z \ge Z^*.z^≥Z∗.

Milestones

  1. Every feasible (z,y)(z, y)(z,y) of (13) has yi≥0y_i \ge 0yi​≥0 for all iii (p. 33).
  2. For a nonempty S∈CiS \in \mathcal C_iS∈Ci​ with Ri(S)>zR_i(S) > zRi​(S)>z, u^=γiz+(1−γi)Ri(S)\hat u = \gamma_i z + (1 - \gamma_i) R_i(S)u^=γi​z+(1−γi​)Ri​(S), and a nonzero optimal solution xxx of the relaxation at u^\hat uu^:
Vi(x)γi(Ri(x)−z)≥Vi(S)γi(Ri(S)−z)(pp. 33–34).V_i(x)^{\gamma_i}\big(R_i(x) - z\big) \ge V_i(S)^{\gamma_i}\big(R_i(S) - z\big)\quad\text{(pp. 33–34).}Vi​(x)γi​(Ri​(x)−z)≥Vi​(S)γi​(Ri​(S)−z)(pp. 33–34).
  1. Under the same hypotheses, the zero vector is not an optimal solution of the relaxation at u^\hat uu^ (p. 34).
  2. The claim of the proof: every feasible (z,y)(z, y)(z,y) of (13) satisfies yi≥Vi(Si)γi(Ri(Si)−z)y_i \ge V_i(S_i)^{\gamma_i}(R_i(S_i) - z)yi​≥Vi​(Si​)γi​(Ri​(Si​)−z) for every nest iii and every feasible assortment (pp. 33–34).

Significance

The proposition makes the optimality gaps of §7 meaningful: the expected revenue of any assortment that respects the space constraints, divided by the optimal value of (13), is a certified lower bound on its fraction of Z∗Z^*Z∗. The bound is a linear program with 1+m1 + m1+m variables and one constraint per interval solution, so it can be solved for instances where Z∗Z^*Z∗ itself, an NP-hard quantity, cannot be computed.

The result is proved in the paper; no machine-checked proof of it is known. Formalizing it checks the interplay of three ingredients that the paper treats briefly: the role of the interval solutions xigx_i^gxig​ (only their feasibility and their optimality for every u≥0u \ge 0u≥0 matter), the extension of ViV_iVi​ and RiR_iRi​ to fractional vectors, and the concavity of V↦VγiV \mapsto V^{\gamma_i}V↦Vγi​. A related but different program is Davis, Gallego and Topaloglu's LP (16) (NestedLogitVariants.LP.lp16_upper_bound), which bounds the unconstrained problem by another argument.

Difficulty

The constraints of (13) are indexed by finitely many fractional vectors, while Z∗Z^*Z∗ is attained at an integral assortment that need not be among them. The obvious argument, that (13) is a relaxation of an exact linear-programming formulation of problem (1), does not apply: no constraint of (13) involves Si∗S_i^*Si∗​ directly. The link between the two has to be made nest by nest, through the knapsack relaxations at values of uuu that depend on the unknown optimum, and the fractional vectors xigx_i^gxig​ are compared with integral assortments through the nonlinear map V↦VγiV \mapsto V^{\gamma_i}V↦Vγi​.

Formalization scope

The formalization references the published nested logit model NestedLogitVariants.General.Model (instance, ViV_iVi​, RiR_iRi​, ViγiV_i^{\gamma_i}Viγi​​, Π\PiΠ) and NestedLogitVariants.General.Relaxation (the unit box and the term FFF of the constraints of (13)). The conventions are:

  • nests are any finite type; products are Fin n, indexed from 000; assortments are finite sets of products and 0ˉ\bar 00ˉ is the empty set;
  • the within-nest no-purchase weights of the published model are set to 000 in every statement, which makes ViV_iVi​ the paper's Vi(Si)=∑j∈SivijV_i(S_i) = \sum_{j \in S_i} v_{ij}Vi​(Si​)=∑j∈Si​​vij​;
  • v0>0v_0 > 0v0​>0, vij>0v_{ij} > 0vij​>0 and wij>0w_{ij} > 0wij​>0 are added hypotheses, and the paper's wij≤ciw_{ij} \le c_iwij​≤ci​ (p. 8) is kept wherever the proof needs the zero vector to be feasible for the relaxation; revenues are arbitrary reals; γi∈(0,1]\gamma_i \in (0, 1]γi​∈(0,1] as on p. 8;
  • real powers are Real.rpow, and a/0=0a/0 = 0a/0=0, which gives Ri(0ˉ)=0R_i(\bar 0) = 0Ri​(0ˉ)=0 as in the paper and makes the constraint term at x=0x = 0x=0 equal to 000;
  • the vectors {xig}\{x_i^g\}{xig​} are replaced by any finite sets XiX_iXi​ of vectors that are feasible for the relaxation and contain an optimal solution of it for every u≥0u \ge 0u≥0, the family fixed before uuu; this is what the proof uses, and the paper's interval solutions satisfy it;
  • Z∗Z^*Z∗ is the revenue of a hypothesised optimal assortment of problem (1) under the space constraints; an optimal solution of (13) is a feasible pair with minimal zzz.

The statement is not to be trivialized: setting γi=1\gamma_i = 1γi​=1, taking XiX_iXi​ to be the whole box [0,1]n[0,1]^n[0,1]n (not a finite set and not LP (13)), assuming 0∈Xi0 \in X_i0∈Xi​, or proving the bound for one particular feasible point are all excluded.

A complete development needs the concavity (tangent-line) inequality of V↦VγV \mapsto V^{\gamma}V↦Vγ at a positive point and elementary facts about fractional knapsack relaxations; both are reusable. Proofs of the milestones and of the goal are welcome.

Selected references

  • G. Gallego and H. Topaloglu, Constrained Assortment Optimization for the Nested Logit Model, Management Science, 2014 (authors' manuscript of September 11, 2013). https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2014.1931
  • J. M. Davis, G. Gallego and H. Topaloglu, Assortment Optimization Under Variants of the Nested Logit Model, Operations Research, 2014. https://doi.org/10.1287/opre.2014.1256
  • P. Rusmevichientong, Z.-J. M. Shen and D. B. Shmoys, A PTAS for Capacitated Sum-of-Ratios Optimization, Operations Research Letters, 2009. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.orl.2009.03.002
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Convex OptimizationLinear algebraNumerical Analysis+1·Captain: mikedeng1

A Primal-Dual Interior-Point Algorithm for Nonsymmetric Exponential-Cone Optimization 2: Rank-One Recursions Factor Y₀(Y₀ᵀS₀)⁻¹Y₀ᵀ = VVᵀ and S₀(Y₀ᵀS₀)⁻¹S₀ᵀ = UUᵀResearch Paper

Motivation

Quasi-Newton methods replace the Hessian of an objective by a matrix H≻0H \succ 0H≻0 that is updated from observed pairs of steps and gradient changes. The secant equation HS=YHS = YHS=Y asks the new matrix to map the observed steps SSS to the observed changes YYY. The best-known update is BFGS, which for ppp simultaneous pairs S,Y∈Rn×pS, Y \in \mathbb{R}^{n\times p}S,Y∈Rn×p reads

HBFGS:=Y(YTS)−1YT+H−HS(STHS)−1STH.H_{\mathrm{BFGS}} := Y(Y^TS)^{-1}Y^T + H - HS(S^THS)^{-1}S^TH .HBFGS​:=Y(YTS)−1YT+H−HS(STHS)−1STH.

Schnabel (Quasi-Newton methods using multiple secant equations, technical report, University of Colorado at Boulder, 1983, reference [25] of the paper) studied such multiple-secant updates; one of his results is that a positive definite HHH with HS=YHS = YHS=Y exists exactly when YTS≻0Y^TS \succ 0YTS≻0.

Dahl and Andersen (Math. Program. 194:341–370, 2022) use multiple-secant BFGS updates to build primal-dual scaling matrices for an interior-point algorithm on the nonsymmetric exponential cone, following Tunçel (Found. Comput. Math. 1:229–254, 2001) and Myklebust and Tunçel (arXiv:1411.2129). In their setting p=2p = 2p=2, and they need the update in factored, low-rank form. Their Theorem 2 supplies it: the term Y(YTS)−1YTY(Y^TS)^{-1}Y^TY(YTS)−1YT, and its counterpart S(YTS)−1STS(Y^TS)^{-1}S^TS(YTS)−1ST for the inverse update, are computed by ppp rank-one steps. These steps resemble single-secant quasi-Newton updates, and no inverse is formed. This mission formalizes Theorem 2 and the steps of its proof.

Setting

Let n,p≥0n, p \ge 0n,p≥0 and Y0,S0∈Rn×pY_0, S_0 \in \mathbb{R}^{n\times p}Y0​,S0​∈Rn×p. Write eke_kek​ for the kkk-th unit vector of Rp\mathbb{R}^pRp and ⟨a,b⟩=aTb\langle a, b\rangle = a^Tb⟨a,b⟩=aTb for the inner product of Rn\mathbb{R}^nRn, so that ⟨Yek,Sek⟩=(YTS)kk\langle Ye_k, Se_k\rangle = (Y^TS)_{kk}⟨Yek​,Sek​⟩=(YTS)kk​. The hypothesis of the theorem is

Y0TS0≻0,Y_0^TS_0 \succ 0,Y0T​S0​≻0,

meaning that the p×pp\times pp×p matrix Y0TS0Y_0^TS_0Y0T​S0​ is symmetric and positive definite.

For k=1,…,pk = 1, \dots, pk=1,…,p the recursions (25)–(26) are

vk:=Yk−1ek⟨Yk−1ek,Sk−1ek⟩1/2,Yk:=Yk−1−vkvkTSk−1,v_k := \frac{Y_{k-1}e_k}{\langle Y_{k-1}e_k, S_{k-1}e_k\rangle^{1/2}}, \qquad Y_k := Y_{k-1} - v_kv_k^TS_{k-1},vk​:=⟨Yk−1​ek​,Sk−1​ek​⟩1/2Yk−1​ek​​,Yk​:=Yk−1​−vk​vkT​Sk−1​, uk:=Sk−1ek⟨Yk−1ek,Sk−1ek⟩1/2,Sk:=Sk−1−ukukTYk−1.u_k := \frac{S_{k-1}e_k}{\langle Y_{k-1}e_k, S_{k-1}e_k\rangle^{1/2}}, \qquad S_k := S_{k-1} - u_ku_k^TY_{k-1}.uk​:=⟨Yk−1​ek​,Sk−1​ek​⟩1/2Sk−1​ek​​,Sk​:=Sk−1​−uk​ukT​Yk−1​.

Both updates of step kkk use the previous pair (Yk−1,Sk−1)(Y_{k-1}, S_{k-1})(Yk−1​,Sk−1​). Collect the vectors into V:=(v1⋯vp)V := (v_1 \cdots v_p)V:=(v1​⋯vp​) and U:=(u1⋯up)∈Rn×pU := (u_1 \cdots u_p) \in \mathbb{R}^{n\times p}U:=(u1​⋯up​)∈Rn×p.

The proof uses two more objects. The first is the p×pp\times pp×p matrix

L:=(Y0TS0e1⟨Y0e1,S0e1⟩1/2,⋯ ,Yp−1TSp−1ep⟨Yp−1ep,Sp−1ep⟩1/2).L := \left(\frac{Y_0^TS_0e_1}{\langle Y_0e_1, S_0e_1\rangle^{1/2}}, \cdots, \frac{Y_{p-1}^TS_{p-1}e_p}{\langle Y_{p-1}e_p, S_{p-1}e_p\rangle^{1/2}}\right).L:=(⟨Y0​e1​,S0​e1​⟩1/2Y0T​S0​e1​​,⋯,⟨Yp−1​ep​,Sp−1​ep​⟩1/2Yp−1T​Sp−1​ep​​).

The second is Ψk\Psi_kΨk​, the principal submatrix formed by the last p−kp-kp−k rows and columns of YkTSkY_k^TS_kYkT​Sk​. In Lean these are ExpConeIPM.Secant.Ys, Ss, d, V, U, L and Ψ, all in one definition item.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 2 (pp. 357–358)

Y0(Y0TS0)−1Y0T=VVT,S0(Y0TS0)−1S0T=UUT.Y_0(Y_0^TS_0)^{-1}Y_0^T = VV^T, \qquad S_0(Y_0^TS_0)^{-1}S_0^T = UU^T .Y0​(Y0T​S0​)−1Y0T​=VVT,S0​(Y0T​S0​)−1S0T​=UUT.

Milestones (the steps of the proof, pp. 358–359)

  1. (27). For k=1,…,pk = 1, \dots, pk=1,…,p,
YkTSk=Yk−1TSk−1−(Yk−1TSk−1ek)(Yk−1TSk−1ek)T⟨Yk−1ek,Sk−1ek⟩.Y_k^TS_k = Y_{k-1}^TS_{k-1} - \frac{(Y_{k-1}^TS_{k-1}e_k)(Y_{k-1}^TS_{k-1}e_k)^T}{\langle Y_{k-1}e_k, S_{k-1}e_k\rangle}.YkT​Sk​=Yk−1T​Sk−1​−⟨Yk−1​ek​,Sk−1​ek​⟩(Yk−1T​Sk−1​ek​)(Yk−1T​Sk−1​ek​)T​.
  1. Well-definedness. For k=0,…,p−1k = 0, \dots, p-1k=0,…,p−1, Ψk≻0\Psi_k \succ 0Ψk​≻0, and in particular ⟨Ykek+1,Skek+1⟩>0\langle Y_ke_{k+1}, S_ke_{k+1}\rangle > 0⟨Yk​ek+1​,Sk​ek+1​⟩>0.
  2. Sparsity. Yjek=Sjek=0Y_je_k = S_je_k = 0Yj​ek​=Sj​ek​=0 for 1≤k≤j≤p1 \le k \le j \le p1≤k≤j≤p.
  3. Cholesky factorization (28). LLT=Y0TS0LL^T = Y_0^TS_0LLT=Y0T​S0​.
  4. The VVV-identity. LVT=Y0TLV^T = Y_0^TLVT=Y0T​.

