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Operations Research

2,210 missions · 1,088 completed

The discipline of applying mathematical analysis to complex decision problems in operations: allocating scarce resources, scheduling, routing, inventory, and the design of service and production systems. Drawing on mathematical programming, stochastic modeling, queueing, simulation, and game-theoretic reasoning, it seeks policies that perform provably well in systems shaped by constraints, congestion, and uncertainty.

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Convex OptimizationOptimization·Captain: mikedeng1

Self-Scaled Barriers and Interior-Point Methods for Convex Programming II: A Long Step of the Conic Karmarkar Method Lowers the Potential by at Least (‖p‖²/|p|²)(1 − ln 2) ≥ 1 − ln 2Research Paper

Motivation

Karmarkar's projective method (1984) was the first interior-point algorithm for linear programming with a polynomial bound that was also fast in practice. Its analysis rests on a potential function that combines the logarithm of the objective gap with a logarithmic barrier: if every iteration lowers the potential by a fixed constant, then the gap shrinks geometrically. Nesterov and Nemirovskii (1994, §4.3) carried the method over to general convex cones with self-concordant barriers, but only with short steps, which move a fraction of the way to the boundary of a ball in the local norm.

Nesterov and Todd (1997) introduced self-scaled barriers, the class behind the cones of linear, second-order cone and semidefinite programming. They used it to allow long steps, which go a large fraction of the way to the boundary of the cone itself. Section 7.1 of that paper analyses the Karmarkar method with long steps on a self-scaled cone. It shows that the potential decrease per iteration is at least the absolute constant 1−ln⁡21-\ln 21−ln2, independent of the barrier parameter, as in the linear-programming case. This mission formalizes that analysis.

Timeline:

  • 1984, Karmarkar: projective method for linear programming, with potential decrease per step bounded below by a constant.
  • 1986, Anstreicher: a strengthened acceptance criterion for approximate projections in Karmarkar's algorithm for standard linear programming, containing the result that Lemma 7.1 of the 1997 paper generalizes (p. 28).
  • 1994, Nesterov–Nemirovskii, Interior-Point Polynomial Algorithms in Convex Programming, §4.3: the extension to self-concordant barriers on general cones, short steps.
  • 1997, Nesterov–Todd: self-scaled barriers and long steps (this paper, Theorem 7.2).

Setting

Let E=RnE=\mathbb R^nE=Rn with inner product ⟨⋅,⋅⟩\langle\cdot,\cdot\rangle⟨⋅,⋅⟩, which identifies the dual space E∗E^*E∗ with EEE. Let K⊆EK\subseteq EK⊆E be a closed convex cone with nonempty interior that contains no line, and let K∗={s:⟨s,x⟩≥0 ∀x∈K}K^*=\{s:\langle s,x\rangle\ge0\ \forall x\in K\}K∗={s:⟨s,x⟩≥0 ∀x∈K} be its dual cone. A ν\nuν-self-scaled barrier F:int⁡K→RF:\operatorname{int}K\to\mathbb RF:intK→R is a self-concordant barrier that is logarithmically homogeneous, F(τx)=F(x)−νln⁡τF(\tau x)=F(x)-\nu\ln\tauF(τx)=F(x)−νlnτ, and satisfies the two scaling conditions of Definition 2.1 of the paper. F′F'F′ and F′′F''F′′ are its gradient and Hessian.

Two measures of a direction p∈Ep\in Ep∈E at x∈int⁡Kx\in\operatorname{int}Kx∈intK are used:

  • the local norm ∥p∥x=⟨F′′(x)p,p⟩1/2\|p\|_x=\langle F''(x)p,p\rangle^{1/2}∥p∥x​=⟨F′′(x)p,p⟩1/2;
  • the σ-measure σx(p)=min⁡{β≥0:βx−p∈K}\sigma_x(p)=\min\{\beta\ge0:\beta x-p\in K\}σx​(p)=min{β≥0:βx−p∈K}, and the uniform norm ∣p∣x=max⁡{σx(p),σx(−p)}|p|_x=\max\{\sigma_x(p),\sigma_x(-p)\}∣p∣x​=max{σx​(p),σx​(−p)}.

