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Operations Research

2,338 missions · 1,112 completed

The discipline of applying mathematical analysis to complex decision problems in operations: allocating scarce resources, scheduling, routing, inventory, and the design of service and production systems. Drawing on mathematical programming, stochastic modeling, queueing, simulation, and game-theoretic reasoning, it seeks policies that perform provably well in systems shaped by constraints, congestion, and uncertainty.

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Optimization·Captain: mikedeng1

Theoretical and Numerical Comparison of Relaxation Methods for Mathematical Programs with Complementarity Constraints 1: Scholtes Relaxation Limits Are C-Stationary under MPEC-MFCQResearch Paper

Motivation

A mathematical program with complementarity constraints (MPCC, also called MPEC, mathematical program with equilibrium constraints) is a nonlinear optimization problem in which some pairs of constraint functions must be nonnegative with at least one of each pair equal to zero. Such constraints model equilibria inside an optimization problem: bilevel programs whose lower level is replaced by its optimality conditions, Stackelberg games, traffic and electricity market equilibria, contact problems in mechanics. See Luo, Pang and Ralph, Mathematical Programs with Equilibrium Constraints (Cambridge University Press, 1996), doi:10.1017/CBO9780511983658.

The complementarity constraints make the standard theory fail. At every feasible point the Mangasarian–Fromovitz constraint qualification is violated, so the Karush–Kuhn–Tucker conditions are not necessary for optimality, and standard NLP solvers lose their convergence guarantees. A common remedy is relaxation: replace the MPEC by a family of ordinary nonlinear programs depending on a parameter t>0t>0t>0, solve them for t↓0t\downarrow0t↓0, and study the limits of their stationary points.

The first relaxation scheme, and the reference point for all later ones, is due to Scholtes (Convergence properties of a regularization scheme for mathematical programs with complementarity constraints, SIAM J. Optim. 11 (2001), doi:10.1137/S1052623499361233). Scholtes showed that limits of stationary points of the relaxed programs are C-stationary when MPEC-LICQ holds at the limit. Hoheisel, Kanzow and Schwartz (Preprint 299, University of Würzburg, 2010; later Math. Program. 137 (2013), doi:10.1007/s10107-011-0488-5) compare five relaxation schemes and weaken the constraint qualification in each convergence theorem. For Scholtes' scheme, their Theorem 3.1 replaces MPEC-LICQ by the weaker MPEC-MFCQ. This mission formalizes that theorem.

Setting

The MPEC (1) is

min⁡f(x)  s.t.  gi(x)≤0 (i≤m),  hi(x)=0 (i≤p),  Gi(x)≥0,  Hi(x)≥0,  Gi(x)Hi(x)=0 (i≤l),\min f(x)\ \ \text{s.t.}\ \ g_i(x)\le0\ (i\le m),\ \ h_i(x)=0\ (i\le p),\ \ G_i(x)\ge0,\ \ H_i(x)\ge0,\ \ G_i(x)H_i(x)=0\ (i\le l),minf(x)  s.t.  gi​(x)≤0 (i≤m),  hi​(x)=0 (i≤p),  Gi​(x)≥0,  Hi​(x)≥0,  Gi​(x)Hi​(x)=0 (i≤l),

with continuously differentiable f,gi,hi,Gi,Hi:Rn→Rf,g_i,h_i,G_i,H_i:\mathbb R^n\to\mathbb Rf,gi​,hi​,Gi​,Hi​:Rn→R and feasible set XXX. For a point x∗x^*x∗ the paper uses the index sets Ig={i∣gi(x∗)=0}I_g=\{i\mid g_i(x^*)=0\}Ig​={i∣gi​(x∗)=0}, I0+={i∣Gi(x∗)=0<Hi(x∗)}I_{0+}=\{i\mid G_i(x^*)=0<H_i(x^*)\}I0+​={i∣Gi​(x∗)=0<Hi​(x∗)}, I00={i∣Gi(x∗)=Hi(x∗)=0}I_{00}=\{i\mid G_i(x^*)=H_i(x^*)=0\}I00​={i∣Gi​(x∗)=Hi​(x∗)=0} and I+0={i∣Gi(x∗)>0=Hi(x∗)}I_{+0}=\{i\mid G_i(x^*)>0=H_i(x^*)\}I+0​={i∣Gi​(x∗)>0=Hi​(x∗)}.

A standard nonlinear program has constraints gi≤0g_i\le0gi​≤0, hj=0h_j=0hj​=0. Its point xxx satisfies the Mangasarian–Fromovitz constraint qualification (MFCQ) if the gradients ∇hj(x)\nabla h_j(x)∇hj​(x) are linearly independent and some direction ddd has ∇gi(x)Td<0\nabla g_i(x)^Td<0∇gi​(x)Td<0 for all active iii and ∇hj(x)Td=0\nabla h_j(x)^Td=0∇hj​(x)Td=0 for all jjj. A stationary point is the xxx-part of a KKT point: xxx is feasible and there are λ≥0\lambda\ge0λ≥0, μ\muμ with λigi(x)=0\lambda_ig_i(x)=0λi​gi​(x)=0 and ∇f(x)+∑λi∇gi(x)+∑μj∇hj(x)=0\nabla f(x)+\sum\lambda_i\nabla g_i(x)+\sum\mu_j\nabla h_j(x)=0∇f(x)+∑λi​∇gi​(x)+∑μj​∇hj​(x)=0.

The tightened program TNLP(x∗)(x^*)(x∗) keeps gi≤0g_i\le0gi​≤0, hi=0h_i=0hi​=0 and imposes Gi=0, Hi≥0G_i=0,\ H_i\ge0Gi​=0, Hi​≥0 on I0+I_{0+}I0+​, Gi≥0, Hi=0G_i\ge0,\ H_i=0Gi​≥0, Hi​=0 on I+0I_{+0}I+0​, and Gi=Hi=0G_i=H_i=0Gi​=Hi​=0 on I00I_{00}I00​. MPEC-MFCQ holds at x∗x^*x∗ if MFCQ holds at x∗x^*x∗ for TNLP(x∗)(x^*)(x∗).

A feasible x∗x^*x∗ is weakly stationary if there are multipliers λ∈Rm\lambda\in\mathbb R^mλ∈Rm, μ∈Rp\mu\in\mathbb R^pμ∈Rp, γ,ν∈Rl\gamma,\nu\in\mathbb R^lγ,ν∈Rl with

∇f(x∗)+∑i=1mλi∇gi(x∗)+∑i=1pμi∇hi(x∗)−∑i=1lγi∇Gi(x∗)−∑i=1lνi∇Hi(x∗)=0,\nabla f(x^*)+\sum_{i=1}^m\lambda_i\nabla g_i(x^*)+\sum_{i=1}^p\mu_i\nabla h_i(x^*)-\sum_{i=1}^l\gamma_i\nabla G_i(x^*)-\sum_{i=1}^l\nu_i\nabla H_i(x^*)=0,∇f(x∗)+i=1∑m​λi​∇gi​(x∗)+i=1∑p​μi​∇hi​(x∗)−i=1∑l​γi​∇Gi​(x∗)−i=1∑l​νi​∇Hi​(x∗)=0,

λ≥0\lambda\ge0λ≥0, λigi(x∗)=0\lambda_ig_i(x^*)=0λi​gi​(x∗)=0, γi=0\gamma_i=0γi​=0 on I+0I_{+0}I+0​ and νi=0\nu_i=0νi​=0 on I0+I_{0+}I0+​. It is C-stationary if such multipliers can be chosen with, in addition, γiνi≥0\gamma_i\nu_i\ge0γi​νi​≥0 for all i∈I00i\in I_{00}i∈I00​.

Scholtes' relaxed program RS(t)R^S(t)RS(t) replaces Gi(x)Hi(x)=0G_i(x)H_i(x)=0Gi​(x)Hi​(x)=0 by Gi(x)Hi(x)≤tG_i(x)H_i(x)\le tGi​(x)Hi​(x)≤t and keeps all other constraints of (1). The notation {tk}↓0\{t_k\}\downarrow0{tk​}↓0 means a sequence of positive parameters decreasing to 000.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 3.1

Let {tk}↓0\{t_k\}\downarrow0{tk​}↓0, let xkx^kxk be a stationary point of RS(tk)R^S(t_k)RS(tk​), and let xk→x∗x^k\to x^*xk→x∗ with MPEC-MFCQ at x∗x^*x∗. Then

x∗ is a C-stationary point of the MPEC (1).x^*\ \text{is a C-stationary point of the MPEC (1).}x∗ is a C-stationary point of the MPEC (1).

No feasibility of x∗x^*x∗ is assumed; it is part of the conclusion.

Milestones

  1. Remark 2.2: for a feasible point of a standard NLP, MFCQ holds if and only if the active inequality gradients together with all equality gradients are positive-linearly independent.
  2. §2.2, pp. 6–7: MPEC-MFCQ written out explicitly, i.e. linear independence of ∇hi\nabla h_i∇hi​, ∇Gi\nabla G_i∇Gi​ (I00∪I0+I_{00}\cup I_{0+}I00​∪I0+​) and ∇Hi\nabla H_i∇Hi​ (I00∪I+0I_{00}\cup I_{+0}I00​∪I+0​), plus a direction ddd.
  3. Proof of Theorem 3.2, p. 11: MPEC-MFCQ implies positive-linear independence of {∇gi(x∗)}Ig∪{{∇hi}∪{∇Gi}I00∪I0+∪{∇Hi}I00∪I+0}\{\nabla g_i(x^*)\}_{I_g}\cup\{\{\nabla h_i\}\cup\{\nabla G_i\}_{I_{00}\cup I_{0+}}\cup\{\nabla H_i\}_{I_{00}\cup I_{+0}}\}{∇gi​(x∗)}Ig​​∪{{∇hi​}∪{∇Gi​}I00​∪I0+​​∪{∇Hi​}I00​∪I+0​​}.
  4. Proof of Theorem 3.1, p. 9: for large kkk, Ig(xk)⊆IgI_g(x^k)\subseteq I_gIg​(xk)⊆Ig​, IG(xk)⊆I00∪I0+I_G(x^k)\subseteq I_{00}\cup I_{0+}IG​(xk)⊆I00​∪I0+​, IH(xk)⊆I00∪I+0I_H(x^k)\subseteq I_{00}\cup I_{+0}IH​(xk)⊆I00​∪I+0​.
  5. Proof of Theorem 3.1, pp. 10–11: under the goal's hypotheses, x∗x^*x∗ is weakly stationary.

Significance

Theorem 3.1 says that Scholtes' scheme, run to the limit, produces C-stationary points under a constraint qualification strictly weaker than the one in Scholtes' original result. MPEC-MFCQ is the natural assumption here: under it the KKT multipliers of the relaxed programs need not converge, and the theorem shows that a convergent subsequence of suitably modified multipliers still exists. The result is the first of a family of convergence theorems in the paper (the schemes of Lin–Fukushima, Kadrani–Dussault–Benchakroun and Steffensen–Ulbrich follow the same pattern) and the baseline against which those schemes are compared.

The theorem is proved in the paper; it is not open. To the extent a search of the Prove2Me catalog shows, no MPEC stationarity concept, MPEC constraint qualification or relaxation result has been formalized there, and Mathlib has no theory of constraint qualifications for nonlinear programs. The mission produces a machine-checked proof of Theorem 3.1 and, along the way, reusable statements of Definition 2.1, MFCQ, KKT points and the MFCQ/positive-linear-independence equivalence for general nonlinear programs.

Difficulty

The obvious argument takes a limit of the KKT multipliers of RS(tk)R^S(t_k)RS(tk​). That fails twice. First, under MPEC-MFCQ the multiplier sequence need not be bounded, so there may be nothing to take a limit of; boundedness has to be recovered from MPEC-MFCQ through positive-linear independence, a theorem of the alternative. Second, the multiplier δk\delta^kδk of the product constraint GiHi≤tkG_iH_i\le t_kGi​Hi​≤tk​ multiplies Hi∇Gi+Gi∇HiH_i\nabla G_i+G_i\nabla H_iHi​∇Gi​+Gi​∇Hi​, which is not a multiplier of ∇Gi\nabla G_i∇Gi​ or ∇Hi\nabla H_i∇Hi​ alone; how it is redistributed depends on whether iii lies in I0+I_{0+}I0+​, I+0I_{+0}I+0​ or I00I_{00}I00​, and the sign condition on I00I_{00}I00​ comes from the support disjointness between δk\delta^kδk and the multipliers of Gi≥0G_i\ge0Gi​≥0, Hi≥0H_i\ge0Hi​≥0, which uses tk>0t_k>0tk​>0. Compactness, index-set bookkeeping along a subsequence and continuity of all gradients have to be combined.

Formalization scope

  • Rn\mathbb R^nRn is EuclideanSpace ℝ (Fin n), gradients are Mathlib's gradient, and ∇g(x)Td\nabla g(x)^Td∇g(x)Td is the inner product. Constraint indices are Fin m, Fin p, Fin l (0-based); m,p,lm,p,lm,p,l may be 000.
  • The paper's standing assumption that all data are continuously differentiable (p. 1) is the explicit hypothesis P.IsC1 (ContDiff ℝ 1 for each function) of the goal and of milestones 4 and 5. Milestones 1–3 are pointwise linear algebra and assume no smoothness.
  • "Stationary point of RS(tk)R^S(t_k)RS(tk​)" is a KKT point of RS(tk)R^S(t_k)RS(tk​) viewed as a standard NLP with inequality constraints gi≤0g_i\le0gi​≤0, −Gi≤0-G_i\le0−Gi​≤0, −Hi≤0-H_i\le0−Hi​≤0, GiHi−t≤0G_iH_i-t\le0Gi​Hi​−t≤0: feasibility, nonnegative multipliers and complementary slackness are included (p. 5).
  • "{tk}↓0\{t_k\}\downarrow0{tk​}↓0" is tk>0t_k>0tk​>0 for all kkk, (tk)(t_k)(tk​) nonincreasing, and tk→0t_k\to0tk​→0.
  • Families of gradients are indexed families (repeated vectors count as dependent); in MPEC-MFCQ an index of I00I_{00}I00​ contributes both ∇Gi\nabla G_i∇Gi​ and ∇Hi\nabla H_i∇Hi​. TNLP(x∗)(x^*)(x∗) has constraints indexed by subtypes of the index sets; absent constraints are not padded by zero functions, which would make MPEC-MFCQ fail everywhere.
  • Definition 2.3(a) is printed with two misprints ("μihi(x∗)\mu_ih_i(x^*)μi​hi​(x∗)", "i=1,…,li=1,\dots,li=1,…,l" for the complementarity of λ\lambdaλ); the formalization uses μi∇hi(x∗)\mu_i\nabla h_i(x^*)μi​∇hi​(x∗) and i=1,…,mi=1,\dots,mi=1,…,m. C-stationarity requires feasibility and one multiplier tuple satisfying both the weak-stationarity conditions and the sign condition on I00I_{00}I00​.
  • A "stationary point" that is merely a feasible point or a critical point of fff, or a C-stationarity whose sign condition refers to multipliers other than those of the weak-stationarity equation, would make the goal false or empty; neither reading is used. The hypotheses of the goal are jointly satisfiable (checked on the paper's Example 3.6 instance).
  • Infrastructure needed: theorems of the alternative (Motzkin/Farkas) for finite families in Rn\mathbb R^nRn, compactness of normalised multiplier sequences, continuity of gradients of C1C^1C1 maps. The NLP layer (positive-linear dependence, MFCQ, KKT points, Remark 2.2) is reusable for any constraint-qualification development. Contributions of proofs of the milestones, of general NLP lemmas, and of the goal are welcome.

Selected references

  • T. Hoheisel, C. Kanzow, A. Schwartz, Theoretical and numerical comparison of relaxation methods for mathematical programs with complementarity constraints, Preprint 299, Institute of Mathematics, University of Würzburg, September 2010; published in Math. Program. 137 (2013) 257–288. doi:10.1007/s10107-011-0488-5
  • S. Scholtes, Convergence properties of a regularization scheme for mathematical programs with complementarity constraints, SIAM J. Optim. 11 (2001) 918–936. doi:10.1137/S1052623499361233
  • Z.-Q. Luo, J.-S. Pang, D. Ralph, Mathematical Programs with Equilibrium Constraints, Cambridge University Press, 1996. doi:10.1017/CBO9780511983658
9 thms1 active userReviewed
AnalysisProbabilityStochastic Systems·Captain: mikedeng1

Law of Large Numbers Limits for Many-Server Queues 1: The Fluid Equations Have at Most One Solution, Given Explicitly by the Age Representation (3.11)Research Paper

Motivation

Large service systems such as call centers and hospital wards are modelled as many-server queues: NNN identical servers, customers arriving according to a general process, service requirements drawn independently from a general distribution GGG, and a single first-come-first-served queue. When GGG is not exponential the number of customers in system is not Markov, and a tractable state must keep track of how long each customer in service has been served. Kaspi and Ramanan (Ann. Appl. Probab. 21 (2011)) take as state the number in system together with the age measure, the point measure of the ages of the customers in service, and prove a functional law of large numbers: scaled by NNN, these processes converge to the unique solution of a deterministic system, the fluid equations. Earlier fluid and diffusion analyses of the G/GI/NG/GI/NG/GI/N queue worked with other state descriptors (Reed, Ann. Appl. Probab. 19 (2009); Whitt, Oper. Res. 54 (2006)); the measure-valued description records the elapsed service time of every customer in service, which is the information a non-exponential service distribution requires.

This mission covers the deterministic half of that result: the fluid equations are well posed, and their solution is given in closed form.

Setting

Service requirements have a density ggg that vanishes on (−∞,0)(-\infty,0)(−∞,0), G(x)=∫(−∞,x]gG(x)=\int_{(-\infty,x]}gG(x)=∫(−∞,x]​g, and the mean is normalized to one, ∫x g(x) dx=1\int x\,g(x)\,dx=1∫xg(x)dx=1. Let M=sup⁡{x≥0:G(x)<1}∈(0,∞]M=\sup\{x\ge0: G(x)<1\}\in(0,\infty]M=sup{x≥0:G(x)<1}∈(0,∞] and let h=g/(1−G)h=g/(1-G)h=g/(1−G) be the hazard rate on [0,M)[0,M)[0,M); hhh is locally integrable on [0,M)[0,M)[0,M) but not integrable on it. For a measure μ\muμ and a function fff write ⟨f,μ⟩=∫f dμ\langle f,\mu\rangle=\int f\,d\mu⟨f,μ⟩=∫fdμ, and 1\mathbf 11 for the constant one.

The data are a triple (Eˉ,Xˉ(0),νˉ0)(\bar E,\bar X(0),\bar\nu_0)(Eˉ,Xˉ(0),νˉ0​) in

S0={(f,x,μ):f nondecreasing caˋdlaˋg,f(0)=0; x≥0; μ a measure on [0,M), ⟨1,μ⟩≤1, 1−⟨1,μ⟩=[1−x]+},\mathcal S_0=\{(f,x,\mu): f \text{ nondecreasing càdlàg}, f(0)=0;\ x\ge0;\ \mu \text{ a measure on }[0,M),\ \langle\mathbf 1,\mu\rangle\le1,\ 1-\langle\mathbf 1,\mu\rangle=[1-x]^+\},S0​={(f,x,μ):f nondecreasing caˋdlaˋg,f(0)=0; x≥0; μ a measure on [0,M), ⟨1,μ⟩≤1, 1−⟨1,μ⟩=[1−x]+},

where Eˉ\bar EEˉ is the cumulative arrival process, Xˉ(0)\bar X(0)Xˉ(0) the initial number in system and νˉ0\bar\nu_0νˉ0​ the initial age measure (per server, so the total capacity is one). A càdlàg pair (Xˉ,νˉ)(\bar X,\bar\nu)(Xˉ,νˉ), with νˉt\bar\nu_tνˉt​ a sub-probability measure on [0,M)[0,M)[0,M) in the weak topology, solves the fluid equations if for every t≥0t\ge0t≥0: ∫0t⟨h,νˉs⟩ds<∞\int_0^t\langle h,\bar\nu_s\rangle ds<\infty∫0t​⟨h,νˉs​⟩ds<∞ (3.4); for every test function φ∈Cc1,1([0,M)×R+)\varphi\in\mathcal C_c^{1,1}([0,M)\times\mathbb R_+)φ∈Cc1,1​([0,M)×R+​)

⟨φ(⋅,t),νˉt⟩=⟨φ(⋅,0),νˉ0⟩+∫0t⟨φx+φs,νˉs⟩ds−∫0t⟨hφ(⋅,s),νˉs⟩ds+∫[0,t]φ(0,s) dKˉ(s)(3.5);\langle\varphi(\cdot,t),\bar\nu_t\rangle=\langle\varphi(\cdot,0),\bar\nu_0\rangle+\int_0^t\langle\varphi_x+\varphi_s,\bar\nu_s\rangle ds-\int_0^t\langle h\varphi(\cdot,s),\bar\nu_s\rangle ds+\int_{[0,t]}\varphi(0,s)\,d\bar K(s)\quad(3.5);⟨φ(⋅,t),νˉt​⟩=⟨φ(⋅,0),νˉ0​⟩+∫0t​⟨φx​+φs​,νˉs​⟩ds−∫0t​⟨hφ(⋅,s),νˉs​⟩ds+∫[0,t]​φ(0,s)dKˉ(s)(3.5);

Xˉ(t)=Xˉ(0)+Eˉ(t)−Dˉ(t)\bar X(t)=\bar X(0)+\bar E(t)-\bar D(t)Xˉ(t)=Xˉ(0)+Eˉ(t)−Dˉ(t) (3.6); and the nonidling condition 1−⟨1,νˉt⟩=[1−Xˉ(t)]+1-\langle\mathbf 1,\bar\nu_t\rangle=[1-\bar X(t)]^+1−⟨1,νˉt​⟩=[1−Xˉ(t)]+ (3.7). Here Dˉ(t)=∫0t⟨h,νˉs⟩ds\bar D(t)=\int_0^t\langle h,\bar\nu_s\rangle dsDˉ(t)=∫0t​⟨h,νˉs​⟩ds is the cumulative departure process and Kˉ(t)=⟨1,νˉt⟩−⟨1,νˉ0⟩+Dˉ(t)\bar K(t)=\langle\mathbf 1,\bar\nu_t\rangle-\langle\mathbf 1,\bar\nu_0\rangle+\bar D(t)Kˉ(t)=⟨1,νˉt​⟩−⟨1,νˉ0​⟩+Dˉ(t) the cumulative entry into service. Equation (3.5) is a weak form of a transport equation: mass moves to the right at unit speed, is killed at rate hhh, and enters at age 000 at rate dKˉd\bar KdKˉ.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 3.5

For every (Eˉ,Xˉ(0),νˉ0)∈S0(\bar E,\bar X(0),\bar\nu_0)\in\mathcal S_0(Eˉ,Xˉ(0),νˉ0​)∈S0​:

  1. the fluid equations have at most one solution;
  2. under (3.4) and the path conditions, (Xˉ,νˉ)(\bar X,\bar\nu)(Xˉ,νˉ) is a solution if and only if it satisfies (3.6), (3.7) and, for every bounded continuous fff and t≥0t\ge0t≥0,
⟨f,νˉt⟩=∫[0,M)f(x+t)1−G(x+t)1−G(x) νˉ0(dx)+∫[0,t]f(t−s)(1−G(t−s)) dKˉ(s);(3.11)\langle f,\bar\nu_t\rangle=\int_{[0,M)}f(x+t)\frac{1-G(x+t)}{1-G(x)}\,\bar\nu_0(dx)+\int_{[0,t]}f(t-s)\big(1-G(t-s)\big)\,d\bar K(s);\quad(3.11)⟨f,νˉt​⟩=∫[0,M)​f(x+t)1−G(x)1−G(x+t)​νˉ0​(dx)+∫[0,t]​f(t−s)(1−G(t−s))dKˉ(s);(3.11)
  1. if Eˉ\bar EEˉ has a density λˉ\bar\lambdaλˉ, then Kˉ\bar KKˉ has a density κˉ\bar\kappaκˉ equal a.e. to λˉ\bar\lambdaλˉ where Xˉ<1\bar X<1Xˉ<1, to λˉ∧⟨h,νˉt⟩\bar\lambda\wedge\langle h,\bar\nu_t\rangleλˉ∧⟨h,νˉt​⟩ where Xˉ=1\bar X=1Xˉ=1, and to ⟨h,νˉt⟩\langle h,\bar\nu_t\rangle⟨h,νˉt​⟩ where Xˉ>1\bar X>1Xˉ>1 (3.12);
  2. if moreover νˉ0\bar\nu_0νˉ0​ is absolutely continuous, so is every νˉt\bar\nu_tνˉt​.

Milestones

  • Remark 4.3, (4.4): integration by parts for the entry term of (4.3).
  • (4.55): the integrated hazard in closed form, ψh(x,t)=(1−G(x))/(1−G(x−t))\psi_h(x,t)=(1-G(x))/(1-G(x-t))ψh​(x,t)=(1−G(x))/(1−G(x−t)) or 1−G(x)1-G(x)1−G(x).
  • Theorem 4.1: for a Radon-measure-valued path satisfying the hazard bound (4.1), the age equation (4.2), which is (3.5) with an arbitrary Radon measure υ0\upsilon_0υ0​ and an arbitrary ZZZ of bounded variation in place of νˉ0\bar\nu_0νˉ0​ and Kˉ\bar KKˉ, holds if and only if the representation (4.3) holds.
  • Proof of Corollary 4.4: Kˉ\bar KKˉ is nondecreasing.
  • Corollary 4.4, (4.5): Kˉ(t)=⟨1,νˉt⟩−⟨1,νˉ0⟩+∫G(x+t)−G(x)1−G(x)νˉ0(dx)+∫0tg(t−s)Kˉ(s)ds\bar K(t)=\langle\mathbf 1,\bar\nu_t\rangle-\langle\mathbf 1,\bar\nu_0\rangle+\int\frac{G(x+t)-G(x)}{1-G(x)}\bar\nu_0(dx)+\int_0^tg(t-s)\bar K(s)dsKˉ(t)=⟨1,νˉt​⟩−⟨1,νˉ0​⟩+∫1−G(x)G(x+t)−G(x)​νˉ0​(dx)+∫0t​g(t−s)Kˉ(s)ds.
  • Lemma 4.5: ∥⟨f,νˉs2⟩−⟨f,νˉs1⟩∥T≤∥f∥M∣Δυ0∣TV+(2∥f∥T+∥f′∥T)∥ΔZ∥T\|\langle f,\bar\nu^2_s\rangle-\langle f,\bar\nu^1_s\rangle\|_T\le\|f\|_M|\Delta\upsilon_0|_{TV}+(2\|f\|_T+\|f'\|_T)\|\Delta Z\|_T∥⟨f,νˉs2​⟩−⟨f,νˉs1​⟩∥T​≤∥f∥M​∣Δυ0​∣TV​+(2∥f∥T​+∥f′∥T​)∥ΔZ∥T​.
  • Theorem 4.6: with equal initial measures, ∥ΔKˉ∥T∨∥ΔDˉ∥T≤∣ΔXˉ(0)∣+∥ΔEˉ∥T\|\Delta\bar K\|_T\vee\|\Delta\bar D\|_T\le|\Delta\bar X(0)|+\|\Delta\bar E\|_T∥ΔKˉ∥T​∨∥ΔDˉ∥T​≤∣ΔXˉ(0)∣+∥ΔEˉ∥T​, together with (4.8) and (4.10).

Significance

Uniqueness of the fluid solution is what turns tightness of the scaled NNN-server processes into convergence: every subsequential limit solves the fluid equations, so all coincide (the paper's Theorem 3.7). The representation (3.11) reduces the measure-valued equation to the scalar process Kˉ\bar KKˉ, and the continuity estimate of Theorem 4.6 says the fluid solution is a Lipschitz function of the arrival process. Both are used in the paper's study of long-time behaviour, where νˉt\bar\nu_tνˉt​ converges to the measure with density 1−G1-G1−G, and (3.12) is the form of the entry rate used there.

The results are proved in the paper. None of them, and no part of the measure-valued fluid model, has a machine-checked proof. Formalizing them produces a checked weak-solution theory for a transport equation with an unbounded killing rate and a measure-valued boundary input, which is a reusable piece of infrastructure for other age- and residual-time-based queueing models.

Difficulty

The central step is Theorem 4.1. The naive approach treats (4.2) as a first-order PDE and integrates along characteristics, but the solution is only a càdlàg path of measures, hhh is merely locally integrable and blows up near MMM, and ZZZ may jump, so classical characteristics are not available; the test functions must not vanish on the boundary x=0x=0x=0, since that is where the entry term lives. The second difficulty is in Theorem 4.6: the entry process Kˉ\bar KKˉ is defined implicitly through the nonidling condition, and comparing two solutions requires a first-crossing argument that distinguishes whether the system is below, at or above capacity at that time.

Formalization scope

The service law is its density ggg (ServiceLaw), with g=0g=0g=0 below 000, ∫g=1\int g=1∫g=1 and mean one. Time is R\mathbb RR read on [0,∞)[0,\infty)[0,∞); every condition is stated for t≥0t\ge0t≥0. Measures of the fluid model are FiniteMeasure ℝ carried by [0,M)[0,M)[0,M), whose topology is weak convergence, so càdlàg paths are càdlàg in MF[0,M)\mathcal M_F[0,M)MF​[0,M) with the weak topology. The paths of Theorem 4.1 and Lemma 4.5 are ℝ → Measure ℝ with values Radon on [0,M)[0,M)[0,M) (possibly infinite) and càdlàg in the vague topology. M∈[0,∞]M\in[0,\infty]M∈[0,∞] is an extended number. The integral in (3.4) is a lower integral in [0,∞][0,\infty][0,∞], and Dˉ\bar DDˉ, Kˉ\bar KKˉ are its real value. dKˉd\bar KdKˉ is the Lebesgue–Stieltjes measure of Kˉ\bar KKˉ, with no atom at 000. A function ZZZ of bounded variation is a difference Z1−Z2Z_1-Z_2Z1​−Z2​ of nondecreasing càdlàg functions vanishing at 000.

Explicit choices: compact support of test functions is relative to [0,M)×R+[0,M)\times\mathbb R_+[0,M)×R+​, so φ(0,s)\varphi(0,s)φ(0,s) need not vanish (with supports taken in R2\mathbb R^2R2 the entry term of (3.5) would vanish identically); νˉ(0)=νˉ0\bar\nu(0)=\bar\nu_0νˉ(0)=νˉ0​ and Xˉ(0)\bar X(0)Xˉ(0) equal to the datum are clauses of the fluid equations, but not of the age equation, where υ0\upsilon_0υ0​ is arbitrary; functions in Cb(R+)\mathcal C_b(\mathbb R_+)Cb​(R+​), Cc(R+)\mathcal C_c(\mathbb R_+)Cc​(R+​) and Cb1(R+)\mathcal C^1_b(\mathbb R_+)Cb1​(R+​) are represented by functions on R\mathbb RR of the same class, of which only values on [0,∞)[0,\infty)[0,∞) are read; norms in Lemma 4.5 are computed in [0,∞][0,\infty][0,∞], since ∣Δυ0∣TV|\Delta\upsilon_0|_{TV}∣Δυ0​∣TV​ may be infinite. Two printed statements are corrected: in Theorem 3.5 the paper's right-hand side of the equivalence lists (3.6) and (3.11); the nonidling condition (3.7), part of the fluid equations on the left, is kept on the right, as the proof requires. In (4.10), ΔXˉ(0)\Delta\bar X(0)ΔXˉ(0) is replaced by ∣ΔXˉ(0)∣|\Delta\bar X(0)|∣ΔXˉ(0)∣, which is what Lemma 4.5 and (4.9) give.

A fluid solution is defined by the weak transport equation (3.5), never by the representation (3.11) or by a formula for νˉ\bar\nuνˉ in terms of Kˉ\bar KKˉ; with such a definition the equivalence of the goal would be an unfolding of definitions.

A complete development needs Lebesgue–Stieltjes integration by parts for càdlàg functions of bounded variation, the Riesz description of the vague topology, and uniqueness for weak solutions of transport equations; these are reusable beyond this mission. Proofs of any milestone, and of the parts of Theorem 3.5 separately, are welcome. The paper's Section 4.3 machinery (the abstract and simplified age equations, Lemmas 4.12–4.13, Propositions 4.15–4.16) is not posed here and may be formalized as supporting lemmas.

Selected references

  • H. Kaspi and K. Ramanan, Law of large numbers limits for many-server queues, Ann. Appl. Probab. 21(1) (2011), 33–114. https://doi.org/10.1214/09-AAP662
  • J. Reed, The G/GI/N queue in the Halfin–Whitt regime, Ann. Appl. Probab. 19(6) (2009), 2211–2269. https://doi.org/10.1214/09-AAP609
  • W. Whitt, Fluid models for multiserver queues with abandonments, Oper. Res. 54(1) (2006), 37–54. https://doi.org/10.1287/opre.1050.0227
  • S. Asmussen, Applied Probability and Queues, 2nd ed., Springer, 2003. https://doi.org/10.1007/b97236
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OptimizationProbability·Captain: mikedeng1

Robust Dynamic Programming 3: The Worst-Case Expectation over a Chi-Square Ball Equals a Mean–Standard-Deviation DualResearch Paper

Motivation

Robust dynamic programming replaces the single transition law of a Markov decision process by a set of laws, and values a policy by its worst-case expected reward over that set. Iyengar (Robust dynamic programming, CORC Tech Report TR-2002-07, 2004; Math. Oper. Res. 30(2), 2005) and Nilim and El Ghaoui (Robust control of Markov decision processes with uncertain transition matrices, Oper. Res. 53(5), 2005) showed that under a rectangularity assumption the robust value satisfies a robust Bellman equation. Each step of that equation solves, for every state–action pair, an inner problem

inf⁡p∈P Ep[v],\inf_{p\in\mathcal P}\ \mathbf E^p[v],p∈Pinf​ Ep[v],

the worst-case expectation of a value vector vvv over the ambiguity set P\mathcal PP. Robust value iteration is only as practical as this inner problem is cheap.

The ambiguity sets of interest come from statistics: when transition probabilities are estimated from data, natural sets are confidence regions around the empirical distribution. Section 4 of Iyengar's report studies three such families: relative-entropy balls (Lemma 4), a χ² approximation of them (Lemma 5), and an L1L_1L1​ outer approximation (Lemma 6). This mission formalizes the χ² case. The relative-entropy case is already posed on the platform as RobustMDP.EntropyInner.kl_ball_inner_problem_dual (Nilim–El Ghaoui series), up to the sign change v→−vv\to -vv→−v.

Setting

Let S\mathcal SS be a finite set of states and let M(S)={p:S→R: p≥0, ∑sp(s)=1}\mathcal M(\mathcal S)=\{p:\mathcal S\to\mathbb R:\ p\ge 0,\ \sum_s p(s)=1\}M(S)={p:S→R: p≥0, ∑s​p(s)=1} be the probability measures on S\mathcal SS. For p∈M(S)p\in\mathcal M(\mathcal S)p∈M(S) and x:S→Rx:\mathcal S\to\mathbb Rx:S→R write

Ep[x]=∑sp(s)x(s),Varq[x]=∑sq(s)(x(s)−Eq[x])2.\mathbf E^p[x]=\sum_{s}p(s)x(s),\qquad \mathbf{Var}^q[x]=\sum_s q(s)\big(x(s)-\mathbf E^q[x]\big)^2 .Ep[x]=s∑​p(s)x(s),Varq[x]=s∑​q(s)(x(s)−Eq[x])2.

Fix a centre q∈M(S)q\in\mathcal M(\mathcal S)q∈M(S) with q(s)>0q(s)>0q(s)>0 for every sss (in the paper qqq is the empirical next-state distribution of one state–action pair) and a radius t≥0t\ge 0t≥0. The χ² set (46) is

P={p∈M(S): ∑s∈S(p(s)−q(s))2q(s)≤t}.\mathcal P=\Big\{p\in\mathcal M(\mathcal S):\ \sum_{s\in\mathcal S}\frac{(p(s)-q(s))^2}{q(s)}\le t\Big\}.P={p∈M(S): s∈S∑​q(s)(p(s)−q(s))2​≤t}.

Since log⁡(1+x)≤x\log(1+x)\le xlog(1+x)≤x, the relative entropy D(p∥q)=∑sp(s)log⁡(p(s)/q(s))D(p\|q)=\sum_s p(s)\log(p(s)/q(s))D(p∥q)=∑s​p(s)log(p(s)/q(s)) is at most the χ² distance, so P\mathcal PP lies inside the relative-entropy ball of radius ttt: it is a conservative approximation of it. The Lean development names these objects expect, variance, chiSqDist, chiSqSet, relEntropy and the dual objective dualObj q t v μ =Eq[v−μ]−t Varq[v−μ]=\mathbf E^q[v-\mu]-\sqrt{t\,\mathbf{Var}^q[v-\mu]}=Eq[v−μ]−tVarq[v−μ]​, all in the namespace RobustDP.ChiSquare.

Formalization targets

Goal: Lemma 5 (p. 18)

For every value vector v:S→Rv:\mathcal S\to\mathbb Rv:S→R,

min⁡p∈P Ep[v]  =  max⁡μ≥0{Eq[v−μ]−t Varq[v−μ]},\min_{p\in\mathcal P}\ \mathbf E^p[v]\;=\;\max_{\mu\ge 0}\Big\{\mathbf E^q[v-\mu]-\sqrt{t\,\mathbf{Var}^q[v-\mu]}\Big\},p∈Pmin​ Ep[v]=μ≥0max​{Eq[v−μ]−tVarq[v−μ]​},

where μ\muμ ranges over vectors μ:S→R\mu:\mathcal S\to\mathbb Rμ:S→R with μ≥0\mu\ge 0μ≥0 componentwise. Both extrema are attained. The lemma's complexity claim, O(∣S∣log⁡∣S∣)\mathcal O(|\mathcal S|\log|\mathcal S|)O(∣S∣log∣S∣) for (48), is a statement about an algorithm and is not part of the mission.

Milestones (the steps of the paper's proof)

  1. (49) With y=p−qy=p-qy=p−q, the value of the primal problem is Eq[v]\mathbf E^q[v]Eq[v] plus the minimum of ∑sy(s)v(s)\sum_s y(s)v(s)∑s​y(s)v(s) over ∑sy(s)2/q(s)≤t\sum_s y(s)^2/q(s)\le t∑s​y(s)2/q(s)≤t, ∑sy(s)=0\sum_s y(s)=0∑s​y(s)=0, y≥−qy\ge -qy≥−q.
  2. (50) For fixed multipliers μ\muμ and γ∈R\gamma\in\mathbb Rγ∈R, the minimum of the Lagrangian over the ellipsoid {y:∑sy(s)2/q(s)≤t}\{y:\sum_s y(s)^2/q(s)\le t\}{y:∑s​y(s)2/q(s)≤t} is Eq[v−μ]−t∑sq(s)(v(s)−μ(s)−γ)2\mathbf E^q[v-\mu]-\sqrt{t\sum_s q(s)(v(s)-\mu(s)-\gamma)^2}Eq[v−μ]−t∑s​q(s)(v(s)−μ(s)−γ)2​, attained at an explicit y∗y^*y∗.
  3. (51) Maximizing over γ\gammaγ replaces the sum of squares by Varq[v−μ]\mathbf{Var}^q[v-\mu]Varq[v−μ], attained at γ=Eq[v−μ]\gamma=\mathbf E^q[v-\mu]γ=Eq[v−μ].
  4. (52)–(53) Some optimal multiplier has the form μ∗(s)=(v(s)−α)+\mu^*(s)=(v(s)-\alpha)^+μ∗(s)=(v(s)−α)+ with α≥min⁡sv(s)\alpha\ge\min_s v(s)α≥mins​v(s), so the dual is a one-dimensional problem.

Two further results stand on the same definitions: the inequality D(p∥q)≤∑s(p(s)−q(s))2/q(s)D(p\|q)\le\sum_s(p(s)-q(s))^2/q(s)D(p∥q)≤∑s​(p(s)−q(s))2/q(s) of Section 4.2, and the L1L_1L1​ analogue of Lemma 5 established in the proof of Lemma 6 (p. 20):

min⁡p∈M(S)∥p−q∥1≤cEp[v]=max⁡μ≥0{Eq[v−μ]−12c(max⁡s(v−μ)(s)−min⁡s(v−μ)(s))},c=2ln⁡(2) t.\min_{\substack{p\in\mathcal M(\mathcal S)\\ \|p-q\|_1\le c}}\mathbf E^p[v]=\max_{\mu\ge0}\Big\{\mathbf E^q[v-\mu]-\tfrac12 c\big(\max_s(v-\mu)(s)-\min_s(v-\mu)(s)\big)\Big\},\qquad c=\sqrt{2\ln(2)\,t}.p∈M(S)∥p−q∥1​≤c​min​Ep[v]=μ≥0max​{Eq[v−μ]−21​c(smax​(v−μ)(s)−smin​(v−μ)(s))},c=2ln(2)t​.