The first identity of the goal follows from milestones 4 and 5. The paper says the second "follows similarly". The analogous identity LUT=S0TLU^T = S_0^TLUT=S0T​ is not displayed in the paper, so it is not a milestone.

Significance

The result. Theorem 2 expresses the multiple-secant part of the BFGS update (23), and of its inverse, as a sum of ppp rank-one terms vkvkTv_kv_k^Tvk​vkT​ and ukukTu_ku_k^Tuk​ukT​. Each term comes from a recursion that touches one column at a time. On pp. 359–360 Dahl and Andersen apply it twice with p=2p = 2p=2. This gives the BFGS scaling of their exponential-cone algorithm as an explicit rank-3 update of μF′′(x)\mu F''(x)μF′′(x), which is how the algorithm implemented in MOSEK computes its scaling matrices (§6, p. 361 of the paper). The argument is a Cholesky factorization of Y0TS0Y_0^TS_0Y0T​S0​ carried out implicitly on the factors Y0Y_0Y0​ and S0S_0S0​.

Formalizing it. The theorem is proved in the paper, in under a page. Its proof leaves two steps implicit. The first is that the symmetry of every YkTSkY_k^TS_kYkT​Sk​, which (27) and the step to LVT=Y0TLV^T = Y_0^TLVT=Y0T​ use, propagates from Y0TS0Y_0^TS_0Y0T​S0​. The second is the second identity, which the paper does not prove. A machine-checked proof records both. To our knowledge no proof assistant has a formal treatment of multiple-secant updates. The recursion also gives a reusable statement: a column-by-column Schur-complement process on a product YTSY^TSYTS produces its Cholesky factor.

Difficulty

The obvious route expands VVTVV^TVVT directly and compares it with Y0(Y0TS0)−1Y0TY_0(Y_0^TS_0)^{-1}Y_0^TY0​(Y0T​S0​)−1Y0T​. This leads nowhere, because vkv_kvk​ depends on all earlier steps through Yk−1Y_{k-1}Yk−1​ and Sk−1S_{k-1}Sk−1​. The step that carries the proof is an invariant over the recursion. The trailing blocks Ψk\Psi_kΨk​ of YkTSkY_k^TS_kYkT​Sk​ must stay symmetric positive definite, and the leading columns of YkY_kYk​ and SkS_kSk​ must stay zero. Both must be maintained together through a pair of coupled updates, in which SkS_kSk​ is updated with the old Yk−1Y_{k-1}Yk−1​. A second difficulty is bookkeeping: the paper's 1-based columns, the step count kkk, and the trailing block of size p−kp-kp−k shift relative to each other.

The hypothesis needs care. If Y0TS0Y_0^TS_0Y0T​S0​ is only assumed to satisfy xTY0TS0x>0x^TY_0^TS_0x > 0xTY0T​S0​x>0 for x≠0x \ne 0x=0, without symmetry, the identities are false in general. A 5×35\times 35×3 instance whose symmetric part is positive definite, with a small antisymmetric part, violates the first identity by 0.440.440.44 in the largest entry.

Formalization scope

Everything is real matrix algebra over Matrix (Fin n) (Fin p) ℝ, with arbitrary n,pn, pn,p (including p=0p = 0p=0, where both sides are zero). The formalization commits to the following conventions.

  • Y0TS0≻0Y_0^TS_0 \succ 0Y0T​S0​≻0 is Matrix.PosDef, which includes symmetry. The inverse is Matrix.inv. It is a genuine inverse under this hypothesis.
  • Columns are 0-based. Column j : Fin p is the paper's ej+1e_{j+1}ej+1​. Ys Y₀ S₀ k and Ss Y₀ S₀ k are YkY_kYk​ and SkS_kSk​ after kkk steps, and they are left unchanged after step ppp. d Y₀ S₀ j is ⟨Yjej+1,Sjej+1⟩\langle Y_je_{j+1}, S_je_{j+1}\rangle⟨Yj​ej+1​,Sj​ej+1​⟩.
  • The square root is Real.sqrt. The division by it is multiplication by an inverse. Both return junk values on non-positive arguments, which never occur under the hypothesis; milestone 2 states this.
  • VVV, UUU and LLL are computed from the recursion (25)–(26). They are never chosen as some factorization satisfying the conclusion. The trivializing formalization, which defines VVV as any factor of Y0(Y0TS0)−1Y0TY_0(Y_0^TS_0)^{-1}Y_0^TY0​(Y0T​S0​)−1Y0T​, is ruled out by construction.
  • Each milestone carries the theorem's hypothesis Y0TS0≻0Y_0^TS_0 \succ 0Y0T​S0​≻0. No hypothesis on the intermediate YkTSkY_k^TS_kYkT​Sk​ is assumed, since its symmetry is part of what must be proved.

No repair of the printed statements was needed. On p. 359 two misprints are not copied: ⟨Yp−1Tep,Sp−1ep⟩\langle Y_{p-1}^Te_p, S_{p-1}e_p\rangle⟨Yp−1T​ep​,Sp−1​ep​⟩ for ⟨Yp−1ep,Sp−1ep⟩\langle Y_{p-1}e_p, S_{p-1}e_p\rangle⟨Yp−1​ep​,Sp−1​ep​⟩, and SiTYiS_i^TY_iSiT​Yi​ for YiTSiY_i^TS_iYiT​Si​. The definition of LLL uses YiTSiY_i^TS_iYiT​Si​.

A complete development needs rank-one updates of products, Schur complements of a positive definite matrix in its leading entry, and inverses of LLTLL^TLLT for an invertible LLL. Schnabel's existence theorem (Theorem 1 of the paper) and the applications on pp. 359–360 are outside the mission. A general lemma on Schur-complement recursions producing Cholesky factors would be reusable on its own. Contributions on the U-side identity LUT=S0TLU^T = S_0^TLUT=S0T​ are welcome.

Selected references

  • J. Dahl, E. D. Andersen, A primal-dual interior-point algorithm for nonsymmetric exponential-cone optimization, Math. Program. 194:341–370, 2022. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10107-021-01631-4
  • R. B. Schnabel, Quasi-Newton methods using multiple secant equations, Technical Report, University of Colorado at Boulder, 1983 (no stable online link known; cited as [25] in Dahl–Andersen).
  • L. Tunçel, Generalization of primal-dual interior-point methods to convex optimization problems in conic form, Found. Comput. Math. 1:229–254, 2001. https://doi.org/10.1007/s102080010008
  • T. Myklebust, L. Tunçel, Interior-point algorithms for convex optimization based on primal-dual metrics, arXiv:1411.2129, 2014. https://arxiv.org/abs/1411.2129
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Optimization·Captain: mikedeng1

An Exact Algorithm for the Two-Echelon Capacitated Vehicle Routing Problem 1: The Multiple-Choice Knapsack Relaxation Gives a Valid Lower Bound for Every Admissible Choice of PenaltiesResearch Paper

Motivation

In city logistics, goods often cannot be carried by large trucks all the way to the final customers. A common design routes the goods through intermediate depots, called satellites: large first-level vehicles carry freight from a central depot to the satellites, and small second-level vehicles deliver it from the satellites to the customers. The two-echelon capacitated vehicle routing problem (2E-CVRP) asks for the cheapest such two-level distribution plan. It contains the capacitated vehicle routing problem as a special case (a single satellite), and the location-routing problem can be reduced to it.

Exact methods for problems of this kind rest on lower bounds: a branch-and-bound or enumeration scheme can discard a partial solution only when it has a certified bound above the best known cost. Baldacci, Mingozzi, Roberti and Wolfler Calvo (Oper. Res. 61(2), 2013) built an exact algorithm for the 2E-CVRP on a chain of relaxations of a set-partitioning formulation FFF. Its first link is a Lagrangean relaxation RFRFRF and a further relaxation RF‾\overline{RF}RF, a multiple-choice knapsack problem solved by dynamic programming. Its optimal value, maximised over the penalties, gives the lower bound LD1\mathrm{LD1}LD1 that drives the rest of the method. This mission formalizes the statements that make LD1\mathrm{LD1}LD1 a valid bound.

Setting

An instance has a depot 000, satellites NSN_SNS​ and customers NCN_CNC​, a symmetric cost matrix dijd_{ij}dij​ (with the vehicle fixed costs already added to the depot–satellite and satellite–customer entries), positive integer demands qiq_iqi​ with total qtotq_{\mathrm{tot}}qtot​, m1m^1m1 first-level vehicles of capacity Q1Q_1Q1​, mkm_kmk​ second-level vehicles of capacity Q2<Q1Q_2 < Q_1Q2​<Q1​ at satellite kkk, a global limit m2m^2m2 on second-level vehicles, satellite capacities BkB_kBk​ and handling costs HkH_kHk​ per unit.

A first-level route r∈Mr \in \mathcal Mr∈M leaves the depot, visits a set RrR_rRr​ of satellites and returns; its cost grg_rgr​ is the cost of this closed walk. A second-level route l∈Rkl \in \mathcal R_kl∈Rk​ is a simple cycle from satellite kkk through a set of customers of total demand wkl≤Q2w_{kl} \le Q_2wkl​≤Q2​; its cost cklc_{kl}ckl​ is the cost of the cycle plus HkwklH_k w_{kl}Hk​wkl​. In formulation FFF, binary variables xklx_{kl}xkl​ and yry_ryr​ select the routes and integers qkrq_{kr}qkr​ give the amount that route rrr delivers to satellite kkk. The constraints require that every customer is served exactly once (2), that the vehicle limits mkm_kmk​, m2m^2m2, m1m^1m1 hold (3), (4), (6), that satellite capacities hold (5), that each satellite receives what its routes deliver (7), and that first-level capacities hold (8).

Relaxation RFRFRF removes (2)–(4) with penalties λi∈R\lambda_i \in \mathbb Rλi​∈R, μk≤0\mu_k \le 0μk​≤0, μ0≤0\mu_0 \le 0μ0​≤0, and replaces the second-level routes by marginal costs βik\beta_{ik}βik​ of serving customer iii from satellite kkk, subject to

∑iaiklβik≤ckl−∑iaiklλi−μk−μ0(l∈Rk),(12)\sum_{i} a_{ikl}\beta_{ik} \le c_{kl} - \sum_i a_{ikl}\lambda_i - \mu_k - \mu_0 \qquad (l \in \mathcal R_k), \qquad (12)i∑​aikl​βik​≤ckl​−i∑​aikl​λi​−μk​−μ0​(l∈Rk​),(12)

where aikla_{ikl}aikl​ counts the visits of route lll to customer iii. Its variables are an assignment ξik\xi_{ik}ξik​ of customers to satellites and the first-level variables yry_ryr​, qkrq_{kr}qkr​.

Relaxation RF‾\overline{RF}RF chooses for every first-level route rrr at most one load www in the interval Wr=[wmin⁡,wrmax⁡]W_r = [w^{\min}, w_r^{\max}]Wr​=[wmin,wrmax​] of integers, so that the loads add up to qtotq_{\mathrm{tot}}qtot​. A route with load www costs gr+ϕrwg_r + \phi_{rw}gr​+ϕrw​, where ϕrw\phi_{rw}ϕrw​ is the optimum of a continuous knapsack problem that serves demand www at the cheapest marginal costs min⁡k∈Rrβik\min_{k \in R_r}\beta_{ik}mink∈Rr​​βik​. Both objectives carry the constant ∑iλi+∑kmkμk+m2μ0\sum_i \lambda_i + \sum_k m_k\mu_k + m^2\mu_0∑i​λi​+∑k​mk​μk​+m2μ0​.

Formalization targets

Goal: LD1 is a valid lower bound (Eq. (23))

For every β\betaβ satisfying (12), every λ\lambdaλ, every μ≤0\mu \le 0μ≤0, μ0≤0\mu_0 \le 0μ0​≤0, and every feasible solution of FFF with cost costF\mathrm{cost}_FcostF​,

z(RF‾(β,λ,μ))≤costF,equivalentlyLD1=max⁡β,λ,μz(RF‾(β,λ,μ))≤z(F).z(\overline{RF}(\beta,\lambda,\mu)) \le \mathrm{cost}_F, \qquad\text{equivalently}\qquad \mathrm{LD1} = \max_{\beta,\lambda,\mu} z(\overline{RF}(\beta,\lambda,\mu)) \le z(F).z(RF(β,λ,μ))≤costF​,equivalentlyLD1=β,λ,μmax​z(RF(β,λ,μ))≤z(F).