The point x−αpx-\alpha px−αp stays in int⁡K\operatorname{int}KintK exactly when α σx(p)<1\alpha\,\sigma_x(p)<1ασx​(p)<1.

The problem is in Karmarkar form:

(P)min⁡ ⟨c,x⟩s.t.Bx=0,  ⟨d,x⟩=1,  x∈K,(P)\qquad\min\ \langle c,x\rangle\quad\text{s.t.}\quad Bx=0,\ \ \langle d,x\rangle=1,\ \ x\in K,(P)min ⟨c,x⟩s.t.Bx=0,  ⟨d,x⟩=1,  x∈K,

with B:E→RmB:E\to\mathbb R^mB:E→Rm linear and surjective and d∈K∗d\in K^*d∈K∗. Its dual is max⁡{ζ:B∗y+dζ+s=c, s∈K∗}\max\{\zeta: B^*y+d\zeta+s=c,\ s\in K^*\}max{ζ:B∗y+dζ+s=c, s∈K∗}. The standing assumptions are that (P) and the dual have strictly feasible points, and that ⟨c,⋅⟩\langle c,\cdot\rangle⟨c,⋅⟩ is not constant on the feasible set of (P). The optimal value is ζ∗\zeta^*ζ∗. The method decreases the potential

Φ(x;ζ)=νln⁡⟨c−ζd,x⟩+F(x),\Phi(x;\zeta)=\nu\ln\langle c-\zeta d,x\rangle+F(x),Φ(x;ζ)=νln⟨c−ζd,x⟩+F(x),

which is homogeneous of degree 000 in xxx.

One iteration starts from a strictly feasible x^\hat xx^ and a lower bound ζ^≤ζ∗\hat\zeta\le\zeta^*ζ^​≤ζ∗:

  1. Put c^=c+⟨c,x^⟩νF′(x^)\hat c=c+\frac{\langle c,\hat x\rangle}{\nu}F'(\hat x)c^=c+ν⟨c,x^⟩​F′(x^) and d^=d+⟨d,x^⟩νF′(x^)\hat d=d+\frac{\langle d,\hat x\rangle}{\nu}F'(\hat x)d^=d+ν⟨d,x^⟩​F′(x^). Let p(c)p(c)p(c), p(d)p(d)p(d) be their projections into ker⁡B\ker BkerB with respect to F′′(x^)F''(\hat x)F′′(x^): Bp(u)=0Bp(u)=0Bp(u)=0 and B∗y(u)+F′′(x^)p(u)=u^B^*y(u)+F''(\hat x)p(u)=\hat uB∗y(u)+F′′(x^)p(u)=u^ (7.3).
  2. Put x~(ζ)=⟨c−ζd,x^⟩νx^+p(c)−ζp(d)\tilde x(\zeta)=\frac{\langle c-\zeta d,\hat x\rangle}{\nu}\hat x+p(c)-\zeta p(d)x~(ζ)=ν⟨c−ζd,x^⟩​x^+p(c)−ζp(d) (7.4). If x~(ζ^)∉int⁡K\tilde x(\hat\zeta)\notin\operatorname{int}Kx~(ζ^​)∈/intK, keep ζ+=ζ^\zeta^+=\hat\zetaζ+=ζ^​. Otherwise raise the bound to ζ+=ζ^+1/σx~(ζ^)(p(d)+x^/ν)\zeta^+=\hat\zeta+1/\sigma_{\tilde x(\hat\zeta)}(p(d)+\hat x/\nu)ζ+=ζ^​+1/σx~(ζ^​)​(p(d)+x^/ν) (7.6).
  3. Take the direction p=p(c)−ζ+p(d)p=p(c)-\zeta^+p(d)p=p(c)−ζ+p(d) (7.5) and the new point x+=x^−αpx^+=\hat x-\alpha px+=x^−αp.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 7.2 (p. 28)

