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Operations Research

2,413 missions · 1,132 completed

The discipline of applying mathematical analysis to complex decision problems in operations: allocating scarce resources, scheduling, routing, inventory, and the design of service and production systems. Drawing on mathematical programming, stochastic modeling, queueing, simulation, and game-theoretic reasoning, it seeks policies that perform provably well in systems shaped by constraints, congestion, and uncertainty.

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OptimizationTheoretical Computer Science·Captain: mikedeng1

An Optimal On-Line Algorithm for Metrical Task System 1: Every n-State Metrical Task System Has Competitive Ratio 2n - 1Research Paper

Motivation

A system that processes a stream of tasks can often be configured in several ways, and the configuration affects both the cost of the current task and the cost of switching before the next one: paging schemes, replicated files, server placements. When the future is unknown, the natural worst-case yardstick is competitive analysis, introduced by Sleator and Tarjan for list update and paging (Sleator–Tarjan 1985): an on-line strategy is compared with the optimal strategy that knows the whole input in advance.

Borodin, Linial and Saks (J. ACM 1992; conference version STOC 1987) proposed metrical task systems as a single model containing all such problems, and determined the exact deterministic competitive ratio of every such system. Their theorem is the starting point of the on-line-algorithms literature on metrical task systems, the kkk-server problem (Manasse–McGeoch–Sleator 1990) and their randomized variants.

Timeline. 1985: Sleator and Tarjan introduce competitive analysis for paging and list update. 1987: Borodin, Linial and Saks prove w(S,d)=2n−1w(S,d)=2n-1w(S,d)=2n−1 for every nnn-state metrical task system (journal version 1992). 1990: Manasse, McGeoch and Sleator extend the task-system model to restricted task sets and pose the kkk-server conjecture. The randomized ratio of the uniform task system, bounded in the same paper between H(n)H(n)H(n) and 2H(n)2H(n)2H(n), is the subject of the companion mission.

Setting

A task system (S,d)(S,d)(S,d) has a finite set SSS of nnn states and a transition-cost matrix ddd with d(i,i)=0d(i,i)=0d(i,i)=0, d(i,j)>0d(i,j)>0d(i,j)>0 for i≠ji\neq ji=j, and the triangle inequality d(i,j)+d(j,k)≥d(i,k)d(i,j)+d(j,k)\ge d(i,k)d(i,j)+d(j,k)≥d(i,k). It is metrical if also d(i,j)=d(j,i)d(i,j)=d(j,i)d(i,j)=d(j,i).

A task TTT is a vector of nonnegative processing costs T(s)T(s)T(s), s∈Ss\in Ss∈S. Given a task sequence T=T1⋯Tm\mathbf T=T^1\cdots T^mT=T1⋯Tm and an initial state s0s_0s0​, a schedule is a map σ:{0,…,m}→S\sigma:\{0,\dots,m\}\to Sσ:{0,…,m}→S with σ(0)=s0\sigma(0)=s_0σ(0)=s0​; task TiT^iTi is processed in state σ(i)\sigma(i)σ(i), and the cost is

c(T;σ)=∑i=1md(σ(i−1),σ(i))+∑i=1mTi(σ(i)).c(\mathbf T;\sigma)=\sum_{i=1}^m d(\sigma(i-1),\sigma(i))+\sum_{i=1}^m T^i(\sigma(i)).c(T;σ)=i=1∑m​d(σ(i−1),σ(i))+i=1∑m​Ti(σ(i)).

The off-line optimum c0(T)c_0(\mathbf T)c0​(T) is the minimum over all schedules. An on-line algorithm AAA chooses σ(i)\sigma(i)σ(i) knowing only s0s_0s0​ and T1,…,TiT^1,\dots,T^iT1,…,Ti; its cost is cA(T)c_A(\mathbf T)cA​(T). For w>0w>0w>0, AAA is www-competitive if there is a constant KwK_wKw​ with cA(T)≤w c0(T)+Kwc_A(\mathbf T)\le w\,c_0(\mathbf T)+K_wcA​(T)≤wc0​(T)+Kw​ for every finite task sequence. The competitive ratio of AAA is w(A)=inf⁡{w:A is w-competitive}w(A)=\inf\{w: A\text{ is }w\text{-competitive}\}w(A)=inf{w:A is w-competitive}, and the competitive ratio of the task system is w(S,d)=inf⁡Aw(A)w(S,d)=\inf_A w(A)w(S,d)=infA​w(A).

For the upper bound the paper also uses continuous-time schedules, in which task TiT^iTi occupies the interval [i,i+1)[i,i+1)[i,i+1) and the scheduler may change state at any real time, paying ∫ii+1Ti(σ(t)) dt\int_i^{i+1}T^i(\sigma(t))\,dt∫ii+1​Ti(σ(t))dt for processing. For a general (possibly asymmetric) matrix ddd, the cycle offset ratio ψ(d)\psi(d)ψ(d) is the maximum over closed walks s0,…,sk=s0s_0,\dots,s_k=s_0s0​,…,sk​=s0​ of ∑id(si−1,si)/∑id(si,si−1)\sum_i d(s_{i-1},s_i)\big/\sum_i d(s_i,s_{i-1})∑i​d(si−1​,si​)/∑i​d(si​,si−1​); it equals 111 when ddd is symmetric.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 1.1

For every metrical task system (S,d)(S,d)(S,d) with nnn states,

w(S,d)=2n−1.w(S,d)=2n-1 .w(S,d)=2n−1.

The value depends on nnn only, not on the distances.

Milestones

  • Lemma 2.1. If c0(T1⋯Tm)→∞c_0(T^1\cdots T^m)\to\inftyc0​(T1⋯Tm)→∞ along an infinite task sequence T\mathbf TT, then w(A)≥wT(A)=lim sup⁡mcA/c0w(A)\ge w_{\mathbf T}(A)=\limsup_m c_A/c_0w(A)≥wT​(A)=limsupm​cA​/c0​.
  • Theorem 2.2. Against the cruel taskmaster M(ε)M(\varepsilon)M(ε), which charges ε\varepsilonε in the state the algorithm currently occupies,
wT(ε)(A)≥2n−11+ε/min⁡i≠jd(i,j).w_{\mathbf T(\varepsilon)}(A)\ge\frac{2n-1}{1+\varepsilon/\min_{i\neq j}d(i,j)} .wT(ε)​(A)≥1+ε/mini=j​d(i,j)2n−1​.
  • Lemma 3.1. Every on-line continuous-time algorithm is matched, on every task sequence, by an on-line discrete-time algorithm.
  • Lemmas 6.3, 6.4, 6.2. Properties of the functions fkf_kfk​ that drive the algorithm Ad∗A^*_dAd∗​: fk(s)−fk(s′)≤d(s′,s)f_k(s)-f_k(s')\le d(s',s)fk​(s)−fk​(s′)≤d(s′,s); the identity 2∑s≠skfk(s)+fk(sk)=Ck−1+∑i≤kd(si,si−1)2\sum_{s\ne s_k}f_k(s)+f_k(s_k)=C_{k-1}+\sum_{i\le k}d(s_i,s_{i-1})2∑s=sk​​fk​(s)+fk​(sk​)=Ck−1​+∑i≤k​d(si​,si−1​); and fk≤hkf_k\le h_kfk​≤hk​, the off-line cost at the kkk-th transition time.
  • Theorem 6.1 (= Theorem 1.2). For every task system, symmetric or not, Ad∗A^*_dAd∗​ has competitive ratio at most (2n−1)ψ(d)(2n-1)\psi(d)(2n−1)ψ(d).

Significance

The theorem settles the deterministic competitive ratio of the whole class of metrical task systems: the lower bound says that no deterministic on-line strategy can beat 2n−12n-12n−1 on any metric, and the upper bound supplies one algorithm that achieves it on every metric. For asymmetric costs the same algorithm gives (2n−1)ψ(d)(2n-1)\psi(d)(2n−1)ψ(d). The 2n−12n-12n−1 lower bound is also the benchmark against which restricted models, such as paging and the kkk-server problem, measure their improvements, and the randomized question it leaves open drove much of the later work on metrical task systems.

The result was proved in 1987 and is standard; to the best of our knowledge no machine-checked proof exists. A formal development would provide a reusable model of deterministic on-line algorithms and competitiveness (on-line maps from task prefixes, additive competitiveness, infima over algorithms), an adversary construction by mutual recursion with an arbitrary algorithm, and an exact treatment of continuous-time schedules with piecewise-constant task costs. These pieces are reusable for other competitive-analysis results.

Difficulty

The lower bound is not a single bad input: the adversary is built from the algorithm it plays against, so the hard task sequence exists only as a recursion interleaved with the algorithm's choices, and the bound must hold for every deterministic on-line map, including ones that behave erratically. Obtaining the exact constant 2n−12n-12n−1, rather than some Ω(n)\Omega(n)Ω(n) bound, requires a sharp estimate of the off-line cost of that sequence.

The upper bound needs an algorithm defined in continuous time, whose transition times are determined by accumulated processing costs; the budgets can be zero, so transitions can be instantaneous, and a formal cost must remain well defined before one knows that only finitely many transitions occur. Relating the off-line cost function at those times to the recursively defined fkf_kfk​ (Lemma 6.2) requires reasoning about all continuous-time off-line schedules. Finally, the goal combines both directions through infima over all on-line algorithms, and the discretization of Lemma 3.1 must be composed with the continuous-time algorithm.

Formalization scope

States form a finite type S (Fintype, DecidableEq, Nonempty); the goal is stated for all n≥1n\ge1n≥1, where n=1n=1n=1 gives w(S,d)=1w(S,d)=1w(S,d)=1. Task costs are finite nonnegative reals; the paper also allows +∞+\infty+∞ entries, which are excluded (this affects neither bound). A task sequence is T : Fin m → S → ℝ, with T i the paper's Ti+1T^{i+1}Ti+1, and a schedule is σ : Fin (m+1) → S. An on-line algorithm is a map sending (s0,[T1,…,Ti])(s_0,[T^1,\dots,T^i])(s0​,[T1,…,Ti]) to σ(i)\sigma(i)σ(i), so on-line behaviour is built into the type. Competitiveness is written additively, cA≤w c0+Kc_A\le w\,c_0+KcA​≤wc0​+K, with KKK independent of the task sequence and of s0s_0s0​.

The competitive ratio competitiveRatio d is the real infimum of the set of all www for which some on-line algorithm is www-competitive. It is not defined as an infimum of per-algorithm real infima: a non-competitive algorithm has WA=∅W_A=\emptysetWA​=∅, whose real infimum is 000, and that would drag w(S,d)w(S,d)w(S,d) to 000 for every system. Since the goal's value 2n−12n-12n−1 is at least 111 while the empty set's real infimum is 000, the goal cannot hold vacuously.

Continuous-time algorithms are given as lists of (state,length)(\text{state},\text{length})(state,length) pieces per unit interval; processing integrals are exact finite sums. The algorithm Ad∗A^*_dAd∗​ minimizes over states different from the current one, as its proof requires (the printed rule ranges over all states, and would stall); ties are left arbitrary. Its budgets may be 000, its entry times are Option ℝ, and its cost is a sum in [0,∞][0,\infty][0,∞], so that Theorem 6.1 itself asserts that only finitely many transitions occur. The ratio ψ(d)\psi(d)ψ(d) excludes closed walks that never move, and Theorems 2.2 and 6.1 require n≥2n\ge2n≥2, where min⁡i≠jd(i,j)\min_{i\ne j}d(i,j)mini=j​d(i,j) and ψ(d)\psi(d)ψ(d) are defined. Lemma 3.1 is stated comparing AAA with A′A'A′ (the printed statement says "as well as AAA").

A complete development needs: the discrete model and off-line optimum (finite minimum over schedules), limsup arguments in EReal, continuous-time schedules with piecewise-constant costs, and the recursion defining Ad∗A^*_dAd∗​. Proofs of any milestone, including the purely combinatorial Lemmas 6.3 and 6.4, are welcome, as is a formal composition of Lemma 3.1 with Theorem 6.1.

Selected references

  • A. Borodin, N. Linial, M. E. Saks, An optimal on-line algorithm for metrical task system, Journal of the ACM 39(4):745–763, 1992. https://doi.org/10.1145/146585.146588
  • D. D. Sleator, R. E. Tarjan, Amortized efficiency of list update and paging rules, Communications of the ACM 28(2):202–208, 1985. https://doi.org/10.1145/2786.2793
  • M. S. Manasse, L. A. McGeoch, D. D. Sleator, Competitive algorithms for server problems, Journal of Algorithms 11(2):208–230, 1990. https://doi.org/10.1016/0196-6774(90)90003-W
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CombinatoricsDiscrete GeometryLinear Optimization·Captain: mikedeng1

On Sub-determinants and the Diameter of Polyhedra: A Polynomial Diameter Bound in the Largest SubdeterminantResearch Paper

Motivation

The combinatorial diameter of a polyhedron is the largest distance, in its vertex-edge graph, between two vertices. It is a lower bound on the number of pivots any edge-following method such as the simplex method needs in the worst case, which is why the polynomial Hirsch conjecture — the diameter of P={x∈Rn:Ax≤b}P = \{x \in \mathbb{R}^n : Ax \le b\}P={x∈Rn:Ax≤b} is bounded by a polynomial in mmm and nnn — is a central open question of linear optimization and discrete geometry. The best general upper bound is quasi-polynomial, m1+log⁡nm^{1+\log n}m1+logn (Kalai–Kleitman 1992); the original Hirsch bound m−nm - nm−n is false for polytopes (Santos 2012).

A different line of work bounds the diameter by the arithmetic of the constraint matrix instead of its size. For an integer matrix AAA let Δ\DeltaΔ be the largest absolute value of a sub-determinant of AAA. Dyer and Frieze (1994) showed that for totally unimodular AAA (Δ=1\Delta = 1Δ=1) the diameter is polynomial, O(m16n3(log⁡mn)3)O(m^{16} n^3 (\log mn)^3)O(m16n3(logmn)3). Bonifas, Di Summa, Eisenbrand, Hähnle and Niemeier (SoCG 2012; Discrete Comput Geom 52, 2014) improved and generalized this to O(Δ2n4log⁡nΔ)O(\Delta^2 n^4 \log n\Delta)O(Δ2n4lognΔ) for all polyhedra and O(Δ2n3.5log⁡nΔ)O(\Delta^2 n^{3.5} \log n\Delta)O(Δ2n3.5lognΔ) for polytopes, bounds that do not depend on the number mmm of inequalities. This mission formalizes the polytope case.

Setting

Let A∈Zm×nA \in \mathbb{Z}^{m\times n}A∈Zm×n with rows a1,…,ama_1,\dots,a_ma1​,…,am​, let b∈Rmb \in \mathbb{R}^mb∈Rm, and let P={x∈Rn:Ax≤b}P = \{x \in \mathbb{R}^n : Ax \le b\}P={x∈Rn:Ax≤b}. A vertex of PPP is an extreme point; for a polyhedron this is a point of PPP at which nnn linearly independent inequalities are tight. Two vertices u≠vu \ne vu=v are adjacent if the segment [u,v][u,v][u,v] is an edge (a one-dimensional face) of PPP. This gives the polyhedral graph GP=(V,E)G_P = (V, E)GP​=(V,E), and the diameter of PPP is at most BBB if every two vertices are joined by a walk of at most BBB edges.

AAA has sub-determinants bounded by Δ\DeltaΔ if every k×kk\times kk×k submatrix, for every k≥1k \ge 1k≥1, has determinant in [−Δ,Δ][-\Delta, \Delta][−Δ,Δ]. In particular every entry is at most Δ\DeltaΔ in absolute value.

For a vertex vvv the normal cone CvC_vCv​ is the set of objectives ccc for which vvv maximizes cTxc^T xcTx over PPP. With BnB_nBn​ the closed unit ball, the volume of a set U⊆VU \subseteq VU⊆V of vertices is

vol(U)=vol(⋃v∈UCv∩Bn),\mathrm{vol}(U) = \mathrm{vol}\Big(\bigcup_{v\in U} C_v \cap B_n\Big),vol(U)=vol(v∈U⋃​Cv​∩Bn​),

and the neighbourhood N(I)\mathcal N(I)N(I) of I⊆VI \subseteq VI⊆V is the set of vertices outside III adjacent to a vertex of III. A spherical cone is S=C∩BnS = C \cap B_nS=C∩Bn​ with CCC closed under non-negative scaling; its dockable surface D(S)D(S)D(S) is the (n−1)(n-1)(n−1)-dimensional measure of the part of its boundary inside the open ball. A cone of revolution of angle 0<θ≤π/20<\theta\le\pi/20<θ≤π/2 is {x∈Bn:vTx≥cos⁡θ ∥v∥ ∥x∥}\{x \in B_n : v^T x \ge \cos\theta\,\|v\|\,\|x\|\}{x∈Bn​:vTx≥cosθ∥v∥∥x∥}. PPP is non-degenerate if every vertex has exactly nnn tight inequalities.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 2 (p. 105)

If A∈Zm×nA \in \mathbb{Z}^{m\times n}A∈Zm×n has all sub-determinants bounded by Δ\DeltaΔ and PPP is bounded, then

diam⁡(P)≤2⌊2π Δ2n5/2ln⁡ ⁣(2n n! nn/2 Δn)⌋+2  =  O(Δ2n3.5log⁡nΔ).\operatorname{diam}(P) \le 2\Big\lfloor \sqrt{2\pi}\,\Delta^2 n^{5/2}\ln\!\big(2^n\, n!\, n^{n/2}\,\Delta^n\big)\Big\rfloor + 2 \;=\; O(\Delta^2 n^{3.5}\log n\Delta).diam(P)≤2⌊2π​Δ2n5/2ln(2nn!nn/2Δn)⌋+2=O(Δ2n3.5lognΔ).

No non-degeneracy, full-dimensionality or rank condition is assumed, and the bound is uniform in mmm and bbb.

Milestones

  1. Lemma 3 (p. 108): for a vertex vvv of a non-degenerate polytope, D(Sv)≤Δ2n3 vol(Sv)D(S_v) \le \Delta^2 n^3\,\mathrm{vol}(S_v)D(Sv​)≤Δ2n3vol(Sv​), where Sv=Cv∩BnS_v = C_v \cap B_nSv​=Cv​∩Bn​.
  2. Lemma 4 (p. 109): among spherical cones of a given volume, a cone of revolution has minimum dockable surface.
  3. Lemma 5 (p. 110): for a cone of revolution, D(S)≥2n/π vol(S)D(S) \ge \sqrt{2n/\pi}\,\mathrm{vol}(S)D(S)≥2n/π​vol(S).
  4. Lemma 6 (p. 111): for every measurable spherical cone with vol(S)≤12vol(Bn)\mathrm{vol}(S) \le \frac12 \mathrm{vol}(B_n)vol(S)≤21​vol(Bn​), D(S)≥2n/π vol(S)D(S) \ge \sqrt{2n/\pi}\,\mathrm{vol}(S)D(S)≥2n/π​vol(S).
  5. Lemma 1 (p. 105): for a non-degenerate polytope and I⊆VI \subseteq VI⊆V with vol(I)≤12vol(Bn)\mathrm{vol}(I) \le \frac12\mathrm{vol}(B_n)vol(I)≤21​vol(Bn​),
vol(N(I))≥2π 1Δ2n2.5 vol(I).\mathrm{vol}(\mathcal N(I)) \ge \sqrt{\tfrac{2}{\pi}}\,\frac{1}{\Delta^2 n^{2.5}}\,\mathrm{vol}(I).vol(N(I))≥π2​​Δ2n2.51​vol(I).
  1. Eq. (1) (p. 105): if IjI_jIj​ is the set of vertices at graph distance at most jjj from a vertex vvv and vol(Ij)≤12vol(Bn)\mathrm{vol}(I_j) \le \frac12\mathrm{vol}(B_n)vol(Ij​)≤21​vol(Bn​), then j≤2π Δ2n2.5ln⁡(2n/vol(I0))j \le \sqrt{2\pi}\,\Delta^2 n^{2.5}\ln(2^n/\mathrm{vol}(I_0))j≤2π​Δ2n2.5ln(2n/vol(I0​)).

Significance

The result. Theorem 2 bounds the diameter of every integral polytope by a polynomial in the dimension and the largest sub-determinant, independently of the number of facets. For totally unimodular matrices, which cover network-flow, bipartite matching and transportation polytopes, it gives O(n3.5log⁡n)O(n^{3.5}\log n)O(n3.5logn), improving the Dyer–Frieze bound by a large polynomial factor. It shows that the obstruction to a polynomial Hirsch bound, if any, must come from matrices with large sub-determinants. The volume-expansion method — measuring breadth-first search by the volume of the normal fan it has covered — was later refined, for instance in the shadow-vertex analysis of Dadush–Hähnle, which improves the dependence on nnn.

Formalizing it. The theorem is proved (2012/2014); no machine-checked proof is known. A formal development needs, on top of Mathlib, the normal fan of a polytope and its relation to the vertex-edge graph, a Hausdorff-measure calculus for cones (surface of a cone in terms of its base), Lévy's isoperimetric inequality on the sphere in a measure-theoretic form, and explicit Gamma-function estimates. Each of these is reusable well beyond this paper.

Difficulty

The combinatorial side is short; the geometry is not. Lemma 4 is the spherical isoperimetric inequality of Lévy, which Mathlib does not have in any form, and which the paper cites rather than proves; the relations between the volume of a spherical cone, the area of its base, its lateral surface and the length of the base's boundary (Eq. (3), "basic integration") are also absent. Lemma 3 depends on the structure of the normal cone of a vertex of a non-degenerate polytope (full-dimensional, simplicial, generated by rows of AAA), none of which is available for Mathlib's extreme points. Lemma 1 depends on the normal fan of a polytope: the normal cones have pairwise disjoint interiors, cover Rn\mathbb{R}^nRn, and share a facet exactly when their vertices are adjacent. The step from non-degenerate to arbitrary polytopes perturbs bbb and needs the diameter not to decrease, a statement about the vertex-edge graph under perturbation. A shortcut through a finite graph abstraction is not available: the constant depends on the geometry of the normal cones, not only on the graph.

Formalization scope

The polyhedron is Hirsch.Hpoly (rowVec A) b, with rowVec A i the iii-th row of A∈A \inA∈ Matrix (Fin m) (Fin n) ℤ as a vector of EuclideanSpace ℝ (Fin n). Vertices are Set.extremePoints ℝ P, adjacency is Hirsch.Adj, "diameter at most BBB" is Hirsch.DiamLE P B, all from the published Hirsch_model. The normal cone is the published FirstOrderOpt.ConvexTheory.normalCone. Volumes are Lebesgue measure with values in [0,∞][0,\infty][0,∞]; the dockable surface uses μHE[n-1], the Hausdorff measure normalized to agree with Lebesgue measure on hyperplanes, applied to frontier S ∩ Metric.ball 0 1. Δ\DeltaΔ is a natural number and the sub-determinant bound ranges over all sizes k≥1k \ge 1k≥1.

Explicit constants. The paper writes O(Δ2n3.5log⁡nΔ)O(\Delta^2 n^{3.5}\log n\Delta)O(Δ2n3.5lognΔ) in Theorem 2; the proof on pp. 105–106 yields 2⌊K⌋+22\lfloor K\rfloor + 22⌊K⌋+2 with K=2π Δ2n5/2ln⁡(2nn! nn/2Δn)K = \sqrt{2\pi}\,\Delta^2 n^{5/2}\ln(2^n n!\, n^{n/2}\Delta^n)K=2π​Δ2n5/2ln(2nn!nn/2Δn), from Eq. (1), the bound vol(I0)≥1/(n! nn/2Δn)\mathrm{vol}(I_0) \ge 1/(n!\,n^{n/2}\Delta^n)vol(I0​)≥1/(n!nn/2Δn) and the fact that the diameter is at most twice the number of breadth-first-search iterations needed to cover more than half of BnB_nBn​. This explicit bound is the goal. The ratios D/volD/\mathrm{vol}D/vol of Lemmas 3, 5, 6 are stated in multiplicative form.

Non-degeneracy is a hypothesis of Lemma 3, Lemma 1 and Eq. (1) only, as in the paper's §1.1, and never of Theorem 2. The neighbourhood N(I)\mathcal N(I)N(I) excludes III; including it would make Lemma 1 trivial, since its constant is below 111. Lemma 4 is stated against every competitor: for every measurable spherical cone SSS and every cone of revolution S∗S^*S∗ of the same volume, D(S∗)≤D(S)D(S^*) \le D(S)D(S∗)≤D(S); it does not assert existence of a cone of a prescribed volume. The goal is Theorem 2 about the polytope and its graph, not an abstract statement about set families with a volume-expansion property; integrality of AAA and the bound on minors of every size are both essential (scaling a real matrix down makes Δ\DeltaΔ arbitrarily small), and the raw Hausdorff measure μH[n-1] would put Lemmas 3 and 6 on incompatible scales.

Contributions are welcome at every level: the normal fan and its adjacency structure, cone surface formulas, the Gamma estimate Γ(x+12)/Γ(x)≥x−14\Gamma(x+\frac12)/\Gamma(x) \ge \sqrt{x-\frac14}Γ(x+21​)/Γ(x)≥x−41​​, and a formal Lévy inequality.

Selected references

  • N. Bonifas, M. Di Summa, F. Eisenbrand, N. Hähnle, M. Niemeier, On Sub-determinants and the Diameter of Polyhedra, Discrete Comput Geom 52 (2014) 102–115. https://doi.org/10.1007/s00454-014-9601-x
  • M. Dyer, A. Frieze, Random walks, totally unimodular matrices, and a randomised dual simplex algorithm, Math. Program. 64 (1994) 1–16. https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01582563
  • G. Kalai, D. J. Kleitman, A quasi-polynomial bound for the diameter of graphs of polyhedra, Bull. Amer. Math. Soc. 26 (1992) 315–316. https://doi.org/10.1090/S0273-0979-1992-00285-9
  • F. Santos, A counterexample to the Hirsch conjecture, Annals of Math. 176 (2012) 383–412. https://doi.org/10.4007/annals.2012.176.1.7
  • T. Figiel, J. Lindenstrauss, V. Milman, The dimension of almost spherical sections of convex bodies, Acta Math. 139 (1977) 53–94 (Lévy's isoperimetric inequality, Theorem 2.1). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF02392234
  • D. Dadush, N. Hähnle, On the shadow simplex method for curved polyhedra, Discrete Comput Geom 56 (2016). https://arxiv.org/abs/1412.6705
11 thms2 active usersReviewed
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Convex OptimizationOptimization·Captain: mikedeng1

Nonmonotone Spectral Projected Gradient Methods on Convex Sets I: SPG2 Is Well Defined and Its Accumulation Points Are StationaryResearch Paper

Motivation

Minimizing a smooth function over a closed convex set Ω⊆Rn\Omega\subseteq\mathbb R^nΩ⊆Rn on which projection is cheap (a box, a ball, a simplex) is a routine subproblem in large-scale optimization: box-constrained minimization is the inner solver of augmented Lagrangian methods, and bound-constrained least squares, image restoration and density estimation all have this form. The classical projected gradient method of Goldstein and of Levitin and Polyak is simple and needs only gradients and projections, but with constant or Armijo-type step lengths it is slow.

Spectral projected gradient (SPG) methods, introduced by Birgin, Martínez and Raydan (paper), combine three ingredients: the projected gradient direction; the Barzilai–Borwein (spectral) step length αk+1=⟨sk,sk⟩/⟨sk,yk⟩\alpha_{k+1}=\langle s_k,s_k\rangle/\langle s_k,y_k\rangleαk+1​=⟨sk​,sk​⟩/⟨sk​,yk​⟩, an inverse Rayleigh quotient of the average Hessian along the last step; and the nonmonotone line search of Grippo, Lampariello and Lucidi, which compares a trial value with the worst of the last MMM objective values instead of the current one. The method is widely used in practice, and its analysis is the template for many later nonmonotone projected methods.

Timeline:

  • 1964–1966: Goldstein; Levitin and Polyak introduce gradient projection.
  • 1976: Bertsekas analyses the Armijo rule along the projection arc.
  • 1986: Grippo, Lampariello and Lucidi introduce the nonmonotone line search for unconstrained problems.
  • 1988: Barzilai and Borwein propose the two-point step size; Raydan (1993, 1997) proves convergence for quadratics and combines it with nonmonotone search in the unconstrained case.
  • 2000: Birgin, Martínez and Raydan define SPG1 and SPG2 for convex constraints (SIAM J. Optim. 10(4)).
  • 2003: the same authors publish the convergence proof that Theorem 2.1 refers to, in the inexact setting (IMA J. Numer. Anal. 23).

Setting

Let Ω⊆Rn\Omega\subseteq\mathbb R^nΩ⊆Rn be nonempty, closed and convex, with the Euclidean inner product ⟨⋅,⋅⟩\langle\cdot,\cdot\rangle⟨⋅,⋅⟩ and norm ∥⋅∥\|\cdot\|∥⋅∥. Let fff have continuous partial derivatives on an open set U⊇ΩU\supseteq\OmegaU⊇Ω and write g(x)=∇f(x)g(x)=\nabla f(x)g(x)=∇f(x). The orthogonal projection P(z)P(z)P(z) is the unique point of Ω\OmegaΩ nearest to zzz. The scaled projected gradient is gt(x)=P(x−t g(x))−xg_t(x)=P(x-t\,g(x))-xgt​(x)=P(x−tg(x))−x for x∈Ωx\in\Omegax∈Ω, t>0t>0t>0. A point xˉ\bar xxˉ is a constrained stationary point if ⟨g(xˉ),x−xˉ⟩≥0\langle g(\bar x),x-\bar x\rangle\ge0⟨g(xˉ),x−xˉ⟩≥0 for all x∈Ωx\in\Omegax∈Ω.

The parameters are an integer M≥1M\ge1M≥1, reals 0<αmin⁡<αmax⁡0<\alpha_{\min}<\alpha_{\max}0<αmin​<αmax​, a sufficient-decrease constant γ∈(0,1)\gamma\in(0,1)γ∈(0,1) and safeguards 0<σ1<σ2<10<\sigma_1<\sigma_2<10<σ1​<σ2​<1. Algorithm SPG2 starts from x0∈Ωx_0\in\Omegax0​∈Ω and α0∈[αmin⁡,αmax⁡]\alpha_0\in[\alpha_{\min},\alpha_{\max}]α0​∈[αmin​,αmax​] and at iteration k=0,1,…k=0,1,\dotsk=0,1,…:

  1. Stop test. If ∥P(xk−g(xk))−xk∥=0\|P(x_k-g(x_k))-x_k\|=0∥P(xk​−g(xk​))−xk​∥=0, stop: xkx_kxk​ is stationary.
  2. Backtracking. Set dk=P(xk−αkg(xk))−xkd_k=P(x_k-\alpha_k g(x_k))-x_kdk​=P(xk​−αk​g(xk​))−xk​ and λ=1\lambda=1λ=1. While
f(xk+λdk)≤max⁡0≤j≤min⁡{k,M−1}f(xk−j)+γλ⟨dk,g(xk)⟩(3)f(x_k+\lambda d_k)\le\max_{0\le j\le\min\{k,M-1\}}f(x_{k-j})+\gamma\lambda\langle d_k,g(x_k)\rangle\qquad(3)f(xk​+λdk​)≤0≤j≤min{k,M−1}max​f(xk−j​)+γλ⟨dk​,g(xk​)⟩(3)

fails, replace λ\lambdaλ by any λnew∈[σ1λ,σ2λ]\lambda_{\rm new}\in[\sigma_1\lambda,\sigma_2\lambda]λnew​∈[σ1​λ,σ2​λ]. When (3) holds, λk=λ\lambda_k=\lambdaλk​=λ and xk+1=xk+λkdkx_{k+1}=x_k+\lambda_kd_kxk+1​=xk​+λk​dk​. 3. Spectral step. With sk=xk+1−xks_k=x_{k+1}-x_ksk​=xk+1​−xk​, yk=g(xk+1)−g(xk)y_k=g(x_{k+1})-g(x_k)yk​=g(xk+1​)−g(xk​), bk=⟨sk,yk⟩b_k=\langle s_k,y_k\ranglebk​=⟨sk​,yk​⟩: αk+1=αmax⁡\alpha_{k+1}=\alpha_{\max}αk+1​=αmax​ if bk≤0b_k\le0bk​≤0, else αk+1=min⁡{αmax⁡,max⁡{αmin⁡,⟨sk,sk⟩/bk}}\alpha_{k+1}=\min\{\alpha_{\max},\max\{\alpha_{\min},\langle s_k,s_k\rangle/b_k\}\}αk+1​=min{αmax​,max{αmin​,⟨sk​,sk​⟩/bk​}}.