Milestones

  1. Theorem 1. z(RF(β,λ,μ))≤costFz(RF(\beta,\lambda,\mu)) \le \mathrm{cost}_Fz(RF(β,λ,μ))≤costF​ under the same hypotheses.
  2. Theorem 3, corrected. z(RF‾(β,λ,μ))z(\overline{RF}(\beta,\lambda,\mu))z(RF(β,λ,μ)) is at most the objective of every feasible RFRFRF solution whose satellite loads satisfy ∑iqiξik≤mkQ2\sum_i q_i\xi_{ik} \le m_kQ_2∑i​qi​ξik​≤mk​Q2​.
  3. Reduced-cost elimination with RF‾\overline{RF}RF (§3.2): a feasible solution of cost below z(UB)z(\mathrm{UB})z(UB) uses no route with c~kl≥z(UB)−z(RF‾)\tilde c_{kl} \ge z(\mathrm{UB}) - z(\overline{RF})c~kl​≥z(UB)−z(RF), where c~kl=ckl−∑iaikl(βik+λi)−μk−μ0\tilde c_{kl} = c_{kl} - \sum_i a_{ikl}(\beta_{ik}+\lambda_i) - \mu_k - \mu_0c~kl​=ckl​−∑i​aikl​(βik​+λi​)−μk​−μ0​.
  4. Corollary 1: the same elimination with z(RF)z(RF)z(RF).
  5. Theorem 4: for any enlarged family R^k⊇Rk\hat{\mathcal R}_k \supseteq \mathcal R_kR^k​⊇Rk​ of not necessarily elementary routes, βik=qimin⁡l∈R^ikckl−∑i′ai′klλi′−μk−μ0∑i′ai′klqi′\beta_{ik} = q_i \min_{l \in \hat{\mathcal R}_{ik}} \frac{c_{kl} - \sum_{i'} a_{i'kl}\lambda_{i'} - \mu_k - \mu_0}{\sum_{i'} a_{i'kl}q_{i'}}βik​=qi​minl∈R^ik​​∑i′​ai′kl​qi′​ckl​−∑i′​ai′kl​λi′​−μk​−μ0​​ solves (12).

Significance

The bound LD1\mathrm{LD1}LD1 is the first lower bound of the paper's exact method. The configuration enumeration of its §5 and the reduced-cost elimination of second-level routes both use it as a certificate: a configuration or a route is discarded only when this bound shows that no cheaper solution contains it. If the bound were invalid, the method could discard the optimum. Theorem 4 provides, at every step of the paper's subgradient procedure, a β\betaβ to which the bound applies.

The paper's proofs are in an electronic companion. As printed, Theorem 3 (z(RF‾)≤z(RF)z(\overline{RF}) \le z(RF)z(RF)≤z(RF)) is false: RFRFRF does not limit a satellite's load by its fleet capacity mkQ2m_kQ_2mk​Q2​, whereas the loads of RF‾\overline{RF}RF are capped by it. A small instance with one satellite and two unit-demand customers, Q2=1Q_2 = 1Q2​=1 and m1=1m_1 = 1m1​=1 has z(RF)z(RF)z(RF) finite and z(RF‾)=+∞z(\overline{RF}) = +\inftyz(RF)=+∞. The bound (23) is nevertheless true, because the RFRFRF solutions that come from feasible solutions of FFF respect the fleets. A machine-checked version pins down exactly which hypotheses the chain needs, including the positivity of demands, without which (23) fails. None of these results has been formalized before.

Difficulty

Theorems 1, 4 and Corollary 1 are bookkeeping with sums over routes, customers and satellites. The substantive step is the corrected Theorem 3. A solution of RFRFRF assigns whole customers to satellites, while RF‾\overline{RF}RF sees each first-level route only through its total load and a continuous knapsack. The two descriptions have to be related, and that relation must respect every side condition of RF‾\overline{RF}RF: the knapsack bounds 0≤zi≤10 \le z_i \le 10≤zi​≤1, the load window WrW_rWr​ (whose lower end wmin⁡w^{\min}wmin depends on the vehicle count m1m^1m1) and the fleet cap ∑k∈RrmkQ2\sum_{k \in R_r} m_kQ_2∑k∈Rr​​mk​Q2​. The obvious route, comparing the optimal values z(RF)z(RF)z(RF) and z(RF‾)z(\overline{RF})z(RF) directly as the paper states, does not work: the inequality between them is false, and the fleet condition is what has to be carried from FFF.

Formalization scope

Satellites are Fin ns, customers Fin nc (0-based). Demands are positive integers; capacities, fleet sizes and loads are natural numbers, and costs are real. Binary variables are Bool and integer variables ℕ. The route families M\mathcal MM and R\mathcal RR are arbitrary finite families of routes (nonempty, no repeated vertex, second-level loads at most Q2Q_2Q2​), not necessarily all routes as in the paper; every statement holds in this generality. Route costs are computed along the closed walk, so (0,k,0)(0,k,0)(0,k,0) costs 2d0k2d_{0k}2d0k​. The triangle inequality is not assumed. Optimal values z(RF)z(RF)z(RF), z(RF‾)z(\overline{RF})z(RF) and ϕrw\phi_{rw}ϕrw​ are infima in EReal, equal to +∞+\infty+∞ on infeasible problems, and comparisons with an upper bound are written with +++ instead of −-−. Where the paper writes "optimal solution of cost below z(UB)z(\mathrm{UB})z(UB)", the statements cover every feasible solution below any real z(UB)z(\mathrm{UB})z(UB).

The formalization cannot be trivialized: every optimal value is an infimum over the feasible set of the paper's own problem, so it equals +∞+\infty+∞, not 000, when that set is empty. The hypotheses of each theorem are satisfiable, which is checked on explicit small instances. The definitions of the instance, FFF, RFRFRF and RF‾\overline{RF}RF are written in the shape shared by the other missions of this series. Proofs of any milestone and reusable lemmas on finite sums over route families are welcome.

Selected references

  • R. Baldacci, A. Mingozzi, R. Roberti, R. Wolfler Calvo, An Exact Algorithm for the Two-Echelon Capacitated Vehicle Routing Problem, Operations Research 61(2), 298–314, 2013. https://doi.org/10.1287/opre.1120.1153
  • R. Baldacci, A. Mingozzi, R. Roberti, New Route Relaxation and Pricing Strategies for the Vehicle Routing Problem, Operations Research 59(5), 1269–1283, 2011 (ng-routes). https://doi.org/10.1287/opre.1110.0975
  • G. Perboli, R. Tadei, D. Vigo, The Two-Echelon Capacitated Vehicle Routing Problem: Models and Math-Based Heuristics, Transportation Science 45(3), 364–380, 2011. https://doi.org/10.1287/trsc.1110.0368
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CombinatoricsOptimization·Captain: mikedeng1

A Hybrid Genetic Algorithm for Multidepot and Periodic Vehicle Routing Problems: Biased-Fitness Survivor Selection Never Removes an Elite Individual Outside XResearch Paper

Motivation

Genetic algorithms with local search ("memetic" or hybrid genetic algorithms) are among the most effective heuristics for vehicle routing. Their recurring weakness is premature convergence: selection and local improvement both favour good individuals, so the population fills with near-copies of a few solutions and the search stalls. Vidal, Crainic, Gendreau, Lahrichi and Rei addressed this in their hybrid genetic search with adaptive diversity control (HGSADC) for multi-depot and periodic vehicle routing (CIRRELT-2010-34, 2010; journal version Operations Research 60(3), 2012). Instead of judging an individual by its cost alone, HGSADC ranks it by a Biased Fitness that mixes its cost rank with its rank in contribution to population diversity, and it uses that score to decide which individuals survive.

Trading cost for diversity raises an obvious worry: a very good but unoriginal solution could be discarded. The paper answers it with its only stated result, an elitism property (Section 4.6, an unnumbered Proposition with a three-sentence proof): the best individuals by cost are never discarded, as long as they are not clones. The HGSADC framework has since become the basis of state-of-the-art codes for many routing variants, and this guarantee is the one formal statement on which its population management rests.

Setting

HGSADC keeps two subpopulations (feasible and infeasible) and manages each separately. Everything below concerns one subpopulation; no routing object is involved.

A population is a finite set PPP of individuals, with nbIndiv=∣P∣\mathit{nbIndiv} = |P|nbIndiv=∣P∣. Each individual III has a penalized cost c(I)∈Rc(I)\in\mathbb Rc(I)∈R, its fitness (lower is better); a distance δ(I1,I2)\delta(I_1,I_2)δ(I1​,I2​) to every other individual; and a diversity contribution ΔP(I)\Delta_P(I)ΔP​(I), which in the paper is the mean distance from III to its nclosen_{close}nclose​ nearest neighbours in PPP (higher is better).

The normalized ranks of III relative to the current population are

fitP(I)=#{J∈P: c(J)<c(I)}∣P∣−1,dcP(I)=#{J∈P: ΔP(I)<ΔP(J)}∣P∣−1,\mathit{fit}_P(I)=\frac{\#\{J\in P:\ c(J)<c(I)\}}{|P|-1},\qquad \mathit{dc}_P(I)=\frac{\#\{J\in P:\ \Delta_P(I)<\Delta_P(J)\}}{|P|-1},fitP​(I)=∣P∣−1#{J∈P: c(J)<c(I)}​,dcP​(I)=∣P∣−1#{J∈P: ΔP​(I)<ΔP​(J)}​,

so that the best individual has rank 000 and the worst rank 111. For an integer parameter nbElit\mathit{nbElit}nbElit, the Biased Fitness is (equation (7))

BFP(I)=fitP(I)+(1−nbElit∣P∣−1)×dcP(I).BF_P(I)=\mathit{fit}_P(I)+\Bigl(1-\frac{\mathit{nbElit}}{|P|-1}\Bigr)\times \mathit{dc}_P(I).BFP​(I)=fitP​(I)+(1−∣P∣−1nbElit​)×dcP​(I).

An individual III is a clone in PPP if some other J∈PJ\in PJ∈P has δ(J,I)=0\delta(J,I)=0δ(J,I)=0 or c(J)=c(I)c(J)=c(I)c(J)=c(I). With best\mathit{best}best the current best solution, X(P)X(P)X(P) is the set of individuals of PPP, other than best\mathit{best}best, that have a clone.

Survivor selection. When a subpopulation reaches μ+λ\mu+\lambdaμ+λ individuals, λ\lambdaλ of them are discarded one at a time: if X≠∅X\neq\emptysetX=∅, an individual of maximum BFBFBF in XXX is removed; otherwise an individual of maximum BFBFBF in the whole population. After each removal the distances, XXX, the ranks and BFBFBF are recomputed on the remaining population. An individual is among the nbElit\mathit{nbElit}nbElit best of PPP in terms of fitness when fewer than nbElit\mathit{nbElit}nbElit members of PPP have strictly smaller cost.

Formalization targets

Goal: Section 4.6, Proposition

For every run of the survivor-selection procedure that removes λ\lambdaλ individuals from PPP and ends at P′P'P′, with nbElit+λ≤∣P∣\mathit{nbElit}+\lambda\le|P|nbElit+λ≤∣P∣:

J∈P,J∉X(P),#{K∈P:c(K)<c(J)}<nbElit ⟹ J∈P′.J\in P,\quad J\notin X(P),\quad \#\{K\in P: c(K)<c(J)\}<\mathit{nbElit}\ \Longrightarrow\ J\in P'.J∈P,J∈/X(P),#{K∈P:c(K)<c(J)}<nbElit ⟹ J∈P′.

Milestones: the three sentences of the proof (p. 17)

  1. If X(P)=∅X(P)=\emptysetX(P)=∅, the individual WWW with the worst fitness has fitP(W)=1\mathit{fit}_P(W)=1fitP​(W)=1 and BFP(W)≥1BF_P(W)\ge 1BFP​(W)≥1.
  2. An individual JJJ among the nbElit\mathit{nbElit}nbElit best has
BFP(J)≤nbElit−1∣P∣−1+1−nbElit∣P∣−1<1.BF_P(J)\le\frac{\mathit{nbElit}-1}{|P|-1}+1-\frac{\mathit{nbElit}}{|P|-1}<1.BFP​(J)≤∣P∣−1nbElit−1​+1−∣P∣−1nbElit​<1.
  1. One removal step does not remove an individual J∉X(P)J\notin X(P)J∈/X(P) among the nbElit\mathit{nbElit}nbElit best.

Significance

The result. The Proposition explains what the parameter nbElit\mathit{nbElit}nbElit means: it is the number of top individuals whose survival is guaranteed from one generation to the next, whatever their diversity contribution. It lets the algorithm designer push for diversity through BFBFBF without risking the loss of the best solutions, and it is what makes the "removal zone" BF≥1BF\ge 1BF≥1 of the paper's Figure 4 a meaningful picture. The same Biased Fitness and survivor rule are reused in later HGS variants, so the guarantee transfers to them.

Formalizing it. The proof in the paper is three sentences long, but it leaves several things implicit: what happens with ties in cost or diversity, why "the" worst individual has rank exactly 111, why the coefficient of dc\mathit{dc}dc is nonnegative, and why the one-step argument survives λ\lambdaλ successive removals with everything recomputed. A machine-checked version settles each of these. To our knowledge no formalization of this or any other population-management guarantee for genetic algorithms exists.

Difficulty

The arithmetic of each step is elementary. The difficulty is in reading the statement correctly. "The individual with the worst fitness has rank 1" fails when costs tie; it holds only in the branch X=∅X=\emptysetX=∅, where equal costs are excluded because two individuals with equal cost are both clones and at most one of them is the best solution. The inequality BF≥1BF\ge 1BF≥1 needs nbElit≤∣P∣−1\mathit{nbElit}\le|P|-1nbElit≤∣P∣−1, which the Proposition does not state: it follows from the population sizes (μ+λ\mu+\lambdaμ+λ reduced to μ\muμ, with nbElit=el×μ\mathit{nbElit}=el\times\munbElit=el×μ, el∈[0,1]el\in[0,1]el∈[0,1], Table 1). Without it the Proposition is false: if nbElit≥∣P∣\mathit{nbElit}\ge|P|nbElit≥∣P∣ and X=∅X=\emptysetX=∅, some elite individual must be removed. Finally, the one-step argument must be iterated: the population, its ranks and XXX change after each removal, and one must check that the hypotheses on JJJ persist.