For a suitable α>0\alpha>0α>0, the point x+=x^−αpx^+=\hat x-\alpha px+=x^−αp lies in {x∈int⁡K:Bx=0}\{x\in\operatorname{int}K:Bx=0\}{x∈intK:Bx=0} and

Φ(x+;ζ+)≤Φ(x^;ζ^)−∥p∥x^2∣p∣x^2(1−ln⁡2)≤Φ(x^;ζ^)−(1−ln⁡2).(7.9)\Phi(x^+;\zeta^+)\le\Phi(\hat x;\hat\zeta)-\frac{\|p\|_{\hat x}^2}{|p|_{\hat x}^2}(1-\ln2)\le\Phi(\hat x;\hat\zeta)-(1-\ln2).\qquad(7.9)Φ(x+;ζ+)≤Φ(x^;ζ^​)−∣p∣x^2​∥p∥x^2​​(1−ln2)≤Φ(x^;ζ^​)−(1−ln2).(7.9)

The goal asserts the existence of the step, not a particular step size, so it does not commit to the step chosen in the proof.

Milestones

  • Lemma 7.1 (p. 27): ζ+≤ζ∗\zeta^+\le\zeta^*ζ+≤ζ∗, and ⟨c,x^⟩−ζ+≤ν σx^(−p)\langle c,\hat x\rangle-\zeta^+\le\nu\,\sigma_{\hat x}(-p)⟨c,x^⟩−ζ+≤νσx^​(−p) (7.7).
  • (7.8) (p. 28): ∥p∥x^2=⟨c−ζ+d,p⟩\|p\|_{\hat x}^2=\langle c-\zeta^+d,p\rangle∥p∥x^2​=⟨c−ζ+d,p⟩.

Companion: Theorem 7.1 (p. 26)

With Kˉ={x∈K:Bx=0, ⟨c,x⟩≤max⁡(⟨c,x0⟩,0)+1, ⟨d,x⟩≤1}\bar K=\{x\in K:Bx=0,\ \langle c,x\rangle\le\max(\langle c,x_0\rangle,0)+1,\ \langle d,x\rangle\le1\}Kˉ={x∈K:Bx=0, ⟨c,x⟩≤max(⟨c,x0​⟩,0)+1, ⟨d,x⟩≤1} and F‾\underline FF​ the minimum of FFF over it: if Φ(x;ζ)≤Φ(x0;ζ0)−Δ\Phi(x;\zeta)\le\Phi(x_0;\zeta_0)-\DeltaΦ(x;ζ)≤Φ(x0​;ζ0​)−Δ with ζ∈[ζ0,ζ∗]\zeta\in[\zeta_0,\zeta^*]ζ∈[ζ0​,ζ∗] and Δ\DeltaΔ large enough, then

⟨c,x⟩−ζ≤(⟨c,x0⟩−ζ0) e(F(x0)−F‾)/ν e−Δ/ν.(7.2)\langle c,x\rangle-\zeta\le(\langle c,x_0\rangle-\zeta_0)\,e^{(F(x_0)-\underline F)/\nu}\,e^{-\Delta/\nu}.\qquad(7.2)⟨c,x⟩−ζ≤(⟨c,x0​⟩−ζ0​)e(F(x0​)−F​)/νe−Δ/ν.(7.2)

Significance

Theorem 7.2 together with Theorem 7.1 gives the O(νln⁡(1/ϵ))O(\nu\ln(1/\epsilon))O(νln(1/ϵ)) iteration bound of the long-step conic Karmarkar method. The decrease constant 1−ln⁡21-\ln21−ln2 does not depend on ν\nuν or on the cone. The finer bound ∥p∥2∣p∣2(1−ln⁡2)\frac{\|p\|^2}{|p|^2}(1-\ln 2)∣p∣2∥p∥2​(1−ln2) can be much larger than 1−ln⁡21-\ln 21−ln2, since ∥p∥x≥∣p∣x\|p\|_x\ge|p|_x∥p∥x​≥∣p∣x​ always holds. This explains why long steps outperform short ones in practice. Lemma 7.1 shows that the lower bound obtained from dual information is valid and tight enough to drive the analysis. The paper presents it as a generalization of a result of Anstreicher (1986) for standard linear programming.