Significance

The result. Lemma 5 reduces a worst-case expectation over a curved convex set of probability vectors to a concave problem in one scalar, which the paper solves by sorting. This makes robust value iteration with χ² ambiguity sets about as expensive as nominal value iteration, up to a logarithmic factor. The identity also explains the shape of the answer: a mean minus a standard-deviation penalty, applied to a value vector truncated from above at the level α\alphaα. The truncation comes from the constraint p≥0p\ge 0p≥0.

Formalizing it. The result is proved in the paper; no machine-checked proof is known. A complete formalization gives a verified finite-dimensional duality theorem for a quadratic constraint combined with polyhedral constraints, which is the computational core of χ²-ambiguity robust MDPs and of χ²-divergence distributionally robust optimization in general. Lemma 6's printed formula (57) is false (see below); the mission poses the corrected identity that the paper's proof establishes.

Difficulty

The obvious argument drops the constraint p≥0p\ge 0p≥0. Without it, the minimum of the linear function Ep[v]\mathbf E^p[v]Ep[v] over the ellipsoid {∑sp(s)=1, χ2(p,q)≤t}\{\sum_s p(s)=1,\ \chi^2(p,q)\le t\}{∑s​p(s)=1, χ2(p,q)≤t} follows from Cauchy–Schwarz and equals Eq[v]−t Varq[v]\mathbf E^q[v]-\sqrt{t\,\mathbf{Var}^q[v]}Eq[v]−tVarq[v]​. The page notes (p. 19) that earlier work solved only this relaxed problem. With p≥0p\ge 0p≥0 the minimizer of the relaxation can leave the simplex, so the problem has an ellipsoidal constraint, a polyhedral constraint and an equality at once. The multiplier μ\muμ of p≥0p\ge 0p≥0 is what Lemma 5 has to handle. Equality of the primal minimum with the dual supremum needs a duality theorem that is not in Mathlib in this form. Attainment of the dual maximum over the unbounded cone μ≥0\mu\ge 0μ≥0 needs an additional argument, namely that an optimal multiplier has the truncation form (53).

Formalization scope

  • S\mathcal SS is a Fintype; vectors are functions S → ℝ; M(S)\mathcal M(\mathcal S)M(S) is Mathlib's stdSimplex ℝ S. Nonemptiness of S\mathcal SS follows from ∑sq(s)=1\sum_s q(s)=1∑s​q(s)=1. Finiteness is the standing restriction of Section 4 (p. 15).
  • q(s)>0q(s)>0q(s)>0 for every sss is a hypothesis of every χ² statement. The page divides by q(s)q(s)q(s); in Lean x/0=0x/0=0x/0=0 would silently drop a coordinate from the constraint.
  • t≥0t\ge 0t≥0 is assumed. The page puts no sign condition on ttt. At t=0t=0t=0 the set is {q}\{q\}{q} and both sides equal Eq[v]\mathbf E^q[v]Eq[v].
  • Minimum and maximum are IsLeast and IsGreatest of image sets, so the goal asserts attainment on both sides, as the page's "minimize" and "max" do.
  • μ≥0\mu\ge 0μ≥0 is a vector inequality (0 ≤ μ). The multiplier γ\gammaγ of the equality ∑sy(s)=0\sum_s y(s)=0∑s​y(s)=0 ranges over R\mathbb RR. The page's "γ≥0\gamma\ge 0γ≥0" in (50) is a misprint: the proof of Lemma 6 writes γ∈R\gamma\in\mathbb Rγ∈R, and the optimal γ=Eq[v−μ]\gamma=\mathbf E^q[v-\mu]γ=Eq[v−μ] may be negative.
  • The relative entropy uses the natural logarithm, as in (35), with 0log⁡0=00\log 0=00log0=0.
  • Lemma 6 is posed only as established in its proof. The printed (57) is false: taking μ=v−min⁡sv(s)\mu=v-\min_s v(s)μ=v−mins​v(s) makes the bracket vanish, so (57) always equals Eq[v]\mathbf E^q[v]Eq[v]. For q=(12,12)q=(\frac12,\frac12)q=(21​,21​), v=(0,1)v=(0,1)v=(0,1) and c=12c=\frac12c=21​ the true minimum is 14\frac1441​. The set (55) is also restricted to p∈M(S)p\in\mathcal M(\mathcal S)p∈M(S), which its proof uses.
  • Ruled out: a formalization of Lemma 5 whose feasible set omits p≥0p\ge 0p≥0 (or that takes μ=0\mu=0μ=0) states the easier relaxed identity above and is not this mission's goal. Likewise a χ² set whose centre may vanish, or a dual written as ⨆ over an unbounded set, would make the statement junk.
  • All complexity claims (Lemmas 5 and 6, the sorting argument, (54)) are excluded. So are the Pinsker step of Section 4.3, whose constant 1/(2ln⁡2)1/(2\ln 2)1/(2ln2) is wrong for the natural logarithm, and the asymptotic confidence statements (33)–(39).
  • Reusable infrastructure: Lagrangian duality for a linear objective over an ellipsoid intersected with a polyhedron, and Cauchy–Schwarz minimization of a linear function over a weighted ellipsoid. Proofs of the milestones, alternative proofs of the goal, and a formalization of the paper's sorting algorithm on top of (52)–(53) are welcome.

Selected references

  • G. Iyengar, Robust dynamic programming, CORC Tech Report TR-2002-07, IEOR Department, Columbia University, revised May 4, 2004; published in Mathematics of Operations Research 30(2):257–280, 2005. https://doi.org/10.1287/moor.1040.0129
  • A. Nilim and L. El Ghaoui, Robust control of Markov decision processes with uncertain transition matrices, Operations Research 53(5):780–798, 2005. https://doi.org/10.1287/opre.1050.0216
  • J. K. Satia and R. E. Lave, Markovian decision processes with uncertain transition probabilities, Operations Research 21(3):728–740, 1973. https://doi.org/10.1287/opre.21.3.728
  • T. M. Cover and J. A. Thomas, Elements of Information Theory, Wiley, 1991. https://doi.org/10.1002/0471200611
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Algorithmic Game TheoryProbability·Captain: mikedeng1

A Multiple-Choice Secretary Algorithm with Applications to Online Auctions: The Recursive k-Choice Secretary Algorithm Earns at Least (1 − 5/√k) Times the Sum of the k Largest ValuesResearch Paper

Motivation

The secretary problem asks how well an online decision maker can do when items arrive one at a time in random order and each must be accepted or rejected on the spot. With a single selection, the classical rule (observe a 1/e1/e1/e fraction, then take the first item better than everything seen) selects the best item with probability about 1/e1/e1/e, and no rule does better. Many allocation problems are not single-choice: a seller with kkk identical goods facing bidders who arrive over time, an advertiser with a budget of kkk impressions, an employer with kkk openings. Each asks the multiple-choice secretary problem: how much of the best achievable total can an online rule collect when kkk selections are allowed?

Kleinberg's 2005 SODA paper answered this for the sum objective. It gave a recursive algorithm whose expected total is at least (1−5/k)(1 - 5/\sqrt k)(1−5/k​) times the sum of the kkk largest values, so the ratio tends to 111 as kkk grows, and stated a matching 1−Ω(1/k)1 - \Omega(\sqrt{1/k})1−Ω(1/k​) upper bound for every algorithm, whose proof the extended abstract omits. The motivating application was online auctions: the algorithm becomes a strategyproof mechanism for selling kkk identical items to bidders who arrive and depart over time, extending the single-item online auction of Hajiaghayi, Kleinberg and Parkes (EC 2004).

Timeline. Dynkin (1963) and the classical literature settle k=1k = 1k=1 with ratio 1/e1/e1/e. Hajiaghayi, Kleinberg and Parkes (2004) turn the single-item rule into an online auction. Kleinberg (2005) proves 1−O(1/k)1 - O(1/\sqrt k)1−O(1/k​) for kkk selections, with the explicit constant 555. Babaioff, Immorlica, Kempe and Kleinberg (2008) survey the resulting family of generalized secretary problems and their use in online auctions.

Setting

Let SSS be a finite set of nnn distinct non-negative real numbers. The elements of SSS are revealed in a uniformly random order: each of the n!n!n! orders has probability 1/n!1/n!1/n!. After each arrival the algorithm decides, irrevocably and using only the values seen so far, whether to select it. At most k≥1k \ge 1k≥1 elements may be selected. Write TTT for the set of the kkk largest elements of SSS (all of SSS if k>nk > nk>n) and

v=∑x∈Txv = \sum_{x \in T} xv=x∈T∑​x

for their sum, the best total any rule could collect knowing SSS in advance.

Kleinberg's algorithm Ak\mathcal A_kAk​ is defined by recursion on kkk:

  1. If k=1k = 1k=1, use the classical rule: observe the first ⌊n/e⌋\lfloor n/e \rfloor⌊n/e⌋ arrivals, then select the first later arrival that exceeds all earlier ones, if there is one.
  2. If k≥2k \ge 2k≥2, draw mmm from the binomial distribution B(n,1/2)B(n, 1/2)B(n,1/2). Apply Aℓ\mathcal A_\ellAℓ​, with ℓ=⌊k/2⌋\ell = \lfloor k/2 \rfloorℓ=⌊k/2⌋, to the first mmm arrivals. Let y1>y2>⋯>ymy_1 > y_2 > \dots > y_my1​>y2​>⋯>ym​ be those mmm values in decreasing order. After the mmm-th arrival, select every arrival exceeding yℓy_\ellyℓ​, until kkk elements have been selected in total or the sequence ends.

The expected value of the algorithm is taken over the random order and over every binomial draw at every level of the recursion.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 2.1

E[∑x selected by Akx]  ≥  (1−5k) vfor every S⊂R≥0 finite and every k≥1.\mathbb E\Big[\sum_{x \text{ selected by } \mathcal A_k} x\Big] \;\ge\; \Big(1 - \frac{5}{\sqrt k}\Big)\, v \qquad \text{for every } S \subset \mathbb R_{\ge 0} \text{ finite and every } k \ge 1.E[x selected by Ak​∑​x]≥(1−k​5​)vfor every S⊂R≥0​ finite and every k≥1.

The statement is uniform in nnn and kkk; it says nothing beyond the explicit constant 555 printed in the paper.

Milestones: the claims of the proof sketch

The paper proves the theorem by induction on kkk. Its sketch introduces YYY, the set of the first mmm arrivals, Z=S∖YZ = S \setminus YZ=S∖Y, the modified value of a set (the sum of its elements lying in TTT), and qqq, the number of elements of ZZZ exceeding yℓy_\ellyℓ​. The milestones are its stated claims, in order:

  1. YYY is uniformly distributed on the 2n2^n2n subsets of SSS.
  2. ∣Y∩T∣|Y \cap T|∣Y∩T∣ has the distribution B(k,1/2)B(k, 1/2)B(k,1/2).
  3. Conditional on ∣Y∩T∣=r|Y \cap T| = r∣Y∩T∣=r, the expected modified value of YYY is (r/k)v(r/k)v(r/k)v.
  4. The displayed bound ∑r=1kPr⁡(∣Y∩T∣=r) min⁡(r,ℓ)k v≥(1−12k)v2\sum_{r=1}^{k}\Pr(|Y\cap T| = r)\,\frac{\min(r,\ell)}{k}\,v \ge \big(1 - \frac{1}{2\sqrt k}\big)\frac v2∑r=1k​Pr(∣Y∩T∣=r)kmin(r,ℓ)​v≥(1−2k​1​)2v​ with ℓ=k/2\ell = k/2ℓ=k/2.
  5. The top ℓ=k/2\ell = k/2ℓ=k/2 elements of YYY have expected modified value at least (1−12k)v2\big(1 - \frac{1}{2\sqrt k}\big)\frac v2(1−2k​1​)2v​.
  6. E ∣q−ℓ∣≤k\mathbb E\,|q - \ell| \le \sqrt kE∣q−ℓ∣≤k​.
  7. The elements the algorithm selects from ZZZ have expected modified value at least (12−1/k)v\big(\frac12 - \sqrt{1/k}\big)v(21​−1/k​)v.
  8. The closing computation (1−5k/2)(1−12k)12+12−1k>1−5k\big(1 - \frac{5}{\sqrt{k/2}}\big)\big(1 - \frac{1}{2\sqrt k}\big)\frac12 + \frac12 - \sqrt{\frac1k} > 1 - \frac{5}{\sqrt k}(1−k/2​5​)(1−2k​1​)21​+21​−k1​​>1−k​5​.

Significance

The result. Theorem 2.1 shows that random arrival order costs only a 1−O(1/k)1 - O(1/\sqrt k)1−O(1/k​) factor when many items are sold, against the constant 1/e1/e1/e for a single item. With the paper's matching upper bound, it pins down the optimal rate for the kkk-choice problem. It is the base of the paper's strategyproof online auction for kkk identical goods and a standard reference point for the later literature on secretary problems with combinatorial constraints and on online allocation in the random-order model.

Formalizing it. The paper is a two-page extended abstract, and the theorem's proof is a sketch: several steps are described as "easy", a stochastic-domination argument is stated without detail, and the behaviour of the algorithm when fewer than ℓ\ellℓ elements have been observed is not specified. A machine-checked proof would supply the complete argument for the explicit constant. The result is proved on paper only in this sketch; no machine-checked proof of it is known.

Difficulty

The obvious argument fixes m=n/2m = n/2m=n/2 and treats the threshold yℓy_\ellyℓ​ as if it split the remaining elements exactly. Both steps fail. With a fixed mmm, the first mmm arrivals are not a uniform subset of SSS and ∣Y∩T∣|Y \cap T|∣Y∩T∣ is hypergeometric, so the clean binomial computations of the sketch are not available; the binomial choice of mmm is what makes YYY uniform. And the number qqq of later elements beyond yℓy_\ellyℓ​ fluctuates by order k\sqrt kk​: the second phase may run out of budget before reaching all of T∩ZT \cap ZT∩Z, or accept elements outside TTT. Controlling this fluctuation, while the cap of kkk also counts the first phase's selections, is the central step. The induction must then combine a recursive guarantee on a random, random-sized prefix with this estimate.

Formalization scope

The Lean development fixes these conventions.

  • SSS is a Finset ℝ with all elements non-negative; distinctness is automatic. The arrival at time ttt (0-based) under the order π∈Perm(Fin n)\pi \in \mathrm{Perm}(\mathrm{Fin}\, n)π∈Perm(Finn) is the π(t)\pi(t)π(t)-th smallest element of SSS, and expectations over the order use the published uniform average SecretaryWD.DiscUpper.uniformAvg.
  • The algorithm is a PMF over sets of selected positions, defined by well-founded recursion on kkk. The base case is the published SecretaryWD.DiscUpper.classicalSecretary. B(n,1/2)B(n, 1/2)B(n,1/2) is Mathlib's PMF.binomial (1/2). At k=0k = 0k=0 the algorithm selects nothing, for totality only; all statements assume k≥1k \ge 1k≥1.
  • When the first phase has seen fewer than ℓ\ellℓ arrivals (m<ℓm < \ellm<ℓ), yℓy_\ellyℓ​ is taken to be −∞-\infty−∞: every later arrival is selected until the cap. The page does not specify this case; under the reading "select nothing", the theorem fails when nnn is much smaller than kkk.
  • The cap of kkk counts the selections of both phases. A cap applied to the second phase alone would let the algorithm select up to k+ℓk + \ellk+ℓ elements and is excluded.
  • The goal mentions only the algorithm, the order, SSS, kkk and vvv. It does not mention YYY, ZZZ, qqq or the modified value, which appear only in milestones, so the goal cannot be discharged by assuming any part of the sketch.
  • Three milestone hypotheses are added and disclosed: k≤nk \le nk≤n for milestones 2, 3, 5 and 6 (for n<kn < kn<k the law of ∣Y∩T∣|Y \cap T|∣Y∩T∣ is B(n,1/2)B(n, 1/2)B(n,1/2), and milestone 6 fails); kkk even for milestone 5 (the sketch writes ℓ=k/2\ell = k/2ℓ=k/2; for odd kkk with ℓ=⌊k/2⌋\ell = \lfloor k/2\rfloorℓ=⌊k/2⌋ the bound fails at k=3k = 3k=3). Milestone 4 uses the real number ℓ=k/2\ell = k/2ℓ=k/2, as printed; with ⌊k/2⌋\lfloor k/2\rfloor⌊k/2⌋ it fails for odd kkk.

A complete development needs: the uniform-subset law of a binomially sized random prefix; conditional expectations over random subsets; tail and absolute-deviation bounds for sums of geometric variables and a stochastic-domination argument; and a careful treatment of the recursion through PMF.bind. The first and third are reusable beyond this mission, for other random-order and sample-based algorithms. Proofs of any milestone, of auxiliary lemmas about the random prefix, and of the goal by a route different from the sketch are all welcome.

Selected references

  • R. Kleinberg, A multiple-choice secretary algorithm with applications to online auctions, Proceedings of the 16th ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete Algorithms (SODA), 2005.
  • M. T. Hajiaghayi, R. Kleinberg, D. C. Parkes, Adaptive limited-supply online auctions, Proceedings of the 5th ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce (EC), 2004, pp. 71–80. https://doi.org/10.1145/988772.988784
  • E. B. Dynkin, The optimum choice of the instant for stopping a Markov process, Soviet Mathematics Doklady 4, 1963.
  • T. S. Ferguson, Who solved the secretary problem?, Statistical Science 4(3), 1989. https://doi.org/10.1214/ss/1177012493
  • M. Babaioff, N. Immorlica, D. Kempe, R. Kleinberg, Online auctions and generalized secretary problems, ACM SIGecom Exchanges, 2008. https://doi.org/10.1145/1399589.1399596
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CombinatoricsProbabilityRandom Matrix Theory·Captain: mikedeng1

Phase Transition of the Largest Eigenvalue for Nonnull Complex Sample Covariance Matrices 4: The Exponential Last Passage Time Has the Law of the Largest Sample EigenvalueResearch Paper

Motivation

Random growth models and random matrices share limit laws. The first exact instance was found by Johansson (Shape fluctuations and random matrices, Comm. Math. Phys. 2000), who showed that the last passage time of a lattice model with geometric or exponential weights has the law of the largest eigenvalue of a Laguerre (complex Wishart) random matrix. Baik, Ben Arous and Péché (Ann. Probab. 33 (2005)) extended the identity to weights whose rate depends on the row. On the matrix side this is a sample covariance matrix with a general population covariance Σ\SigmaΣ; on the growth side it is a corner growth model, or a series of exponential queues, with inhomogeneous service rates.

The identity is the reason the paper's main result, the phase transition of the largest sample eigenvalue as a few population eigenvalues ("spikes") cross the critical value 1+γ−11 + \gamma^{-1}1+γ−1, is also a theorem about last passage percolation and tandem queues. In the queueing reading, a spike is a slow server, and the phase transition describes how slow a few servers must be before they change the centring and the fluctuation scale of the exit time.

Timeline:

  • 2000, Johansson: equal rates; the geometric and exponential last passage time has the law of the largest Laguerre eigenvalue (his Proposition 1.4 is the case π1=⋯=πN\pi_1 = \cdots = \pi_Nπ1​=⋯=πN​ of (307)).
  • 2001, Baryshnikov and, independently, Gravner, Tracy and Widom: the tandem-queue and GUE-minor descriptions of the same object.
  • 2005, Baik, Ben Arous and Péché: row-dependent rates πi\pi_iπi​ (Proposition 6.1), via the Robinson–Schensted–Knuth (RSK) formula for geometric weights (310) and a scaling limit.

Setting

Last passage time. Attach a real weight X(i,j)X(i,j)X(i,j) to every site of the grid {1,…,N}×{1,…,M}\{1,\ldots,N\}\times\{1,\ldots,M\}{1,…,N}×{1,…,M}. An up/right path from (1,1)(1,1)(1,1) to (N,M)(N,M)(N,M) is a sequence of N+M−1N+M-1N+M−1 sites starting at (1,1)(1,1)(1,1), ending at (N,M)(N,M)(N,M), each step adding (1,0)(1,0)(1,0) or (0,1)(0,1)(0,1). The last passage time is

L(N,M)=max⁡π:(1,1)↗(N,M)∑(i,j)∈πX(i,j).(306)L(N,M) = \max_{\pi:(1,1)\nearrow(N,M)} \sum_{(i,j)\in\pi} X(i,j). \qquad (306)L(N,M)=π:(1,1)↗(N,M)max​(i,j)∈π∑​X(i,j).(306)

Exponential environment. Given positive numbers π1,…,πN\pi_1,\ldots,\pi_Nπ1​,…,πN​, the X(i,j)X(i,j)X(i,j) are independent and X(i,j)X(i,j)X(i,j) is exponential of mean 1/(πiM)1/(\pi_iM)1/(πi​M), i.e. density πiMe−πiMx\pi_iMe^{-\pi_iMx}πi​Me−πi​Mx on x≥0x\ge0x≥0. All MMM sites of row iii share one rate.

Sample covariance matrix. Let gkjg_{kj}gkj​, 1≤k≤M1\le k\le M1≤k≤M, 1≤j≤N1\le j\le N1≤j≤N, be independent standard complex Gaussians (real and imaginary parts independent N(0,1/2)N(0,1/2)N(0,1/2)). For a unitary UUU and ℓj=πj−1\ell_j = \pi_j^{-1}ℓj​=πj−1​ (308), the samples y⃗k=U diag(ℓj) gk\vec y_k = U\,\mathrm{diag}(\sqrt{\ell_j})\,g_ky​k​=Udiag(ℓj​​)gk​ are mean-zero complex Gaussian vectors with covariance Σ=U diag(ℓ) U∗\Sigma = U\,\mathrm{diag}(\ell)\,U^*Σ=Udiag(ℓ)U∗, and

S=1M∑k=1My⃗ky⃗k ∗,λ1=largest eigenvalue of S.S = \frac1M\sum_{k=1}^M \vec y_k\vec y_k^{\,*}, \qquad \lambda_1 = \text{largest eigenvalue of } S.S=M1​k=1∑M​y​k​y​k∗​,λ1​=largest eigenvalue of S.

Schur functions and geometric weights. For a partition λ\lambdaλ, the Schur function sλ(x)s_\lambda(x)sλ​(x) is the sum over semistandard Young tableaux TTT of shape λ\lambdaλ of ∏cxT(c)\prod_{c}x_{T(c)}∏c​xT(c)​. A geometric variable of parameter q∈[0,1)q\in[0,1)q∈[0,1) has P(Y=k)=(1−q)qk\mathbb P(Y = k) = (1-q)q^kP(Y=k)=(1−q)qk.

Formalization targets

Goal: Proposition 6.1

For 1≤N≤M1\le N\le M1≤N≤M, positive π1,…,πN\pi_1,\ldots,\pi_Nπ1​,…,πN​ and every unitary UUU,

P(L(N,M)≤x)=P(λ1(M,N)≤x)for all x∈R.(309)\mathbb P\big(L(N,M)\le x\big) = \mathbb P\big(\lambda_1(M,N)\le x\big) \qquad \text{for all } x\in\mathbb R. \qquad (309)P(L(N,M)≤x)=P(λ1​(M,N)≤x)for all x∈R.(309)

The two sides are defined independently: one by a maximum over lattice paths of exponential weights, the other by the spectrum of a Gaussian random matrix.

Milestones

  1. The recurrence (313): for every array of weights and every site with a,b≥2a, b\ge2a,b≥2,
L(a,b)=max⁡{L(a−1,b),L(a,b−1)}+X(a,b).L(a,b) = \max\{L(a-1,b), L(a,b-1)\} + X(a,b).L(a,b)=max{L(a−1,b),L(a,b−1)}+X(a,b).
  1. The Cauchy identity (311): ∑λsλ(x)sλ(y)=∏i,j(1−xiyj)−1\sum_\lambda s_\lambda(x)s_\lambda(y) = \prod_{i,j}(1-x_iy_j)^{-1}∑λ​sλ​(x)sλ​(y)=∏i,j​(1−xi​yj​)−1 for xi,yj≥0x_i,y_j\ge0xi​,yj​≥0, xiyj<1x_iy_j<1xi​yj​<1.
  2. The geometric formula (310): for independent geometric weights Y(i,j)Y(i,j)Y(i,j) of parameter xiyjx_iy_jxi​yj​, xi,yj∈[0,1)x_i,y_j\in[0,1)xi​,yj​∈[0,1),
P(G(N,M)≤n)=∏i,j(1−xiyj)∑λ:λ1≤nsλ(x)sλ(y).\mathbb P\big(G(N,M)\le n\big) = \prod_{i,j}(1-x_iy_j)\sum_{\lambda:\lambda_1\le n}s_\lambda(x)s_\lambda(y).P(G(N,M)≤n)=i,j∏​(1−xi​yj​)λ:λ1​≤n∑​sλ​(x)sλ​(y).
  1. The exponential formula (307): for M≥NM\ge NM≥N and distinct πi\pi_iπi​,
P(L(N,M)≤x)=1C∫[0,x]Ndet⁡(e−Mπiξj)V(π)V(ξ)∏jξjM−N dξ.\mathbb P\big(L(N,M)\le x\big) = \frac1C\int_{[0,x]^N}\frac{\det(e^{-M\pi_i\xi_j})}{V(\pi)}V(\xi)\prod_{j}\xi_j^{M-N}\,d\xi.P(L(N,M)≤x)=C1​∫[0,x]N​V(π)det(e−Mπi​ξj​)​V(ξ)j∏​ξjM−N​dξ.

Significance

The proposition makes every distributional statement about λ1\lambda_1λ1​ in the paper a statement about last passage percolation with row-dependent rates: the FkF_kFk​ (generalised Tracy–Widom) fluctuations at the critical spike value, the Gaussian fluctuations above it, and the fixed-dimension limit. Through (312)–(313) it also covers the exit time of MMM customers from NNN exponential servers in series, an operations research object. The geometric formula (310) is the entry point of the RSK method for exactly solvable growth models.

These results are proved in the literature; the paper cites (310) and (311) and derives (307) from them by a limit. None of them is machine-checked as far as this series knows. Formalizing them requires a Lean development of Schur functions, the Cauchy identity and the RSK correspondence on matrices with nonnegative integer entries, and of the Wishart eigenvalue density, each reusable well beyond this mission.

Difficulty

The recurrence (313) is elementary. Everything else is not. The geometric formula (310) needs the RSK bijection between nonnegative integer matrices and pairs of semistandard tableaux of the same shape, together with Schensted's theorem that the first row of the shape is the last passage time; neither is in Mathlib. The passage from (310) to (307) is a scaling limit xi=1−Mπi/Lx_i = 1 - M\pi_i/Lxi​=1−Mπi​/L, n=xLn = xLn=xL, L→∞L\to\inftyL→∞, in which a sum over partitions must converge to a multiple integral. The matrix side needs the joint eigenvalue density of a complex Wishart matrix with general Σ\SigmaΣ, which uses the Harish-Chandra–Itzykson–Zuber integral. A direct coupling of the two sides is not known; the identity is an equality of laws, proved by computing both.

Formalization scope

The development lives in the namespace SpikedWishart.LastPassage. Conventions:

  • Sites and indices are 0-based; the paper's (1,1)(1,1)(1,1) and (N,M)(N,M)(N,M) are (0,0)(0,0)(0,0) and (N−1,M−1)(N-1,M-1)(N−1,M−1), and N,M≥1N, M\ge1N,M≥1.
  • LLL is defined as the maximum over paths (306), never by the recurrence (313), so (313) is a genuine statement.
  • The exponential law is Mathlib's expMeasure with rate πiM\pi_iMπi​M.
  • The sample model is mean zero, uncentred, with factor 1/M1/M1/M and E∣g∣2=1\mathbb E|g|^2 = 1E∣g∣2=1; this is the model of (59), (61) and (307), and the page's centring by the sample mean and S=(1/N)XX∗S = (1/N)XX^*S=(1/N)XX∗ are printed slips. The covariance is U diag(π−1)U∗U\,\mathrm{diag}(\pi^{-1})U^*Udiag(π−1)U∗ for every unitary UUU; specialising to diagonal Σ\SigmaΣ would prove a special case.
  • N≤MN\le MN≤M is a disclosed addition to the goal, matching the page's "for M≥NM\ge NM≥N" in (307).
  • Proposition 6.1 prints L(M,N)L(M,N)L(M,N); the object is (306)'s L(N,M)L(N,M)L(N,M).
  • Schur functions are the tableau sum with variables extended by zero. The Cauchy identity is stated with the exponent −1-1−1 that the page omits. In (307) the constant CCC is the integral of the same integrand over (0,∞)N(0,\infty)^N(0,∞)N, and the πi\pi_iπi​ are distinct so that V(π)≠0V(\pi)\ne0V(π)=0; the goal has no distinctness hypothesis.

A formalization in which either side of (309) is defined through the other, or through (307), would be trivial and is excluded: both laws are defined from scratch. Contributions are welcome on RSK and Schur function infrastructure, on the Wishart density, and on the measurability of λ1\lambda_1λ1​.

Selected references

  • J. Baik, G. Ben Arous, S. Péché, Phase transition of the largest eigenvalue for nonnull complex sample covariance matrices, Ann. Probab. 33(5):1643–1697, 2005. https://doi.org/10.1214/009117905000000233
  • K. Johansson, Shape fluctuations and random matrices, Comm. Math. Phys. 209:437–476, 2000. https://doi.org/10.1007/s002200050027
  • Y. Baryshnikov, GUEs and queues, Probab. Theory Related Fields 119:256–274, 2001. https://doi.org/10.1007/PL00008760
  • J. Gravner, C. A. Tracy, H. Widom, Limit theorems for height fluctuations in a class of discrete space and time growth models, J. Stat. Phys. 102:1085–1132, 2001. https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1004879725949
  • R. P. Stanley, Enumerative Combinatorics, Vol. 2, Cambridge University Press, 1999 (the paper's reference [36] for the Cauchy identity). https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511609589
9 thms1 active userReviewed
Algorithmic Game TheoryLinear algebra·Captain: mikedeng1

Flows and Decompositions of Games: Harmonic and Potential Games 5: Every ϵ-Equilibrium of the Closest Potential Game Is an (ϵ + max_m 2α/√h_m)-Equilibrium of the Game, and ConverselyResearch Paper

Motivation

Potential games (Monderer and Shapley, 1996) are the finite games whose unilateral payoff differences are all differences of a single function, the potential. They always have a pure Nash equilibrium, and many natural learning dynamics (best response, fictitious play, logit response) converge in them. Most games met in applications are not exactly potential games, so a recurring question is how much of this theory survives for a game that is close to a potential game.

Candogan, Menache, Ozdaglar and Parrilo (arXiv:1005.2405, journal version Math. Oper. Res. 36(3), 2011) decompose the space of finite games into potential, harmonic and nonstrategic components. Section 6 of the paper equips the space of games with a weighted inner product under which this decomposition is orthogonal, computes the closest potential game to any game in closed form, and shows that approximate equilibria of a game and of its closest potential game correspond, with an explicit loss controlled by the distance between them. This mission formalizes that last result together with the statements it rests on.

Setting

A finite game has a finite set of players M\mathcal MM; each player mmm has a nonempty finite strategy set EmE^mEm with hm=∣Em∣h_m = |E^m|hm​=∣Em∣ elements, and a utility um:E→Ru^m : E \to \mathbb Rum:E→R on the set of strategy profiles E=∏mEmE = \prod_m E^mE=∏m​Em. For a profile ppp, (qm,p−m)(q^m, p^{-m})(qm,p−m) denotes ppp with player mmm's strategy replaced by qmq^mqm.

A profile ppp is an ϵ\epsilonϵ-equilibrium if um(pm,p−m)≥um(qm,p−m)−ϵu^m(p^m, p^{-m}) \ge u^m(q^m, p^{-m}) - \epsilonum(pm,p−m)≥um(qm,p−m)−ϵ for every player mmm and strategy qmq^mqm (equation (2) of the paper). A game is a potential game if there is φ:E→R\varphi : E \to \mathbb Rφ:E→R with φ(pm,p−m)−φ(qm,p−m)=um(pm,p−m)−um(qm,p−m)\varphi(p^m, p^{-m}) - \varphi(q^m, p^{-m}) = u^m(p^m, p^{-m}) - u^m(q^m, p^{-m})φ(pm,p−m)−φ(qm,p−m)=um(pm,p−m)−um(qm,p−m) for all mmm, pmp^mpm, qmq^mqm, p−mp^{-m}p−m (Definition 2.1).

A game is identified with its tuple of utilities, an element of C0MC_0^MC0M​ where C0={f:E→R}C_0 = \{f : E \to \mathbb R\}C0​={f:E→R}. The game graph has the profiles as nodes, with an edge between two profiles that differ in exactly one player's strategy. The operator DmD_mDm​ sends umu^mum to its differences along the edges where player mmm deviates, D=∑mDmD = \sum_m D_mD=∑m​Dm​, δ0\delta_0δ0​ is the gradient of the game graph, Πm=Dm†Dm\Pi_m = D_m^\dagger D_mΠm​=Dm†​Dm​, and †\dagger† is the Moore–Penrose pseudoinverse. Definition 4.2 defines the potential, harmonic and nonstrategic subspaces

P={u=Πu, Du∈im⁡δ0},H={u=Πu, Du∈ker⁡δ0∗},N=ker⁡D,\mathcal P = \{u = \Pi u,\ Du \in \operatorname{im}\delta_0\},\qquad \mathcal H = \{u = \Pi u,\ Du \in \ker\delta_0^*\},\qquad \mathcal N = \ker D ,P={u=Πu, Du∈imδ0​},H={u=Πu, Du∈kerδ0∗​},N=kerD,

and a harmonic game is a game in H⊕N\mathcal H \oplus \mathcal NH⊕N.

Section 6 introduces the weighted inner product and norm

⟨G,G^⟩M,E=∑mhm∑p∈Eum(p) u^m(p),∥G∥M,E2=⟨G,G⟩M,E.\langle G, \hat G\rangle_{M,E} = \sum_{m} h_m \sum_{p \in E} u^m(p)\,\hat u^m(p), \qquad \|G\|_{M,E}^2 = \langle G, G\rangle_{M,E} .⟨G,G^⟩M,E​=m∑​hm​p∈E∑​um(p)u^m(p),∥G∥M,E2​=⟨G,G⟩M,E​.

A closest potential game to GGG is a potential game G^\hat GG^ with ∥G−G^∥M,E≤∥G−G′∥M,E\|G - \hat G\|_{M,E} \le \|G - G'\|_{M,E}∥G−G^∥M,E​≤∥G−G′∥M,E​ for every potential game G′G'G′; a closest harmonic game is defined in the same way.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 6.3

Let G^\hat GG^ be the closest potential game to GGG and α=∥G−G^∥M,E\alpha = \|G - \hat G\|_{M,E}α=∥G−G^∥M,E​. Then for every ϵ1\epsilon_1ϵ1​, every ϵ1\epsilon_1ϵ1​-equilibrium of G^\hat GG^ is an ϵ\epsilonϵ-equilibrium of GGG, and every ϵ1\epsilon_1ϵ1​-equilibrium of GGG is an ϵ\epsilonϵ-equilibrium of G^\hat GG^, where

ϵ=max⁡m∈M2αhm+ϵ1.\epsilon = \max_{m \in \mathcal M} \frac{2\alpha}{\sqrt{h_m}} + \epsilon_1 .ϵ=m∈Mmax​hm​​2α​+ϵ1​.

Milestones

  1. Lemma 2.1. If ∣um(p)−u^m(p)∣≤ϵ0|u^m(p) - \hat u^m(p)| \le \epsilon_0∣um(p)−u^m(p)∣≤ϵ0​ for all mmm and ppp, every ϵ1\epsilon_1ϵ1​-equilibrium of one game is a (2ϵ0+ϵ1)(2\epsilon_0 + \epsilon_1)(2ϵ0​+ϵ1​)-equilibrium of the other.
  2. Theorem 5.1. The set of potential games is the subspace P⊕N\mathcal P \oplus \mathcal NP⊕N.
  3. Theorem 6.1. Under ⟨⋅,⋅⟩M,E\langle\cdot,\cdot\rangle_{M,E}⟨⋅,⋅⟩M,E​ the subspaces P\mathcal PP, H\mathcal HH, N\mathcal NN are pairwise orthogonal.
  4. Theorem 6.2. With φ=δ0†Du\varphi = \delta_0^\dagger D uφ=δ0†​Du, the closest potential game to GGG has utilities Πmφ+(I−Πm)um\Pi_m \varphi + (I - \Pi_m)u^mΠm​φ+(I−Πm​)um, and the closest harmonic game has utilities um−Πmφu^m - \Pi_m\varphium−Πm​φ.

Significance

The result. Theorem 6.3 reduces the study of approximate equilibria of an arbitrary finite game to a potential game, where pure equilibria exist and are maximizers of the potential. Section 7 of the paper reports that, in a companion paper, best-response and fictitious-play dynamics are shown to converge to a neighbourhood of equilibria in near-potential games, with the size of the neighbourhood governed by the distance of the game to its closest potential game. Theorems 6.1 and 6.2 make that distance computable: the closest potential game is an orthogonal projection, given by linear operators of the game graph.

Formalizing it. All four statements are proved in the paper; none of them is machine-checked anywhere known to this mission. A formal development produces a verified operator layer for games on the game graph (gradient, pseudoinverses, the projections Πm\Pi_mΠm​), a verified proof that the weighted inner product, and not the unweighted one, makes the decomposition orthogonal, and a reusable perturbation lemma for ϵ\epsilonϵ-equilibria.

Difficulty

Lemma 2.1 and the final step of Theorem 6.3 are elementary inequalities. The obvious way to approximate a game by a potential game, taking the identical-interest part of its zero-sum/identical-interest split, does not give the closest potential game: the paper's Table 7 (p. 35) shows a potential game whose identical-interest part is far from it. The closest potential game has to come from the projection of Section 6. The weight of the mission is in Theorems 5.1, 6.1 and 6.2. They need the decomposition theorem of Section 4 (every game splits uniquely into P\mathcal PP, H\mathcal HH, N\mathcal NN) and properties of pseudoinverses of the operators DmD_mDm​ and δ0\delta_0δ0​ that Mathlib does not provide: Mathlib has no operator pseudoinverse at all. The orthogonality P⊥H\mathcal P \perp \mathcal HP⊥H under the weighted product rests on the specific spectral structure of the Laplacian of the graph of a single player's deviations; it is not a general fact, and it fails for the unweighted product when the hmh_mhm​ differ, so the standard orthogonal-complement machinery cannot be applied to C0MC_0^MC0M​ with its default inner product.

Formalization scope

Players are a finite type ι with decidable equality; strategy sets are finite types E m. Utilities are plain functions u : ι → (∀ m, E m) → ℝ, the shape used by the published MondererShapley.ClosedPath.IsPotentialGame, which is referenced for Definition 2.1. The operator layer works in PiLp 2 (fun _ => EuclideanSpace ℝ (∀ k, E k)) with the unweighted inner product of Section 4; edge flows carry the inner product 12∑(p,q)∈AX(p,q)Y(p,q)\tfrac12\sum_{(p,q)\in A} X(p,q)Y(p,q)21​∑(p,q)∈A​X(p,q)Y(p,q) of (7). The weighted inner product (55) and norm (56) are plain functions, not a second instance on the same type. "Closest" is the minimizing property itself, not an infimum of distances.

Hypotheses made explicit: every strategy set is nonempty (the paper's Em={1,…,hm}E^m = \{1,\dots,h_m\}Em={1,…,hm​}), so hm≥1h_m \ge 1hm​≥1; in Theorem 6.3 the set of players is nonempty, which the maximum over players needs. The paper's "an ϵ\epsilonϵ-equilibrium for some ϵ≤B\epsilon \le Bϵ≤B" is stated as "a BBB-equilibrium", which is equivalent because (2) is monotone in ϵ\epsilonϵ. Both directions of Lemma 2.1 and Theorem 6.3 are included.

The goal is stated for the closest potential game, as printed. A version for an arbitrary potential game at distance α\alphaα would be a different theorem, and the hypothesis is not vacuous: Theorem 6.2 shows the closest potential game exists. Theorem 6.2 is stated as an "if and only if" characterization, so it gives existence and uniqueness as well as the formula.

Contributions welcome: the Penrose identities for the pseudoinverse, the identities D†D=ΠD^\dagger D = \PiD†D=Π and Δ0,m=hmΠm\Delta_{0,m} = h_m \Pi_mΔ0,m​=hm​Πm​, and the decomposition theorem of Section 4, all of which are reusable by the other missions of this series.