Formalization scope

Individuals are elements of an arbitrary type α\alphaα with decidable equality; populations are Finset α. Costs, distances and diversity contributions are real-valued, and Δ\DeltaΔ is an arbitrary function of (population, individual), which includes the paper's equation (5); the goal is therefore stated for every diversity measure. Explicit readings of loose phrases:

  • "normalized ranks … where the best individual has rank 0 and the worst has rank 1": the number of strictly better individuals divided by ∣P∣−1|P|-1∣P∣−1, in R\mathbb RR (competition ranking; tied individuals share the better rank);
  • "the nbElit best individuals … in terms of fitness": fewer than nbElit\mathit{nbElit}nbElit members with strictly smaller cost;
  • "Update the distance measures and X, and repeat": XXX, ranks and BFBFBF are recomputed on the current population at each of the λ\lambdaλ steps;
  • ties in "maximum Biased Fitness" are broken arbitrarily, and the goal quantifies over every run;
  • the population-size condition nbElit+λ≤∣P∣\mathit{nbElit}+\lambda\le|P|nbElit+λ≤∣P∣ is an explicit hypothesis, taken from Section 4.6 and Table 1;
  • the best solution best\mathit{best}best is a parameter, not required to lie in PPP (for the infeasible subpopulation it is the incumbent feasible solution); JJJ may itself be best\mathit{best}best.

A formalization that freezes the initial Biased Fitness, that takes the ranks as arbitrary functions into [0,1][0,1][0,1], that states the existence of one good run, or whose size hypothesis cannot be met, would not be this Proposition. The supporting definition file contains the ranks, the Biased Fitness, clones, XXX, a removal step and a run of λ\lambdaλ steps; no further library is needed beyond Finset cardinalities. Proofs of the three milestones and of the goal are welcome, as is a formalization of the paper's Hamming distance (6) and diversity contribution (5) as an instance of Δ\DeltaΔ.

Selected references

  • T. Vidal, T. G. Crainic, M. Gendreau, N. Lahrichi, W. Rei, A Hybrid Genetic Algorithm for Multi-Depot and Periodic Vehicle Routing Problems, technical report CIRRELT-2010-34, July 2010. https://www.cirrelt.ca/documentstravail/cirrelt-2010-34.pdf (the version cited throughout; Section 4.6, pp. 16–17).
  • T. Vidal, T. G. Crainic, M. Gendreau, N. Lahrichi, W. Rei, A Hybrid Genetic Algorithm for Multidepot and Periodic Vehicle Routing Problems, Operations Research 60(3):611–624, 2012. https://doi.org/10.1287/opre.1120.1048
  • C. Prins, A simple and effective evolutionary algorithm for the vehicle routing problem, Computers & Operations Research 31(12):1985–2002, 2004. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0305-0548(03)00158-8
  • K. Sörensen, M. Sevaux, MA|PM: memetic algorithms with population management, Computers & Operations Research 33(5):1214–1225, 2006. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cor.2004.09.011
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Dynamic ProgrammingOptimization·Captain: mikedeng1

Robust Assortment Optimization in Revenue Management Under the Multinomial Logit Choice Model 3: Robust Dynamic Assortments Grow with Remaining Capacity and over TimeResearch Paper

Motivation

Single-leg capacity allocation under customer choice is the basic dynamic problem of revenue management: a firm holds a fixed stock of a perishable resource (seats on a flight leg, rooms on a night), and in every period of a finite selling horizon it decides which products (fare classes) to offer to the arriving customer. Talluri and van Ryzin (Management Science, 2004) showed that under a multinomial logit (MNL) choice model with known parameters, the optimal assortment in every period is revenue-ordered and shrinks as capacity becomes scarcer ("nesting by fare order"), which is what justifies the protection levels and bid prices used in practice.

The MNL parameters are estimated from data and are never known exactly. Rusmevichientong and Topaloglu (Operations Research, 2012) study the robust version, in which an adversary picks the parameters of each period from an uncertainty set after seeing the offered assortment, following the robust Markov decision process framework of Iyengar (Mathematics of Operations Research, 2005). Their Section 4 shows that the structure of the known-parameter problem survives: the value function is concave in capacity, the optimal assortment is a revenue threshold set, and it grows with remaining capacity and, when uncertainty does not shrink, over time. This mission formalizes those results.

Setting

There are nnn products A={1,…,n}\mathcal A = \{1,\dots,n\}A={1,…,n} with revenues r1,…,rnr_1,\dots,r_nr1​,…,rn​. An MNL parameter vector is v=(v0,v1,…,vn)∈R++n+1v = (v_0, v_1, \dots, v_n) \in \mathbb R^{n+1}_{++}v=(v0​,v1​,…,vn​)∈R++n+1​; offered the assortment S⊆AS \subseteq \mathcal AS⊆A, a customer buys product i∈Si \in Si∈S with probability

ϕi(S,v)=viv0+∑ℓ∈Svℓ,\phi_i(S,v) = \frac{v_i}{v_0 + \sum_{\ell\in S} v_\ell},ϕi​(S,v)=v0​+∑ℓ∈S​vℓ​vi​​,

and nothing with probability 1−∑i∈Sϕi(S,v)1 - \sum_{i\in S}\phi_i(S,v)1−∑i∈S​ϕi​(S,v). The expected revenue is f(S,v)=∑i∈Sriϕi(S,v)f(S,v) = \sum_{i\in S} r_i \phi_i(S,v)f(S,v)=∑i∈S​ri​ϕi​(S,v).

Static problem (Section 3). For a compact nonempty uncertainty set V⊆R++n+1\mathcal V \subseteq \mathbb R^{n+1}_{++}V⊆R++n+1​,

Z∗(V)=max⁡S⊆A min⁡v∈Vf(S,v),Z^*(\mathcal V) = \max_{S\subseteq\mathcal A}\ \min_{v\in\mathcal V} f(S,v),Z∗(V)=S⊆Amax​ v∈Vmin​f(S,v),

and S∗(V)S^*(\mathcal V)S∗(V) is an optimal assortment of smallest cardinality.

Dynamic problem (Section 4). Periods t=1,…,Tt = 1,\dots,Tt=1,…,T each bring one customer, whose parameter vector lies in a compact nonempty Vt⊆R++n+1\mathcal V_t \subseteq \mathbb R^{n+1}_{++}Vt​⊆R++n+1​. A purchase consumes one unit of capacity. The value function Jt(x)J_t(x)Jt​(x), the maximum worst-case revenue from period ttt on with xxx units of capacity, satisfies

Jt(x)=max⁡St⊆A min⁡vt∈Vt{∑i∈Stϕi(St,vt)(ri+Jt+1(x−1))+(1−∑i∈Stϕi(St,vt))Jt+1(x)}J_t(x) = \max_{S_t\subseteq\mathcal A}\ \min_{v_t\in\mathcal V_t}\Big\{\sum_{i\in S_t}\phi_i(S_t,v_t)\big(r_i + J_{t+1}(x-1)\big) + \Big(1-\sum_{i\in S_t}\phi_i(S_t,v_t)\Big)J_{t+1}(x)\Big\}Jt​(x)=St​⊆Amax​ vt​∈Vt​min​{i∈St​∑​ϕi​(St​,vt​)(ri​+Jt+1​(x−1))+(1−i∈St​∑​ϕi​(St​,vt​))Jt+1​(x)}

for x≥1x \ge 1x≥1, with Jt(0)=0J_t(0) = 0Jt​(0)=0 and JT+1≡0J_{T+1} \equiv 0JT+1​≡0. The marginal value of capacity is ΔJt(x)=Jt(x)−Jt(x−1)\Delta J_t(x) = J_t(x) - J_t(x-1)ΔJt​(x)=Jt​(x)−Jt​(x−1), and St∗(x)S^*_t(x)St∗​(x) is a maximizer of the right-hand side of smallest cardinality.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 4.3 (p. 17)

For every 1≤t≤T1 \le t \le T1≤t≤T and x≥1x \ge 1x≥1, and, in the second part, every 1≤t≤T−11 \le t \le T-11≤t≤T−1 with Vt⊆Vt+1\mathcal V_t \subseteq \mathcal V_{t+1}Vt​⊆Vt+1​:

St∗(x)⊆St∗(x+1),Vt⊆Vt+1  ⟹  St∗(x)⊆St+1∗(x).S^*_t(x) \subseteq S^*_t(x+1), \qquad \mathcal V_t \subseteq \mathcal V_{t+1} \implies S^*_t(x) \subseteq S^*_{t+1}(x).St∗​(x)⊆St∗​(x+1),Vt​⊆Vt+1​⟹St∗​(x)⊆St+1∗​(x).

Milestones

  1. (Dynamic Robust), second line (p. 16): Jt(x)=max⁡Smin⁡v∈Vt∑i∈Sϕi(S,v) (ri−ΔJt+1(x))+Jt+1(x)J_t(x) = \max_{S}\min_{v\in\mathcal V_t}\sum_{i\in S}\phi_i(S,v)\,(r_i - \Delta J_{t+1}(x)) + J_{t+1}(x)Jt​(x)=maxS​minv∈Vt​​∑i∈S​ϕi​(S,v)(ri​−ΔJt+1​(x))+Jt+1​(x).
  2. Proof of Theorem 4.2 (pp. 16–17): St∗(x)S^*_t(x)St∗​(x) is the static S∗(Vt)S^*(\mathcal V_t)S∗(Vt​) for revenues ri−ΔJt+1(x)r_i - \Delta J_{t+1}(x)ri​−ΔJt+1​(x), and Jt(x)−Jt+1(x)J_t(x) - J_{t+1}(x)Jt​(x)−Jt+1​(x) is the corresponding Z∗(Vt)Z^*(\mathcal V_t)Z∗(Vt​).
  3. Theorem 3.2 (p. 7): S∗(V)={i:ri>Z∗(V)}S^*(\mathcal V) = \{i : r_i > Z^*(\mathcal V)\}S∗(V)={i:ri​>Z∗(V)}.
  4. Theorem 3.7 (p. 10): for δ≥0\delta \ge 0δ≥0, S∗(V)S^*(\mathcal V)S∗(V) is contained in the robust assortment for revenues r+δr + \deltar+δ.
  5. Corollary 3.5 (p. 9): V⊆V′  ⟹  Z∗(V′)≤Z∗(V)\mathcal V \subseteq \mathcal V' \implies Z^*(\mathcal V') \le Z^*(\mathcal V)V⊆V′⟹Z∗(V′)≤Z∗(V) and S∗(V)⊆S∗(V′)S^*(\mathcal V) \subseteq S^*(\mathcal V')S∗(V)⊆S∗(V′).
  6. Theorem 4.1, first inequality (p. 16): ΔJt(x+1)≤ΔJt(x)\Delta J_t(x+1) \le \Delta J_t(x)ΔJt​(x+1)≤ΔJt​(x).
  7. Theorem 4.1, second inequality (p. 16): ΔJt+1(x)≤ΔJt(x)\Delta J_{t+1}(x) \le \Delta J_t(x)ΔJt+1​(x)≤ΔJt​(x).
  8. Theorem 4.2 (p. 16): St∗(x)={i:ri>Jt(x)−Jt+1(x−1)}S^*_t(x) = \{i : r_i > J_t(x) - J_{t+1}(x-1)\}St∗​(x)={i:ri​>Jt​(x)−Jt+1​(x−1)}.

Significance

The result. Theorems 4.1–4.3 say that robustness costs nothing structurally: the robust policy is still a nested threshold policy, so it can be implemented with the protection levels or bid-price controls already in use, and it can be computed by examining at most nnn revenue-ordered assortments per state instead of 2n2^n2n. Theorem 4.3 gives the operational content: with less inventory, offer fewer, higher-revenue products; nearer the end of the season (when the uncertainty sets are nested), offer more.

Formalizing it. The results are proved in the paper; none of them has a machine-checked proof. A formalization produces a checked robust finite-horizon dynamic program over finite action sets with compact adversary sets, the reduction of each Bellman step to a static max–min problem with shifted revenues, and checked concavity and time-monotonicity arguments that are reusable for other single-resource problems. The known-parameter analogues for general regular choice models and for the Markov chain choice model are separate drafts on the platform (RevenueOrdered.Nesting.*, MarkovChainChoice.SingleResource.*); they have no uncertainty set and are not used here.

Difficulty

The obvious route to concavity, an induction on ttt in which JtJ_tJt​ is a maximum of concave functions, fails: a maximum of concave functions is not concave, and here each candidate assortment is evaluated by a minimum over Vt\mathcal V_tVt​, and the worst-case parameter vector changes with the capacity level, so the known-parameter argument cannot be reused term by term. Any induction on ttt also has to handle the boundary x=0x = 0x=0, where the Bellman equation does not apply and only Jt(0)=0J_t(0) = 0Jt​(0)=0 is given. Every step involving a minimum must use that the minimum over a compact set is attained, and translating a minimum by a constant must be justified rather than assumed.