The results are proved in the paper; none of them is formalized anywhere. A formal development checks the interplay of the lower-bound update with the σ-measure and the homogeneity of Φ\PhiΦ, which the paper treats briefly. It also records a correction: on p. 27 the paper prints c^=c−⟨c,x^⟩νF′(x^)\hat c=c-\frac{\langle c,\hat x\rangle}{\nu}F'(\hat x)c^=c−ν⟨c,x^⟩​F′(x^) (and likewise d^\hat dd^). The paper's own surrounding identities, in particular ⟨u^,x^⟩=0\langle\hat u,\hat x\rangle=0⟨u^,x^⟩=0 on p. 28, require the sign "+++", and the formalization uses "+++".

Difficulty

The obvious argument bounds the change of FFF along x−αpx-\alpha px−αp with self-concordance in the local norm. That argument only controls steps with α∥p∥x^<1\alpha\|p\|_{\hat x}<1α∥p∥x^​<1, and it gives a decrease that degrades with the step length. The long step goes up to 1/σx^(p)1/\sigma_{\hat x}(p)1/σx^​(p), which can be much larger. Reaching it requires the long-step barrier bound for self-scaled barriers (Theorem 4.2 of the paper, stated in another mission of this series). That bound controls F(x−αp)F(x-\alpha p)F(x−αp) through σx(p)\sigma_x(p)σx​(p) instead of ∥p∥x\|p\|_x∥p∥x​.

The second obstacle is the linear term. The decrease in νln⁡⟨c−ζ+d,⋅⟩\nu\ln\langle c-\zeta^+d,\cdot\rangleνln⟨c−ζ+d,⋅⟩ must be compared with ∥p∥2\|p\|^2∥p∥2, which needs both the identity (7.8) and the gap bound (7.7). The gap bound is the step at which the lower-bound update is essential: without the update, ⟨c,x^⟩−ζ^\langle c,\hat x\rangle-\hat\zeta⟨c,x^⟩−ζ^​ is not bounded by νσx^(−p)\nu\sigma_{\hat x}(-p)νσx^​(−p).

Formalization scope

The Lean development reuses the published self-scaled setting of the series SelfScaledIPM (IsProperCone, IsSelfScaledBarrier, hess, lnorm, sigma, absn) and ConvexOptimization.dualCone. Conventions:

  • E=E=E= EuclideanSpace ℝ (Fin n), with E∗E^*E∗ identified with EEE.
  • F′′F''F′′ is assumed nondegenerate on int⁡K\operatorname{int}KintK. This follows from the other axioms for a pointed cone.
  • The conjugate barrier is a supremum over int⁡K\operatorname{int}KintK.
  • ν≥1\nu\ge1ν≥1 is a binder. The paper derives it from pointedness on p. 3.
  • ζ∗\zeta^*ζ∗ is a real infimum, made finite by the strict dual feasibility assumption, which every statement carries. Nonconstancy of the objective is stated as the existence of two feasible points with different objective values.
  • The projections p(c)p(c)p(c), p(d)p(d)p(d) are data satisfying (7.3), not chosen by a selection function. The lower-bound update and the direction are definitions computed from them.
  • The goal adds the conjunct ⟨c−ζ+d,x+⟩>0\langle c-\zeta^+d,x^+\rangle>0⟨c−ζ+d,x+⟩>0, so that the logarithm in Φ(x+;ζ+)\Phi(x^+;\zeta^+)Φ(x+;ζ+) is genuine. It does not assert ⟨d,x+⟩=1\langle d,x^+\rangle=1⟨d,x+⟩=1, which the paper notes may fail.
  • Identity (7.8) is stated for every real ζ\zetaζ, which contains the page's ζ=ζ+\zeta=\zeta^+ζ=ζ+.
  • F‾\underline FF​ is an infimum over Kˉ∩int⁡K\bar K\cap\operatorname{int}KKˉ∩intK, where the barrier is finite.
  • c^\hat cc^ and d^\hat dd^ carry the corrected sign "+++".

