Centralized and Competitive Inventory Models with Demand Substitution 1: The Competitive Substitution Game Has a Nash Equilibrium, Unique and Globally Stable When Substitution Rates Sum Below OneResearch Paper
Motivation
A retailer that carries several substitutable products, such as brands of the same item or sizes of the same garment, must choose stock levels before demand is known. When a product runs out, some of its customers buy another product instead. Inventory models with this demand substitution go back to McGillivray and Silver (1978, INFOR 16(1)) and Parlar and Goyal (1984). When the products are run by different firms, each firm's stock affects the demand its competitors see, and stocking becomes a game. Parlar (1988) proved existence and uniqueness of the equilibrium for two products; Lippman and McCardle (1997) treated a symmetric version of the game with an arbitrary number of firms.
Netessine and Rudi (SSRN 303779, working paper 2002; journal version in Operations Research 51(2), 2003) treat products with a general joint demand distribution and general prices and costs, under both centralized and competitive management. This mission formalizes their analysis of the competitive game (§2.2): the first-order characterization of its Nash equilibria (Proposition 3) and the existence, uniqueness and global stability of the equilibrium (Proposition 4).
Setting
There are products, indexed , sold in a single period. Product is stocked at units at unit cost , sold at unit price , and leftovers are salvaged at , with . Write (underage cost) and (overage cost).
The first-choice demand is a random vector with a known continuous joint distribution with positive support. A fraction of the customers who want product and find it out of stock buy product instead, with and for every ; a customer whose second choice is also out of stock is lost. The effective demand for product is
which depends on the other products' stocks but not on .
In the competitive model, firm chooses and earns the expected profit
A best response of firm to is a stock maximizing , and a Nash equilibrium is a stock vector from which no firm gains by deviating.
Formalization targets
Goal: Proposition 4
A Nash equilibrium exists, the equilibria are exactly the nonnegative solutions of the first-order conditions
and if either for all or for all , the equilibrium is unique and globally stable: every sequence of simultaneous best responses started at any nonnegative stock vector converges to .
Milestones
- The derivative (p. 8).
- Concavity of in (p. 8).
- Proposition 3: a nonnegative stock vector is a Nash equilibrium if and only if it satisfies (10) (p. 8).
- Each best response is unique and is characterized by (10) (proof of Proposition 4, p. 9).
- The best response of firm is nonincreasing in the rivals' stocks, with slope in at most in absolute value (p. 9).
- The simultaneous best-response map is Lipschitz with constant in the one-norm and in the infinity-norm (p. 9).
Significance
Proposition 4 makes the competitive equilibrium a well-defined object: a single stock vector, characterized by (10), which can be compared with the centralized optimum (the paper's Proposition 6) and which best-response adjustment reaches from any starting point. Without uniqueness, comparative statements about "the" competitive stocking level would be about an arbitrary selection.
The paper's argument has two gaps that this mission makes explicit. The proof asserts that best responses are single-valued because each profit is concave, and differentiates the best response using a density of ; the bound on the Jacobian is then stated in derivative form. The formal statements replace the derivative bounds by difference (Lipschitz) bounds, which need no differentiability, and state the positivity of the density on which single-valuedness rests. The paper also proves existence by citation to Lippman and McCardle; here existence is part of the goal. No machine-checked proof of these results is known.
Difficulty
The obvious route differentiates the best response implicitly, as the paper does. That requires to have a continuous, positive density at the equilibrium quantile, which is not a consequence of a continuous joint law: is a piecewise-linear function of , and its distribution function may have kinks. A second point is that concavity of alone does not make the best response unique: a demand law whose support has a gap gives a flat stretch and an interval of maximizers. Global stability must hold for every sequence of best responses, not for the iterates of one selected best-response function. Finally, the probabilities in (10) use strict inequalities, and their identification with uses that has no atoms, which needs a measure-theoretic argument about under an absolutely continuous law.
Formalization scope
Products are indexed by Fin n (0-based). The model data and the standing assumptions , , and are fields of a structure Model n. a i j is the share of 's unmet demand going to , so uses a j i. The demand law is a probability measure on that is absolutely continuous with respect to Lebesgue measure, gives every coordinate a positive value almost surely, and has integrable coordinates; this is the reading of "a known continuous multivariate demand distribution with positive support". Expectations are Bochner integrals and probabilities are μ.real of events, with the strict and weak inequalities as printed.
The stocks range over , with no upper bound. A best response maximizes over ; a Nash equilibrium is defined by the absence of a profitable deviation, not by (10). Defining equilibria by (10) would make Proposition 3 and half of Proposition 4 true by definition, and is ruled out.
One hypothesis is added beyond the page and disclosed in every statement that uses it: has a Lebesgue density that is strictly positive on the open positive orthant. It is used for single-valued best responses, the slope and contraction bounds, and the goal; the derivative, concavity and Proposition 3 do not use it. In the goal, the second branch of the uniqueness condition, for all , coincides with the standing assumption of §2, so uniqueness always applies within the model; the disjunction is kept as printed. The paper's proof attaches the one-norm bound to the first branch, which is a column-sum condition on ; both branches are true, with the one-norm used for row sums and the infinity-norm for column sums.
A complete development needs: differentiation under the integral sign for piecewise-linear integrands, the absence of atoms of under an absolutely continuous law, quantiles of strictly increasing continuous distribution functions, and the Banach fixed-point theorem on the closed nonnegative orthant (Mathlib's ContractingWith). The first two are reusable for every newsvendor model with substitution. Proofs of the milestones in any order are welcome.
Selected references
- S. Netessine and N. Rudi, Centralized and Competitive Inventory Models with Demand Substitution, Simon School Working Paper OP 02-01, University of Rochester, April 2002, SSRN 303779. https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.303779
- S. Netessine and N. Rudi, Centralized and Competitive Inventory Models with Demand Substitution, Operations Research 51(2):329–335, 2003. https://doi.org/10.1287/opre.51.2.329.12788
- S. A. Lippman and K. F. McCardle, The Competitive Newsboy, Operations Research 45(1):54–65, 1997. https://doi.org/10.1287/opre.45.1.54
- M. Parlar, Game Theoretic Analysis of the Substitutable Product Inventory Problem with Random Demands, Naval Research Logistics 35(3):397–409, 1988.
- A. R. McGillivray and E. A. Silver, Some Concepts for Inventory Control under Substitutable Demand, INFOR 16(1):47–63, 1978.
- M. Parlar and S. K. Goyal, Optimal Ordering Decisions for Two Substitutable Products with Stochastic Demand, OPSEARCH 21(1):1–15, 1984.
- R. A. Horn and C. R. Johnson, Matrix Analysis, Cambridge University Press, 1985 (Theorem 5.6.9).