Formalization scope

  • Representation. Products are Fin n (Lean index iii is product i+1i+1i+1). A parameter vector is p : ℝ × (Fin n → ℝ) with p.1 =v0= v_0=v0​. f(S,v)f(S,v)f(S,v) is the published ChoiceCDLP.MNL.mnlObjective. Minima over uncertainty sets are real infima (sInf), equal to the attained minima under the standing hypotheses; maxima are Finset.sup' over all 2n2^n2n assortments.
  • Standing assumptions. Every V t, 1≤t≤T1 \le t \le T1≤t≤T, is compact, nonempty and contained in R++n+1\mathbb R^{n+1}_{++}R++n+1​ (IsUncertaintySeq); the static results assume the same of V. The paper writes "V⊂R++n\mathcal V \subset \mathbb R^n_{++}V⊂R++n​" in Theorem 3.2 and Corollary 3.5; this is read as R++n+1\mathbb R^{n+1}_{++}R++n+1​, compact.
  • Revenues are arbitrary reals. The paper orders r1≥⋯≥rn>0r_1 \ge \dots \ge r_n > 0r1​≥⋯≥rn​>0 "without loss of generality"; no proof uses it, and the dynamic reduction applies Theorem 3.2 to ri−ΔJt+1(x)r_i - \Delta J_{t+1}(x)ri​−ΔJt+1​(x), which may be negative. Dropping it strengthens every statement.
  • The value function is defined by the recursion. The max–min policy formulation (p. 15) and Iyengar's theorem that it satisfies the Bellman equation are not formalized. Jt(x)J_t(x)Jt​(x) is defined for every x∈Nx \in \mathbb Nx∈N; the initial capacity CCC never enters the recursion, so the paper's JtJ_tJt​ on {0,…,C}\{0,\dots,C\}{0,…,C} is the restriction.
  • Capacity x≥1x \ge 1x≥1. Theorem 4.1 is printed "for any x∈{0,1,…,C}x \in \{0,1,\dots,C\}x∈{0,1,…,C}", which includes the undefined ΔJt(0)\Delta J_t(0)ΔJt​(0); Theorems 4.2 and 4.3 say "for any xxx", but St∗(0)S^*_t(0)St∗​(0) is not defined by the Bellman equation. All statements assume x≥1x \ge 1x≥1.
  • Tie-break. S∗(V)S^*(\mathcal V)S∗(V) and St∗(x)S^*_t(x)St∗​(x) are predicates ("SSS is an optimal assortment of smallest cardinality"), not choice functions; Theorems 3.2 and 4.2 are stated as "↔ SSS is the threshold set", which also asserts the threshold set is optimal. Without the tie-break Theorems 4.2 and 4.3 are false, since a product with revenue exactly at the threshold can be added.
  • Ruled out. Defining JJJ as a maximum over revenue-ordered assortments, or through the threshold formula, would make Theorem 4.2 definitional; JJJ is defined with the minimum inside a maximum over all subsets.
  • Restatements. Theorems 3.2, 3.7 and Corollary 3.5 restate, in RobustMNL.Dynamic, the companion mission on Section 3 of the same paper, identically up to namespace.
  • Source. The source is the authors' manuscript of 20 September 2011 of the Operations Research 2012 article; its printed page numbers equal the PDF's.
  • Welcome contributions. Lemmas on attained minima of continuous functions on compact sets of positive parameter vectors, the translation of a max–min by a constant, and the bound ∑i∈Sϕi(S,v)≤1\sum_{i\in S}\phi_i(S,v) \le 1∑i∈S​ϕi​(S,v)≤1 are reusable across all three missions of this paper.

Selected references

  • P. Rusmevichientong, H. Topaloglu, Robust Assortment Optimization in Revenue Management Under the Multinomial Logit Choice Model, Operations Research 60(4), 2012. https://doi.org/10.1287/opre.1120.1063
  • K. Talluri, G. van Ryzin, Revenue Management Under a General Discrete Choice Model of Consumer Behavior, Management Science 50(1), 2004. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.1030.0147
  • G. N. Iyengar, Robust Dynamic Programming, Mathematics of Operations Research 30(2), 2005. https://doi.org/10.1287/moor.1040.0129
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Optimization·Captain: mikedeng1

Robust Assortment Optimization in Revenue Management Under the Multinomial Logit Choice Model 2: Rectangular Uncertainty Reduces the Size-Constrained Robust Problem to Known Weights (u₀, l₁, …, lₙ)Research Paper

Motivation

Assortment optimization is the problem a retailer faces in deciding which subset of its products to put in front of customers. Under the multinomial logit (MNL) choice model each product carries a preference weight, and a customer facing an offered set buys each product with probability proportional to its weight, or buys nothing. The optimal assortment under known weights is classical: it is one of the revenue-ordered sets (Talluri and van Ryzin, 2004). In practice the weights are estimated from data and are uncertain.

Rusmevichientong and Topaloglu (2012) study a robust version: the seller knows only that the weights lie in an uncertainty set, and maximizes the worst-case expected revenue over that set. They also treat the case where the offered set is limited in size, as when a display window or a web page holds only a fixed number of items. Under known weights the size-constrained MNL problem is solvable in polynomial time (Rusmevichientong, Shen and Shmoys, 2010); for a general uncertainty set the robust size-constrained problem has no comparable structure. This mission formalizes the result showing that, for a rectangular uncertainty set, the robust size-constrained problem is exactly a known-weights problem at an explicit parameter vector.

Setting

There are nnn products A={1,…,n}\mathcal A=\{1,\dots,n\}A={1,…,n} with revenues r1,…,rnr_1,\dots,r_nr1​,…,rn​. A parameter vector v=(v0,v1,…,vn)∈R++n+1v=(v_0,v_1,\dots,v_n)\in\mathbb R^{n+1}_{++}v=(v0​,v1​,…,vn​)∈R++n+1​ gives the no-purchase weight v0v_0v0​ and the preference weight viv_ivi​ of each product. When the seller offers an assortment S⊆AS\subseteq\mathcal AS⊆A, a customer buys product i∈Si\in Si∈S with probability vi/(v0+∑ℓ∈Svℓ)v_i/(v_0+\sum_{\ell\in S}v_\ell)vi​/(v0​+∑ℓ∈S​vℓ​), and the expected revenue is

f(S,v)=∑i∈Sriviv0+∑i∈Svi.f(S,v)=\frac{\sum_{i\in S} r_i v_i}{v_0+\sum_{i\in S} v_i}.f(S,v)=v0​+∑i∈S​vi​∑i∈S​ri​vi​​.

An uncertainty set V⊆R++n+1\mathcal V\subseteq\mathbb R^{n+1}_{++}V⊆R++n+1​ is a compact set of parameter vectors. The worst-case revenue of SSS is min⁡v∈Vf(S,v)\min_{v\in\mathcal V} f(S,v)minv∈V​f(S,v). For a size limit K∈NK\in\mathbb NK∈N, the size-constrained robust problem is

Y∗(V)=max⁡S⊆A: ∣S∣≤K min⁡v∈Vf(S,v),Y^*(\mathcal V)=\max_{S\subseteq\mathcal A:\ |S|\le K}\ \min_{v\in\mathcal V} f(S,v),Y∗(V)=S⊆A: ∣S∣≤Kmax​ v∈Vmin​f(S,v),

and with no size limit its value is Z∗(V)=max⁡S⊆Amin⁡v∈Vf(S,v)Z^*(\mathcal V)=\max_{S\subseteq\mathcal A}\min_{v\in\mathcal V} f(S,v)Z∗(V)=maxS⊆A​minv∈V​f(S,v). A rectangular uncertainty set is a product of intervals

V=∏i=0n[li,ui],0<li≤ui,\mathcal V=\prod_{i=0}^n [l_i,u_i],\qquad 0<l_i\le u_i ,V=i=0∏n​[li​,ui​],0<li​≤ui​,

in which each weight, including the no-purchase weight v0∈[l0,u0]v_0\in[l_0,u_0]v0​∈[l0​,u0​], varies independently over its own range.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 3.8 (p. 11)

For every rectangular V=∏i=0n[li,ui]⊆R++n+1\mathcal V=\prod_{i=0}^n[l_i,u_i]\subseteq\mathbb R^{n+1}_{++}V=∏i=0n​[li​,ui​]⊆R++n+1​, every vector of revenues and every K∈NK\in\mathbb NK∈N,

Y∗(V)=max⁡S⊆A: ∣S∣≤K ∑i∈Sliriu0+∑i∈Sli=max⁡S⊆A: ∣S∣≤Kf(S,(u0,l1,…,ln)).Y^*(\mathcal V)=\max_{S\subseteq\mathcal A:\ |S|\le K}\ \frac{\sum_{i\in S} l_i r_i}{u_0+\sum_{i\in S} l_i} =\max_{S\subseteq\mathcal A:\ |S|\le K} f\big(S,(u_0,l_1,\dots,l_n)\big).Y∗(V)=S⊆A: ∣S∣≤Kmax​ u0​+∑i∈S​li​∑i∈S​li​ri​​=S⊆A: ∣S∣≤Kmax​f(S,(u0​,l1​,…,ln​)).

Milestones (proof of Theorem 3.8, p. 12)

  1. Parametric form of Y∗Y^*Y∗, for every compact nonempty V⊆R++n+1\mathcal V\subseteq\mathbb R^{n+1}_{++}V⊆R++n+1​:
Y∗(V)=max⁡{λ: max⁡S: ∣S∣≤K min⁡v∈V 1v0∑i∈Svi(ri−λ)≥λ}.Y^*(\mathcal V)=\max\Big\{\lambda:\ \max_{S:\,|S|\le K}\ \min_{v\in\mathcal V}\ \frac{1}{v_0}\sum_{i\in S}v_i(r_i-\lambda)\ge\lambda\Big\}.Y∗(V)=max{λ: S:∣S∣≤Kmax​ v∈Vmin​ v0​1​i∈S∑​vi​(ri​−λ)≥λ}.
  1. Rectangular reduction, for every real λ\lambdaλ:
max⁡S: ∣S∣≤K min⁡v∈V 1v0∑i∈Svi(ri−λ)=max⁡S: ∣S∣≤K 1u0∑i∈Sli(ri−λ).\max_{S:\,|S|\le K}\ \min_{v\in\mathcal V}\ \frac{1}{v_0}\sum_{i\in S}v_i(r_i-\lambda)=\max_{S:\,|S|\le K}\ \frac{1}{u_0}\sum_{i\in S}l_i(r_i-\lambda).S:∣S∣≤Kmax​ v∈Vmin​ v0​1​i∈S∑​vi​(ri​−λ)=S:∣S∣≤Kmax​ u0​1​i∈S∑​li​(ri​−λ).
  1. Parametric form at known weights:
max⁡S: ∣S∣≤Kf(S,(u0,l1,…,ln))=max⁡{λ: max⁡S: ∣S∣≤K 1u0∑i∈Sli(ri−λ)≥λ}.\max_{S:\,|S|\le K} f\big(S,(u_0,l_1,\dots,l_n)\big)=\max\Big\{\lambda:\ \max_{S:\,|S|\le K}\ \frac{1}{u_0}\sum_{i\in S}l_i(r_i-\lambda)\ge\lambda\Big\}.S:∣S∣≤Kmax​f(S,(u0​,l1​,…,ln​))=max{λ: S:∣S∣≤Kmax​ u0​1​i∈S∑​li​(ri​−λ)≥λ}.

Further result (Example 3.4, p. 8)

The unconstrained case: Z∗(V)=max⁡S⊆Af(S,(u0,l1,…,ln))Z^*(\mathcal V)=\max_{S\subseteq\mathcal A} f\big(S,(u_0,l_1,\dots,l_n)\big)Z∗(V)=maxS⊆A​f(S,(u0​,l1​,…,ln​)) for rectangular V\mathcal VV, which the paper establishes by a separate argument.

Significance

The result. Theorem 3.8 converts a max–min problem over a continuum of parameter vectors into a single deterministic size-constrained MNL problem with weights (u0,l1,…,ln)(u_0,l_1,\dots,l_n)(u0​,l1​,…,ln​): the largest no-purchase weight and the smallest product weights. The size-constrained MNL problem with known weights has efficient algorithms, so the robust problem inherits them. The theorem also identifies the worst-case customer explicitly, which means robustness against a box costs nothing computationally beyond a known-weights solve. The parametric description of Y∗Y^*Y∗ in Milestone 1 holds for every compact uncertainty set and is the starting point for other uncertainty sets.

Formalizing it. The result is proved in the paper; no machine-checked version exists. The mission produces a Lean formalization of the size-constrained robust MNL problem built on the published MNL objective ChoiceCDLP.MNL.mnlObjective, the parametric (Dinkelbach-type) characterization of a max–min ratio problem with attainment, and the box reduction. The definitions are shared in convention with the companion missions on the same paper (the revenue-ordered structure of the unconstrained robust problem and the dynamic robust problem).

Difficulty

The direct approach — for each assortment SSS, find the worst parameter vector in the box and compare — does not work as stated: for a fixed SSS containing a product whose revenue is below the target ratio, the minimizing no-purchase weight is l0l_0l0​, not u0u_0u0​, so the per-assortment worst case is not attained at (u0,l1,…,ln)(u_0,l_1,\dots,l_n)(u0​,l1​,…,ln​). The identity holds only after maximizing over assortments of size at most KKK, and the size constraint interacts with which products can be discarded. A second point is that the ratio f(S,v)f(S,v)f(S,v) is not linear in vvv, so its minimum over the box is not determined coordinate by coordinate from the signs of the revenues alone, and every "max" in the statements asserts attainment, which has to be established, not assumed.

Formalization scope

The source is the authors' manuscript of 20 Sep 2011 of the Operations Research 2012 article; its printed page numbers equal the PDF's.