Selected references

  • O. Candogan, I. Menache, A. Ozdaglar, P. A. Parrilo, Flows and Decompositions of Games: Harmonic and Potential Games, arXiv:1005.2405v2, 2010; Math. Oper. Res. 36(3):474–503, 2011. https://arxiv.org/abs/1005.2405, https://doi.org/10.1287/moor.1110.0500
  • D. Monderer, L. S. Shapley, Potential Games, Games Econ. Behav. 14(1):124–143, 1996. https://doi.org/10.1006/game.1996.0044
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CombinatoricsLinear OptimizationOptimization·Captain: mikedeng1

Robust Branch-and-Cut-and-Price for the Capacitated Vehicle Routing Problem: The Integer Points of P1 ∩ P2 Are Exactly the CVRP Solutions, and the Dantzig–Wolfe Master Describes P1 ∩ P2Research Paper

Motivation

The capacitated vehicle routing problem (CVRP) asks for KKK delivery routes from a depot that serve every client exactly once without exceeding a vehicle capacity, at minimum total length. It was introduced by Dantzig and Ramser in 1959 and is the reference problem of the vehicle routing literature: most exact methods for richer routing models (time windows, heterogeneous fleets, split deliveries) are first developed and benchmarked on it.

Exact CVRP algorithms are driven by the lower bound of a linear relaxation. Two families dominated before 2005. Branch-and-cut works with the edge variables xex_exe​ and the rounded capacity inequalities (Lysgaard, Letchford and Eglese 2004, among others); its bound degrades as the number of vehicles grows. Lagrangean and column-generation methods work with q-routes, walks from the depot of bounded total demand that may revisit clients (Christofides, Mingozzi and Toth 1981). Fukasawa, Longo, Lysgaard, Poggi de Aragão, Reis, Uchoa and Werneck combine the two in one linear program over the intersection of the two polytopes, priced by column generation with every cut written on the edge variables. According to the abstract, the resulting branch-and-cut-and-price solves to optimality all instances from the literature with up to 135 vertices. The design is called robust because cuts are written on the edge variables xxx and therefore never change the structure of the pricing problem.

This mission formalizes the formulation itself (§2 of the paper) and the two exact facts of its column generation (§3.1).

Setting

Let G=(V,E)G=(V,E)G=(V,E) be an undirected graph on V={0,1,…,n}V=\{0,1,\dots,n\}V={0,1,…,n}. Vertex 000 is the depot; V+={1,…,n}V_+=\{1,\dots,n\}V+​={1,…,n} are the clients, client iii having a positive demand did_idi​. Each edge has a length ℓe\ell_eℓe​. There are KKK vehicles of capacity CCC, both positive integers.

A list of clients r=(r1,…,rm)r=(r_1,\dots,r_m)r=(r1​,…,rm​) describes the closed walk 0→r1→⋯→rm→00\to r_1\to\cdots\to r_m\to 00→r1​→⋯→rm​→0. Its edge incidence qe(r)q^e(r)qe(r) is the number of times the walk traverses eee (a one-client walk 0→j→00\to j\to 00→j→0 traverses {0,j}\{0,j\}{0,j} twice); its load is dr1+⋯+drmd_{r_1}+\cdots+d_{r_m}dr1​​+⋯+drm​​, with repetitions.

  • A CVRP route visits pairwise distinct clients with load at most CCC; a CVRP solution is a family R=(R1,…,RK)R=(R_1,\dots,R_K)R=(R1​,…,RK​) of routes visiting every client exactly once. Its edge vector is χ(R)e=∑kqe(Rk)\chi(R)_e=\sum_kq^e(R_k)χ(R)e​=∑k​qe(Rk​).
  • A q-route without 2-cycles is a walk of load at most CCC that may revisit clients but contains no subpath i→j→ii\to j\to ii→j→i with i≠0i\ne 0i=0.

For S⊆VS\subseteq VS⊆V, δ(S)\delta(S)δ(S) is the set of edges with one end in SSS, x(δ(S))=∑e∈δ(S)xex(\delta(S))=\sum_{e\in\delta(S)}x_ex(δ(S))=∑e∈δ(S)​xe​, and k(S)=⌈d(S)/C⌉k(S)=\lceil d(S)/C\rceilk(S)=⌈d(S)/C⌉. The paper's constraints on x∈REx\in\mathbb R^{E}x∈RE and on weights λj≥0\lambda_j\ge 0λj​≥0 of the q-routes jjj are

x(δ({i}))=2  (i∈V+)  (1),x(δ({0}))=2K  (2),x(δ(S))≥2k(S)  (S⊆V+)  (3),xe≤1  (e∈E∖δ({0}))  (4),∑jqjeλj=xe  (e∈E)  (5),∑jλj=K  (6).\begin{aligned} &x(\delta(\{i\}))=2\ \ (i\in V_+)\ \ (1), && x(\delta(\{0\}))=2K\ \ (2), && x(\delta(S))\ge 2k(S)\ \ (S\subseteq V_+)\ \ (3),\\ &x_e\le 1\ \ (e\in E\setminus\delta(\{0\}))\ \ (4), && \textstyle\sum_jq^e_j\lambda_j=x_e\ \ (e\in E)\ \ (5), && \textstyle\sum_j\lambda_j=K\ \ (6). \end{aligned}​x(δ({i}))=2  (i∈V+​)  (1),xe​≤1  (e∈E∖δ({0}))  (4),​​x(δ({0}))=2K  (2),∑j​qje​λj​=xe​  (e∈E)  (5),​​x(δ(S))≥2k(S)  (S⊆V+​)  (3),∑j​λj​=K  (6).​

P1P_1P1​ is {x≥0:(1)–(4)}\{x\ge0:(1)\text{–}(4)\}{x≥0:(1)–(4)}; P2P_2P2​ is the set of x≥0x\ge 0x≥0 satisfying (1) together with some λ≥0\lambda\ge0λ≥0 satisfying (5), (6); the Explicit Master P3P_3P3​ is the projection onto xxx of the system (1)–(6) with one λ\lambdaλ. The Dantzig–Wolfe Master (DWM) is the LP in λ\lambdaλ alone obtained by substituting (5) into (1)–(4), giving the rows (8)–(11), with objective (7) ∑j∑eℓeqjeλj\sum_j\sum_e\ell_eq^e_j\lambda_j∑j​∑e​ℓe​qje​λj​. The bounds are Li=min⁡x∈Piℓ⊤xL_i=\min_{x\in P_i}\ell^\top xLi​=minx∈Pi​​ℓ⊤x.

Formalization targets

Goal: the formulation theorem

For a loop-free graph with positive demands and capacity, and arbitrary lengths:

x∈P3∩ZE  ⟺  x=χ(R) for a CVRP solution R,P3={Qλ:λ DWM-feasible},L1, L2 ≤ L3 ≤ OPT,x\in P_3\cap\mathbb Z^{E}\iff x=\chi(R)\ \text{for a CVRP solution }R, \qquad P_3=\{Q\lambda:\lambda\ \text{DWM-feasible}\}, \qquad L_1,\,L_2\ \le\ L_3\ \le\ \mathrm{OPT},x∈P3​∩ZE⟺x=χ(R) for a CVRP solution R,P3​={Qλ:λ DWM-feasible},L1​,L2​ ≤ L3​ ≤ OPT,

with (7) equal to ℓ⊤Qλ\ell^\top Q\lambdaℓ⊤Qλ. The bounds are stated in lower-bound form: every lower bound of ℓ⊤x\ell^\top xℓ⊤x over P1P_1P1​ or P2P_2P2​ is one over P3P_3P3​, and every lower bound over P3P_3P3​ is at most the cost of every solution.

Milestones

  1. P3=P1∩P2P_3=P_1\cap P_2P3​=P1​∩P2​ (p. 5).
  2. Every CVRP route is a q-route without 2-cycles (p. 2).
  3. Validity of (1)–(4): χ(R)∈P1\chi(R)\in P_1χ(R)∈P1​, with ℓ⊤χ(R)\ell^\top\chi(R)ℓ⊤χ(R) the cost of RRR (p. 4).
  4. Validity of (5)–(6): χ(R)∈P2\chi(R)\in P_2χ(R)∈P2​, with the routes of RRR as columns (p. 4).
  5. Every integer point of P1P_1P1​ is χ(R)\chi(R)χ(R) for a solution RRR (p. 4).
  6. Constraint (6) is implied by (2) and (5) (p. 5).
  7. The DWM (8)–(11) is (1)–(4) on x=Qλx=Q\lambdax=Qλ (p. 5).
  8. A generic cut ∑eaexe≥b\sum_ea_ex_e\ge b∑e​ae​xe​≥b becomes ∑j(∑eaeqje)λj≥b\sum_j(\sum_ea_eq^e_j)\lambda_j\ge b∑j​(∑e​ae​qje​)λj​≥b (p. 5).
  9. Every integer point of P2P_2P2​ is χ(R)\chi(R)χ(R) for a solution RRR (p. 4).
  10. The reduced cost of a column is ∑ecˉeqe\sum_e\bar c_eq^e∑e​cˉe​qe (§3.1, p. 6).
  11. Scaling: a q-route for demands ⌈dv/g⌉\lceil d_v/g\rceil⌈dv​/g⌉ and capacity ⌊C/g⌋\lfloor C/g\rfloor⌊C/g⌋ is a q-route for (d,C)(d,C)(d,C) (§3.1, p. 7).

Significance

The formulation theorem is what makes the algorithm exact: integer points of P3P_3P3​ are solutions, so branching on xxx terminates at an optimum, and P3P_3P3​ is a relaxation, so L3L_3L3​ is a valid bound that dominates both classical bounds. The DWM description is what makes it computable: P3P_3P3​ is optimized by column generation over q-routes, and milestones 8 and 10 show that any cut on xxx can be added without changing the pricing problem, which remains a shortest q-route problem with edge costs cˉe\bar c_ecˉe​.

The paper proves none of these claims formally; most are stated in a sentence, and milestone 9 is stated with "It can be shown" and no proof. To our knowledge none of them has a machine-checked proof. A formal development produces a library of walks, edge incidences, cut values and column families on a general graph that later missions on branch-cut-and-price (subset-row cuts, ng-routes, other routing variants) can import.

Difficulty

Most items are linear-algebra bookkeeping on finite sums, but they require a working theory of walks: edge incidences along a closed walk, the cut value of an incidence vector, and the fact that a walk from the depot crosses every client set an even number of times. The integrality statements (milestones 5 and 9 and goal part 1) are the hard part: an integer vector satisfying degree constraints need not come from routes through the depot, and the statements must exclude every other structure. For P2P_2P2​ there are no capacity cuts at all, so the capacity of the routes must be recovered from the columns, and the paper states this case without proof. The obvious reduction "an integer point of P2P_2P2​ is an integer combination of q-routes" fails: λ\lambdaλ may be fractional even when xxx is integral.

Formalization scope

Vertices are Fin (n+1) with depot 0; edges are Sym2 (Fin (n+1)); the graph is an edge set E assumed loop-free where needed. Edge vectors are functions on all unordered pairs that vanish off E, which encodes x∈R∣E∣x\in\mathbb R^{|E|}x∈R∣E∣. Demands ddd, KKK and CCC are natural numbers; positive demands, K>0K>0K>0 and C>0C>0C>0 (the paper's standing assumptions, p. 1) are carried by the integrality statements and the goal, while ℓ≥0\ell\ge0ℓ≥0 is used by no statement and is omitted. Loads count repeated visits. The cut value x(δ(S))x(\delta(S))x(δ(S)), the demand d(S)d(S)d(S) and k(S)=⌈d(S)/C⌉k(S)=\lceil d(S)/C\rceilk(S)=⌈d(S)/C⌉ are the published definitions LysgaardCVRP.Shrink.cut, .demand and .roundedCapacityBound. The matrix QQQ is replaced by finitely supported weights on client lists ranging over all q-routes without 2-cycles. L1,L2,L3L_1,L_2,L_3L1​,L2​,L3​ and OPT are never real infima, since P3P_3P3​ is empty for infeasible instances.

Three trivializations are ruled out by construction: P3P_3P3​ is defined from the Explicit Master display, not as P1∩P2P_1\cap P_2P1​∩P2​; a CVRP solution is defined by its routes, not as an integer point of a polytope; and the columns are not a fixed finite list, which would turn P2P_2P2​ into a restricted master.

The strictness of "CVRP routes ⊊\subsetneq⊊ q-routes" (p. 2) depends on the instance and is not stated. Contributions of reusable lemmas on walks and cut values of incidence vectors are welcome, as are proofs of any milestone.

Selected references

  • R. Fukasawa, H. Longo, J. Lysgaard, M. Poggi de Aragão, M. Reis, E. Uchoa and R. F. Werneck, Robust branch-and-cut-and-price for the capacitated vehicle routing problem, Mathematical Programming 106 (2006); accepted manuscript. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10107-005-0644-x
  • N. Christofides, A. Mingozzi and P. Toth, Exact algorithms for the vehicle routing problem, based on spanning tree and shortest path relaxations, Mathematical Programming 20 (1981). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01589353
  • J. Lysgaard, A. N. Letchford and R. W. Eglese, A new branch-and-cut algorithm for the capacitated vehicle routing problem, Mathematical Programming 100 (2004). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10107-003-0481-8
  • G. B. Dantzig and J. H. Ramser, The truck dispatching problem, Management Science 6 (1959). https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.6.1.80
17 thms1 active userReviewed
Algorithmic Game TheoryLinear algebra·Captain: mikedeng1

Flows and Decompositions of Games: Harmonic and Potential Games 1: Every Finite Game Decomposes Uniquely into Potential, Harmonic and Nonstrategic ComponentsResearch Paper

Motivation

Potential games (Monderer and Shapley, 1996) are the finite games whose incentives are captured by a single function on strategy profiles: every unilateral change of strategy changes the deviator's payoff by exactly the change of a common potential. They have pure Nash equilibria, and natural learning dynamics such as better-reply and fictitious play converge in them. Most games are not potential games, however, and before Candogan, Menache, Ozdaglar and Parrilo there was no canonical way to say how far a given game is from one, or what the remainder looks like.

Their paper (arXiv:1005.2405; Math. Oper. Res. 36(3), 2011) answers this by viewing a game as a flow on a graph. The payoff differences between profiles that differ in one player's strategy form an edge flow on the game graph, and the classical Helmholtz (Hodge) decomposition of edge flows into gradient, harmonic and curl parts (Jiang, Lim, Yao, Ye, 2011) pulls back to a decomposition of the game itself. Every finite game becomes the sum of a potential game, a harmonic game and a component that carries no strategic information. The decomposition is the basis for the rest of the paper (equilibria of harmonic games, projections onto potential games, approximate equilibria) and for later work on dynamics in near-potential games.

Setting

Fix a finite set of players M\mathcal MM and, for each player mmm, a finite nonempty strategy set EmE^mEm with hm=∣Em∣h_m = |E^m|hm​=∣Em∣ elements. A strategy profile is p=(pm)m∈E=∏mEmp = (p^m)_m \in E = \prod_m E^mp=(pm)m​∈E=∏m​Em, and p−mp^{-m}p−m denotes the strategies of the players other than mmm. A game is a family of utilities u=(um)mu = (u^m)_mu=(um)m​ with um:E→Ru^m : E \to \mathbb Rum:E→R, so the space of games is GM,E≅C0M\mathcal G_{\mathcal M,E} \cong C_0^{\mathcal M}GM,E​≅C0M​, where C0={E→R}C_0 = \{E \to \mathbb R\}C0​={E→R} with ⟨φ,ψ⟩0=∑pφ(p)ψ(p)\langle \varphi,\psi\rangle_0 = \sum_p \varphi(p)\psi(p)⟨φ,ψ⟩0​=∑p​φ(p)ψ(p).

Two profiles are mmm-comparable if they are distinct and differ only in player mmm's strategy. The game graph has the profiles as nodes and an edge between comparable profiles. An edge flow is a function X:E×E→RX : E\times E\to\mathbb RX:E×E→R that is antisymmetric on edges and zero off edges; the space C1C_1C1​ of edge flows carries ⟨X,Y⟩1=12∑(p,q) edgeX(p,q)Y(p,q)\langle X,Y\rangle_1 = \tfrac12\sum_{(p,q)\text{ edge}} X(p,q)Y(p,q)⟨X,Y⟩1​=21​∑(p,q) edge​X(p,q)Y(p,q). Triangular flows C2C_2C2​ live on ordered 3-cliques.

The operators are: the gradient (δ0φ)(p,q)=W(p,q)(φ(q)−φ(p))(\delta_0\varphi)(p,q) = W(p,q)(\varphi(q)-\varphi(p))(δ0​φ)(p,q)=W(p,q)(φ(q)−φ(p)), with WWW the edge indicator; the curl (δ1X)(p,q,r)=X(p,q)+X(q,r)+X(r,p)(\delta_1X)(p,q,r) = X(p,q)+X(q,r)+X(r,p)(δ1​X)(p,q,r)=X(p,q)+X(q,r)+X(r,p) on 3-cliques; the per-player gradient (Dmφ)(p,q)=Wm(p,q)(φ(q)−φ(p))(D_m\varphi)(p,q) = W^m(p,q)(\varphi(q)-\varphi(p))(Dm​φ)(p,q)=Wm(p,q)(φ(q)−φ(p)), with WmW^mWm the indicator of mmm-comparability; and D:C0M→C1D : C_0^{\mathcal M}\to C_1D:C0M​→C1​, Du=∑mDmumDu = \sum_m D_m u^mDu=∑m​Dm​um, the flow of pairwise comparisons of uuu. Adjoints are written ∗{}^*∗ and Moore–Penrose pseudoinverses †{}^\dagger†. The space C0MC_0^{\mathcal M}C0M​ carries the unweighted inner product ∑m⟨um,vm⟩0\sum_m\langle u^m,v^m\rangle_0∑m​⟨um,vm⟩0​. Further, Δ1=δ1∗δ1+δ0δ0∗\Delta_1 = \delta_1^*\delta_1+\delta_0\delta_0^*Δ1​=δ1∗​δ1​+δ0​δ0∗​, Δ0,m=Dm∗Dm\Delta_{0,m} = D_m^*D_mΔ0,m​=Dm∗​Dm​, Πm=Dm†Dm\Pi_m = D_m^\dagger D_mΠm​=Dm†​Dm​, and Π=diag⁡(Π1,…,ΠM)\Pi = \operatorname{diag}(\Pi_1,\dots,\Pi_M)Π=diag(Π1​,…,ΠM​).

A game is normalized if ∑pmum(pm,p−m)=0\sum_{p^m} u^m(p^m,p^{-m}) = 0∑pm​um(pm,p−m)=0 for all p−mp^{-m}p−m and mmm (Definition 4.1). The potential, harmonic and nonstrategic subspaces are (Definition 4.2)

P={u∣u=Πu, Du∈im⁡δ0},H={u∣u=Πu, Du∈ker⁡δ0∗},N=ker⁡D.\mathcal P = \{u \mid u = \Pi u,\ Du\in\operatorname{im}\delta_0\},\qquad \mathcal H = \{u \mid u = \Pi u,\ Du\in\ker\delta_0^*\},\qquad \mathcal N = \ker D .P={u∣u=Πu, Du∈imδ0​},H={u∣u=Πu, Du∈kerδ0∗​},N=kerD.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 4.1

GM,E=P⊕H⊕N,\mathcal G_{\mathcal M,E} = \mathcal P\oplus\mathcal H\oplus\mathcal N,GM,E​=P⊕H⊕N,

and every game uuu splits as u=uP+uH+uNu = u_P + u_H + u_Nu=uP​+uH​+uN​ with

uP=D†δ0δ0†Du∈P,uH=D†(I−δ0δ0†)Du∈H,uN=(I−D†D)u∈N,u_P = D^\dagger\delta_0\delta_0^\dagger Du\in\mathcal P,\quad u_H = D^\dagger(I-\delta_0\delta_0^\dagger)Du\in\mathcal H,\quad u_N = (I-D^\dagger D)u\in\mathcal N,uP​=D†δ0​δ0†​Du∈P,uH​=D†(I−δ0​δ0†​)Du∈H,uN​=(I−D†D)u∈N,

where φ=δ0†Du\varphi = \delta_0^\dagger Duφ=δ0†​Du is a potential function of uPu_PuP​, i.e. DuP=δ0φDu_P = \delta_0\varphiDuP​=δ0​φ.

Milestones

  1. Theorem 3.1 (Helmholtz decomposition), on an arbitrary finite graph: C1=im⁡δ0⊕ker⁡Δ1⊕im⁡δ1∗C_1 = \operatorname{im}\delta_0\oplus\ker\Delta_1\oplus\operatorname{im}\delta_1^*C1​=imδ0​⊕kerΔ1​⊕imδ1∗​, orthogonally, with ker⁡Δ1=ker⁡δ1∩ker⁡δ0∗\ker\Delta_1 = \ker\delta_1\cap\ker\delta_0^*kerΔ1​=kerδ1​∩kerδ0∗​.
  2. Lemma 4.1: Δ0,m=hmΠm\Delta_{0,m} = h_m\Pi_mΔ0,m​=hm​Πm​.
  3. Lemma 4.2: ker⁡Dm=ker⁡Πm=ker⁡Δ0,m\ker D_m = \ker\Pi_m = \ker\Delta_{0,m}kerDm​=kerΠm​=kerΔ0,m​, with an explicit basis indexed by E−mE^{-m}E−m.
  4. Lemma 4.4 (i)–(v): Dm†=1hmDm∗D_m^\dagger = \tfrac1{h_m}D_m^*Dm†​=hm​1​Dm∗​; (∑iDi)†Dj=(∑iDi∗Di)†Dj∗Dj(\sum_iD_i)^\dagger D_j = (\sum_iD_i^*D_i)^\dagger D_j^*D_j(∑i​Di​)†Dj​=(∑i​Di∗​Di​)†Dj∗​Dj​; D†=[D1†;… ;DM†]D^\dagger = [D_1^\dagger;\dots;D_M^\dagger]D†=[D1†​;…;DM†​]; Π=D†D\Pi = D^\dagger DΠ=D†D; DD†δ0=δ0DD^\dagger\delta_0 = \delta_0DD†δ0​=δ0​.
  5. Lemma 4.5: uuu normalized   ⟺  \iff⟺ Πmum=um\Pi_mu^m = u^mΠm​um=um for all mmm   ⟺  \iff⟺ Πu=u\Pi u = uΠu=u   ⟺  \iff⟺ u∈(ker⁡D)⊥u\in(\ker D)^\perpu∈(kerD)⊥.

Lemma 4.6 (the unique normalized game with the same pairwise comparisons is Πu\Pi uΠu) is included as a supporting theorem.

Significance

The decomposition turns questions about a game into questions about its three components. The potential component inherits the equilibrium and convergence theory of potential games. The harmonic component has a sharply different structure: harmonic games generically have no pure equilibrium, and in each of them the uniformly mixed profile is a mixed equilibrium. The nonstrategic component does not affect any equilibrium notion. The closed-form expressions also give the potential game closest to a given game, and with it bounds relating the approximate equilibria of the two games. The other missions of this series formalize those consequences; all of them rest on the operator layer and the subspaces defined here.

Theorem 4.1 is proved in the paper; to our knowledge it has not been machine-checked. A formal development produces graph-flow infrastructure that Mathlib does not yet have: edge and triangular flows with their inner products, the combinatorial gradient and curl, the Helmholtz decomposition of a finite graph, and an operator Moore–Penrose pseudoinverse on finite-dimensional inner product spaces. The paper leaves Theorem 3.1 to the literature, so a full development needs a proof of it. The pseudoinverse identities of Lemma 4.4 also have a short appendix argument in the paper that a formal proof has to make complete.

Difficulty

The decomposition is not orthogonal decomposition along a single map. The subspaces P\mathcal PP and H\mathcal HH are defined through Π\PiΠ, which is assembled player by player from the DmD_mDm​, while the flow conditions involve δ0\delta_0δ0​ and the combined operator DDD. Connecting the two requires the player operators to have mutually orthogonal ranges (Dk∗Dm=0D_k^*D_m = 0Dk∗​Dm​=0 for k≠mk\ne mk=m) and the explicit form of Dm∗DmD_m^*D_mDm∗​Dm​ as a scaled projection. Without these, Π=D†D\Pi = D^\dagger DΠ=D†D (Lemma 4.4 (iv)) and DD†δ0=δ0DD^\dagger\delta_0 = \delta_0DD†δ0​=δ0​ (Lemma 4.4 (v)) are not available, and they are what make the formulas for uPu_PuP​ and uHu_HuH​ land in P\mathcal PP and H\mathcal HH. A direct attempt to apply the Helmholtz decomposition to DuDuDu produces a flow decomposition, not a game decomposition; the pullback through DDD is not formal, because DDD is neither injective nor surjective.

Formalization scope

Players form a Fintype ι; strategy sets are E : ι → Type with Fintype, DecidableEq and Nonempty instances, and hmh_mhm​ is Fintype.card (E m). Profiles are ∀ m, E m, and (qm,p−m)(q^m,p^{-m})(qm,p−m) is Function.update p m q. The game graph is a Mathlib SimpleGraph; comparability requires p≠qp\ne qp=q, so the graph has no loops, as the Laplacian (15) requires. C0C_0C0​ is EuclideanSpace ℝ on profiles. C1C_1C1​ and C2C_2C2​ are type synonyms of the subspaces of antisymmetric (resp. alternating) functions, with inner products built from (7), including the factor 12\tfrac1221​ on C1C_1C1​. Lemma 4.4 (i) fails without it. The space of games is PiLp 2 of copies of C0C_0C0​, whose inner product is the unweighted sum used on p. 14, not the weighted inner product of the paper's Section 6. Adjoints are LinearMap.adjoint. The pseudoinverse is defined explicitly as the inverse of LLL on (ker⁡L)⊥(\ker L)^\perp(kerL)⊥ composed with the orthogonal projection onto im⁡L\operatorname{im}LimL.

P\mathcal PP, H\mathcal HH and N\mathcal NN are defined by (28), not as the ranges of the component maps; the direct-sum part of the goal is stated independently of the formulas, so the goal cannot be satisfied by construction. Lemma 4.4 is split into five items, one per identity. "Orthogonal decomposition" in Theorem 3.1 is stated as pairwise orthogonality plus spanning. The paper's statements have no hypotheses beyond the setting, and none were added except nonemptiness of the strategy sets, which the paper assumes by writing Em={1,…,hm}E^m = \{1,\dots,h_m\}Em={1,…,hm​}.

Welcome contributions: a proof of the Helmholtz decomposition on a finite simple graph, general facts about the pseudoinverse (Penrose identities, L†LL^\dagger LL†L is the projection onto (ker⁡L)⊥(\ker L)^\perp(kerL)⊥, invariance under rescaling of inner products), and the explicit adjoint formulas (12) and (22).

Selected references

  • O. Candogan, I. Menache, A. Ozdaglar, P. A. Parrilo, Flows and Decompositions of Games: Harmonic and Potential Games, arXiv:1005.2405v2, 2010; Mathematics of Operations Research 36(3):474–503, 2011. https://arxiv.org/abs/1005.2405, https://doi.org/10.1287/moor.1110.0500
  • D. Monderer, L. S. Shapley, Potential Games, Games and Economic Behavior 14(1):124–143, 1996. https://doi.org/10.1006/game.1996.0044
  • X. Jiang, L.-H. Lim, Y. Yao, Y. Ye, Statistical Ranking and Combinatorial Hodge Theory, Mathematical Programming 127:203–244, 2011. https://arxiv.org/abs/0811.1067
  • R. Penrose, A generalized inverse for matrices, Mathematical Proceedings of the Cambridge Philosophical Society 51(3):406–413, 1955. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0305004100030401
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OptimizationProbability·Captain: mikedeng1

Mitigating Supply Risk: Dual Sourcing or Process Improvement? 4: The Advantage of Single Sourcing with Improvement over Dual Sourcing Increases in Supplier Cost HeterogeneityResearch Paper

Motivation

Firms that buy from unreliable suppliers have two broad ways to protect themselves against supply disruptions: dual sourcing, which splits the order between two suppliers so that a shortfall at one is cushioned by the other, and process improvement, which invests in a supplier's operations so that it fails less often. Wang, Gilland and Tomlin, Mitigating Supply Risk: Dual Sourcing or Process Improvement? (M&SOM 12(3):489–510, 2010), compare the two in a single-period model in which the uncertainty is in the supplier's capacity, not in a proportional yield.

Real supply bases are rarely symmetric. Suppliers differ in cost, reliability and capacity because of their history or location, and the paper (p. 501) cites evidence that global sourcing has widened those differences. This mission formalizes the paper's analytical answer to one question this raises: as two otherwise identical suppliers drift apart in unit cost, which strategy gains? The paper's answer (Theorem 7, p. 502) is that the advantage of single sourcing with improvement over dual sourcing grows with the cost gap.

Setting

A firm sells one product over one season with unit revenue rrr, salvage value vvv and penalty ppp per unit of unmet demand; demand X≥0X \ge 0X≥0 has a known law with finite mean. Supplier i∈{1,2}i \in \{1, 2\}i∈{1,2} has unit cost cic_ici​, committed-cost fraction ηi∈[0,1]\eta_i \in [0, 1]ηi​∈[0,1] and design capacity Ki>0K_i > 0Ki​>0. Its realized capacity loss ξi≥0\xi_i \ge 0ξi​≥0 has a continuous distribution Gi(⋅,ai)G_i(\cdot, a_i)Gi​(⋅,ai​) indexed by a reliability index aia_iai​; a larger index means a stochastically smaller loss: a≤a′a \le a'a≤a′ implies Gi(t,a)≤Gi(t,a′)G_i(t, a) \le G_i(t, a')Gi​(t,a)≤Gi​(t,a′) for all ttt. Losses are independent of each other and of demand.

An order qi≥0q_i \ge 0qi​≥0 delivers yi=min⁡{qi,(Ki−ξi)+}y_i = \min\{q_i, (K_i - \xi_i)^+\}yi​=min{qi​,(Ki​−ξi​)+} and costs (ηiqi+(1−ηi)yi)ci(\eta_i q_i + (1 - \eta_i) y_i) c_i(ηi​qi​+(1−ηi​)yi​)ci​. The realized profit is

π(q)=−∑i(ηiqi+(1−ηi)yi)ci+rmin⁡{x,∑iyi}+v(∑iyi−x)+−p(x−∑iyi)+,\pi(q) = -\sum_i (\eta_i q_i + (1-\eta_i) y_i) c_i + r\min\Big\{x, \sum_i y_i\Big\} + v\Big(\sum_i y_i - x\Big)^+ - p\Big(x - \sum_i y_i\Big)^+,π(q)=−i∑​(ηi​qi​+(1−ηi​)yi​)ci​+rmin{x,i∑​yi​}+v(i∑​yi​−x)+−p(x−i∑​yi​)+,

the second-stage expected profit is Π2(q;a)=E[π(q)]\Pi_2(q; a) = \mathbb E[\pi(q)]Π2​(q;a)=E[π(q)], and Π2∗(a)=sup⁡q≥0Π2(q;a)\Pi_2^*(a) = \sup_{q \ge 0}\Pi_2(q; a)Π2∗​(a)=supq≥0​Π2​(q;a).

  • Dual sourcing (DS) orders from both suppliers at their initial indices: ΠDS∗=Π2∗(a10,a20)\Pi^*_{DS} = \Pi_2^*(a_1^0, a_2^0)ΠDS∗​=Π2∗​(a10​,a20​).
  • Single sourcing with improvement (SSI) commits to one supplier iii, spends mizi(a)m_i z_i(a)mi​zi​(a) to try to raise its index to a≥ai0a \ge a_i^0a≥ai0​ (success probability θi\theta_iθi​), and orders only from it. With Π2∗(ai)\Pi_2^*(a_i)Π2∗​(ai​) the single-supplier optimal value, its profit is Π1(ai)=−mizi(ai)+θiΠ2∗(ai)+(1−θi)Π2∗(ai0)\Pi_1(a_i) = -m_i z_i(a_i) + \theta_i \Pi_2^*(a_i) + (1-\theta_i)\Pi_2^*(a_i^0)Π1​(ai​)=−mi​zi​(ai​)+θi​Π2∗​(ai​)+(1−θi​)Π2∗​(ai0​) (Eq. (7)), and ΠSSI∗=max⁡isup⁡a≥ai0Π1(a)\Pi^*_{SSI} = \max_i \sup_{a \ge a_i^0} \Pi_1(a)ΠSSI∗​=maxi​supa≥ai0​​Π1​(a).
  • Heterogeneity. For suppliers identical except in cost, c1=c−Δcc_1 = c - \Delta_cc1​=c−Δc​ and c2=c+Δcc_2 = c + \Delta_cc2​=c+Δc​ with 0≤Δc<c0 \le \Delta_c < c0≤Δc​<c; Δc\Delta_cΔc​ is the cost heterogeneity parameter. The committed-cost parameter Δη\Delta_\etaΔη​ is defined in the same way.

In Lean these objects are MitigateSupplyRisk.Heterogeneity.Model (with Pi2, Pi2star, PiDS, Pi1single, PiSSI, Pi1) and SymData (with costModel Δ and etaModel Δ).

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 7 (p. 502)

For suppliers identical except in unit cost,

Δc↦ΠSSI∗(Δc)−ΠDS∗(Δc)is nondecreasing on [0,c).\Delta_c \mapsto \Pi^*_{SSI}(\Delta_c) - \Pi^*_{DS}(\Delta_c) \quad\text{is nondecreasing on } [0, c).Δc​↦ΠSSI∗​(Δc​)−ΠDS∗​(Δc​)is nondecreasing on [0,c).

The statement fixes no parameter values and no particular distribution; it asserts only the direction of the effect.

Milestones

  1. Theorem 6(a) (p. 501): ΠSSI∗\Pi^*_{SSI}ΠSSI∗​ is nondecreasing in Δc\Delta_cΔc​ on [0,c)[0, c)[0,c) and in Δη\Delta_\etaΔη​ on [0,min⁡{η,1−η}][0, \min\{\eta, 1-\eta\}][0,min{η,1−η}].
  2. Theorem 6(b) (p. 501): ΠDS∗\Pi^*_{DS}ΠDS∗​ is nondecreasing in Δc\Delta_cΔc​ and in Δη\Delta_\etaΔη​ on the same ranges.
  3. Lemma 5 (p. 504): the combined-strategy profit Π1(a)\Pi_1(a)Π1​(a) of Eq. (5), which improves one or both suppliers before dual sourcing, is submodular on [a10,∞)×[a20,∞)[a_1^0, \infty) \times [a_2^0, \infty)[a10​,∞)×[a20​,∞):
Π1(a∨b)+Π1(a∧b)≤Π1(a)+Π1(b).\Pi_1(a \vee b) + \Pi_1(a \wedge b) \le \Pi_1(a) + \Pi_1(b).Π1​(a∨b)+Π1​(a∧b)≤Π1​(a)+Π1​(b).

Significance

Theorem 7 turns a strategy comparison into a comparative-statics statement: once SSI is preferred at some cost gap, it stays preferred at every larger gap, so the preference switches at most once along a cost-heterogeneity path. Theorem 6 shows separately that both strategies benefit from heterogeneity, which is immediate for a single-sourcing strategy but not for dual sourcing, where one supplier improves and the other deteriorates. Lemma 5 is the structural fact the paper uses for the combined strategy: improvement efforts at the two suppliers are substitutes.

The results are proved in the paper's online appendix, which this formalization does not use. To our knowledge none of them has a machine-checked proof. A formal development would supply reusable pieces: an expected-profit model for random capacity with integrable profits, envelope and convexity arguments for suprema of affine families, and monotone comparative statics for single- and dual-supplier newsvendor problems.

Difficulty

ΠSSI∗\Pi^*_{SSI}ΠSSI∗​ and ΠDS∗\Pi^*_{DS}ΠDS∗​ are both nondecreasing in Δc\Delta_cΔc​ (Theorem 6), so the goal compares the growth rates of two optimal values. Neither has a closed form. Both are suprema of families affine in Δc\Delta_cΔc​, so they are convex but may have kinks, and an optimal improvement level need not exist when the index set [a0,∞)[a^0, \infty)[a0,∞) is unbounded. The comparison concerns orders at different cost levels and under different strategies, so it needs a link between the dual-sourcing order from the cheaper supplier and the single-sourcing order and its response to improvement. Evaluating each side at a fixed optimizer does not give it, because the two optimizers move with Δc\Delta_cΔc​. For Lemma 5, submodularity of Π2(q;a)\Pi_2(q; a)Π2​(q;a) in aaa for each fixed qqq does not pass to the supremum over qqq by itself.

Formalization scope

  • Representation. Suppliers are indexed by Fin 2. Each Gi(⋅,a)G_i(\cdot, a)Gi​(⋅,a) is the cdf of a measure ν i a on ℝ. Expectations are Bochner integrals against the product of the two loss laws and the demand law. The integrand is bounded by a constant times 1+∣x∣1 + |x|1+∣x∣, so the integrals are genuine.
  • Optimal values. Optimal values are real suprema over q≥0q \ge 0q≥0 and a≥ai0a \ge a_i^0a≥ai0​. Under the standing assumptions every such set is nonempty and bounded above by (r+∣v∣)(K1+K2)(r + |v|)(K_1 + K_2)(r+∣v∣)(K1​+K2​), so no supremum takes Lean's default value. ΠSSI∗\Pi^*_{SSI}ΠSSI∗​ is the early-commitment value and maximizes over the choice of supplier; it does not fix supplier 1.
  • Standing assumptions (fields of Model.Standing and SymData.Standing):
    • the demand is a probability law on [0,∞)[0, \infty)[0,∞) with finite mean;
    • each loss law is a continuous probability law on [0,∞)[0, \infty)[0,∞), stochastically decreasing in the index;
    • ηi∈[0,1]\eta_i \in [0, 1]ηi​∈[0,1], Ki>0K_i > 0Ki​>0, θi∈[0,1]\theta_i \in [0, 1]θi​∈[0,1], mi≥0m_i \ge 0mi​≥0;
    • ziz_izi​ is convex and nondecreasing on [ai0,∞)[a_i^0, \infty)[ai0​,∞) with zi(ai0)=0z_i(a_i^0) = 0zi​(ai0​)=0.
  • Disclosed readings.
    • r≥0r \ge 0r≥0, p≥0p \ge 0p≥0 and ci≥0c_i \ge 0ci​≥0 (c>0c > 0c>0 in the heterogeneity statements, so that c1>0c_1 > 0c1​>0) are the paper's readings of revenue, penalty and cost.
    • v<r+pv < r + pv<r+p is implicit in the paper's Eq. (2), which divides by r+p−vr + p - vr+p−v.
    • The effort function zi(a)z_i(a)zi​(a) is taken as the primitive, as on p. 493. This presumes that every index a≥ai0a \ge a_i^0a≥ai0​ is reachable.
    • Δη\Delta_\etaΔη​ ranges over [0,min⁡{η,1−η}][0, \min\{\eta, 1-\eta\}][0,min{η,1−η}], the reading of "analogously" (p. 501) that keeps both committed costs in [0,1][0, 1][0,1].
  • Weak monotonicity. "Increasing" is weak (p. 492) and is stated as MonotoneOn.
  • Corrections. No printed slip is corrected in this mission.
  • Not formalized. Theorem 7 is stated without η=0\eta = 0η=0 and without concavity of GGG in aaa, as on the page. The ΔK\Delta_KΔK​ and Δa\Delta_aΔa​ clauses of Theorem 6 are not formalized, because the paper does not pin down how the improvement function depends on an initial index that differs between suppliers. Theorem 8 is also left out.
  • Non-trivialization. Both values are recomputed as optimal values of the model at every Δc\Delta_cΔc​. Defining them by a formula, fixing an optimizer at Δc=0\Delta_c = 0Δc​=0, or hard-coding supplier 1 as the single source would trivialize the goal, and none of these is done.

Contributions are welcome at every level: integrability and boundedness lemmas for Π2\Pi_2Π2​, convexity of the optimal values in Δ\DeltaΔ, the symmetry argument behind Theorem 6(b), and monotone comparative statics of single-supplier orders in the reliability index.

Selected references

  • Y. Wang, W. Gilland, B. Tomlin, Mitigating Supply Risk: Dual Sourcing or Process Improvement?, Manufacturing & Service Operations Management 12(3):489–510, 2010. https://doi.org/10.1287/msom.1090.0279
  • J. Hazra, B. Mahadevan, Impact of supply base heterogeneity in electronic markets, European Journal of Operational Research 174(3):1580–1594, 2006 (cited on p. 501 of the paper for the growth of supply-base heterogeneity).
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CombinatoricsGraph Theory·Captain: mikedeng1

On Metric Generators of Graphs 3: A Connected Minimum T-Join Exists Exactly When μ_G|T Is a Tree Metric Whose Minimal Realization Is a T′-Join Embedding Isometrically in GResearch Paper

Motivation

A TTT-join of a graph GGG is a set of edges FFF such that exactly the vertices of a prescribed even set TTT have odd degree in FFF. Minimum TTT-joins are a classical object of combinatorial optimization: they contain shortest paths (∣T∣=2|T|=2∣T∣=2), Chinese postman tours and perfect matchings as special cases, and their duality with TTT-cuts connects them to integral multiflows. Whether the minimum size τ(G,T)\tau(G,T)τ(G,T) of a TTT-join equals the maximum number ν(G,T)\nu(G,T)ν(G,T) of disjoint TTT-cuts has been studied extensively; equality always holds in bipartite graphs (Seymour 1981).