In Lean the projection is a function P with the predicate IsProjOnto Ω P, gtg_tgt​ is scaledProjGrad P f t, stationarity is IsConstrainedStationary Ω f, the maximum in (3) is nonmonotoneRef f x M k, and an infinite run is IsSPG2Run Ω f P M αmin αmax γ σ₁ σ₂ x α.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 2.1, accumulation points are stationary

For every infinite run (xk,αk)(x_k,\alpha_k)(xk​,αk​) of SPG2 and every accumulation point xˉ\bar xxˉ of (xk)(x_k)(xk​),

⟨g(xˉ),x−xˉ⟩≥0for all x∈Ω.\langle g(\bar x),x-\bar x\rangle\ge0\qquad\text{for all }x\in\Omega.⟨g(xˉ),x−xˉ⟩≥0for all x∈Ω.

The statement fixes no parameter values and assumes neither convexity of fff nor a bounded level set.

Milestones

  • Lemma 2.1 (ii). For xˉ∈Ω\bar x\in\Omegaxˉ∈Ω and t∈(0,αmax⁡]t\in(0,\alpha_{\max}]t∈(0,αmax​]: gt(xˉ)=0g_t(\bar x)=0gt​(xˉ)=0 iff xˉ\bar xxˉ is a constrained stationary point.
  • Lemma 2.1 (i). For x∈Ωx\in\Omegax∈Ω and t∈(0,αmax⁡]t\in(0,\alpha_{\max}]t∈(0,αmax​]:
⟨g(x),gt(x)⟩≤−1t∥gt(x)∥22≤−1αmax⁡∥gt(x)∥22.\langle g(x),g_t(x)\rangle\le-\tfrac1t\|g_t(x)\|_2^2\le-\tfrac1{\alpha_{\max}}\|g_t(x)\|_2^2.⟨g(x),gt​(x)⟩≤−t1​∥gt​(x)∥22​≤−αmax​1​∥gt​(x)∥22​.
  • Theorem 2.1, first clause (SPG2 is well defined). At a point where Step 1 does not stop, every admissible backtracking sequence reaches a step satisfying (3). The step is stated for an arbitrary reference value R≥f(x)R\ge f(x)R≥f(x), which covers the maximum in (3).
  • Section 2, p. 4. The iterates remain in Ω0={x∈Ω:f(x)≤f(x0)}\Omega_0=\{x\in\Omega:f(x)\le f(x_0)\}Ω0​={x∈Ω:f(x)≤f(x0​)}.

Significance

Theorem 2.1 is the global convergence guarantee for SPG2. It holds without monotone decrease of fff and without any restriction on the spectral step beyond the safeguards. These are the two features that make the method fast in practice, and together they mean that no classical monotone projected-gradient argument applies directly. The same statement underlies the convergence claims of the SPG software (ACM TOMS Algorithm 813) and of the many methods that reuse the nonmonotone spectral framework: inexact SPG, augmented Lagrangian inner solvers, and projected BB methods for machine learning.

Status: the theorem is proved in the literature. This paper's proof reads "See [7]", a pointer to Birgin, Martínez and Raydan (2003). No Lean formalization of this theorem, of the nonmonotone Armijo analysis, or of the projected-gradient stationarity lemma is known. The mission produces a formal proof and a reusable Lean interface for projection-based first-order methods on convex sets.

Difficulty

The obvious argument for monotone descent methods is to show that f(xk)f(x_k)f(xk​) decreases, so that the total decrease is finite and the per-iteration decrease γλk∣⟨dk,g(xk)⟩∣\gamma\lambda_k|\langle d_k,g(x_k)\rangle|γλk​∣⟨dk​,g(xk​)⟩∣ tends to zero. Here f(xk)f(x_k)f(xk​) need not decrease. Only the reference value max⁡0≤j≤min⁡{k,M−1}f(xk−j)\max_{0\le j\le\min\{k,M-1\}}f(x_{k-j})max0≤j≤min{k,M−1}​f(xk−j​) is nonincreasing, and a small decrease of this maximum along the whole sequence does not by itself give a small decrease at the iterates that approach a given accumulation point xˉ\bar xxˉ. A second difficulty is that the accepted step lengths λk\lambda_kλk​ may tend to zero along the subsequence, while fff is C1C^1C1 only on a neighbourhood of Ω\OmegaΩ and no Lipschitz constant for ggg is available, so no uniform sufficient-decrease estimate holds. The spectral steps αk\alpha_kαk​ vary within [αmin⁡,αmax⁡][\alpha_{\min},\alpha_{\max}][αmin​,αmax​], so the directions dkd_kdk​ are not a fixed function of xkx_kxk​.

Formalization scope

  • Space and data. The space is EuclideanSpace ℝ (Fin n) with inner ℝ and the 2-norm. fff is a total function EuclideanSpace ℝ (Fin n) → ℝ with ContDiffOn ℝ 1 f U on an open U ⊇ Ω, and ggg is Mathlib's gradient f. The algorithm evaluates fff and ggg only at points of Ω\OmegaΩ.
  • Iteration and trials. Iterations are indexed from 000. The backtracking choice (2) is universally quantified: a run carries, at each iteration, a finite trial list λ(0)=1\lambda^{(0)}=1λ(0)=1, λ(i+1)∈[σ1λ(i),σ2λ(i)]\lambda^{(i+1)}\in[\sigma_1\lambda^{(i)},\sigma_2\lambda^{(i)}]λ(i+1)∈[σ1​λ(i),σ2​λ(i)], in which test (3) fails at every trial but the last and holds at the last.
  • Step size. αk+1\alpha_{k+1}αk+1​ is given by Step 3 exactly.
  • Accumulation point. An accumulation point is MapClusterPt x̄ atTop x.
  • Excluded simplifications. A run predicate that accepts any positive step, or lets αk+1\alpha_{k+1}αk+1​ range freely over [αmin⁡,αmax⁡][\alpha_{\min},\alpha_{\max}][αmin​,αmax​], is not SPG2. Nor is a goal stating gt(xˉ)=0g_t(\bar x)=0gt​(xˉ)=0 instead of the variational inequality, or one that adds convexity of fff, a Lipschitz gradient or a bounded level set.
  • Non-vacuity. The hypotheses of the goal are satisfiable: for f(x)=∥x∥2f(x)=\|x\|^2f(x)=∥x∥2, Ω=Rn\Omega=\mathbb R^nΩ=Rn, M=1M=1M=1, αmin⁡=1/8\alpha_{\min}=1/8αmin​=1/8, αmax⁡=1/4\alpha_{\max}=1/4αmax​=1/4, γ=1/2\gamma=1/2γ=1/2 and v≠0v\ne0v=0, the iterates xk=2−kvx_k=2^{-k}vxk​=2−kv with αk=1/4\alpha_k=1/4αk​=1/4 form an infinite run with accumulation point 000.
  • Infrastructure. A complete development needs the variational characterization of the projection (Mathlib has it for the iInf form: norm_eq_iInf_iff_real_inner_le_zero), continuity properties of the projection, a mean-value estimate for C1C^1C1 functions on segments in Ω\OmegaΩ, and the nonmonotone reference-value bookkeeping. The projection lemmas and the nonmonotone bookkeeping are reusable beyond this mission, in particular for the companion mission on SPG1, and contributions of them as separate lemmas are welcome.

Selected references

  • E. G. Birgin, J. M. Martínez, M. Raydan, Nonmonotone spectral projected gradient methods on convex sets, SIAM J. Optim. 10(4) (2000) 1196–1211; authors' updated version, July 2004. https://doi.org/10.1137/S1052623497330963, https://www.ime.unicamp.br/~martinez/bmr.pdf
  • E. G. Birgin, J. M. Martínez, M. Raydan, Inexact spectral projected gradient methods on convex sets, IMA J. Numer. Anal. 23 (2003) 539–559. https://doi.org/10.1093/imanum/23.4.539
  • J. Barzilai, J. M. Borwein, Two-point step size gradient methods, IMA J. Numer. Anal. 8 (1988) 141–148. https://doi.org/10.1093/imanum/8.1.141
  • L. Grippo, F. Lampariello, S. Lucidi, A nonmonotone line search technique for Newton's method, SIAM J. Numer. Anal. 23 (1986) 707–716. https://doi.org/10.1137/0723046
  • M. Raydan, The Barzilai and Borwein gradient method for the large scale unconstrained minimization problem, SIAM J. Optim. 7 (1997) 26–33. https://doi.org/10.1137/S1052623494266365
  • D. P. Bertsekas, On the Goldstein–Levitin–Polyak gradient projection method, IEEE Trans. Automat. Control 21 (1976) 174–184. https://doi.org/10.1109/TAC.1976.1101194
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Convex OptimizationOptimization·Captain: mikedeng1

Robust Solutions of Optimization Problems Affected by Uncertain Probabilities II: A Self-Concordant Barrier for the Perspective ConstraintResearch Paper

Motivation

Robust optimization protects a decision against every scenario in an uncertainty set. When the uncertain data are probabilities, a natural uncertainty set is a ball around a nominal distribution measured by a φ-divergence (Kullback–Leibler, Burg entropy, χ², Hellinger and others). Ben-Tal, den Hertog, De Waegenaere, Melenberg and Rennen (Management Science 59(2), 2013) show that the robust counterpart of a linear constraint over such a set is a finite convex system, and then ask whether that system is computationally tractable: can an interior-point method solve it in polynomial time?

For the Burg and Kullback–Leibler divergences the reformulated constraints (Eqs. (29) and (32) of the paper) have the shape λf(si/λ)≤…\lambda f(s_i/\lambda)\le\dotsλf(si​/λ)≤…, a perspective constraint. Polynomial-time solvability by interior-point methods follows once the constraint set carries a self-concordant barrier in the sense of Nesterov and Nemirovski (Interior-Point Polynomial Algorithms in Convex Programming, SIAM 1994). Theorem 2 of the paper supplies such a barrier for every perspective constraint whose generating function satisfies a one-dimensional differential inequality. The same question arises for perspective and relative-entropy cones in conic optimization generally, so the criterion is of interest beyond φ-divergences.

Setting

A function φ:F→R\varphi:F\to\mathbb Rφ:F→R on an open convex set F⊆RnF\subseteq\mathbb R^nF⊆Rn is κ\kappaκ-self-concordant (κ≥0\kappa\ge0κ≥0) if it is three times continuously differentiable on FFF and for every y∈Fy\in Fy∈F and every direction h∈Rnh\in\mathbb R^nh∈Rn

∣∇3φ(y)[h,h,h]∣≤2κ (hT∇2φ(y)h)3/2,\bigl|\nabla^3\varphi(y)[h,h,h]\bigr|\le 2\kappa\,\bigl(h^{\mathsf T}\nabla^2\varphi(y)h\bigr)^{3/2},​∇3φ(y)[h,h,h]​≤2κ(hT∇2φ(y)h)3/2,

where ∇kφ(y)[h,…,h]\nabla^k\varphi(y)[h,\dots,h]∇kφ(y)[h,…,h] is the kkk-th differential of φ\varphiφ at yyy in direction hhh (Definition 1, p. 350). In Lean this is PhiDivRobust.Barrier.IsSelfConcordant κ F φ.

Let fff be a real function on (0,∞)(0,\infty)(0,∞). Its perspective is g(s,y)=y f(s/y)g(s,y)=y\,f(s/y)g(s,y)=yf(s/y) for s,y>0s,y>0s,y>0 (perspective f). The constraint set (34) is

{(s,y,z): yf(s/y)≤z, s≥0, y≥0},\{(s,y,z):\ y f(s/y)\le z,\ s\ge0,\ y\ge0\},{(s,y,z): yf(s/y)≤z, s≥0, y≥0},

and its logarithmic barrier (35) is

φB(s,y,z)=−ln⁡(z−yf(s/y))−ln⁡s−ln⁡y\varphi_B(s,y,z)=-\ln\bigl(z-yf(s/y)\bigr)-\ln s-\ln yφB​(s,y,z)=−ln(z−yf(s/y))−lns−lny

(logBarrier f), finite on the open set Ff={(s,y,z):s>0, y>0, yf(s/y)<z}F_f=\{(s,y,z): s>0,\ y>0,\ yf(s/y)<z\}Ff​={(s,y,z):s>0, y>0, yf(s/y)<z} (barrierDomain f). Directions are h=(h1,h2)h=(h_1,h_2)h=(h1​,h2​) for ggg, with h1h_1h1​ along sss and h2h_2h2​ along yyy, and h∈R3h\in\mathbb R^3h∈R3 for φB\varphi_BφB​.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 2 (p. 350)

If fff is convex on (0,∞)(0,\infty)(0,∞) and, for some κ>0\kappa>0κ>0,

∣f′′′(s)∣≤κ f′′(s)s(s>0),(33)|f'''(s)|\le\kappa\,\frac{f''(s)}{s}\qquad(s>0),\tag{33}∣f′′′(s)∣≤κsf′′(s)​(s>0),(33)

then φB\varphi_BφB​ is (2+23κ)\bigl(2+\tfrac{\sqrt2}{3}\kappa\bigr)(2+32​​κ)-self-concordant on FfF_fFf​.

Milestones (the displayed steps of the proof)

  1. Eq. (37): ∇2g(s,y)[h,h]=f′′(s/y)(h12/y−2sh1h2/y2+s2h22/y3)\nabla^2 g(s,y)[h,h]=f''(s/y)\bigl(h_1^2/y-2sh_1h_2/y^2+s^2h_2^2/y^3\bigr)∇2g(s,y)[h,h]=f′′(s/y)(h12​/y−2sh1​h2​/y2+s2h22​/y3).
  2. The third differential of ggg in terms of f′′(s/y)f''(s/y)f′′(s/y) and f′′′(s/y)f'''(s/y)f′′′(s/y).
  3. Under (33), inequality (36) with β=3+κ2\beta=3+\kappa\sqrt2β=3+κ2​:
∣∇3g(s,y)[h,h,h]∣≤β hT∇2g(s,y)h h12/s2+h22/y2.\bigl|\nabla^3 g(s,y)[h,h,h]\bigr|\le\beta\,h^{\mathsf T}\nabla^2 g(s,y)h\,\sqrt{h_1^2/s^2+h_2^2/y^2}.​∇3g(s,y)[h,h,h]​≤βhT∇2g(s,y)hh12​/s2+h22​/y2​.
  1. Lemma A.2 of den Hertog (1994), as quoted in the proof: if (36) holds with β≥0\beta\ge0β≥0, then φB\varphi_BφB​ is (1+β/3)(1+\beta/3)(1+β/3)-self-concordant on FfF_fFf​.

Milestones 3 and 4 give the goal, since 1+13(3+κ2)=2+23κ1+\tfrac13(3+\kappa\sqrt2)=2+\tfrac{\sqrt2}{3}\kappa1+31​(3+κ2​)=2+32​​κ. A further item records the paper's application: f(s)=−log⁡sf(s)=-\log sf(s)=−logs (the Burg case) satisfies (33) with κ=2\kappa=2κ=2.

Significance

The result. Theorem 2 turns a two-line calculus check on a scalar function into a certificate of polynomial-time solvability for a three-dimensional convex constraint. The paper uses it to conclude that the robust counterparts for the Burg entropy and Kullback–Leibler uncertainty sets are tractable, and the criterion applies to any other convex fff satisfying (33); for example f(s)=slog⁡sf(s)=s\log sf(s)=slogs satisfies it with κ=1\kappa=1κ=1, which covers the relative-entropy cone. The constant 2+23κ2+\tfrac{\sqrt2}{3}\kappa2+32​​κ enters the complexity bound of any path-following method through the barrier parameter.

Formalizing it. The theorem is proved in the paper, but the decisive step is delegated to Lemma A.2 of den Hertog's monograph, which in turn belongs to the compatibility theory of Nesterov and Nemirovski. As far as is known none of these statements has a machine-checked proof. The mission produces a checked version of the compatibility lemma for perspective constraints, which is reusable for any barrier of the form −ln⁡(z−g)−ln⁡s−ln⁡y-\ln(z-g)-\ln s-\ln y−ln(z−g)−lns−lny, together with explicit second- and third-differential formulas for perspectives in Mathlib's iteratedFDeriv language. The printed third-differential display contains a typo (see below); the formal statements fix it.

Difficulty

The differential identities (milestones 1 and 2) are routine but heavy: they require computing iterated Fréchet derivatives of a composition with a quotient in two variables and matching them with one-variable iterated derivatives of fff. The inequality (milestone 3) is elementary real-variable algebra once the differentials are available.

The central difficulty is den Hertog's lemma. The obvious approach, bounding the three terms of ∇3φB\nabla^3\varphi_B∇3φB​ separately against (∇2φB)3/2(\nabla^2\varphi_B)^{3/2}(∇2φB​)3/2, fails: the cross term −3 (∇ω⋅h) ∇2g[h,h]/ω2-3\,(\nabla\omega\cdot h)\,\nabla^2 g[h,h]/\omega^2−3(∇ω⋅h)∇2g[h,h]/ω2 with ω=z−g\omega=z-gω=z−g couples the first and second differentials, and bounding it separately loses the constant 1+β/31+\beta/31+β/3. A further practical difficulty is that FfF_fFf​ is open and convex only because the perspective of a convex function is jointly convex and continuous, which must itself be established.

Formalization scope

Points are (s,y,z)∈R×R×R(s,y,z)\in\mathbb R\times\mathbb R\times\mathbb R(s,y,z)∈R×R×R and directions for ggg are in R×R\mathbb R\times\mathbb RR×R. Differentials are iteratedFDeriv ℝ k applied to the constant tuple (h,…,h)(h,\dots,h)(h,…,h); f′′f''f′′ and f′′′f'''f′′′ are iteratedDeriv 2 f and iteratedDeriv 3 f. The power x3/2x^{3/2}x3/2 is Real.rpow, which is 000 for x<0x<0x<0; this makes the Lean definition of self-concordance no weaker than the paper's. Real.log and division have junk values outside FfF_fFf​, but FfF_fFf​ is open, so no differential at a point of FfF_fFf​ sees them.

Committed conventions and disclosed deviations:

  • "f:R+→Rf:\mathbb R^+\to\mathbb Rf:R+→R" is read as fff convex on the open half-line (0,∞)(0,\infty)(0,∞); the Burg case f=−log⁡f=-\logf=−log is undefined at 000, and fff is only evaluated at s/ys/ys/y with s,y>0s,y>0s,y>0.
  • fff is assumed C3C^3C3 on (0,∞)(0,\infty)(0,∞). The page does not say so, but (33) uses f′′′f'''f′′′ and Definition 1 requires the barrier to be C3C^3C3.
  • The printed third-differential display ends in s3hx3/y5s^3h_x^3/y^5s3hx3​/y5; the correct term is s3h23/y5s^3h_2^3/y^5s3h23​/y5, and the Lean statement uses it. The milestone text keeps the printed version.
  • Lemma A.2 is stated with β≥0\beta\ge0β≥0 added. The quoted text says "if there exists a β\betaβ", which is false for β<0\beta<0β<0: with f≡0f\equiv0f≡0, (36) holds for every β\betaβ and β=−3\beta=-3β=−3 would give a 000-self-concordant −ln⁡z−ln⁡s−ln⁡y-\ln z-\ln s-\ln y−lnz−lns−lny. The goal uses β=3+κ2>0\beta=3+\kappa\sqrt2>0β=3+κ2​>0 and is unaffected.

A trivializing formalization is excluded. The self-concordance predicate requires C3C^3C3 regularity and quantifies over all directions h∈R3h\in\mathbb R^3h∈R3, the domain is exactly FfF_fFf​ (not a subset such as ∅\emptyset∅), and κ>0\kappa>0κ>0 is as printed. The constant of the conclusion is tied to the same κ\kappaκ as in (33).

Useful infrastructure, reusable beyond this mission: iterated derivatives of perspectives, joint convexity of perspectives, and the calculus of self-concordance (sums, −ln⁡-\ln−ln of a concave function composed with an affine map). Proofs of the milestones independently of the goal are welcome, as are proofs of the Burg item's consequence and of the analogous statement for f(s)=slog⁡sf(s)=s\log sf(s)=slogs.

Selected references

  • A. Ben-Tal, D. den Hertog, A. De Waegenaere, B. Melenberg, G. Rennen, Robust Solutions of Optimization Problems Affected by Uncertain Probabilities, Management Science 59(2):341–357, 2013. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.1120.1641
  • D. den Hertog, Interior Point Approach to Linear, Quadratic and Convex Programming: Algorithms and Complexity, Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1994. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-011-1134-8
  • Yu. Nesterov, A. Nemirovskii, Interior-Point Polynomial Algorithms in Convex Programming, SIAM Studies in Applied Mathematics 13, 1994. https://doi.org/10.1137/1.9781611970791
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Convex OptimizationOptimization·Captain: mikedeng1

Robust Solutions of Optimization Problems Affected by Uncertain Probabilities I: The Robust Counterpart of a Linear Constraint under φ-Divergence UncertaintyResearch Paper

Motivation

Many decision problems contain a constraint whose coefficients are an expectation under a probability vector that is not known exactly: an expected cost under uncertain scenario probabilities, an expected payoff of an asset under an estimated distribution, the expected demand in a newsvendor model. The probabilities are usually estimated from data, and a solution that is feasible for the estimate can be infeasible for the true distribution. Robust optimization protects against this by requiring the constraint to hold for every probability vector in an uncertainty region around the estimate.

A natural region is a ball in a φ-divergence, a family of statistical distances between probability vectors that contains the Kullback–Leibler divergence, the Burg entropy, the χ² distances, the Hellinger distance and the variation distance. Such balls arise as asymptotic confidence sets for the true distribution given observed frequencies (Pardo 2006), so the radius has a statistical meaning. Ben-Tal, den Hertog, De Waegenaere, Melenberg and Rennen (Management Science 59(2), 2013) showed that the robust version of a linear constraint over such a ball is equivalent to a finite convex system involving the convex conjugate of φ. This reformulation is a standard tool in the later literature on distributionally robust optimization.

Setting

A φ-divergence function is a function ϕ:R→R∪{+∞}\phi:\mathbb R\to\mathbb R\cup\{+\infty\}ϕ:R→R∪{+∞} that is convex on [0,∞)[0,\infty)[0,∞), finite on (0,∞)(0,\infty)(0,∞), and satisfies ϕ(1)=0\phi(1)=0ϕ(1)=0; the value ϕ(0)\phi(0)ϕ(0) may be +∞+\infty+∞. Examples are ϕ(t)=tlog⁡t−t+1\phi(t)=t\log t-t+1ϕ(t)=tlogt−t+1 (Kullback–Leibler), ϕ(t)=−log⁡t+t−1\phi(t)=-\log t+t-1ϕ(t)=−logt+t−1 (Burg), ϕ(t)=(t−1)2\phi(t)=(t-1)^2ϕ(t)=(t−1)2 (modified χ²) and ϕ(t)=∣t−1∣\phi(t)=|t-1|ϕ(t)=∣t−1∣ (variation). For p,q∈Rmp,q\in\mathbb R^mp,q∈Rm with q>0q>0q>0 the φ-divergence is

Iϕ(p,q)=∑i=1mqi ϕ ⁣(piqi),I_\phi(p,q)=\sum_{i=1}^m q_i\,\phi\!\left(\frac{p_i}{q_i}\right),Iϕ​(p,q)=i=1∑m​qi​ϕ(qi​pi​​),

and the conjugate of ϕ\phiϕ is ϕ∗(s)=sup⁡t≥0{st−ϕ(t)}\phi^*(s)=\sup_{t\ge0}\{st-\phi(t)\}ϕ∗(s)=supt≥0​{st−ϕ(t)}, a function with values in R∪{+∞}\mathbb R\cup\{+\infty\}R∪{+∞}.

Fix a∈Rna\in\mathbb R^na∈Rn, B∈Rn×mB\in\mathbb R^{n\times m}B∈Rn×m with columns bib_ibi​, β∈R\beta\in\mathbb Rβ∈R, C∈Rk×mC\in\mathbb R^{k\times m}C∈Rk×m with columns cic_ici​, d∈Rkd\in\mathbb R^kd∈Rk, a nominal vector q∈Rmq\in\mathbb R^mq∈Rm and a radius ρ>0\rho>0ρ>0. The uncertainty region is

U={p∈Rm∣p≥0, Cp≤d, Iϕ(p,q)≤ρ},U=\{p\in\mathbb R^m\mid p\ge0,\ Cp\le d,\ I_\phi(p,q)\le\rho\},U={p∈Rm∣p≥0, Cp≤d, Iϕ​(p,q)≤ρ},

where the linear constraints Cp≤dCp\le dCp≤d can encode e⊤p=1e^\top p=1e⊤p=1 and any further information on ppp. A decision x∈Rnx\in\mathbb R^nx∈Rn satisfies the robust linear constraint if

(a+Bp)⊤x≤βfor all p∈U.(11)(a+Bp)^\top x\le\beta\qquad\text{for all }p\in U. \tag{11}(a+Bp)⊤x≤βfor all p∈U.(11)

Inequalities between vectors are componentwise throughout.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 1

Assume q>0q>0q>0 and q∈Uq\in Uq∈U. Then xxx satisfies (11) if and only if there are η∈Rk\eta\in\mathbb R^kη∈Rk and λ∈R\lambda\in\mathbb Rλ∈R with

a⊤x+d⊤η+ρλ+λ∑iqi ϕ∗ ⁣(bi⊤x−ci⊤ηλ)≤β,η≥0, λ≥0,(13)a^\top x+d^\top\eta+\rho\lambda+\lambda\sum_{i}q_i\,\phi^*\!\left(\frac{b_i^\top x-c_i^\top\eta}{\lambda}\right)\le\beta,\qquad\eta\ge0,\ \lambda\ge0, \tag{13}a⊤x+d⊤η+ρλ+λi∑​qi​ϕ∗(λbi⊤​x−ci⊤​η​)≤β,η≥0, λ≥0,(13)

where 0ϕ∗(s/0):=00\phi^*(s/0):=00ϕ∗(s/0):=0 for s≤0s\le0s≤0 and 0ϕ∗(s/0):=+∞0\phi^*(s/0):=+\infty0ϕ∗(s/0):=+∞ for s>0s>0s>0. The statement fixes no constants and no particular φ; it holds for the whole class.

Milestones

The proof in the paper has three displayed steps, which are the milestones. With the Lagrange function L(p,λ,η)=(a+Bp)⊤x+ρλ−λIϕ(p,q)+η⊤(d−Cp)L(p,\lambda,\eta)=(a+Bp)^\top x+\rho\lambda-\lambda I_\phi(p,q)+\eta^\top(d-Cp)L(p,λ,η)=(a+Bp)⊤x+ρλ−λIϕ​(p,q)+η⊤(d−Cp) and the dual objective g(λ,η)=sup⁡p≥0L(p,λ,η)g(\lambda,\eta)=\sup_{p\ge0}L(p,\lambda,\eta)g(λ,η)=supp≥0​L(p,λ,η):

  1. Closing identity. For λ≥0\lambda\ge0λ≥0, (λϕ)∗(s)=sup⁡t≥0{st−λϕ(t)}(\lambda\phi)^*(s)=\sup_{t\ge0}\{st-\lambda\phi(t)\}(λϕ)∗(s)=supt≥0​{st−λϕ(t)} equals λϕ∗(s/λ)\lambda\phi^*(s/\lambda)λϕ∗(s/λ), with the convention above at λ=0\lambda=0λ=0.
  2. Eq. (15). For q>0q>0q>0 and λ≥0\lambda\ge0λ≥0,
g(λ,η)=a⊤x+d⊤η+ρλ+∑i=1mqi(λϕ)∗(bi⊤x−ci⊤η).g(\lambda,\eta)=a^\top x+d^\top\eta+\rho\lambda+\sum_{i=1}^m q_i(\lambda\phi)^*(b_i^\top x-c_i^\top\eta).g(λ,η)=a⊤x+d⊤η+ρλ+i=1∑m​qi​(λϕ)∗(bi⊤​x−ci⊤​η).
  1. Duality. Under the hypotheses of Theorem 1, xxx satisfies (11) if and only if g(λ,η)≤βg(\lambda,\eta)\le\betag(λ,η)≤β for some λ≥0\lambda\ge0λ≥0, η≥0\eta\ge0η≥0. This is split into the weak-duality direction and the strong-duality direction with attainment.

An additional item states Corollary 1, the specialization to U={p≥0, e⊤p=1, Iϕ(p,q)≤ρ}U=\{p\ge0,\ e^\top p=1,\ I_\phi(p,q)\le\rho\}U={p≥0, e⊤p=1, Iϕ​(p,q)≤ρ}, where the multiplier η∈R\eta\in\mathbb Rη∈R of the normalization is free in sign.

Significance

Theorem 1 turns a semi-infinite constraint, one inequality for each ppp in a convex set, into a single convex inequality in (x,λ,η)(x,\lambda,\eta)(x,λ,η). The left side of (13) is jointly convex because λϕ∗(s/λ)\lambda\phi^*(s/\lambda)λϕ∗(s/λ) is the perspective of a convex function. For the divergences of Table 4 of the paper the conjugate has a closed form, and the robust constraint becomes a linear, conic quadratic or self-concordant-barrier-representable constraint. The paper's applications (robust asset pricing, a robust newsvendor, and the tractability results of its §5) all start from this theorem, as do its Corollaries 2–5.

The theorem is proved in the paper; no machine-checked proof of it is known. Formalizing it adds a checked robust-counterpart theorem for φ-divergence regions, a reusable encoding of φ-divergences with extended values, and a strong-duality statement with attainment for convex programs whose constraint function takes the value +∞+\infty+∞ on the boundary of the orthant. It also records a correction: the paper states the theorem for q≥0q\ge0q≥0, and that version is false (see Formalization scope).

Difficulty

The separation step (15) and the conjugate identity are elementary manipulations of suprema, but in extended arithmetic: ϕ\phiϕ may be +∞+\infty+∞ at 000, the conjugate may be +∞+\infty+∞, and the case λ=0\lambda=0λ=0 follows its own convention. The central difficulty is the duality step. The worst-case problem is a convex program whose constraint Iϕ(p,q)≤ρI_\phi(p,q)\le\rhoIϕ​(p,q)≤ρ is not a finite convex function on a closed set: for the Burg or χ² divergence it is +∞+\infty+∞ on the boundary of the orthant, and UUU itself need not be closed. Textbook statements of Slater-type strong duality usually assume finite-valued convex functions on a closed domain, so they do not apply as stated. The statement also requires attainment of the dual minimum, not only the absence of a duality gap, and this is the part a naive limiting argument does not give.

Formalization scope

Conventions:

  • Vectors are Fin n → ℝ with the componentwise order; BBB and CCC are Matrix (Fin n) (Fin m) ℝ and Matrix (Fin k) (Fin m) ℝ; bib_ibi​ and cic_ici​ are the columns fun j => B j i and fun j => C j i.
  • ϕ\phiϕ is ℝ → EReal, never −∞-\infty−∞, finite on (0,∞)(0,\infty)(0,∞), with ϕ(1)=0\phi(1)=0ϕ(1)=0 and convexity on [0,∞)[0,\infty)[0,∞) written out in EReal. ϕ(0)=+∞\phi(0)=+\inftyϕ(0)=+∞ is allowed, so the Burg, χ² and J divergences are covered.
  • Iϕ(p,q)I_\phi(p,q)Iϕ​(p,q), ϕ∗\phi^*ϕ∗, (λϕ)∗(\lambda\phi)^*(λϕ)∗, LLL, ggg and the left side of (13) are EReal-valued. λϕ(t)\lambda\phi(t)λϕ(t) is the EReal product, in which 0⋅(+∞)=00\cdot(+\infty)=00⋅(+∞)=0. The term λϕ∗(s/λ)\lambda\phi^*(s/\lambda)λϕ∗(s/λ) is defined by an explicit case split at λ=0\lambda=0λ=0, and λ∑iqiϕ∗(⋅/λ)\lambda\sum_i q_i\phi^*(\cdot/\lambda)λ∑i​qi​ϕ∗(⋅/λ) in (13) is read as ∑iqi (λϕ∗(⋅/λ))\sum_i q_i\,(\lambda\phi^*(\cdot/\lambda))∑i​qi​(λϕ∗(⋅/λ)) with the convention applied term by term.
  • The paper's max⁡p≥0\max_{p\ge0}maxp≥0​ in ggg is a supremum; min⁡λ,η≥0g≤β\min_{\lambda,\eta\ge0}g\le\betaminλ,η≥0​g≤β is stated in its attained form, ∃ λ≥0,η≥0\exists\,\lambda\ge0,\eta\ge0∃λ≥0,η≥0 with g(λ,η)≤βg(\lambda,\eta)\le\betag(λ,η)≤β.
  • mmm and kkk may be 000.