Representation. Products are Fin n (Lean index iii is the paper's product i+1i+1i+1). A parameter vector is p : ℝ × (Fin n → ℝ) with p.1 =v0=v_0=v0​. The revenue f(S,v)f(S,v)f(S,v) is the published ChoiceCDLP.MNL.mnlObjective p.2 r p.1 S. Every minimum over V\mathcal VV is a real sInf of the image; every maximum over assortments is a Finset.sup' over all subsets of size at most KKK (a nonempty family, since it contains ∅\emptyset∅). Every "max⁡{λ:… }\max\{\lambda:\dots\}max{λ:…}" is stated as IsGreatest, which asserts attainment. The rectangular set is Set.Icc l₀ u₀ ×ˢ Set.Icc l u. KKK is any natural number, with no lower or upper bound.

Hypotheses.

  • Milestone 1 assumes the paper's standing assumption: V\mathcal VV compact, nonempty, and inside R++n+1\mathbb R^{n+1}_{++}R++n+1​. Nonemptiness is implicit in the paper's min⁡v∈V\min_{v\in\mathcal V}minv∈V​.
  • The box results assume 0<l00<l_00<l0​, 0<li0<l_i0<li​ (the paper's [li,ui]⊂R++[l_i,u_i]\subset\mathbb R_{++}[li​,ui​]⊂R++​) and l0≤u0l_0\le u_0l0​≤u0​, li≤uil_i\le u_ili​≤ui​, the reading of "the interval [li,ui][l_i,u_i][li​,ui​] represents the range of the likely values"; without them the box would be empty.
  • Revenues are arbitrary reals. The paper's ordering r1≥⋯≥rn>0r_1\ge\dots\ge r_n>0r1​≥⋯≥rn​>0 (p. 5, "without loss of generality") is used by no proof and is dropped; the statements are strengthened accordingly.
  • The paper writes "V⊂R++n+1\mathcal V\subset\mathbb R^{n+1}_{++}V⊂R++n+1​"; it is read as inclusion.
  • Example 3.4's chain ends with f(Sh∗,h)f(S^*_h,h)f(Sh∗​,h), which equals max⁡Sf(S,h)\max_S f(S,h)maxS​f(S,h) by definition of Sh∗S^*_hSh∗​; the Lean statement keeps the first equality.

Trivializations ruled out. Y∗Y^*Y∗ is defined through the worst case over the whole box and the maximum over all assortments of size at most KKK, never through the vertex (u0,l1,…,ln)(u_0,l_1,\dots,l_n)(u0​,l1​,…,ln​) or a restricted family of sets, so the goal is not definitional. The box hypotheses make V\mathcal VV nonempty, so no sInf is evaluated on an empty set.

Contributions welcome. Proofs of the four milestones and the goal; lemmas on attainment of sInf of a continuous function over a compact set used for the inner minimum; a reusable parametric characterization of max⁡Smin⁡v\max_S \min_vmaxS​minv​ of ratios with positive denominators.

Selected references

  • P. Rusmevichientong, H. Topaloglu, Robust Assortment Optimization in Revenue Management Under the Multinomial Logit Choice Model, Operations Research 60(4), 2012. https://doi.org/10.1287/opre.1120.1063
  • P. Rusmevichientong, Z.-J. M. Shen, D. B. Shmoys, Dynamic Assortment Optimization with a Multinomial Logit Choice Model and Capacity Constraint, Operations Research 58(6), 2010. https://doi.org/10.1287/opre.1090.0800
  • K. Talluri, G. van Ryzin, Revenue Management Under a General Discrete Choice Model of Consumer Behavior, Management Science 50(1), 2004. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.1030.0147
  • W. Dinkelbach, On Nonlinear Fractional Programming, Management Science 13(7), 1967. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.13.7.492
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Optimization·Captain: mikedeng1

Robust Assortment Optimization in Revenue Management Under the Multinomial Logit Choice Model 1: The Optimal Robust Assortment Is Revenue-Ordered, S*(V) = {i : rᵢ > Z*(V)}Research Paper

Motivation

Assortment optimization asks which subset of products a firm should offer when customers choose among the offered products, or leave without buying. It underlies shelf-space planning in retail, the choice of which fare classes to keep open in airline revenue management, and the selection of items shown on a web page. The multinomial logit (MNL) model is the standard choice model in this literature: when the model parameters are known, the optimal assortment is revenue-ordered, that is, it consists of the products with the highest revenues (Talluri and van Ryzin, 2004; Gallego et al., 2004; Liu and van Ryzin, 2008), so only nnn candidate assortments need to be compared instead of 2n2^n2n.

In practice the parameters of the choice model are estimated from limited data. Rusmevichientong and Topaloglu (Operations Research, 2012) take a robust view: the parameters are only known to lie in an uncertainty set, and the firm maximizes its worst-case expected revenue. Their main structural result is that the revenue-ordered structure survives this uncertainty, whatever the uncertainty set. This mission formalizes that result and the comparative statics the paper derives from it.

Setting

There are nnn products, A={1,…,n}\mathcal A = \{1, \dots, n\}A={1,…,n}, and product iii earns revenue rir_iri​. A customer's choice is governed by a parameter vector v=(v0,v1,…,vn)∈R++n+1v = (v_0, v_1, \dots, v_n) \in \mathbb R^{n+1}_{++}v=(v0​,v1​,…,vn​)∈R++n+1​ (all components strictly positive): v0v_0v0​ is the weight of the no-purchase option and viv_ivi​ the preference weight of product iii. When the assortment S⊆AS \subseteq \mathcal AS⊆A is offered, the customer buys product i∈Si \in Si∈S with probability

ϕi(S,v)=viv0+∑ℓ∈Svℓ,\phi_i(S, v) = \frac{v_i}{v_0 + \sum_{\ell \in S} v_\ell},ϕi​(S,v)=v0​+∑ℓ∈S​vℓ​vi​​,

and buys nothing with the remaining probability. The expected revenue of SSS is

f(S,v)=∑i∈Sri ϕi(S,v)=∑i∈Sriviv0+∑i∈Svi.f(S, v) = \sum_{i\in S} r_i\,\phi_i(S, v) = \frac{\sum_{i\in S} r_i v_i}{v_0 + \sum_{i\in S} v_i}.f(S,v)=i∈S∑​ri​ϕi​(S,v)=v0​+∑i∈S​vi​∑i∈S​ri​vi​​.

The parameters are unknown and lie in an uncertainty set V⊆R++n+1\mathcal V \subseteq \mathbb R^{n+1}_{++}V⊆R++n+1​, which is compact and nonempty. The Robust Logit problem maximizes the worst-case expected revenue:

Z∗(V)=max⁡S⊆A min⁡v∈Vf(S,v).Z^*(\mathcal V) = \max_{S \subseteq \mathcal A}\ \min_{v \in \mathcal V} f(S, v).Z∗(V)=S⊆Amax​ v∈Vmin​f(S,v).

Among the optimal assortments, S∗(V)S^*(\mathcal V)S∗(V) is one with the smallest cardinality. For a single parameter vector vvv, write Sv∗=S∗({v})S^*_v = S^*(\{v\})Sv∗​=S∗({v}) and Zv∗=Z∗({v})Z^*_v = Z^*(\{v\})Zv∗​=Z∗({v}); this is the classical problem with known parameters. Finally, for δ≥0\delta \ge 0δ≥0, Zδ∗(V)Z^*_\delta(\mathcal V)Zδ∗​(V) and Sδ∗(V)S^*_\delta(\mathcal V)Sδ∗​(V) are the same quantities when every revenue rir_iri​ is replaced by ri+δr_i + \deltari​+δ.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 3.2 (revenue-ordered assortments are robust)

S∗(V)={ i∈A:ri>Z∗(V) }.S^*(\mathcal V) = \{\, i \in \mathcal A : r_i > Z^*(\mathcal V) \,\}.S∗(V)={i∈A:ri​>Z∗(V)}.

Equivalently: an assortment is optimal with smallest cardinality if and only if it is the set of products whose revenue strictly exceeds the optimal worst-case revenue. When r1≥⋯≥rnr_1 \ge \dots \ge r_nr1​≥⋯≥rn​ this set is {1,…,i}\{1, \dots, i\}{1,…,i} for some iii.

Milestones

  1. The identity in the proof of Lemma 3.1 (p. 6): for i∉Ai \notin Ai∈/A, f(A∪{i},v)f(A\cup\{i\}, v)f(A∪{i},v) is the convex combination of rir_iri​ and f(A,v)f(A, v)f(A,v) with weights vi/(v0+vi+∑ℓ∈Avℓ)v_i/(v_0+v_i+\sum_{\ell\in A}v_\ell)vi​/(v0​+vi​+∑ℓ∈A​vℓ​) and (v0+∑ℓ∈Avℓ)/(v0+vi+∑ℓ∈Avℓ)(v_0+\sum_{\ell\in A}v_\ell)/(v_0+v_i+\sum_{\ell\in A}v_\ell)(v0​+∑ℓ∈A​vℓ​)/(v0​+vi​+∑ℓ∈A​vℓ​).
  2. Lemma 3.1 (p. 6): for i∉Ai \notin Ai∈/A, the statements ri>f(A,v)r_i > f(A,v)ri​>f(A,v), f(A∪{i},v)>f(A,v)f(A\cup\{i\},v) > f(A,v)f(A∪{i},v)>f(A,v) and ri>f(A∪{i},v)r_i > f(A\cup\{i\},v)ri​>f(A∪{i},v) are equivalent.
  3. Corollary 3.5 (p. 9): if V⊆V′\mathcal V \subseteq \mathcal V'V⊆V′, then Z∗(V′)≤Z∗(V)Z^*(\mathcal V') \le Z^*(\mathcal V)Z∗(V′)≤Z∗(V) and S∗(V)⊆S∗(V′)S^*(\mathcal V) \subseteq S^*(\mathcal V')S∗(V)⊆S∗(V′).
  4. Theorem 3.6 (p. 10): S∗(V)=⋃v∈VSv∗S^*(\mathcal V) = \bigcup_{v\in\mathcal V} S^*_vS∗(V)=⋃v∈V​Sv∗​.
  5. The sandwich in the proof of Theorem 3.7 (p. 11): Z∗(V)≤Zδ∗(V)≤δ+Z∗(V)Z^*(\mathcal V) \le Z^*_\delta(\mathcal V) \le \delta + Z^*(\mathcal V)Z∗(V)≤Zδ∗​(V)≤δ+Z∗(V) for δ≥0\delta \ge 0δ≥0.
  6. Theorem 3.7 (p. 10): S∗(V)⊆Sδ∗(V)S^*(\mathcal V) \subseteq S^*_\delta(\mathcal V)S∗(V)⊆Sδ∗​(V) for δ≥0\delta \ge 0δ≥0.

Milestones 3–6 are consequences of the goal on the same definitions.

Significance

Theorem 3.2 reduces the robust problem, a max–min over 2n2^n2n assortments and a possibly infinite parameter set, to at most n+1n+1n+1 revenue-ordered candidates, each requiring one worst-case evaluation min⁡v∈Vf(S,v)\min_{v\in\mathcal V} f(S, v)minv∈V​f(S,v). Applied to a singleton V={v}\mathcal V = \{v\}V={v} it also reproves the classical revenue-ordered optimality under known MNL parameters, together with the exact tie-breaking description. Corollary 3.5 and Theorem 3.6 say that more uncertainty calls for a larger assortment, and that the robust assortment is the largest assortment optimal for some parameter in V\mathcal VV; Theorem 3.7 compares assortments when all revenues shift by a constant, which the paper uses in Section 4 to show that robust dynamic assortments grow with remaining capacity and over time.

The results are proved in the paper; none of them has a machine-checked proof on Prove2Me. The platform has ChoiceCDLP.MNL.top_ranked_optimal (from Liu and van Ryzin, 2008), a statement about top-ranked offer sets for known MNL weights, which is a different statement without uncertainty or tie-breaking. A formal development here gives a checked version of the robust structure theorem stated for arbitrary real revenues, the generality in which the dynamic part of the paper uses it.

Difficulty

The obvious argument fails at the max–min. For known parameters, Lemma 3.1 immediately shows that a product should be added exactly when its revenue beats the current expected revenue; but under uncertainty the minimizing parameter vector changes with the assortment, so one cannot compare f(S,v)f(S, v)f(S,v) and f(S∪{i},v)f(S \cup \{i\}, v)f(S∪{i},v) at a single worst-case vvv. The argument has to establish a strict improvement uniformly over V\mathcal VV and then pass to the minimum, which is where compactness enters: a pointwise strict inequality survives the minimum only because it is attained. The tie-breaking rule is equally essential: a product with ri=Z∗(V)r_i = Z^*(\mathcal V)ri​=Z∗(V) can be added to an optimal assortment without changing its worst-case value, so without the smallest-cardinality rule the characterization is false.

Formalization scope

Products are Fin n, so Lean index iii stands for the paper's product i+1i+1i+1. A parameter vector is p : ℝ × (Fin n → ℝ) with p.1 =v0= v_0=v0​ and p.2 i the weight of product iii; IsPos p expresses v∈R++n+1v \in \mathbb R^{n+1}_{++}v∈R++n+1​. The expected revenue f(S,v)f(S, v)f(S,v) is the published definition ChoiceCDLP.MNL.mnlObjective. The worst case min⁡v∈Vf(S,v)\min_{v\in\mathcal V} f(S,v)minv∈V​f(S,v) is a real infimum (sInf), and Z∗(V)Z^*(\mathcal V)Z∗(V) is a maximum over all subsets of products. S∗(V)S^*(\mathcal V)S∗(V) is encoded as the predicate IsSmallestOptimal V r S (optimal, and of cardinality at most that of every optimal assortment), not as a choice function, so every statement about S∗(V)S^*(\mathcal V)S∗(V) is asserted for every optimal assortment of smallest cardinality. Zδ∗Z^*_\deltaZδ∗​ and Sδ∗S^*_\deltaSδ∗​ are the same objects for the revenue vector r+δr + \deltar+δ, which is exact since ∑i∈S(ri+δ)ϕi(S,v)\sum_{i\in S}(r_i+\delta)\phi_i(S,v)∑i∈S​(ri​+δ)ϕi​(S,v) is f(S,v)f(S,v)f(S,v) at those revenues.