A statement with ζ+\zeta^+ζ+ an arbitrary real, or with ppp an arbitrary vector, would be false or vacuous. The statements here fix both by the page's construction (7.3)–(7.6), and the logarithm in Φ\PhiΦ is guarded by the positivity conjunct.

A proof needs the long-step barrier inequality (Theorem 4.2), the monotonicity facts of Proposition 4.1, K∗=F′′(v)KK^*=F''(v)KK∗=F′′(v)K (Theorem 3.1 (iii)), and ∥p(u)∥w2=⟨u,p(u)⟩\|p(u)\|^2_w=\langle u,p(u)\rangle∥p(u)∥w2​=⟨u,p(u)⟩ (Proposition 6.2). These are milestones of the other missions of this series, and contributions proving them are reusable here. Elementary facts about σ\sigmaσ (positive homogeneity, the boundary characterization x−αp∈∂Kx-\alpha p\in\partial Kx−αp∈∂K at α=1/σx(p)\alpha=1/\sigma_x(p)α=1/σx​(p)) are useful beyond this mission.

Selected references

  • Yu. E. Nesterov and M. J. Todd, Self-scaled barriers and interior-point methods for convex programming, Mathematics of Operations Research 22(1), 1997, 1–42. https://doi.org/10.1287/moor.22.1.1
  • N. Karmarkar, A new polynomial-time algorithm for linear programming, Combinatorica 4, 1984, 373–395. https://doi.org/10.1007/BF02579150
  • K. M. Anstreicher, A strengthened acceptance criterion for approximate projections in Karmarkar's algorithm, Operations Research Letters 5, 1986, 211–214. https://www.sciencedirect.com/journal/operations-research-letters/vol/5
  • Yu. Nesterov and A. Nemirovskii, Interior-Point Polynomial Algorithms in Convex Programming, SIAM, 1994. https://doi.org/10.1137/1.9781611970791
  • Yu. E. Nesterov and M. J. Todd, Primal-dual interior-point methods for self-scaled cones, SIAM Journal on Optimization 8(2), 1998, 324–364. https://doi.org/10.1137/S1052623495290209
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Convex OptimizationOptimization·Captain: mikedeng1

Self-Scaled Barriers and Interior-Point Methods for Convex Programming III: An Affine Potential-Reduction Step Lowers the Potential by at Least 1 − ln 2, and by (‖p‖²/|p|²)(1 − ln 2) When µ ≥ 2νResearch Paper

Motivation

Potential-reduction methods solve a linear or conic program by driving down a single merit function that combines the objective gap with a barrier for the constraint cone. For linear programming the primal version goes back to Karmarkar (1984) and, without Karmarkar's special problem form, to Gonzaga (1990, Math. Programming 49, 7–21), whose method reduces the potential by a constant at every step while updating a lower bound on the optimal value. Nesterov and Nemirovskii (1994) extended such methods to general convex cones with self-concordant barriers, but their analysis only allows short steps: steps confined to a ball of the local norm, which in practice is a small fraction of the way to the boundary.

Nesterov and Todd (1997) singled out the self-scaled cones (the nonnegative orthant, the second-order cone, the cone of positive semidefinite matrices, and their products) and showed that for them long steps are admissible. This mission formalizes their extension of Gonzaga's method (§7.2 of the paper): a primal potential-reduction step, with a lower-bound update, that decreases the potential by a constant and, when the potential parameter is large enough, by an amount that scales with how far the step can go.

Setting

Let E=RnE = \mathbb R^nE=Rn with its inner product, identified with its dual E∗E^*E∗. Let K⊆EK \subseteq EK⊆E be a closed convex pointed cone with nonempty interior, and FFF a ν\nuν-self-scaled barrier for KKK: a ν\nuν-self-concordant logarithmically homogeneous barrier (F(τx)=F(x)−νln⁡τF(\tau x) = F(x) - \nu\ln\tauF(τx)=F(x)−νlnτ) such that for all w,x∈int⁡Kw, x \in \operatorname{int} Kw,x∈intK the Hessian satisfies F′′(w)x∈int⁡K∗F''(w)x \in \operatorname{int} K^*F′′(w)x∈intK∗ and F∗(F′′(w)x)=F(x)−2F(w)−νF_*(F''(w)x) = F(x) - 2F(w) - \nuF∗​(F′′(w)x)=F(x)−2F(w)−ν, where K∗K^*K∗ is the dual cone and F∗F_*F∗​ the conjugate barrier. Here ν≥1\nu \ge 1ν≥1.