Corrected slip. The paper's standing assumption is q≥0q\ge0q≥0. The third equality of (15) substitutes pi=qitp_i=q_itpi​=qi​t, which needs qi>0q_i>0qi​>0, and Theorem 1 is false for q≥0q\ge0q≥0: with m=k=2m=k=2m=k=2, n=1n=1n=1, ϕ(t)=∣t−1∣\phi(t)=|t-1|ϕ(t)=∣t−1∣, q=(1,0)q=(1,0)q=(1,0), both columns of CCC equal to (1,−1)⊤(1,-1)^\top(1,−1)⊤, d=(1,−1)d=(1,-1)d=(1,−1), a=0a=0a=0, B=(0  1)B=(0\ \ 1)B=(0  1), x=1x=1x=1, ρ=1\rho=1ρ=1, β=0\beta=0β=0, the vector p=(1/2,1/2)p=(1/2,1/2)p=(1/2,1/2) lies in UUU and violates (11), while η=0\eta=0η=0, λ=0\lambda=0λ=0 satisfy (13). Every statement of the mission therefore assumes qi>0q_i>0qi​>0 for all iii. The hypothesis q∈Uq\in Uq∈U (the paper's "such that q∈Uq\in Uq∈U") and ρ>0\rho>0ρ>0 are kept.

Ruled-out trivializations: a conjugate taken as a supremum over all t∈Rt\in\mathbb Rt∈R of a real-valued φ with junk values at t<0t<0t<0 is a different function; computing the λ=0\lambda=0λ=0 term as 0⋅ϕ∗(s/0)0\cdot\phi^*(s/0)0⋅ϕ∗(s/0) with Lean's s/0=0s/0=0s/0=0 makes it identically 000; a real-valued, everywhere finite φ silently excludes the Burg, χ² and J divergences; dropping q∈Uq\in Uq∈U or ρ>0\rho>0ρ>0 removes the Slater point and changes the theorem. The mission's definitions avoid all four.

Needed infrastructure: suprema of EReal-valued families over half-lines and orthants, the interchange of a supremum over a product with a finite sum, and a Lagrangian strong-duality theorem with attainment for a convex program with finitely many affine inequality constraints and one convex, possibly infinite-valued, inequality constraint with a Slater point in the interior of its domain. That duality theorem, and the φ-divergence definitions, are reusable beyond this mission, in particular for the paper's Corollaries 2–5 and for other distributionally robust formulations. Contributions of any of these pieces as separate theorems are welcome.

Selected references

  • A. Ben-Tal, D. den Hertog, A. De Waegenaere, B. Melenberg, G. Rennen, Robust Solutions of Optimization Problems Affected by Uncertain Probabilities, Management Science 59(2):341–357, 2013. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.1120.1641
  • L. Pardo, Statistical Inference Based on Divergence Measures, Chapman & Hall/CRC, 2006. https://doi.org/10.1201/9781420034813
  • A. Ben-Tal, L. El Ghaoui, A. Nemirovski, Robust Optimization, Princeton University Press, 2009. https://doi.org/10.1515/9781400831050
  • R. T. Rockafellar, Convex Analysis, Princeton University Press, 1970. https://doi.org/10.1515/9781400873173
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Markov ChainProbabilityStochastic Systems·Captain: mikedeng1

Open, Closed, and Mixed Networks of Queues with Different Classes of Customers: The Product-Form Equilibrium DistributionResearch Paper

Motivation

Networks of queues model computer systems, communication networks and manufacturing lines: customers (jobs, packets, parts) move between service centers, wait, receive service and move on. Their equilibrium behaviour determines throughputs, utilizations and response times, and for most networks it can only be computed by solving the full balance equations of a continuous-time Markov chain whose state space grows combinatorially with the number of centers and customers. A product-form network is one whose equilibrium distribution factorizes over the centers; for such networks performance measures can be computed exactly by efficient algorithms (convolution, mean value analysis), and this is the basis of much of classical computer-performance modelling.

Timeline of the main product-form results:

  • 1957–1963, Jackson (Oper. Res. 5, 1957; Manag. Sci. 10, 1963): open networks of exponential FCFS queues, one customer class, Poisson arrivals.
  • 1967, Gordon and Newell (Oper. Res. 15): the closed single-class exponential case.
  • 1975, Baskett, Chandy, Muntz and Palacios (J. ACM 22): several customer classes with class switching, four service disciplines (FCFS, processor sharing, infinite server, preemptive-resume LCFS), service times with rational Laplace transforms at the last three, and open, closed or mixed networks with state-dependent Poisson arrivals. This is the BCMP theorem, the subject of this mission.
  • 1975–1979, Kelly (J. Appl. Prob. 12, 1975; Reversibility and Stochastic Networks, Wiley 1979): symmetric queues and quasi-reversibility, a general framework containing the BCMP disciplines.

Setting

A network has NNN service centers and RRR customer classes. A class-rrr customer finishing service at center iii next requires center jjj in class sss with probability pi,r;j,sp_{i,r;j,s}pi,r;j,s​ and leaves the network with probability 1−∑j,spi,r;j,s1-\sum_{j,s}p_{i,r;j,s}1−∑j,s​pi,r;j,s​. The pairs (i,r)(i,r)(i,r) are partitioned into subchains E1,…,EmE_1,\dots,E_mE1​,…,Em​ that routing never leaves. Each center has one of four types:

  1. FCFS, with an exponential service time of rate μi\mu_iμi​ common to all classes;
  2. a single processor-sharing server (each of nnn customers is served at rate 1/n1/n1/n);
  3. an infinite-server center;
  4. a single preemptive-resume LCFS server.

At types 2–4 the class-rrr service time is Coxian: uir≥1u_{ir}\ge1uir​≥1 exponential stages of rates μirl\mu_{irl}μirl​, and after stage lll the customer continues with probability airla_{irl}airl​ or finishes with probability birl=1−airlb_{irl}=1-a_{irl}birl​=1−airl​. The state S=(x1,…,xN)S=(x_1,\dots,x_N)S=(x1​,…,xN​) records the FCFS order of classes at type 1, the number mirlm_{irl}mirl​ of class-rrr customers in stage lll at types 2 and 3, and the LCFS order of (class, stage) pairs at type 4. External arrivals are Poisson, either with rate λ(M(S))\lambda(M(S))λ(M(S)) depending on the total population M(S)M(S)M(S) (process A) or with one stream per subchain of rate λk(M(S/Ek))\lambda_k(M(S/E_k))λk​(M(S/Ek​)) (process B); an arrival joins center jjj in class sss with probability qjsq_{js}qjs​. A subchain with q≡0q\equiv0q≡0 is closed and keeps a fixed population KkK_kKk​.

With relative arrival rates eir≥0e_{ir}\ge0eir​≥0 solving the traffic equations ∑(i,r)eirpi,r;j,s+qjs=ejs\sum_{(i,r)}e_{ir}p_{i,r;j,s}+q_{js}=e_{js}∑(i,r)​eir​pi,r;j,s​+qjs​=ejs​ and Airl=∏j<lairjA_{irl}=\prod_{j<l}a_{irj}Airl​=∏j<l​airj​ (the probability of reaching stage lll, stages numbered from 0), the paper defines fi(xi)f_i(x_i)fi​(xi​) per center type and a factor d(S)d(S)d(S) from the arrival rates.

Formalization targets

Goal: the BCMP theorem (§3.2, pp. 253–254)

π(S)=d(S) f1(x1) f2(x2)⋯fN(xN)\pi(S)=d(S)\,f_1(x_1)\,f_2(x_2)\cdots f_N(x_N)π(S)=d(S)f1​(x1​)f2​(x2​)⋯fN​(xN​)

satisfies the global balance equations of the network, and, under the paper's assumption that the equilibrium distribution is unique, every equilibrium distribution equals π/Z\pi/Zπ/Z whenever Z=∑Sπ(S)Z=\sum_S\pi(S)Z=∑S​π(S) is finite and positive. The goal covers all four center types, open, closed and mixed networks, and both arrival processes.

Milestones

  • §3.1 (p. 252): independent balance implies global balance.
  • §3.2 (p. 254): the product form satisfies the independent balance equations.
  • §4.1 (p. 254): the aggregate-state probabilities are C d(S) g1(y1)⋯gN(yN)C\,d(S)\,g_1(y_1)\cdots g_N(y_N)Cd(S)g1​(y1​)⋯gN​(yN​).

A further supporting item, also from §4.1 (p. 254), states that summing fif_ifi​ over local states with fixed class counts gives gig_igi​. So gig_igi​ depends on the service times only through their means 1/μir=∑lAirl/μirl1/\mu_{ir}=\sum_lA_{irl}/\mu_{irl}1/μir​=∑l​Airl​/μirl​.

Significance

The theorem places the four disciplines, class switching and mixed open/closed populations under one formula. Its corollary in §4.1, that aggregate probabilities depend on service time distributions only through their means (insensitivity), is what makes the model usable with measured mean service times, and it underlies the convolution and mean value analysis algorithms for normalizing constants.

The result is classical and proved on paper. As far as the platform's catalogue shows, it is not formalized: the platform has Kelly's single-class migration process with exponential service, a special case. A machine-checked BCMP theorem would provide a verified multiclass queueing-network model (states, event-driven transition rates, balance equations) on which later results can build: mean value analysis, the state-dependent rates of §5, and the open-network marginals of §4.2.

The printed statement contains an error. The paper defines Airl=∏j=1lairjA_{irl}=\prod_{j=1}^{l}a_{irj}Airl​=∏j=1l​airj​ (p. 253). With the branching of its Figs. 1 and 3, this product includes the branch out of stage lll. For exponential service (uir=1u_{ir}=1uir​=1) it gives Air1=air1=0A_{ir1}=a_{ir1}=0Air1​=air1​=0, so every fif_ifi​ of a type 2–4 center with a customer present vanishes, and a closed network of such centers would have no normalizable solution. The mission states the corrected theorem with Airl=∏j<lairjA_{irl}=\prod_{j<l}a_{irj}Airl​=∏j<l​airj​, which the mean-service-time identity of §4.1 also requires. The type-2 factor 1/mikl!1/m_{ikl}!1/mikl​! is read as 1/mirl!1/m_{irl}!1/mirl​!.

Difficulty

The algebra of the paper's proof is local: each independent balance equation reduces to the traffic equations. The difficulty is in making that statement precise for a real state space. The independent balance equations need a consistent labelling of each moving customer by the "stage" it leaves and enters. That labelling has to cover FCFS centers, where per-class labels are inconsistent (p. 253), the outside world of each open subchain, and LCFS preemption. Every in-flow into a state is a sum over predecessor states, and those states differ by list operations (appending at an FCFS tail, pushing on an LCFS head) or by stage-count updates. The factorials in the processor-sharing and infinite-server factors, and the telescoping identity ∑lAirlbirl=1\sum_lA_{irl}b_{irl}=1∑l​Airl​birl​=1 for departures, must line up exactly with the rates. The obvious shortcut is to check global balance directly for a single class with exponential service. That covers neither class switching, nor Coxian stages, nor mixed networks.

Formalization scope

Centers are Fin N, classes Fin R and subchains Fin m. The class-rrr stages at center iii are Fin (u i r) with u i r : ℕ+, numbered from 0. A local state is an inductive type with three shapes (FCFS list, stage-count array, LCFS list of (class, stage) pairs). The state space is the subtype of configurations whose shapes match the center types and whose closed subchains hold their fixed populations. Transition rates are the sums of the rates of explicit events (arrivals, FCFS completions, stage moves and completions, LCFS moves and completions). Global balance uses tsum; every state has finitely many successors and predecessors with nonzero rate, so these sums are finite. The standing assumptions (substochastic routing closed on subchains, closed subchains with no arrivals and no departures, positive rates, continuation probabilities in [0,1][0,1][0,1] vanishing at the last stage) are collected in Network.IsValid. Irreducibility of subchains is not assumed, and any nonnegative solution of the traffic equations is allowed. Under process B the product in d(S)d(S)d(S) runs over open subchains only. Uniqueness of the equilibrium is a hypothesis, as in the paper. The type-1 rate is constant, and the state-dependent rates of Condition 1 and §5 are not covered.

The following formalizations would trivialize the mission and are ruled out: stating only global balance of π\piπ (satisfied by π≡0\pi\equiv0π≡0), quantifying over arbitrary rate functions instead of the rates built from the network data, and restricting the goal to exponential service or to a single class.

Needed infrastructure: finite-support tsum manipulations, multinomial identities for the §4.1 sums over orderings and stage assignments, and bookkeeping for list and array updates. The model and the balance-equation layer can be reused for later queueing missions. Contributions are welcome on each milestone, on the per-center-type pieces of the independent balance check, and on helper lemmas about the event system.

Selected references

  • F. Baskett, K. M. Chandy, R. R. Muntz, F. G. Palacios, Open, Closed, and Mixed Networks of Queues with Different Classes of Customers, J. ACM 22(2):248–260, 1975. https://doi.org/10.1145/321879.321887
  • J. R. Jackson, Networks of Waiting Lines, Operations Research 5(4):518–521, 1957. https://doi.org/10.1287/opre.5.4.518
  • J. R. Jackson, Jobshop-like Queueing Systems, Management Science 10(1):131–142, 1963. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.10.1.131
  • W. J. Gordon, G. F. Newell, Closed Queuing Systems with Exponential Servers, Operations Research 15(2):254–265, 1967. https://doi.org/10.1287/opre.15.2.254
  • F. P. Kelly, Reversibility and Stochastic Networks, Wiley, 1979. http://www.statslab.cam.ac.uk/~frank/rsn.html
  • D. R. Cox, A Use of Complex Probabilities in the Theory of Stochastic Processes, Proc. Cambridge Phil. Soc. 51:313–319, 1955. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0305004100030231
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Mechanism Design·Captain: naimengye

Fundamentals of Supply Chain Theory XIII: AuctionsTextbook

When is the auctioneer's revenue acceptable?

The Vickrey-Clarke-Groves auction is the textbook mechanism for selling several objects at once: bidders report valuations for bundles, the auctioneer computes the welfare-maximizing allocation, and each winner pays the externality it imposes on the others. Truthful bidding is a dominant strategy and the outcome is efficient. Yet Ausubel and Milgrom (2006) catalogued its practical defects: revenue can be zero when the objects are valuable, revenue can fall when bidders or bids are added, losing bidders can profit by colluding, and a bidder can profit from false identities. Chapter 15 of Snyder and Shen's Fundamentals of Supply Chain Theory (2019) reproduces those examples and then gives the cooperative-game answer to when they cannot occur: the VCG payoff vector should lie in the core, the set of outcomes no coalition of auctioneer and bidders can improve upon, and it does so for every set of participants exactly when the coalitional value function is bidder-submodular. This mission formalizes that characterization, Theorem 15.3, together with the lemma and theorem leading to it.

Setting

Players are the auctioneer 000 and bidders 1,…,n1, \dots, n1,…,n. A coalitional value function VVV assigns to each coalition TTT the value it can create by trading among themselves: 000 if the auctioneer, who owns the objects, is not in TTT, and otherwise the optimal value of the auctioneer's allocation problem among the bidders of TTT, each bidder receiving at most one bundle and bundles disjoint (capValue). Two properties of VVV are all the theory uses: coalitions without the auctioneer are worthless, and adding players never lowers the value (IsCoalitionalValue).

A payoff vector π\piπ gives each player a payoff. It lies in the core of the game on a coalition S∋0S \ni 0S∋0 (InCore V S π) if the payoffs of SSS sum to V(S)V(S)V(S) and no sub-coalition T⊆ST \subseteq ST⊆S is paid less than V(T)V(T)V(T). The VCG payoff vector πˉ(S)\bar\pi(S)πˉ(S) (vcgPayoff) pays each bidder kkk its marginal contribution V(S)−V(S∖k)V(S) - V(S \setminus k)V(S)−V(S∖k), which is its valuation minus its VCG payment, and the auctioneer the remainder. A core vector is bidder dominant (BidderDominant) if every bidder weakly prefers it to every other core vector. VVV is bidder-submodular (BidderSubmodular) if each bidder's marginal contribution weakly decreases as the coalition grows.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 15.3

For a coalitional value function VVV, the following are equivalent: (i) VVV is bidder-submodular; (ii) for every coalition S∋0S \ni 0S∋0 the core equals ΠS={π:∑k∈Sπk=V(S), 0≤πk≤πˉk(S) ∀k∈S∖0}\Pi_S = \{\pi : \sum_{k \in S}\pi_k = V(S),\ 0 \le \pi_k \le \bar\pi_k(S)\ \forall k \in S \setminus 0\}ΠS​={π:∑k∈S​πk​=V(S), 0≤πk​≤πˉk​(S) ∀k∈S∖0}; (iii) for every coalition S∋0S \ni 0S∋0, πˉ(S)\bar\pi(S)πˉ(S) lies in the core of SSS. This is vcg_core_characterization.

Supporting targets

That the combinatorial auction's VVV is a coalitional value function; Lemma 15.1, the core is nonempty and each bidder's VCG payoff is the largest it receives at any core point; Theorem 15.2, the VCG vector is the bidder-dominant core point when it is in the core, and otherwise no bidder-dominant point exists and the auctioneer's VCG payoff is below every core payoff.

The English auction of Sect. 15.2, presented as a primal-dual interpretation of a linear program, and the combinatorial allocation problem of Sect. 15.3 carry no numbered results and are not targets.

Significance

Theorem 15.3 is the criterion an auction designer can check before running a VCG auction: when the bidders' valuations make VVV bidder-submodular (for instance when objects are substitutes), the VCG outcome is a competitive outcome, its revenue meets the core benchmark, and none of the defects of Sect. 15.4.2 can arise; when they do not, Theorem 15.2 says the auctioneer's revenue is strictly below every competitive outcome. The result underlies the ascending package auctions proposed as VCG alternatives and the procurement auctions used in supply chains, such as the combinatorial reverse auctions of the chapter's case study.

None of these results has a machine-checked proof. The book proves all three. The formal treatment of the core and of marginal-contribution vectors is reusable for the cooperative-game models of cost allocation in supply chains.

Difficulty

The theorems are combinatorial statements about a function on finite sets, and the difficulty is entirely in the bookkeeping of coalitions. Lemma 15.1 needs the explicit core vector of its proof to be verified against every sub-coalition, which splits into cases on whether the sub-coalition contains the auctioneer and the distinguished bidder. The implication (i) ⇒\Rightarrow⇒ (ii) telescopes marginal contributions along a chain of coalitions between a sub-coalition and SSS, and the chain has to be built and its sum computed. The implication (iii) ⇒\Rightarrow⇒ (i) is the delicate one: a failure of submodularity is a pair of nested coalitions, and the proof needs to extract from it a single-element step at which a bidder's marginal contribution increases, then show the two-bidder sub-coalition blocks the VCG vector. The obvious idea, that submodularity can be checked only on single-element extensions, is correct but must itself be proved.

Formalization scope

Coalitions are finite sets of Fin (n+1) and payoff vectors are functions on all players; the core and ΠS\Pi_SΠS​ constrain only the players of SSS, so vectors differing outside SSS are interchangeable. The core's budget equation sums over all players of the coalition, including the auctioneer, which is what the book's proofs use although its displayed definition sums over the bidders. The theorems take VVV as any function with the two properties, and the auction's VVV is shown to have them; the VCG vector is defined by the formulas (15.23) and (15.24) rather than through the payment rule, whose equivalence is the book's derivation. Bidder-submodularity is stated for S⊆S′S \subseteq S'S⊆S′ rather than proper inclusion, which changes nothing.

The definition module is shared by all five items. The single-item English auction as a primal-dual algorithm and the condition on individual preferences (substitutes) that implies bidder-submodularity are natural extensions on the same definitions.

Selected references

  • L. V. Snyder and Z.-J. M. Shen, Fundamentals of Supply Chain Theory, 2nd ed., Wiley, 2019, Chapter 15. https://doi.org/10.1002/9781119584445
  • L. M. Ausubel and P. Milgrom, The lovely but lonely Vickrey auction, in Combinatorial Auctions, MIT Press, 2006. https://doi.org/10.7551/mitpress/9780262033428.003.0002
  • S. de Vries and R. V. Vohra, Combinatorial auctions: a survey, INFORMS Journal on Computing 15(3), 2003. https://doi.org/10.1287/ijoc.15.3.284.16077
  • W. Vickrey, Counterspeculation, auctions, and competitive sealed tenders, Journal of Finance 16(1), 1961. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-6261.1961.tb02789.x
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Algorithmic Game Theory·Captain: naimengye

The Theory and Practice of Revenue Management V: CompetitionTextbook

When competing firms settle on prices and allocations

Revenue management is practised by firms that compete: airlines matching fares while allocating seats, retailers ordering stock and then pricing to clear it, hotels protecting rooms for late high-paying guests. Chapter 8 of Talluri and van Ryzin's The Theory and Practice of Revenue Management (2004) surveys the economics behind these situations: monopoly pricing and mechanism design, the Coase problem, advance-purchase discounts, and oligopoly in quantities (Cournot), in prices (Bertrand, Bertrand–Edgeworth with capacities), in newsvendor capacities and in RM allocations. Most of its numbered results are quoted from the literature; what the book itself establishes is a family of equilibrium arguments built on Talluri's equilibrium graph: when each firm's best response moves monotonically with the rival's action, following best-response arcs must end in an equilibrium pair. This mission formalizes those arguments, with Proposition 8.3, existence of an equilibrium in offer sets under the multinomial-logit choice model, as the goal.

Setting

A two-firm game on finite chains of strategies has payoffs u1,u2u_1, u_2u1​,u2​, best responses and pure Nash equilibria (IsBestResponse1, IsNashEquilibrium); its equilibrium graph has no crossing arcs (NoCrossing1) when best-response arcs (k2,k1)(k_2, k_1)(k2​,k1​), (l2,l1)(l_2, l_1)(l2​,l1​) with k2<l2k_2 < l_2k2​<l2​ always have k1≤l1k_1 \le l_1k1​≤l1​. The chapter's games are: the RM duopoly of Sect. 8.4.1.3, two firms with capacity CCC and fares pL<pHp_L < p_HpL​<pH​ whose high-fare demand spills over to the rival beyond its protection level (spilloverDemand), each firm answering with Littlewood's protection level (littlewoodResponse); the duopoly newsvendor of Example 8.16 with effective demands R1=D1+(D2−x2)+R_1 = D_1 + (D_2 - x_2)^+R1​=D1​+(D2​−x2​)+ (effectiveDemand); linear Cournot (cournotPayoff); Bertrand–Edgeworth price competition with capacity CCC per firm, linear demand and efficient rationing (beSales, bePayoff, IsBEEquilibrium); the advance-purchase model of Sect. 8.3.6 (peakLoadRevenue, advancePurchaseRevenue); and the one-period offer-set game of Sect. 8.4.3.2, where a firm offering its first kkk products earns g(Ck)/(W1(k)+W2(l)+w0)g(C_k)/(W_1(k) + W_2(l) + w_0)g(Ck​)/(W1​(k)+W2​(l)+w0​) with g(Ck)=∑j≤kwj(pj−Δ)−w0δg(C_k) = \sum_{j \le k} w_j(p_j - \Delta) - w_0\deltag(Ck​)=∑j≤k​wj​(pj​−Δ)−w0​δ (OfferFirm, offerPayoff1, CaseI, CaseII).

Formalization targets

Goal: Proposition 8.3

If both firms are in Case I (g(G∗)≥0g(G^*) \ge 0g(G∗)≥0) or both in Case II (g<0g < 0g<0 on every complete set), the offer-set game has a pure-strategy equilibrium in complete sets: mnl_offer_set_equilibrium.

Supporting targets

The equilibrium-graph lemma, monotone best responses for both firms give an equilibrium (Sect. 8.4.1.3); Proposition 8.1, Littlewood responses in the RM duopoly are monotone in the rival's protection level, and the resulting equilibrium of the RM duopoly game; Example 8.16, duopoly newsvendor capacities total at least the monopoly capacity; Example 8.15, the symmetric Cournot equilibrium and its price; Theorem 8.5 (i)-(ii), the pure-strategy Bertrand–Edgeworth equilibria; and the advance-purchase comparison of Sect. 8.3.6, w2<w^w_2 < \hat ww2​<w^ and VAPD(w^)≥Vpeak(w2)V_{APD}(\hat w) \ge V_{peak}(w_2)VAPD​(w^)≥Vpeak​(w2​).

Not targets: Theorems 8.1-8.2 (the Coase problem, subgame-perfect equilibria of an infinite-horizon game, proofs in von der Fehr and Kühn), Theorem 8.3 (Harris–Raviv priority pricing, stated with a garbled price formula), Theorem 8.4 (existence via quasiconcavity, cited), Theorem 8.5 (iii), 8.6 and 8.7-8.8 (mixed-strategy and supergame equilibria of Kreps and Scheinkman and Benoit and Krishna), Proposition 8.2 and Proposition 8.4 (the dynamic offer-set game under condition (8.32), proved in Talluri's paper), and the Kreps–Scheinkman derivation of Sect. 8.4.1.6, which rests on Theorem 8.6.

Significance

The equilibrium graph is the chapter's own contribution: a bipartite picture of best responses on chains in which monotonicity, the absence of crossing arcs, forces an equilibrium. It is the finite, combinatorial form of the monotone comparative-statics route to Nash equilibrium (Tarski's fixed point on a chain), and it is what makes RM allocation games tractable: the two-class duopoly with Littlewood responses always has an equilibrium, and the offer-set duopoly does whenever the two firms face the same sign of ggg, while Example 8.18 shows a best-response cycle when they do not. The Bertrand–Edgeworth, Cournot and newsvendor results are the benchmarks the book uses to interpret RM competition: capacity constraints soften Bertrand's zero-profit outcome, competing in allocations tends to raise total capacity above the monopoly level, and advance-purchase discounts dominate peak-load pricing as a self-selection mechanism. None of these has a machine-checked proof.

Difficulty

The lemma and the goal are fixed-point arguments on finite chains: the largest best response is a monotone map of the rival's index, the composition of two monotone (or two antitone) maps on a finite chain has a fixed point, and for the offer-set game the monotonicity itself must be extracted from the ratio structure g(Ck)/(W(k)+a)g(C_k)/(W(k) + a)g(Ck​)/(W(k)+a) as in the appendix's inequalities (8.A.3)-(8.A.5), separately in the two cases. Proposition 8.1 is a monotonicity of tail probabilities under the pointwise order of effective demands. Example 8.16 is a short probabilistic argument that needs the identity {D>x1+x2}={R1>x1}∩{R2>x2}\{D > x_1 + x_2\} = \{R_1 > x_1\} \cap \{R_2 > x_2\}{D>x1​+x2​}={R1​>x1​}∩{R2​>x2​} and the strict monotonicity of the tail. Theorem 8.5 requires computing efficient-rationing sales for every unilateral deviation from a symmetric profile, through the recursive definition of residual demand, and a quadratic inequality for upward deviations in part (ii). The advance-purchase item reduces to the identity VAPD(w)−Vpeak(w)=(1−α)wV_{APD}(w) - V_{peak}(w) = (1 - \alpha)wVAPD​(w)−Vpeak​(w)=(1−α)w and the strict decrease of the first-order-condition function.

Formalization scope

Products, protection levels and complete sets are natural numbers; the offer-set game's strategies are the complete sets C1,…,CnC_1, \dots, C_nC1​,…,Cn​ of the book, and its payoff is (8.31) up to the positive factor λ\lambdaλ and the terms independent of both offer sets. Prices decreasing in the product index are a hypothesis, as the nested-by-revenue order of Sect. 8.4.3.2. The RM duopoly is modeled through Littlewood's response, as the book's appendix argues, rather than through expected revenues. Efficient rationing is defined recursively over the firms priced strictly below a given firm, with equal sharing among firms at the same price. Example 8.16 is stated with the equilibrium conditions (8.23) and the strictly increasing distribution of aggregate demand as hypotheses. The advance-purchase item takes the first-order conditions (8.13) and (8.15) and the book's uniqueness assumption as hypotheses, the latter as (v−w)−F(w)/f(w)(v - w) - F(w)/f(w)(v−w)−F(w)/f(w) strictly decreasing in www (the page prints "increasing", but its footnote identifies it with the monotone marginal-revenue assumption, which is decreasing in the waiting cost). Theorem 8.5 is stated for its pure-strategy parts (i) and (ii) only.

Selected references

  • K. T. Talluri and G. J. van Ryzin, The Theory and Practice of Revenue Management, Kluwer/Springer, 2004, Chapter 8. https://doi.org/10.1007/b139000
  • D. M. Kreps and J. A. Scheinkman, Quantity precommitment and Bertrand competition yield Cournot outcomes, Bell Journal of Economics 14(2), 1983. https://doi.org/10.2307/3003636
  • S. A. Lippman and K. F. McCardle, The competitive newsboy, Operations Research 45(1), 1997. https://doi.org/10.1287/opre.45.1.54
  • S. Netessine and R. A. Shumsky, Revenue management games: horizontal and vertical competition, Management Science 51(5), 2005. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.1040.0356
  • I. L. Gale and T. J. Holmes, Advance-purchase discounts and monopoly allocation of capacity, American Economic Review 83(1), 1993. https://www.jstor.org/stable/2117500
  • D. M. Topkis, Supermodularity and Complementarity, Princeton University Press, 1998. https://doi.org/10.1515/9781400822539
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Fundamentals of Supply Chain Theory XII: The Vehicle Routing ProblemTextbook

Many vehicles, one depot

The vehicle routing problem asks for the cheapest set of delivery routes from a depot to a set of customers when each vehicle can carry only so much. It generalizes the traveling salesman problem, which is the case of a single vehicle of unlimited capacity, and it is the operational problem behind every distribution fleet. Exact methods reach a few hundred customers; the questions that shape fleet design are structural: how does the optimal routing cost compare with the cost of a single grand tour, and how does it grow with the number of customers? Haimovich and Rinnooy Kan (1985) answered both for unit demands by bounding the optimal cost above and below in terms of the optimal TSP tour and the average distance to the depot. Chapter 11 of Snyder and Shen's Fundamentals of Supply Chain Theory (2019) presents that result with its full proof as Theorem 11.6, and it is the goal of this mission.

Setting

Nodes are the depot 000 and customers 1,…,n1, \dots, n1,…,n, with distances cijc_{ij}cij​ that are symmetric, nonnegative and satisfy the triangle inequality (VRPMetric). Every customer has demand 111 and every vehicle capacity CCC, so a route is a sequence of at most CCC distinct customers, served by one vehicle that leaves the depot, visits them in order and returns; its length is routeCost c L. A solution is a family of routes visiting every customer exactly once (IsVRPSolution), with total length solutionCost; the number of routes is free. The optimal VRP value z∗z^*z∗ (vrpOpt c C) is the least total length, the optimal TSP value zTz_TzT​ (tspOpt c) is the least length of a single route through all customers, and cˉ\bar ccˉ (avgDepotDist) is the average distance from the depot to a customer.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 11.6

For every metric instance with n≥1n \ge 1n≥1 customers and capacity C≥1C \ge 1C≥1,

max⁡{2nCcˉ, zT}  ≤  z∗  ≤  2⌈nC⌉cˉ+(1−1C)zT.\max\Big\{2\frac{n}{C}\bar c,\ z_T\Big\} \;\le\; z^* \;\le\; 2\Big\lceil\frac{n}{C}\Big\rceil\bar c + \Big(1 - \frac{1}{C}\Big)z_T.max{2Cn​cˉ, zT​}≤z∗≤2⌈Cn​⌉cˉ+(1−C1​)zT​.