Standing assumptions and departures from the page:

  • Every theorem assumes V\mathcal VV compact, nonempty and contained in R++n+1\mathbb R^{n+1}_{++}R++n+1​, the standing assumption of Sec. 3 (p. 6). Theorem 3.2, Corollary 3.5 and Theorem 3.6 write "V⊂R++n\mathcal V \subset \mathbb R^n_{++}V⊂R++n​"; this is read as the compact V⊆R++n+1\mathcal V \subseteq \mathbb R^{n+1}_{++}V⊆R++n+1​ of p. 6, since the parameter vector has n+1n+1n+1 components and the proofs use compactness.
  • Revenues are arbitrary real numbers. The paper's ordering r1≥⋯≥rn>0r_1 \ge \dots \ge r_n > 0r1​≥⋯≥rn​>0 (p. 5, "without loss of generality") is used by none of the proofs, and Sec. 4 applies Theorem 3.2 to revenues that may be negative. This is a strengthening.
  • The goal is stated as an equivalence: an assortment is optimal of smallest cardinality iff it equals {i:ri>Z∗(V)}\{i : r_i > Z^*(\mathcal V)\}{i:ri​>Z∗(V)}. The backward direction asserts that the threshold set is optimal, so the statement cannot hold vacuously. Defining Z∗Z^*Z∗ as a maximum over revenue-ordered prefixes only, or defining S∗(V)S^*(\mathcal V)S∗(V) through the threshold, would make the goal true by definition; both are ruled out by the definitions above.

The infimum is meaningful only under the standing assumptions (on an empty set it is 000), which is why they appear as hypotheses of every statement. A complete development needs continuity of v↦f(S,v)v \mapsto f(S,v)v↦f(S,v) on positive vectors and attainment of minima on compact sets, both available in Mathlib, and finite maxima over Finset (Finset (Fin n)). The lemmas about fff (milestones 1–2) are reusable for any MNL model. Proofs of any milestone, and alternative proofs of the goal, are welcome.

The source is the authors' manuscript of 20 Sep 2011 of the Operations Research 2012 article; its printed page numbers equal the PDF's page numbers, and all page citations refer to it.

Selected references

  • P. Rusmevichientong, H. Topaloglu, Robust Assortment Optimization in Revenue Management Under the Multinomial Logit Choice Model, Operations Research 60(4), 2012. https://doi.org/10.1287/opre.1120.1063
  • K. Talluri, G. van Ryzin, Revenue Management Under a General Discrete Choice Model of Consumer Behavior, Management Science 50(1), 2004. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.1030.0147
  • Q. Liu, G. van Ryzin, On the Choice-Based Linear Programming Model for Network Revenue Management, Manufacturing & Service Operations Management 10(2), 2008. https://doi.org/10.1287/msom.1070.0172
  • G. Gallego, G. Iyengar, R. Phillips, A. Dubey, Managing Flexible Products on a Network, CORC Technical Report TR-2004-01, Columbia University, 2004.
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OptimizationTheoretical Computer Science·Captain: mikedeng1

Optimal Inapproximability Results for MAX-CUT and Other 2-Variable CSPs? 2: Random-Hyperplane Rounding Approximates Balanced MAX-2SAT within β ≈ 0.943Research Paper

Motivation

MAX-2SAT asks for an assignment of Boolean variables that maximizes the total weight of satisfied clauses, each clause being a disjunction of two literals. It is one of the basic constraint satisfaction problems of approximation theory, and its approximability has been studied alongside MAX-CUT since semidefinite programming entered the field.

Khot, Kindler, Mossel and O'Donnell (SIAM J. Comput. 37(1), 2007) show that, assuming the Unique Games Conjecture, it is NP-hard to approximate MAX-2SAT within any factor greater than

β=min⁡π/2≤θ≤π2+(2/π)θ3−cos⁡θ≈0.943\beta = \min_{\pi/2 \le \theta \le \pi} \frac{2 + (2/\pi)\theta}{3 - \cos\theta} \approx 0.943β=π/2≤θ≤πmin​3−cosθ2+(2/π)θ​≈0.943

(their Theorem 3), and that their reduction produces balanced instances, in which every variable carries as much weight positively as negatively. Their Theorem 4 shows that for this balanced restriction the bound is tight: a Goemans–Williamson style semidefinite relaxation followed by random-hyperplane rounding approximates Balanced-MAX-2SAT within any factor smaller than β\betaβ. This mission formalizes Theorem 4.

Timeline.

  • 1995: Goemans and Williamson give the 0.878 algorithm for MAX-CUT and a 0.878 algorithm for MAX-2SAT by semidefinite programming and random-hyperplane rounding (J. ACM 42(6)).
  • 2007: Khot, Kindler, Mossel and O'Donnell prove UGC-hardness at β\betaβ for MAX-2SAT, and show β\betaβ is achievable for balanced instances (Theorem 4).
  • 2007: Austrin shows that, under the Unique Games Conjecture, general MAX-2SAT is hard to approximate beyond about 0.9401, strictly below β\betaβ, so balanced instances are not the hardest ones (STOC 2007); for the balanced version β\betaβ remains the threshold.

Setting

Treat the bit TRUE as −1-1−1 and FALSE as 111 (the paper's §7.2 convention). An assignment of the variables x0,…,xn−1x_0,\dots,x_{n-1}x0​,…,xn−1​ is a point x∈{−1,1}nx \in \{-1,1\}^nx∈{−1,1}n. A literal is y=rixiy = r_i x_iy=ri​xi​ with a sign ri∈{−1,1}r_i \in \{-1,1\}ri​∈{−1,1} (ri=−1r_i = -1ri​=−1 for the negated variable ¬xi\neg x_i¬xi​); it is true when y=−1y = -1y=−1. A weighted MAX-2SAT instance is a finite list of clauses C=(y∨z)C = (y \vee z)C=(y∨z) with y=rixiy = r_ix_iy=ri​xi​, z=rjxjz = r_jx_jz=rj​xj​ (the two variables may coincide), with nonnegative weights wCw_CwC​. The satisfied weight of xxx is

sat(x)=∑CwC [ y=−1 or z=−1 ],OPT=max⁡x∈{−1,1}nsat(x).\mathrm{sat}(x) = \sum_C w_C\,[\,y = -1 \text{ or } z = -1\,], \qquad \mathrm{OPT} = \max_{x\in\{-1,1\}^n} \mathrm{sat}(x).sat(x)=C∑​wC​[y=−1 or z=−1],OPT=x∈{−1,1}nmax​sat(x).

An instance is balanced (Definition 12) if for each variable iii, the expected satisfied weight when xi=1x_i = 1xi​=1 and the other variables are uniform equals the expected satisfied weight when xi=−1x_i = -1xi​=−1 and the others are uniform.

The semidefinite relaxation replaces each xix_ixi​ by a unit vector vi∈Rdv_i \in \mathbb R^dvi​∈Rd and the balanced objective by

SDPobj(v)=∑C=(rixi∨rjxj)wC(34−14 (rivi)⋅(rjvj)),\mathrm{SDPobj}(v) = \sum_{C = (r_ix_i\vee r_jx_j)} w_C\Bigl(\tfrac34 - \tfrac14\,(r_iv_i)\cdot(r_jv_j)\Bigr),SDPobj(v)=C=(ri​xi​∨rj​xj​)∑​wC​(43​−41​(ri​vi​)⋅(rj​vj​)),

with optimal value SDP=sup⁡SDPobj(v)\mathrm{SDP} = \sup \mathrm{SDPobj}(v)SDP=supSDPobj(v) over unit-vector families in every dimension. Hyperplane rounding draws a standard Gaussian vector g∈Rdg \in \mathbb R^dg∈Rd and sets xi=sgn⁡(g⋅vi)x_i = \operatorname{sgn}(g\cdot v_i)xi​=sgn(g⋅vi​).

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 4 (p. 12), as the guarantee of the algorithm

For every balanced instance with nonnegative weights, every ε≥0\varepsilon \ge 0ε≥0, every unit-vector family vvv with SDPobj(v)≥SDP−ε\mathrm{SDPobj}(v) \ge \mathrm{SDP} - \varepsilonSDPobj(v)≥SDP−ε, and every standard Gaussian vector ggg,

E[sat(sgn⁡(g⋅vi))i]  ≥  β (OPT−ε),\mathbb E\bigl[\mathrm{sat}(\operatorname{sgn}(g\cdot v_i))_i\bigr] \;\ge\; \beta\,(\mathrm{OPT} - \varepsilon),E[sat(sgn(g⋅vi​))i​]≥β(OPT−ε),

with the satisfied weight integrable. The constant is Theorem 3's exact minimum β\betaβ, not its decimal rounding.

Milestones (proof of Theorem 4, pp. 21–22)

  1. Arithmetization: [ y∨z ]=34−14y−14z−14yz[\,y\vee z\,] = \tfrac34 - \tfrac14 y - \tfrac14 z - \tfrac14 yz[y∨z]=43​−41​y−41​z−41​yz on {−1,1}2\{-1,1\}^2{−1,1}2.
  2. Balanced   ⟺  \iff⟺ the linear terms cancel: sat(x)=∑CwC(34−14yz)\mathrm{sat}(x) = \sum_C w_C(\tfrac34 - \tfrac14 yz)sat(x)=∑C​wC​(43​−41​yz) for all xxx.
  3. Relaxation: OPT≤SDP\mathrm{OPT} \le \mathrm{SDP}OPT≤SDP for balanced instances.
  4. Hyperplane identity E[xixj]=1−2πarccos⁡(vi⋅vj)\mathbb E[x_ix_j] = 1 - \tfrac2\pi\arccos(v_i\cdot v_j)E[xi​xj​]=1−π2​arccos(vi​⋅vj​), already proved on the platform as Grothendieck's identity (in the equivalent form 2πarcsin⁡\tfrac2\pi\arcsinπ2​arcsin).
  5. Per-clause bound: 34−14(1−2πarccos⁡t)≥β(34−14t)\tfrac34 - \tfrac14(1 - \tfrac2\pi\arccos t) \ge \beta(\tfrac34 - \tfrac14 t)43​−41​(1−π2​arccost)≥β(43​−41​t) for all t∈[−1,1]t\in[-1,1]t∈[−1,1].

Significance

The result. Together with Theorem 3, Theorem 4 pins the approximability of Balanced-MAX-2SAT at exactly β\betaβ under the Unique Games Conjecture: the constant arising from the Majority Is Stablest analysis of the hardness reduction coincides with the constant of a semidefinite rounding algorithm. It also explains why the hardness reduction for MAX-2SAT cannot give more than β\betaβ without abandoning balanced instances.

Formalizing it. The theorem is proved in the paper; no machine-checked proof is known to exist. A formal proof produces a verified approximation guarantee for a randomized rounding scheme that holds for every near-optimal vector solution, and a reusable layer for weighted 2-CSPs on {−1,1}n\{-1,1\}^n{−1,1}n: arithmetization, balancedness, the vector relaxation and its rounding. The hyperplane identity is already available on the platform, so the remaining work is combinatorial and analytic rather than probabilistic.

Difficulty

The naive approach, rounding the full arithmetized objective 34−14y−14z−14yz\tfrac34 - \tfrac14 y - \tfrac14 z - \tfrac14 yz43​−41​y−41​z−41​yz, fails: the relaxation of a linear term rixir_ix_iri​xi​ has no vector counterpart that random-hyperplane rounding treats correctly, and for unbalanced instances the achievable ratio is different. The whole argument rests on balancedness making the linear terms vanish identically, and the equivalence between Definition 12 (a statement about conditional expectations) and the cancellation of linear coefficients must be established with care, including clauses whose two literals involve the same variable.

The second difficulty is the constant. β\betaβ is defined as a minimum over θ∈[π/2,π]\theta\in[\pi/2,\pi]θ∈[π/2,π] only, while the per-clause comparison is needed for all inner products t∈[−1,1]t\in[-1,1]t∈[−1,1], that is for all θ∈[0,π]\theta\in[0,\pi]θ∈[0,π]. Showing that the ratio 2+(2/π)θ3−cos⁡θ\frac{2 + (2/\pi)\theta}{3-\cos\theta}3−cosθ2+(2/π)θ​ does not drop below β\betaβ on [0,π/2][0,\pi/2][0,π/2] is a genuine one-variable inequality, not a definitional unfolding. Finally, the expectation must be computed for a genuine Gaussian vector, with the sign convention at 000 handled almost surely.