Sebő and Tannier (Math. Oper. Res. 2004) study the number of connected components of a minimum TTT-join, motivated by the observation that a minimum TTT-join with few components yields a large integral packing of TTT-cuts. Deciding whether some minimum TTT-join has at most kkk components is NP-complete in general (their Theorem 5). This mission formalizes the opposite end, k=1k=1k=1: Theorem 6 characterizes exactly when a minimum TTT-join can be chosen connected, in terms of the shortest-path metric of GGG restricted to TTT. The result first appeared in the authors' IPCO paper Connected joins in graphs (2001); the 2004 article derives it from its theory of isometric embeddings.

Setting

All graphs are finite, simple, undirected and connected. For vertices x,yx,yx,y of GGG, μG(x,y)\mu_G(x,y)μG​(x,y) is the number of edges of a shortest xxx–yyy path. For T⊆V(G)T\subseteq V(G)T⊆V(G), μG∣T\mu_G|_TμG​∣T​ is the restriction of μG\mu_GμG​ to pairs of vertices of TTT.

For an edge set F⊆E(G)F\subseteq E(G)F⊆E(G), deg⁡F(v)\deg_F(v)degF​(v) is the number of edges of FFF at vvv; FFF is a TTT-join if deg⁡F(v)\deg_F(v)degF​(v) is odd exactly when v∈Tv\in Tv∈T. A minimum TTT-join has the fewest edges among all TTT-joins; a minimal one has no proper subset that is a TTT-join. V(F)V(F)V(F) is the set of endpoints of edges of FFF; FFF is connected (a tree) when the graph (V(F),F)(V(F),F)(V(F),F) is connected (a tree), and μF\mu_FμF​ is the distance in (V(F),F)(V(F),F)(V(F),F).

An isometry from (X,μ)(X,\mu)(X,μ) to (Y,ν)(Y,\nu)(Y,ν) is a map fff with ν(f(x),f(y))=μ(x,y)\nu(f(x),f(y))=\mu(x,y)ν(f(x),f(y))=μ(x,y) for all x,yx,yx,y. A metric μ\muμ on a finite set XXX is a tree metric if there is a tree AAA (unit edge lengths) and an isometry ggg from (X,μ)(X,\mu)(X,μ) to AAA; the pair (A,g)(A,g)(A,g) is a realization. A realization is inclusionwise minimal if no proper subtree of AAA contains g(X)g(X)g(X). A tree AAA is an SSS-join if its vertices of odd degree are exactly those of SSS.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 6

For GGG connected and TTT nonempty of even cardinality,

∃ F minimum connected T-join  ⟺  {μG∣T is a tree metric, and for its minimal realization (A,g), T′:=g(T):A is a T′-join,∃ φ:V(A)→V(G) isometry with φ(g(t))=t (t∈T).\exists\,F\ \text{minimum connected }T\text{-join} \iff \begin{cases}\mu_G|_T \text{ is a tree metric, and for its minimal realization }(A,g),\ T':=g(T):\\ A \text{ is a } T'\text{-join},\\ \exists\,\varphi:V(A)\to V(G)\ \text{isometry with } \varphi(g(t))=t\ (t\in T).\end{cases}∃F minimum connected T-join⟺⎩⎨⎧​μG​∣T​ is a tree metric, and for its minimal realization (A,g), T′:=g(T):A is a T′-join,∃φ:V(A)→V(G) isometry with φ(g(t))=t (t∈T).​

The conditions are required of every minimal realization; all of them are isomorphic.

Milestones

  1. (p. 389) A minimal TTT-join is the edge-disjoint union of ∣T∣/2|T|/2∣T∣/2 paths pairing the vertices of TTT.
  2. (p. 391) In every realization of μ\muμ, the distance from g(x)g(x)g(x) to the g(y)g(y)g(y)–g(z)g(z)g(z) path equals 12(μ(x,y)+μ(x,z)−μ(y,z))\tfrac12(\mu(x,y)+\mu(x,z)-\mu(y,z))21​(μ(x,y)+μ(x,z)−μ(y,z)).
  3. (p. 391) A tree metric has an inclusionwise minimal realization, unique up to an isomorphism respecting the realization maps.
  4. (Lemma 2, p. 392) A connected TTT-join FFF is minimum if and only if FFF is a tree and μF=μG\mu_F=\mu_GμF​=μG​ on V(F)V(F)V(F).
  5. (p. 392) If AAA is a T′T'T′-join and φ\varphiφ an isometry from AAA to GGG extending g−1g^{-1}g−1, the image of AAA under φ\varphiφ is a TTT-join that is a tree with μF=μG\mu_F=\mu_GμF​=μG​ on V(F)V(F)V(F).

Significance

Theorem 6 turns the existence of a connected minimum TTT-join, a question about all TTT-joins of GGG, into conditions on the finite metric μG∣T\mu_G|_TμG​∣T​ alone plus one isometric embedding of a tree into GGG. Tree metrics can be recognized and their minimal realization constructed efficiently (Buneman 1974), and the embedding problem is the one solved in §2 of the paper, since T′T'T′ contains all leaves of AAA. The authors deduce that connected minimum TTT-joins can be found in polynomial time, which contrasts with the NP-completeness of the same question for kkk components. A consequence stated in the paper: if the minimal realization of μG∣T\mu_G|_TμG​∣T​ is not a T′T'T′-join, then no minimum TTT-join is connected.

The result is proved in the paper. No machine-checked version of Theorem 6, of Lemma 2, or of the uniqueness of minimal tree realizations is known to exist; Mathlib has graph distances, trees and walks, but neither TTT-joins nor tree metrics. The mission produces these definitions and a formal proof of the characterization; the complexity consequence is out of scope.

Difficulty

The central difficulty is in the necessity direction. A connected minimum TTT-join FFF is itself a minimal realization of μG∣T\mu_G|_TμG​∣T​ (Lemma 2), so FFF satisfies the conditions; but the conditions concern the minimal realization, and transferring them from FFF to an arbitrary minimal realization requires that minimal realizations are unique up to a label-preserving isomorphism. That uniqueness (milestone 3) is the step where the obvious approach stops: it is a statement about all trees realizing a metric, not about the graph GGG.

Formalization scope

  • Graphs are SimpleGraph V with [Fintype V] [DecidableEq V]; G.Connected is a hypothesis of every statement about GGG (SimpleGraph.dist is 000 on unreachable pairs). Distances are natural numbers (SimpleGraph.dist).
  • Edge sets are Finset (Sym2 V). Connectivity, the tree property and μF\mu_FμF​ refer to the graph with edge set FFF induced on V(F)V(F)V(F), not on all of VVV.
  • "Minimum" is "∣F∣≤∣F′∣|F|\le|F'|∣F∣≤∣F′∣ for every TTT-join F′F'F′", never an infimum over N\mathbb NN.
  • A realization is a tree on Fin N together with a map g:X→g:X\tog:X→ Fin N; this avoids quantifying over a universe. A tree metric must satisfy μ(x,y)=0⇒x=y\mu(x,y)=0\Rightarrow x=yμ(x,y)=0⇒x=y.
  • "The unique minimal realization" is encoded by quantifying over all inclusionwise minimal realizations. A goal that only asks for some minimal realization satisfying the conditions is a different, weaker statement (its necessity half needs no uniqueness) and is not this mission's target.
  • T≠∅T\neq\emptysetT=∅ is added: for T=∅T=\emptysetT=∅ the minimum TTT-join is empty and its connectivity is only a convention.
  • "fff is the inverse of ggg and φ\varphiφ extends fff" is encoded as φ(g(t))=t\varphi(g(t))=tφ(g(t))=t. Isometries preserve all distances, not only adjacency.
  • Halving and subtraction (milestone 2) are multiplied out.

Reusable beyond this mission: the TTT-join vocabulary, the path decomposition of minimal TTT-joins, and tree metrics with the uniqueness of minimal realizations. Contributions to any milestone are welcome, as are alternative proofs of milestone 3.

Selected references

  • András Sebő, Eric Tannier, On Metric Generators of Graphs, Mathematics of Operations Research 29(2):383–393, 2004. https://doi.org/10.1287/moor.1030.0070
  • András Sebő, Eric Tannier, Connected joins in graphs, Integer Programming and Combinatorial Optimization (IPCO 2001), Lecture Notes in Computer Science 2081, 383–395, 2001. https://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-45535-3
  • Peter Buneman, A note on the metric properties of trees, Journal of Combinatorial Theory, Series B 17:48–50, 1974. https://doi.org/10.1016/0095-8956(74)90047-1
  • Paul Seymour, On odd cuts and plane multicommodity flows, Proceedings of the London Mathematical Society 42:178–192, 1981. https://doi.org/10.1112/plms/s3-42.1.178
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Bandit AlgorithmsProbability·Captain: mikedeng1

Linearly Parameterized Bandits 4: For Finitely Many Arms, the Uncertainty Ellipsoid Policy Has Regret at Most a₆|U|‖z‖ + a₇|U| Σᵤ min{log T/Δᵘ(z), TΔᵘ(z)}Research Paper

Motivation

In a linearly parameterized bandit, the expected rewards of many arms are driven by a small number of unknown parameters. Each arm is a vector u∈Rru \in \mathbb R^ru∈Rr, and its expected reward is the inner product u′Zu'Zu′Z with an unknown parameter vector ZZZ. Problems of this kind arise in marketing and revenue management, where each product is described by rrr features (price, popularity, …) and the expected revenues of thousands of products are, to a good approximation, linear in a few unknown feature weights. Pulling one arm then reveals information about all of them, and a good policy has to exploit this correlation.

Rusmevichientong and Tsitsiklis (arXiv:0812.3465v2, 2010) studied this model with unbounded, sub-Gaussian noise and a prior on ZZZ. They proved an Ω(rT)\Omega(r\sqrt T)Ω(rT​) lower bound, a matching policy for smooth arm sets, and the Uncertainty Ellipsoid (UE) policy for arbitrary arm sets. This mission formalizes their Theorem 4.2: when the set of arms is finite, the regret of UE grows like log⁡T\log TlogT, within a constant factor of the Lai–Robbins lower bound for the classical multi-armed bandit (Lai and Robbins, 1985).

Timeline.

  • 1985: Lai and Robbins prove that, for independent arms, the regret of any uniformly good policy grows at least like log⁡T\log TlogT, and give policies attaining it.
  • 2002: Auer, Cesa-Bianchi and Fischer give the finite-time UCB1 analysis (doi:10.1023/A:1013689704352), whose pull-count argument the UE analysis adapts. Auer, in the same year, studies linear payoffs with confidence bounds (JMLR 3).
  • 2010: Rusmevichientong and Tsitsiklis treat unbounded sub-Gaussian noise with an anytime policy (UE), and prove the log⁡T\log TlogT regret and log⁡2T\log^2 Tlog2T Bayes-risk bounds for finitely many arms formalized here.

Setting

Let r≥2r \ge 2r≥2 and let Ur⊂Rr\mathcal U_r \subset \mathbb R^rUr​⊂Rr be a finite, nonempty set of arms. Fix z∈Rrz \in \mathbb R^rz∈Rr, the value of the unknown parameter. Playing arm uuu in period ttt yields the reward Xt=u′z+WtX_t = u'z + W_tXt​=u′z+Wt​. The noise WtW_tWt​ is drawn afresh in each period from a law νu\nu_uνu​ that depends only on the arm played, independently of the past. A policy chooses the arm Ut+1U_{t+1}Ut+1​ of period t+1t+1t+1 as a function of the history Ht=(U1,X1,…,Ut,Xt)H_t = (U_1, X_1, \dots, U_t, X_t)Ht​=(U1​,X1​,…,Ut​,Xt​). The regret given Z=zZ = zZ=z is

Regret(z,T,ψ)=∑t=1TE[max⁡v∈Urv′z−Ut′z ∣ Z=z],\mathrm{Regret}(z, T, \psi) = \sum_{t=1}^T \mathbb E\Big[\max_{v \in \mathcal U_r} v'z - U_t'z \,\Big|\, Z = z\Big],Regret(z,T,ψ)=t=1∑T​E[v∈Ur​max​v′z−Ut′​z​Z=z],

and for a prior μ\muμ of ZZZ the Bayes risk is Risk(T,ψ)=EZ∼μ[Regret(Z,T,ψ)]\mathrm{Risk}(T, \psi) = \mathbb E_{Z \sim \mu}[\mathrm{Regret}(Z, T, \psi)]Risk(T,ψ)=EZ∼μ​[Regret(Z,T,ψ)]. The gap of arm uuu is Δu(z)=max⁡v∈Urv′z−u′z\Delta^u(z) = \max_{v \in \mathcal U_r} v'z - u'zΔu(z)=maxv∈Ur​​v′z−u′z, and Nu(z,T)N^u(z, T)Nu(z,T) is the number of periods among the first TTT in which uuu is played.

Assumption 1.

  • (a) Every νu\nu_uνu​ has mean zero and E[exW]≤ex2σ02/2\mathbb E[e^{xW}] \le e^{x^2\sigma_0^2/2}E[exW]≤ex2σ02​/2 for all xxx.
  • (b) Every arm has norm at most uˉ\bar uuˉ, and Ur\mathcal U_rUr​ contains rrr linearly independent arms b1,…,brb_1, \dots, b_rb1​,…,br​ with λmin⁡(∑kbkbk′)≥λ0\lambda_{\min}(\sum_k b_kb_k') \ge \lambda_0λmin​(∑k​bk​bk′​)≥λ0​.

The UE policy first plays b1,…,brb_1, \dots, b_rb1​,…,br​. It then forms the least squares estimate Z^t=Ct∑s≤tUsXs\widehat Z_t = C_t\sum_{s\le t}U_sX_sZt​=Ct​∑s≤t​Us​Xs​ with Ct=(∑s≤tUsUs′)−1C_t = (\sum_{s \le t} U_sU_s')^{-1}Ct​=(∑s≤t​Us​Us′​)−1, and plays an arm maximizing v′Z^t+Rtvv'\widehat Z_t + R^v_tv′Zt​+Rtv​. The uncertainty radius is

Rtv=αlog⁡tmin⁡{rlog⁡t,∣Ur∣} v′Ctv,R^v_t = \alpha\sqrt{\log t}\sqrt{\min\{r\log t, |\mathcal U_r|\}}\,\sqrt{v'C_tv},Rtv​=αlogt​min{rlogt,∣Ur​∣}​v′Ct​v​,

with α=4σ0κ02\alpha = 4\sigma_0\kappa_0^2α=4σ0​κ02​ and κ0=21+log⁡(1+36uˉ2/λ0)\kappa_0 = 2\sqrt{1 + \log(1 + 36\bar u^2/\lambda_0)}κ0​=21+log(1+36uˉ2/λ0​)​. Ties are broken arbitrarily.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 4.2

There are constants a6,a7>0a_6, a_7 > 0a6​,a7​>0 depending only on σ0,uˉ,λ0\sigma_0, \bar u, \lambda_0σ0​,uˉ,λ0​ such that for all T≥r+1T \ge r+1T≥r+1 and zzz,

Regret(z,T,UE)≤a6∣Ur∣ ∥z∥+a7∣Ur∣∑u∈Urmin⁡{log⁡TΔu(z),TΔu(z)}.\mathrm{Regret}(z, T, \mathrm{UE}) \le a_6|\mathcal U_r|\,\|z\| + a_7|\mathcal U_r|\sum_{u \in \mathcal U_r}\min\Big\{\frac{\log T}{\Delta^u(z)}, T\Delta^u(z)\Big\}.Regret(z,T,UE)≤a6​∣Ur​∣∥z∥+a7​∣Ur​∣u∈Ur​∑​min{Δu(z)logT​,TΔu(z)}.

If moreover each Δu(Z)\Delta^u(Z)Δu(Z) has a point mass at 000 and a density bounded by M0M_0M0​ on R+\mathbb R_+R+​, there are a8,a9>0a_8, a_9 > 0a8​,a9​>0 depending only on σ0,uˉ,λ0,M0\sigma_0, \bar u, \lambda_0, M_0σ0​,uˉ,λ0​,M0​ with

Risk(T,UE)≤a8∣Ur∣ E∥Z∥+a9∣Ur∣2log⁡2T.\mathrm{Risk}(T, \mathrm{UE}) \le a_8|\mathcal U_r|\,\mathbb E\|Z\| + a_9|\mathcal U_r|^2\log^2 T.Risk(T,UE)≤a8​∣Ur​∣E∥Z∥+a9​∣Ur​∣2log2T.

The constants are left unspecified, as in the paper. Their existence, uniformly in rrr and in the arm set, is the content.

Milestones

  • Theorem B.1 and Theorem B.2: Chernoff-type deviation bounds for adaptive least squares, with factors t5∣Ur∣t^{5|\mathcal U_r|}t5∣Ur​∣ and trκ02t^{r\kappa_0^2}trκ02​.
  • Lemma B.6: the radius RtuR^u_tRtu​ is exceeded with probability at most 1/t21/t^21/t2.
  • The pull-count bound of App. B.3: E[Nu(z,T)]≤6+4α2∣Ur∣log⁡T/Δu(z)2\mathbb E[N^u(z,T)] \le 6 + 4\alpha^2|\mathcal U_r|\log T/\Delta^u(z)^2E[Nu(z,T)]≤6+4α2∣Ur​∣logT/Δu(z)2 for every suboptimal arm.
  • The regret decomposition Regret=∑uΔu(z) E[Nu(z,T)]\mathrm{Regret} = \sum_u\Delta^u(z)\,\mathbb E[N^u(z,T)]Regret=∑u​Δu(z)E[Nu(z,T)].
  • The risk bound E[min⁡{log⁡T/Δu(Z),TΔu(Z)}]≤(M0+1)log⁡T+M0log⁡2T\mathbb E[\min\{\log T/\Delta^u(Z), T\Delta^u(Z)\}] \le (M_0+1)\log T + M_0\log^2 TE[min{logT/Δu(Z),TΔu(Z)}]≤(M0​+1)logT+M0​log2T.

Significance

The result. For a fixed finite arm set, Theorem 4.2 shows that a single anytime policy, which does not know TTT, has regret O(log⁡T)O(\log T)O(logT) for every parameter and Bayes risk O(log⁡2T)O(\log^2 T)O(log2T). It does this with unbounded noise and correlated arms. The dependence on the problem enters only through the gaps Δu(z)\Delta^u(z)Δu(z) and the number of arms. The companion result for general compact arm sets (Theorem 4.1) gives only O~(rT)\tilde O(r\sqrt T)O~(rT​). The finite case shows that the same policy adapts to the easier problem.

Formalizing it. The theorem is proved on paper. As far as is known, it has no machine-checked proof. The platform's finite-armed bandit library (Lattimore–Szepesvári) has the regret decomposition and UCB pull-count bounds for independent arms, e.g. BanditAlgorithm.bandit_regret_decomposition. Those statements live in a different model and do not apply to correlated linear rewards with a least squares estimator. This mission adds:

  • self-normalized deviation bounds for adaptively collected least squares estimates, under per-arm sub-Gaussian noise;
  • a pull-count analysis that runs through a matrix-valued confidence radius;
  • the Bayes-risk integration under a density condition.

Difficulty

The arms are chosen adaptively, so the design matrix ∑sUsUs′\sum_s U_sU_s'∑s​Us​Us′​ is random and depends on the noise. Applied with the realized CtC_tCt​, the classical Chernoff bound for a fixed weighted sum of independent noises is not valid. The obvious union bound over arms does not apply either: the event concerns the random matrix CtC_tCt​, not one arm. In the pull-count bound, the radius of arm uuu must be controlled through the number of times uuu was played, although CtC_tCt​ mixes all arms, and the Gram matrix of the other arms may be singular.

Formalization scope

  • Space. Rr\mathbb R^rRr is EuclideanSpace ℝ (Fin r), so ∥⋅∥\|\cdot\|∥⋅∥ is Euclidean. The source is arXiv:0812.3465v2; its printed page numbers equal the PDF's.
  • Model.
    • The arm set is a finite nonempty Set, and ∣Ur∣|\mathcal U_r|∣Ur​∣ is its ncard. Theorem B.2 and Lemma B.6, which the paper states for any compact arm set, are stated for compact nonempty arm sets, as printed.
    • The noise is a Markov kernel u↦νuu \mapsto \nu_uu↦νu​.
    • The law of the history given Z=zZ = zZ=z is built period by period, with fresh noise from νUt+1\nu_{U_{t+1}}νUt+1​​. This is the paper's model: noises independent of each other and of ZZZ, identically distributed in ttt, mean zero.
    • Policies are deterministic and history-dependent, with measurable selection rules. The paper uses this measurability implicitly.
    • Regret is Tmax⁡vv′z−E[∑tUt′z]T\max_v v'z - \mathbb E[\sum_t U_t'z]Tmaxv​v′z−E[∑t​Ut′​z].
    • Assumption 1(a) is an mgf bound written with a lower integral, so the exponential moments are finite. Assumption 1(b) writes λmin⁡≥λ0\lambda_{\min} \ge \lambda_0λmin​≥λ0​ as λ0∥x∥2≤∑k(bk′x)2\lambda_0\|x\|^2 \le \sum_k (b_k'x)^2λ0​∥x∥2≤∑k​(bk′​x)2.
    • A UE run is any measurable policy that plays b1,…,brb_1, \dots, b_rb1​,…,br​ first and then an arg max of (7). The theorems hold for every tie-breaking rule.
  • Constants. They are quantified before rrr, the arm set, the noise, the policy, TTT, zzz and the prior, so they cannot depend on any of these.
  • Corrections and added hypotheses.
    • The pull-count bound is stated for arms with Δu(z)>0\Delta^u(z) > 0Δu(z)>0. As printed, it divides by a zero gap for an optimal arm.
    • The risk part assumes E∥Z∥<∞\mathbb E\|Z\| < \inftyE∥Z∥<∞ and concludes the integrability of the regret.
  • Conventions.
    • An optimal arm contributes min⁡{log⁡T/0,0}=0\min\{\log T/0, 0\} = 0min{logT/0,0}=0, the paper's reading and Lean's value.
    • The density condition says that, on (0,∞)(0,\infty)(0,∞), the law of Δu(Z)\Delta^u(Z)Δu(Z) is at most M0M_0M0​ times Lebesgue measure.
  • No trivializing reading. The regret is never a junk-valued integral that makes the bound free: the integrand is bounded and measurable, and a junk value would only raise the regret. The width min⁡{rlog⁡t,∣Ur∣}\min\{r\log t, |\mathcal U_r|\}min{rlogt,∣Ur​∣} uses the true cardinality, so the radius is not zero.
  • Contributions welcome. Reusable pieces are the history-measure construction, Chernoff bounds for adaptive designs, and the deviation bounds of Theorems B.1–B.2, which the companion mission on general compact arm sets also needs.

Selected references

  • P. Rusmevichientong, J. N. Tsitsiklis, Linearly Parameterized Bandits, arXiv:0812.3465v2, 24 Feb 2010. https://arxiv.org/abs/0812.3465
  • T. L. Lai, H. Robbins, Asymptotically efficient adaptive allocation rules, Advances in Applied Mathematics 6, 1985. https://doi.org/10.1016/0196-8858(85)90002-8
  • P. Auer, N. Cesa-Bianchi, P. Fischer, Finite-time analysis of the multiarmed bandit problem, Machine Learning 47, 2002. https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1013689704352
  • P. Auer, Using confidence bounds for exploitation–exploration trade-offs, JMLR 3, 2002. https://www.jmlr.org/papers/v3/auer02a.html
  • V. H. de la Peña, M. J. Klass, T. L. Lai, Self-normalized processes: exponential inequalities, moment bounds and iterated logarithm laws, Annals of Probability 32, 2004. https://doi.org/10.1214/009117904000000397
12 thms1 active userReviewed
OptimizationProbability·Captain: mikedeng1

Mitigating Supply Risk: Dual Sourcing or Process Improvement? 3: Late Commitment Strictly Beats Early Commitment When the Costlier Supplier's Improved Gain Exceeds mz/(θ(1−θ))Research Paper

Motivation

Firms that buy from unreliable suppliers can protect themselves in two ways: they can spread orders across several suppliers, or they can invest in improving a supplier's reliability, for example through supplier-development programmes or joint process-improvement projects. Wang, Gilland and Tomlin (MSOM 12(3):489–510, 2010) compare the two strategies in a newsvendor model with random supplier capacity.

This mission formalizes one part of that comparison: single sourcing with improvement, in which improvement efforts may fail. The firm must then decide when to choose its supplier. Under early commitment it picks one supplier, invests in it, and buys from it whatever the outcome. Under late commitment it invests in both suppliers, observes which efforts succeeded, and only then buys from the better one. Empirical work on supplier development documents both practices and the reluctance of suppliers whose improvement efforts previously failed (Handfield et al. 2000, as cited by Wang et al. 2010, p. 496; Krause et al. 2007). The question is how much the option to postpone the choice is worth.

Setting

A firm sells a single product over one season. It earns a unit revenue r≥0r\ge 0r≥0, salvages leftovers at vvv, and pays a penalty p≥0p\ge 0p≥0 per unit of unmet demand, with v<r+pv<r+pv<r+p. Demand XXX is nonnegative with finite mean.

Supplier i∈{1,2}i\in\{1,2\}i∈{1,2} has design capacity Ki>0K_i>0Ki​>0, unit cost ci≥0c_i\ge 0ci​≥0 and committed-cost fraction ηi∈[0,1]\eta_i\in[0,1]ηi​∈[0,1]. Its capacity loss ξi≥0\xi_i\ge 0ξi​≥0 has a continuous distribution Gi(⋅,ai)G_i(\cdot,a_i)Gi​(⋅,ai​) that depends on a reliability index aia_iai​; a higher index means a stochastically smaller loss. An order qi≥0q_i\ge 0qi​≥0 delivers yi=min⁡{qi,(Ki−ξi)+}y_i=\min\{q_i,(K_i-\xi_i)^+\}yi​=min{qi​,(Ki​−ξi​)+}. The firm pays (ηiqi+(1−ηi)yi)ci(\eta_iq_i+(1-\eta_i)y_i)c_i(ηi​qi​+(1−ηi​)yi​)ci​, and the realized profit of single sourcing from iii is

π(qi)=−(ηiqi+(1−ηi)yi)ci+rmin⁡{x,yi}+v(yi−x)+−p(x−yi)+.\pi(q_i)=-(\eta_iq_i+(1-\eta_i)y_i)c_i+r\min\{x,y_i\}+v(y_i-x)^+-p(x-y_i)^+ .π(qi​)=−(ηi​qi​+(1−ηi​)yi​)ci​+rmin{x,yi​}+v(yi​−x)+−p(x−yi​)+.

The second-stage expected profit is Π2(qi;ai)=E[π(qi)]\Pi_2(q_i;a_i)=\mathsf E[\pi(q_i)]Π2​(qi​;ai​)=E[π(qi​)], and Pi(ai)=Π2∗(ai)=sup⁡qi≥0Π2(qi;ai)P_i(a_i)=\Pi_2^*(a_i)=\sup_{q_i\ge 0}\Pi_2(q_i;a_i)Pi​(ai​)=Π2∗​(ai​)=supqi​≥0​Π2​(qi​;ai​) is its optimal value.

Improvement. Supplier iii starts at index ai0a_i^0ai0​. Effort to reach index ai≥ai0a_i\ge a_i^0ai​≥ai0​ costs mizi(ai)m_iz_i(a_i)mi​zi​(ai​), where ziz_izi​ is convex and increasing with zi(ai0)=0z_i(a_i^0)=0zi​(ai0​)=0. The effort succeeds with probability θi\theta_iθi​; on failure the index stays at ai0a_i^0ai0​.

  • Early commitment to supplier iii yields
Π1iE(ai)=−mizi(ai)+θiPi(ai)+(1−θi)Pi(ai0),\Pi_{1i}^E(a_i)=-m_iz_i(a_i)+\theta_iP_i(a_i)+(1-\theta_i)P_i(a_i^0),Π1iE​(ai​)=−mi​zi​(ai​)+θi​Pi​(ai​)+(1−θi​)Pi​(ai0​),

and Π1∗E=max⁡isup⁡ai≥ai0Π1iE(ai)\Pi_1^{*E}=\max_i\sup_{a_i\ge a_i^0}\Pi_{1i}^E(a_i)Π1∗E​=maxi​supai​≥ai0​​Π1iE​(ai​).

  • Late commitment yields Π1L(a1,a2)\Pi_1^L(a_1,a_2)Π1L​(a1​,a2​): the improvement costs, plus, for each of the four success/failure outcomes, its probability times max⁡{P1(⋅),P2(⋅)}\max\{P_1(\cdot),P_2(\cdot)\}max{P1​(⋅),P2​(⋅)} at the realized indices (Eq. (9)). Π1∗L\Pi_1^{*L}Π1∗L​ is its supremum over a1≥a10a_1\ge a_1^0a1​≥a10​, a2≥a20a_2\ge a_2^0a2​≥a20​.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 5

Let the suppliers be identical except for their unit costs, c1≤c2c_1\le c_2c1​≤c2​, with common θ∈(0,1)\theta\in(0,1)θ∈(0,1), mmm, zzz and a0a^0a0, and let a2∗Ea_2^{*E}a2∗E​ be an optimal early-commitment index of supplier 2. Then

[P2(a2∗E)−P1(a10)]+>m z(a2∗E)θ(1−θ)⟹Π1∗L>Π1∗E.\bigl[P_2(a_2^{*E})-P_1(a_1^0)\bigr]^+>\frac{m\,z(a_2^{*E})}{\theta(1-\theta)}\quad\Longrightarrow\quad\Pi_1^{*L}>\Pi_1^{*E}.[P2​(a2∗E​)−P1​(a10​)]+>θ(1−θ)mz(a2∗E​)​⟹Π1∗L​>Π1∗E​.

Milestones, in the paper's order

  1. Lemma 2(b), single-supplier instance: PiP_iPi​ is increasing in the index.
  2. Theorem 4(a), cost-only instance: if the suppliers differ only in unit cost, the cheaper one is preferred with and without improvement, so i∗=j∗i^*=j^*i∗=j∗.
  3. §4.2.2: late commitment weakly dominates early commitment, Π1∗E≤Π1∗L\Pi_1^{*E}\le\Pi_1^{*L}Π1∗E​≤Π1∗L​.
  4. Lemma 4: ai∗L≤ai∗Ea_i^{*L}\le a_i^{*E}ai∗L​≤ai∗E​, in the form valid for non-unique optimizers.
  5. §4.2.2: Π1∗L=Π1∗E\Pi_1^{*L}=\Pi_1^{*E}Π1∗L​=Π1∗E​ if Pi(ai∗E)<Pj(aj0)P_i(a_i^{*E})<P_j(a_j^0)Pi​(ai∗E​)<Pj​(aj0​) for some iii.
  6. Corollary 3(a): strict superiority of late commitment at c1=c^1c_1=\hat c_1c1​=c^1​ persists for every c1∈[c^1,c2]c_1\in[\hat c_1,c_2]c1​∈[c^1​,c2​].

Significance

The results identify when the flexibility of postponing supplier selection has value. Late commitment never hurts. It has no value when one supplier dominates the other, even after the other's improvement. For suppliers that differ only in cost, Theorem 5 gives a checkable sufficient condition for strict value. The condition weighs the gain from switching in the outcome "the costlier supplier improves, the cheaper one does not", which has probability θ(1−θ)\theta(1-\theta)θ(1−θ), against the cost of improving the costlier supplier. Together with Lemma 4 the results say that keeping the choice open lowers the reliability target but can raise expected profit. Corollary 3(a) says this value is easiest to obtain when costs are close.

The paper's proofs are in an online appendix that is not used here, and none of these statements has a machine-checked proof. The mission produces formal versions of the statements, with the hypotheses that the printed versions leave implicit made explicit (see Formalization scope), and invites proofs of them.

Difficulty

The late-commitment profit (9) is a probability-weighted sum of maxima of two optimal-value functions. It is "neither concave nor unimodal" (p. 498), so first-order conditions do not characterize its optimum, and optimizers need not be unique.

  • Order of the arguments. The comparison results rest on the monotonicity of PiP_iPi​ (Lemma 2(b)). That is a statement about a supremum of expectations under a stochastically ordered family of capacity-loss laws, and must be established before the first-stage results can use it.
  • Theorem 5 and Corollary 3(a) compare two suprema, neither of which is assumed to be attained. Strictness has to survive passing to the supremum.
  • Corollary 3(a) is a comparative-statics statement in c1c_1c1​. Both Π1∗L\Pi_1^{*L}Π1∗L​ and Π1∗E\Pi_1^{*E}Π1∗E​ decrease as c1c_1c1​ grows, so nothing pointwise orders their difference.

Formalization scope

Everything is in the namespace MitigateSupplyRisk.LateCommit, with one definition module Model.

  • Model. The demand law is a probability measure μ\muμ on R\mathbb RR with μ(−∞,0)=0\mu(-\infty,0)=0μ(−∞,0)=0 and finite mean; no density is assumed. Capacity losses are a family a↦νaa\mapsto\nu_aa↦νa​ of atomless probability measures on [0,∞)[0,\infty)[0,∞), ordered by νa(−∞,t]≤νa′(−∞,t]\nu_a(-\infty,t]\le\nu_{a'}(-\infty,t]νa​(−∞,t]≤νa′​(−∞,t] for a≤a′a\le a'a≤a′. Loss and demand are independent (a product measure).
  • Optimal values. Π2\Pi_2Π2​ is the Bochner integral of the realized profit (1). Every optimal value is a sSup over the feasible set. The sign conventions r,p,ci≥0r,p,c_i\ge 0r,p,ci​≥0, v<r+pv<r+pv<r+p make these sets bounded above, so no supremum is a junk value, and no optimum is assumed to be attained.
  • Effort. The effort function zzz is taken as the primitive on [a0,∞)[a^0,\infty)[a0,∞), which presumes that every index is reachable.
  • Identical suppliers. "Identical except for unit costs" means that the two suppliers share the same Supplier record (committed cost, capacity, loss family) and the same Improvement record (a0,θ,m,za^0,\theta,m,za0,θ,m,z).
  • Notation in (9). The paper writes Π2∗\Pi_2^*Π2∗​ for both suppliers in (9); the Lean writes P1P_1P1​ and P2P_2P2​.
  • Added or reread hypotheses:
    • Theorem 5 assumes 0<θ<10<\theta<10<θ<1. The printed condition divides by θ(1−θ)\theta(1-\theta)θ(1−θ), and Lean's x/0=0x/0=0x/0=0 would otherwise turn it into [⋅]+>0[\cdot]^+>0[⋅]+>0, under which the conclusion is false at θ=1\theta=1θ=1.
    • Lemma 4 is stated for arbitrary maximizers: max⁡{aiL,aiE}\max\{a_i^L,a_i^E\}max{aiL​,aiE​} is again an early maximizer. This reduces to the printed inequality when the early optimizer is unique.
    • Lemma 2(b) and Theorem 4(a) are the single-supplier and cost-only instances of the paper's statements.
    • Optimizers ai∗Ea_i^{*E}ai∗E​ appear as hypotheses (IsMaxOn), never as claims.
  • Not trivially true. A statement in which Π1∗L\Pi_1^{*L}Π1∗L​ or Π1∗E\Pi_1^{*E}Π1∗E​ is a junk supremum, or in which Theorem 5's condition degenerates at θ∈{0,1}\theta\in\{0,1\}θ∈{0,1}, would be trivially true or false; the bounded feasible sets and the hypothesis 0<θ<10<\theta<10<θ<1 exclude both.
  • Not formalized: Theorem 4 for other attributes and Theorem 4(b), Lemma 3, and Corollary 3(b), whose printed form needs hypotheses the page does not pin.

Proofs of the milestones are welcome. A reusable lemma, that the supremum of expectations is monotone under first-order stochastic dominance of the loss, would serve the other missions of this series too.

Selected references

  • Y. Wang, W. Gilland, B. Tomlin, Mitigating Supply Risk: Dual Sourcing or Process Improvement?, Manufacturing & Service Operations Management 12(3):489–510, 2010. https://doi.org/10.1287/msom.1090.0279
  • R. B. Handfield, D. R. Krause, T. V. Scannell, R. M. Monczka, Avoid the pitfalls in supplier development, Sloan Management Review, 2000, pp. 37–49 (cited from the reference list of Wang et al. 2010, https://doi.org/10.1287/msom.1090.0279).
  • D. R. Krause, R. B. Handfield, B. B. Tyler, The relationships between supplier development, commitment, social capital accumulation and performance improvement, Journal of Operations Management 25(2):528–545, 2007. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jom.2006.05.007
  • B. Tomlin, On the value of mitigation and contingency strategies for managing supply chain disruption risks, Management Science 52(5):639–657, 2006. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.1060.0515
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CombinatoricsComplexity TheoryGraph Theory·Captain: mikedeng1

On Metric Generators of Graphs 2: The Gadget Graph of a 3-Dimensional Matching Instance Has a Minimum T-Join With at Most q Components Exactly When a Matching ExistsResearch Paper

Motivation

Let GGG be a connected graph and TTT a set of vertices of even cardinality. A TTT-join is a set of edges FFF in which exactly the vertices of TTT have odd degree. A TTT-cut is a cut δ(X)\delta(X)δ(X) with ∣X∩T∣|X\cap T|∣X∩T∣ odd. Write τ(G,T)\tau(G,T)τ(G,T) for the minimum size of a TTT-join and ν(G,T)\nu(G,T)ν(G,T) for the maximum number of pairwise disjoint TTT-cuts. Every TTT-cut meets every TTT-join, so ν(G,T)≤τ(G,T)\nu(G,T)\le\tau(G,T)ν(G,T)≤τ(G,T). When equality holds is a central question of combinatorial optimization because of its links to integral multiflows. Seymour (1981) proved equality for all TTT in bipartite graphs. Middendorf and Pfeiffer (1998) showed that deciding equality is NP-complete.

Korach and Penn (1992) proved that a minimum TTT-join FFF with kkk connected components satisfies

τ(G,T)−k+1 ≤ ν(G,T) ≤ ∣F∣.\tau(G,T)-k+1\ \le\ \nu(G,T)\ \le\ |F|.τ(G,T)−k+1 ≤ ν(G,T) ≤ ∣F∣.

So a minimum TTT-join with few components certifies a large packing of TTT-cuts, and a connected one certifies ν=τ\nu=\tauν=τ. Sebő and Tannier (Math. Oper. Res. 2004) therefore study the problem MTSC: given GGG, TTT and an integer kkk, is there a minimum TTT-join with at most kkk connected components? They show it can be solved in polynomial time for k=1k=1k=1 and is NP-complete in general (their Theorem 5). The hardness proof reduces three-dimensional matching (3DM) to MTSC. This mission formalizes the correctness of that reduction.

Setting

Three-dimensional matching. An instance consists of three pairwise disjoint sets WWW, XXX, YYY, each of cardinality qqq, and a set of triples H⊆W×X×YH\subseteq W\times X\times YH⊆W×X×Y. A matching is a subset M⊆HM\subseteq HM⊆H in which every element of W∪X∪YW\cup X\cup YW∪X∪Y occurs in exactly one triple.

The graph GGG. Take a further set ZZZ of qqq points and put T:=W∪X∪Y∪ZT:=W\cup X\cup Y\cup ZT:=W∪X∪Y∪Z, so ∣T∣=4q|T|=4q∣T∣=4q. The graph GGG has as vertices the points of TTT, the triples of HHH, and one new vertex pabp_{ab}pab​ for every unordered pair {a,b}\{a,b\}{a,b} of distinct points of TTT. Its edges are:

  1. a paba\,p_{ab}apab​ and pab bp_{ab}\,bpab​b for every such pair, so any two points of TTT are joined by a path of length 2;
  2. hwhwhw, hxhxhx, hyhyhy and hzhzhz for every h=(w,x,y)∈Hh=(w,x,y)\in Hh=(w,x,y)∈H and every z∈Zz\in Zz∈Z.

There are no other edges. In Lean, GGG is gadget q H and TTT is gadgetT q H.

TTT-joins and components. For F⊆E(G)F\subseteq E(G)F⊆E(G) and a vertex vvv, deg⁡F(v)\deg_F(v)degF​(v) is the number of edges of FFF at vvv. FFF is a TTT-join (IsTJoin) if deg⁡F(v)\deg_F(v)degF​(v) is odd exactly for v∈Tv\in Tv∈T. It is a minimum TTT-join (IsMinTJoin) if no TTT-join of GGG is smaller. The connected components of FFF are those of the graph (V(F),F)(V(F),F)(V(F),F), where V(F)V(F)V(F) is the set of endpoints of edges of FFF. Their number is numComponents F.

Formalization targets

Goal: the Claim in the proof of Theorem 5 (p. 391)

∃ F minimum T-join of G with at most q components  ⟺  ∃ M⊆H a matching.\exists\,F \text{ minimum } T\text{-join of } G \text{ with at most } q \text{ components}\quad\iff\quad \exists\,M\subseteq H \text{ a matching.}∃F minimum T-join of G with at most q components⟺∃M⊆H a matching.