The problem is

(P)min⁡ ⟨c,x⟩s.t.Ax=b, x∈K,(P)\qquad \min\ \langle c, x\rangle \quad\text{s.t.}\quad Ax = b,\ x \in K,(P)min ⟨c,x⟩s.t.Ax=b, x∈K,

with A:E→RmA : E \to \mathbb R^mA:E→Rm linear and surjective, and dual (D)(D)(D): max⁡⟨b,y⟩\max \langle b, y\ranglemax⟨b,y⟩ s.t. A∗y+s=cA^*y + s = cA∗y+s=c, s∈K∗s \in K^*s∈K∗. Both have strictly feasible points: S0(P)={x∈int⁡K:Ax=b}S^0(P) = \{x \in \operatorname{int}K : Ax = b\}S0(P)={x∈intK:Ax=b} and S0(D)S^0(D)S0(D) are nonempty, and the objective is not constant on the feasible region of (P)(P)(P). Let ζ∗\zeta^*ζ∗ be the optimal value.

At x∈int⁡Kx \in \operatorname{int}Kx∈intK the local norm is ∥p∥x=⟨F′′(x)p,p⟩1/2\|p\|_x = \langle F''(x)p, p\rangle^{1/2}∥p∥x​=⟨F′′(x)p,p⟩1/2, its dual is ∥u∥x∗=⟨u,[F′′(x)]−1u⟩1/2\|u\|^*_x = \langle u, [F''(x)]^{-1}u\rangle^{1/2}∥u∥x∗​=⟨u,[F′′(x)]−1u⟩1/2, and σx(p)=min⁡{β≥0:βx−p∈K}\sigma_x(p) = \min\{\beta \ge 0 : \beta x - p \in K\}σx​(p)=min{β≥0:βx−p∈K} measures how far one can move from xxx along −p-p−p: the point x−αpx - \alpha px−αp stays in int⁡K\operatorname{int}KintK for ασx(p)<1\alpha\sigma_x(p) < 1ασx​(p)<1. The uniform norm is ∣p∣x=max⁡{σx(p),σx(−p)}≤∥p∥x|p|_x = \max\{\sigma_x(p), \sigma_x(-p)\} \le \|p\|_x∣p∣x​=max{σx​(p),σx​(−p)}≤∥p∥x​.

For μ>ν\mu > \nuμ>ν and a lower bound ζ≤ζ∗\zeta \le \zeta^*ζ≤ζ∗, the primal potential is

Φ(x;ζ)=μln⁡(⟨c,x⟩−ζ)+F(x).\Phi(x;\zeta) = \mu\ln(\langle c, x\rangle - \zeta) + F(x).Φ(x;ζ)=μln(⟨c,x⟩−ζ)+F(x).