Formalization scope

  • Assignments are Fin n → Bool read through pm true = -1, pm false = 1; a literal is (i, r) : Fin n × Bool with r = true for ¬xi\neg x_i¬xi​. The two literals of a clause may involve the same variable.
  • An instance is a structure with m clauses, a clause map, and real weights with a nonnegativity field (Definition 10's "nonnegative weight function").
  • Balancedness is Definition 12, stated as equality of the sums of satisfied weight over the two halves {xi=1}\{x_i = 1\}{xi​=1} and {xi=−1}\{x_i = -1\}{xi​=−1} of the cube; the common factor 2−(n−1)2^{-(n-1)}2−(n−1) is dropped.
  • OPT is a maximum over the 2n2^n2n assignments. SDP is a real supremum over unit-vector families Fin n → Fin d → ℝ in every dimension ddd; the set is nonempty and bounded above by the total weight.
  • beta is the infimum of the image of [π/2,π][\pi/2,\pi][π/2,π], i.e. Theorem 3's attained minimum. Defining it over [0,π][0,\pi][0,π] instead would make milestone 5 definitional and is ruled out.
  • The Gaussian vector is the platform predicate IsStandardGaussianVector (measurable, independent coordinates of law N(0,1)N(0,1)N(0,1) on an arbitrary probability space); the expectation is a Bochner integral and its integrability is part of the conclusion. The rounding outputs FALSE on the null event g⋅vi=0g\cdot v_i = 0g⋅vi​=0.
  • Not formalized: polynomial running time. The paper obtains an (SDP−ε)(\mathrm{SDP}-\varepsilon)(SDP−ε)-optimal solution in polynomial time by citing Goemans–Williamson; the goal quantifies over every such solution. "Within any factor smaller than β\betaβ" follows by taking ε\varepsilonε small, because OPT≥12∑CwC\mathrm{OPT} \ge \tfrac12\sum_C w_COPT≥21​∑C​wC​.
  • The goal cannot be met trivially: the vector family is universally quantified (not chosen inside the statement), the expectation is over a genuine Gaussian, and the instance ranges over all balanced weighted instances (a nontrivial balanced instance such as (x1∨x2)∧(¬x1∨¬x2)(x_1\vee x_2)\wedge(\neg x_1\vee\neg x_2)(x1​∨x2​)∧(¬x1​∨¬x2​) exists).

Welcome contributions: proofs of the milestones, a bridge from Real.sign (used by the platform's Grothendieck identity) to the {−1,1}\{-1,1\}{−1,1}-valued rounding, and the one-variable analysis behind the per-clause bound.

Selected references

  • S. Khot, G. Kindler, E. Mossel, R. O'Donnell, Optimal Inapproximability Results for MAX-CUT and Other 2-Variable CSPs?, SIAM J. Comput. 37(1), 2007. https://doi.org/10.1137/S0097539705447372
  • M. X. Goemans, D. P. Williamson, Improved approximation algorithms for maximum cut and satisfiability problems using semidefinite programming, J. ACM 42(6), 1995. https://doi.org/10.1145/227683.227684
  • P. Austrin, Balanced Max 2-Sat might not be the hardest, STOC 2007. https://doi.org/10.1145/1250790.1250818
  • R. Vershynin, High-Dimensional Probability, Cambridge University Press, 2018, Lemma 3.6.6 (Grothendieck's identity). https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108231596
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Matroid Prophet Inequalities 3: Stopping at the First Value Above E[max X_i]/2 Earns at Least Half the Prophet's Expected MaximumResearch Paper

Motivation

A prophet inequality compares two players facing the same random sequence of rewards X1,X2,…,XnX_1, X_2, \dots, X_nX1​,X2​,…,Xn​. The gambler sees the values one at a time and must decide, as each value arrives, whether to stop and collect it; a value passed over is lost. The prophet knows the whole sequence in advance and simply takes its maximum. In 1978 Krengel, Sucheston and Garling showed that when the XiX_iXi​ are independent, non-negative and E[max⁡iXi]<∞\mathbb E[\max_i X_i] < \inftyE[maxi​Xi​]<∞, the gambler has a stopping rule τ\tauτ with

2 E[Xτ]  ≥  E[max⁡iXi],2\,\mathbb E[X_\tau] \;\ge\; \mathbb E\big[\max_i X_i\big],2E[Xτ​]≥E[imax​Xi​],

and that the factor 222 cannot be improved. This inequality, labelled (1) in Kleinberg and Weinberg's Matroid Prophet Inequalities (arXiv:1201.4764, STOC 2012), is the starting point of optimal stopping theory's prophet inequalities and, more recently, of a large literature in online algorithms and algorithmic mechanism design, where it is the reason that a single posted price can extract a constant fraction of the optimal welfare or revenue.

Timeline.

  • 1977: Krengel and Sucheston prove the inequality with factor 4 in place of 2 (Bull. Amer. Math. Soc. 83).
  • 1978: Krengel and Sucheston publish the result attributed to Krengel, Sucheston and Garling, the factor-2 inequality (1) for independent non-negative rewards with E[max⁡iXi]<∞\mathbb E[\max_i X_i] < \inftyE[maxi​Xi​]<∞; the factor 222 cannot be improved.
  • 1984: Samuel-Cahn shows that a single threshold suffices: stopping at the first value above a threshold TTT with Pr⁡[max⁡iXi>T]=12\Pr[\max_i X_i > T] = \tfrac12Pr[maxi​Xi​>T]=21​ (a median of max⁡iXi\max_i X_imaxi​Xi​) already achieves the factor 222 (doi:10.1214/aop/1176993223).
  • 2012: Kleinberg and Weinberg, introducing the matroid prophet inequality, give in §3.1 a second single-threshold rule, with threshold T=E[max⁡iXi]/2T = \mathbb E[\max_i X_i]/2T=E[maxi​Xi​]/2, and a half-page proof that it earns at least TTT. This rule and its analysis are the rank-one case of their matroid algorithm.

This mission formalizes that §3.1 result.

Setting

Let (Ω,F,P)(\Omega, \mathcal F, \mathbb P)(Ω,F,P) be a probability space and n≥1n \ge 1n≥1. Let X1,…,XnX_1, \dots, X_nX1​,…,Xn​ be real random variables on Ω\OmegaΩ that are independent (as a family), non-negative, and such that the prophet's value max⁡iXi\max_i X_imaxi​Xi​ has finite expectation. Define

T=12 E[max⁡iXi],p=Pr⁡[max⁡iXi≥T].T = \tfrac12\,\mathbb E\big[\max_i X_i\big], \qquad p = \Pr\big[\max_i X_i \ge T\big].T=21​E[imax​Xi​],p=Pr[imax​Xi​≥T].

The single-threshold rule observes X1,X2,…X_1, X_2, \dotsX1​,X2​,… in order and stops at the first time τ\tauτ with Xτ≥TX_\tau \ge TXτ​≥T, collecting XτX_\tauXτ​. If no XiX_iXi​ reaches TTT, the rule accepts nothing and collects 000. Write XτX_\tauXτ​ for the amount collected; it equals Xτ(ω)(ω)X_{\tau(\omega)}(\omega)Xτ(ω)​(ω) on the event {max⁡iXi≥T}\{\max_i X_i \ge T\}{maxi​Xi​≥T}, which has probability ppp, and 000 off it.

In Lean the variables are X : Fin n → Ω → ℝ with [NeZero n]; max⁡iXi\max_i X_imaxi​Xi​ is maxX X, TTT is thr P X, ppp is stopProb P X, and XτX_\tauXτ​ is reward P X, all in the namespace MatroidProphetKW.RankOne.

Formalization targets

Goal: the half-mean threshold rule

E[Xτ]  ≥  T  =  12 E[max⁡iXi].\mathbb E[X_\tau] \;\ge\; T \;=\; \tfrac12\,\mathbb E\big[\max_i X_i\big].E[Xτ​]≥T=21​E[imax​Xi​].

This is inequality (1) for an explicit rule, which is stronger than (1)'s existence statement. The constant 12\tfrac1221​ is sharp, so the goal is stated with it.

Milestones (in the order the paper's argument uses them)

  1. Tail bound, for every x>Tx > Tx>T:
Pr⁡[Xτ>x]  ≥  (1−p)∑i=1nPr⁡[Xi>x].\Pr[X_\tau > x] \;\ge\; (1-p)\sum_{i=1}^n \Pr[X_i > x].Pr[Xτ​>x]≥(1−p)i=1∑n​Pr[Xi​>x].
  1. Comparison with the prophet's tail, for every x>Tx > Tx>T:
Pr⁡[Xτ>x]  ≥  (1−p) Pr⁡[max⁡iXi>x].\Pr[X_\tau > x] \;\ge\; (1-p)\,\Pr\big[\max_i X_i > x\big].Pr[Xτ​>x]≥(1−p)Pr[imax​Xi​>x].
  1. The prophet's upper tail:
∫T∞Pr⁡[max⁡iXi>x] dx  ≥  T.\int_T^\infty \Pr\big[\max_i X_i > x\big]\,dx \;\ge\; T.∫T∞​Pr[imax​Xi​>x]dx≥T.
  1. The gambler's lower tail:
∫0TPr⁡[Xτ>x] dx  ≥  pT.\int_0^T \Pr[X_\tau > x]\,dx \;\ge\; pT.∫0T​Pr[Xτ​>x]dx≥pT.

Significance

The result. A threshold that depends on the distributions only through one number, E[max⁡iXi]\mathbb E[\max_i X_i]E[maxi​Xi​], already matches the optimal worst-case guarantee of the best stopping rule. Because it is a single price, the rule translates directly into a posted-price mechanism: a seller who posts the price TTT to arriving buyers obtains half of the expected maximum value. The same accounting, in which accepted value is charged against the threshold and rejected value against the probability of having accepted nothing, is what Kleinberg and Weinberg generalize to matroids (missions 1 and 2 of this series).

Formalizing it. The result is proved and classical; the work here is to formalize its known proof. No machine-checked proof of the factor-2 prophet inequality is in Mathlib, and none was found among the platform's published theorems in October 2026. A completed development provides the inequality itself, the tail comparisons, and the layer-cake bookkeeping for a stopped reward, all of which are reusable for other single-threshold prophet inequalities (Samuel-Cahn's median rule, kkk-choice and posted-price variants).

Difficulty

The expected reward of the rule is not a function of the marginals of the individual XiX_iXi​ alone in an obvious way: the event that the rule is still running when XiX_iXi​ arrives depends on X1,…,Xi−1X_1, \dots, X_{i-1}X1​,…,Xi−1​, and the reward is XτX_\tauXτ​ at a random index. The natural first attempt, comparing XτX_\tauXτ​ and max⁡iXi\max_i X_imaxi​Xi​ pointwise, fails, since on a given outcome the rule may stop early at a value just above TTT while the maximum comes later. The comparison has to be made between distributions, at each level xxx, and it has to use independence to decouple "nothing accepted before time iii" from "Xi>xX_i > xXi​>x". The rest is measure-theoretic bookkeeping that is routine on paper and not routine in Lean: expressing expectations of non-negative variables as integrals of tail probabilities, splitting them at TTT, and keeping track of integrability.

Formalization scope

  • Probability space. Ω with a MeasurableSpace, P : Measure Ω with [IsProbabilityMeasure P].
  • Variables. X : Fin n → Ω → ℝ, [NeZero n]; each X i measurable; iIndepFun X P (mutual independence); 0 ≤ X i ω for all i, ω; Integrable (maxX X) P, which is the paper's E[max⁡iXi]<∞\mathbb E[\max_i X_i] < \inftyE[maxi​Xi​]<∞.
  • Maximum. Finset.sup' over the nonempty index set; no junk supremum.
  • Expectations and probabilities. Bochner integrals (∫ ω, … ∂P) and Measure.real probabilities. Tail integrals are Lebesgue integrals of x↦Pr⁡[⋅>x]x \mapsto \Pr[\cdot > x]x↦Pr[⋅>x] over (T,∞)(T, \infty)(T,∞) and (0,T](0, T](0,T].
  • Weak and strict inequalities are as printed: the rule stops at Xτ≥TX_\tau \ge TXτ​≥T, p=Pr⁡[max⁡iXi≥T]p = \Pr[\max_i X_i \ge T]p=Pr[maxi​Xi​≥T], tails are Pr⁡[⋅>x]\Pr[\cdot > x]Pr[⋅>x], for x>Tx > Tx>T.
  • The rule may accept nothing. The reward is 000 when no value reaches TTT; the rule is not forced to stop at XnX_nXn​.

The threshold TTT is a definition, E[max⁡iXi]/2\mathbb E[\max_i X_i]/2E[maxi​Xi​]/2, not a free parameter constrained by hypotheses; a formalization in which TTT is arbitrary and the upper-tail bound is assumed would make the goal a rearrangement of its hypotheses, and is ruled out.

Infrastructure that a complete development needs, and that is welcome as separate contributions: the layer-cake formula E[Y]=∫0∞Pr⁡[Y>x] dx\mathbb E[Y] = \int_0^\infty \Pr[Y > x]\,dxE[Y]=∫0∞​Pr[Y>x]dx for non-negative integrable YYY split at a level TTT (Mathlib has the unsplit form, MeasureTheory.integral_eq_integral_meas_lt); measurability and integrability of the stopped reward (it is dominated by max⁡iXi\max_i X_imaxi​Xi​); and the probability of the event "the first i−1i-1i−1 values are below TTT and Xi>xX_i > xXi​>x" as a product under iIndepFun.

Selected references

  • Robert Kleinberg and S. Matthew Weinberg, Matroid Prophet Inequalities, STOC 2012, pp. 123–136; preprint arXiv:1201.4764v1, 2012. https://arxiv.org/abs/1201.4764 (doi:10.1145/2213977.2213991)
  • Ulrich Krengel and Louis Sucheston, Semiamarts and finite values, Bulletin of the American Mathematical Society 83, 1977, pp. 745–747.
  • Ulrich Krengel and Louis Sucheston, On semiamarts, amarts, and processes with finite value, Advances in Probability and Related Topics 4, 1978, pp. 197–266.
  • Ester Samuel-Cahn, Comparison of threshold stop rules and maximum for independent nonnegative random variables, Annals of Probability 12(4), 1984, pp. 1213–1216. https://doi.org/10.1214/aop/1176993223
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