This is vrp_tsp_bounds.

Supporting targets

The three steps of the book's proof: the radial bound 2nCcˉ≤z∗2\frac{n}{C}\bar c \le z^*2Cn​cˉ≤z∗, obtained route by route from the triangle inequality and the capacity; the routing bound zT≤z∗z_T \le z^*zT​≤z∗; and the iterated optimal tour partition bound (11.59), that for any tour Γ\GammaΓ through all customers some partition of its customer sequence into ⌈n/C⌉\lceil n/C\rceil⌈n/C⌉ consecutive routes costs at most 2⌈n/C⌉cˉ+(1−⌈n/C⌉/n) z(Γ)2\lceil n/C\rceil\bar c + (1 - \lceil n/C\rceil/n)\,z(\Gamma)2⌈n/C⌉cˉ+(1−⌈n/C⌉/n)z(Γ).

The chapter's other numbered results are not targets: Proposition 11.1 (state-space relaxation of the routing dynamic program) and Theorem 11.2 (the capacitated comb inequality, proof omitted, which needs the bin-packing function v(S)v(S)v(S)), and Theorems 11.3, 11.5, 11.7 and Lemma 11.4 (almost-sure asymptotics of random instances and the location-based heuristic), whose proofs the book cites.

Significance

Theorem 11.6 is the quantitative link between routing and the two things a planner can estimate without solving anything: the TSP length, which grows like n\sqrt{n}n​ for random customers, and the average depot distance. It says that the VRP cost is the TSP cost plus a radial term 2cˉ2\bar c2cˉ per vehicle, and that this decomposition is exact up to a factor bounded by the capacity. The radial term explains Theorem 11.7, that the optimal cost grows linearly in nnn for fixed capacity, and the tour partition heuristic in the proof is a practical route-first-cluster-second method with a provable guarantee. The bounds are the basis of the continuous approximation formulas used in strategic distribution design.

None of these results has a machine-checked proof. The book proves Theorem 11.6 in full. The formal treatment of routes as lists and of the averaging argument over rotations of a tour is reusable for the capacitated heuristics of Sect. 11.3.

Difficulty

The upper bound is an averaging argument that is easy to state and fiddly to formalize: for each of the nnn rotations of the tour's customer sequence, the sequence is cut into blocks of CCC, and one must count, across all rotations, how often each customer is the first or last of a block and how often each tour edge is cut. The counts, ℓ=⌈n/C⌉\ell = \lceil n/C\rceilℓ=⌈n/C⌉ each, hold only after the rotations are indexed carefully, and the passage from the average to the best rotation needs the sum of the nnn solution costs computed exactly.

The lower bound has two parts with different flavors. The radial part needs, for each route, that the closed route from the depot is at least twice the largest depot distance among its customers, which is the triangle inequality applied along the route, followed by an averaging step that uses the capacity. The routing part is a shortcutting argument: the routes of a solution concatenate into a closed walk that revisits the depot, and removing the repeated depot visits must not increase the length. The obvious idea, that a VRP solution is itself a tour, is false, and the shortcut has to be constructed.

Formalization scope

Routes are lists of customers, solutions are lists of routes, and the feasibility predicate requires nonempty routes of length at most CCC avoiding the depot, with the concatenation of all routes a duplicate-free list containing every customer. Costs use the closed walk through the depot followed by the route. The optimal values are infima of finite nonempty sets of reals, nonempty because singleton routes are feasible when C≥1C \ge 1C≥1. The ceiling ⌈n/C⌉\lceil n/C\rceil⌈n/C⌉ is Mathlib's Nat.ceil of the real quotient. The number of vehicles is unrestricted, as the section assumes; the fixed-fleet version of the problem is not modeled.

The TSP value zTz_TzT​ is defined as the least route cost over all orderings of the customers, so no separate tour model is needed and the mission does not depend on the TSP mission of this series.

The definition module is shared by all five items. Problem 11.18 (tightness of both bounds) and Theorem 11.7 for deterministic instance families are natural extensions on the same definitions.

Selected references

  • L. V. Snyder and Z.-J. M. Shen, Fundamentals of Supply Chain Theory, 2nd ed., Wiley, 2019, Chapter 11. https://doi.org/10.1002/9781119584445
  • M. Haimovich and A. H. G. Rinnooy Kan, Bounds and heuristics for capacitated routing problems, Mathematics of Operations Research 10(4), 1985. https://doi.org/10.1287/moor.10.4.527
  • P. Toth and D. Vigo (eds.), Vehicle Routing: Problems, Methods, and Applications, 2nd ed., SIAM, 2014. https://doi.org/10.1137/1.9781611973594
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Fundamentals of Supply Chain Theory XI: The Traveling Salesman ProblemTextbook

The problem every routing model contains

A salesman must visit nnn cities and return home by the shortest route. The traveling salesman problem is the prototype of combinatorial optimization: easy to state, NP-hard (Karp 1972), and solved to optimality on instances with tens of thousands of nodes by branch-and-cut. In a supply chain it is the core of every vehicle routing model and of the location-routing models of the chapters that follow. Chapter 10 of Snyder and Shen's Fundamentals of Supply Chain Theory (2019) covers the symmetric metric TSP, in which distances satisfy the triangle inequality: the cutting planes of branch-and-cut (comb inequalities), the construction heuristics with their worst-case guarantees, culminating in Christofides' (1976) 3/2-approximation, and the lower bounds of Little et al. and of Held and Karp (1970). This mission formalizes those results, with Christofides' theorem as its goal.

Setting

Nodes are N={1,…,n}N = \{1, \dots, n\}N={1,…,n} with distances cijc_{ij}cij​ that are symmetric, nonnegative, zero on the diagonal and satisfy the triangle inequality cij≤cik+ckjc_{ij} \le c_{ik} + c_{kj}cij​≤cik​+ckj​ (IsMetric). A tour is a visiting order τ\tauτ of all the nodes, of length z(τ)=∑kc(τk,τk+1)z(\tau) = \sum_k c(\tau_k, \tau_{k+1})z(τ)=∑k​c(τk​,τk+1​) with indices mod nnn (tourLength); z∗z^*z∗ is the least tour length (optTourLength). A tour has an edge set (tourEdges), and for a node set SSS the counts of tour edges inside SSS and leaving SSS (edgesWithin, edgesLeaving) are the sums ∑i,j∈Sxij\sum_{i,j \in S} x_{ij}∑i,j∈S​xij​ and ∑i∈S,j∉Sxij\sum_{i \in S, j \notin S} x_{ij}∑i∈S,j∈/S​xij​ of the integer programming formulation. A comb is a handle HHH with an odd number s≥3s \ge 3s≥3 of pairwise disjoint teeth, each meeting both HHH and its complement (IsComb); when every tooth has exactly two nodes the comb is a 2-matching configuration.

The nearest neighbor heuristic always moves to a nearest unvisited node (IsNearestNeighborTour); the nearest insertion heuristic grows a partial tour by inserting the unvisited node nearest to it at the cheapest position (IsNearestInsertionRun, with cycleLength and distToTour). The minimum spanning tree heuristic doubles an MST (IsMST, graphWeight), takes an Eulerian tour of the doubled tree and shortcuts it, visiting the nodes in order of first appearance (IsShortcut). Christofides' heuristic instead adds to the MST a minimum-weight perfect matching on its odd-degree nodes (oddNodes, IsMinMatchingOn) before taking the Eulerian tour. A 1-tree rooted at rrr is a spanning tree on the other nodes plus two edges at rrr (Is1Tree); the revised distances cij′=cij+λi+λjc'_{ij} = c_{ij} + \lambda_i + \lambda_jcij′​=cij​+λi​+λj​ (revisedCost) define the Held-Karp bound.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 10.13

For every metric instance, every minimum spanning tree T∗T^*T∗, every minimum-weight perfect matching MMM on the odd-degree nodes of T∗T^*T∗, every Eulerian tour of T∗+MT^* + MT∗+M and its shortcut τ\tauτ,

z(τ)  ≤  32 z∗.z(\tau) \;\le\; \tfrac{3}{2}\, z^*.z(τ)≤23​z∗.

This is christofides_bound.

Supporting targets

Theorem 10.1, the reduced-matrix bound ∑iρi+∑jκj≤z∗\sum_i \rho_i + \sum_j \kappa_j \le z^*∑i​ρi​+∑j​κj​≤z∗; Theorem 10.2, Proposition 10.3 and Theorem 10.4, the 2-matching and comb inequalities valid for every tour; Theorem 10.6, zNN≤12(⌈log⁡2n⌉+1)z∗z_{NN} \le \frac{1}{2}(\lceil\log_2 n\rceil + 1) z^*zNN​≤21​(⌈log2​n⌉+1)z∗; Theorem 10.7, zNI≤2z∗z_{NI} \le 2z^*zNI​≤2z∗; Lemma 10.9, z(T∗)≤z∗z(T^*) \le z^*z(T∗)≤z∗; Theorem 10.10, Euler's theorem; Theorem 10.11, zMST≤2z∗z_{MST} \le 2z^*zMST​≤2z∗; Lemma 10.12, the handshaking lemma; Lemma 10.15, the 1-tree bound; Lemma 10.16, the revised distance identities; Theorem 10.17, the Held-Karp bound. Theorem 10.5 (no constant-factor approximation unless P = NP), Theorem 10.8 and the second part of Theorem 10.6 (tightness instances), Lemma 10.14 (Euclidean tours do not cross), Lemma 10.18 (the integrality gap) and Theorem 10.19 (the Beardwood-Halton-Hammersley asymptotics) are not targets.

Significance

Christofides' bound was the best approximation guarantee for the metric TSP for over forty years, until the 3/2−10−363/2 - 10^{-36}3/2−10−36 of Karlin, Klein and Oveis Gharan (2021), and it is the reference point against which every heuristic in the chapter is measured: nearest neighbor has no constant bound, nearest insertion and the MST heuristic achieve 222, Christofides 3/23/23/2. The comb inequalities are the cuts that make branch-and-cut work, and the Held-Karp bound is the lower bound that tells a practitioner how far a heuristic tour is from optimal. Theorem 10.1 is the historical bounding rule of the first branch-and-bound algorithm.

None of these results has a machine-checked proof. The book proves Theorems 10.2, 10.11, 10.13 and 10.17 and Proposition 10.3 and Lemma 10.9, cites Theorems 10.6, 10.7 and 10.10, and leaves Theorem 10.4 and Lemmas 10.12 and 10.16 as exercises. The formal infrastructure for tours, shortcutting and Eulerian walks is reusable for the vehicle routing chapter.

Difficulty

Christofides' argument has three steps and each has a formal obstacle. The MST bound is a spanning-path argument that needs the removal of an edge from a tour to yield a tree, in Mathlib's terms a connected acyclic subgraph of the complete graph. The matching bound is the subtle one: the optimal tour shortcut to the odd-degree nodes, of length at most z∗z^*z∗ by the triangle inequality, is an even cycle whose alternate edges form two perfect matchings on those nodes, the cheaper of which costs at most z∗/2z^*/2z∗/2; formalizing the decomposition of a cycle on an even node set into two matchings, and the shortcut's length bound, is the bulk of the work. The final step, that shortcutting an Eulerian walk does not lengthen it, is an induction along the walk using the triangle inequality on the skipped stretches, and it needs the first-occurrence order to be handled explicitly.

The obvious approach to the heuristic bounds, comparing the heuristic tour directly with the optimal tour, fails; every proof goes through a spanning tree. For nearest insertion the tree is Prim's, grown in the same order as the insertions, and the bound charges each insertion cost to a tree edge; for nearest neighbor the argument of Rosenkrantz et al. bounds the sum of the kkk largest steps by 2z∗2z^*2z∗ for each kkk and sums a geometric series, which is where the logarithm comes from.

The comb inequalities are counting arguments on degrees, but the general comb of Theorem 10.4 needs the case analysis of how a tour enters and leaves each tooth. Euler's theorem in the sufficiency direction is Hierholzer's construction, which is not in Mathlib.

Formalization scope

Tours are permutations of Fin n, so a tour is an ordering rather than an edge set, and every tie-breaking of a heuristic is covered by a predicate on its output rather than by an algorithm. Graphs are Mathlib SimpleGraphs on Fin n; the multigraphs of the two tree heuristics are represented by closed walks with prescribed edge multisets, and shortcutting is the first-occurrence order along the walk's node sequence. All degree and edge-set computations use classical decidability. Theorems on tours assume n≥3n \ge 3n≥3 where a tour must have distinct edges, n≥1n \ge 1n≥1 otherwise.

Theorem 10.1 is stated for the reduction of the full off-diagonal matrix, because the book's upper-triangular version is false: a random metric instance violates it, since the last row and first column of a triangular matrix are empty and the two edges at a node need not be one row and one column entry. The full-matrix version is the statement of Little et al. It is stated for n≥2n \ge 2n≥2, because a one-node "tour" is a self-loop that no off-diagonal entry constrains.

Theorem 10.4 is stated with the comb inequality's right-hand side corrected to ∣H∣+∑k(∣Tk∣−1)−12(s+1)|H| + \sum_k(|T_k| - 1) - \tfrac{1}{2}(s+1)∣H∣+∑k​(∣Tk​∣−1)−21​(s+1), the standard form. The book prints +12(s−1)+\tfrac{1}{2}(s-1)+21​(s−1), which contradicts its own 2-matching special case (10.15) and is weaker by sss. The corrected statement implies the printed one.

The 111-tree root is an explicit node rrr, the book's node 111. The nearest insertion run is a sequence of lists indexed by iteration, and the theorem compares the nnn-th list's closed length with z∗z^*z∗; a run always exists, so the hypothesis is satisfiable.

The definition module is shared by all fifteen items. Theorem 10.8 and Problem 10.12 (tightness of the bounds of 222), the second part of Theorem 10.6, and Lemma 10.18 on the integrality gap are natural extensions on the same definitions.

Selected references

  • L. V. Snyder and Z.-J. M. Shen, Fundamentals of Supply Chain Theory, 2nd ed., Wiley, 2019, Chapter 10. https://doi.org/10.1002/9781119584445
  • N. Christofides, Worst-case analysis of a new heuristic for the travelling salesman problem, Report 388, GSIA, Carnegie Mellon University, 1976; reprinted in Operations Research Forum 3, 2022. https://doi.org/10.1007/s43069-021-00101-z
  • D. J. Rosenkrantz, R. E. Stearns and P. M. Lewis II, An analysis of several heuristics for the traveling salesman problem, SIAM Journal on Computing 6(3), 1977. https://doi.org/10.1137/0206041
  • M. Held and R. M. Karp, The traveling-salesman problem and minimum spanning trees, Operations Research 18(6), 1970. https://doi.org/10.1287/opre.18.6.1138
  • J. D. C. Little, K. G. Murty, D. W. Sweeney and C. Karel, An algorithm for the traveling salesman problem, Operations Research 11(6), 1963. https://doi.org/10.1287/opre.11.6.972
  • M. Grötschel and M. W. Padberg, On the symmetric travelling salesman problem I and II, Mathematical Programming 16, 1979. https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01582116
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The Theory and Practice of Revenue Management III: Dynamic PricingTextbook

Prices that respond to inventory

A retailer marking down a seasonal line, an airline raising fares as seats sell, a manufacturer pricing while restocking: each sets prices over time against a finite and changing inventory. Chapter 5 of Talluri and van Ryzin's The Theory and Practice of Revenue Management (2004) collects the structural theory of that problem. Without replenishment, the Bernoulli-arrival model of Gallego and van Ryzin (1994) gives a marginal value of capacity that falls with inventory and with time, hence prices that jump up at each sale and drift down between sales, and the deterministic fluid model bounds it from above. With replenishment, the model of Federgruen and Heching (1999) has a jointly concave and supermodular continuation value, from which the base-stock, posted-price policy follows: below a base-stock level order up to it and post a fixed price, above it order nothing and discount, more the higher the inventory. This mission formalizes those results with Proposition 5.3 as the goal.

Setting

Bernoulli demand (Sect. 5.2.2.2). One customer arrives per period with a random willingness to pay; the firm's decision is the demand rate d∈[0,1]d \in [0, 1]d∈[0,1], the probability of a sale at the inverse-demand price p(t,d)p(t, d)p(t,d), with revenue rate r(t,d)=d p(t,d)r(t, d) = d\,p(t, d)r(t,d)=dp(t,d) (revenueRate). The value function (5.12) is Vt(x)=max⁡d{r(t,d)−d ΔVt+1(x)}+Vt+1(x)V_t(x) = \max_{d}\{r(t, d) - d\,\Delta V_{t+1}(x)\} + V_{t+1}(x)Vt​(x)=maxd​{r(t,d)−dΔVt+1​(x)}+Vt+1​(x), VT+1=0V_{T+1} = 0VT+1​=0, Vt(0)=0V_t(0) = 0Vt​(0)=0 (bernoulliValue), and ΔVt(x)=Vt(x)−Vt(x−1)\Delta V_t(x) = V_t(x) - V_t(x-1)ΔVt​(x)=Vt​(x)−Vt​(x−1) (bernoulliDelta). The deterministic model (5.1) maximizes ∑tr(t,d(t))\sum_t r(t, d(t))∑t​r(t,d(t)) over rates with ∑td(t)≤C\sum_t d(t) \le C∑t​d(t)≤C (deterministicValue).

Pricing with replenishment (Sect. 5.3.2). Inventory may be negative (backorders). In period ttt with inventory xxx the firm orders up to y≥xy \ge xy≥x at unit cost ctc_tct​, chooses a rate d∈[0,dˉ]d \in [0, \bar d]d∈[0,dˉ], sells the random demand D(t,d,ξt)=at(ξt) d+bt(ξt)D(t, d, \xi_t) = a_t(\xi_t)\,d + b_t(\xi_t)D(t,d,ξt​)=at​(ξt​)d+bt​(ξt​) (additive, multiplicative or mixed noise), and pays the convex cost hth_tht​ on ending inventory. The value function (5.20) is Vt(x)=sup⁡y≥x, d{r(t,d)−ct(y−x)+Gt+1(y,d)}V_t(x) = \sup_{y \ge x,\, d}\{r(t, d) - c_t(y - x) + G_{t+1}(y, d)\}Vt​(x)=supy≥x,d​{r(t,d)−ct​(y−x)+Gt+1​(y,d)} with the continuation value Gt+1(y,d)=E[Vt+1(y−D(t,d,ξt))−ht(y−D(t,d,ξt))]G_{t+1}(y, d) = \mathbb E[V_{t+1}(y - D(t, d, \xi_t)) - h_t(y - D(t, d, \xi_t))]Gt+1​(y,d)=E[Vt+1​(y−D(t,d,ξt​))−ht​(y−D(t,d,ξt​))] (ReplPricing.value, contValue). Assumption 7.2, marginal revenue decreasing, is the concavity of r(t,⋅)r(t, \cdot)r(t,⋅).

Formalization targets

Goal: Proposition 5.3

For every period, Gt+1G_{t+1}Gt+1​ is jointly concave on R×[0,dˉ]\mathbb R \times [0, \bar d]R×[0,dˉ], VtV_tVt​ is concave on R\mathbb RR, and Gt+1G_{t+1}Gt+1​ has increasing differences in (y,d)(y, d)(y,d), the supermodularity that the book states through its partial derivatives: replenishment_concave_supermodular.

Supporting targets

Proposition 5.2, the marginal value of capacity in the Bernoulli model decreases in ttt and in xxx; the upper bound of Sect. 5.2.2.3, the optimal deterministic revenue dominates the optimal expected stochastic revenue; and the base-stock, posted-price structure of Sect. 5.3.2.1, derived from Proposition 5.3: below the unconstrained optimum y0y^0y0 order up to it and use d0d^0d0, above it order nothing and use a rate at least d0d^0d0 that is nondecreasing in the inventory.

Proposition 5.1 and Lemma 5-5.A.1 (the continuous-demand model without replenishment) are not targets; see the formalization scope. The deterministic sections (efficient prices, discrete price sets), the asymptotic optimality of the deterministic heuristic, the infinite-horizon stationary problem and the multiproduct and finite-population models carry no numbered results.

Significance

Proposition 5.3 is the structural core of joint pricing and inventory control: joint concavity makes the period problem a concave program, and supermodularity is what turns its solution into a policy, the base-stock, posted-price rule that Federgruen and Heching showed optimal and that later work on pricing with inventory builds on. Proposition 5.2 is the reason optimal dynamic prices in the stochastic single-item model rise at every sale and fall while inventory sits, the behaviour of Figure 5.5, and the deterministic upper bound is what justifies the fluid model as a benchmark and a heuristic, the pattern quantified in Table 5.6. None of these has a machine-checked proof; the replenishment result in particular needs the interplay of concavity, expectation and partial maximization on all of R\mathbb RR.

Difficulty

Proposition 5.2 is an induction whose step compares suprema over the rate interval, with the boundary condition Vt(0)=0V_t(0) = 0Vt​(0)=0 breaking the recursion at x=1x = 1x=1 and requiring r(t,0)=0r(t, 0) = 0r(t,0)=0. The deterministic bound is an induction on periods that uses the concavity of the deterministic value in the inventory (a concave program's value) to absorb the two branches of the Bernoulli recursion. The goal needs: integrability and continuity of Vt+1(y−D)−ht(y−D)V_{t+1}(y - D) - h_t(y - D)Vt+1​(y−D)−ht​(y−D) under bounded noise; that the expectation of a concave function of an affine map is jointly concave, and its increasing differences from those of the concave integrand; that a partial supremum of a jointly concave function over the convex feasible set {y≥x}\{y \ge x\}{y≥x} is concave in xxx; and the boundedness of the objective so that every supremum is a real number. The base-stock item is the segment argument that moves an unconstrained maximizer onto the boundary y=xy = xy=x and a monotone comparative-statics argument on the supermodular objective, with maxima attained by continuity on the compact rate interval.

Formalization scope

Periods are natural numbers with value t the value with T+1−tT + 1 - tT+1−t periods to go, the maxima are suprema, and the book's ranges are hypotheses. The demand is affine in the rate, which is the additive and multiplicative models the book names; with a merely convex demand (Assumption 5.1) the joint concavity of Proposition 5.3 fails when Vt+1−htV_{t+1} - h_tVt+1​−ht​ is not monotone, and the noise has bounded support, strengthening Assumption 7.6. The partial-derivative statements (iii)-(iv) are in difference form. Proposition 5.1 is not formalized: its model (5.11) evaluates Vt+1(x−D)V_{t+1}(x - D)Vt+1​(x−D) at negative inventories the model does not define while truncating revenue at xxx, and its Lemma 5-5.A.1 (joint concavity of r+r^+r+) is false as stated, its Hessian argument mistaking an indefinite matrix for a negative definite one; a counterexample is in the mission's check. The deterministic model restricts rates to [0,1][0, 1][0,1], the rates the Bernoulli model can realize.

Selected references

  • K. T. Talluri and G. J. van Ryzin, The Theory and Practice of Revenue Management, Kluwer/Springer, 2004, Chapter 5. https://doi.org/10.1007/b139000
  • G. Gallego and G. J. van Ryzin, Optimal dynamic pricing of inventories with stochastic demand over finite horizons, Management Science 40(8), 1994. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.40.8.999
  • A. Federgruen and A. Heching, Combined pricing and inventory control under uncertainty, Operations Research 47(3), 1999. https://doi.org/10.1287/opre.47.3.454
  • W. Elmaghraby and P. Keskinocak, Dynamic pricing in the presence of inventory considerations, Management Science 49(10), 2003. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.49.10.1287.17315
  • D. M. Topkis, Supermodularity and Complementarity, Princeton University Press, 1998. https://doi.org/10.1515/9781400822539
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Fundamentals of Supply Chain Theory X: Supply UncertaintyTextbook

When the supplier is the risk

Every model in the earlier chapters of this series treats demand as the uncertain quantity and supply as given. Chapter 9 of Snyder and Shen's Fundamentals of Supply Chain Theory (2019) reverses the roles: demand is deterministic and the supplier fails. A disruption is a binary event, modeled as a two-state Markov process between up and down periods, during which nothing can be ordered. The chapter's thesis, from Snyder and Shen (2006), is that supply uncertainty is a mirror image of demand uncertainty: the optimal base-stock level has the same critical-fractile form as the newsvendor solution but with the fractile taken over the disruption-length distribution (Tomlin 2006), and consolidation, which pools demand risk, now does nothing to expected cost and multiplies its variance, the risk-diversification effect of Schmitt, Sun, Snyder and Shen (2015). The chapter closes with the reliable fixed-charge location problem of Snyder and Daskin (2005). This mission formalizes the chapter's theorems on disruptions, with the risk-diversification theorem as its goal.

Setting

A supplier that is up is disrupted next period with probability α\alphaα; one that is down recovers with probability β\betaβ. The disruption chain records 000 when the supplier is up and n≥1n \ge 1n≥1 in the nnn-th consecutive period of a disruption; its stationary distribution is π0=β/(α+β)\pi_0 = \beta/(\alpha+\beta)π0​=β/(α+β) and πn=αβα+β(1−β)n−1\pi_n = \frac{\alpha\beta}{\alpha+\beta}(1-\beta)^{n-1}πn​=α+βαβ​(1−β)n−1 (disruptionPmf), with distribution function F(n)=∑i≤nπiF(n) = \sum_{i \le n}\pi_iF(n)=∑i≤n​πi​ (disruptionCdf).

A single location faces demand ddd per period, pays hhh per unit held and ppp per unit backordered per period, and follows a base-stock policy: it orders up to SSS in every up period and nothing in down periods. In the nnn-th period of a disruption it has S−(n+1)dS - (n+1)dS−(n+1)d units on hand or backordered, so its cost is g^(S,n)=h[S−(n+1)d]++p[(n+1)d−S]+\hat g(S, n) = h[S-(n+1)d]^+ + p[(n+1)d - S]^+g^​(S,n)=h[S−(n+1)d]++p[(n+1)d−S]+ (periodCost), and the expected cost per period is g(S)=∑nπng^(S,n)g(S) = \sum_n \pi_n \hat g(S, n)g(S)=∑n​πn​g^​(S,n) (meanCost), with variance V(S)V(S)V(S) over the disruption state (varCost). The critical fractile γ=p/(p+h)\gamma = p/(p+h)γ=p/(p+h) and F−1(γ)F^{-1}(\gamma)F−1(γ), the smallest nnn with F(n)≥γF(n) \ge \gammaF(n)≥γ, determine the optimal level.

In the reliable fixed-charge location problem (RFLP), sites fail independently with probability qqq and each customer is assigned to a chain of facilities: its level-rrr facility serves it when the rrr closer facilities are disrupted, until it is assigned to an emergency facility uuu that never fails and charges the penalty θi\theta_iθi​. The objective (9.61) is fixed cost plus expected transportation cost, with coefficients ψijr=hicijqr(1−q)\psi_{ijr} = h_i c_{ij} q^r (1-q)ψijr​=hi​cij​qr(1−q) (rflpPsi, rflpCost) under the constraints (9.62)-(9.67) (RFLPFeasible).

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 9.9

For NNN identical locations and the centralized location formed by merging them (demand NdNdNd):

SC∗=NS∗,gC∗=gD∗=Ng∗,VC∗=NVD∗=N2V∗,S^*_C = NS^*, \qquad g^*_C = g^*_D = Ng^*, \qquad V^*_C = N V^*_D = N^2 V^*,SC∗​=NS∗,gC∗​=gD∗​=Ng∗,VC∗​=NVD∗​=N2V∗,

that is, an optimal single-location level SSS scales to the optimal centralized level NSNSNS, the centralized expected cost at NSNSNS is NNN times the single-location cost, and its variance is N2N^2N2 times the single-location variance. This is risk_diversification.

Supporting targets

Lemma 9.2, the stationary distribution and distribution function of the disruption chain; Lemma 9.4, that the optimal base-stock level is a multiple of ddd; Theorem 9.5, S∗=d+dF−1(p/(p+h))S^* = d + dF^{-1}(p/(p+h))S∗=d+dF−1(p/(p+h)), as the least minimizer of ggg; and Theorem 9.10, that in every optimal RFLP solution consecutive backup assignments are ordered by cost. Theorem 9.3, the optimality of base-stock policies, is cited by the book to Song and Zipkin without a model of the policy space and is not a target; Proposition 9.1 and the multisupplier results of Sect. 9.4 are left for a later mission, as discussed below.

Significance

Theorem 9.5 is the supply-side newsvendor formula: it says exactly how much inventory buys protection against disruptions of a given length, and it underlies the disruption models used in practice for raw-material buffers. Theorem 9.9 is the chapter's central insight and the reason supply and demand uncertainty call for opposite strategies: pooling reduces expected cost under demand uncertainty but only redistributes risk under supply uncertainty, concentrating it. Its three identities are what a risk-averse planner needs to compare the two designs by a mean-variance criterion. Theorem 9.10 is what lets the RFLP be formulated without ordering constraints and solved by Lagrangian relaxation like the UFLP.

None of these results has a machine-checked proof. The book proves Theorem 9.5 and the identities behind Theorem 9.9, sketches Lemma 9.4, and leaves Lemma 9.2 and Theorem 9.10 as exercises. The formal treatment of the piecewise-linear cost ggg and its finite differences is reusable for the yield-uncertainty and multi-supplier models of the same chapter.

Difficulty

The cost ggg is an infinite series whose terms grow linearly in nnn against a geometric weight, so every statement about it begins with summability, and the finite-difference identity Δg(S)=d[(h+p)F(S/d−1)−p]\Delta g(S) = d[(h+p)F(S/d - 1) - p]Δg(S)=d[(h+p)F(S/d−1)−p] requires exchanging a difference with a sum. Theorem 9.5 then needs the convexity and piecewise linearity of ggg to pass from a sign condition on slopes at multiples of ddd to a global minimum over all real SSS, and the identification of the least minimizer needs the slopes to be strictly negative below S∗S^*S∗. The obvious idea, treating the problem as a discrete newsvendor over multiples of ddd, is only half of the argument: it does not by itself exclude non-multiple minimizers, which is what Lemma 9.4 asserts.

Lemma 9.2 is elementary but the stationary equations involve a series over all down states, and the proof must establish summability before manipulating it. Theorem 9.9's scaling identities are termwise, but the optimality transfer in part 1 requires the scaling to preserve minimizers, which follows from the cost identity holding for every SSS.

Theorem 9.10 is an exchange argument on a binary program with layered constraints. The delicate case is the emergency facility: swapping it into a lower level is infeasible, and the correct move is to promote it and drop the later assignment, which changes the constraints for every higher level; the argument must show feasibility of the modified solution level by level.

Formalization scope

The disruption distribution is given by Lemma 9.2's formula rather than defined as the stationary distribution, and Lemma 9.2 shows it satisfies the stationary equations; the theorems assume 0<α≤10 < \alpha \le 10<α≤1 and 0<β≤10 < \beta \le 10<β≤1, under which every series is a geometric series times a polynomial and is summable. The quantity F−1(γ)F^{-1}(\gamma)F−1(γ) enters Theorem 9.5 as a natural number kkk characterized by F(k)≥γF(k) \ge \gammaF(k)≥γ and F(n)<γF(n) < \gammaF(n)<γ for n<kn < kn<k, which exists since F(n)→1>γF(n) \to 1 > \gammaF(n)→1>γ; the conclusion asserts both optimality and leastness of d+dkd + dkd+dk among all real levels.

Theorem 9.9 is stated as the scaling of the single-location functions; the decentralized totals Ng∗Ng^*Ng∗ and NV∗NV^*NV∗ are the mean and variance of a sum of NNN independent copies, which the book asserts rather than derives, and are not modeled separately. In the RFLP, levels are indexed by Fin m, the emergency facility is a designated index uuu whose data satisfy the book's conventions through the hypotheses, and demands are positive with 0<q<10 < q < 10<q<1, both needed: with q=0q = 0q=0 or hi=0h_i = 0hi​=0 backup assignments are free and any order is optimal.

The EOQ with disruptions (Proposition 9.1) is a renewal-reward derivation without a formal model of the renewal process in the book, and the multisupplier newsvendor of Sect. 9.4 (Lemma 9.6, Theorems 9.7 and 9.8) rests on differentiability conditions the book defers to Dada et al. and on a lemma it leaves as an exercise; both are natural extensions on the same definitions rather than targets here.