This statement is quantified over every qqq and every HHH, and it is the full mathematical content of the reduction.

Milestones (p. 391, in the order the proof uses them)

  1. Every TTT-join FFF of GGG has ∣F∣≥4q|F|\ge 4q∣F∣≥4q, with equality iff each t∈Tt\in Tt∈T lies in exactly one edge of FFF.
  2. If MMM is a matching, ZZZ can be indexed as {zm:m∈M}\{z_m: m\in M\}{zm​:m∈M}, and for every such indexing ⋃m=(w,x,y)∈M{mw,mx,my,mzm}\bigcup_{m=(w,x,y)\in M}\{mw,mx,my,mz_m\}⋃m=(w,x,y)∈M​{mw,mx,my,mzm​} is a minimum TTT-join with exactly qqq components.
  3. Every minimum TTT-join FFF has ∣F∣=4q|F|=4q∣F∣=4q, and each t∈Tt\in Tt∈T lies in exactly one edge of FFF.
  4. Every minimum TTT-join has at least qqq components. It has exactly qqq iff each component contains a vertex of HHH and exactly one vertex of each of WWW, XXX and YYY.

Significance

The result. The Claim shows that minimizing the number of components of a minimum TTT-join is NP-hard. A Korach–Penn certificate for a large packing of TTT-cuts therefore cannot in general be found by optimizing the component count. This sets the k=1k=1k=1 case, which Sebő and Tannier solve in polynomial time through isometric embeddings of tree metrics, apart from the general case.

Formalizing it. The Claim is proved in the paper, in one paragraph. No machine-checked version is known, and the platform has no TTT-join library. The mission produces a reusable vocabulary for TTT-joins, minimum TTT-joins and the components of an edge set, together with a checked proof that a concrete gadget is correct. One sentence of the published argument is false as written (see Difficulty); a formal proof settles the conclusion independently of it.

Difficulty

The direction from a matching to a TTT-join is a direct verification. The converse has to control an arbitrary minimum TTT-join: its size, the shape of each of its components, and how the components meet WWW, XXX and YYY. A first reading of the printed proof suggests that every vertex outside TTT that carries edges of FFF is adjacent to at most one vertex of each of WWW, XXX, YYY. This is false for the inner vertex of a path joining two vertices of the same class, and the construction joins every pair of points of TTT, including pairs inside WWW. Such components really occur in minimum TTT-joins, so the count of components has to cover them as well. The stated conclusion (at least qqq components, with equality only in the matching-like configuration) remains true.

On the Lean side, the components of an edge set are not the components of the graph with that edge set on all vertices: there every untouched vertex would be a component, and the Claim would become false.

Formalization scope

  • 3DM. WWW, XXX, YYY are three copies of {0,…,q−1}\{0,\dots,q-1\}{0,…,q−1} (Fin q), so their disjointness holds by construction. HHH and MMM are finite sets of triples in Fin q × Fin q × Fin q. IsMatching q M requires each element of each class to be the corresponding coordinate of exactly one triple of MMM, and M⊆HM\subseteq HM⊆H is a separate hypothesis. A covering-only or at-most-one version would be a different problem.
  • The graph. Its vertex type has three kinds of vertices: TTT-vertices (i,j)(i,j)(i,j) with class i∈{0,1,2,3}i\in\{0,1,2,3\}i∈{0,1,2,3} (W,X,Y,ZW,X,Y,ZW,X,Y,Z), one midpoint per non-diagonal unordered pair of TTT-vertices, and one vertex per element of HHH. The adjacency is exactly the two bullets of p. 390. The graph is fixed by the definition, not described by properties.
  • TTT-joins. Edges are unordered pairs (Sym2) and FFF is a Finset of edges of GGG. Parity uses deg⁡F\deg_FdegF​. Minimality is "∣F∣≤∣F′∣|F|\le|F'|∣F∣≤∣F′∣ for all TTT-joins F′F'F′", never an infimum on N\mathbb NN.
  • Components. A component of FFF is a component of the graph with edge set FFF that contains an endpoint of an edge of FFF. Isolated vertices are never counted, and the empty edge set has 000 components.
  • The degenerate case q=0q=0q=0 is included: the graph is empty, F=∅F=\emptysetF=∅ is a minimum TTT-join with 000 components, and M=∅M=\emptysetM=∅ is a matching.
  • Not formalized. Membership of MTSC in NP, polynomial-time computability of the construction, and NP-completeness itself. The platform has no complexity-theory substrate. The Claim is the mathematical statement those rest on.
  • Ruled out. The Claim must not be weakened to "exactly qqq components" or to minimality among TTT-joins with few components, and components must not be counted on the whole vertex type. Each of these changes the statement.

Contributions welcome: proofs of the milestones, general lemmas on TTT-joins (a TTT-join in a graph where TTT is independent has at least ∣T∣|T|∣T∣ edges), and lemmas on the components of an edge set, which are reusable well beyond this mission.

Selected references

  • A. Sebő, E. Tannier, On Metric Generators of Graphs, Mathematics of Operations Research 29(2):383–393, 2004. https://doi.org/10.1287/moor.1030.0070
  • E. Korach, M. Penn, Tight integral duality gap in the Chinese postman problem, Mathematical Programming 55:183–191, 1992.
  • P. D. Seymour, On odd cuts and plane multicommodity flows, Proceedings of the London Mathematical Society 42:178–192, 1981.
  • M. Middendorf, F. Pfeiffer, On the complexity of the edge-disjoint path problem, Combinatorica (cited by Sebő and Tannier as 1998, vol. 8, pp. 103–116) — NP-completeness of deciding ν=τ\nu=\tauν=τ.
  • M. R. Garey, D. S. Johnson, Computers and Intractability, W. H. Freeman, San Francisco, 1979 — NP-completeness of 3DM.
  • A. Frank, A survey on T-joins, T-cuts, and conservative weightings, in Combinatorics, Paul Erdős is Eighty, Vol. 2, 1996, pp. 213–252.
  • Related platform item, not reused: UnrelatedSched.ThreeHalves.ThreeDimMatching (Lenstra–Shmoys–Tardos) encodes 3DM with an indexed family of triples and the covering form of a matching, a different encoding from the paper's set HHH with "exactly one".
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OptimizationProbability·Captain: mikedeng1

Mitigating Supply Risk: Dual Sourcing or Process Improvement? 2: With No Committed Cost, Expected Profit Is Concave in the Supplier's Reliability Index, with an Explicit First-Order ConditionResearch Paper

Motivation

Supply disruptions — fires, quality failures, capacity shortfalls at a supplier — are a first-order risk in manufacturing supply chains. A buying firm has two broad responses. It can dual source, splitting orders between suppliers so that one supplier's shortfall is partly covered by the other, or it can invest in process improvement at a single supplier (kaizen events, supplier development programmes) to make that supplier more reliable. Wang, Gilland and Tomlin, Mitigating Supply Risk: Dual Sourcing or Process Improvement? (M&SOM 12(3):489–510, 2010), build a two-stage newsvendor model that captures both levers and compare them analytically.

This mission formalizes the paper's analysis of the improvement lever on its own: the firm commits early to one supplier, decides how much effort to spend improving it, and then orders. The paper's Theorem 3 shows that, without committed costs, this improvement problem is a concave program with an explicit first-order condition, and its Corollary 2 derives how the optimal effort responds to costs, revenue and the chance that improvement succeeds. These are the facts the paper's later comparisons between improvement and dual sourcing rest on.

Setting

A firm sells one product over one season at unit revenue rrr, salvage value vvv and unit penalty ppp for unmet demand. Demand X≥0X \ge 0X≥0 has distribution function FFF and finite mean. The firm orders q≥0q \ge 0q≥0 units from a supplier with design capacity K>0K > 0K>0, unit cost ccc and committed cost η∈[0,1]\eta \in [0,1]η∈[0,1]: the firm pays (ηq+(1−η)y)c(\eta q + (1-\eta)y)c(ηq+(1−η)y)c when yyy units are delivered.

The supplier suffers a random capacity loss ξ≥0\xi \ge 0ξ≥0 and delivers y=min⁡{q,(K−ξ)+}y = \min\{q, (K-\xi)^+\}y=min{q,(K−ξ)+}. The law of ξ\xiξ has a continuous distribution function G(⋅,a)G(\cdot, a)G(⋅,a) that depends on the supplier's reliability index aaa; a larger index means a stochastically smaller loss, G(⋅,a)≤G(⋅,a′)G(\cdot, a) \le G(\cdot, a')G(⋅,a)≤G(⋅,a′) for a≤a′a \le a'a≤a′. Demand and losses are independent.

With ψ=−ηc/(r+p−v)\psi = -\eta c/(r+p-v)ψ=−ηc/(r+p−v) and φ=(r+p−(1−η)c)/(r+p−v)\varphi = (r+p-(1-\eta)c)/(r+p-v)φ=(r+p−(1−η)c)/(r+p−v), the second-stage expected profit at index aaa is

Π2(q;a)=(r+p−v)(ψq+φ E[y]−E[(y−X)+])−p E[X],\Pi_2(q; a) = (r+p-v)\big(\psi q + \varphi\,\mathsf E[y] - \mathsf E[(y-X)^+]\big) - p\,\mathsf E[X],Π2​(q;a)=(r+p−v)(ψq+φE[y]−E[(y−X)+])−pE[X],

and Π2∗(a)=sup⁡q≥0Π2(q;a)\Pi_2^*(a) = \sup_{q \ge 0}\Pi_2(q; a)Π2∗​(a)=supq≥0​Π2​(q;a) is its optimal value.

In the first stage the firm may improve the supplier from its initial index a0a^0a0. The paper reparametrizes effort by the target index: reaching index a≥a0a \ge a^0a≥a0 needs effort z(a)z(a)z(a), where zzz is convex and nondecreasing with z(a0)=0z(a^0) = 0z(a0)=0. Effort costs mmm per unit and succeeds with probability θ\thetaθ. The first-stage profit of early commitment is Eq. (7):

Π1(a)=−m z(a)+θ Π2∗(a)+(1−θ) Π2∗(a0),a≥a0.\Pi_1(a) = -m\,z(a) + \theta\,\Pi_2^*(a) + (1-\theta)\,\Pi_2^*(a^0), \qquad a \ge a^0 .Π1​(a)=−mz(a)+θΠ2∗​(a)+(1−θ)Π2∗​(a0),a≥a0.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 3

Assume η=0\eta = 0η=0 and that a↦G(ξ,a)a \mapsto G(\xi, a)a↦G(ξ,a) is concave on [a0,∞)[a^0,\infty)[a0,∞) for every ξ\xiξ (decreasing marginal reliability improvement). Then Π1\Pi_1Π1​ is concave on [a0,∞)[a^0, \infty)[a0,∞), and an optimal index a∗>a0a^* > a^0a∗>a0, with an optimal order q∗q^*q∗ at a∗a^*a∗, satisfies

mθ z′(a∗)=(r+p−v)∫K−q∗K(φ−F(K−ξ)) ∂G(ξ,a∗)∂a dξ.(8)\frac{m}{\theta}\,z'(a^*) = (r+p-v)\int_{K-q^*}^{K}\big(\varphi - F(K-\xi)\big)\,\frac{\partial G(\xi, a^*)}{\partial a}\,d\xi. \tag{8}θm​z′(a∗)=(r+p−v)∫K−q∗K​(φ−F(K−ξ))∂a∂G(ξ,a∗)​dξ.(8)

Milestones

  1. Eq. (6), single-supplier instance with η=0\eta = 0η=0. For 0<φ<10 < \varphi < 10<φ<1 the critical fractile q^=inf⁡{t:F(t)≥φ}\hat q = \inf\{t : F(t) \ge \varphi\}q^​=inf{t:F(t)≥φ} maximizes Π2(⋅ ;a)\Pi_2(\cdot\,; a)Π2​(⋅;a) for every index aaa, and (with atomless demand) every positive optimal order satisfies the η=0\eta = 0η=0 instance of (6), G(K−q∗,a)(φ−F(q∗))=0G(K-q^*,a)(\varphi - F(q^*)) = 0G(K−q∗,a)(φ−F(q∗))=0.
  2. Lemma 2(b), single-supplier instance. Π2∗(a)\Pi_2^*(a)Π2∗​(a) is increasing in aaa.
  3. Corollary 2 (a), (b), (c), (e). The optimal reliability index, and so the optimal effort z∗=z(a∗)z^* = z(a^*)z∗=z(a∗), is decreasing in mmm, increasing in θ\thetaθ, decreasing in ccc and increasing in rrr, each in the strong set order on the set of maximizers.

Significance

Theorem 3 turns the firm's improvement decision into a one-dimensional concave program, so that the first-order condition (8) characterizes the optimum and comparative statics are available. Corollary 2 is the managerial content: cheaper or more reliable improvement, a cheaper supplier and a more valuable product all justify more improvement effort. The paper's later results — when late commitment beats early commitment (§4.2.2) and when single sourcing with improvement beats dual sourcing (§5) — compare the optimal values these results describe.

The results are proved in the paper's online appendix; none of them has a machine-checked proof. A complete development provides formal proofs of the layer-cake representation of the random-capacity newsvendor profit, of its critical-fractile solution, and of the concavity and envelope arguments on top of it.

Difficulty

Π2∗\Pi_2^*Π2∗​ is an optimal value, a supremum over order quantities, and suprema of concave functions are not concave in general. The obvious route — "Π2(q;a)\Pi_2(q; a)Π2​(q;a) is concave in aaa for each qqq, hence so is the supremum" — fails, because Π2(q;a)\Pi_2(q;a)Π2​(q;a) is not concave in aaa for a fixed qqq beyond the critical fractile. Any argument has to control how the optimal order moves with aaa under random capacity, where the delivered quantity is a minimum of the order and a random effective capacity. The first-order condition then requires differentiating an expectation of a non-smooth function of (ξ,X)(\xi, X)(ξ,X) in the parameter of ξ\xiξ's law. Corollary 2 must be argued on the set of maximizers, since Π1\Pi_1Π1​ is concave but not strictly concave.

Formalization scope

The Lean development lives in the namespace MitigateSupplyRisk.Improvement. Model bundles r,v,p,c,η,Kr, v, p, c, \eta, Kr,v,p,c,η,K, a demand law μ\muμ and the family ν(a)\nu(a)ν(a) of loss laws; FFF and G(⋅,a)G(\cdot,a)G(⋅,a) are their cdf. Expectations are Bochner integrals over ν(a)\nu(a)ν(a) and over the product ν(a)⊗μ\nu(a)\otimes\muν(a)⊗μ. Model.Assumptions collects the standing assumptions of §3: 0≤η≤10 \le \eta \le 10≤η≤1, K>0K > 0K>0, v<r+pv < r+pv<r+p (implicit in the paper's division by r+p−vr+p-vr+p−v), a nonnegative integrable demand, nonnegative atomless losses, and the stochastic order in aaa. Demand needs no density. Effort bundles θ,m,a0,z\theta, m, a^0, zθ,m,a0,z with θ∈[0,1]\theta \in [0,1]θ∈[0,1], m≥0m \ge 0m≥0 and zzz convex, nondecreasing on [a0,∞)[a^0,\infty)[a0,∞), z(a0)=0z(a^0) = 0z(a0)=0; taking zzz as primitive assumes every index a≥a0a \ge a^0a≥a0 is reachable. Π2∗\Pi_2^*Π2∗​ is a real supremum and Π1\Pi_1Π1​ is built from it, never from the critical fractile. Every statement about Π2∗\Pi_2^*Π2∗​ carries η=0\eta = 0η=0 or c≥0c \ge 0c≥0, which makes the supremum finite. "Optimal" always means a maximizer over the whole feasible set, and "increasing" is weak throughout, as on p. 492 of the paper.

The paper's proofs are in an online appendix that was not used here. Deviations from the page, each disclosed in the item's Formalization Note:

  • Eq. (8) omits the factor r+p−vr+p-vr+p−v on its right side; it is correct as printed only when r+p−v=1r+p-v = 1r+p−v=1, which holds in all of the paper's numerical examples. The goal states the corrected identity, multiplied by θ\thetaθ.
  • ∂2G/∂a2≤0\partial^2 G/\partial a^2 \le 0∂2G/∂a2≤0 is read as concavity of G(ξ,⋅)G(\xi,\cdot)G(ξ,⋅) on [a0,∞)[a^0,\infty)[a0,∞).
  • (8) is the first-order condition at an interior optimum a∗>a0a^* > a^0a∗>a0; differentiability of zzz and of G(ξ,⋅)G(\xi,\cdot)G(ξ,⋅) at a∗a^*a∗ is assumed explicitly.
  • Corollary 2 is stated in the strong set order on the argmax, (c) and (e) in the setting η=0\eta = 0η=0 of Theorem 3, and (b) with c≥0c \ge 0c≥0. Corollary 2(d), on the committed cost η\etaη, is not stated, because Theorem 3's setting fixes η=0\eta = 0η=0.
  • Lemma 2(b) and Eq. (6) are the single-supplier instances of the paper's dual-sourcing statements, which the paper applies to single sourcing on p. 496.

A trivializing formalization is ruled out: Π1\Pi_1Π1​ is built from the supremum Π2∗\Pi_2^*Π2∗​ (not from Π2\Pi_2Π2​ at a fixed order), the supremum is finite under the stated hypotheses, and every expectation is of an integrable function, so no statement holds through a junk value.

Reusable beyond this mission: the random-capacity newsvendor objects (delivered quantity, expected profit, layer-cake representation) and a Topkis-type monotone comparative statics lemma on a chain. Contributions of either, and proofs of the milestones in any order, are welcome.

Selected references

  • Y. Wang, W. Gilland, B. Tomlin, Mitigating Supply Risk: Dual Sourcing or Process Improvement?, Manufacturing & Service Operations Management 12(3):489–510, 2010. https://doi.org/10.1287/msom.1090.0279
  • D. M. Topkis, Supermodularity and Complementarity, Princeton University Press, 1998. https://doi.org/10.1515/9781400822539
  • R. B. Handfield, D. R. Krause, T. V. Scannell, R. M. Monczka, Avoid the Pitfalls in Supplier Development, Sloan Management Review 41(2):37–49, 2000.
9 thms1 active userReviewed
OptimizationProbability·Captain: mikedeng1

Mitigating Supply Risk: Dual Sourcing or Process Improvement? 1: Region-by-Region Optimal Dual-Sourcing Quantities under Random Capacity, Including the Quantity HedgeResearch Paper

Motivation

Firms that buy from unreliable suppliers face two broad remedies: spread orders across several suppliers (dual sourcing), or invest in making a supplier more reliable (process improvement). Wang, Gilland and Tomlin, Mitigating Supply Risk: Dual Sourcing or Process Improvement? (M&SOM 12(3):489–510, 2010), compare the two in a single newsvendor model in which suppliers deliver less than ordered because of random capacity losses. This mission covers the first half of that comparison: the pure dual-sourcing strategy, in which the firm improves nobody and only chooses how much to order from each of two suppliers.

A single-supplier random-capacity model was studied by Ciarallo, Akella and Morton (Management Science 40(3), 1994); in that model, as the paper notes, the firm never orders more than demand to hedge against capacity shortfall. Dada, Petruzzi and Schwarz (M&SOM 9(1), 2007) studied several unreliable suppliers but gave only necessary conditions for optimal orders. The paper states necessary and sufficient conditions for two suppliers (its Theorem 1) and, for deterministic demand, a closed-form optimal order in each of six demand regions (Theorem 2). Its proofs are in an online appendix.

Setting

A product sells at unit revenue rrr, is salvaged at vvv, and unmet demand costs ppp per unit, with v<r+pv < r + pv<r+p. Two suppliers i=1,2i = 1, 2i=1,2 have unit cost ci≥0c_i \ge 0ci​≥0, committed-cost fraction ηi∈[0,1]\eta_i \in [0, 1]ηi​∈[0,1] and design capacity Ki>0K_i > 0Ki​>0. Supplier iii suffers a random capacity loss ξi≥0\xi_i \ge 0ξi​≥0 whose continuous distribution function Gi(t,ai)G_i(t, a_i)Gi​(t,ai​) depends on a reliability index aia_iai​: a larger index makes the loss stochastically smaller, Gi(⋅,a)≤Gi(⋅,a^)G_i(\cdot, a) \le G_i(\cdot, \hat a)Gi​(⋅,a)≤Gi​(⋅,a^) for a≤a^a \le \hat aa≤a^. The losses are independent of each other and of demand X≥0X \ge 0X≥0, which has distribution function FFF.

For an order vector q=(q1,q2)≥0q = (q_1, q_2) \ge 0q=(q1​,q2​)≥0, supplier iii delivers yi=min⁡{qi,(Ki−ξi)+}y_i = \min\{q_i, (K_i - \xi_i)^+\}yi​=min{qi​,(Ki​−ξi​)+} and is paid (ηiqi+(1−ηi)yi)ci(\eta_i q_i + (1 - \eta_i) y_i) c_i(ηi​qi​+(1−ηi​)yi​)ci​. The realized profit is

π(q)=−∑i(ηiqi+(1−ηi)yi)ci+rmin⁡{x,∑iyi}+v(∑iyi−x)+−p(x−∑iyi)+,\pi(q) = -\sum_i (\eta_i q_i + (1-\eta_i) y_i) c_i + r \min\Big\{x, \sum_i y_i\Big\} + v\Big(\sum_i y_i - x\Big)^+ - p\Big(x - \sum_i y_i\Big)^+,π(q)=−i∑​(ηi​qi​+(1−ηi​)yi​)ci​+rmin{x,i∑​yi​}+v(i∑​yi​−x)+−p(x−i∑​yi​)+,

and the second-stage expected profit is Π2(q;a)=Eξ(a),X[π(q)]\Pi_2(q; a) = \mathbb E_{\xi(a), X}[\pi(q)]Π2​(q;a)=Eξ(a),X​[π(q)]. With ψi=−ηici/(r+p−v)\psi_i = -\eta_i c_i/(r+p-v)ψi​=−ηi​ci​/(r+p−v) and ϕi=(r+p−(1−ηi)ci)/(r+p−v)\phi_i = (r + p - (1-\eta_i)c_i)/(r+p-v)ϕi​=(r+p−(1−ηi​)ci​)/(r+p−v) this is the paper's Eq. (3). The optimal value is Π2∗(a)=sup⁡q≥0Π2(q;a)\Pi_2^*(a) = \sup_{q \ge 0} \Pi_2(q; a)Π2∗​(a)=supq≥0​Π2​(q;a), and an optimal procurement vector is a q≥0q \ge 0q≥0 attaining it.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 2 (corrected)

Let demand be deterministic, X=x≥0X = x \ge 0X=x≥0, let η=0\eta = 0η=0, let 0<ϕi<10 < \phi_i < 10<ϕi​<1, let each GiG_iGi​ be strictly increasing on a support [0,bi][0, b_i][0,bi​] with bi≤Kib_i \le K_ibi​≤Ki​, and let ϕ1G1(K1)≥ϕ2G2(K2)\phi_1 G_1(K_1) \ge \phi_2 G_2(K_2)ϕ1​G1​(K1​)≥ϕ2​G2​(K2​). With A1=G1−1(ϕ2)A_1 = G_1^{-1}(\phi_2)A1​=G1−1​(ϕ2​), A2=G2−1(ϕ1)A_2 = G_2^{-1}(\phi_1)A2​=G2−1​(ϕ1​), B=G1−1(ϕ2ϕ1G2(K2))B = G_1^{-1}(\tfrac{\phi_2}{\phi_1}G_2(K_2))B=G1−1​(ϕ1​ϕ2​​G2​(K2​)) and S=K1+K2S = K_1 + K_2S=K1​+K2​, an optimal vector is

q∗={(x,0)0≤x≤K1−B(Ω1)(x−q2∗,q2∗), ϕ1G1(K1−x+q2∗)=ϕ2G2(K2−q2∗)x≤S−(A1+A2)(Ω2)(x−K2+A2, x−K1+A1)x≤S−max⁡(A1,A2)(Ω3)(x−K2+A2,K2) if A1≥A2, else (K1,x−K1+A1)x≤S−min⁡(A1,A2)(Ω4)(K1,K2)otherwise(Ω5∪Ω6).q^* = \begin{cases} (x, 0) & 0 \le x \le K_1 - B \quad (\Omega_1)\\ (x - q_2^*, q_2^*),\ \phi_1 G_1(K_1 - x + q_2^*) = \phi_2 G_2(K_2 - q_2^*) & x \le S - (A_1 + A_2) \quad (\Omega_2)\\ (x - K_2 + A_2,\ x - K_1 + A_1) & x \le S - \max(A_1, A_2) \quad (\Omega_3)\\ (x - K_2 + A_2, K_2) \text{ if } A_1 \ge A_2, \text{ else } (K_1, x - K_1 + A_1) & x \le S - \min(A_1, A_2) \quad (\Omega_4)\\ (K_1, K_2) & \text{otherwise} \quad (\Omega_5 \cup \Omega_6).\end{cases}q∗=⎩⎨⎧​(x,0)(x−q2∗​,q2∗​), ϕ1​G1​(K1​−x+q2∗​)=ϕ2​G2​(K2​−q2∗​)(x−K2​+A2​, x−K1​+A1​)(x−K2​+A2​,K2​) if A1​≥A2​, else (K1​,x−K1​+A1​)(K1​,K2​)​0≤x≤K1​−B(Ω1​)x≤S−(A1​+A2​)(Ω2​)x≤S−max(A1​,A2​)(Ω3​)x≤S−min(A1​,A2​)(Ω4​)otherwise(Ω5​∪Ω6​).​

In Ω3\Omega_3Ω3​–Ω5\Omega_5Ω5​ the firm orders more in total than demand: the quantity hedge.

Milestones

  1. Lemma 1: Π2(q;a)\Pi_2(q; a)Π2​(q;a) is submodular in qqq, Π2(q∨q′)+Π2(q∧q′)≤Π2(q)+Π2(q′)\Pi_2(q \vee q') + \Pi_2(q \wedge q') \le \Pi_2(q) + \Pi_2(q')Π2​(q∨q′)+Π2​(q∧q′)≤Π2​(q)+Π2​(q′).
  2. Theorem 1: with a demand density, some optimal q∗q^*q∗ has, for each iii, qi∗∈{0,Ki}q_i^* \in \{0, K_i\}qi∗​∈{0,Ki​} or ∇qiΠ2(q∗;a)=0\nabla_{q_i}\Pi_2(q^*; a) = 0∇qi​​Π2​(q∗;a)=0.
  3. Eq. (6): for 0<qi<Ki0 < q_i < K_i0<qi​<Ki​, ∇qiΠ2=(r+p−v)(ψi+Gi(Ki−qi)(ϕi−E[F(qi+yj)]))\nabla_{q_i}\Pi_2 = (r+p-v)\big(\psi_i + G_i(K_i - q_i)(\phi_i - \mathbb E[F(q_i + y_j)])\big)∇qi​​Π2​=(r+p−v)(ψi​+Gi​(Ki​−qi​)(ϕi​−E[F(qi​+yj​)])), which vanishes at an optimal qqq.
  4. Lemma 2(b): Π2∗(a)\Pi_2^*(a)Π2∗​(a) is increasing in each aia_iai​.
  5. Corollary 1 (after the goal): as either index increases, the hedge region Ω3∪Ω4∪Ω5\Omega_3 \cup \Omega_4 \cup \Omega_5Ω3​∪Ω4​∪Ω5​ and the hedge size [q1∗+q2∗−x]+[q_1^* + q_2^* - x]^+[q1∗​+q2∗​−x]+ shrink; Ω1\Omega_1Ω1​ expands in a1a_1a1​ and contracts in a2a_2a2​.

Significance

Theorem 2 is the paper's explicit description of how a buyer splits orders between two unreliable suppliers: single sourcing when capacity is ample, dual sourcing at total order equal to demand, then deliberate over-ordering, and finally ordering full capacity. The quantity hedge is the paper's main qualitative finding for dual sourcing, since, as the paper notes, over-ordering of this kind does not occur with one random-capacity supplier. Corollary 1 says how this hedge responds to reliability, which is the comparison with process improvement that the rest of the paper builds on; Lemma 2(b) is the value of reliability used there.

None of these results has a machine-checked proof, and the paper's proofs are in an online appendix not used here. A formalization would also settle the printed statement, which contains a slip (below) that a formal proof must avoid.

Difficulty

Π2\Pi_2Π2​ is submodular but not jointly concave in qqq, so the usual route (concavity plus first-order conditions) is not available, and the paper invokes unimodality instead. Under deterministic demand Π2\Pi_2Π2​ is not differentiable on the line q1+q2=xq_1 + q_2 = xq1​+q2​=x, where the Ω1\Omega_1Ω1​ and Ω2\Omega_2Ω2​ optima sit, so Theorem 1 cannot simply be specialized to Theorem 2: optimality there needs one-sided arguments. In every region the claim is global optimality over all q≥0q \ge 0q≥0, including orders above the design capacities, and the feasible set is unbounded.

Formalization scope

Suppliers are indexed by Fin 2 (index 0 is supplier 1). The capacity losses are a family of probability measures νi(a)\nu_i(a)νi​(a) on R\mathbb RR without atoms and with νi(a)((−∞,0))=0\nu_i(a)((-\infty, 0)) = 0νi​(a)((−∞,0))=0, and Gi(t,a)G_i(t, a)Gi​(t,a) is their distribution function. Π2\Pi_2Π2​ is the Bochner integral of π\piπ against ν1(a1)⊗ν2(a2)⊗μ\nu_1(a_1) \otimes \nu_2(a_2) \otimes \muν1​(a1​)⊗ν2​(a2​)⊗μ for a demand law μ\muμ. Every theorem assumes μ\muμ is a probability measure on [0,∞)[0, \infty)[0,∞) with finite mean. Deterministic demand is μ=δx\mu = \delta_xμ=δx​. Theorem 1 and Eq. (6) add μ≪\mu \llμ≪ Lebesgue (the paper's density). "Optimal" means a global maximizer over q≥0q \ge 0q≥0, and "increasing" is weak, as the paper declares. Added standing hypotheses: Ki>0K_i > 0Ki​>0, v<r+pv < r + pv<r+p, and r,p,ci≥0r, p, c_i \ge 0r,p,ci​≥0, which bound π\piπ above so that Π2∗\Pi_2^*Π2∗​ is a genuine supremum. Gi−1G_i^{-1}Gi−1​ is the generalized inverse inf⁡{t≥0:Gi(t)≥u}\inf\{t \ge 0 : G_i(t) \ge u\}inf{t≥0:Gi​(t)≥u}.

Corrections to the printed Theorem 2, each disclosed in its item:

  • the min⁡\minmin and max⁡\maxmax in the bounds of Ω3\Omega_3Ω3​, Ω4\Omega_4Ω4​, Ω5\Omega_5Ω5​ are swapped back (as printed, Ω4\Omega_4Ω4​ is empty and the Ω3\Omega_3Ω3​ formula can exceed K1K_1K1​);
  • Gi(Ki)=1G_i(K_i) = 1Gi​(Ki​)=1 is added, through the support hypothesis (without it the Ω1\Omega_1Ω1​ claim is false);
  • 0<ϕi<10 < \phi_i < 10<ϕi​<1 and strict increase of GiG_iGi​ on its support are added.

Theorem 1's "qi∗=Kq_i^* = Kqi∗​=K" is read as KiK_iKi​. Lemma 2(a) is not formalized: optimal orders are not unique and no reading of "qi∗q_i^*qi∗​ is increasing" was found that is both faithful and safely true.

Stating Theorem 2 as "q∗q^*q∗ satisfies the first-order conditions", or optimality only within a region's face, would trivialize it; the statement requires Π2(q;a)≤Π2(q∗;a)\Pi_2(q; a) \le \Pi_2(q^*; a)Π2​(q;a)≤Π2​(q∗;a) for every q≥0q \ge 0q≥0. Proofs need integrals of piecewise-linear functions of independent variables, differentiation under the integral sign, and facts about generalized inverses of continuous distribution functions. Lemma 1 and the generalized-inverse facts are reusable beyond this mission; proofs of any milestone are welcome.

Selected references

  • Y. Wang, W. Gilland, B. Tomlin, Mitigating Supply Risk: Dual Sourcing or Process Improvement?, Manufacturing & Service Operations Management 12(3):489–510, 2010. https://doi.org/10.1287/msom.1090.0279
  • F. W. Ciarallo, R. Akella, T. E. Morton, A Periodic Review, Production Planning Model with Uncertain Capacity and Uncertain Demand — Optimality of Extended Myopic Policies, Management Science 40(3):320–332, 1994. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.40.3.320
  • M. Dada, N. C. Petruzzi, L. B. Schwarz, A Newsvendor's Procurement Problem when Suppliers Are Unreliable, Manufacturing & Service Operations Management 9(1):9–32, 2007. https://doi.org/10.1287/msom.1060.0126
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Bandit AlgorithmsProbability·Captain: mikedeng1

Linearly Parameterized Bandits 3: For Any Compact Set of Arms, the Uncertainty Ellipsoid Policy Has Regret at Most a₄r‖z‖ + a₅r√T log^{3/2} TResearch Paper

Motivation

In a linearly parameterized bandit a decision maker repeatedly chooses an arm uuu from a set Ur⊂Rr\mathcal U_r \subset \mathbb R^rUr​⊂Rr and observes a noisy reward whose mean is linear in an unknown vector ZZZ. The model covers problems in which many arms share a few underlying features: products described by a handful of characteristics, prices, or routes whose costs depend on a few parameters. Because the arms are correlated through ZZZ, a good policy can learn about every arm from the rewards of any arm, and its regret can be made to depend on the dimension rrr instead of on the number of arms, which may be infinite.

Rusmevichientong and Tsitsiklis (arXiv:0812.3465v2, published in Mathematics of Operations Research, 2010) prove an Ω(rT)\Omega(r\sqrt T)Ω(rT​) lower bound on the regret when the arms form the unit sphere, give a matching phase-based policy for strongly convex arm sets, and propose the Uncertainty Ellipsoid (UE) policy for arbitrary compact arm sets. The UE policy is close to the algorithms of Auer (2002) and Dani, Hayes and Kakade (2008), with two differences: it does not need to know the horizon TTT, and it allows ZZZ and the noise to be unbounded. This mission formalizes its regret bound for general compact arm sets, Theorem 4.1 of the paper.

Setting

Fix r≥2r \ge 2r≥2 and a compact set of arms Ur⊂Rr\mathcal U_r \subset \mathbb R^rUr​⊂Rr, with the Euclidean norm ∥v∥=v′v\|v\| = \sqrt{v'v}∥v∥=v′v​. Playing arm uuu in period ttt yields

Xtu=u′Z+Wtu,X^u_t = u'Z + W^u_t,Xtu​=u′Z+Wtu​,

where the noises WtuW^u_tWtu​ are independent of each other and of ZZZ, identically distributed in ttt for each arm, and have mean zero. A policy chooses the arm Ut+1U_{t+1}Ut+1​ of period t+1t+1t+1 as a function of the history (U1,X1,…,Ut,Xt)(U_1, X_1, \dots, U_t, X_t)(U1​,X1​,…,Ut​,Xt​). The regret given Z=zZ = zZ=z and the Bayes risk are

Regret(z,T,ψ)=∑t=1TE[max⁡v∈Urv′z−Ut′z ∣ Z=z],Risk(T,ψ)=E[Regret(Z,T,ψ)].\mathrm{Regret}(z, T, \psi) = \sum_{t=1}^T \mathbb E\Big[\max_{v \in \mathcal U_r} v'z - U_t'z \,\Big|\, Z = z\Big], \qquad \mathrm{Risk}(T, \psi) = \mathbb E\big[\mathrm{Regret}(Z, T, \psi)\big].Regret(z,T,ψ)=t=1∑T​E[v∈Ur​max​v′z−Ut′​z​Z=z],Risk(T,ψ)=E[Regret(Z,T,ψ)].

Assumption 1 (p. 13) fixes constants σ0,uˉ,λ0>0\sigma_0, \bar u, \lambda_0 > 0σ0​,uˉ,λ0​>0 such that, for every r≥2r \ge 2r≥2: (a) E[exWtu]≤ex2σ02/2\mathbb E[e^{xW^u_t}] \le e^{x^2\sigma_0^2/2}E[exWtu​]≤ex2σ02​/2 for every arm and every x∈Rx \in \mathbb Rx∈R; (b) every arm has ∥u∥≤uˉ\|u\| \le \bar u∥u∥≤uˉ, and Ur\mathcal U_rUr​ contains linearly independent arms b1,…,brb_1, \dots, b_rb1​,…,br​ with λmin⁡(∑kbkbk′)≥λ0\lambda_{\min}(\sum_k b_kb_k') \ge \lambda_0λmin​(∑k​bk​bk′​)≥λ0​.

The UE policy keeps the ordinary least squares estimate Z^t=Ct∑s≤tUsXs\widehat Z_t = C_t\sum_{s \le t}U_sX_sZt​=Ct​∑s≤t​Us​Xs​, where Ct=(∑s≤tUsUs′)−1C_t = (\sum_{s \le t}U_sU_s')^{-1}Ct​=(∑s≤t​Us​Us′​)−1, and, with κ0=21+log⁡(1+36uˉ2/λ0)\kappa_0 = 2\sqrt{1 + \log(1 + 36\bar u^2/\lambda_0)}κ0​=21+log(1+36uˉ2/λ0​)​ and α=4σ0κ02\alpha = 4\sigma_0\kappa_0^2α=4σ0​κ02​, the uncertainty radius

Rtu=αlog⁡t min⁡{rlog⁡t,∣Ur∣}  ∥u∥Ct,∥u∥C=u′Cu.R^u_t = \alpha\sqrt{\log t}\,\sqrt{\min\{r\log t, |\mathcal U_r|\}}\;\|u\|_{C_t}, \qquad \|u\|_{C} = \sqrt{u'Cu}.Rtu​=αlogt​min{rlogt,∣Ur​∣}​∥u∥Ct​​,∥u∥C​=u′Cu​.

It plays b1,…,brb_1, \dots, b_rb1​,…,br​ in the first rrr periods and then, in each period t+1t+1t+1, an arm maximizing v′Z^t+Rtvv'\widehat Z_t + R^v_tv′Zt​+Rtv​ over Ur\mathcal U_rUr​, with ties broken arbitrarily.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 4.1

There are constants a4,a5>0a_4, a_5 > 0a4​,a5​>0 depending only on σ0,uˉ,λ0\sigma_0, \bar u, \lambda_0σ0​,uˉ,λ0​ such that for every r≥2r \ge 2r≥2, every compact arm set satisfying Assumption 1, every run of the UE policy, all T≥r+1T \ge r+1T≥r+1 and all z∈Rrz \in \mathbb R^rz∈Rr,

Regret(z,T,UE)≤a4 r∥z∥+a5 rTlog⁡3/2T,Risk(T,UE)≤a4 r E∥Z∥+a5 rTlog⁡3/2T.\mathrm{Regret}(z, T, \mathrm{UE}) \le a_4\,r\|z\| + a_5\,r\sqrt T\log^{3/2}T, \qquad \mathrm{Risk}(T, \mathrm{UE}) \le a_4\,r\,\mathbb E\|Z\| + a_5\,r\sqrt T\log^{3/2}T.Regret(z,T,UE)≤a4​r∥z∥+a5​rT​log3/2T,Risk(T,UE)≤a4​rE∥Z∥+a5​rT​log3/2T.

The constants are not fixed: any positive values that work suffice.

Milestones

The proof in Appendix B proceeds through large deviation inequalities for adaptive least squares (Theorem B.1 for finitely many arms; Lemmas B.3, B.4, B.5 leading to Theorem B.2 for infinitely many), the radius bound Pr⁡{u′(Z^t−z)>Rtu∣Z=z}≤1/t2\Pr\{u'(\widehat Z_t - z) > R^u_t \mid Z = z\} \le 1/t^2Pr{u′(Zt​−z)>Rtu​∣Z=z}≤1/t2 (Lemma B.6), the instantaneous regret bound (Lemma B.7), the regret decomposition

Regret(z,T,UE)≤2uˉ(r+2)∥z∥+2αr(log⁡T)T  E[∑t=rT−1∥Ut+1∥Ct2  ∣  Z=z]\mathrm{Regret}(z, T, \mathrm{UE}) \le 2\bar u(r+2)\|z\| + 2\alpha\sqrt r(\log T)\sqrt T\;\mathbb E\Big[\sqrt{\textstyle\sum_{t=r}^{T-1}\|U_{t+1}\|^2_{C_t}} \;\Big|\; Z = z\Big]Regret(z,T,UE)≤2uˉ(r+2)∥z∥+2αr​(logT)T​E[∑t=rT−1​∥Ut+1​∥Ct​2​​​Z=z]

(Lemma B.8), and the deterministic Lemmas B.9–B.11, which bound ∑t=rT−1∥Ut+1∥Ct2\sum_{t=r}^{T-1}\|U_{t+1}\|^2_{C_t}∑t=rT−1​∥Ut+1​∥Ct​2​ by the value V∗(uˉ2/λ0,T−r)V^*(\bar u^2/\lambda_0, T-r)V∗(uˉ2/λ0​,T−r) of an optimization problem and that value by O(rlog⁡T)O(r\log T)O(rlogT).