At an iterate x^∈S0(P)\hat x \in S^0(P)x^∈S0(P) with lower bound ζ^\hat\zetaζ^​, let p(c)p(c)p(c) and p(d)p(d)p(d) be the projections of ccc and of d=F′(x^)d = F'(\hat x)d=F′(x^) into ker⁡A\ker AkerA with respect to F′′(x^)F''(\hat x)F′′(x^): Ap(u)=0Ap(u) = 0Ap(u)=0, A∗y(u)+F′′(x^)p(u)=uA^*y(u) + F''(\hat x)p(u) = uA∗y(u)+F′′(x^)p(u)=u. For λ∈R\lambda \in \mathbb Rλ∈R put s~(λ)=F′′(x^)(p(c)+λp(d))−λF′(x^)\tilde s(\lambda) = F''(\hat x)(p(c) + \lambda p(d)) - \lambda F'(\hat x)s~(λ)=F′′(x^)(p(c)+λp(d))−λF′(x^). Whenever s~(λ)∈K∗\tilde s(\lambda) \in K^*s~(λ)∈K∗, the number ⟨c,x^⟩−⟨s~(λ),x^⟩\langle c, \hat x\rangle - \langle \tilde s(\lambda), \hat x\rangle⟨c,x^⟩−⟨s~(λ),x^⟩ is the value of a feasible dual solution, hence a lower bound on ζ∗\zeta^*ζ∗. The updated lower bound ζ+\zeta^+ζ+ is the larger of ζ^\hat\zetaζ^​ and the best such bound. Finally λ+=(⟨c,x^⟩−ζ+)/μ\lambda^+ = (\langle c, \hat x\rangle - \zeta^+)/\muλ+=(⟨c,x^⟩−ζ+)/μ and the search direction is p=p(c)+λ+p(d)p = p(c) + \lambda^+ p(d)p=p(c)+λ+p(d), which is λ+\lambda^+λ+ times the projected gradient of Φ(⋅;ζ+)\Phi(\cdot;\zeta^+)Φ(⋅;ζ+). Write p+=σx^(p)p_+ = \sigma_{\hat x}(p)p+​=σx^​(p).

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 7.4 (b), the long step

If μ≥2ν\mu \ge 2\nuμ≥2ν, there is α>0\alpha > 0α>0 with x+=x^−αp∈S0(P)x^+ = \hat x - \alpha p \in S^0(P)x+=x^−αp∈S0(P) and

Φ(x+;ζ+)≤Φ(x^;ζ^)−∥p∥x^2(max⁡{p+,∣p∣x^})2(1−ln⁡2)=Φ(x^;ζ^)−∥p∥x^2∣p∣x^2(1−ln⁡2)≤Φ(x^;ζ^)−(1−ln⁡2).\Phi(x^+;\zeta^+) \le \Phi(\hat x;\hat\zeta) - \frac{\|p\|^2_{\hat x}}{(\max\{p_+, |p|_{\hat x}\})^2}(1-\ln 2) = \Phi(\hat x;\hat\zeta) - \frac{\|p\|^2_{\hat x}}{|p|^2_{\hat x}}(1-\ln 2) \le \Phi(\hat x;\hat\zeta) - (1-\ln 2).Φ(x+;ζ+)≤Φ(x^;ζ^​)−(max{p+​,∣p∣x^​})2∥p∥x^2​​(1−ln2)=Φ(x^;ζ^​)−∣p∣x^2​∥p∥x^2​​(1−ln2)≤Φ(x^;ζ^​)−(1−ln2).

Companion: Theorem 7.4 (a), the short step

If μ≥ν+ν\mu \ge \nu + \sqrt\nuμ≥ν+ν​, there is α>0\alpha > 0α>0 with x+=x^−αp∈S0(P)x^+ = \hat x - \alpha p \in S^0(P)x+=x^−αp∈S0(P) and

Φ(x+;ζ+)≤Φ(x^;ζ^)−∥p∥x^2(max⁡{p+,∥p∥x^})2(1−ln⁡2)=Φ(x^;ζ^)−(1−ln⁡2).\Phi(x^+;\zeta^+) \le \Phi(\hat x;\hat\zeta) - \frac{\|p\|^2_{\hat x}}{(\max\{p_+, \|p\|_{\hat x}\})^2}(1-\ln 2) = \Phi(\hat x;\hat\zeta) - (1-\ln 2).Φ(x+;ζ+)≤Φ(x^;ζ^​)−(max{p+​,∥p∥x^​})2∥p∥x^2​​(1−ln2)=Φ(x^;ζ^​)−(1−ln2).