Selected references

  • L. V. Snyder and Z.-J. M. Shen, Fundamentals of Supply Chain Theory, 2nd ed., Wiley, 2019, Chapter 9. https://doi.org/10.1002/9781119584445
  • B. Tomlin, On the value of mitigation and contingency strategies for managing supply chain disruption risks, Management Science 52(5), 2006. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.1060.0515
  • A. J. Schmitt, S. A. Sun, L. V. Snyder and Z.-J. M. Shen, Centralization versus decentralization: risk pooling, risk diversification, and supply chain disruptions, Omega 52, 2015. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.omega.2014.10.010
  • L. V. Snyder and M. S. Daskin, Reliability models for facility location: the expected failure cost case, Transportation Science 39(3), 2005. https://doi.org/10.1287/trsc.1040.0107
  • L. V. Snyder and Z.-J. M. Shen, Supply and demand uncertainty in multi-echelon supply chains, working paper, 2006. https://doi.org/10.1287/msom.1080.0224
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Fundamentals of Supply Chain Theory IX: Facility Location ModelsTextbook

Where to put the warehouses

Choosing where to open distribution centers is the strategic decision that fixes a supply chain's shape for years. The basic model, the uncapacitated fixed-charge location problem (UFLP) of Balinski (1965), trades the fixed cost of opening sites against the cost of transporting demand from open sites to customers. It is NP-hard, yet routinely solved to optimality, and the reason is a fact about its relaxations: the LP relaxation is unusually tight, and Lagrangian relaxation, which Cornuejols, Fisher and Nemhauser (1977) brought to location problems, gives the same bound with a subproblem solvable by inspection. Chapter 8 of Snyder and Shen's Fundamentals of Supply Chain Theory (2019) develops the UFLP, its Lagrangian relaxation and Erlenkotter's (1978) DUALOC dual-ascent method, then the p-median problem with Hakimi's (1965) node-optimality theorem and the covering models. This mission formalizes the chapter's numbered results, with the equality of the Lagrangian and LP bounds as its goal.

Setting

Customers i∈Ii \in Ii∈I have demands hih_ihi​; candidate sites j∈Jj \in Jj∈J have fixed costs fjf_jfj​; shipping one unit from jjj to iii costs cijc_{ij}cij​. A solution opens sites (xj∈{0,1}x_j \in \{0,1\}xj​∈{0,1}) and assigns demand fractions (yij≥0y_{ij} \ge 0yij​≥0, ∑jyij=1\sum_j y_{ij} = 1∑j​yij​=1, yij≤xjy_{ij} \le x_jyij​≤xj​); its cost is ∑jfjxj+∑i∑jhicijyij\sum_j f_j x_j + \sum_i \sum_j h_i c_{ij} y_{ij}∑j​fj​xj​+∑i​∑j​hi​cij​yij​ (uflpCost, UFLPFeasible). The optimal value is z∗z^*z∗ (uflpOpt); relaxing xj∈{0,1}x_j \in \{0,1\}xj​∈{0,1} to 0≤xj≤10 \le x_j \le 10≤xj​≤1 gives the LP relaxation with value zLPz_{LP}zLP​ (uflpLP).

Lagrangian relaxation removes the assignment constraints and charges λi\lambda_iλi​ per unit of violation. For fixed multipliers λ\lambdaλ the subproblem (UFLP-LRλ_\lambdaλ​) minimizes ∑jfjxj+∑i∑j(hicij−λi)yij+∑iλi\sum_j f_j x_j + \sum_i\sum_j (h_i c_{ij} - \lambda_i) y_{ij} + \sum_i \lambda_i∑j​fj​xj​+∑i​∑j​(hi​cij​−λi​)yij​+∑i​λi​ over yij≤xjy_{ij} \le x_jyij​≤xj​, xxx binary, y≥0y \ge 0y≥0 (lagrObjective, LagrFeasible), with value zLR(λ)z_{LR}(\lambda)zLR​(λ) (zLR). It separates by site: the benefit of opening jjj is βj=∑imin⁡{0,hicij−λi}\beta_j = \sum_i \min\{0, h_i c_{ij} - \lambda_i\}βj​=∑i​min{0,hi​cij​−λi​} (benefit), and jjj is opened iff βj+fj<0\beta_j + f_j < 0βj​+fj​<0. The best bound is the Lagrangian dual value zLR=max⁡λzLR(λ)z_{LR} = \max_\lambda z_{LR}(\lambda)zLR​=maxλ​zLR​(λ) (zLRbest).

DUALOC works with the condensed dual of the LP relaxation, whose variables viv_ivi​ satisfy ∑imax⁡{0,vi−c^ij}≤fj\sum_i \max\{0, v_i - \hat c_{ij}\} \le f_j∑i​max{0,vi​−c^ij​}≤fj​ with c^ij=hicij\hat c_{ij} = h_i c_{ij}c^ij​=hi​cij​. A dual solution vvv and a site set J+J^+J+ form a primal-dual pair (PDP) when these constraints are tight on J+J^+J+ and every customer has a site in J+J^+J+ with c^ij≤vi\hat c_{ij} \le v_ic^ij​≤vi​; the primal solution opens J+J^+J+ and assigns each customer to its nearest open site j+(i)j^+(i)j+(i) (NearestIn, primalX, primalY).

For the p-median problem on a network, the customers are the nodes, ddd is the shortest-path distance between nodes, and a facility may sit at position ttt along an edge (u,w)(u, w)(u,w) of length ℓ\ellℓ, at distance min⁡{d(i,u)+tℓ,d(i,w)+(1−t)ℓ}\min\{d(i,u) + t\ell, d(i,w) + (1-t)\ell\}min{d(i,u)+tℓ,d(i,w)+(1−t)ℓ} from node iii (NetPoint, netDist). The p-center problem minimizes the largest distance from a customer to its nearest of ppp open sites; pCenterValue c p is its optimal value.

Formalization targets

Goal: Corollary 8.2

For every instance with at least one candidate site,

zLP  =  zLR  =  sup⁡λzLR(λ).z_{LP} \;=\; z_{LR} \;=\; \sup_\lambda z_{LR}(\lambda).zLP​=zLR​=λsup​zLR​(λ).

This is lagrangian_equals_lp.

Supporting targets

Theorem 8.1, the closed form zLR(λ)=∑jmin⁡{0,βj+fj}+∑iλiz_{LR}(\lambda) = \sum_j \min\{0, \beta_j + f_j\} + \sum_i \lambda_izLR​(λ)=∑j​min{0,βj​+fj​}+∑i​λi​ with its optimal solution; the bounds (8.16) zLR(λ)≤z∗z_{LR}(\lambda) \le z^*zLR​(λ)≤z∗ and (8.19) zLP≤zLR≤z∗z_{LP} \le z_{LR} \le z^*zLP​≤zLR​≤z∗; Theorem 8.3, the variable-fixing tests; Lemma 8.4, the DUALOC duality gap zP+−zD+=∑i∑j∈J+,j≠j+(i)max⁡{0,vi−c^ij}z^+_P - z^+_D = \sum_i \sum_{j \in J^+, j \ne j^+(i)} \max\{0, v_i - \hat c_{ij}\}zP+​−zD+​=∑i​∑j∈J+,j=j+(i)​max{0,vi​−c^ij​}; Lemma 8.6, the characterization of complementary slackness violations; Theorem 8.7, Hakimi's theorem that some ppp nodes are optimal among all ppp-point sets; Lemma 8.8, the equivalence between the ppp-center value being at most rrr and a set cover of radius rrr with at most ppp sites. Proposition 8.5, which concerns the output of a specific procedure, is not a target.

Significance

Corollary 8.2 explains the behavior of every Lagrangian location code: the bound cannot beat the LP bound, so its value lies in the ease of the subproblem and in extensions to nonlinear location models (the location model with risk pooling of Chapter 12) where no LP is available. Theorem 8.1 is the subproblem solution those codes use; Theorem 8.3 is the variable-fixing device of Daskin, Snyder and others that shrinks branch-and-bound trees. Lemmas 8.4 and 8.6 are the analytical core of DUALOC, the method that made large UFLP instances solvable in the 1970s. Hakimi's theorem is the reason the ppp-median problem is a discrete problem at all, and Lemma 8.8 is the reason ppp-center problems are solved by bisection over covering problems rather than by their weak MIP formulation.

None of these results has a machine-checked proof. The book proves Theorems 8.1 and 8.3 and Lemma 8.6, cites Corollary 8.2 to Appendix D and Theorem 8.7 to Hakimi, and leaves Lemmas 8.4 and 8.8 as exercises. The formal treatment of the integrality property and of Lagrangian duality for a linear objective over a product of boxes is reusable for the p-median and capacitated variants the chapter goes on to discuss.

Difficulty

The goal is an LP duality statement in disguise, and the obvious idea, that zLR(λ)z_{LR}(\lambda)zLR​(λ) is the dual function of the LP relaxation, is exactly what needs proof. Two facts must be established: that for fixed λ\lambdaλ the subproblem over binary xxx has the same value as over x∈[0,1]x \in [0,1]x∈[0,1], because after the optimal yyy is substituted the objective is linear in xxx; and that the supremum over λ\lambdaλ of the resulting concave piecewise-linear function equals the LP minimum. The second is strong duality for a linear program, which Mathlib does not provide ready-made; it has to be obtained either through a Farkas-type argument or by exhibiting, for the LP optimum, a multiplier vector that attains it, which for this problem can be read off the LP dual. The book proves none of this; it invokes Lemma D.3.

The bounds (8.16) and (8.19) are easier but not free: the infima and suprema defining z∗z^*z∗, zLPz_{LP}zLP​ and zLRz_{LR}zLR​ must be shown attained, which needs finiteness of the binary choices and compactness of the assignment polytope. Theorem 8.3 depends on the value of the subproblem with one variable forced, which is Theorem 8.1 applied to a modified instance. Hakimi's theorem needs a concavity argument in each point's position and a bookkeeping step, since moving several points to nodes may merge them and the result must still have exactly ppp nodes. Lemma 8.8 is combinatorial and short once the ppp-center value is identified with a minimum over ppp-subsets.

Formalization scope

Customers and sites are Fin n and Fin m; demands, costs and fixed costs are arbitrary reals, as the book's formulations are, and the theorems that need it assume m≥1m \ge 1m≥1. Optimal values are infima or suprema of the sets of attainable objective values, all of which are nonempty and bounded under the stated hypotheses. The Lagrangian dual value is a supremum over all real multiplier vectors, so Corollary 8.2 asserts in particular that the supremum equals the attained LP value.

The DUALOC statements take the nearest-facility assignment j+(i)j^+(i)j+(i) as a function a with the defining property, so ties are resolved by the hypothesis, and the complementary slackness violation is written exactly as (8.51) with (x+,y+)(x^+, y^+)(x+,y+) substituted. Hakimi's theorem is stated for a family of ppp points with repetition allowed, which is stronger than for a set. It assumes what the book's network supplies: the node distances satisfy the triangle inequality, since they are shortest-path distances, and every edge carrying a point is at least as long as the distance between its endpoints. The argument needs both: they make the ends of an edge coincide with its nodes, and without them a point on a short fictitious edge can beat every node. The set covering value in Lemma 8.8 is expressed through the existence of a cover with at most ppp sites rather than as a natural-number infimum, whose value 000 on infeasible instances would falsify the equivalence.

The definition module is shared by all ten items. The Lagrangian relaxation of the ppp-median problem (Sect. 8.3.2.2), the continuous knapsack subproblem of the capacitated problem, and Proposition 8.5 on the dual-ascent procedure are natural extensions on the same definitions.

Selected references

  • L. V. Snyder and Z.-J. M. Shen, Fundamentals of Supply Chain Theory, 2nd ed., Wiley, 2019, Chapter 8. https://doi.org/10.1002/9781119584445
  • M. L. Balinski, Integer programming: methods, uses, computation, Management Science 12(3), 1965. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.12.3.253
  • G. Cornuejols, M. L. Fisher and G. L. Nemhauser, Location of bank accounts to optimize float, Management Science 23(8), 1977. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.23.8.789
  • D. Erlenkotter, A dual-based procedure for uncapacitated facility location, Operations Research 26(6), 1978. https://doi.org/10.1287/opre.26.6.992
  • S. L. Hakimi, Optimum distribution of switching centers in a communication network and some related graph theoretic problems, Operations Research 13(3), 1965. https://doi.org/10.1287/opre.13.3.462
  • A. M. Geoffrion, Lagrangean relaxation for integer programming, Mathematical Programming Study 2, 1974. https://doi.org/10.1007/BFb0120690
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Algorithmic Game Theory·Captain: naimengye

Fundamentals of Supply Chain Theory VIII: Supply Chain ContractsTextbook

Why the newsvendor orders too little

A retailer facing uncertain single-period demand and buying from a supplier at a wholesale price orders less than the two of them together would want. The reason is not irrationality but incentives: the retailer bears the whole cost of unsold stock while the supplier collects a margin on every unit ordered, so each party marks up its own cost and the combined markup, Spengler's (1950) double marginalization, depresses the order. Pasternack (1985) showed that a buyback credit for unsold units, priced correctly, realigns the retailer with the chain, and Cachon (2003) surveys the contracts that followed. Chapter 14 of Snyder and Shen's Fundamentals of Supply Chain Theory (2019) develops this as a Stackelberg game on the newsvendor model: the supplier sets contract terms, the retailer sets the order quantity. This mission formalizes the chapter's seven theorems, with the buyback allocation theorem, which shows that buyback both coordinates the chain and can divide its profit in any proportion, as the goal.

Setting

Demand DDD is a random variable with law on R\mathbb{R}R and mean μ\muμ. The retail price is rrr; the supplier's and retailer's per-unit costs are csc_scs​ and crc_rcr​ with c=cs+cr<rc = c_s + c_r < rc=cs​+cr​<r; lost sales cost the two parties goodwill penalties psp_sps​ and prp_rpr​ with p=ps+prp = p_s + p_rp=ps​+pr​; unsold units salvage for v<crv < c_rv<cr​ (ContractData). With S(Q)=E[min⁡{Q,D}]S(Q) = \mathbb{E}[\min\{Q, D\}]S(Q)=E[min{Q,D}] the expected sales (expSales) and I(Q)=Q−S(Q)I(Q) = Q - S(Q)I(Q)=Q−S(Q) the expected leftover (expLeftover), a transfer payment T(Q)T(Q)T(Q) from retailer to supplier determines the two profits (retailerProfit, supplierProfit),

πr(Q)=(r−v+pr)S(Q)−(cr−v)Q−prμ−T(Q),πs(Q)=psS(Q)−csQ−psμ+T(Q),\pi_r(Q) = (r - v + p_r)S(Q) - (c_r - v)Q - p_r\mu - T(Q), \qquad \pi_s(Q) = p_s S(Q) - c_s Q - p_s\mu + T(Q),πr​(Q)=(r−v+pr​)S(Q)−(cr​−v)Q−pr​μ−T(Q),πs​(Q)=ps​S(Q)−cs​Q−ps​μ+T(Q),

whose sum Π(Q)=(r−v+p)S(Q)−(c−v)Q−pμ\Pi(Q) = (r - v + p)S(Q) - (c - v)Q - p\muΠ(Q)=(r−v+p)S(Q)−(c−v)Q−pμ (chainProfit) is independent of the contract. The chain-optimal quantity Q0Q_0Q0​ maximizes Π\PiΠ; the retailer's and supplier's optimal quantities Qr∗Q^*_rQr∗​, Qs∗Q^*_sQs∗​ maximize their own profits. A contract coordinates the chain when Qr∗=Qs∗=Q0Q^*_r = Q^*_s = Q_0Qr∗​=Qs∗​=Q0​, stated here as equality of the sets of maximizers, and is a coordinating contract type when some choice of its parameters does this with both profits positive.

The four contracts are their transfer payments. Wholesale price: T=wQT = wQT=wQ. Buyback: T=wQ−b I(Q)T = wQ - b\,I(Q)T=wQ−bI(Q), the supplier crediting bbb per unsold unit, with 0≤b≤r−v+pr0 \le b \le r - v + p_r0≤b≤r−v+pr​ and w=w(b)w = w(b)w=w(b) of (14.22). Revenue sharing: the retailer keeps a fraction ϕ\phiϕ of sales and salvage revenue, T=(w+(1−ϕ)v)Q+(1−ϕ)(r−v)S(Q)T = (w + (1-\phi)v)Q + (1-\phi)(r - v)S(Q)T=(w+(1−ϕ)v)Q+(1−ϕ)(r−v)S(Q), with w=w(ϕ)w = w(\phi)w=w(ϕ) of (14.34). Quantity flexibility: the supplier reimburses the retailer's loss w+cr−vw + c_r - vw+cr​−v on unsold units up to δQ\delta QδQ, T=wQ−(w+cr−v)∫(1−δ)QQF(t) dtT = wQ - (w + c_r - v)\int_{(1-\delta)Q}^{Q} F(t)\,dtT=wQ−(w+cr​−v)∫(1−δ)QQ​F(t)dt, with w=w(δ)w = w(\delta)w=w(δ) of (14.46). For buyback, λ=(r−v+pr−b)/(r−v+p)\lambda = (r - v + p_r - b)/(r - v + p)λ=(r−v+pr​−b)/(r−v+p) is the retailer's share of the chain profit (buybackShare), and b1<b2b_1 < b_2b1​<b2​ (buybackB1, buybackB2) are the credits at which one party earns everything.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 14.5

Under buyback with w(b)w(b)w(b) at the chain-optimal Q0Q_0Q0​, the retailer's profit is decreasing and the supplier's increasing in b∈[0,r−v+pr]b \in [0, r - v + p_r]b∈[0,r−v+pr​], with 0<b1<b2<r−v+pr0 < b_1 < b_2 < r - v + p_r0<b1​<b2​<r−v+pr​ and

πr(Q0,w(b1),b1)=Π(Q0),πs(Q0,w(b2),b2)=Π(Q0),\pi_r(Q_0, w(b_1), b_1) = \Pi(Q_0), \qquad \pi_s(Q_0, w(b_2), b_2) = \Pi(Q_0),πr​(Q0​,w(b1​),b1​)=Π(Q0​),πs​(Q0​,w(b2​),b2​)=Π(Q0​),

the supplier losing money for b<b1b < b_1b<b1​, both earning positive profit for b1<b<b2b_1 < b < b_2b1​<b<b2​, and the retailer losing money for b>b2b > b_2b>b2​. This is buyback_allocation.

Supporting targets

Equation (14.8), Q0Q_0Q0​ maximizes Π\PiΠ iff Fˉ(Q0)=(c−v)/(r−v+p)\bar F(Q_0) = (c - v)/(r - v + p)Fˉ(Q0​)=(c−v)/(r−v+p); Theorem 14.1, the wholesale price contract coordinates iff w=cs−c−vr−v+ppsw = c_s - \frac{c-v}{r-v+p}p_sw=cs​−r−v+pc−v​ps​, at which the supplier's profit is negative; Theorem 14.2, Qr∗<Q0Q^*_r < Q_0Qr∗​<Q0​ whenever w>csw > c_sw>cs​; Theorem 14.3, for IGFR demand the supplier's induced profit πs(Q,w(Q))\pi_s(Q, w(Q))πs​(Q,w(Q)) is unimodal; the identities (14.27) and (14.28), πr=λΠ+μ(λp−pr)\pi_r = \lambda\Pi + \mu(\lambda p - p_r)πr​=λΠ+μ(λp−pr​) and its complement under buyback; Theorem 14.4, buyback with w(b)w(b)w(b) coordinates; Theorem 14.6, revenue sharing with w(ϕ)w(\phi)w(ϕ) coordinates; Theorem 14.7, quantity flexibility with w(δ)w(\delta)w(δ) makes Q0Q_0Q0​ optimal for the retailer.

Significance

The chapter's theorems are the analytical basis of contract design in newsvendor supply chains. Theorem 14.1 and 14.2 make double marginalization precise: coordination by price alone is possible only at a price the supplier rejects, and any acceptable price makes the retailer under-order. Theorem 14.3 is what lets the supplier optimize the wholesale price at all, and is the reason the IGFR class of Lariviere and Porteus (2001) is standard in the field. Theorems 14.4 to 14.6 show that buyback and revenue sharing coordinate and, through the share λ\lambdaλ, that the chain profit can be split arbitrarily, so a coordinating contract can be made acceptable to both parties. Theorem 14.7 shows the limits: quantity flexibility coordinates the retailer but not necessarily the supplier.

None of these results has a machine-checked proof. The book proves Theorems 14.1, 14.3, 14.4, 14.5, 14.6 and 14.7 and leaves 14.2 as an exercise. The formalization of the fractile characterization and of the affine profit identities is reusable for the many contract types (sales rebates, quantity discounts) the chapter cites but does not analyze.

Difficulty

The wholesale price results are first-order conditions on concave functions, and the difficulty is entirely in the analysis: S(Q)=E[min⁡{Q,D}]S(Q) = \mathbb{E}[\min\{Q, D\}]S(Q)=E[min{Q,D}] has derivative Fˉ(Q)\bar F(Q)Fˉ(Q) for every QQQ when FFF is continuous, which is a differentiation under the integral that has to be carried out for a Lipschitz integrand and an arbitrary law, and the maximizers of the concave profit must then be identified with the solutions of the fractile equation, including existence by the intermediate value theorem. Theorem 14.1's "only if" direction requires that a coincidence of maximizer sets pins the fractile and hence the price, which is where strict monotonicity of FFF enters.

Theorem 14.3 is the delicate one. The obvious approach, concavity of πs(Q,w(Q))\pi_s(Q, w(Q))πs​(Q,w(Q)), fails: the book stresses the function is not concave in general. The proof is a sign-change argument on the derivative (14.16), which is Fˉ(Q)\bar F(Q)Fˉ(Q) times a bracket that IGFR makes decreasing, minus a constant; one must show the derivative is positive near 000, eventually negative, and crosses zero exactly once, and that the last needs both Fˉ\bar FFˉ strictly decreasing and the bracket positive at the crossing. Working with a density in Mathlib means relating the withDensity law to the distribution function throughout.

The buyback, revenue sharing and quantity flexibility theorems are algebra once the right identity is found: πr\pi_rπr​ is an affine function of Π\PiΠ with slope λ\lambdaλ. The formalization must handle the boundary cases the book glosses over, where λ=0\lambda = 0λ=0 or λ=1\lambda = 1λ=1 and one party is indifferent among all quantities, so "the same QQQ maximizes" holds only in one direction. Theorem 14.5 also needs Π(Q0)≤μ(r−c)\Pi(Q_0) \le \mu(r - c)Π(Q0​)≤μ(r−c), a Jensen-type bound S(Q)≤min⁡{Q,μ}S(Q) \le \min\{Q, \mu\}S(Q)≤min{Q,μ}, for b1>0b_1 > 0b1​>0, and the ordering b1<b2b_1 < b_2b1​<b2​ needs Π(Q0)>0\Pi(Q_0) > 0Π(Q0​)>0, which the book's proof does not isolate.

Formalization scope

Demand is an arbitrary probability law on R\mathbb{R}R with finite mean, not assumed nonnegative; the book's own examples use normal demand. Optimal quantities are maximizers over all of R\mathbb{R}R (IsMaxOn … Set.univ), and coordination is the coincidence of maximizer sets, with the degenerate endpoints of the parameter ranges stated as one-directional. Where the book uses a density, continuity of the distribution function (NullSingletonClass) is assumed instead, except in Theorem 14.3, where the density fff is explicit, continuous on [0,∞)[0, \infty)[0,∞) (so the exponential law is included), positive on (0,∞)(0, \infty)(0,∞), and IGFR on (0,∞)(0, \infty)(0,∞). Strict monotonicity of FFF on R\mathbb{R}R is never assumed, since it would rule out every nonnegative demand law. Theorem 14.1 assumes ps>0p_s > 0ps​>0 and a positive chain optimum, Fˉ(0)>(c−v)/(r−v+p)\bar F(0) > (c - v)/(r - v + p)Fˉ(0)>(c−v)/(r−v+p), both implicit in the book's proof.

The transfer payments are functions of QQQ and the profits are defined for every QQQ, so the theorems compare values of one family of functions; the book's Fˉ\bar FFˉ is 1−F1 - F1−F with Mathlib's cdf, and the quantity flexibility integral is an interval integral. Theorem 14.5 takes Π(Q0)>0\Pi(Q_0) > 0Π(Q0​)>0, μ>0\mu > 0μ>0 and ps,pr>0p_s, p_r > 0ps​,pr​>0 as hypotheses. Without positive goodwill costs its strict inequalities 0<b10 < b_10<b1​ and b2<r−v+prb_2 < r - v + p_rb2​<r−v+pr​ fail (at ps=0p_s = 0ps​=0, b1=0b_1 = 0b1​=0; at pr=0p_r = 0pr​=0, b2=r−v+prb_2 = r - v + p_rb2​=r−v+pr​).

The definition module is shared by all eleven items. The equivalence (14.42)-(14.43) of revenue sharing and buyback, the supplier's stationarity under quantity flexibility (Problem 14.11) and the allocation results for revenue sharing (14.40)-(14.41) are natural extensions on the same definitions.

Selected references

  • L. V. Snyder and Z.-J. M. Shen, Fundamentals of Supply Chain Theory, 2nd ed., Wiley, 2019, Chapter 14. https://doi.org/10.1002/9781119584445
  • B. A. Pasternack, Optimal pricing and return policies for perishable commodities, Marketing Science 4(2), 1985. https://doi.org/10.1287/mksc.4.2.166
  • G. P. Cachon, Supply chain coordination with contracts, in Handbooks in Operations Research and Management Science 11, 2003. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0927-0507(03)11006-7
  • M. A. Lariviere and E. L. Porteus, Selling to the newsvendor: an analysis of price-only contracts, Manufacturing & Service Operations Management 3(4), 2001. https://doi.org/10.1287/msom.3.4.293.9971
  • G. P. Cachon and M. A. Lariviere, Supply chain coordination with revenue-sharing contracts, Management Science 51(1), 2005. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.1040.0215
  • J. J. Spengler, Vertical integration and antitrust policy, Journal of Political Economy 58(4), 1950. https://doi.org/10.1086/256964
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Optimization·Captain: naimengye

Inventory Control VII: Multi-Echelon Lot Sizing and Roundy's 98 % ApproximationTextbook

Batch quantities that cannot be chosen one site at a time

Chapter 9 of Axsäter's Inventory Control opens with the observation that in a multi-echelon system it is not optimal to choose batch quantities installation by installation: the batch at one site is the demand pattern of the next site upstream. Even with constant customer demand the exact optimum can be complicated, and the book's Example 9.4 shows a four-stage serial system whose optimal batch at one stage alternates between two values over time. Roundy (1985, 1986) showed that this complexity can be avoided at a guaranteed price: restrict every batch quantity to be a power of two times a common basic quantity, nested from stage to stage, and the best such policy costs at most 2 % more than the optimum. The book presents the result for a serial system and remarks that the same approach handles assembly and distribution systems and, in Sect. 7.3.1.2, joint replenishments. It is the capstone of Chapter 9 and the multi-echelon payoff of the powers-of-two analysis of Chapter 7.

Setting

A serial system has NNN installations; installation iii produces item iii from one unit of item i+1i+1i+1, item NNN is obtained from an outside supplier, and item 1 faces a constant, continuous final demand ddd. Lead-times are zero, shortages are not allowed, production is instantaneous, and each batch quantity QiQ_iQi​ is constant over time. Installation iii has an ordering cost AiA_iAi​ per batch and an echelon holding cost eie_iei​ per unit and time unit, charged on the echelon stock (the stock at installation iii and everything downstream), so that the cost per time unit is the sum of NNN single-item costs of the chapter 4 form,

C(Q)  =  ∑i=1N(eiQi2+AidQi)(Eq. 9.17).C(Q) \;=\; \sum_{i=1}^{N}\Big(e_i\frac{Q_i}{2} + A_i\frac{d}{Q_i}\Big) \qquad\text{(Eq. 9.17).}C(Q)=i=1∑N​(ei​2Qi​​+Ai​Qi​d​)(Eq. 9.17).

The book first works out the two-level case, where the optimum has Q2=kQ1Q_2 = kQ_1Q2​=kQ1​ for a positive integer kkk, the cost (9.9) is the EOQ cost with modified parameters A1+A2/kA_1 + A_2/kA1​+A2​/k and e1+ke2e_1 + ke_2e1​+ke2​, and the best kkk is found from k∗=A2e1/(A1e2)k^{*} = \sqrt{A_2e_1/(A_1e_2)}k∗=A2​e1​/(A1​e2​)​ by a rounding rule.

For NNN stages, Roundy's constraints (9.16) require Qi=2kiQi−1Q_i = 2^{k_i}Q_{i-1}Qi​=2ki​Qi−1​ with nonnegative integers kik_iki​, so that every solution is nested. The relaxed constraints (9.18) require only Qi−1≤QiQ_{i-1} \le Q_iQi−1​≤Qi​; they are implied by (9.16), the relaxed problem is convex with linear constraints, and its solution QrelQ^{\mathrm{rel}}Qrel is computed by aggregating consecutive stages whose cost ratios Ai/eiA_i/e_iAi​/ei​ decrease. Roundy's solution rounds QrelQ^{\mathrm{rel}}Qrel to Qi=2miqQ_i = 2^{m_i}qQi​=2mi​q for a basic quantity qqq, chosen as in Proposition 7.2.

Formalization targets

Goal — Roundy's 98 % approximation

For d>0d > 0d>0, Ai>0A_i > 0Ai​>0, ei>0e_i > 0ei​>0 and any minimizer QrelQ^{\mathrm{rel}}Qrel of CCC over positive batch quantities satisfying (9.18), there exist q>0q > 0q>0 and integers m1≤⋯≤mNm_1 \le \dots \le m_Nm1​≤⋯≤mN​ such that Qi=2miqQ_i = 2^{m_i}qQi​=2mi​q satisfies (9.16) and

C(2mq)  ≤  12 ln⁡2 C(Qrel).C\big(2^{m}q\big) \;\le\; \frac{1}{\sqrt 2\,\ln 2}\,C\big(Q^{\mathrm{rel}}\big).C(2mq)≤2​ln21​C(Qrel).

Supporting targets

The two-level results of Sect. 9.2.1: the equivalence of the installation and echelon cost forms (9.6) and (9.9); the optimal Q1Q_1Q1​ and cost (9.10)-(9.11) for a given kkk; the closed form and convexity of C(k)2C(k)^2C(k)2 (9.12) and the real minimizer k∗k^{*}k∗ (9.13); and the integer rounding rule with its corollary that A1/e1≥A2/e2A_1/e_1 \ge A_2/e_2A1​/e1​≥A2​/e2​ forces k=1k = 1k=1. For NNN stages: existence of the relaxed optimum; the aggregation lemma, that Ai/ei<Ai−1/ei−1A_i/e_i < A_{i-1}/e_{i-1}Ai​/ei​<Ai−1​/ei−1​ forces Qirel=Qi−1relQ^{\mathrm{rel}}_i = Q^{\mathrm{rel}}_{i-1}Qirel​=Qi−1rel​; that (9.16) implies (9.18), so the relaxed optimum bounds every powers-of-two policy from below; and that rounding to the nearest power of two times qqq is monotone and lands within a factor 2\sqrt 22​.

Significance

The result itself. Roundy's theorem replaces an intractable lot-sizing problem by a closed-form computation with a provable 2 % guarantee, and the policies it produces are the nested, periodic schedules that production planning wants anyway. In Example 9.4 the rounding with q=1q = 1q=1 is already within 0.7 % of the relaxed bound. The two-level analysis has its own use: the modified parameters A1+A2/kA_1 + A_2/kA1​+A2​/k and e1+ke2e_1 + ke_2e1​+ke2​ are what the Blackburn-Millen heuristic of Sect. 9.3.2 feeds to the Wagner-Whitin algorithm under time-varying demand, and the condition A1/e1≥A2/e2A_1/e_1 \ge A_2/e_2A1​/e1​≥A2​/e2​ tells when a two-stage system collapses to one stage.

Formalizing it. The book proves the bound in a paragraph that leans on three earlier results: Proposition 7.2 for the rounding, the Lagrangean relaxation for the lower bound, and the aggregation algorithm for the structure of QrelQ^{\mathrm{rel}}Qrel. Formalizing it makes explicit what the paragraph glosses: that the multipliers vanish off tight constraints, that equal quantities round to equal quantities, and that the comparison class is the class of nested constant-batch policies. The published Proposition 7.2 (pot_two_percent) and the mean value 1/(2ln⁡2)1/(\sqrt 2\ln 2)1/(2​ln2) are cited as reference items. Nothing here is open; no statement has a machine-checked proof yet.