Significance

Theorem 4.1 shows that one policy achieves regret within a factor log⁡3/2T\log^{3/2}Tlog3/2T of the Ω(rT)\Omega(r\sqrt T)Ω(rT​) lower bound for every compact arm set, finite or infinite, with sub-Gaussian unbounded noise and without knowledge of TTT. The dependence on the problem is only through rrr and the three constants of Assumption 1; the number of arms does not appear. The large deviation inequalities of Appendix B.1 are also the input of the paper's Theorem 4.2 for finitely many arms.

The result is proved on paper; no machine-checked proof of it is known. A formal development would produce reusable components that are currently absent from Mathlib: a Chernoff-type bound for least squares estimates built from adaptively chosen regressors, the self-normalized inequality of De la Peña, Klass and Lai in the form of Lemma B.3, the determinant recursion behind Lemma B.9, and the law of a bandit history driven by a policy and an arm-dependent noise kernel.

Difficulty

The arms UsU_sUs​ depend on past noise, so Z^t−z=CtMt\widehat Z_t - z = C_tM_tZt​−z=Ct​Mt​ with Mt=∑sUsWsM_t = \sum_s U_sW_sMt​=∑s​Us​Ws​ is not a sum of independent terms with fixed weights, and the classical Chernoff bound does not apply. For finitely many arms a union bound over the possible pull counts suffices (Theorem B.1), but its bound grows like t5∣Ur∣t^{5|\mathcal U_r|}t5∣Ur​∣ and is useless for infinite arm sets. Theorem B.2 instead needs a self-normalized martingale inequality and a covering argument over directions to compare MtMt′M_tM_t'Mt​Mt′​ with Ct−1C_t^{-1}Ct−1​ in the Loewner order. A second difficulty is that the sum ∑t∥Ut+1∥Ct\sum_t\|U_{t+1}\|_{C_t}∑t​∥Ut+1​∥Ct​​ of the radii played is not bounded term by term: each term can be as large as uˉ2/λ0\bar u^2/\lambda_0uˉ2/λ0​, and only the multiplicative recursion of Lemma B.9 shows that large terms are rare.

Formalization scope

Rr\mathbb R^rRr is EuclideanSpace ℝ (Fin r), so norms are Euclidean. The constants uˉ,λ0\bar u, \lambda_0uˉ,λ0​ are written ubar, lam0. Policies are deterministic, history-dependent and measurable (measurability is implicit in the paper). The noise is a Markov kernel ν\nuν giving the law of WtuW^u_tWtu​ for each arm; the history given Z=zZ = zZ=z is built period by period with fresh independent noise, which is the law of the paper's history. Assumption 1(a) is a bound on a lower Lebesgue integral, so it also asserts finiteness; λmin⁡(∑kbkbk′)≥λ0\lambda_{\min}(\sum_k b_kb_k') \ge \lambda_0λmin​(∑k​bk​bk′​)≥λ0​ is x′(∑kbkbk′)x≥λ0∥x∥2x'(\sum_k b_kb_k')x \ge \lambda_0\|x\|^2x′(∑k​bk​bk′​)x≥λ0​∥x∥2. The standing assumptions of Sec. 1.1 (compact Ur\mathcal U_rUr​, r≥2r \ge 2r≥2, independent mean-zero noise identically distributed in ttt) are hypotheses. min⁡{rlog⁡t,∣Ur∣}\min\{r\log t, |\mathcal U_r|\}min{rlogt,∣Ur​∣} equals rlog⁡tr\log trlogt for an infinite arm set. A UE run is any measurable policy that plays b1,…,brb_1, \dots, b_rb1​,…,br​ first and then a maximizer of v′Z^t+Rtvv'\widehat Z_t + R^v_tv′Zt​+Rtv​ after every history that starts with b1,…,brb_1, \dots, b_rb1​,…,br​; on those histories CtC_tCt​ is a genuine inverse.

Deviations from the page, all disclosed in the items: Lemma B.4 is printed for t≥1t \ge 1t≥1 but its proof needs t≥rt \ge rt≥r, and at t=1t = 1t=1 the printed claim fails; it is stated for t≥rt \ge rt≥r. Lemmas B.4 and B.5 are printed without "∣Z=z\mid Z = z∣Z=z" and are stated for each fixed zzz, the form in which the paper uses them. Lemmas B.9 and B.10 ("with probability one") are stated for every arm sequence that starts with b1,…,brb_1, \dots, b_rb1​,…,br​ and stays in the ball of radius uˉ\bar uuˉ, which is stronger. Theorem B.1 carries the hypothesis that Ur\mathcal U_rUr​ is finite.

The regret is Tmax⁡vv′zT\max_v v'zTmaxv​v′z minus the expected total reward, whose integrand is bounded, so it is never a junk value; the risk bound asserts integrability of the regret in zzz and assumes E∥Z∥<∞\mathbb E\|Z\| < \inftyE∥Z∥<∞. The constants a4,a5a_4, a_5a4​,a5​ are chosen before rrr, the arm set and the instance, so a formalization in which they depend on rrr or on Ur\mathcal U_rUr​ does not prove the goal.

Welcome contributions include proofs of any milestone, in particular the deterministic Lemmas B.9–B.11, and reusable lemmas on matrix determinants, self-normalized bounds and bandit history measures. The source is arXiv:0812.3465v2; its printed page numbers equal the PDF page numbers.

Selected references

  • P. Rusmevichientong and J. N. Tsitsiklis, Linearly Parameterized Bandits, Mathematics of Operations Research 35(2), 2010; preprint arXiv:0812.3465v2. https://arxiv.org/abs/0812.3465
  • V. H. de la Peña, M. J. Klass and T. L. Lai, Self-normalized processes: exponential inequalities, moment bounds and iterated logarithm laws, Annals of Probability 32(3A), 2004. https://doi.org/10.1214/009117904000000397
  • P. Auer, Using confidence bounds for exploitation-exploration trade-offs, Journal of Machine Learning Research 3, 2002. https://www.jmlr.org/papers/v3/auer02a.html
  • V. Dani, T. P. Hayes and S. M. Kakade, Stochastic linear optimization under bandit feedback, COLT 2008. https://www.learningtheory.org/colt2008/papers/80-Dani.pdf
  • T. L. Lai and H. Robbins, Asymptotically efficient adaptive allocation rules, Advances in Applied Mathematics 6, 1985. https://doi.org/10.1016/0196-8858(85)90002-8
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CombinatoricsGraph Theory·Captain: mikedeng1

On Metric Generators of Graphs 1: An Isometry Given on a Strong Metric Generator T of H, With H − T a Forest, Extends to All of H Exactly When H Has a Representation in GResearch Paper

Motivation

A set of vertices TTT of a graph is a metric generator when every vertex is determined by its vector of distances to the elements of TTT. The minimum size of such a set is the metric dimension, studied in graph theory since the 1970s and surveyed by Chartrand, Eroh, Johnson and Oellermann (Discrete Appl. Math. 2000). Metric generators also appear in combinatorial search, where identifying a vertex from distance queries is the same as weighing false coins.

Sebő and Tannier (Math. Oper. Res. 2004) ask a converse question. Suppose an isometric copy of TTT is already placed inside a second graph GGG. When does that placement extend to an isometric embedding of the whole graph HHH into GGG? With T=∅T=\emptysetT=∅ the question contains clique detection and is NP-hard (p. 385), so the interest lies in hypotheses on TTT that make it tractable. The paper's answer, Theorem 4, is the tool behind its main application: deciding whether a graph has a connected minimum TTT-join (§3.2), a question raised by Frank (1996).

Setting

All graphs are finite, simple, undirected and connected. For a graph GGG, μG(x,y)\mu_G(x,y)μG​(x,y) is the number of edges of a shortest path between xxx and yyy.

  • A vertex ttt distinguishes xxx and yyy if μG(t,x)≠μG(t,y)\mu_G(t,x)\neq\mu_G(t,y)μG​(t,x)=μG​(t,y). A set T⊆V(G)T\subseteq V(G)T⊆V(G) is a metric generator if any two distinct vertices are distinguished by some t∈Tt\in Tt∈T.
  • A set S⊆V(G)S\subseteq V(G)S⊆V(G) is a strong metric generator if for every pair x,yx,yx,y there is s∈Ss\in Ss∈S such that some shortest path from sss to xxx passes through yyy, or some shortest path from sss to yyy passes through xxx.
  • An isometry from HHH to GGG is a map φ:V(H)→V(G)\varphi:V(H)\to V(G)φ:V(H)→V(G) with μG(φ(u),φ(v))=μH(u,v)\mu_G(\varphi(u),\varphi(v))=\mu_H(u,v)μG​(φ(u),φ(v))=μH​(u,v) for all u,vu,vu,v. An isometry f:(T,μH∣T)→Gf:(T,\mu_H|_T)\to Gf:(T,μH​∣T​)→G is a map defined on T⊆V(H)T\subseteq V(H)T⊆V(H) that preserves the distances between elements of TTT; φ\varphiφ extends fff if φ(t)=f(t)\varphi(t)=f(t)φ(t)=f(t) for t∈Tt\in Tt∈T.
  • H−TH-TH−T is the subgraph of HHH induced on V(H)∖TV(H)\setminus TV(H)∖T.
  • Nonempty sets Cu⊆V(G)C_u\subseteq V(G)Cu​⊆V(G) (u∈V(H)u\in V(H)u∈V(H)) represent HHH in GGG with respect to TTT if (i) μG(f(t),x)=μH(t,u)\mu_G(f(t),x)=\mu_H(t,u)μG​(f(t),x)=μH​(t,u) for all t∈Tt\in Tt∈T and x∈Cux\in C_ux∈Cu​, and (ii) whenever uv∈E(H)uv\in E(H)uv∈E(H) and x∈Cux\in C_ux∈Cu​, some y∈Cvy\in C_vy∈Cv​ is adjacent to xxx in GGG.
  • The candidate procedure starts from Cu(0)={v:μG(f(t),v)=μH(t,u) ∀t∈T}C^{(0)}_u=\{v:\mu_G(f(t),v)=\mu_H(t,u)\ \forall t\in T\}Cu(0)​={v:μG​(f(t),v)=μH​(t,u) ∀t∈T} and C(0)=⋃uCu(0)C^{(0)}=\bigcup_u C^{(0)}_uC(0)=⋃u​Cu(0)​. It then repeatedly deletes from C(i)C^{(i)}C(i) every xxx that lies in some Cu(i)C^{(i)}_uCu(i)​ but has no neighbour in Cv(i)C^{(i)}_vCv(i)​ for some neighbour vvv of uuu, and sets Cu(i+1)=Cu(i)∩C(i+1)C^{(i+1)}_u=C^{(i)}_u\cap C^{(i+1)}Cu(i+1)​=Cu(i)​∩C(i+1). Finally Cu∗:=Cu(n)C^*_u:=C^{(n)}_uCu∗​:=Cu(n)​ with n=∣V(G)∣n=|V(G)|n=∣V(G)∣.

In Lean these are IsMetricGenerator, IsStrongMetricGenerator, IsIsometry, IsIsometryOn, Extends, Represents, candSet, cand and cStar in the namespace MetricGenerators.IsometryExt.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 4 (p. 388)

Let TTT be a strong metric generator of HHH with H−TH-TH−T a forest, and f:(T,μH∣T)→Gf:(T,\mu_H|_T)\to Gf:(T,μH​∣T​)→G an isometry. Then

∃ fˉ isometry H→G extending f  ⟺  ∃ (Cu)u∈V(H) representing H in G w.r.t. T,\exists\,\bar f \text{ isometry } H\to G \text{ extending } f\iff \exists\,(C_u)_{u\in V(H)} \text{ representing } H \text{ in } G \text{ w.r.t. } T,∃fˉ​ isometry H→G extending f⟺∃(Cu​)u∈V(H)​ representing H in G w.r.t. T,

and if fˉ\bar ffˉ​ exists, (Cu∗)u(C^*_u)_u(Cu∗​)u​ is a representation with Cu⊆Cu∗C_u\subseteq C^*_uCu​⊆Cu∗​ for every representation (Cu)u(C_u)_u(Cu​)u​, so it is the unique inclusionwise maximal one.

Milestones

  1. A strong metric generator is a metric generator (p. 386).
  2. The Cu(0)C^{(0)}_uCu(0)​ are pairwise disjoint and Ct(0)={f(t)}C^{(0)}_t=\{f(t)\}Ct(0)​={f(t)} for t∈Tt\in Tt∈T (p. 387).
  3. C(0)⊇C(1)⊇⋯C^{(0)}\supseteq C^{(1)}\supseteq\cdotsC(0)⊇C(1)⊇⋯ stabilizes after at most ∣V(G)∣|V(G)|∣V(G)∣ steps (p. 387).
  4. In a representation, Ct={f(t)}C_t=\{f(t)\}Ct​={f(t)} and the CuC_uCu​ are pairwise disjoint (p. 387).
  5. Lemma 1 (p. 387): in a representation, for all u,vu,vu,v and x∈Cux\in C_ux∈Cu​,
μH(u,v)=μG(x,Cv):=min⁡y∈CvμG(x,y).\mu_H(u,v)=\mu_G(x,C_v):=\min_{y\in C_v}\mu_G(x,y).μH​(u,v)=μG​(x,Cv​):=y∈Cv​min​μG​(x,y).
  1. Every representation satisfies Cu⊆Cu∗C_u\subseteq C^*_uCu​⊆Cu∗​ (proof of Theorem 4, p. 388).

A further theorem states the criterion behind Corollary 1 (p. 389): an extension exists iff every Cu∗C^*_uCu∗​ is nonempty.

Significance

Theorem 4 turns a global question (does an isometric embedding with prescribed values on TTT exist?) into a local one about adjacencies among candidate sets, and the procedure C(i)C^{(i)}C(i) settles it in at most ∣V(G)∣|V(G)|∣V(G)∣ rounds. In §3.2 of the paper the theorem is applied to a tree HHH with TTT its set of leaves (all but one leaf forms a strong metric generator, Theorem 3), and this yields the characterization and polynomial-time recognition of graphs with a connected minimum TTT-join. Without the forest hypothesis the characterization fails: Figure 2 of the paper gives a representation, with a triangle in H−TH-TH−T, for which no extension exists.

The result is proved in the paper. To our knowledge none of it has a machine-checked proof: Mathlib has graph distances (SimpleGraph.dist), acyclicity and induced subgraphs, but no metric generators, no isometry-extension results and no metric dimension. A formal proof would provide that vocabulary and a verified decision criterion. It would also be the first step towards formalizing the TTT-join application of the same paper.

Difficulty

The necessity half and the maximality of C∗C^*C∗ are bookkeeping. The difficulty is sufficiency: from a representation one must build an actual isometry. The obvious idea is to pick any cu∈Cuc_u\in C_ucu​∈Cu​ for every uuu, but this fails: two independently chosen candidates for adjacent vertices need not be adjacent, and condition (ii) only guarantees some adjacent partner. The choices must be coordinated along H−TH-TH−T. Even with coordinated choices, the distance between images must be bounded above along every shortest path of HHH, including paths that leave one component of H−TH-TH−T, pass through TTT, and return. Figure 2 shows that without the forest hypothesis no such choice need exist. Lemma 1 supplies the matching lower bound, and its proof needs the strong generator property, not just the metric-generator property.

Formalization scope

  • Vertex types are Fintypes; graphs are SimpleGraphs, and both HHH and GGG are assumed Connected in every statement. SimpleGraph.dist is N\mathbb NN-valued and equals 000 on unreachable pairs, so connectivity is load-bearing.
  • TTT is a Finset of vertices of HHH; fff is a function on the subtype of TTT, so it has no values outside TTT.
  • "A shortest path from sss to xxx contains yyy" is encoded as μ(s,x)=μ(s,y)+μ(y,x)\mu(s,x)=\mu(s,y)+\mu(y,x)μ(s,x)=μ(s,y)+μ(y,x), which is equivalent in a connected graph.
  • An isometry preserves all distances; a graph homomorphism is not an isometry.
  • H−TH-TH−T is H.induce (↑T)ᶜ, and "forest" is IsAcyclic. T=V(H)T=V(H)T=V(H) is allowed.
  • Candidate sets are Sets; the recursion follows the page's union form, and C∗C^*C∗ is the stage ∣V(G)∣|V(G)|∣V(G)∣.
  • The nonemptiness of every CuC_uCu​ is part of Represents. Without it the empty family would represent every HHH and the right-hand side of the goal would be trivially true. "Unique inclusionwise maximal" is stated as "a representation containing every representation".
  • Lemma 1's minimum is stated as attained plus a lower bound, without sInf.
  • No complexity statement (polynomial time, NP ∩ coNP) is formalized.

Reusable infrastructure: metric generators and strong metric generators of graphs, isometries between graph metrics, and lemmas relating SimpleGraph.dist to shortest paths through a vertex. Contributions are welcome on any milestone and on general SimpleGraph.dist lemmas they need.

Selected references

  • A. Sebő and E. Tannier, On Metric Generators of Graphs, Mathematics of Operations Research 29(2):383–393, 2004. https://doi.org/10.1287/moor.1030.0070
  • G. Chartrand, L. Eroh, M. A. Johnson and O. R. Oellermann, Resolvability in graphs and the metric dimension of a graph, Discrete Applied Mathematics 105:99–113, 2000. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0166-218X(00)00198-0
  • A. Frank, A survey on T-joins, T-cuts, and conservative weightings, in Combinatorics, Paul Erdős is Eighty, Vol. 2, Bolyai Society Mathematical Studies, 1996, pp. 213–252.
9 thms1 active userReviewed
Convex OptimizationOptimization·Captain: mikedeng1

Prox-Method with Rate of Convergence O(1/t) for Variational Inequalities with Lipschitz Continuous Monotone Operators and Smooth Convex-Concave Saddle Point Problems: Error √2ΘL/(αN) After N StepsResearch Paper

Motivation

Monotone variational inequalities (v.i.) cover convex minimization, convex–concave saddle-point problems, Nash equilibria of convex games and complementarity problems. Matrix games and other large saddle-point problems are typical cases. At large scale, first-order methods that use only values of the operator and simple auxiliary minimizations are the practical tool. The paper's introduction (pp. 229–231) contrasts this with the black-box lower bound of order 1/ϵ21/\epsilon^21/ϵ2 evaluations for nonsmooth Lipschitz minimization, and with Nesterov's smoothing method (2005), which reaches O(1/t)O(1/t)O(1/t) for structured saddle-point objectives. The paper states that its O(1/t)O(1/t)O(1/t) complexity estimate is new, to the author's knowledge, even in the Euclidean case, where the scheme is Korpelevich's extragradient method of 1976.

A. Nemirovski, Prox-Method with Rate of Convergence O(1/t) for Variational Inequalities with Lipschitz Continuous Monotone Operators and Smooth Convex-Concave Saddle Point Problems, SIAM J. Optim. 15(1):229–251, 2004 (doi:10.1137/S1052623403425629), introduced what is now called the mirror-prox method. It showed that two prox steps per iteration give an ergodic error of order 1/N1/N1/N when the operator is Lipschitz continuous, and that the bound holds in an arbitrary norm, adapted to the geometry of the feasible set by a distance-generating function. The method and its analysis underlie later work on smooth saddle-point problems, including Nesterov's dual extrapolation and Juditsky–Nemirovski–Tauvel's stochastic mirror-prox (2011).

Setting

Let EEE be a finite-dimensional real vector space with an arbitrary norm ∥⋅∥\|\cdot\|∥⋅∥, not necessarily Euclidean. Dual vectors ξ\xiξ act on z∈Ez\in Ez∈E by ⟨ξ,z⟩\langle\xi,z\rangle⟨ξ,z⟩, and the conjugate norm is ∥ξ∥∗=max⁡∥z∥≤1⟨ξ,z⟩\|\xi\|_*=\max_{\|z\|\le1}\langle\xi,z\rangle∥ξ∥∗​=max∥z∥≤1​⟨ξ,z⟩. Let Z⊆EZ\subseteq EZ⊆E be nonempty, convex and compact.

The operator FFF maps ZZZ to dual vectors and satisfies (2.1): it is LLL-Lipschitz, ∥F(z)−F(z′)∥∗≤L∥z−z′∥\|F(z)-F(z')\|_*\le L\|z-z'\|∥F(z)−F(z′)∥∗​≤L∥z−z′∥, and monotone, ⟨F(z)−F(z′),z−z′⟩≥0\langle F(z)-F(z'),z-z'\rangle\ge0⟨F(z)−F(z′),z−z′⟩≥0, for all z,z′∈Zz,z'\in Zz,z′∈Z. A solution of the v.i. is a point z∗∈Zz_*\in Zz∗​∈Z with ⟨F(z),z∗−z⟩≤0\langle F(z),z_*-z\rangle\le0⟨F(z),z∗​−z⟩≤0 for all z∈Zz\in Zz∈Z. The accuracy of a candidate zˉ∈Z\bar z\in Zzˉ∈Z is

ϵ(zˉ)=max⁡u∈Z⟨F(u),zˉ−u⟩.\epsilon(\bar z)=\max_{u\in Z}\langle F(u),\bar z-u\rangle .ϵ(zˉ)=u∈Zmax​⟨F(u),zˉ−u⟩.

The distance-generating function ω:Z→R\omega:Z\to\mathbb Rω:Z→R is continuously differentiable on ZZZ and strongly convex with modulus α>0\alpha>0α>0 in the form (2.2): ⟨ω′(z)−ω′(w),z−w⟩≥α∥z−w∥2\langle\omega'(z)-\omega'(w),z-w\rangle\ge\alpha\|z-w\|^2⟨ω′(z)−ω′(w),z−w⟩≥α∥z−w∥2. The prox-mapping is

Pz(ξ)=argmin⁡w∈Z[ω(w)+⟨ξ−ω′(z),w⟩],P_z(\xi)=\operatorname*{argmin}_{w\in Z}\big[\omega(w)+\langle\xi-\omega'(z),w\rangle\big],Pz​(ξ)=w∈Zargmin​[ω(w)+⟨ξ−ω′(z),w⟩],

and the constant Θ(z0)=max⁡z∈Z[ω(z)−ω(z0)−⟨ω′(z0),z−z0⟩]\Theta(z_0)=\max_{z\in Z}[\omega(z)-\omega(z_0)-\langle\omega'(z_0),z-z_0\rangle]Θ(z0​)=maxz∈Z​[ω(z)−ω(z0​)−⟨ω′(z0​),z−z0​⟩] measures how far ZZZ extends from the starting point z0z_0z0​ in the geometry of ω\omegaω.

The basic implementation fixes the stepsize γ=α/(2L)\gamma=\alpha/(\sqrt2L)γ=α/(2​L) (3.2). At step ttt it computes wt,1=Pzt−1(γF(zt−1))w_{t,1}=P_{z_{t-1}}(\gamma F(z_{t-1}))wt,1​=Pzt−1​​(γF(zt−1​)) and checks the test (3.4),

⟨γF(a),a−b⟩+ω(zt−1)+⟨ω′(zt−1),b−zt−1⟩−ω(b)≤0,\langle\gamma F(a),a-b\rangle+\omega(z_{t-1})+\langle\omega'(z_{t-1}),b-z_{t-1}\rangle-\omega(b)\le0,⟨γF(a),a−b⟩+ω(zt−1​)+⟨ω′(zt−1​),b−zt−1​⟩−ω(b)≤0,

for (a,b)=(zt−1,wt,1)(a,b)=(z_{t-1},w_{t,1})(a,b)=(zt−1​,wt,1​). If the test passes, wt=zt−1w_t=z_{t-1}wt​=zt−1​ and zt=wt,1z_t=w_{t,1}zt​=wt,1​. Otherwise wt=wt,1w_t=w_{t,1}wt​=wt,1​ and zt=Pzt−1(γF(wt,1))z_t=P_{z_{t-1}}(\gamma F(w_{t,1}))zt​=Pzt−1​​(γF(wt,1​)). The output after NNN steps is the average zN=1N∑t=1Nwtz^N=\frac1N\sum_{t=1}^Nw_tzN=N1​∑t=1N​wt​ of the points wtw_twt​.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 3.2 (p. 239), variational-inequality form

For every run of the basic implementation, (3.4) holds at every step, so two inner iterations always suffice, and for every N≥1N\ge1N≥1

ϵ(zN)≤2 Θ(z0) LαN.(3.9)\epsilon(z^N)\le\frac{\sqrt2\,\Theta(z_0)\,L}{\alpha N}.\tag{3.9}ϵ(zN)≤αN2​Θ(z0​)L​.(3.9)

Milestones, in the order of the proof

  1. Lemma 2.1 (2.5), p. 232: Hu(Pz(ξ))−Hu(z)≤⟨ξ,u−Pz(ξ)⟩+[ω(z)+⟨ω′(z),Pz(ξ)−z⟩−ω(Pz(ξ))]H_u(P_z(\xi))-H_u(z)\le\langle\xi,u-P_z(\xi)\rangle+[\omega(z)+\langle\omega'(z),P_z(\xi)-z\rangle-\omega(P_z(\xi))]Hu​(Pz​(ξ))−Hu​(z)≤⟨ξ,u−Pz​(ξ)⟩+[ω(z)+⟨ω′(z),Pz​(ξ)−z⟩−ω(Pz​(ξ))], and the bracket is ≤0\le0≤0. Here Hu(z)=Ω(ω′(z))−⟨ω′(z),u⟩H_u(z)=\Omega(\omega'(z))-\langle\omega'(z),u\rangleHu​(z)=Ω(ω′(z))−⟨ω′(z),u⟩ and Ω\OmegaΩ is the Legendre transform of ω∣Z\omega|_Zω∣Z​.
  2. (2.15), p. 235: one step of the relaxed conceptual prox-method satisfies ⟨γtF(wt),wt−u⟩≤Hu(zt−1)−Hu(zt)+ϵt\langle\gamma_tF(w_t),w_t-u\rangle\le H_u(z_{t-1})-H_u(z_t)+\epsilon_t⟨γt​F(wt​),wt​−u⟩≤Hu​(zt−1​)−Hu​(zt​)+ϵt​.
  3. Proposition 2.2(ii), p. 234: ϵ(zN)≤(Θ(z0)+∑tϵt)/∑tγt\epsilon(z^N)\le(\Theta(z_0)+\sum_t\epsilon_t)/\sum_t\gamma_tϵ(zN)≤(Θ(z0​)+∑t​ϵt​)/∑t​γt​ for the relaxed method (2.11).
  4. Lemma 3.1 (3.7.a), p. 238: ∥w−z+∥≤α−1γ∥ξ−η∥∗\|w-z_+\|\le\alpha^{-1}\gamma\|\xi-\eta\|_*∥w−z+​∥≤α−1γ∥ξ−η∥∗​.
  5. Lemma 3.1 (3.7.c), p. 238: δ≤ϵ\delta\le\epsilonδ≤ϵ.
  6. Lemma 3.1 (3.7.d), p. 238: ϵ≤α−1γ2∥ξ−η∥∗2−α2[∥w−z∥2+∥w−z+∥2]\epsilon\le\alpha^{-1}\gamma^2\|\xi-\eta\|_*^2-\frac\alpha2[\|w-z\|^2+\|w-z_+\|^2]ϵ≤α−1γ2∥ξ−η∥∗2​−2α​[∥w−z∥2+∥w−z+​∥2].
  7. The display of the proof of Theorem 3.2, p. 239: with γ=α/(2L)\gamma=\alpha/(\sqrt2L)γ=α/(2​L), the second inner iterate always passes (3.4).

Lemma 2.1 (2.4), Lemma 3.1 (3.7.b) and Remark 2.3 are also stated as companion theorems.

Significance

The theorem gives an O(1/N)O(1/N)O(1/N) bound for monotone Lipschitz v.i. and for smooth convex–concave saddle points at a cost of two operator evaluations and two prox problems per step. With a distance-generating function adapted to ZZZ, the paper derives rates that are, in its words, nearly dimension-independent under favorable circumstances, for matrix games, eigenvalue minimization and the Lovász capacity number (§5). In the Euclidean case ω=12∥⋅∥22\omega=\frac12\|\cdot\|_2^2ω=21​∥⋅∥22​ the method is Korpelevich's extragradient method, so the theorem also gives an ergodic O(1/N)O(1/N)O(1/N) rate for that method.

The result is proved in the paper; no machine-checked proof of it is known. The platform has a formalized statement of mirror prox for minimization of a smooth convex function (Bubeck's Theorem 4.4), which uses a mirror map on an open set and a function-value gap. It does not cover operators, the v.i. accuracy measure or a prox-mapping over a compact set. This mission produces the general v.i. version, with an arbitrary norm and a distance-generating function defined only on ZZZ.

Difficulty

The algebra of each step is short. The work is in three places. First, the first-order optimality conditions of the constrained prox problems, (2.6) and (3.8), must be derived when ω′\omega'ω′ is only a derivative within ZZZ, and ZZZ may have empty interior. Second, (3.7.d) needs the function-value form of strong convexity, ω(w)≥ω(z)+⟨ω′(z),w−z⟩+α2∥w−z∥2\omega(w)\ge\omega(z)+\langle\omega'(z),w-z\rangle+\frac\alpha2\|w-z\|^2ω(w)≥ω(z)+⟨ω′(z),w−z⟩+2α​∥w−z∥2, which must be derived from the monotonicity form (2.2) along segments of ZZZ. Third, the telescoping of (2.15) uses the identity Ω(ω′(z))=⟨ω′(z),z⟩−ω(z)\Omega(\omega'(z))=\langle\omega'(z),z\rangle-\omega(z)Ω(ω′(z))=⟨ω′(z),z⟩−ω(z) for z∈Zz\in Zz∈Z, and the passage from the weighted sum to the average uses monotonicity of FFF.

The natural first idea is to prove that the inner map w↦Pz(γF(w))w\mapsto P_z(\gamma F(w))w↦Pz​(γF(w)) is a contraction, observation (3.1), and iterate it to a fixed point. That gives only a geometric number of inner steps, not two. The two-step bound comes from Lemma 3.1, which decouples the two prox steps and compares them through strong convexity.

Formalization scope

Dual vectors are continuous linear functionals E →L[ℝ] ℝ on a finite-dimensional normed space E, and ∥⋅∥∗\|\cdot\|_*∥⋅∥∗​ is the operator norm. This is equivalent to the paper's Euclidean space with a second norm. ZZZ is assumed convex, compact and nonempty in every item. ω\omegaω has a derivative within ZZZ that is continuous on ZZZ, and (2.2) is assumed in the monotonicity form. The prox-mapping is the relation "v∈Uv\in Uv∈U minimizes ω(y)+⟨ξ−ω′(z),y⟩\omega(y)+\langle\xi-\omega'(z),y\rangleω(y)+⟨ξ−ω′(z),y⟩ over UUU". Ω\OmegaΩ and Θ\ThetaΘ are suprema over the image of ZZZ, which are maxima under these assumptions. The paper's indices are kept: z 0 is z0z_0z0​, and step t+1t+1t+1 goes from z t to w (t+1) and z (t+1).

Disclosed choices: L>0L>0L>0 and N≥1N\ge1N≥1 are hypotheses, because (3.2) and (3.9) divide by them. The termination test (2.8) is not modelled, so runs never stop; this only adds runs. The basic implementation's inner loop is cut at s=2s=2s=2, which is what the goal's first claim justifies. The bound on ϵ(zN)\epsilon(z^N)ϵ(zN) is stated for every u∈Zu\in Zu∈Z, which is equivalent to the bound on the maximum. Items that use only monotonicity of FFF, or no property of FFF, do not assume the rest of (2.1).

The goal quantifies over every run, and a sorry-free sanity file exhibits a run on Z=[0,1]Z=[0,1]Z=[0,1], so the run relation is not empty. The average is over the wtw_twt​, not the ztz_tzt​. The suprema are taken over compact nonempty ZZZ with continuous ω\omegaω, so they are not junk values. The saddle-point form (3.10), the bound (2.14) and Theorems 4.1–4.2 are not posed.

Useful contributions: optimality conditions for minimizers of functions differentiable within a convex set; the function-value form of strong convexity derived from (2.2); and the Legendre-transform identity. All three are reusable for other mirror-descent and prox-method analyses.

Selected references

  • A. Nemirovski, Prox-Method with Rate of Convergence O(1/t) for Variational Inequalities with Lipschitz Continuous Monotone Operators and Smooth Convex-Concave Saddle Point Problems, SIAM J. Optim. 15(1):229–251, 2004. https://doi.org/10.1137/S1052623403425629
  • G. M. Korpelevich, The extragradient method for finding saddle points and other problems, Ekonomika i Matematicheskie Metody 12:747–756, 1976.
  • Yu. Nesterov, Dual extrapolation and its applications to solving variational inequalities and related problems, Math. Program. 109:319–344, 2007. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10107-006-0034-z
  • A. Juditsky, A. Nemirovski, C. Tauvel, Solving variational inequalities with stochastic mirror-prox algorithm, Stochastic Systems 1(1):17–58, 2011. https://doi.org/10.1214/10-SSY011
  • S. Bubeck, Convex Optimization: Algorithms and Complexity, Found. Trends Mach. Learn. 8(3–4):231–357, 2015, §4.5. https://doi.org/10.1561/2200000050
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OptimizationProbability·Captain: mikedeng1

Centralized and Competitive Inventory Models with Demand Substitution 2: At Least One Product Is Stocked No Less Under Competition Than Under Centralized ManagementResearch Paper

Motivation

A retailer that carries several substitutable products, such as brands of the same item, loses part of a customer's demand when the preferred product is out of stock, but not all of it: some customers buy another product instead. How much of each product to stock then depends on the stocking levels of the others. When all products are managed by one company, the stocking problem is a joint optimization; when each product is managed by a separate firm, it is a game, and each firm ignores the effect of its stock-outs on its competitors.

A common view in the inventory literature is that competition drives inventories up for every product. Mahajan and van Ryzin and Lippman and McCardle demonstrated it in special cases (Lippman & McCardle, Operations Research 1997; Mahajan & van Ryzin, Columbia working paper 1999, published in Operations Research 2001). Netessine and Rudi (SSRN 303779, 2002, later published in Operations Research, 2003) study the general model with nnn products, an arbitrary continuous joint demand distribution, and arbitrary substitution fractions. They show that the common view fails in general: some products may be stocked more under centralized management (Proposition 6(i)), but at least one product is always stocked no less under competition (Proposition 6(ii)). This mission formalizes Proposition 6(ii) and the centralized first-order analysis on which it rests.

Setting

There are n≥1n \ge 1n≥1 products, indexed i=1,…,ni = 1,\dots,ni=1,…,n, sold in a single period. Product iii is stocked at Qi≥0Q_i \ge 0Qi​≥0 units at unit cost cic_ici​, sold at unit price rir_iri​, and salvaged at unit value sis_isi​, with ri>ci>si>0r_i > c_i > s_i > 0ri​>ci​>si​>0. Write ui=ri−ciu_i = r_i - c_iui​=ri​−ci​ (the underage cost) and oi=ci−sio_i = c_i - s_ioi​=ci​−si​ (the overage cost).

The first-choice demand vector D=(D1,…,Dn)D = (D_1,\dots,D_n)D=(D1​,…,Dn​) is random, with a known continuous joint law on the positive orthant. A fraction aij∈[0,1]a_{ij} \in [0,1]aij​∈[0,1] of the unmet demand for product iii switches to product jjj, with aii=0a_{ii} = 0aii​=0 and ∑jaij<1\sum_j a_{ij} < 1∑j​aij​<1; a customer whose second choice is also out of stock is lost. The effective demand for product iii is

Dis=Di+∑j≠iaji (Dj−Qj)+,x+=max⁡(0,x).D^s_i = D_i + \sum_{j \ne i} a_{ji}\,(D_j - Q_j)^+, \qquad x^+ = \max(0,x).Dis​=Di​+j=i∑​aji​(Dj​−Qj​)+,x+=max(0,x).

Under centralized management a single company maximizes the expected profit

π(Q)=E∑i[rimin⁡(Dis,Qi)−ciQi+si(Qi−Dis)+]\pi(Q) = \mathbb E \sum_i \Big[r_i \min(D^s_i, Q_i) - c_i Q_i + s_i (Q_i - D^s_i)^+\Big]π(Q)=Ei∑​[ri​min(Dis​,Qi​)−ci​Qi​+si​(Qi​−Dis​)+]

over all Q≥0Q \ge 0Q≥0; a maximizer is written QcQ^cQc. Under competition firm iii chooses Qi≥0Q_i \ge 0Qi​≥0 to maximize

πi(Q)=E[uiDis−ui(Dis−Qi)+−oi(Qi−Dis)+],\pi_i(Q) = \mathbb E\big[u_i D^s_i - u_i (D^s_i - Q_i)^+ - o_i (Q_i - D^s_i)^+\big],πi​(Q)=E[ui​Dis​−ui​(Dis​−Qi​)+−oi​(Qi​−Dis​)+],

given the other firms' quantities; a Nash equilibrium Qd≥0Q^d \ge 0Qd≥0 is a vector at which no firm gains by changing its own quantity. In the Lean development these objects are Model, Ds, centralProfit, IsCentralOptimal, firmProfit, IsBestResponse and IsNash in the namespace DemandSubstitution.Comparison.

Formalization targets

Goal: Proposition 6(ii)

For every optimal centralized stocking vector QcQ^cQc and every Nash equilibrium QdQ^dQd,

∃ i:Qic≤Qid.\exists\, i:\quad Q^c_i \le Q^d_i .∃i:Qic​≤Qid​.

The statement quantifies over all optima and all equilibria; it asserts neither existence nor uniqueness of either.

Milestones

  1. The underage/overage form (1): π=E∑i[uiDis−ui(Dis−Qi)+−oi(Qi−Dis)+]\pi = \mathbb E\sum_i [u_i D^s_i - u_i (D^s_i - Q_i)^+ - o_i (Q_i - D^s_i)^+]π=E∑i​[ui​Dis​−ui​(Dis​−Qi​)+−oi​(Qi​−Dis​)+].
  2. The derivative of one substitution term: for j≠ij \ne ij=i, ∂ E(Djs−Qj)+/∂Qi=−aijPr⁡(Djs>Qj,Di>Qi)\partial\,\mathbb E(D^s_j - Q_j)^+/\partial Q_i = -a_{ij}\Pr(D^s_j > Q_j, D_i > Q_i)∂E(Djs​−Qj​)+/∂Qi​=−aij​Pr(Djs​>Qj​,Di​>Qi​).
  3. The partial derivative (8) of π\piπ with respect to QiQ_iQi​.
  4. Proposition 1, the centralized optimality condition (7):
Pr⁡(Di<Qic)−Pr⁡(Di<Qic<Dis)+∑j≠iuj+ojui+oi aijPr⁡(Djs<Qjc,Di>Qic)=uiui+oi.\Pr(D_i < Q^c_i) - \Pr(D_i < Q^c_i < D^s_i) + \sum_{j\ne i}\frac{u_j+o_j}{u_i+o_i}\,a_{ij}\Pr(D^s_j < Q^c_j, D_i > Q^c_i) = \frac{u_i}{u_i+o_i}.Pr(Di​<Qic​)−Pr(Di​<Qic​<Dis​)+j=i∑​ui​+oi​uj​+oj​​aij​Pr(Djs​<Qjc​,Di​>Qic​)=ui​+oi​ui​​.
  1. The comparison Pr⁡(Disc<Qic)≤Pr⁡(Disd<Qid)\Pr(D^{sc}_i < Q^c_i) \le \Pr(D^{sd}_i < Q^d_i)Pr(Disc​<Qic​)≤Pr(Disd​<Qid​), where DscD^{sc}Dsc and DsdD^{sd}Dsd are the effective demands at QcQ^cQc and QdQ^dQd.

Significance

Proposition 6(ii) bounds how far competition can depart from the centralized solution in the downward direction: it can never make every product understocked. Together with Proposition 6(i), it shows that neither "competition overstocks everything" nor its opposite holds in general, and it is the step from which the symmetric case, Proposition 6(iii) (every product is stocked at least as much under competition), follows. The centralized condition (7) and the derivative (8) are of independent use: they give the first-order conditions of the multi-product newsvendor with stock-out substitution for an arbitrary number of products and an arbitrary continuous demand law, obtained without Leibniz-rule integration over polyhedral regions.

The results are proved in the paper; none of them has a machine-checked proof. A formal proof requires differentiating an expectation of piecewise-linear functions of the demand under the integral sign, and handling the measure-zero boundaries where those functions have kinks. That machinery is reusable for other multi-product newsvendor models.