Difficulty

The obvious argument, rounding QrelQ^{\mathrm{rel}}Qrel item by item and invoking Proposition 7.2 for each, does not work: Proposition 7.2 bounds the rounded cost relative to each item's unconstrained optimum, and QirelQ^{\mathrm{rel}}_iQirel​ is generally not that optimum. The proof must pass through the Lagrangean relaxation (9.19)-(9.20), under which QrelQ^{\mathrm{rel}}Qrel is the unconstrained optimum for the modified holding costs ei′=ei−2λi+2λi+1e_i' = e_i - 2\lambda_i + 2\lambda_{i+1}ei′​=ei​−2λi​+2λi+1​, apply Proposition 7.2 there, and transfer the bound back using complementary slackness: the multiplier λi\lambda_iλi​ is positive only where Qirel=Qi−1relQ^{\mathrm{rel}}_i = Q^{\mathrm{rel}}_{i-1}Qirel​=Qi−1rel​, and equal quantities round to equal quantities, so the correction terms λi(Qi−Qi−1)\lambda_i(Q_i - Q_{i-1})λi​(Qi​−Qi−1​) vanish for both QrelQ^{\mathrm{rel}}Qrel and its rounding. A solver therefore needs the KKT conditions for this convex program, or an equivalent direct argument through the aggregation structure (within an aggregate all quantities are equal and their sum is an EOQ problem). The two-level statements and the rounding lemma are elementary.

Formalization scope

Stages are indexed by Fin N; the cost is serialCost A e d Q = ∑ i, eoqCost (A i) d (e i) (Q i) with eoqCost imported from the chapter 4 definitions, and the two-level cost is eoqCost (A1 + A2/k) d (e1 + k e2) Q1 by definition, so the published eoq_optimal and eoq_cost_at_eoq apply to it directly. SerialNested and SerialPowerOfTwo are the constraints (9.18) and (9.16) on consecutive indices; for N≤1N \le 1N≤1 both hold vacuously and the goal is Proposition 7.2 for one item. potRound q Q is ⌊log⁡2(Q/q)+12⌋\lfloor \log_2(Q/q) + \tfrac12\rfloor⌊log2​(Q/q)+21​⌋.

All theorems assume d,Ai,ei>0d, A_i, e_i > 0d,Ai​,ei​>0 and positive batch quantities. The book says "nonnegative ordering and echelon holding costs"; strict positivity is needed for the relaxed problem to have a solution at all (ei=0e_i = 0ei​=0 or Ai=0A_i = 0Ai​=0 sends the optimal QiQ_iQi​ to ∞\infty∞ or 000), and it is what the book's own examples satisfy. The relaxed optimum enters the goal as a hypothesis, with existence stated separately; uniqueness is not used. The constant is the exact 1/(2ln⁡2)1/(\sqrt 2\ln 2)1/(2​ln2).

Two readings are excluded. The bound is not against an arbitrary nested QQQ, for which it would be false, but against the relaxed optimum; and the comparison class is stated as nested constant-batch policies, the class the relaxed problem bounds directly, not the book's larger class of time-varying policies, which would need a dynamic model. The definitions are reusable for assembly systems and for the joint replenishment problem of Sect. 7.3.1.2, whose Roundy analysis is the same with a fictive item 0 of zero holding cost; contributions in that direction are welcome.

Selected references

  • Sven Axsäter, Inventory Control, 3rd edition, International Series in Operations Research & Management Science 225, Springer, 2015, Sect. 9.2. DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-15729-0
  • Robin Roundy, 98%-Effective Integer-Ratio Lot-Sizing for One-Warehouse Multi-Retailer Systems, Management Science 31(11), 1985, pp. 1416-1430. DOI 10.1287/mnsc.31.11.1416
  • Robin Roundy, A 98%-Effective Lot-Sizing Rule for a Multi-Product, Multi-Stage Production/Inventory System, Mathematics of Operations Research 11(4), 1986, pp. 699-727. DOI 10.1287/moor.11.4.699
  • John A. Muckstadt and Robin O. Roundy, Analysis of Multistage Production Systems, in: Handbooks in Operations Research and Management Science 4, Elsevier, 1993, pp. 59-131. DOI 10.1016/S0927-0507(05)80182-4
  • Peter L. Jackson, William L. Maxwell and John A. Muckstadt, The Joint Replenishment Problem with a Powers-of-Two Restriction, IIE Transactions 17(1), 1985, pp. 25-32. DOI 10.1080/07408178508975268
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Inventory Control VI: Optimality of (R, Q) Policies When Ordering in BatchesTextbook

Why the policy class is not up for debate

Every model in Chapters 5 and 6 of Axsäter's Inventory Control assumes at the outset that the ordering policy is of (R,Q)(R,Q)(R,Q) or (s,S)(s,S)(s,S) type. Section 6.2 asks whether better policies exist and answers, for the case in which there are no ordering costs but every order must be a multiple of a fixed batch quantity QQQ, that none do: Proposition 6.1, "an (R,Q)(R,Q)(R,Q) policy is optimal", with a proof the book attributes to Chen (2000). For Q=1Q = 1Q=1 it is the optimality of an order-up-to-SSS policy in the absence of ordering costs, and for continuous or Poisson demand it transfers to (s,S)(s,S)(s,S) policies, which are then the same thing. The proposition is the one place in the book where a policy is compared against every feasible alternative rather than against other members of its own family, and its proof is short enough to be given in full, which makes it the natural capstone of Chapter 6.

Setting

Demand is compound Poisson: customers arrive according to a Poisson process with rate λ\lambdaλ and each demands an integral number of units, with sizes D0,D1,…D_0, D_1, \dotsD0​,D1​,… independent and identically distributed with law fff on the positive integers, independent of the arrival process. The book's standing assumption that not all demands are multiples of some integer larger than one is kept. Writing TnT_nTn​ for the nnn-th arrival time, N(t)N(t)N(t) for the number of arrivals by time ttt and Sn=D0+⋯+Dn−1S_n = D_0 + \dots + D_{n-1}Sn​=D0​+⋯+Dn−1​, the total demand by time ttt is SN(t)S_{N(t)}SN(t)​.

The replenishment lead-time LLL is constant and D(L)D(L)D(L), the demand over a lead-time, has law DDD. A holding cost h>0h > 0h>0 and a shortage cost b1>0b_1 > 0b1​>0 per unit and time unit are charged. There are no ordering costs, but all orders must be multiples of a given batch quantity Q≥1Q \ge 1Q≥1 and can only be triggered by customer demands. A policy is therefore any rule mmm that decides at each demand epoch how many batches to order; with initial position y0y_0y0​ the inventory position evolves as yn+1=yn−Dn+mnQy_{n+1} = y_n - D_n + m_nQyn+1​=yn​−Dn​+mn​Q (Eq. 6.22), and yt=yN(t)y_t = y_{N(t)}yt​=yN(t)​.

The standard argument of Sect. 5.3.2 gives the cost rate at time t+Lt + Lt+L as

g(yt),g(k)=−b1(k−μ′)+(h+b1)∑j=1kj Pr⁡[D(L)=k−j],g(y_t), \qquad g(k) = -b_1(k - \mu') + (h+b_1)\sum_{j=1}^{k} j\,\Pr[D(L) = k - j],g(yt​),g(k)=−b1​(k−μ′)+(h+b1​)j=1∑k​jPr[D(L)=k−j],

the expected holding-plus-shortage cost rate of an inventory level k−D(L)k - D(L)k−D(L) (Eq. 6.20), which is convex in kkk with g(k)→∞g(k) \to \inftyg(k)→∞ as ∣k∣→∞|k| \to \infty∣k∣→∞. The band cost is gˉ(y)=∑j=1Qg(y+j)\bar g(y) = \sum_{j=1}^{Q} g(y+j)gˉ​(y)=∑j=1Q​g(y+j) and RRR denotes an integer minimizing gˉ\bar ggˉ​. The (R,Q)(R,Q)(R,Q) policy orders, as soon as the position is at or below RRR, the smallest number of batches that brings it above RRR; its position lives in the band {R+1,…,R+Q}\{R+1, \dots, R+Q\}{R+1,…,R+Q} from the first order on. The performance measure is the long-run average cost rate 1T∫0Tg(yt−L) dt\frac{1}{T}\int_0^T g(y_{t-L})\,\mathrm{d}tT1​∫0T​g(yt−L​)dt as T→∞T \to \inftyT→∞.

Formalization targets

Goal — Proposition 6.1

Almost surely, (1) for every policy mmm and every y0y_0y0​,

lim inf⁡T→∞1T∫0Tg(yt−Lm) dt  ≥  gˉ(R)Q,\liminf_{T\to\infty} \frac{1}{T}\int_0^T g\big(y^{m}_{t-L}\big)\,\mathrm{d}t \;\ge\; \frac{\bar g(R)}{Q},T→∞liminf​T1​∫0T​g(yt−Lm​)dt≥Qgˉ​(R)​,

and (2) the (R,Q)(R,Q)(R,Q) policy attains it:

1T∫0Tg(yt−L(R,Q)) dt  ⟶  gˉ(R)Q.\frac{1}{T}\int_0^T g\big(y^{(R,Q)}_{t-L}\big)\,\mathrm{d}t \;\longrightarrow\; \frac{\bar g(R)}{Q}.T1​∫0T​g(yt−L(R,Q)​)dt⟶Qgˉ​(R)​.

Supporting targets

Lemma 6.1, that x↦g(z+xQ)x \mapsto g(z + xQ)x↦g(z+xQ) is convex and minimized at the representative of zzz in the band; the closed form of the (R,Q)(R,Q)(R,Q) position, y0−Sny_0 - S_ny0​−Sn​ until the first order and the band representative of y0−Sny_0 - S_ny0​−Sn​ afterwards; the uniform occupation of the band by the reduced process yt′y_t'yt′​, the book's "the steady state distribution can be shown to be uniform", and its consequence that the long-run average of g(yt′)g(y_t')g(yt′​) is gˉ(R)/Q\bar g(R)/Qgˉ​(R)/Q; Proposition 5.1 in the same ergodic form for the (R,Q)(R,Q)(R,Q) policy; and the two halves of the goal as separate statements.

Significance

The result itself. Proposition 6.1 is what licenses the two-parameter policies on which the rest of the book's single-echelon theory is built, and it does so for the practically important case of batch ordering (pallets, containers, production lots). Its proof also explains why the policy works: the only quantity a policy controls is the residue class of the inventory position modulo QQQ, which no policy can influence, and the position within that class, which the (R,Q)(R,Q)(R,Q) policy always sets to the cheapest possible value. The book extends the same reasoning to other cost structures and to periodic review.

Formalizing it. The proposition is a theorem about the class of all policies, and the book's proof is pathwise: Lemma 6.1 compares any policy with the reduced process instant by instant, and an ergodic statement about the reduced process does the rest. Formalizing it therefore forces the policy class, the demand process and the long-run average to be written down exactly, which the book never does. Nothing here is open; no statement has a machine-checked proof yet.

Difficulty

The pointwise comparison is elementary once Lemma 6.1 is available, and Lemma 6.1 is discrete convexity. The difficulty is entirely in the ergodic statement: that the reduced position yt′=y_t' = yt′​= (the band representative of y0−SN(t)y_0 - S_{N(t)}y0​−SN(t)​) spends a fraction 1/Q1/Q1/Q of the time at each point of the band, almost surely. In discrete time this is the convergence of occupation frequencies for an irreducible random walk on Z/QZ\mathbb{Z}/Q\mathbb{Z}Z/QZ with step law fff modulo QQQ, where irreducibility is exactly the aperiodicity assumption on fff, and the book's double-stochasticity argument (Eq. 5.33-5.34) identifies the uniform law as stationary. Passing to continuous time adds the exponential holding times: the time average is the arrival average weighted by i.i.d. holding times independent of the walk, which a strong law of large numbers turns back into the discrete statement. Mathlib has the strong law and the exponential law but no ergodic theorem for finite Markov chains, so that is the groundwork a solver must build. The naive route through the stationary distribution of the embedded chain at demand epochs is not enough on its own: for pure Poisson demand that chain is periodic, and the book itself notes it.

Formalization scope

A CompoundPoissonDemand on a probability space packages the rate, the size law with f0=0f_0 = 0f0​=0 and the aperiodicity condition, and two sequences of random variables, the gaps and the sizes, with their laws (expMeasure lam, the given pmf), independence within each sequence, and independence between the sequences. Arrival times are partial sums of the gaps, count t is the supremum of {n:Tn≤t}\{n : T_n \le t\}{n:Tn​≤t}, and cumDemand n is the partial sum of the sizes. A policy is a function m : ℕ → Ω → ℕ with no measurability requirement; ipPath and ipAt are the position after the nnn-th demand and at time ttt; rqIP and rqOrders are the (R,Q)(R,Q)(R,Q) policy, with a theorem identifying rqOrders as a policy in the general sense. avgCost is 1T∫0Tg(yt−L) dt\frac{1}{T}\int_0^T g(y_{t-L})\,\mathrm{d}tT1​∫0T​g(yt−L​)dt with ys=y0y_s = y_0ys​=y0​ for s<0s < 0s<0. The cost function ggg is sPolicyCost from the previous mission, applied to a DiscreteDemand that the hypotheses tie to the process as the law of the demand in (0,L](0, L](0,L].

Conventions: Q≥1Q \ge 1Q≥1, L≥0L \ge 0L≥0, h,b1>0h, b_1 > 0h,b1​>0; RRR is any minimizer of gˉ\bar ggˉ​ (it exists by the divergence of ggg, proved in the previous mission); y0y_0y0​ is arbitrary. count and the interval integral take junk values on the null set where arrivals do not tend to infinity, which the almost-sure conclusions absorb. "lim inf⁡≥c\liminf \ge climinf≥c" is stated as "for every ε>0\varepsilon > 0ε>0, eventually ≥c−ε\ge c - \varepsilon≥c−ε", avoiding a liminf on R\mathbb{R}R that could be junk.

Two readings that would trivialize the goal are excluded: the lower bound is over every rule, not over stationary or measurable ones, and the achievability half is a genuine limit, not a bound. The demand model and the occupation-frequency theorems are reusable for Proposition 10.1 and the batch-ordering models of Sect. 10.5; contributions establishing the ergodic theorem for irreducible chains on a finite cyclic group are welcome and would close most of this mission.

Selected references

  • Sven Axsäter, Inventory Control, 3rd edition, International Series in Operations Research & Management Science 225, Springer, 2015, Sects. 5.3.1 and 6.2.1. DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-15729-0
  • Fangruo Chen, Optimal Policies for Multi-Echelon Inventory Problems with Batch Ordering, Operations Research 48(3), 2000, pp. 376-389. DOI 10.1287/opre.48.3.376.12427
  • Awi Federgruen and Yu-Sheng Zheng, An Efficient Algorithm for Computing an Optimal (r,Q)(r,Q)(r,Q) Policy in Continuous Review Stochastic Inventory Systems, Operations Research 40(4), 1992, pp. 808-813. DOI 10.1287/opre.40.4.808
  • Evan L. Porteus, Foundations of Stochastic Inventory Theory, Stanford University Press, 2002.
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Inventory Control V: Joint Optimization of Reorder Point and Batch QuantityTextbook

Two decisions that are usually taken separately

An (R,Q)(R,Q)(R,Q) policy has two parameters. Chapter 4 of Axsäter's Inventory Control chooses the batch quantity QQQ from a deterministic model, and Chapter 5 chooses the reorder point RRR from a stochastic one with QQQ held fixed; the book presents this two-step practice as an adequate approximation. Section 6.1 asks what is lost by it and shows how to optimize both parameters jointly in one stochastic model. For discrete demand the answer, due to Federgruen and Zheng (1992), is an algorithm of remarkable simplicity: increase QQQ one unit at a time, keep the reorder point optimal along the way by a one-line rule, and stop at the first QQQ for which the cost goes up. The claim that this stopping rule finds the global optimum over all pairs (R,Q)(R, Q)(R,Q) is the capstone of Sect. 6.1.1.1 and the goal of this mission. The same idea is reused in the book for (s,S)(s,S)(s,S) policies (Sect. 6.1.1.2) and, in continuous form, for normally distributed demand (Sect. 6.1.2).

Setting

An item is controlled by a continuous review (R,Q)(R,Q)(R,Q) policy with integral reorder point RRR and batch quantity Q≥1Q \ge 1Q≥1. Demand is discrete and stationary; the lead-time demand D(L)D(L)D(L) takes values in the nonnegative integers with probabilities pj=Pr⁡[D(L)=j]p_j = \Pr[D(L) = j]pj​=Pr[D(L)=j] and has a finite mean μ′\mu'μ′. The average demand per unit of time is μ\muμ. Costs are a holding cost hhh and a shortage cost b1b_1b1​, both per unit and time unit, and an ordering cost AAA per batch.

The building block is the cost of an (S−1,S)(S-1,S)(S−1,S) policy that keeps the inventory position at a fixed integer kkk. By the standard argument of Sect. 5.3.2 the inventory level a lead-time later is k−D(L)k - D(L)k−D(L), and the average holding and shortage cost rate is (Eq. 6.3)

g(k)  =  −b1 (k−μ′)+(h+b1)∑j=1kj Pr⁡[D(L)=k−j].g(k) \;=\; -b_1\,(k - \mu') + (h + b_1)\sum_{j=1}^{k} j\,\Pr[D(L) = k - j].g(k)=−b1​(k−μ′)+(h+b1​)j=1∑k​jPr[D(L)=k−j].

Under the (R,Q)(R,Q)(R,Q) policy the inventory position is uniformly distributed on {R+1,…,R+Q}\{R+1, \dots, R+Q\}{R+1,…,R+Q} (Proposition 5.1), so the total average cost rate is (Eq. 6.4)

C(R,Q)  =  AμQ+1Q∑k=R+1R+Qg(k),C(R, Q) \;=\; \frac{A\mu}{Q} + \frac{1}{Q}\sum_{k=R+1}^{R+Q} g(k),C(R,Q)=QAμ​+Q1​k=R+1∑R+Q​g(k),

and C(Q)=min⁡RC(R,Q)C(Q) = \min_R C(R,Q)C(Q)=minR​C(R,Q) (Eq. 6.5), attained at an optimal reorder point R∗(Q)R^{*}(Q)R∗(Q). The ready rate S3(R)=Pr⁡[IL>0]=1Q∑k=R+1R+QPr⁡[D(L)≤k−1]S_3(R) = \Pr[IL > 0] = \frac{1}{Q}\sum_{k=R+1}^{R+Q}\Pr[D(L) \le k-1]S3​(R)=Pr[IL>0]=Q1​∑k=R+1R+Q​Pr[D(L)≤k−1] links the cost to service: raising the reorder point by one unit changes the cost by −b1+(h+b1)S3(R+1)-b_1 + (h + b_1)S_3(R+1)−b1​+(h+b1​)S3​(R+1) (Eq. 5.60).

Formalization targets

Goal — the Federgruen-Zheng stopping rule is optimal

Let Q∗≥1Q^{*} \ge 1Q∗≥1 be the smallest batch quantity with C(Q∗+1)≥C(Q∗)C(Q^{*}+1) \ge C(Q^{*})C(Q∗+1)≥C(Q∗) and let R∗R^{*}R∗ be an optimal reorder point for Q∗Q^{*}Q∗. Then

C(R∗,Q∗)  ≤  C(R,Q)for all R∈Z, Q≥1.C(R^{*}, Q^{*}) \;\le\; C(R, Q) \qquad\text{for all } R \in \mathbb{Z},\ Q \ge 1.C(R∗,Q∗)≤C(R,Q)for all R∈Z, Q≥1.

Supporting targets

The increment identity g(k+1)−g(k)=−b1+(h+b1)Pr⁡[D(L)≤k]g(k+1) - g(k) = -b_1 + (h+b_1)\Pr[D(L) \le k]g(k+1)−g(k)=−b1​+(h+b1​)Pr[D(L)≤k]; convexity of ggg on Z\mathbb{Z}Z together with g(k)→∞g(k) \to \inftyg(k)→∞ as ∣k∣→∞|k| \to \infty∣k∣→∞; Eq. (5.60) and the convexity of C(⋅,Q)C(\cdot, Q)C(⋅,Q) in RRR; Eq. (5.61), that the largest RRR with S3(R)≤b1/(h+b1)S_3(R) \le b_1/(h+b_1)S3​(R)≤b1​/(h+b1​) is optimal for its QQQ; existence of an optimal RRR for every QQQ; the recursion (6.6)-(6.7), R∗(Q+1)∈{R∗(Q)−1,R∗(Q)}R^{*}(Q+1) \in \{R^{*}(Q) - 1, R^{*}(Q)\}R∗(Q+1)∈{R∗(Q)−1,R∗(Q)} chosen by comparing g(R∗(Q))g(R^{*}(Q))g(R∗(Q)) with g(R∗(Q)+Q+1)g(R^{*}(Q)+Q+1)g(R∗(Q)+Q+1), and C(Q+1)=C(Q)QQ+1+min⁡{g(R∗(Q)),g(R∗(Q)+Q+1)}1Q+1C(Q+1) = C(Q)\frac{Q}{Q+1} + \min\{g(R^{*}(Q)), g(R^{*}(Q)+Q+1)\}\frac{1}{Q+1}C(Q+1)=C(Q)Q+1Q​+min{g(R∗(Q)),g(R∗(Q)+Q+1)}Q+11​; the equivalence C(Q+1)≥C(Q)  ⟺  min⁡{⋅}≥C(Q)C(Q+1) \ge C(Q) \iff \min\{\cdot\} \ge C(Q)C(Q+1)≥C(Q)⟺min{⋅}≥C(Q) and the monotonicity of that minimum in QQQ; and the existence of some QQQ at which the costs stop decreasing.

Significance

The result itself. Joint optimization typically enlarges the batch and lowers the reorder point relative to the two-step procedure, and the book's Example 6.1 puts the resulting cost saving at a few percent. The Federgruen-Zheng procedure makes the exact joint optimum for discrete demand as cheap to compute as the two-step approximation, because each step of the recursion evaluates ggg at two points. It is the exact benchmark against which the book's approximate techniques for normal demand (Sects. 6.1.2 and 6.1.3) are judged, and its structural core, that the optimal window of QQQ consecutive inventory positions grows one neighbour at a time, is the discrete-convexity fact behind the whole of Sect. 6.1.

Formalizing it. The mathematics is settled. What the mission produces is a Lean development in which the steps the book marks "evident" and "obvious" are separate statements: that the recursion preserves optimality, that the marginal cost of enlarging the batch is monotone, and that a minimum over RRR exists at all. None of the statements has a machine-checked proof yet.

Difficulty

The obvious first idea, to argue that C(Q)C(Q)C(Q) is convex in QQQ and stop at its first increase, does not work as stated: C(Q)C(Q)C(Q) is a minimum over RRR of a ratio and is not convex in general. What is true, and what the proof uses, is that the marginal cost (Q+1)C(Q+1)−QC(Q)(Q+1)C(Q+1) - QC(Q)(Q+1)C(Q+1)−QC(Q) is nondecreasing, because it equals the smaller of the two ggg-values adjacent to the optimal window. Establishing the recursion (6.6) is where discrete convexity is needed: one must show that the best window of Q+1Q+1Q+1 consecutive positions is obtained from the best window of QQQ by adding a neighbour, which fails for non-convex ggg. The window sums R↦∑k=R+1R+Qg(k)R \mapsto \sum_{k=R+1}^{R+Q} g(k)R↦∑k=R+1R+Q​g(k) are themselves convex in RRR with increments g(R+Q+1)−g(R+1)g(R+Q+1) - g(R+1)g(R+Q+1)−g(R+1), and the argument compares a competing window with the optimal one through the end terms. The remaining steps are finite algebra and an induction on QQQ from Q∗Q^{*}Q∗.

Formalization scope

A DiscreteDemand is a function p:N→Rp : \mathbb{N} \to \mathbb{R}p:N→R with p≥0p \ge 0p≥0, ∑p=1\sum p = 1∑p=1 and a summable first moment; Pr⁡[D(L)≤k]\Pr[D(L) \le k]Pr[D(L)≤k] is a finite sum over 0≤j≤k0 \le j \le k0≤j≤k, empty for k<0k < 0k<0. The reorder point ranges over Z\mathbb{Z}Z and the batch quantity over N\mathbb{N}N, with Q≥1Q \ge 1Q≥1 assumed in every statement because Lean's division by 000 is 000. Convexity of a function on Z\mathbb{Z}Z is stated as nondecreasing increments, and divergence as Tendsto g (cocompact ℤ) atTop.

C(Q)C(Q)C(Q) enters the goal as a function CQ together with the hypothesis that CQ Q is the least value of R↦C(R,Q)R \mapsto C(R, Q)R↦C(R,Q); the stopping index Q∗Q^{*}Q∗ is characterized by the two conditions that define "the smallest QQQ with C(Q+1)≥C(Q)C(Q+1) \ge C(Q)C(Q+1)≥C(Q)", and R∗R^{*}R∗ by optimality at Q∗Q^{*}Q∗. That these objects exist is the content of two separate items, so the goal is not vacuous: a minimum over RRR exists for every QQQ because g→∞g \to \inftyg→∞, and the costs cannot decrease forever because the average of the QQQ smallest values of ggg tends to infinity. The positivity of AAA and μ\muμ is the book's setting and is assumed where it appears.

The uniform inventory position of Proposition 5.1, which needs the book's assumption that not all demands are multiples of an integer larger than one, is taken as given in the cost formula (6.4), as the book does; the proposition itself is the subject of the next mission of this series. The definitions are reusable for the (s,S)(s,S)(s,S) optimization of Sect. 6.1.1.2 and for the multi-echelon batch-ordering results of Sect. 10.5; contributions formalizing the Zheng-Federgruen (s,S)(s,S)(s,S) algorithm on top of them are welcome.

Selected references

  • Sven Axsäter, Inventory Control, 3rd edition, International Series in Operations Research & Management Science 225, Springer, 2015, Sects. 5.9.1 and 6.1.1. DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-15729-0
  • Awi Federgruen and Yu-Sheng Zheng, An Efficient Algorithm for Computing an Optimal (r,Q)(r,Q)(r,Q) Policy in Continuous Review Stochastic Inventory Systems, Operations Research 40(4), 1992, pp. 808-813. DOI 10.1287/opre.40.4.808
  • Yu-Sheng Zheng and Awi Federgruen, Finding Optimal (s,S)(s,S)(s,S) Policies Is About as Simple as Evaluating a Single Policy, Operations Research 39(4), 1991, pp. 654-665. DOI 10.1287/opre.39.4.654
  • Paul Zipkin, Foundations of Inventory Management, McGraw-Hill, 2000.
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Inventory Control IV: Reorder Points under Normally Distributed DemandTextbook

Where the reorder point comes from

Chapter 4 of Axsäter's Inventory Control fixes the batch quantity QQQ from a deterministic model, and Chapter 5 asks the question that deterministic models cannot answer: with demand random and a replenishment lead-time LLL, when should the next batch be ordered? Under a continuous review (R,Q)(R,Q)(R,Q) policy the answer is a single number, the reorder point RRR, and Sections 5.3 through 5.9 are one sustained computation of what a given RRR buys. The chapter's own capstone is Eq. (5.67): if backorders are charged at b1b_1b1​ per unit and time unit and stock at hhh, the cost-minimizing reorder point is exactly the one whose fill rate is b1/(h+b1)b_1/(h+b_1)b1​/(h+b1​). The book calls the relationship "even more striking" than its discrete counterpart, and it is used in practice in both directions: a backorder cost prescribes a service level, and a chosen service level reveals the backorder cost a planner is implicitly assuming (Eq. 5.68).

Setting

An order for a fixed batch quantity Q>0Q > 0Q>0 is triggered whenever the inventory position (stock on hand plus outstanding orders minus backorders) falls to the reorder point RRR, and it arrives LLL time units later. Demand is continuous and normally distributed; the demand over a lead-time has mean μ′\mu'μ′ and standard deviation σ′>0\sigma' > 0σ′>0. Two modelling facts from the book are taken as the definition of the steady state. First (Sect. 5.3.1), the inventory position IPIPIP is uniformly distributed on [R,R+Q][R, R+Q][R,R+Q]; the book proves this for compound Poisson demand (Proposition 5.1) and adopts it as an accurate approximation for continuous demand. Second (Sect. 5.3.2, Eq. 5.35), the inventory level a lead-time later is the inventory position now minus the demand in between,

IL(t+L)  =  IP(t)−D(t,t+L),IL(t+L) \;=\; IP(t) - D(t, t+L),IL(t+L)=IP(t)−D(t,t+L),

with the two terms independent. The law of ILILIL is therefore the image of the product of a uniform and a normal law under subtraction, and everything in the chapter is a functional of it:

  • the distribution function F(x)=Pr⁡[IL≤x]F(x) = \Pr[IL \le x]F(x)=Pr[IL≤x] and its density fff;
  • the ready rate S3=Pr⁡[IL>0]S_3 = \Pr[IL > 0]S3​=Pr[IL>0], which for continuous demand equals the fill rate S2S_2S2​, the fraction of demand met from stock on hand;
  • the expected cost rate C(R)=E[h (IL)++b1 (IL)−]C(R) = \mathbb{E}\big[h\,(IL)^{+} + b_1\,(IL)^{-}\big]C(R)=E[h(IL)++b1​(IL)−], holding cost on positive stock and backorder cost on negative stock, Eq. (5.56).

The closed forms run through the standard normal loss function G(x)=∫x∞(v−x)φ(v) dvG(x) = \int_x^\infty (v-x)\varphi(v)\,\mathrm{d}vG(x)=∫x∞​(v−x)φ(v)dv of Eq. (5.40), published with the newsboy mission and reused here, and through its integral, the second loss function H(x)=∫x∞G(v) dvH(x) = \int_x^\infty G(v)\,\mathrm{d}vH(x)=∫x∞​G(v)dv of Eq. (5.64). Both are tabulated in the book's Appendix 2, and both recur in Chapters 6, 9 and 10.

Formalization targets

Goal — Eq. (5.67)

For h,b1,Q,σ′>0h, b_1, Q, \sigma' > 0h,b1​,Q,σ′>0 and any μ′\mu'μ′, a reorder point RRR minimizes CCC over R\mathbb{R}R if and only if

S2(R)  =  S3(R)  =  b1h+b1.S_2(R) \;=\; S_3(R) \;=\; \frac{b_1}{h + b_1}.S2​(R)=S3​(R)=h+b1​b1​​.

The biconditional carries both halves of the book's sentence: the stationary point is the optimum ("the optimal RRR is obtained for dC/dR=0\mathrm{d}C/\mathrm{d}R = 0dC/dR=0") and the optimum is stationary ("in the optimal solution we have S2=S3=b1/(h+b1)S_2 = S_3 = b_1/(h+b_1)S2​=S3​=b1​/(h+b1​)").

Supporting targets

In the order the chapter builds them: Eq. (5.41), G′=Φ−1G' = \Phi - 1G′=Φ−1, with GGG decreasing and convex; Eq. (5.39), the distribution function by conditioning on the inventory position; Eq. (5.42), its closed form F(x)=σ′Q[G(R−x−μ′σ′)−G(R+Q−x−μ′σ′)]F(x) = \frac{\sigma'}{Q}[G(\frac{R-x-\mu'}{\sigma'}) - G(\frac{R+Q-x-\mu'}{\sigma'})]F(x)=Qσ′​[G(σ′R−x−μ′​)−G(σ′R+Q−x−μ′​)]; Eq. (5.43), the density; Eq. (5.52), the fill rate 1−σ′Q[G(R−μ′σ′)−G(R+Q−μ′σ′)]1 - \frac{\sigma'}{Q}[G(\frac{R-\mu'}{\sigma'}) - G(\frac{R+Q-\mu'}{\sigma'})]1−Qσ′​[G(σ′R−μ′​)−G(σ′R+Q−μ′​)]; Eq. (5.55), the expected backorders E(B)\mathbb{E}(B)E(B) covered by one batch, and Eq. (5.54), that 1−E(B)/Q1 - \mathbb{E}(B)/Q1−E(B)/Q is the same fill rate; integrability of the cost rate and the mean E(IL)=R+Q/2−μ′\mathbb{E}(IL) = R + Q/2 - \mu'E(IL)=R+Q/2−μ′; Eq. (5.63), E(IL)−=∫−∞0F\mathbb{E}(IL)^{-} = \int_{-\infty}^0 FE(IL)−=∫−∞0​F; Eq. (5.64), the closed form of HHH and H′=−GH' = -GH′=−G; Eq. (5.65), the cost C=h(R+Q/2−μ′)+(h+b1)σ′2Q[H(R−μ′σ′)−H(R+Q−μ′σ′)]C = h(R + Q/2 - \mu') + (h+b_1)\frac{\sigma'^2}{Q}[H(\frac{R-\mu'}{\sigma'}) - H(\frac{R+Q-\mu'}{\sigma'})]C=h(R+Q/2−μ′)+(h+b1​)Qσ′2​[H(σ′R−μ′​)−H(σ′R+Q−μ′​)]; Eq. (5.66), dC/dR=−b1+(h+b1)S2\mathrm{d}C/\mathrm{d}R = -b_1 + (h+b_1)S_2dC/dR=−b1​+(h+b1​)S2​; and the convexity of CCC in RRR.

Significance

The result itself. The reorder point is the one parameter of an (R,Q)(R,Q)(R,Q) policy that stochastic demand actually decides, and Eq. (5.67) says that deciding it by cost and deciding it by service level are the same decision, with an explicit dictionary between the two. That is why the book can present service-level constraints (Sect. 5.7) and shortage costs (Sect. 5.9) as interchangeable ways of specifying the same thing, and why it warns, immediately after Eq. (5.67), that the equivalence is only valid when QQQ is given: with an ordering cost and a joint optimization of RRR and QQQ it fails, which is Chapter 6's problem.

The intermediate formulas have independent standing. Eq. (5.42) is the single expression from which every service measure of the chapter is computed, and Eq. (5.65) is the cost function that Chapter 6 extends by an ordering cost, Eq. (6.10), and optimizes iteratively. The second loss function HHH returns in the periodic-review fill rate of Eq. (5.86) and in the two-echelon batch-ordering model of Sect. 10.5.

Formalizing it. Nothing here is open; the value is that the steady-state model becomes an explicit measure, so that formulas the book obtains by manipulating integrals whose existence it never questions become theorems about that measure. Integrability of the cost rate is a target of its own for exactly that reason. None of the statements has a machine-checked proof yet.

Difficulty

The obvious route is the book's, and it is not the hard part: once FFF is known in closed form, every later identity is calculus on GGG and HHH. The work is upstream of that. The distribution function (5.39) is a conditioning argument over the product measure, a Fubini step in which the inner probability is a Gaussian tail; the density (5.43) is a derivative of a parameter-dependent integral; and Eq. (5.63) exchanges the order of two integrals over an unbounded region, which needs integrability of ILILIL itself. The derivative (5.66) is then obtained from the closed form (5.65), not by differentiating under an expectation, which is what makes the goal reachable: CCC is a smooth function of RRR with an explicitly increasing derivative, and Eq. (5.67) follows from strict convexity together with the fact that the fill rate is a continuous, strictly increasing function of RRR ranging over (0,1)(0,1)(0,1). A solver who starts from the expectation and tries to differentiate it directly will meet the kink of x+x^{+}x+ at 000 and a dominated-convergence argument; the integrated route avoids both.

Formalization scope

The inventory position is rqPosition R Q, Lebesgue measure conditioned on [R,R+Q][R, R+Q][R,R+Q]; the lead-time demand is newsboyDemand m s, Mathlib's gaussianReal m (s^2).toNNReal from the newsboy mission, with m=μ′m = \mu'm=μ′ and s=σ′s = \sigma's=σ′; and rqLevel R Q m s is the pushforward of their product under (u,d)↦u−d(u, d) \mapsto u - d(u,d)↦u−d. Two lemmas in the definition file record that both are probability measures when Q>0Q > 0Q>0. The distribution function, ready rate and cost are the measure of (−∞,x](-\infty, x](−∞,x], the measure of (0,∞)(0, \infty)(0,∞), and a Bochner integral against this law.

Every statement assumes Q>0Q > 0Q>0 and σ′>0\sigma' > 0σ′>0. At Q=0Q = 0Q=0 the conditioned measure is the zero measure and every integral is 000, so a statement without the hypothesis would be true and empty; at σ′=0\sigma' = 0σ′=0 the demand is a point mass and FFF has jumps. The mean μ′\mu'μ′ is unrestricted, as none of the formulas depends on its sign, and reorder points may be negative, which the book explicitly allows in Sect. 5.8. Costs hhh and b1b_1b1​ are positive in every statement that involves them, and E(B)\mathbb{E}(B)E(B) is stated for Q≥0Q \ge 0Q≥0 because its closed form holds there.

Two trivializing readings are ruled out. The cost is not defined as a formula in HHH but as an expectation, so the closed form (5.65) has content; and because Lean's Bochner integral of a non-integrable function is 000, integrability of the cost rate is stated as a theorem rather than assumed, otherwise a zero cost would make every reorder point optimal. The goal quantifies optimality over all real competing reorder points, not a neighbourhood.

A complete development needs Gaussian tail integrals, differentiation of parameter-dependent integrals, Fubini on a product of a bounded interval with the line, and the strict monotonicity of the Gaussian distribution function. The loss functions GGG and HHH and the inventory-level law are reusable across the rest of the series; contributions that establish the same identities for an arbitrary continuous lead-time demand with a finite mean, where Eqs. (5.39), (5.63) and (5.66) hold verbatim, are welcome.

Selected references

  • Sven Axsäter, Inventory Control, 3rd edition, International Series in Operations Research & Management Science 225, Springer, 2015, Sects. 5.3, 5.7, 5.8 and 5.9. DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-15729-0
  • George Hadley and Thomson M. Whitin, Analysis of Inventory Systems, Prentice-Hall, 1963.
  • Paul Zipkin, Foundations of Inventory Management, McGraw-Hill, 2000.
  • Yu-Sheng Zheng, On Properties of Stochastic Inventory Systems, Management Science 38(1), 1992, pp. 87-103. DOI 10.1287/mnsc.38.1.87
  • Kaj Rosling, Inventory Cost Rate Functions with Nonlinear Shortage Costs, Operations Research 50(6), 2002, pp. 1007-1017. DOI 10.1287/opre.50.6.1007.346
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Complex Scheduling III: Interval Consistency Tests for the RCPSPTextbook

Motivation

Exact methods for the resource-constrained project scheduling problem — branch-and-bound over activity lists or over start-time assignments, and the lower-bound computations inside them — live or die by how much of the search space can be discarded before it is enumerated. The standard tool is constraint propagation: deducing, from the precedence, resource and time-window data, new precedence relations i→ji\to ji→j that every feasible schedule must satisfy, and tighter time windows for the activities. Brucker and Knust's Section 3.6 (doi:10.1007/978-3-642-23929-8) presents the family of interval consistency tests — input, output, input-or-output and their negations — that constraint-programming schedulers apply at every node of the search, following Carlier and Pinson (An algorithm for solving the job-shop problem, Management Science 35, 1989, doi:10.1287/mnsc.35.2.164) and Baptiste, Le Pape and Nuijten (Constraint-Based Scheduling, Kluwer, 2001, doi:10.1007/978-1-4615-1479-4). Every test is an instance of one theorem, Theorem 3.7, and its cumulative-resource analogue, Theorem 3.8. Those two theorems, and the tests as their corollaries, are this mission.

Setting

The instance is the RCPSP of mission I: activities 0,…,n−10,\dots,n-10,…,n−1 with integer processing times pip_ipi​, renewable resources kkk with capacities RkR_kRk​ and demands rikr_{ik}rik​, and precedence arcs; a schedule is an integer start-time vector SSS, feasible when it meets the precedences and never exceeds a capacity. Section 3.6 adds three things.

Relations. A conjunction i→ji\to ji→j holds in SSS when Si+pi≤SjS_i+p_i\le S_jSi​+pi​≤Sj​. Two activities are parallel, i∥ji\parallel ji∥j, when they overlap for at least one time unit, and a disjunction i−ji-ji−j is the negation of that: i→ji\to ji→j or j→ij\to ij→i. The instance carries a set CCC of conjunctions and a set DDD of disjunctions that every feasible schedule must satisfy; initially C0C_0C0​ is the precedence relation and D0D_0D0​ the pairs whose combined demand exceeds some capacity, and propagation adds to them.

Disjunctive sets. A set III of at least two activities is disjunctive when any two of its members are related by a disjunction or a conjunction, so no two are ever processed together: the activities of a unit-capacity resource, the jobs of a single machine, the operations of one job in a shop. Its total processing time is P(I)=∑i∈IpiP(I)=\sum_{i\in I}p_iP(I)=∑i∈I​pi​.

Time windows. Each activity has a head rir_iri​ and a deadline did_idi​, and a feasible schedule has ri≤Sir_i\le S_iri​≤Si​ and Si+pi≤diS_i+p_i\le d_iSi​+pi​≤di​. An activity starts first in a set JJJ when no activity of JJJ starts earlier, and ends last when none completes later.

For a cumulative resource kkk the work of activity iii is wi=rikpiw_i=r_{ik}p_iwi​=rik​pi​ and W(J)=∑i∈JwiW(J)=\sum_{i\in J}w_iW(J)=∑i∈J​wi​.

Formalization targets

Goal — Theorem 3.7 (printed p. 169)

Let III be a disjunctive set, J⊆IJ\subseteq IJ⊆I, and J′,J′′J',J''J′,J′′ proper subsets of JJJ with J′∪J′′≠∅J'\cup J''\ne\emptysetJ′∪J′′=∅. If

max⁡ν∈J∖J′, μ∈J∖J′′ν≠μ(dμ−rν)<P(J),\max_{\substack{\nu\in J\setminus J',\ \mu\in J\setminus J''\\ \nu\ne\mu}}\bigl(d_\mu-r_\nu\bigr)<P(J),ν∈J∖J′, μ∈J∖J′′ν=μ​max​(dμ​−rν​)<P(J),

then in every feasible schedule an activity from J′J'J′ starts first in JJJ or an activity from J′′J''J′′ ends last in JJJ.

The first infeasibility test (printed p. 169)

If some nonempty J⊆IJ\subseteq IJ⊆I has max⁡μ∈Jdμ−min⁡ν∈Jrν<P(J)\max_{\mu\in J}d_\mu-\min_{\nu\in J}r_\nu<P(J)maxμ∈J​dμ​−minν∈J​rν​<P(J), no feasible schedule exists.

The input test (3.123) and the output test (3.124) (printed p. 171)

For Ω⊆I\Omega\subseteq IΩ⊆I nonempty and i∈I∖Ωi\in I\setminus\Omegai∈I∖Ω: if max⁡μ∈Ω∪{i}dμ−min⁡ν∈Ωrν<P(Ω)+pi\max_{\mu\in\Omega\cup\{i\}}d_\mu-\min_{\nu\in\Omega}r_\nu<P(\Omega)+p_imaxμ∈Ω∪{i}​dμ​−minν∈Ω​rν​<P(Ω)+pi​ then i→ji\to ji→j for all j∈Ωj\in\Omegaj∈Ω; symmetrically, if max⁡μ∈Ωdμ−min⁡ν∈Ω∪{i}rν<P(Ω)+pi\max_{\mu\in\Omega}d_\mu-\min_{\nu\in\Omega\cup\{i\}}r_\nu<P(\Omega)+p_imaxμ∈Ω​dμ​−minν∈Ω∪{i}​rν​<P(Ω)+pi​ then j→ij\to ij→i for all j∈Ωj\in\Omegaj∈Ω.

The input-or-output test (printed p. 170)

For i,j∈J⊆Ii,j\in J\subseteq Ii,j∈J⊆I, ∣J∣≥2|J|\ge 2∣J∣≥2: if max⁡μ∈J∖{j}dμ−min⁡ν∈J∖{i}rν<P(J)\max_{\mu\in J\setminus\{j\}}d_\mu-\min_{\nu\in J\setminus\{i\}}r_\nu<P(J)maxμ∈J∖{j}​dμ​−minν∈J∖{i}​rν​<P(J) then iii starts first in JJJ or jjj ends last in JJJ, and i→ji\to ji→j when i≠ji\ne ji=j.

Theorem 3.8 (printed p. 186)

For a cumulative resource kkk, J⊆IkJ\subseteq I_kJ⊆Ik​ and proper subsets J′,J′′J',J''J′,J′′ of JJJ: if Rk(max⁡μ∈J∖J′′dμ−min⁡ν∈J∖J′rν)<W(J)R_k\bigl(\max_{\mu\in J\setminus J''}d_\mu-\min_{\nu\in J\setminus J'}r_\nu\bigr)<W(J)Rk​(maxμ∈J∖J′′​dμ​−minν∈J∖J′​rν​)<W(J) then an activity from J′J'J′ starts first in JJJ or an activity from J′′J''J′′ ends last in JJJ.

Significance

Theorem 3.7 is the single statement behind a whole toolbox. Every interval consistency test in the literature — the input and output tests that fix a new conjunction, the input-or-output test, the negation tests that only shrink a window — is the theorem with a particular choice of J′J'J′ and J′′J''J′′, and the book's Section 3.6.4 derives them one by one. A propagation engine that applies these tests to a fixpoint is what makes branch-and-bound for the job shop and the RCPSP practical; Carlier and Pinson's solution of the 10×10 job-shop instance is the historical demonstration. Theorem 3.8 extends the same reasoning from disjunctive to cumulative resources by replacing "no overlap" with "at most RkR_kRk​ units per time unit", the energetic-reasoning viewpoint that the rest of Section 3.6.5 develops.

The results are elementary and proved; formalizing them fixes, once, what "feasible" means in the presence of the relation sets CCC and DDD and time windows, on top of the RCPSP model of mission I. That layer is reusable: the start-start distance matrix of Section 3.6.2 and the symmetric-triple rules of Section 3.6.3 are statements about the same schedules and the same relations. Nothing here is on the platform or in Mathlib.

Difficulty

The obvious argument for Theorem 3.7 is the correct one, and its difficulty is in the bookkeeping. If no activity of J′J'J′ starts first and none of J′′J''J′′ ends last, the first starter is some ν∈J∖J′\nu\in J\setminus J'ν∈J∖J′ and the last finisher some μ∈J∖J′′\mu\in J\setminus J''μ∈J∖J′′, and every activity of JJJ is processed inside [Sν, Sμ+pμ]⊆[rν,dμ][S_\nu,\,S_\mu+p_\mu]\subseteq[r_\nu,d_\mu][Sν​,Sμ​+pμ​]⊆[rν​,dμ​]. Since the activities of a disjunctive set are pairwise non-overlapping, their total length P(J)P(J)P(J) fits in that interval, contradicting (3.121). The formal work is the packing lemma: pairwise disjoint integer intervals inside an interval of length LLL have total length at most LLL, which requires ordering the activities by start time and an induction that Mathlib does not supply.

The subtle point is the restriction ν≠μ\nu\ne\muν=μ in (3.121). The book allows it because "an activity which starts first cannot complete also last" when there are at least two activities with positive durations. The formal statement reads "starts first" and "ends last" with ≤\le≤, which makes the theorem true without a positivity hypothesis: when the restriction empties the index set, J∖J′=J∖J′′={x}J\setminus J'=J\setminus J''=\{x\}J∖J′=J∖J′′={x}, the conclusion holds because xxx cannot be both the unique first starter and the unique last finisher of a disjunctive set with two or more members. A solver should expect to handle that corner separately.

For the tests the extra step is turning "starts first" into a conjunction i→ji\to ji→j, which uses the disjunction between iii and jjj together with positive processing times: with pj=0p_j=0pj​=0 an activity could start at the same instant as iii without violating the disjunction, so the tests carry the positivity hypothesis that Theorem 3.7 itself does not need. Theorem 3.8 replaces the packing lemma by a work-counting lemma: over an interval of length LLL a resource of capacity RkR_kRk​ supplies at most RkLR_kLRk​L units, and every activity of JJJ consumes rikpir_{ik}p_irik​pi​ of them.

Formalization scope

Schedules are integer start-time vectors on Fin n, as in missions I and II, and a feasible schedule of this mission is one that is FeasibleSchedule for the RCPSP instance (mission I), respects the arcs of CCC (RespectsArcs, mission II), satisfies the disjunctions of DDD and lies within the time windows; these four hypotheses are the book's "feasible schedule" in Section 3.6 and are carried on every statement, although the arguments use only the last two, or, for Theorem 3.8, the resource constraint and the windows. The sets CCC and DDD are parameters, not derived from the instance, since propagation enlarges them.

Every inequality "max⁡(⋅)−min⁡(⋅)<P\max(\cdot)-\min(\cdot)<Pmax(⋅)−min(⋅)<P" is stated as the family of inequalities dμ<rν+Pd_\mu<r_\nu+Pdμ​<rν​+P over the same index pairs. This is equivalent, avoids natural-number subtraction, and gives an empty index set the value the convention max⁡∅=−∞\max\emptyset=-\inftymax∅=−∞ would: the hypothesis is then vacuous. "Starts first" and "ends last" use ≤\le≤. Proper-subset hypotheses J′⊂JJ'\subset JJ′⊂J, J′′⊂JJ''\subset JJ′′⊂J are the book's; the first infeasibility test needs JJJ nonempty, and the input-or-output test needs ∣J∣≥2|J|\ge 2∣J∣≥2.

A trivializing reading is ruled out on the disjunctive side by the nonemptiness hypotheses (an empty JJJ would make the infeasibility test's family vacuous and its conclusion false) and on the cumulative side by the observation that Theorem 3.8 with J′=J′′=∅J'=J''=\emptysetJ′=J′′=∅ asserts infeasibility, which is the book's intended reading. Welcome contributions beyond the milestones: the input-negation and output-negation tests, the window-tightening rules of Section 3.6.4, and the SSD-matrix results of Section 3.6.2.

Selected references

  • Peter Brucker and Sigrid Knust, Complex Scheduling, 2nd ed., Springer, 2012, Section 3.6. doi:10.1007/978-3-642-23929-8
  • Jacques Carlier and Eric Pinson, An algorithm for solving the job-shop problem, Management Science 35 (1989). doi:10.1287/mnsc.35.2.164
  • Philippe Baptiste, Claude Le Pape and Wim Nuijten, Constraint-Based Scheduling, Kluwer, 2001. doi:10.1007/978-1-4615-1479-4
  • Ulrich Dorndorf, Erwin Pesch and Toàn Phan-Huy, Constraint propagation techniques for the disjunctive scheduling problem, Artificial Intelligence 122 (2000). doi:10.1016/S0004-3702(00)00040-0
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Scheduling Algorithms V: Preemptive Scheduling on Uniform MachinesTextbook

Motivation

When several processors share a workload, the first question is how long the workload takes if it is spread out as well as possible. If a job may be interrupted and resumed later, possibly on another processor — preemption, the setting of operating systems, of communication links and of any resource that can be time-shared — the answer is a closed formula, and it is one of the oldest results in scheduling: McNaughton's wrap-around rule of 1959 (Scheduling with deadlines and loss functions, Management Science 6, doi:10.1287/mnsc.6.1.1) shows that on identical machines the optimal makespan is the larger of the longest job and the average load. Horvath, Lam and Sethi (A level algorithm for preemptive scheduling, Journal of the ACM 24, 1977, doi:10.1145/321992.321995) extended this to machines of different speeds, and Gonzalez and Sahni (Preemptive scheduling of uniform processor systems, Journal of the ACM 25, 1978, doi:10.1145/322047.322055) gave the fast algorithm with few preemptions. Brucker's Chapter 5 (doi:10.1007/978-3-540-69516-5) presents the level-algorithm version, and this mission formalizes the statements it proves about schedules.

Setting

There are nnn jobs with processing requirements p1,…,pn>0p_1,\dots,p_n>0p1​,…,pn​>0 and mmm uniform machines with speeds s1,…,sm>0s_1,\dots,s_m>0s1​,…,sm​>0: running job iii on machine jjj for a period of length ℓ\ellℓ performs sjℓs_j\ellsj​ℓ units of its requirement, so the whole job would take pi/sjp_i/s_jpi​/sj​ time units there. Identical machines are the case s1=⋯=sm=1s_1=\dots=s_m=1s1​=⋯=sm​=1.

A preemptive schedule is a finite list of pieces, each a job, a machine, a start time and a stop time. It is feasible for the data (s,p)(s,p)(s,p) when every piece lies in [0,∞)[0,\infty)[0,∞), no two pieces on the same machine overlap, no two pieces of the same job overlap (a job is on at most one machine at any instant), and every job iii receives total work exactly pip_ipi​ over its pieces. Its makespan Cmax⁡C_{\max}Cmax​ is the largest stop time; the completion time CiC_iCi​ of job iii is the largest stop time of one of its pieces. A schedule is nonpreemptive when every job consists of a single piece.

Following Section 5.1.2 the data are sorted, p1≥⋯≥pnp_1\ge\dots\ge p_np1​≥⋯≥pn​ and s1≥⋯≥sms_1\ge\dots\ge s_ms1​≥⋯≥sm​, with n≥mn\ge mn≥m, and one writes Pj=∑i≤jpiP_j=\sum_{i\le j}p_iPj​=∑i≤j​pi​, Sj=∑i≤jsiS_j=\sum_{i\le j}s_iSj​=∑i≤j​si​. For a set AAA of jobs, h(A)=S∣A∣h(A)=S_{|A|}h(A)=S∣A∣​ if ∣A∣≤m|A|\le m∣A∣≤m and h(A)=Smh(A)=S_mh(A)=Sm​ otherwise: the largest combined speed that ∣A∣|A|∣A∣ jobs can use at one instant.

Formalization targets

Goal — Theorem 5.8 (printed p. 127)

The optimal makespan of Q∣pmtn∣Cmax⁡Q\mid pmtn\mid C_{\max}Q∣pmtn∣Cmax​ is the bound (5.5):

w  =  max⁡{max⁡j=1m−1PjSj, PnSm},w \;=\; \max\Bigl\{\max_{j=1}^{m-1}\frac{P_j}{S_j},\ \frac{P_n}{S_m}\Bigr\} ,w=max{j=1maxm−1​Sj​Pj​​, Sm​Pn​​},

in the sense that some feasible preemptive schedule has makespan exactly www and no feasible preemptive schedule has a smaller makespan.

The lower bound (5.5) (printed p. 125)

Every feasible preemptive schedule has makespan at least www.

P∣pmtn∣Cmax⁡P\mid pmtn\mid C_{\max}P∣pmtn∣Cmax​ (printed p. 108)

On identical machines, LB=max⁡{max⁡ipi, 1m∑ipi}LB=\max\{\max_i p_i,\ \tfrac1m\sum_i p_i\}LB=max{maxi​pi​, m1​∑i​pi​} is a lower bound on the makespan and is attained by some feasible preemptive schedule.

Condition (5.8) (printed p. 129)

The jobs can be scheduled preemptively within [0,T][0,T][0,T] if and only if ∑i∈Api≤T h(A)\sum_{i\in A}p_i\le T\,h(A)∑i∈A​pi​≤Th(A) for every set AAA of jobs.

Theorem 5.7 (printed p. 121)

For P∣pmtn∣∑wiCiP\mid pmtn\mid\sum w_iC_iP∣pmtn∣∑wi​Ci​ with nonnegative weights there is an optimal schedule without preemption.

Significance

Theorem 5.8 turns an optimization over an infinite family of schedules into a formula in the data, and the formula is tight in both directions: each of its terms is a resource bound that some schedule meets exactly. That is what makes preemptive makespan minimization one of the few parallel-machine problems that is solvable at all — its nonpreemptive counterpart P2∥Cmax⁡P2\parallel C_{\max}P2∥Cmax​ is NP-hard (p. 124) — and it is why the preemptive relaxation appears as a bound inside branch-and-bound methods for the nonpreemptive problems.

Condition (5.8) is the form in which the result is reused. It is a Hall-type condition, one inequality per set of jobs, and it is exactly what Section 5.1.2 needs to prove Theorem 5.9, which decides Q∣pmtn;ri∣Lmax⁡Q\mid pmtn; r_i\mid L_{\max}Q∣pmtn;ri​∣Lmax​ by a maximum flow in an expanded network. Theorem 5.7 is the complementary statement for the other classical objective: for total weighted completion time preemption buys nothing, so the nonpreemptive solutions of Section 5.1.1 are optimal in the larger class too.

On status: every statement here is classical and proved, and the formalization adds a checked model of preemptive schedules. Mathlib has no scheduling material, and the platform's SchedulingAlgorithms series so far models only single-machine sequences (missions I, II, IV) and two-machine permutation flow shops (mission III), none of which allow a job to be split. The piece-list model of this mission is the first reusable object for preemptive and parallel-machine problems, and the later sections of Chapter 5 — Q∣pmtn;ri∣Lmax⁡Q\mid pmtn; r_i\mid L_{\max}Q∣pmtn;ri​∣Lmax​, P∣pmtn∣Lmax⁡P\mid pmtn\mid L_{\max}P∣pmtn∣Lmax​ — are stated in it.

Difficulty

The obvious first idea for the goal is to run McNaughton's rule with the speeds ignored. It fails on uniform machines: filling machines one after another does not respect the constraint that a long job on a slow machine is not done when a short job on a fast one is. The correct idea is the level algorithm — always process the jobs of highest remaining requirement on the fastest free machines, sharing machines among tied jobs — and the difficulty is in the analysis rather than the idea. The proof of Theorem 5.8 has to show that the schedule it produces ends exactly at one of the terms of www: either no machine idles before the end, giving Pn/SmP_n/S_mPn​/Sm​, or the machines finish in speed order with the first jjj jobs busy from time 000, giving Pj/SjP_j/S_jPj​/Sj​. Making that case analysis rigorous requires tracking that the order of remaining requirements is preserved over time (the invariant (5.6)) and that ties are broken consistently.

A second, formal difficulty is that the level algorithm's output is defined by continuous-time events (the next completion, the next time two levels coincide), so producing an explicit finite list of pieces with the required properties is itself a construction. Any proof must build a concrete schedule; "the infimum of makespans equals www" is not the goal.

For the lower bound the trap is the opposite: it is tempting to argue only with total capacity SmTS_mTSm​T, which gives Pn/SmP_n/S_mPn​/Sm​ but not Pj/SjP_j/S_jPj​/Sj​. The latter needs the rule that a job is on at most one machine at a time, so that jjj jobs run at combined speed at most SjS_jSj​; a model that let a job be split across machines simultaneously would make the theorem false, and the definition of feasibility rules it out explicitly.

Formalization scope

A schedule is a List of Pieces over jobs Fin n and machines Fin m, with real start and stop times. Feasibility is the three-part condition of the Setting, disjointness of two pieces meaning one stops no later than the other starts. Work is measured with the machine's speed, so the same definitions cover identical machines as the constant speed 111. Pieces of length zero and unsorted lists are allowed; both are harmless.

The sorted orders are hypotheses Antitone p and Antitone s, the speeds and requirements are positive, m≥1m\ge 1m≥1 and, where the book assumes it, n≥mn\ge mn≥m. The book's normalization s1=1s_1=1s1​=1 is not assumed: every statement here is invariant under scaling all speeds, and the book uses the normalization only for a running-time estimate. The bound www is defined as the maximum of an explicit nonempty finite set, so no supremum of an empty or unbounded set occurs; LBLBLB takes a proof that n≥1n\ge 1n≥1 so that max⁡ipi\max_i p_imaxi​pi​ is meaningful.

Two things are deliberately not stated. The level algorithm itself is not transcribed: Theorem 5.8 is stated as the existence of an optimal schedule of makespan www, which is what its proof establishes. And Theorem 5.9, the flow characterization for Q∣pmtn;ri∣Lmax⁡Q\mid pmtn; r_i\mid L_{\max}Q∣pmtn;ri​∣Lmax​, is left for a later mission, since it needs release times and the expanded network on top of this model.

A trivializing reading is excluded by the existential form of the goal and of Theorem 5.7: each asserts that an optimal schedule exists, not merely that any optimal schedule has a property. A proof of the goal has to construct a schedule; a proof of Theorem 5.7 has to construct a nonpreemptive one that beats every preemptive competitor. Contributions welcome beyond the milestones: a general lemma that a feasible schedule can be normalized to sorted, positive-length pieces, and a proof that (5.8) for the sets {1,…,j}\{1,\dots,j\}{1,…,j} is equivalent to w≤Tw\le Tw≤T.

Selected references

  • Peter Brucker, Scheduling Algorithms, 5th ed., Springer, 2007, Chapter 5. doi:10.1007/978-3-540-69516-5
  • Robert McNaughton, Scheduling with deadlines and loss functions, Management Science 6 (1959). doi:10.1287/mnsc.6.1.1
  • E. C. Horvath, S. Lam and R. Sethi, A level algorithm for preemptive scheduling, Journal of the ACM 24 (1977). doi:10.1145/321992.321995
  • Teofilo Gonzalez and Sartaj Sahni, Preemptive scheduling of uniform processor systems, Journal of the ACM 25 (1978). doi:10.1145/322047.322055
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The Design of Competitive Online Algorithms via a Primal-Dual Approach IX: General Packing-Covering ConstraintsTextbook

Motivation

Chapter 4's framework (formalized in this series' 04-framework mission) solves the online covering-packing pair only in the restricted setting a(i,j) ∈ {0,1}, b(j) = 1 — every constraint is an unweighted "cover me with at least one of these" condition. Chapter 14 delivers the promise made at the very start of the survey (p. 115: "we show how to extend the ideas we present here to handle general (non-negative) values of a(i,j) and b(j)"): fully general non-negative coefficients, normalized so every constraint reads ∑_i a(i,j)x(i) ≥ 1. This mission formalizes both halves of that generalization — the packing scheme (Theorem 14.1, with a matching lower bound, Lemma 14.2, showing an extra additive term is unavoidable) and the covering scheme (Theorem 14.3, the goal).

Setting

Fix a finite set I of primal (covering) variables with positive costs c(i), and a finite set J of dual (packing) variables/covering constraints, with a(i,j) ≥ 0 for every pair (Fig. 14.1). The packing scheme (Section 14.1) is parameterized by a target competitive ratio B > 0: on each new dual variable y(j) and its coefficients a(i,j), the algorithm increases y(j) continuously and each x(i) by an explicit exponential increment function until the new primal constraint is satisfied, achieving B-competitiveness for the packing objective at the cost of an additive O(log(a_i(max)/a_i(min))) term (beyond the multiplicative O(log n)) in how much each dual constraint can be violated — qualitatively different from Chapter 4's purely multiplicative O(log d) bound, and Lemma 14.2 proves this additive term cannot be removed. The covering scheme (Section 14.2) instead works in phases: each phase assumes a doubling lower bound α(r) on OPT and "forgets" its primal/dual variables once the primal cost exceeds α(r), restarting with α(r+1) = 2α(r) — a structurally different mechanism from Chapter 4's direct algorithms, needed because with general coefficients a single monotone run can no longer be analyzed via one potential function alone.

Formalization targets

Theorem 14.3 (the goal, p. 253): for any B > 0, the phase-based covering scheme (each constraint normalized to ∑_i a(i,j)x(i) ≥ 1/B) is competitive with an explicit ratio 8 log(2n)/B, taken directly from the proof's own final displayed chain, 2α(r) ≤ 4α(r-1) ≤ (8 log(2n)/B) Y(r-1) ≤ (8 log(2n)/B) OPT (p. 253-254) — the theorem's own statement only gives O(log n/B), so this explicit constant is this mission's own instantiation from the proof, not an independent derivation and not a transcription of a displayed theorem-level formula (flagged, per this series' explicit-constants rule).

Two milestones, in attack order:

  • Theorem 14.1 (p. 249): the packing scheme is B-competitive, and violates each dual constraint by at most the book's own exact displayed bound c(i)·2log(1 + n·a_i(max)/a_i(min))/B (Claim (3) — the exact constant the proof establishes, not the theorem headline's O(·) simplification).
  • Lemma 14.2 (p. 251): a matching lower bound, on the book's own explicit single-constraint instance, showing the additive log(a(max)/a(min)) term of Theorem 14.1 is necessary.