Difficulty

The centralized profit is not concave in general for three or more products (the paper's own example, pp. 3–5), so the optimum cannot be characterized as the unique solution of first-order conditions: the argument must work with an arbitrary maximizer and use only the necessary condition at an interior coordinate. The derivative (8) must be justified as a two-sided derivative of an integral whose integrand is not differentiable on hyperplanes in demand space; the paper's difference quotient argument leaves the boundary terms implicit. Finally, the obvious comparison of the two first-order conditions yields only an inequality between probabilities; turning it into an inequality between stocking levels requires the distribution function of DisD^s_iDis​ to be strictly increasing, and an optimal QicQ^c_iQic​ may be zero, where (7) does not hold.

Formalization scope

Products are Fin n (0-based). The model data and the standing assumptions ri>ci>si>0r_i > c_i > s_i > 0ri​>ci​>si​>0, aij∈[0,1]a_{ij} \in [0,1]aij​∈[0,1], aii=0a_{ii} = 0aii​=0, ∑jaij<1\sum_j a_{ij} < 1∑j​aij​<1 are fields of a structure Model n. The demand law is a probability measure μ\muμ on Rn\mathbb R^nRn that is absolutely continuous with respect to Lebesgue measure, is concentrated on the open positive orthant, and has integrable coordinates (IsDemandLaw). Expectations are Bochner integrals and probabilities are μ.real of sets with the strict and weak inequalities exactly as printed. Derivatives are two-sided HasDerivAt in one coordinate, the others held fixed through Function.update.

Three hypotheses are pinned relative to the page and disclosed in the statements:

  • NeZero n in the goal: for n=0n = 0n=0 "at least one iii" is false.
  • HasPositiveDensity μ in the goal: a Lebesgue density strictly positive on the open positive orthant. The paper's last step uses strict monotonicity of the distribution function of DisD^s_iDis​ without stating it.
  • Qic>0Q^c_i > 0Qic​>0 in Proposition 1 and in the probability comparison: (7) is an equality only at an interior coordinate. The goal carries no such hypothesis.

The centralized optimum is a maximizer of π\piπ over nonnegative vectors and the Nash equilibrium is the no-profitable-deviation property over nonnegative quantities. Defining either by its first-order condition ((7) or (10)) would turn the propositions into definitions and is ruled out. Stating the goal for one chosen optimum or equilibrium is ruled out as well: it holds for every pair.

Contributions welcome: differentiation of expectations of piecewise-linear functions under absolutely continuous laws; null-set lemmas for {Djs=Qj}\{D^s_j = Q_j\}{Djs​=Qj​}; Fermat's rule at a coordinate-wise interior maximizer; the Nash condition (10) of the competitive game, which milestone 5 needs and which is also posed in the companion mission on equilibrium existence.

Selected references

  • S. Netessine and N. Rudi, Centralized and Competitive Inventory Models with Demand Substitution, Simon School Working Paper OP 02-01, University of Rochester, April 2002, SSRN 303779. https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.303779 (journal version: Operations Research 51(2), 2003; this mission cites the working paper's numbering)
  • S. A. Lippman and K. F. McCardle, The competitive newsboy, Operations Research 45(1), 54–65, 1997.
  • S. Mahajan and G. van Ryzin, Inventory competition under dynamic consumer choice, Columbia University working paper, 1999 (cited by Netessine & Rudi as [8]); published in Operations Research, 2001.
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OptimizationProbability·Captain: mikedeng1

Supply Chain Coordination Under Channel Rebates with Sales Effort Effects III: Returns Alone, Linear Rebates Alone or Target Rebates Alone Cannot Coordinate Effort and QuantityResearch Paper

Motivation

Manufacturers of computer hardware, software and automobiles routinely pay channel rebates to their retailers: a payment for each unit the retailer sells to end customers, either for every unit (a linear rebate) or only for units beyond a target (a target rebate). In the same industries manufacturers also accept returns, crediting the retailer for unsold stock. Both instruments are meant to make the retailer act in the interest of the whole supply chain. When the retailer's sales effort drives demand and cannot be written into a contract, the question is which of these instruments, alone or combined, can make the retailer choose the effort and the stock that maximize total chain profit.

T. A. Taylor, Supply Chain Coordination Under Channel Rebates with Sales Effort Effects, Management Science 48(8) (2002) (DOI 10.1287/mnsc.48.8.992.168), answers this in a newsvendor model with multiplicative effort. Its Theorem 2 shows that a target rebate combined with returns can coordinate. This mission formalizes the complementary negative result, the paper's Proposition 2: no single instrument suffices. It is related to the impossibility shown by Cachon and Lariviere for revenue sharing with retailer effort (Management Science 51(1), 2005), but concerns different instruments.

Setting

A retailer orders a quantity Q≥0Q \ge 0Q≥0 and exerts a sales effort e≥0e \ge 0e≥0 before demand is observed. Demand is eξe\xieξ, where ξ\xiξ is a random variable with a density φ\varphiφ on R\mathbb RR that vanishes on (−∞,0)(-\infty, 0)(−∞,0) and is strictly positive on [0,∞)[0, \infty)[0,∞) (Assumption A4), with finite mean. Write

Φ(Q)=∫0Qφ(ξ) dξ,Γ(Q)=∫0Qξ dΦ(ξ).\Phi(Q) = \int_0^Q \varphi(\xi)\,d\xi, \qquad \Gamma(Q) = \int_0^Q \xi\,d\Phi(\xi).Φ(Q)=∫0Q​φ(ξ)dξ,Γ(Q)=∫0Q​ξdΦ(ξ).

Effort costs V(e)V(e)V(e), where V(0)=0V(0) = 0V(0)=0 and VVV is strictly increasing and strictly convex on [0,∞)[0, \infty)[0,∞) (Assumption A5; the paper declares all such properties strict). The retail price ppp, the manufacturer's unit cost ccc, the wholesale price www and the salvage value sss satisfy 0<c<w<p0 < c < w < p0<c<w<p and s<cs < cs<c (Assumption A1); sss may be negative.

The integrated channel earns

Π(Q,e)=−cQ+pEmin⁡(Q,eξ)+sE(Q−eξ)+−V(e),\Pi(Q, e) = -cQ + pE\min(Q, e\xi) + sE(Q - e\xi)^+ - V(e),Π(Q,e)=−cQ+pEmin(Q,eξ)+sE(Q−eξ)+−V(e),

and (Qˉ,eˉ)(\bar Q, \bar e)(Qˉ​,eˉ) denotes a maximizer of Π\PiΠ over Q≥0Q \ge 0Q≥0, e≥0e \ge 0e≥0. Under a contract with wholesale price www, rebate uuu per unit sold beyond the target TTT, and return credit bbb per unsold unit, the retailer earns

R(Q,e∣T)=−wQ+pEmin⁡(Q,eξ)+uE(min⁡(Q,eξ)−T)++bE(Q−eξ)+−V(e).R(Q, e \mid T) = -wQ + pE\min(Q, e\xi) + uE(\min(Q, e\xi) - T)^+ + bE(Q - e\xi)^+ - V(e).R(Q,e∣T)=−wQ+pEmin(Q,eξ)+uE(min(Q,eξ)−T)++bE(Q−eξ)+−V(e).

Returns alone is u=0u = 0u=0 with b∈[s,w)b \in [s, w)b∈[s,w); a target rebate alone is u>0u > 0u>0, T≥0T \ge 0T≥0 with no returns, b=sb = sb=s (the retailer salvages leftovers herself); a linear rebate alone is the case T=0T = 0T=0 of the latter. Channel coordination means that the retailer's optimal decisions under the contract are the integrated channel's (Qˉ,eˉ)(\bar Q, \bar e)(Qˉ​,eˉ).

Formalization targets

Goal: Proposition 2 (p. 1003)

For every b∈[s,w)b \in [s, w)b∈[s,w), every u>0u > 0u>0 and every T≥0T \ge 0T≥0,

(Qˉ,eˉ)∉arg⁡max⁡Q,e≥0R(⋅,⋅∣T)  under (u,b,T)=(0,b,0), (u,s,0), (u,s,T).(\bar Q, \bar e) \notin \arg\max_{Q, e \ge 0} R(\cdot, \cdot \mid T)\ \text{ under } (u, b, T) = (0, b, 0),\ (u, s, 0),\ (u, s, T).(Qˉ​,eˉ)∈/argQ,e≥0max​R(⋅,⋅∣T)  under (u,b,T)=(0,b,0), (u,s,0), (u,s,T).

The three clauses are returns alone, a linear rebate alone, and a target rebate alone. The statement asserts that (Qˉ,eˉ)(\bar Q, \bar e)(Qˉ​,eˉ) is not among the retailer's maximizers at all, which is stronger than saying that the retailer's optimum is not exactly {(Qˉ,eˉ)}\{(\bar Q, \bar e)\}{(Qˉ​,eˉ)}.

Milestones

  1. §4.1, p. 999. An integrated optimum with eˉ>0\bar e > 0eˉ>0 satisfies Qˉ=eˉ Qˉ0\bar Q = \bar e\,\bar Q_0Qˉ​=eˉQˉ​0​ with Φ(Qˉ0)=(p−c)/(p−s)\Phi(\bar Q_0) = (p - c)/(p - s)Φ(Qˉ​0​)=(p−c)/(p−s), V′(eˉ)=(p−s)Γ(Qˉ0)V'(\bar e) = (p - s)\Gamma(\bar Q_0)V′(eˉ)=(p−s)Γ(Qˉ​0​), and Π(Qˉ,eˉ)=eˉV′(eˉ)−V(eˉ)\Pi(\bar Q, \bar e) = \bar e V'(\bar e) - V(\bar e)Π(Qˉ​,eˉ)=eˉV′(eˉ)−V(eˉ).
  2. Lemma 2, p. 1000. For every effort e≥0e \ge 0e≥0, the retailer's optimal orders under (w,u,b,T)(w, u, b, T)(w,u,b,T) are {eQ‾0}\{e\underline Q_0\}{eQ​0​}, {eQ‾1}\{e\underline Q_1\}{eQ​1​} or {eQ‾0,eQ‾1}\{e\underline Q_0, e\underline Q_1\}{eQ​0​,eQ​1​} as e<,>,=T/τe <, >, = T/\taue<,>,=T/τ, where Φ(Q‾0)=(p−w)/(p−b)\Phi(\underline Q_0) = (p - w)/(p - b)Φ(Q​0​)=(p−w)/(p−b), Φ(Q‾1)=(p+u−w)/(p+u−b)\Phi(\underline Q_1) = (p + u - w)/(p + u - b)Φ(Q​1​)=(p+u−w)/(p+u−b) and τ\tauτ is the indifference target of the quantity-only problem.
  3. §4.3, p. 1001. For T>0T > 0T>0, no optimal pair of the retailer has effort exactly T/τT/\tauT/τ.

Significance

Proposition 2 is the converse half of the paper's main message. Together with Theorem 2 it says that the combination of a target rebate with returns is the minimal coordinating scheme among those considered: each ingredient alone fails, under general demand and general effort cost, not only in a parametric example. The proposition also frames the paper's remark that a linear rebate combined with returns coordinates only at u=w−cu = w - cu=w−c and b=s+w−cb = s + w - cb=s+w−c, which leaves the manufacturer no profit.

The result is proved in the paper; nothing in this mission is open mathematics. No part of it has been machine-checked before. The formal development adds a precise account of what the paper's argument needs: the existence and interiority of the integrated optimum, the differentiability of the effort cost, and a full characterization of the retailer's optimal order for a general positive density, which the paper states but proves only for the quantity-only case.

Difficulty

The obvious route compares first-order conditions, but neither problem is globally smooth. The retailer's profit in QQQ has an upward kink at Q=TQ = TQ=T, so it is concave only piecewise and its maximizer is decided by a comparison of two local maxima, not by a first-order condition. Consequently the retailer's value as a function of effort, A(e∣T)=max⁡QR(Q,e∣T)A(e \mid T) = \max_Q R(Q, e \mid T)A(e∣T)=maxQ​R(Q,e∣T), switches branch at e=T/τe = T/\taue=T/τ and is neither concave nor differentiable there. Showing that (Qˉ,eˉ)(\bar Q, \bar e)(Qˉ​,eˉ) is not a retailer optimum therefore requires the global order characterization (Lemma 2) in place of a local condition, a separate argument for the knife-edge effort T/τT/\tauT/τ, and differentiability of expectations such as Emin⁡(Q,eξ)E\min(Q, e\xi)Emin(Q,eξ) in the effort level under only a finite-mean assumption. The paper's own proof cites Lemma 1 where Lemma 2 with b=sb = sb=s is needed.

Formalization scope

The density form of A4 is literal: a measurable φ\varphiφ, zero on negatives, positive on [0,∞)[0, \infty)[0,∞), integrating to one, with ξφ(ξ)\xi\varphi(\xi)ξφ(ξ) integrable. The law of ξ\xiξ is Lebesgue measure with density φ\varphiφ; the law of eξe\xieξ is its image under x↦exx \mapsto exx↦ex. The expectations Emin⁡(Q,eξ)E\min(Q, e\xi)Emin(Q,eξ) and E(Q−eξ)+E(Q - e\xi)^+E(Q−eξ)+ are the published CachonCoord.Newsvendor.expSales and expLeftover of that image law; the rebate term is the integral of max⁡(min⁡(Q,x)−T,0)\max(\min(Q, x) - T, 0)max(min(Q,x)−T,0). Critical fractiles Φ−1(⋅)\Phi^{-1}(\cdot)Φ−1(⋅) and the threshold τ\tauτ are stated by their defining equations, never as inverse functions. "Optimal" means a maximizer over Q≥0Q \ge 0Q≥0 (and e≥0e \ge 0e≥0).

Two hypotheses are pinned relative to the page and disclosed in each statement. The effort cost carries a derivative V′V'V′ with VVV differentiable at every e>0e > 0e>0: the paper writes (∂/∂e)V(\partial/\partial e)V(∂/∂e)V in every first-order condition without stating it, and without it a kink of VVV at eˉ\bar eeˉ could let both the channel and the retailer stop at eˉ\bar eeˉ. The integrated optimum is a hypothesis, as the paper assumes its existence in words, and it is required to have eˉ>0\bar e > 0eˉ>0, as the paper's optimum is interior. Without eˉ>0\bar e > 0eˉ>0 the channel would sell nothing, and a degenerate statement would follow.

A trivializing reading is ruled out: the goal does not say that the retailer's first-order conditions fail at (Qˉ,eˉ)(\bar Q, \bar e)(Qˉ​,eˉ), nor that her optimum is not unique; it says that (Qˉ,eˉ)(\bar Q, \bar e)(Qˉ​,eˉ) is not a retailer maximizer.

Needed infrastructure: differentiation under the integral of Emin⁡(Q,eξ)E\min(Q, e\xi)Emin(Q,eξ) and E(min⁡(Q,eξ)−T)+E(\min(Q, e\xi) - T)^+E(min(Q,eξ)−T)+ in eee, strict monotonicity of Φ\PhiΦ and Γ\GammaΓ on [0,∞)[0, \infty)[0,∞), and the piecewise-concavity analysis of the newsvendor with a target rebate. These pieces are reusable for the sibling missions of this paper and for other effort-dependent newsvendor models. Proofs of the milestones and of supporting lemmas on these expectations are welcome.

Selected references

  • T. A. Taylor, Supply Chain Coordination Under Channel Rebates with Sales Effort Effects, Management Science 48(8):992–1007, 2002. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.48.8.992.168
  • G. P. Cachon, M. A. Lariviere, Supply Chain Coordination with Revenue-Sharing Contracts: Strengths and Limitations, Management Science 51(1):30–44, 2005. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.1040.0215
  • G. P. Cachon, Supply Chain Coordination with Contracts, in Handbooks in Operations Research and Management Science 11, 2003. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0927-0507(03)11006-7
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Convex OptimizationOptimizationProbability·Captain: mikedeng1

Models for Minimax Stochastic Linear Optimization Problems with Risk Aversion 4: With Random Right-Hand Side and Known Dual Extreme Points, a Distribution in 𝒫 Attains Ẑ(x) = Ẑ_DD(x)Research Paper

Motivation

Two-stage stochastic linear programs model decisions taken before uncertainty is revealed (a first-stage plan xxx) followed by a corrective recourse action once it is. The classical model needs the full probability distribution of the uncertain data. In practice usually only estimates of a few moments are available, and the computed plan can be sensitive to the distribution that is assumed. The minimax (distributionally robust) approach replaces the single distribution by a class of distributions sharing given moments and optimizes against the worst member of the class. Bertsimas, Doan, Natarajan and Teo (Math. Oper. Res. 35(3), 2010) combine this with risk aversion, through a piecewise-linear disutility of the second-stage cost, and show which instances become semidefinite programs.

Besides the optimal value, the worst-case distribution itself is of practical interest: the paper proposes it as a natural distribution for stress-testing a first-stage solution (§4). This mission concerns the case where the right-hand side of the second stage is random, and formalizes the paper's construction of a worst-case distribution that is a genuine member of the moment class.

Setting

A first-stage decision x∈Rnx\in\mathbb R^nx∈Rn is feasible if x∈X={x:Ax=b, x≥0}x\in X=\{x : Ax=b,\ x\ge 0\}x∈X={x:Ax=b, x≥0}. Given a recourse matrix W∈Rr×dW\in\mathbb R^{r\times d}W∈Rr×d, a technology matrix T∈Rr×nT\in\mathbb R^{r\times n}T∈Rr×n, a constant cost vector q∈Rdq\in\mathbb R^dq∈Rd and a realized right-hand side h∈Rrh\in\mathbb R^rh∈Rr, the second-stage cost is the optimal value of the dual of the recourse linear program,

Q(h,x)=max⁡p (h−Tx)′ps.t.W′p≤q.\mathcal Q(h,x)=\max_{p}\ (h-Tx)'p\quad\text{s.t.}\quad W'p\le q .Q(h,x)=pmax​ (h−Tx)′ps.t.W′p≤q.

Risk aversion enters through the disutility U(t)=max⁡k=1,…,K(αkt+βk)\mathbb U(t)=\max_{k=1,\dots,K}(\alpha_k t+\beta_k)U(t)=maxk=1,…,K​(αk​t+βk​) with αk≥0\alpha_k\ge 0αk​≥0. The right-hand side h~\tilde hh~ is random; its distribution is only known to lie in the moment class

P={P:EP[h~]=μ, EP[h~h~′]=Q},\mathcal P=\{P : \mathbb E_P[\tilde h]=\mu,\ \mathbb E_P[\tilde h\tilde h']=Q\},P={P:EP​[h~]=μ, EP​[h~h~′]=Q},

and the worst-case expected disutility is Z^(x)=sup⁡P∈PEP[U(Q(h~,x))]\hat Z(x)=\sup_{P\in\mathcal P}\mathbb E_P[\mathbb U(\mathcal Q(\tilde h,x))]Z^(x)=supP∈P​EP​[U(Q(h~,x))].

The standing assumptions are: complete recourse, {Ww:w≥0}=Rr\{Ww : w\ge 0\}=\mathbb R^r{Ww:w≥0}=Rr; a nonempty dual polyhedron {p:W′p≤q}\{p : W'p\le q\}{p:W′p≤q}; Q≻μμ′Q\succ\mu\mu'Q≻μμ′; and (Assumption 5) the extreme points p1,…,pNp_1,\dots,p_Np1​,…,pN​ of the dual polyhedron are known. Under these, the paper introduces the semidefinite program (16): over symmetric blocks indexed by pairs (k,i)(k,i)(k,i),

Z^DD(x)=max⁡ ∑k=1K∑i=1N(αkpi′vki+vk0i(βk−αkpi′Tx))  s.t.  ∑k,i(Vkivki(vki)′vk0i)=(Qμμ′1),  (Vkivki(vki)′vk0i)⪰0.\hat Z_{DD}(x)=\max\ \sum_{k=1}^K\sum_{i=1}^N\big(\alpha_k p_i'v_k^i+v_{k0}^i(\beta_k-\alpha_k p_i'Tx)\big) \ \ \text{s.t.}\ \ \sum_{k,i}\begin{pmatrix}V_k^i & v_k^i\\ (v_k^i)' & v_{k0}^i\end{pmatrix}=\begin{pmatrix}Q&\mu\\ \mu'&1\end{pmatrix},\ \ \begin{pmatrix}V_k^i & v_k^i\\ (v_k^i)' & v_{k0}^i\end{pmatrix}\succeq 0 .Z^DD​(x)=max k=1∑K​i=1∑N​(αk​pi′​vki​+vk0i​(βk​−αk​pi′​Tx))  s.t.  k,i∑​(Vki​(vki​)′​vki​vk0i​​)=(Qμ′​μ1​),  (Vki​(vki​)′​vki​vk0i​​)⪰0.

From a point of (16) the paper builds the mixed distribution Pm(x)P_m(x)Pm​(x), which with probability vk0iv_{k0}^ivk0i​ draws a normal vector with mean vki/vk0iv_k^i/v_{k0}^ivki​/vk0i​ and covariance (Vkivk0i−vki(vki)′)/(vk0i)2(V_k^iv_{k0}^i-v_k^i(v_k^i)')/(v_{k0}^i)^2(Vki​vk0i​−vki​(vki​)′)/(vk0i​)2.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 3.3 (p. 590)

For every x∈Xx\in Xx∈X there is P∈PP\in\mathcal PP∈P with

EP′[U(Q(h~,x))]≤EP[U(Q(h~,x))]=Z^(x)=Z^DD(x)∀P′∈P,\mathbb E_{P'}\big[\mathbb U(\mathcal Q(\tilde h,x))\big]\le \mathbb E_{P}\big[\mathbb U(\mathcal Q(\tilde h,x))\big]=\hat Z(x)=\hat Z_{DD}(x)\qquad\forall P'\in\mathcal P,EP′​[U(Q(h~,x))]≤EP​[U(Q(h~,x))]=Z^(x)=Z^DD​(x)∀P′∈P,

where the common value is the attained maximum of (16), and the expected disutility is integrable under every member of P\mathcal PP.

Milestones (proof of Theorem 3.3, pp. 590–591)

  1. U(Q(h,x))=max⁡k,i(αk(h−Tx)′pi+βk)\mathbb U(\mathcal Q(h,x))=\max_{k,i}\big(\alpha_k(h-Tx)'p_i+\beta_k\big)U(Q(h,x))=maxk,i​(αk​(h−Tx)′pi​+βk​) for every hhh.
  2. Every P∈PP\in\mathcal PP∈P yields a feasible point of (16) of equal value; hence Z^(x)≤Z^DD(x)\hat Z(x)\le\hat Z_{DD}(x)Z^(x)≤Z^DD​(x).
  3. (16) has an optimal solution whose blocks have vk0i>0v_{k0}^i>0vk0i​>0 or vanish.
  4. For such a feasible point, Pm(x)∈PP_m(x)\in\mathcal PPm​(x)∈P.
  5. EPm(x)[U(Q(h~,x))]\mathbb E_{P_m(x)}[\mathbb U(\mathcal Q(\tilde h,x))]EPm​(x)​[U(Q(h~,x))] is at least the objective value of (16) at that point.

Significance

The result. Theorem 3.3 shows that, once the dual extreme points are known, the worst case over the moment class is attained, and by an explicit finite mixture of normal distributions read off an optimal solution of a semidefinite program. This contrasts with the random-objective case of the same paper (Theorem 2.2), where the bound is in general only approached by a sequence of distributions. The extremal distribution gives a concrete stress-test scenario for a candidate first-stage plan, and the identity Z^(x)=Z^DD(x)\hat Z(x)=\hat Z_{DD}(x)Z^(x)=Z^DD​(x) certifies the value of the inner worst-case problem without appeal to strong duality for the moment problem.

Formalizing it. The result is proved in the paper; to our knowledge no machine-checked version exists. A formal proof needs a measure-theoretic treatment of conditional moments on the cells of a piecewise-linear maximum, the existence of optima of a bounded semidefinite program, and moment computations for multivariate normal mixtures. These pieces are reusable well beyond this paper, for instance in other moment-based distributionally robust models.

Difficulty

The obvious route goes through moment-problem duality: dualize sup⁡P∈P\sup_{P\in\mathcal P}supP∈P​, reformulate the semi-infinite constraint as linear matrix inequalities, and dualize again. That route only gives the inequality chain up to a duality gap and says nothing about attainment over P\mathcal PP. The proof here avoids strong duality, but it must show two separate things: every distribution in P\mathcal PP maps to a feasible point of (16) without loss of value (this needs a measurable choice of the maximizing pair and the conditional moments on each cell), and the optimal point of (16) maps back to a distribution in P\mathcal PP whose value is at least the optimum. The second step fails on blocks with zero weight vk0i=0v_{k0}^i=0vk0i​=0, where no normal component can be formed; those blocks have to be removed from an optimal solution first.

Formalization scope

The Lean development works on Rr\mathbb R^rRr as Fin r → ℝ, with measures in place of the paper's densities. The moment class reuses the published definitions MomentDRO.Conf.HasSecondMoments, meanVec and secondMomentAbout P 0 (uncentred second moment). Q(h,x)\mathcal Q(h,x)Q(h,x), Z^(x)\hat Z(x)Z^(x) and Z^DD(x)\hat Z_{DD}(x)Z^DD​(x) are real sSups; every theorem that uses them states the relevant maximum or bound explicitly, so no statement depends on the junk value of an empty or unbounded supremum. Bordered matrices are Matrix.fromBlocks over Fin r ⊕ Fin 1 and ⪰0\succeq 0⪰0 is Matrix.PosSemidef. The normal components are Mathlib's multivariateGaussian, transported from EuclideanSpace ℝ (Fin r); the mixture weights are ENNReal.ofReal vk0iv_{k0}^ivk0i​.

Readings of the page:

  • As printed, Assumption 2 (complete recourse) and Assumption 3 "for all qqq" are mutually inconsistent when r≥1r\ge 1r≥1. The formalization uses complete recourse and nonemptiness of {p:W′p≤q}\{p : W'p\le q\}{p:W′p≤q} at the one constant qqq of §3.
  • Assumption 1 is not used and is dropped; x∈Xx\in Xx∈X is kept as in the statement.
  • "Without loss of generality vk0i>0v_{k0}^i>0vk0i​>0" is read as: some optimal solution has every block either with vk0i>0v_{k0}^i>0vk0i​>0 or zero.
  • The printed "Vkivk0V_k^iv_{k0}Vki​vk0​", "vk02v_{k0}^2vk02​" and "with probability vk0v_{k0}vk0​" are read with the superscript iii.

The goal asserts that a maximizer over P\mathcal PP exists, not only an equation between suprema: an equation such as EP[⋅]=Z^(x)\mathbb E_P[\cdot]=\hat Z(x)EP​[⋅]=Z^(x) alone could hold through a junk value and is ruled out as the target. No strong-duality hypothesis is assumed, since the proof does not need one. Contributions welcome: the measurable argmax selection, compactness of the feasible set of (16), and second-moment computations for Gaussian mixtures.

Selected references

  • D. Bertsimas, X. V. Doan, K. Natarajan, C.-P. Teo, Models for Minimax Stochastic Linear Optimization Problems with Risk Aversion, Mathematics of Operations Research 35(3):580–602, 2010. https://doi.org/10.1287/moor.1100.0445
  • E. Delage, Y. Ye, Distributionally Robust Optimization Under Moment Uncertainty with Application to Data-Driven Problems, Operations Research 58(3):595–612, 2010. https://doi.org/10.1287/opre.1090.0741
  • J. Dupačová, The minimax approach to stochastic programming and an illustrative application, Stochastics 20(1):73–88, 1987. https://doi.org/10.1080/17442508708833436
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Optimization·Captain: mikedeng1

Reliable Facility Location Design Under the Risk of Disruptions 4: The Fixed-Probability Reformulation (RRSP) Lower-Bounds the Relaxed SubproblemResearch Paper

Motivation

Facility networks fail: plants close after floods, distribution centres lose power, suppliers go bankrupt. The reliable uncapacitated facility location problem (RUFL) of Cui, Ouyang and Shen (UCTC-FR-2010-02, February 2010; published as Operations Research 58(4), 2010, doi:10.1287/opre.1090.0801) chooses which facilities to open and, for every customer, an ordered list of backup facilities, so as to minimize fixed cost plus expected transportation and penalty cost when facilities fail independently with site-dependent probabilities. It extends the uniform-probability model of Snyder and Daskin (Transportation Science, 2005).

RUFL is solved by Lagrangian relaxation in the sense of Fisher (Management Science, 1981): dualizing the constraints that link assignments to open facilities splits the problem into one relaxed subproblem (RSPi_ii​) per customer. Every evaluation of the Lagrangian dual solves all III subproblems, and (RSPi_ii​) is itself a hard combinatorial problem, because the probability that a backup facility is used depends on which facilities sit above it. The paper therefore replaces (RSPi_ii​) by a fixed-probability reformulation (RRSPi_ii​), an assignment problem, and Proposition 4 asserts that its optimal value is a valid lower bound. A Lagrangian bound computed from (RRSPi_ii​) is a valid bound on RUFL only if this holds.

Setting

Fix one customer iii and drop the index iii from the variables. The data are: the demand rate λi≥0\lambda_i \ge 0λi​≥0; regular facilities j=0,…,J−1j = 0, \dots, J-1j=0,…,J−1 with unit costs dijd_{ij}dij​ and failure probabilities 0≤qj<10 \le q_j < 10≤qj​<1; an emergency facility JJJ with diJ=φid_{iJ} = \varphi_idiJ​=φi​ (the penalty per unit of unserved demand) and qJ=0q_J = 0qJ​=0; multipliers μij\mu_{ij}μij​; and levels r=0,…,Rr = 0, \dots, Rr=0,…,R with R≥1R \ge 1R≥1.

A level assignment is a binary array YjrY_{jr}Yjr​ (Yjr=1Y_{jr} = 1Yjr​=1: facility jjj serves at level rrr) such that the customer has distinct regular facilities at levels 0,…,s−10, \dots, s-10,…,s−1, the emergency facility at a level s≤Rs \le Rs≤R, and nothing after it. In the paper's constraints:

∑j=0JYjr+∑s<rYJs=1 (∀r),∑r<RYjr≤1 (j<J),∑r≤RYJr=1.\sum_{j=0}^{J} Y_{jr} + \sum_{s<r} Y_{Js} = 1 \ (\forall r),\qquad \sum_{r<R} Y_{jr} \le 1 \ (j<J),\qquad \sum_{r\le R} Y_{Jr} = 1 .j=0∑J​Yjr​+s<r∑​YJs​=1 (∀r),r<R∑​Yjr​≤1 (j<J),r≤R∑​YJr​=1.

The level-rrr facility serves exactly when all facilities at the levels above it have failed. The transitional probabilities are Pj0=1−qjP_{j0} = 1 - q_jPj0​=1−qj​ and Pjr=(1−qj)∑k<Jqk1−qkWk,r−1P_{jr} = (1-q_j)\sum_{k<J} \frac{q_k}{1-q_k} W_{k,r-1}Pjr​=(1−qj​)∑k<J​1−qk​qk​​Wk,r−1​, with Wjr=PjrYjrW_{jr} = P_{jr} Y_{jr}Wjr​=Pjr​Yjr​ imposed through linear constraints. The relaxed subproblem is

(RSPi)min⁡ ∑j≤J∑r≤RλidijWjr+∑j<J∑r<RμijYjr.\text{(RSP}_i)\qquad \min\ \sum_{j\le J}\sum_{r\le R} \lambda_i d_{ij} W_{jr} + \sum_{j<J}\sum_{r<R} \mu_{ij} Y_{jr}.(RSPi​)min j≤J∑​r≤R∑​λi​dij​Wjr​+j<J∑​r<R∑​μij​Yjr​.

Order the regular facilities by reliability, qj0≤qj1≤⋯≤qjJ−1q_{j_0} \le q_{j_1} \le \dots \le q_{j_{J-1}}qj0​​≤qj1​​≤⋯≤qjJ−1​​, and set βr=∏ℓ<rqjℓ\beta_r = \prod_{\ell<r} q_{j_\ell}βr​=∏ℓ<r​qjℓ​​ and αr=(1−qjr)βr\alpha_r = (1 - q_{j_r})\beta_rαr​=(1−qjr​​)βr​. The reformulation freezes the probabilities at these values:

(RRSPi)min⁡ ∑j<J∑r<R(λidijαr+μij)Yjr+∑r≤RλidiJβrYJr\text{(RRSP}_i)\qquad \min\ \sum_{j<J}\sum_{r<R} (\lambda_i d_{ij}\alpha_r + \mu_{ij}) Y_{jr} + \sum_{r\le R} \lambda_i d_{iJ}\beta_r Y_{Jr}(RRSPi​)min j<J∑​r<R∑​(λi​dij​αr​+μij​)Yjr​+r≤R∑​λi​diJ​βr​YJr​

over the same level assignments.

The proof works through a split formulation: YYY chooses whose distance is paid at each level, a second level assignment ZZZ chooses whose failure probability is used, and the cost is G=∑rλidi,y(r)Pz(r),r+∑μi,y(r)G = \sum_r \lambda_i d_{i,y(r)} P_{z(r),r} + \sum \mu_{i,y(r)}G=∑r​λi​di,y(r)​Pz(r),r​+∑μi,y(r)​. Imposing Y=ZY = ZY=Z gives back (RSPi_ii​).

Formalization targets

Goal: Proposition 4

With λi≥0\lambda_i \ge 0λi​≥0, 0≤qj<10 \le q_j < 10≤qj​<1, μij≥0\mu_{ij} \ge 0μij​≥0, R≥1R \ge 1R≥1 and any reliability ordering: for every (RSPi_ii​)-feasible (Y,P,W)(Y, P, W)(Y,P,W) there is an (RRSPi_ii​)-feasible Y′Y'Y′ with

objRRSP(Y′)≤objRSP(Y,W),that is,min⁡(RRSPi)≤min⁡(RSPi).\mathrm{obj}_{\text{RRSP}}(Y') \le \mathrm{obj}_{\text{RSP}}(Y, W), \qquad\text{that is,}\qquad \min(\text{RRSP}_i) \le \min(\text{RSP}_i).objRRSP​(Y′)≤objRSP​(Y,W),that is,min(RRSPi​)≤min(RSPi​).

Milestones, in proof order

  1. Swap identity (A.4, p. 39). Exchanging the probability facilities jjj, kkk of two consecutive levels rrr, r+1r+1r+1 while keeping YYY changes the cost by qj−qk1−qjλiPjr(diu−div)\frac{q_j - q_k}{1 - q_j}\lambda_i P_{jr}(d_{iu} - d_{iv})1−qj​qj​−qk​​λi​Pjr​(diu​−div​).
  2. Lemma 1 (p. 38). The split formulation has an optimal solution whose probability facilities are ordered by qqq on the regular levels.
  3. Relaxation (A.4, p. 39). Every (RSPi_ii​)-feasible point gives a split-feasible point with Z=YZ = YZ=Y and the same cost.

Significance

The result. Proposition 4 makes (RRSPi_ii​) usable as a lower-bounding oracle. (RRSPi_ii​) is an assignment problem with J+1J+1J+1 rows and R+1R+1R+1 levels, so it can be solved in strongly polynomial time by the Hungarian method (Kuhn, 1955). The exact subproblem algorithm of §3.3.1 needs branch and bound over subsets. With the bound, every subgradient iteration of the paper's Lagrangian scheme still yields a valid lower bound on RUFL, which is what the gap-closing branch and bound relies on.

Formalizing it. The proposition has a printed proof, but the proof is incomplete (see below), and to our knowledge no machine-checked version exists. A formal proof certifies the bound, settles which hypotheses it needs, and gives a reusable model of multi-level backup assignment with transitional probabilities.

Difficulty

The obvious argument says that αr\alpha_rαr​ is the largest probability any facility can have of serving at level rrr, so freezing the probabilities at αr\alpha_rαr​ can only lower the cost. That is false as stated: transport costs dijd_{ij}dij​ and the penalty φi\varphi_iφi​ may be negative, and a larger serving probability then means a higher cost. What is needed is a comparison of the whole cost profile, not level by level.

The paper's route is the split formulation. Lemma 1 shows that the probability facilities of some optimal split solution can be taken in increasing order of qqq. The proof then ends with "without loss of generality, we can fix Z=Z∗Z = Z^*Z=Z∗ and P=P∗P = P^*P=P∗ … which leads to the (RRSP) formulation". This step has a gap. Lemma 1 only says that Z∗Z^*Z∗ is ordered. Turning its probabilities into αr\alpha_rαr​, βr\beta_rβr​ also needs Z∗Z^*Z∗ to use the facilities j0,j1,…j_0, j_1, \dotsj0​,j1​,… with the globally smallest failure probabilities, and the paper never shows this. A complete proof has to replace Z∗Z^*Z∗'s facilities by the most reliable ones and show that the cost does not increase. That replacement raises every cumulative service probability 1−∏ℓ≤rq1 - \prod_{\ell\le r} q1−∏ℓ≤r​q, so the comparison is a rearrangement argument over the ordered distances. Lemma 1 alone does not close the proposition.

The sign of the multipliers matters. With μij\mu_{ij}μij​ of mixed sign the proposition is false, for instance with J=2J = 2J=2, R=1R = 1R=1, d=(3.09,4.73)d = (3.09, 4.73)d=(3.09,4.73), q=(0.62,0.86)q = (0.62, 0.86)q=(0.62,0.86), φi=−0.93\varphi_i = -0.93φi​=−0.93, μ=(2.18,−2.99)\mu = (2.18, -2.99)μ=(2.18,−2.99), λi=2.3\lambda_i = 2.3λi​=2.3. There min⁡(RSPi)=−3.306\min(\text{RSP}_i) = -3.306min(RSPi​)=−3.306 while min⁡(RRSPi)=−2.139\min(\text{RRSP}_i) = -2.139min(RRSPi​)=−2.139. Lemma 1, by contrast, holds for multipliers of either sign.

Formalization scope

Facilities are Fin (J+1) with Fin.last J the emergency facility, levels are Fin (R+1), and every variable is a real array, with YYY constrained to {0,1}\{0,1\}{0,1}. The customer index is dropped. The ordering jℓj_\elljℓ​ is a bijection σ\sigmaσ of Fin J with q∘σq \circ \sigmaq∘σ monotone, and the goal quantifies over every such σ\sigmaσ. "Lower bound" is stated as for-all/exists, so no infimum of a possibly empty set is taken; both feasible sets are finite and contain the emergency-only assignment.

Conventions fixed in Lean, each recorded in the docstrings:

  • The level constraints (4b), (7b), (19c) sum over all facilities j=0,…,Jj = 0, \dots, Jj=0,…,J. The printed upper limit J−1J-1J−1 is a typo: with it, a regular facility would have to share the emergency facility's level.
  • αr=0\alpha_r = 0αr​=0 for r≥Jr \ge Jr≥J, and βr\beta_rβr​ for r>Jr > Jr>J is the product of all qjq_jqj​. These values are never multiplied by a nonzero assignment, and R≤JR \le JR≤J is not assumed.
  • The split cost is the GGG used in the proof of Lemma 1, not the printed (19a), which would charge the ZZZ-facility's distance. YYY and ZZZ must put the emergency facility at the same level.
  • μij≥0\mu_{ij} \ge 0μij​≥0 is a hypothesis of the goal only. λi≥0\lambda_i \ge 0λi​≥0, 0≤qj<10 \le q_j < 10≤qj​<1 and R≥1R \ge 1R≥1 are the paper's standing assumptions. No sign is assumed on dijd_{ij}dij​ or φi\varphi_iφi​.

The statements are not trivial. A sanity-check file exhibits a two-facility instance satisfying every hypothesis, together with feasible points of all three formulations.

A complete development needs finite sums and products over Fin, the explicit form of PPP along a level assignment (a product of failure probabilities), and a rearrangement inequality for ordered sequences. All three are reusable for the other missions of this series and for reliability models in general. Contributions are welcome on the milestones, on a corrected proof of the final step, and on lemmas such as "the transitional probabilities of a level assignment are products of the qqq's".

Selected references

  • L. Cui, Y. Ouyang, Z.-J. M. Shen, Reliable Facility Location Design under the Risk of Disruptions, UCTC-FR-2010-02, University of California Transportation Center, February 2010; published in Operations Research 58(4):998–1011, 2010. https://doi.org/10.1287/opre.1090.0801
  • L. V. Snyder, M. S. Daskin, Reliability Models for Facility Location: The Expected Failure Cost Case, Transportation Science 39(3):400–416, 2005. https://doi.org/10.1287/trsc.1040.0107
  • M. L. Fisher, The Lagrangian Relaxation Method for Solving Integer Programming Problems, Management Science 27(1):1–18, 1981. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.27.1.1
  • H. W. Kuhn, The Hungarian Method for the Assignment Problem, Naval Research Logistics Quarterly 2(1–2):83–97, 1955. https://doi.org/10.1002/nav.3800020109
  • H. D. Sherali, A. Alameddine, A New Reformulation-Linearization Technique for Bilinear Programming Problems, Journal of Global Optimization 2:379–410, 1992. https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00122429
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OptimizationProbability·Captain: mikedeng1

On the Rate of Convergence of Optimal Solutions of Monte Carlo Approximations of Stochastic Programs 3: For Finite Polyhedral Problems the SAA Optimal Set Fails to Be a Face Exponentially RarelyResearch Paper

Motivation

Stochastic programs of the form min⁡x∈ΘEP h(x,ω)\min_{x\in\Theta}\mathbb E_P\,h(x,\omega)minx∈Θ​EP​h(x,ω) are rarely solvable exactly, because the expectation is an integral over a large or continuous scenario space. The standard remedy is sample average approximation (SAA), also called the Monte Carlo or sample path method: draw an i.i.d. sample ω1,…,ωN\omega^1,\dots,\omega^Nω1,…,ωN from PPP and minimize the sample average instead. Two-stage linear programs with recourse are the main case in practice. There each h(⋅,ω)h(\cdot,\omega)h(⋅,ω) is the value of a second-stage linear program, hence piecewise linear and convex, and the scenario distribution is often discrete with an astronomically large but finite support.