Significance

This chapter is the survey's demonstration that the primal-dual framework's core technique survives its most natural generalization, at the price of an explicit extra term the chapter also proves is unavoidable — a tight characterization, not merely an upper bound. Every other online covering/packing chapter in this survey (set cover, routing, ad-auctions, bounded allocation) is technically a special case of this chapter's general model; Chapter 4's restricted framework is the pedagogical entry point, and this chapter is where the general theory actually lives. No formal development of the general packing-covering problem was found on the platform as of 2026-09-20; this mission is the first.

Difficulty

Two distinct obstacles, mirroring this chapter's own two schemes. First, Theorem 14.1's proof (p. 249-251) establishes its per-round primal/dual derivative inequality via a direct calculus argument (differentiating the explicit increment function) — formalized here as a hypothesis (hX_le_BY) standing for that calculation, not reproduced, since the goal is a faithful statement of the resulting competitive ratio, and the increment function's own exponential form is transcribed in the theorem's docstring but the differentiation itself is out of scope. Second, Theorem 14.3's phase-based mechanism is genuinely stateful across an unbounded number of phases (each phase resets its own primal/dual variables while the LP's actual variables retain the running maximum) — modeling this process explicitly is comparable in complexity to Chapter 13's level-based algorithm, and this mission makes the same scope choice: the mechanism's output (the resulting cost/profit relationship, hX_le_ratio) is taken as a hypothesis standing for the book's own Claims (1) and (3) combined, rather than constructed phase-by-phase.

Formalization scope

GeneralInstance I J bundles Fig. 14.1's fully general LP data (a(i,j) ≥ 0, c(i) > 0) — restated locally (not importing 04-framework's CoveringInstance) per this series' rule against cross-draft imports, even though this chapter is the direct generalization of that one. aMax/aMin are the per-variable (not per-instance) maximum and minimum-non-zero coefficients Theorem 14.1 needs. harmonicNum is restated locally (duplicated from 13-bounded-allocation's own definition, for the same no-cross-draft-import reason). Both goal-adjacent theorems use this series' weak-duality "competitive against any feasible comparison solution" pattern (04-framework, reused as a convention, not re-derived): Theorem 14.1 against any feasible packing comparison (matching that it concerns the packing side), Theorem 14.3 against any feasible covering comparison (matching the covering side). Welcome contributions: completing the three sorrys (Theorem 14.1's calculus argument, Theorem 14.3's phase-based mechanism constructed explicitly, and Lemma 14.2's direct summation argument, which is the most tractable of the three to actually prove), and formalizing the sanity check that both schemes reduce to Chapter 4's Algorithm 1/2/3 when a(i,j) ∈ {0,1}, b(j) = 1 (checked by hand in SELF_REVIEW.md, not as a Lean lemma).

Selected references

  • N. Buchbinder, J. Naor. The Design of Competitive Online Algorithms via a Primal-Dual Approach. Foundations and Trends in Theoretical Computer Science, 3(2-3):93-263, 2009. https://doi.org/10.1561/0400000024
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The Design of Competitive Online Algorithms via a Primal-Dual Approach VIII: The Bounded Allocation ProblemTextbook

Motivation

The classical online allocation (AdWords) problem has a tight 1 - 1/e competitive ratio in general, achieved by the water-level algorithm and matched by a lower bound in which the number of buyers interested in each item can be as large as the total number of buyers. Buchbinder and Naor's Chapter 13 observes that in many realistic settings each item's interested-buyer set is much smaller than the total buyer population, and shows this structural fact — an explicit bound d on interested buyers per item — provably beats 1 - 1/e for every finite d, via a deliberately non-water-level algorithm. This mission formalizes that algorithm's competitive ratio and its matching lower bound.

Setting

A seller offers items to n buyers one at a time; buyer i has budget B(i) > 0. Each item j has a fixed price b(j) > 0 and a set S(j) of interested buyers with |S(j)| ≤ d. The fractional LP relaxation (Fig. 13.1) allocates y(i,j) ∈ [0,1] of item j to buyer i, subject to each item being sold at most once in total and each buyer's spending never exceeding budget; the seller's objective is to maximize total revenue ∑_j ∑_{i∈S(j)} b(j)y(i,j). Buyers are partitioned into d+1 levels by the fraction of budget spent so far (level k = spent between k/d and (k+1)/d); on each new item, the allocation algorithm splits it equally among the interested buyers in the lowest non-empty level, moving to the next level once that level's buyers are exhausted or saturated — deliberately not the naive "water-level" rule of splitting among the least-spent buyers, which the book shows cannot beat 1-1/e even for small d. The analysis tracks a piecewise-linear trade-off potential function f_d, built from a geometric sequence, that relates each buyer's level to their contribution to a feasible primal (covering) solution.

Formalization targets

Theorem 13.1 (the goal, p. 240): the allocation algorithm is C(d)-competitive, with the book's own explicit closed form C(d) = 1 - (d-1)/(d(1+1/(d-1))^{d-1}) — strictly better than 1 - 1/e for every finite d, approaching it as d → ∞ (Table 13.1). Formalized via the survey's standard weak-duality pattern (as in 04-framework's Theorem 4.3): given the algorithm's per-item primal/dual cost changes satisfying the book's core inequality ΔX(j) ≤ (1/C(d))ΔY(j) (established there by a potential-function case analysis, not reproduced here), the algorithm's realized profit is C(d)-competitive against any feasible comparison allocation.

Lemma 13.2 (milestone, p. 244): a matching lower bound, C(d) ≤ 1 - (k - kH(d) + ∑_{i=1}^k H(d-i))/d, where H is the harmonic number and k is the largest value with H(d) - H(d-k) ≤ 1.

Significance

This chapter is the survey's demonstration that a structural restriction invisible to the classical 1-1/e lower bound — a bound on demand concentration, not on budgets or prices — can be exploited algorithmically, and the exploiting algorithm is not the naive generalization of the water-level rule but a genuinely different level-based, "who's-behind" allocation rule. No formal development of the bounded allocation problem was found on the platform as of 2026-09-20; this mission is the first.

Difficulty

The chapter's own proof of Theorem 13.1 (p. 241-244) is a page-and-a-half case analysis on how an item's fractional allocation crosses level boundaries, bookkeeping the change in both the primal potential-function value and the dual profit through several sub-cases (an item fully absorbed by one level; an item that empties a level and continues into the next; a level exhausting every interested buyer's budget). This mission formalizes the resulting per-item inequality ΔX(j) ≤ (1/C(d))ΔY(j) as a hypothesis (the theorem's own headline claim, not a case-by-case re-derivation) rather than modeling the stateful, order-dependent level-allocation process itself — the same scope choice this series makes for Chapter 11's randomized rounding process, where the book similarly omits (there, entirely; here, gives but does not ask this mission to reproduce) the underlying case analysis. The potential function f_d and its connection to the algorithm's primal variable (allocX) are formalized precisely, since they are what the goal's proof and Lemma 13.2 both depend on structurally, even though the case analysis linking them to ΔX/ΔY is left as the theorem's sorry.

Formalization scope

AllocationInstance I J bundles the LP data of Fig. 13.1 (S, B, b, d ≥ 2, ∀j, |S(j)|≤d) — restated locally per this series' rule that concurrent drafts cannot import each other, even though the problem is a special case of Chapter 10's ad-auctions model (the two chapters' algorithms differ: Chapter 10's is proportional-to-remaining-budget, this chapter's is level-based). geomSeq/potential transcribe the geometric sequence a_t and the potential function f_d at its level grid points exactly (not extended to non-grid-point reals, since Theorem 13.1's and Lemma 13.2's own statements only need the grid values). allocX connects the potential function to the algorithm's primal variable via each buyer's final level t(i). packingFeasible/packingValue transcribe Fig. 13.1's dual/packing LP with a genuine two-index allocation y : I → J → ℝ (not collapsed to a single per-item variable, unlike Chapter 4's simpler 0/1-coefficient framework). harmonicNum is the ordinary harmonic number. The level-based algorithm's literal stateful per-item update rule (which buyers move between which levels, in what order, within a single item's allocation) is not modeled directly — a documented scope reduction (STATUS.md), not a substitution of the "water-level" algorithm the book explicitly warns against (this mission's theorem13_1 commits to neither algorithm's literal rule, only to the resulting invariant the book's own proof establishes for the level-based one). Welcome contributions: completing the two sorrys, and modeling the level-allocation process explicitly enough to derive hinvariant from first principles.

Selected references

  • N. Buchbinder, J. Naor. The Design of Competitive Online Algorithms via a Primal-Dual Approach. Foundations and Trends in Theoretical Computer Science, 3(2-3):93-263, 2009. https://doi.org/10.1561/0400000024
  • B. Kalyanasundaram, K. Pruhs. An optimal deterministic algorithm for online b-matching. Theoretical Computer Science, 233(1-2):319-325, 2000 (cited as [73], the 1-1/e lower bound).
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The Design of Competitive Online Algorithms via a Primal-Dual Approach V: Online RoutingTextbook

Motivation

Network routing is one of the paradigmatic applications of the online primal-dual method: requests for bandwidth between a source and target arrive one at a time, and the algorithm must commit bandwidth to paths without knowing future requests. Chapter 4 already gave a simple (3, O(log n))-competitive routing algorithm as an illustration of the general framework. This chapter asks for something qualitatively stronger: a uni-criteria (1, O(log n))-competitive algorithm — one that routes the full optimal bandwidth (no loss on the throughput side at all), paying only in a bounded edge-capacity violation. The chapter shows this exact-throughput guarantee is achievable, and is moreover the key building block for several other routing objectives (fair routing, max-min fairness) built on top of it in Section 9.2 — a (1, O(log n))-competitive algorithm composes into those richer objectives in a way a merely constant-factor-lossy algorithm does not.

Setting

Fix a graph G=(V,E)G=(V,E)G=(V,E), ∣V∣=n|V|=n∣V∣=n, ∣E∣=m|E|=m∣E∣=m, with integer edge capacities u:E→Nu: E \to \mathbb{N}u:E→N. Routing requests rir_iri​ arrive online, each demanding one unit of bandwidth between a source and target; in the splittable model (this chapter's comparison class), a request's bandwidth may be divided across multiple paths. A (c1,c2)(c_1,c_2)(c1​,c2​)-competitive algorithm routes at least 1/c11/c_11/c1​ of the maximum possible bandwidth while guaranteeing every edge's load (bandwidth allocated divided by capacity) is at most c2c_2c2​. The chapter's generic algorithm (Section 9.1) maintains, for each of O(log⁡n)O(\log n)O(logn) copies G0,…,GkG_0,\dots,G_kG0​,…,Gk​ of the graph (copy jjj keeping only edges of capacity at least mjm^jmj, each capped at min⁡(u(e),mj+2)\min(u(e), m^{j+2})min(u(e),mj+2)), a primal-dual pair matching Chapter 4's own routing LP (Fig. 9.1, identical to Fig. 4.2): a request is routed on the shortest path (by the copy's current primal edge-lengths x(e,j)x(e,j)x(e,j)) if that length is below 111, multiplicatively updating x(e,j)x(e,j)x(e,j) on the path's edges; otherwise, subject to a capacity-limited fallback rule, on an arbitrary feasible path.

Formalization targets

Theorem 9.2 (goal, p. 204): the algorithm is (1, O(log n))-competitive with respect to all splittable routing solutions — exact throughput (ratio 1), edge load at most O(log n).

Lemma 9.1 (milestone, p. 202-204): a single copy GjG_jGj​'s own guarantee, which Theorem 9.2's proof composes across all copies: the algorithm accepts at least MMM (the maximum splittable bandwidth achievable in GjG_jGj​, out of the requests introduced to it) and incurs load O(log⁡n)O(\log n)O(logn) on every edge of GjG_jGj​.

Significance

This is the survey's demonstration that the online primal-dual method, in its most basic form (a single accumulating dual sum driving a multiplicative primal update, exactly Chapter 4's framework), scales to a genuinely harder bicriterion objective once composed across a carefully constructed family of graph copies — the copies are what let the algorithm avoid ever needing to reason about which of the exponentially many sis_isi​-tit_iti​ paths to consider, reducing routing to a sequence of independent shortest-path computations. The chapter's own Section 9.2 builds a coordinate-wise-competitive fair-routing algorithm directly on top of Theorem 9.2 (not formalized here), and its Notes section places (1,O(log⁡n))(1, O(\log n))(1,O(logn))-competitiveness as "a crucial non-trivial step" the chapter needed before those richer objectives became tractable at all. No prior formalization of online routing, splittable or otherwise, was found on the platform as of 2026-09-20 (search below).

Difficulty

This is the most algorithmically intricate chapter in this series: the algorithm processes each request against every one of O(log⁡n)O(\log n)O(logn) graph copies, each copy running its own instance of the Chapter-4-style primal-dual update, and Theorem 9.2's own proof composes Lemma 9.1's per-copy guarantee via a combinatorial backward induction (partitioning the offline-optimal solution's paths into groups by bottleneck capacity, and showing group by group that the algorithm's cumulative routed bandwidth across the top levels dominates the cumulative optimal bandwidth in those groups) together with a separate geometric argument bounding how many copies any single edge can meaningfully appear in. Fully modeling the copy construction, the request-routing process, and both composition arguments from first principles was judged to exceed this mission's time budget without sacrificing the faithfulness of what does get stated (per CAPTAIN_BRIEF.md rule 6). Instead: Lemma 9.1 is formalized via the two facts its own proof isolates as doing the real work — a weak-duality contradiction bound (stepB ≥ M − uMin) and the step-(1c) fallback's own greedy-fill rule for part (i); the multiplicative-update invariant x(e,j) ≤ 2 for part (ii), whose consequence — the exact constant 2 + 6·log₂n — is re-derived from scratch in this mission (the displayed equation this derivation depends on was garbled by the PDF's text extraction; it was confirmed against the actual typeset page image before drafting, see SELF_REVIEW.md). Theorem 9.2 then composes Lemma 9.1 across copies via two explicit, clearly-labeled hypotheses standing for the book's own backward-induction accounting and edge-multiplicity argument, respectively — genuine mathematical content this mission does not re-derive, named honestly as hypotheses rather than silently assumed away or approximated by a weaker statement.

Formalization scope

No shared data structure was introduced: every quantity in both theorems (bandwidths, capacities, loads) is a plain real-number hypothesis-level parameter, since neither theorem's own content needs a reusable instance record (unlike the packing/covering CoveringInstance of 04-framework, this chapter's per-copy quantities are consumed once each, not threaded through a family of algorithms). per_copy_guarantee (Lemma 9.1) takes the weak-duality bound, the step-(1c) fill rule, and the x(e,j)≤2 invariant as hypotheses and derives both parts of the lemma's conclusion by real algebra (a sign case-split for part (i); Real.logb/rpow manipulation for part (ii)). routing_competitive (Theorem 9.2) takes Lemma 9.1's guarantee (universally quantified over the copy index J, a general Fintype) plus the two composition hypotheses described above, and derives the bicriterion conclusion by summation, transitivity, and scaling. This correctly rules out the trivializing formalization in which the composition hypotheses are strengthened to directly assert the theorem's own conclusion (each is a strictly weaker, independently-motivated fact — the backward-induction accounting identity and the geometric edge-multiplicity bound — checked in MODERATION_NOTES.md against this exact failure mode). Reals throughout; Real.logb 2 for log₂. Welcome contributions: completing the two sorrys (Lemma 9.1's part (i) is short algebra; part (ii) needs Real.rpow/Real.logb lemmas; Theorem 9.2's is transitivity/summation once its hypotheses are in hand), and — the natural follow-on — formalizing the copy construction and the backward-induction/edge-multiplicity arguments hquota/hload_aggregation currently stand in for, which would upgrade them from hypotheses to theorems in their own right; Section 9.2's coordinate-wise-competitive fair-routing algorithm (Theorem 9.3) and the matching lower bound (Lemma 9.5) are further natural follow-ons.

Selected references

  • N. Buchbinder, J. Naor. The Design of Competitive Online Algorithms via a Primal-Dual Approach. Foundations and Trends in Theoretical Computer Science, 3(2-3):93-263, 2009. https://doi.org/10.1561/0400000024
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Linear OptimizationTheoretical Computer Science·Captain: mikedeng1

The Design of Competitive Online Algorithms via a Primal-Dual Approach IV: Generalized CachingTextbook

Motivation

Caching is a two-level memory-management problem — the fast level (cache) can hold only kkk items, and the algorithm must decide, online, which item to evict whenever the current request misses — that is normally analyzed through the competitive ratio of ad hoc marking or LRU-style rules. Buchbinder and Naor's survey [1] instead recasts weighted caching (non-uniform fetching costs) as an instance of the covering/packing linear program, and derives a fractional online algorithm through the same primal-dual recipe formalized in this series' 04-framework mission (Chapter 4), but for a genuinely different LP shape: the caching LP's right-hand side varies from constraint to constraint, unlike Chapter 4's uniform b(j)=1b(j)=1b(j)=1. This mission covers Sections 7.1-7.2 of Chapter 7, "Generalized Caching": the fractional weighted-caching algorithm and its 2(1+ln⁡k)2(1+\ln k)2(1+lnk)-competitive analysis. Sections 7.3-7.4, which further generalize to non-uniform page sizes (not just costs), are out of scope — a natural follow-on mission, not attempted here (see Formalization scope).

Setting

Fix a finite set VVV of primal variables x(p,j)x(p,j)x(p,j) — one per page ppp and each of its eviction intervals between its jjj-th and (j+1)(j{+}1)(j+1)-th request — with fetching cost c(p,j)=cp≥1c(p,j) = c_p \ge 1c(p,j)=cp​≥1 (the book's standing weighted-caching assumption), and a finite set Time\mathrm{Time}Time of online constraints, one per request time ttt, revealed in the order enumerated by Time\mathrm{Time}Time. The eviction-charged LP formulation (the book charges for evicting pages rather than fetching them, an equivalent reformulation up to an additive constant independent of the request sequence) constrains, at each time ttt: ∑v∈S(t)xv≥rhs(t)\sum_{v \in S(t)} x_v \ge \mathrm{rhs}(t)∑v∈S(t)​xv​≥rhs(t), where S(t)S(t)S(t) is the set of currently-active eviction variables for pages present until ttt (excluding the page just requested) and rhs(t)=∣B(t)∣−k\mathrm{rhs}(t) = |B(t)| - krhs(t)=∣B(t)∣−k is the amount of cache space those pages must collectively vacate. The Lagrangian dual has a variable y(t)y(t)y(t) per request time and a variable z(p,j)z(p,j)z(p,j) per eviction interval, with dual constraint (∑t∣v∈S(t)y(t))−zv≤cv\big(\sum_{t \mid v \in S(t)} y(t)\big) - z_v \le c_v(∑t∣v∈S(t)​y(t))−zv​≤cv​. As in Chapter 4, primal variables may only increase and the algorithm sees each constraint only upon its arrival.

The Fractional Caching algorithm (p. 153-154) sets each x(p,j)x(p,j)x(p,j) to jump from 000 to 1/k1/k1/k the first time its dual constraint tightens, then increases continuously according to an exponential function of the accumulated dual sum until it saturates at 111 (at which point z(p,j)z(p,j)z(p,j) begins absorbing further dual increase at the same rate, freezing x(p,j)x(p,j)x(p,j)). This is a genuinely different LP shape from Chapter 4's framework (non-uniform, time-varying right-hand side) reusing the same complementary-slackness design pattern as that chapter's Algorithm 3.

Formalization targets

Theorem 7.1 (the goal, p. 154), given the algorithm's final dual values y≥0y \ge 0y≥0, z≥0z \ge 0z≥0 and primal feasibility:

(∀v, ∑t∣v∈S(t)yt−zv≤cv(1+ln⁡k)) ⟹ (∀x′′ feasible, ∑vcvxv≤2(1+ln⁡k)∑vcvxv′′),\Big(\forall v,\ \textstyle\sum_{t \mid v \in S(t)} y_t - z_v \le c_v(1+\ln k)\Big) \ \Longrightarrow\ \Big(\forall x''\text{ feasible},\ \textstyle\sum_v c_v x_v \le 2(1+\ln k)\sum_v c_v x''_v\Big),(∀v, ∑t∣v∈S(t)​yt​−zv​≤cv​(1+lnk)) ⟹ (∀x′′ feasible, ∑v​cv​xv​≤2(1+lnk)∑v​cv​xv′′​),

i.e. the algorithm is 2(1+ln⁡k)2(1+\ln k)2(1+lnk)-competitive, with the constant taken verbatim from the book's own theorem statement (no O(⋅)O(\cdot)O(⋅) instantiation needed here, unlike most goals in this series). The antecedent is itself Eq. (7.2) (p. 155), formalized as the milestone dual_near_feasible: the algorithm's dual solution, scaled down by 1+ln⁡k1+\ln k1+lnk, is feasible — the book's own intermediate step, derived from the fact that every cachingX value is capped at 111.

Significance

Chapter 7 is the first chapter in this survey to apply the online primal-dual method to an LP whose right-hand side is not uniformly 111 (unlike Chapters 4 and 5), demonstrating the method's reach beyond the "simplified" 0/1-coefficient covering LP that 04-framework formalizes. The 2(1+ln⁡k)2(1+\ln k)2(1+lnk) fractional guarantee is also the analytical core of the chapter's randomized rounding result (Theorem 7.3, not part of this mission — see Formalization scope), which converts it into an actual O(log⁡k)O(\log k)O(logk)-competitive randomized algorithm against an adaptive adversary, and of the chapter's further generalization to non-uniform page sizes (Theorem 7.5, Sections 7.3-7.4). No formal development of weighted or generalized caching was found on the platform as of 2026-09-20 (searches below); the existing KServer.* namespace formalizes a different, unweighted, uniform kkk-server model and shares no substrate with this mission. This mission is the first.

Difficulty

As with 04-framework's Algorithm 3, the central obstacle is characterizing an online process by its final output alone: cachingX is defined as the algorithm's own closed-form update rule (threshold-then-exponential, capped once x(p,j)=1x(p,j)=1x(p,j)=1), evaluated at the run's final accumulated dual values, rather than as an independently-constrained free variable — the latter would let xxx and yyy be chosen to satisfy the conclusion's inequalities directly, trivializing the claim that a specific online algorithm achieves this ratio. Establishing that the capped closed form is faithful (not merely an invented convention) requires the same monotonicity argument 04-framework's alg3X uses, adapted to this chapter's extra z(p,j)z(p,j)z(p,j) term inside the exponent (present here; absent from Chapter 4's Algorithm 3). The proof's own structure — splitting the primal cost into a 0→1/k0\to1/k0→1/k contribution (C1C_1C1​) bounded via complementary slackness and a 1/k→11/k\to11/k→1 contribution (C2C_2C2​) bounded via a derivative/telescoping argument over the continuous accumulation process (Eqs. (7.6)-(7.10), p. 155-157) — is, as in Chapter 4, a genuinely dynamic fact about the trajectory, not encoded as a hypothesis; the mission states the theorem faithfully and leaves the sorry for that argument, per this series' documented-simplification convention.

Formalization scope

CachingInstance V Time bundles S : Time → Finset V, rhs : Time → ℝ (unlike 04-framework's CoveringInstance, whose right-hand side is fixed at 111 throughout), c : V → ℝ with hc_pos : ∀v, 1 ≤ c v (the book's own literal cp ≥ 1, not a strengthening), and k : ℕ with hk_pos : 0 < k. dualSum inst y v := ∑_{t \mid v \in S(t)} y_t, matching 04-framework's pattern. cachingX inst y z v is a noncomputable def: 0 before activation, otherwise min 1 ((1/k) exp((dualSum - z - c v)/c v)), so "the algorithm's output" is genuinely a function of its dual trajectory. Reals throughout; Real.log for the book's natural log ln⁡\lnln. Explicitly out of scope: Section 7.3's rounding apparatus (Theorem 7.3, the map from fractional to randomized-integral cache states) and Section 7.4's non-uniform-page-size generalization (Theorem 7.5) — both are natural follow-on missions building on this one's CachingInstance and cachingX, not attempted here per this chunk's own BRIEF.md, which flags Theorem 7.1 alone as "a complete, self-contained mission goal" when the rounding apparatus proves too heavy for a single pass. Welcome contributions: completing the two sorrys, and the Section 7.3-7.4 follow-on mission.

Selected references

  • N. Buchbinder, J. Naor. The Design of Competitive Online Algorithms via a Primal-Dual Approach. Foundations and Trends in Theoretical Computer Science, 3(2-3):93-263, 2009. https://doi.org/10.1561/0400000024
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Theoretical Computer Science·Captain: mikedeng1

The Design of Competitive Online Algorithms via a Primal-Dual Approach III: Metrical Task Systems on a Weighted StarTextbook

Motivation

The metrical task system (MTS) problem is one of the earliest and most general online models: a server occupies a state in a metric space, requests arrive with per-state service costs, and the server may change state (paying the metric's transition cost) before serving each request. On a general metric, competitive algorithms are hard to design directly. Chapter 6 shows that on a weighted star metric — the simplest genuinely non-uniform metric, a hub with leaves at varying distances — the online primal-dual framework of Chapter 4 becomes applicable, but only after a change of rules: the chapter defines a new MTS model, in which the server may change state only at the boundary of a "phase" (an interval during which its accumulated service cost reaches the state's own transition charge), and shows this new model is cost-equivalent, up to a constant factor, to the standard model. This equivalence is what licenses recasting the (new-model) problem as a covering linear program with the online primal-dual framework directly applicable — the chapter's actual algorithmic payoff (an unnumbered O(log⁡N)O(\log N)O(logN)-competitive result, Section 6.2) rests entirely on it.

Setting

Fix a set of leaves VVV (the book's finite {1,…,N}\{1,\dots,N\}{1,…,N}) of a weighted star, each leaf iii at distance d′(i)≥0d'(i) \ge 0d′(i)≥0 from the center. The chapter immediately collapses the full star metric to a single per-state transition charge d(i):=2d′(i)d(i) := 2d'(i)d(i):=2d′(i), since on a star every transition i→ji \to ji→j costs at most d′(i)+d′(j)d'(i) + d'(j)d′(i)+d′(j), and charging the doubled source leaf's distance alone (never charging for arriving) upper-bounds every transition cost independent of destination. A standard-model solution is a finite sequence of runs, each specifying a state sis_isi​ occupied and the service cost wi≥0w_i \ge 0wi​≥0 accumulated while in that state, ending with a transition (cost d(si)d(s_i)d(si​)) to the next run's state; its total cost is ∑i(wi+d(si))\sum_i (w_i + d(s_i))∑i​(wi​+d(si​)). A new-model solution is a finite sequence of phases, each specifying a state visited; a phase's cost is exactly d(state)d(\text{state})d(state) regardless of how much service actually occurred during it (a state change is only permitted once a phase's accumulated service reaches the phase's own ddd-value), so the new model's total cost is ∑id(si)\sum_i d(s_i)∑i​d(si​).

Formalization targets

Lemma 6.1 (goal, p. 144): any standard-model solution's runs (s,w)(s, w)(s,w) transform into a new-model solution whose cost is at most 2⋅∑i(wi+d(si))2 \cdot \sum_i (w_i + d(s_i))2⋅∑i​(wi​+d(si​)); in particular OPTn(σˉ)≤2⋅OPTo(σˉ)OPT_n(\bar\sigma) \le 2 \cdot OPT_o(\bar\sigma)OPTn​(σˉ)≤2⋅OPTo​(σˉ).

Lemma 6.2 (milestone, p. 145): any new-model solution's phases (s,w)(s, w)(s,w), with each phase's actual service wi≤d(si)w_i \le d(s_i)wi​≤d(si​), are simultaneously a legal standard-model solution (the same trajectory, recosted) whose standard-model cost is at most 2⋅∑id(si)2 \cdot \sum_i d(s_i)2⋅∑i​d(si​).

Together (stated in the book but not separately numbered, hence not a formalization target here): a ccc-competitive algorithm in the new model implies a 4c4c4c-competitive algorithm in the standard model.

Significance

This is a model-equivalence result, a distinct and recurring pattern in online algorithm design from the competitive-ratio bounds formalized elsewhere in this series: rather than analyzing an algorithm directly, the chapter first shows that solving an easier, more restricted version of the problem (state changes only at phase boundaries) loses only a constant factor, and only then designs an algorithm for the restricted version. The technique generalizes (the chapter's own Notes section places it in the context of Borodin et al.'s original MTS bounds, and of later work on hierarchically well-separated trees for general metrics), but this chapter gives its cleanest, self-contained instance: two short, tight (factor-2 each direction) transformations between two formally distinct online cost models. No prior formalization of metrical task systems on a weighted star, or of this new/standard model equivalence, was found on the platform as of 2026-09-20 (search below); the platform's existing KServer.* campaign formalizes a different online problem (uniform-metric kkk-server) with a different metric structure and is not adjacent substrate for this chapter's weighted-star MTS model.

Difficulty

The central obstacle is representing "a solution" at a level of abstraction faithful to the book's own proof without committing to a full continuous-time process model (states as functions of a real time variable, phases as recursively-defined stopping times, requests as an explicit arriving sequence) that neither lemma's own proof actually needs. Both proofs work entirely at the granularity of a solution's runs (standard model) or phases (new model) — finite sequences of (state, cost) data — never referencing continuous time except to justify that this decomposition exists. This mission formalizes both lemmas at exactly that granularity: a run/phase sequence indexed by Fin k, with costStandard/costNewPhases the book's own displayed cost formulas. Lemma 6.1's proof genuinely constructs a new object (the delayed-transition solution S′S'S′) and only bounds its cost, never gives S′S'S′ a closed form — formalized here as an existential over a per-segment cost witness w', bounded above and below exactly as the proof's own argument does (with the lower bound d(s i) ≤ w' i serving as the guard against the vacuous witness w' = 0, since without it the existential is trivially satisfiable and asserts nothing). Lemma 6.2's proof, by contrast, reuses the same trajectory in both models with no construction at all, formalized directly as a cost comparison between costStandard and costNewPhases applied to the identical (s, w) data.

Formalization scope

WeightedStar V bundles centerDist : V → ℝ (the book's d′d'd′) with non-negativity; WeightedStar.d is the collapsed charge d(i)=2d′(i)d(i) = 2d'(i)d(i)=2d′(i). costStandard/costNewPhases are literal transcriptions of the two models' displayed cost formulas over a Fin k-indexed run/phase sequence. standard_to_new (Lemma 6.1) is the existential described above; new_to_standard (Lemma 6.2) is the direct cost comparison. Reals throughout; V is left a general Type* (not assumed Fintype) since neither lemma's own statement needs the chapter's finiteness assumption ∣V∣=N|V|=N∣V∣=N — that assumption only matters for the unnumbered O(log⁡N)O(\log N)O(logN)-competitive claim of Section 6.2, out of scope per BRIEF.md's explicit instruction (no numbered theorem to formalize it against). This correctly rules out the trivializing formalization in which "new-model solution" is left as an unconstrained free variable satisfying only the conclusion's own inequality, or in which the star structure is dropped entirely in favor of an arbitrary metric (the chapter's own reduction to a per-state charge d(i)d(i)d(i), rather than a full metric d:V×V→Rd: V\times V\to\mathbb Rd:V×V→R, is precisely what the star's structure licenses, and is preserved here via WeightedStar.d rather than a bare hypothesis-level function). Welcome contributions: completing the two sorrys (Lemma 6.1's needs an explicit construction of S′S'S′ and its per-segment cost bound; Lemma 6.2's is a short termwise algebraic argument), and formalizing the Section 6.2 covering-LP algorithm and its O(log⁡N)O(\log N)O(logN)-competitive claim as a follow-on mission once it can be stated against a numbered result.

Selected references

  • N. Buchbinder, J. Naor. The Design of Competitive Online Algorithms via a Primal-Dual Approach. Foundations and Trends in Theoretical Computer Science, 3(2-3):93-263, 2009. https://doi.org/10.1561/0400000024
  • Bansal et al., reference [14] of this chapter's own bibliography (not independently verified by this mission), cited by the book as the source of the weighted-star MTS results this chapter presents ("The results in this chapter are based on the work of Bansal et al. [14]," p. 147).
  • Borodin, Linial, Saks, reference [29] of this chapter's own bibliography (not independently verified by this mission), cited as the paper that originally formulated the standard MTS model and its tight 2N−12N-12N−1 deterministic bound (p. 147).
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