Shapiro and Homem-de-Mello (SIAM J. Optim. 11(1), 2000) observed that in this discrete, piecewise linear regime SAA does far better than the usual N−1/2N^{-1/2}N−1/2 statistical rate suggests: the SAA problem often returns an exactly optimal solution of the true problem. In their median example, a sample of N=120N=120N=120 solves a problem with 32003^{200}3200 scenarios exactly with probability about 0.950.950.95. This mission formalizes the version of that phenomenon that allows the true problem to have many optimal solutions.

Timeline. In 2000, Shapiro and Homem-de-Mello proved almost-sure exactness of SAA under a sharp-minimum condition (Theorem 2.1) and for finite piecewise linear problems with possibly non-unique optima (Theorem 2.3). They then showed that both events fail with exponentially small probability (Theorems 3.1 and 3.2). In 2002, Kleywegt, Shapiro and Homem-de-Mello extended exponential rates to SAA for discrete stochastic optimization. In 2002, Shapiro, Homem-de-Mello and Kim related the exponential constant for convex piecewise linear programs to a conditioning measure of the problem.

Setting

Let Θ⊆Rm\Theta\subseteq\mathbb R^mΘ⊆Rm be the feasible set, Ω\OmegaΩ a finite set of scenarios with a probability measure PPP, and h:Rm×Ω→Rh:\mathbb R^m\times\Omega\to\mathbb Rh:Rm×Ω→R. The true problem (1.1) and the SAA problem (1.2) are

min⁡x∈Θf(x):=EP h(x,ω),min⁡x∈Θf^N(x):=1N∑j=1Nh(x,ωj),\min_{x\in\Theta} f(x):=\mathbb E_P\,h(x,\omega),\qquad \min_{x\in\Theta}\hat f_N(x):=\frac1N\sum_{j=1}^N h(x,\omega^j),x∈Θmin​f(x):=EP​h(x,ω),x∈Θmin​f^​N​(x):=N1​j=1∑N​h(x,ωj),

where ω1,ω2,…\omega^1,\omega^2,\dotsω1,ω2,… is one i.i.d. sequence with law PPP, defined on an auxiliary probability space (S,Q)(S,Q)(S,Q). Write AAA for the set of optimal solutions of the true problem and ANA_NAN​ for that of the SAA problem. ANA_NAN​ depends on the sample path, and either set may be empty.

The standing assumptions of Theorem 2.3 are:

  1. Ω\OmegaΩ is finite;
  2. every h(⋅,ω)h(\cdot,\omega)h(⋅,ω) is piecewise linear and convex, i.e. a maximum of finitely many affine functions;
  3. Θ\ThetaΘ is closed, convex and polyhedral, i.e. a finite intersection of closed half-spaces;
  4. AAA is nonempty and bounded.

A subset FFF of a convex set AAA is a face of AAA if FFF is convex and every open segment of AAA that meets FFF lies in FFF. The event of interest is

MN:={ AN is nonempty and forms a face of A }.(3.16)\mathcal M_N:=\{\,A_N\text{ is nonempty and forms a face of }A\,\}.\tag{3.16}MN​:={AN​ is nonempty and forms a face of A}.(3.16)

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 3.2

Under assumptions 1–4 there is β>0\beta>0β>0 with

lim sup⁡N→∞1Nlog⁡Q(MNc)≤−β.(3.17)\limsup_{N\to\infty}\frac1N\log Q(\mathcal M_N^c)\le-\beta .\tag{3.17}N→∞limsup​N1​logQ(MNc​)≤−β.(3.17)

The constant β\betaβ is not specified; the goal asserts only that the failure probability decays exponentially.

Companion: Theorem 2.3

Under the same assumptions, AAA is compact, convex and polyhedral, and with probability one ANA_NAN​ is a nonempty face of AAA for all NNN large enough.

Milestones

The milestones are the three parts of Lemma 2.4 (p. 6) and the two steps of the proof of Theorem 3.2 (pp. 12–13).

  1. (a) Finitely many points carry all subdifferentials of fff and of f^N\hat f_Nf^​N​.
  2. (b) The subdifferentials ∂f^N(x)\partial\hat f_N(x)∂f^​N​(x) converge to ∂f(x)\partial f(x)∂f(x) uniformly in xxx, almost surely.
  3. (c) There are finitely many sample-independent points x1,…,xqx_1,\dots,x_qx1​,…,xq​, the first ℓ\ellℓ being the extreme points of AAA, such that f^N(xi)<f^N(xj)\hat f_N(x_i)<\hat f_N(x_j)f^​N​(xi​)<f^​N​(xj​) for all i≤ℓ<ji\le\ell<ji≤ℓ<j forces MN\mathcal M_NMN​.
  4. Union bound. Q(MNc)Q(\mathcal M_N^c)Q(MNc​) is at most a finite sum of one-point deviation probabilities.
  5. One-point deviations. Each such probability decays exponentially.

Significance

The result explains the observed behaviour of SAA on two-stage linear programs with discrete distributions. For a fixed problem, the sample size needed to recover an optimal face of the true problem with a prescribed probability grows only logarithmically in the inverse failure probability. When the true optimum is not unique, the theorem still gives a structural guarantee: every SAA optimal solution is optimal for the true problem, and every vertex of ANA_NAN​ is a vertex of AAA. Theorem 2.3 is the almost-sure consequence, by Borel–Cantelli.

The results are proved in the paper; none of them has a machine-checked proof that we know of. Formalizing them requires a library of polyhedral convex analysis that Mathlib lacks: the cell decomposition of a piecewise linear function, faces of polyhedra, and finiteness of the set of extreme points. It also requires one-dimensional exponential tail bounds for empirical means of finite-valued variables. The mission makes precise one point the paper leaves implicit. The paper first reduces to the unconstrained case by an exact penalty, and the strict gap f(xi)<f(xj)f(x_i)<f(x_j)f(xi​)<f(xj​) recalled on p. 12 holds for the penalized function. For the original fff the lemma is stated with ℓ≤q\ell\le qℓ≤q instead of the printed ℓ<q\ell<qℓ<q.

Difficulty

The probabilistic part is routine. Once Lemma 2.4 (c) is available, the event MNc\mathcal M_N^cMNc​ lies in a finite union of events, each a deviation of one real sample mean from its expectation, and each of those decays exponentially. The difficulty is the deterministic Lemma 2.4 (c). Its points x1,…,xqx_1,\dots,x_qx1​,…,xq​ must be independent of the sample. The argument that all h(⋅,ω)h(\cdot,\omega)h(⋅,ω), and hence every f^N\hat f_Nf^​N​, are affine wherever fff is affine needs every scenario to have positive mass. Passing from local information near AAA to global optimality of ANA_NAN​ uses convexity on a polyhedral neighbourhood of AAA built from finitely many cells. The natural first idea, uniform convergence of f^N\hat f_Nf^​N​ to fff on a compact set, gives only that ANA_NAN​ approaches AAA, not that AN⊆AA_N\subseteq AAN​⊆A, and certainly not that ANA_NAN​ is a face.

Formalization scope

  • Rm\mathbb R^mRm is EuclideanSpace ℝ (Fin m), and Ω\OmegaΩ is a Fintype with measurable singletons.
  • The sample is one sequence ω : ℕ → S → Ω of measurable, independent maps with law PPP; ω1,…,ωN\omega^1,\dots,\omega^Nω1,…,ωN are its first NNN terms. At N=0N=0N=0 the sample average is the junk value 000.
  • Optimal sets are defined directly as sets of minimizers, with no infimum.
  • Disclosed encodings:
    • "piecewise linear and convex" is a maximum of k+1≥1k+1\ge1k+1≥1 affine functions;
    • "polyhedral" is a finite intersection of closed half-spaces;
    • "face" is Convex ℝ F ∧ IsExtreme ℝ A F;
    • "the points form the set of extreme points of AAA" is an equality with Mathlib's Set.extremePoints.
  • Paper indices {1,…,ℓ}\{1,\dots,\ell\}{1,…,ℓ} and {ℓ+1,…,q}\{\ell+1,\dots,q\}{ℓ+1,…,q} become i.val < ℓ and ℓ ≤ j.val in Fin q.
  • Rates are stated in the form: for every δ>0\delta>0δ>0, eventually Q(⋅)≤e−(β−δ)NQ(\cdot)\le e^{-(\beta-\delta)N}Q(⋅)≤e−(β−δ)N. This is equivalent to the lim sup⁡\limsuplimsup form and avoids log⁡0\log 0log0. Failure events are measured by the outer measure QQQ.
  • Lemma 2.4 (a) and (c) assume P{ω}>0P\{\omega\}>0P{ω}>0 for every scenario, as p. 3 takes Ω\OmegaΩ to be the support. Theorems 2.3 and 3.2 do not need this.

The empty set is a face of every set, and so is AAA itself. MN\mathcal M_NMN​ therefore carries nonemptiness explicitly, and "face" is not weakened to AN⊆AA_N\subseteq AAN​⊆A. Lemma 2.4 (c) also carries the gap f(xi)<f(xj)f(x_i)<f(x_j)f(xi​)<f(xj​): without it, repeating an extreme point among the xjx_jxj​ would make (2.13) unsatisfiable and the lemma empty.

The subdifferential is the published ShorNonsmooth.Subdiff.subdifferential with domain Rm\mathbb R^mRm. Contributions are welcome in three areas: polyhedral convex analysis (cells of a piecewise linear convex function, faces and extreme points of polytopes, exact penalties); Hoeffding or Cramér bounds for i.i.d. bounded means; and proofs of the milestones in any order. The polyhedral lemmas are reusable well beyond this mission.

Selected references

  • A. Shapiro and T. Homem-de-Mello, On the rate of convergence of optimal solutions of Monte Carlo approximations of stochastic programs, SIAM J. Optim. 11(1):70–86, 2000. https://doi.org/10.1137/S1052623498349541
  • A. J. Kleywegt, A. Shapiro and T. Homem-de-Mello, The sample average approximation method for stochastic discrete optimization, SIAM J. Optim. 12(2):479–502, 2002. https://doi.org/10.1137/S1052623499363220
  • A. Shapiro, T. Homem-de-Mello and J. Kim, Conditioning of convex piecewise linear stochastic programs, Math. Program. 94:1–19, 2002. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10107-002-0313-4
  • R. T. Rockafellar, Convex Analysis, Princeton University Press, 1970. https://doi.org/10.1515/9781400873173
  • A. Dembo and O. Zeitouni, Large Deviations Techniques and Applications, 2nd ed., Springer, 1998. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4612-5320-4
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AnalysisControl Theory·Captain: mikedeng1

On Minimizing the Ruin Probability by Investment and Reinsurance II: Equation (5) for g = f′ Has a Unique Strictly Decreasing Solution on [0, ∞)Research Paper

Motivation

An insurance company whose surplus falls below zero is ruined. The probability of ruin is the classical measure of solvency risk in actuarial mathematics. A company can lower it in two ways: it can invest part of its surplus in a risky asset, and it can pass part of each claim to a reinsurer in exchange for part of the premium. Which mix of investment and reinsurance minimises the probability of ruin is a stochastic control problem. It is studied in risk theory and in applied probability, and it is a model case for control problems with jumps.

Hipp and Plum (2000) solved the problem with investment alone. They wrote down the Hamilton–Jacobi–Bellman (HJB) equation and showed that it has a smooth solution. H. Schmidli (2002) added proportional reinsurance. He proved a verification theorem (his Theorem 1) and an existence theorem (his Theorem 2) for the combined problem. This mission formalizes the existence theorem and the analytic statements it rests on.

Setting

Claims arrive as a Poisson process with rate λ>0\lambda>0λ>0. The claim sizes YYY are independent with distribution function GGG, where G(0)=0G(0)=0G(0)=0 and GGG is continuous. The insurer collects premiums at rate c>0c>0c>0. A risky asset follows a geometric Brownian motion with drift μ>0\mu>0μ>0 and volatility σ>0\sigma>0σ>0. Under proportional reinsurance with retention level b∈[0,1]b\in[0,1]b∈[0,1], the insurer pays the fraction bYbYbY of each claim and pays the reinsurer a premium at rate c(b)c(b)c(b). The function c(b)c(b)c(b) is decreasing and continuous, c(1)=0c(1)=0c(1)=0, lim inf⁡b↑1c(b)/(1−b)>0\liminf_{b\uparrow1}c(b)/(1-b)>0liminfb↑1​c(b)/(1−b)>0, and there is b‾>0\underline b>0b​>0 with c(b)>cc(b)>cc(b)>c for b<b‾b<\underline bb<b​ and c(b)≤cc(b)\le cc(b)≤c for b≥b‾b\ge\underline bb≥b​. In particular, full reinsurance costs more than the premium income.

Write fff for an unnormalised survival probability, with f(u)=0f(u)=0f(u)=0 for u<0u<0u<0. The HJB equation (1) of the problem is

sup⁡b∈[0,1]sup⁡A≥0[12σ2A2f′′(u)+(c−c(b)+μA)f′(u)+λ(E[f(u−bY)]−f(u))]=0,\sup_{b\in[0,1]}\sup_{A\ge0}\Big[\tfrac12\sigma^2A^2f''(u)+\big(c-c(b)+\mu A\big)f'(u)+\lambda\big(\mathbb E[f(u-bY)]-f(u)\big)\Big]=0 ,b∈[0,1]sup​A≥0sup​[21​σ2A2f′′(u)+(c−c(b)+μA)f′(u)+λ(E[f(u−bY)]−f(u))]=0,

where AAA is the amount invested. Eliminating AAA and substituting g=f′g=f'g=f′ turns (1) into the integral equation (5):

g(u)=1μ22σ2∫0udxDg(x)+cλ,g(u)=\frac{1}{\dfrac{\mu^2}{2\sigma^2}\displaystyle\int_0^u\frac{dx}{D_g(x)}+\dfrac{c}{\lambda}},g(u)=2σ2μ2​∫0u​Dg​(x)dx​+λc​1​, Dg(x)=inf⁡b∈[0,1][λ(1−G(x/b)+∫0x(1−G((x−z)/b))g(z) dz)−(c−c(b))g(x)].D_g(x)=\inf_{b\in[0,1]}\Big[\lambda\Big(1-G(x/b)+\int_0^x\big(1-G((x-z)/b)\big)g(z)\,dz\Big)-\big(c-c(b)\big)g(x)\Big].Dg​(x)=b∈[0,1]inf​[λ(1−G(x/b)+∫0x​(1−G((x−z)/b))g(z)dz)−(c−c(b))g(x)].

Condition (6) at uuu is Dg(u)>0D_g(u)>0Dg​(u)>0. In Lean, ReinsPremium, ClaimLaw, tail, den (=Dg=D_g=Dg​), SolvesEq5On, H and SolvesHJB (equation (1)) live in the shared module SchmidliRuin.Verif.Setting; HasBoundedDensity, Cond6, SolvesEq3At and SolvesHJBAtZero live in SchmidliRuin.Exist.Setting.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 2 (p. 900)

If GGG has a bounded density, then

∃! g:[0,∞)→R strictly decreasing, solving (5) on [0,∞).\exists!\ g:[0,\infty)\to\mathbb R\ \text{strictly decreasing, solving (5) on }[0,\infty).∃! g:[0,∞)→R strictly decreasing, solving (5) on [0,∞).

Lean states this as two conjuncts: existence, and equality on [0,∞)[0,\infty)[0,∞) of any two strictly decreasing solutions.

Milestones, in attack order

  1. Lemma 3 (p. 894). For a solution fff of (3) on [0,η)[0,\eta)[0,η), the optimal retention is b∗(u)=1b^*(u)=1b∗(u)=1 for small uuu: it is optimal not to reinsure small capital.
  2. Lemma 4 (p. 898). Under a bounded density, (5) has a solution on some [0,ε)[0,\varepsilon)[0,ε), with g(u)=λ/c−αu+o(u)g(u)=\lambda/c-\alpha\sqrt u+o(\sqrt u)g(u)=λ/c−αu​+o(u​) and α=λμ/(σc3/2)\alpha=\lambda\mu/(\sigma c^{3/2})α=λμ/(σc3/2).
  3. Condition (6) near 000 (pp. 898–899): such a local solution satisfies Dg(u)>0D_g(u)>0Dg​(u)>0 for small u>0u>0u>0.
  4. Lemma 5 (p. 899). A decreasing solution on [0,u0)[0,u_0)[0,u0​) with (6) on (0,u0)(0,u_0)(0,u0​) extends to [0,u0][0,u_0][0,u0​], and (6) holds at u0u_0u0​.
  5. Continuation (proof of Theorem 2, p. 901). A solution with (6) on (0,u0](0,u_0](0,u0​] continues to [0,u0+η)[0,u_0+\eta)[0,u0​+η) with (6).
  6. Theorem 1, second sentence (p. 896). For a decreasing solution ggg of (5), f(x)=1+∫0xgf(x)=1+\int_0^xgf(x)=1+∫0x​g is a strictly increasing solution of (1), twice continuously differentiable on (0,∞)(0,\infty)(0,∞).
  7. Theorem 1, last sentence (p. 896). There is at most one strictly increasing, twice continuously differentiable solution of (1) with f(0)=1f(0)=1f(0)=1.

Significance

The existence theorem completes the dynamic-programming solution of the problem. By the verification theorem, f=1+∫0⋅gf=1+\int_0^\cdot gf=1+∫0⋅​g divided by f(∞)f(\infty)f(∞) is the maximal survival probability δ(u)\delta(u)δ(u). The maximisers of the HJB equation define the optimal feedback strategy: the investment A∗(u)=−μf′(u)/(σ2f′′(u))A^*(u)=-\mu f'(u)/(\sigma^2f''(u))A∗(u)=−μf′(u)/(σ2f′′(u)) and the retention level b∗(u)b^*(u)b∗(u). Without Theorem 2 the verification theorem would be a statement about a function that might not exist. Equation (5) is also the basis of the paper's numerical scheme (§5), which iterates (5) to compute δ\deltaδ and the optimal strategies.

Theorem 2 has a published proof. As far as is known, none of the results above has a machine-checked proof, and nothing on Prove2Me states them. The work is to formalize the published argument. This takes the local existence result of Hipp and Plum, which the paper cites rather than reproves, and a continuation argument for a nonlinear Volterra-type equation whose kernel is an infimum over a control parameter. Milestones 6 and 7 are the purely analytic content of the verification theorem that the uniqueness part of Theorem 2 uses. The paper derives milestone 7 stochastically, and an analytic proof is equally welcome.

Difficulty

The denominator Dg(x)D_g(x)Dg​(x) vanishes at x=0x=0x=0: Dg(0)=λ−c g(0)=0D_g(0)=\lambda-c\,g(0)=0Dg​(0)=λ−cg(0)=0, because g(0)=λ/cg(0)=\lambda/cg(0)=λ/c. The integral in (5) is therefore improper at the origin. A Picard iteration started from a constant does not work, because it does not control ∫0udx/Dg(x)\int_0^u dx/D_g(x)∫0u​dx/Dg​(x). One needs the exact square-root rate Dg(x)≍xD_g(x)\asymp\sqrt xDg​(x)≍x​, and Lemma 4 obtains it only through Lemma 3 (no reinsurance near 000) and the Hipp–Plum analysis of the reinsurance-free equation. Lemma 4's proof in the paper is a two-line citation, so a solver must formalize that local existence result.

The second difficulty is continuation. A solution can be continued as long as condition (6) holds, and Lemma 5 has to exclude that (6) degenerates at a finite endpoint. There the infimum over bbb interacts with the vanishing of ggg. The paper's argument uses a Gronwall estimate and the shape of c(b)c(b)c(b) around b‾\underline bb​, and the minimiser bbb in DgD_gDg​ need not be unique or continuous.

Formalization scope

  • Model data. c,λ,μ,σc,\lambda,\mu,\sigmac,λ,μ,σ are real parameters, all strictly positive. The claim law is a probability measure ν\nuν on R\mathbb RR, with G=G=G= cdf ν, ν((−∞,0])=0\nu((-\infty,0])=0ν((−∞,0])=0 and GGG continuous. "Bounded density" means ν\nuν has a measurable density with values in [0,C][0,C][0,C]. E[h(u−bY)]\mathbb E[h(u-bY)]E[h(u−bY)] is ∫h(u−by) dν(y)\int h(u-by)\,d\nu(y)∫h(u−by)dν(y).

  • Premium. c(b)c(b)c(b) is a real function, used on [0,1][0,1][0,1]. The condition lim inf⁡b↑1c(b)/(1−b)>0\liminf_{b\uparrow1}c(b)/(1-b)>0liminfb↑1​c(b)/(1−b)>0 is the lower bound c(b)≥κ(1−b)c(b)\ge\kappa(1-b)c(b)≥κ(1−b) near 111, which is equivalent. A real-valued ccc excludes the case c(0)=∞c(0)=\inftyc(0)=∞ that the paper allows when E[Y]<∞\mathbb E[Y]<\inftyE[Y]<∞.

  • Conventions.

    • 1−G(x/b)1-G(x/b)1−G(x/b) at b=0b=0b=0 is P[0⋅Y>x]=0\mathbb P[0\cdot Y>x]=0P[0⋅Y>x]=0; it is computed by tail, never by Lean's x/0=0x/0=0x/0=0.
    • "ggg solves (5) at uuu" includes that the integral exists: ggg is integrable on [0,u][0,u][0,u], Dg≠0D_g\ne0Dg​=0 on (0,u)(0,u)(0,u), and 1/Dg1/D_g1/Dg​ is integrable on [0,u][0,u][0,u].
    • Every supremum of the paper is a least upper bound (IsLUB … 0). Lean's sSup would return 000 on an unbounded family, for example when f′′≥0f''\ge0f′′≥0, and that would make "fff solves (1)" true by accident.
    • Uniqueness is equality on [0,∞)[0,\infty)[0,∞). The values of ggg off [0,∞)[0,\infty)[0,∞) are free, so a unique-existence quantifier over R→R\mathbb R\to\mathbb RR→R would be false.
    • "Twice continuously differentiable" is read on (0,∞)(0,\infty)(0,∞), since f′′(0+)=−∞f''(0+)=-\inftyf′′(0+)=−∞ (p. 895). At u=0u=0u=0, (1) and (3) are taken in the boundary form sup⁡b[(c−c(b))f′(0)+λ(Ef(−bY)−f(0))]=0\sup_b[(c-c(b))f'(0)+\lambda(\mathbb E f(-bY)-f(0))]=0supb​[(c−c(b))f′(0)+λ(Ef(−bY)−f(0))]=0, with the right derivative f′(0)f'(0)f′(0).
    • λ\lambdaλ and ccc are general. §4 sets λ=c=1\lambda=c=1λ=c=1 by a change of units.
  • Trivialising readings ruled out.

    • Encoding (5) with an unguarded 1/Dg1/D_g1/Dg​ would let a function with a vanishing denominator "solve" (5).
    • Dropping the boundary equation at u=0u=0u=0 from Lemma 3 makes it false: a premium flat near b=0b=0b=0 admits local solutions with b∗≡0b^*\equiv0b∗≡0.
  • Infrastructure needed.

    • existence of the minimiser in DgD_gDg​ and continuity of DgD_gDg​ in xxx;
    • a local existence theorem for singular integral equations in the style of Hipp–Plum;
    • Gronwall's inequality (Mathlib has versions);
    • Banach's fixed-point theorem (ContractingWith).

    The continuation and closure lemmas (milestones 3–5) are reusable for other HJB equations of risk theory with a jump term. Contributions that state and prove intermediate claims of the paper's proofs are welcome as sub-results.

Selected references

  • H. Schmidli, On minimizing the ruin probability by investment and reinsurance, Ann. Appl. Probab. 12(3), 890–907, 2002. https://doi.org/10.1214/aoap/1031863173
  • C. Hipp and M. Plum, Optimal investment for insurers, Insurance Math. Econom. 27(2), 215–228, 2000. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0167-6687(00)00049-4
  • H. Schmidli, Optimal proportional reinsurance policies in a dynamic setting, Scand. Actuar. J. 2001(1), 55–68, 2001. https://doi.org/10.1080/034612301750077338
  • S. N. Ethier and T. G. Kurtz, Markov Processes: Characterization and Convergence, Wiley, 1986. https://doi.org/10.1002/9780470316658
10 thms1 active userReviewed
ProbabilityStochastic Systems·Captain: mikedeng1

Is Network Traffic Approximated by Stable Lévy Motion or Fractional Brownian Motion? 2: Superposed ON/OFF Input Under Slow Growth Converges (fidi) to α-Stable Lévy MotionResearch Paper

Motivation

Measurements of Ethernet and Web traffic in the 1990s showed burstiness at every time scale, long-range dependence, and file sizes and transmission times with tails like x−αx^{-\alpha}x−α, 1<α<21<\alpha<21<α<2 (Leland, Taqqu, Willinger and Wilson, 1994; Crovella and Bestavros, 1997). The standard explanation models each user as an ON/OFF source that alternates between transmitting at unit rate and staying silent, with heavy-tailed period lengths. Many such sources are superposed and time is rescaled. Taqqu, Willinger and Sherman (1997) showed that the limit is fractional Brownian motion when the number of sources is sent to infinity first. That limit is the basis of Gaussian queueing models of network buffers.

Mikosch, Resnick, Rootzén and Stegeman (2002) asked what happens when the number of sources MMM and the time scale TTT grow together. The answer depends on how fast M=M(T)M=M(T)M=M(T) grows. Under fast growth the limit is fractional Brownian motion; this is Theorem 4 of the paper and a separate mission. Under slow growth the limit is an α-stable Lévy motion: it has independent increments and infinite variance, and its sample paths jump. This mission formalizes the slow growth result, Theorem 2. The two answers lead to different buffer and dimensioning models, so the dichotomy matters for traffic engineering.

Setting

Period laws. ON-periods have law FonF_{\mathrm{on}}Fon​ and OFF-periods have law FoffF_{\mathrm{off}}Foff​; both are laws of non-negative random variables. Their means are μon\mu_{\mathrm{on}}μon​ and μoff\mu_{\mathrm{off}}μoff​, and μ=μon+μoff\mu=\mu_{\mathrm{on}}+\mu_{\mathrm{off}}μ=μon​+μoff​. Their right tails Fˉ=1−F\bar F=1-FFˉ=1−F satisfy (2.1)–(2.2):

Fˉon(x)=x−αLon(x),Fˉoff(x)=x−αoffLoff(x),1<α<αoff<2,\bar F_{\mathrm{on}}(x)=x^{-\alpha}L_{\mathrm{on}}(x),\qquad \bar F_{\mathrm{off}}(x)=x^{-\alpha_{\mathrm{off}}}L_{\mathrm{off}}(x),\qquad 1<\alpha<\alpha_{\mathrm{off}}<2,Fˉon​(x)=x−αLon​(x),Fˉoff​(x)=x−αoff​Loff​(x),1<α<αoff​<2,

where LonL_{\mathrm{on}}Lon​ and LoffL_{\mathrm{off}}Loff​ are slowly varying: L(cx)/L(x)→1L(cx)/L(x)\to1L(cx)/L(x)→1 for every c>0c>0c>0. The ON-periods therefore have the heavier tail.

One source. Let X1,X2,…X_1,X_2,\dotsX1​,X2​,… be iid FonF_{\mathrm{on}}Fon​ and Yoff,Y1,Y2,…Y_{\mathrm{off}},Y_1,Y_2,\dotsYoff​,Y1​,Y2​,… iid FoffF_{\mathrm{off}}Foff​. Let BBB be Bernoulli with P(B=1)=μon/μP(B=1)=\mu_{\mathrm{on}}/\muP(B=1)=μon​/μ. Let Xon(0)X^{(0)}_{\mathrm{on}}Xon(0)​ and Yoff(0)Y^{(0)}_{\mathrm{off}}Yoff(0)​ have the integrated-tail laws F(0)(x)=μF−1∫0xFˉ(s) dsF^{(0)}(x)=\mu_F^{-1}\int_0^x\bar F(s)\,dsF(0)(x)=μF−1​∫0x​Fˉ(s)ds. All of these variables are independent. Put Zi=Xi+YiZ_i=X_i+Y_iZi​=Xi​+Yi​. The delay is T0=B(Xon(0)+Yoff)+(1−B)Yoff(0)T_0=B(X^{(0)}_{\mathrm{on}}+Y_{\mathrm{off}})+(1-B)Y^{(0)}_{\mathrm{off}}T0​=B(Xon(0)​+Yoff​)+(1−B)Yoff(0)​, and the renewal epochs are Tn=T0+∑i=1nZiT_n=T_0+\sum_{i=1}^nZ_iTn​=T0​+∑i=1n​Zi​. The source is ON at time ttt when

Wt=B 1[0,Xon(0))(t)+∑n≥01[Tn,Tn+Xn+1)(t)=1.W_t=B\,\mathbf 1_{[0,X^{(0)}_{\mathrm{on}})}(t)+\sum_{n\ge0}\mathbf 1_{[T_n,T_n+X_{n+1})}(t)=1 .Wt​=B1[0,Xon(0)​)​(t)+n≥0∑​1[Tn​,Tn​+Xn+1​)​(t)=1.

This construction makes WWW stationary.

Superposition. MMM iid sources W(1),…,W(M)W^{(1)},\dots,W^{(M)}W(1),…,W(M) feed a server. N(t)=∑mWt(m)N(t)=\sum_mW^{(m)}_tN(t)=∑m​Wt(m)​ is the number of active sources, and A(t)=∫0tN(s) dsA(t)=\int_0^tN(s)\,dsA(t)=∫0t​N(s)ds is the cumulative input; its mean is EA(t)=Mμ−1μontEA(t)=M\mu^{-1}\mu_{\mathrm{on}}tEA(t)=Mμ−1μon​t.

Growth. b(t)=(1/Fˉon)←(t)b(t)=(1/\bar F_{\mathrm{on}})^{\leftarrow}(t)b(t)=(1/Fˉon​)←(t) is the quantile function (2.9). M=M(T)M=M(T)M=M(T) is integer valued, non-decreasing and tends to infinity. Slow Growth Condition 1 is b(MT)/T→0b(MT)/T\to0b(MT)/T→0.

Stable laws. Sα(σ,β,μ)S_\alpha(\sigma,\beta,\mu)Sα​(σ,β,μ) is the law with characteristic function exp⁡{−σα∣θ∣α(1−iβ sign(θ)tan⁡πα2)+iμθ}\exp\{-\sigma^\alpha|\theta|^\alpha(1-i\beta\,\mathrm{sign}(\theta)\tan\frac{\pi\alpha}2)+i\mu\theta\}exp{−σα∣θ∣α(1−iβsign(θ)tan2πα​)+iμθ} for α≠1\alpha\neq1α=1. The α-stable Lévy motion Xα,σ,βX_{\alpha,\sigma,\beta}Xα,σ,β​ has independent stationary increments, and X(t)∼Sα(σt1/α,β,0)X(t)\sim S_\alpha(\sigma t^{1/\alpha},\beta,0)X(t)∼Sα​(σt1/α,β,0).

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 2 (p. 40)

With Cα=1−αΓ(2−α)cos⁡(πα/2)C_\alpha=\dfrac{1-\alpha}{\Gamma(2-\alpha)\cos(\pi\alpha/2)}Cα​=Γ(2−α)cos(πα/2)1−α​, σ=Cα−1/α\sigma=C_\alpha^{-1/\alpha}σ=Cα−1/α​ and c=μoff/μ1+1/αc=\mu_{\mathrm{off}}/\mu^{1+1/\alpha}c=μoff​/μ1+1/α, under Condition 1

A(T⋅)−TMμ−1μon(⋅)b(MT)→ fidi c Xα,σ,1(⋅).\frac{A(T\cdot)-TM\mu^{-1}\mu_{\mathrm{on}}(\cdot)}{b(MT)}\xrightarrow{\ fidi\ }c\,X_{\alpha,\sigma,1}(\cdot).b(MT)A(T⋅)−TMμ−1μon​(⋅)​ fidi ​cXα,σ,1​(⋅).

Every constant is stated as printed. The normalisation is the paper's b(MT)b(MT)b(MT) and the limit is the totally skewed (β=1\beta=1β=1) Lévy motion.

Milestones (§5, in the order of the proof)

  • Lemmas 3 and 6: the initial ON-periods (A1A_1A1​) and the overshoots beyond TTT (A3A_3A3​) are negligible at scale b(MT)b(MT)b(MT).
  • Lemmas 4 and 5: the per-source renewal count ξT\xi_TξT​ concentrates around μT=T/μ\mu_T=T/\muμT​=T/μ with probability 1−o(1/M)1-o(1/M)1−o(1/M), plus a truncated-overshoot bound.
  • Lemmas 7, 8 and 9: the left tails of the centred sums Sn=∑k≤nJkS_n=\sum_{k\le n}J_kSn​=∑k≤n​Jk​ are negligible, and replacing ξT\xi_TξT​ by [μT][\mu_T][μT​] is harmless. Here Jk=ron(Xk−μon)−roff(Yk−μoff)J_k=r_{\mathrm{on}}(X_k-\mu_{\mathrm{on}})-r_{\mathrm{off}}(Y_k-\mu_{\mathrm{off}})Jk​=ron​(Xk​−μon​)−roff​(Yk​−μoff​).
  • Lemma 10: [b(MT)]−1A21→cXα,σ,1(1)[b(MT)]^{-1}A_{21}\to cX_{\alpha,\sigma,1}(1)[b(MT)]−1A21​→cXα,σ,1​(1) in distribution.
  • Lemmas 11 and 12: tails of linear combinations of increments, and the two-dimensional limit.

Significance

Theorem 2 identifies the limit regime where the Gaussian heavy-traffic picture fails for ON/OFF traffic. When few sources are observed over long horizons, the aggregate input has infinite-variance, independent-increment fluctuations of size b(MT)≈(MT)1/αb(MT)\approx(MT)^{1/\alpha}b(MT)≈(MT)1/α. Read together with Theorem 4, the result says the growth rate of MMM relative to TTT decides between the two classical models of network input. The proof turns the ON/OFF superposition into row-wise iid random sums and uses a heavy-tailed large-deviation estimate for random walks (Cline and Hsing). That technique carries over to other renewal-reward processes with regularly varying rewards.

The result is proved in the paper. No machine-checked version exists, either of the theorem or of the probabilistic substrate it rests on. Formalization would produce:

  • a stationary alternating renewal process in Lean;
  • a usable notion of regular variation with the quantile function bbb;
  • stable laws given by characteristic functions;
  • the infinitely divisible convergence criterion (Petrov's conditions (A)–(C)) that the proof cites for row-wise iid sums.

Correction. Lemma 12 as printed omits the normalisation [b(MT)]−1[b(MT)]^{-1}[b(MT)]−1 on its left-hand side. Its proof and its use in Theorem 2 both have it, and without it the claim fails because the left-hand side grows. The mission states Lemma 12 with the normalisation. Lemma 11's upper summation limits μTt\mu_{Tt}μTt​ are read as integer parts, as elsewhere in §5.

Difficulty

The natural first idea is to treat A(T)A(T)A(T) as a sum of MMM iid terms and apply the stable central limit theorem for triangular arrays. This fails as stated: each source's contribution A(m)(T)A^{(m)}(T)A(m)(T) is itself a random sum ∑k≤ξTXk\sum_{k\le\xi_T}X_k∑k≤ξT​​Xk​, and its count ξT\xi_TξT​ depends strongly on the XkX_kXk​. Moreover, MMM grows too slowly for a law-of-large-numbers smoothing across sources. The count must be replaced by its mean simultaneously for all MMM sources, with an error probability o(1/M)o(1/M)o(1/M), uniformly as T→∞T\to\inftyT→∞. This requires the two-sided large-deviation estimate of Lemma 4. Its lower tail rests on the Cline–Hsing asymptotics P(Sn>x)∼nFˉ(x)P(S_n>x)\sim n\bar F(x)P(Sn​>x)∼nFˉ(x) for heavy-tailed random walks; its upper tail rests on a Cramér bound. Then Petrov's conditions must be checked at the exact scale b(MT)b(MT)b(MT). That needs Potter bounds for the slowly varying factors and a non-uniform Berry–Esseen estimate for the truncated sums. None of these tools is in Mathlib.

Formalization scope

All declarations are in the namespace NetTraffic.OnOffStable, in one definitions file.

Conventions.

  • Each time scale TTT has its own probability space (ΩT,PT)(\Omega_T,P_T)(ΩT​,PT​), which carries M(T)M(T)M(T) independent sources indexed 0,…,M(T)−10,\dots,M(T)-10,…,M(T)−1. Only laws matter, and the statements quantify over every such family.
  • Lean's X n and Y n are the paper's Xn+1X_{n+1}Xn+1​ and Yn+1Y_{n+1}Yn+1​.
  • ξT\xi_TξT​ is a Set.ncard (junk 000 on a null event). WWW is a tsum of indicators, and AAA is an interval integral.
  • b(t)=inf⁡{x>0:tFˉon(x)≤1}b(t)=\inf\{x>0:t\bar F_{\mathrm{on}}(x)\le1\}b(t)=inf{x>0:tFˉon​(x)≤1}. This set is non-empty for t>0t>0t>0, so bbb is never the junk value 000, and b(MT)/T→0b(MT)/T\to0b(MT)/T→0 is a real condition.
  • Lon(x)=xαFˉon(x)L_{\mathrm{on}}(x)=x^\alpha\bar F_{\mathrm{on}}(x)Lon​(x)=xαFˉon​(x) is assumed slowly varying, which is equivalent to (2.1).
  • Fidi convergence is stated with sorted times: for each kkk there is a probability measure on EuclideanSpace ℝ (Fin k) whose characteristic function is that of c(X(t1),…,X(tk))c(X(t_1),\dots,X(t_k))c(X(t1​),…,X(tk​)), and the laws of the normalised input vectors converge weakly to it. The characteristic function pins the limit down. Its existence is part of the claim, because Mathlib has no stable laws.
  • Convergence in probability means PT(∣YT∣>η)→0P_T(|Y_T|>\eta)\to0PT​(∣YT​∣>η)→0 for every η>0\eta>0η>0.
  • The lemmas that use EA3EA_3EA3​ and EXξT1[⋅]E X_{\xi_T}\mathbf 1[\cdot]EXξT​​1[⋅] also assert integrability, so Bochner junk values cannot trivialise them.

Ruled out. None of the following is acceptable: an encoding in which bbb, NNN or AAA collapses to a junk value; a model hypothesis that no family satisfies (the period laws must be genuine probability laws with finite means, which holds because α>1\alpha>1α>1); a limit "law" not pinned by its characteristic function; or convergence of one-dimensional laws only.

Needed infrastructure.

  • Regular variation: Karamata's theorem and Potter bounds (Proposition 2, App. B).
  • Large deviations for heavy-tailed random walks (Corollary 1, App. A).
  • Renewal theory for delayed alternating renewal processes.
  • Stable laws and the convergence criterion for row-wise iid sums.

The regular-variation and stable-law layers are reusable well beyond this mission. Formalizations of any milestone, of those general tools, or of alternative proofs of the one-dimensional limit are welcome.

Selected references

  • T. Mikosch, S. Resnick, H. Rootzén and A. Stegeman, Is network traffic approximated by stable Lévy motion or fractional Brownian motion?, Ann. Appl. Probab. 12(1):23–68, 2002. https://doi.org/10.1214/aoap/1015961155
  • M. S. Taqqu, W. Willinger and R. Sherman, Proof of a fundamental result in self-similar traffic modeling, Computer Communication Review 27:5–23, 1997. https://doi.org/10.1145/251007.251012
  • W. E. Leland, M. S. Taqqu, W. Willinger and D. V. Wilson, On the self-similar nature of Ethernet traffic (extended version), IEEE/ACM Trans. Networking 2(1):1–15, 1994. https://doi.org/10.1109/90.282603
  • M. E. Crovella and A. Bestavros, Self-similarity in World Wide Web traffic: evidence and possible causes, IEEE/ACM Trans. Networking 5(6):835–846, 1997. https://doi.org/10.1109/90.650143
  • D. B. H. Cline and T. Hsing, Large deviation probabilities for sums of random variables with heavy or subexponential tails, Technical report, Texas A&M University, 1991.
  • G. Samorodnitsky and M. S. Taqqu, Stable Non-Gaussian Random Processes, Chapman and Hall, 1994. https://doi.org/10.1201/9780203738818
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