Milestones

  1. (§7.2, p. 31) The gap ⟨s~(λ),x^⟩=⟨−F′(x^),p(c)⟩+λ((∥F′(x^)∥x^∗)2−∥p(d)∥x^2)\langle\tilde s(\lambda), \hat x\rangle = \langle -F'(\hat x), p(c)\rangle + \lambda\big((\|F'(\hat x)\|^*_{\hat x})^2 - \|p(d)\|^2_{\hat x}\big)⟨s~(λ),x^⟩=⟨−F′(x^),p(c)⟩+λ((∥F′(x^)∥x^∗​)2−∥p(d)∥x^2​) is nondecreasing in λ\lambdaλ.
  2. (Lemma 7.2) If μ≥ν+ν\mu \ge \nu + \sqrt\nuμ≥ν+ν​ then λ+≤∥p∥x^\lambda^+ \le \|p\|_{\hat x}λ+≤∥p∥x^​; if μ≥2ν\mu \ge 2\nuμ≥2ν then λ+≤∣p∣x^\lambda^+ \le |p|_{\hat x}λ+≤∣p∣x^​.

Companion: Theorem 7.3

A total potential decrease Δ>μln⁡(⟨c,x0⟩−ζ0)+F(x0)−F‾\Delta > \mu\ln(\langle c, x_0\rangle - \zeta_0) + F(x_0) - \underline FΔ>μln(⟨c,x0​⟩−ζ0​)+F(x0​)−F​ from the starting pair (x0,ζ0)(x_0, \zeta_0)(x0​,ζ0​) forces ⟨c,x⟩−ζ≤(⟨c,x0⟩−ζ0) e(F(x0)−F‾)/μ e−Δ/μ\langle c, x\rangle - \zeta \le (\langle c, x_0\rangle - \zeta_0)\,e^{(F(x_0) - \underline F)/\mu}\,e^{-\Delta/\mu}⟨c,x⟩−ζ≤(⟨c,x0​⟩−ζ0​)e(F(x0​)−F​)/μe−Δ/μ, where F‾\underline FF​ is the minimum of FFF on a bounded truncation Kˉ\bar KKˉ of the homogenized feasible region.

Significance

Theorem 7.4 together with Theorem 7.3 gives an O(μln⁡(1/ϵ))O(\mu\ln(1/\epsilon))O(μln(1/ϵ))-iteration method for conic programming over self-scaled cones that needs only a primal strictly feasible point and a lower bound, and that, for μ=O(ν)\mu = O(\nu)μ=O(ν), matches the complexity of the short-step theory. Part (b) is the substantive claim: the step α\alphaα may go a large fraction of the way to the boundary of KKK (half way when σx^(p)=σx^(−p)\sigma_{\hat x}(p) = \sigma_{\hat x}(-p)σx^​(p)=σx^​(−p)) and the guaranteed decrease (∥p∥x^2/∣p∣x^2)(1−ln⁡2)(\|p\|^2_{\hat x}/|p|^2_{\hat x})(1 - \ln 2)(∥p∥x^2​/∣p∣x^2​)(1−ln2) is typically much larger than 1−ln⁡21 - \ln 21−ln2. This is the property that distinguishes self-scaled barriers from general self-concordant ones, for which only steps inside the local unit ball are controlled.

The results are proved in the paper. None of them, nor the long-step theory of self-scaled barriers on which they rest, is formalized in any proof assistant as far as is known.

Difficulty

The obvious approach bounds F(x^−αp)−F(x^)F(\hat x - \alpha p) - F(\hat x)F(x^−αp)−F(x^) by the self-concordance inequality, which controls FFF only for α∥p∥x^<1\alpha\|p\|_{\hat x} < 1α∥p∥x^​<1; that is the short-step regime and yields at best part (a). Part (b) requires a bound on FFF along −p-p−p valid all the way to α<1/σx^(p)\alpha < 1/\sigma_{\hat x}(p)α<1/σx^​(p), which holds for self-scaled barriers but not for self-concordant ones. The second difficulty is the interplay with the lower-bound update: the decrease of the barrier term must be paid for by the decrease of μln⁡(⟨c,x⟩−ζ+)\mu\ln(\langle c, x\rangle - \zeta^+)μln(⟨c,x⟩−ζ+), and this needs the scaling factor λ+\lambda^+λ+ of the direction to be at most ∣p∣x^|p|_{\hat x}∣p∣x^​, which in turn depends on how ζ+\zeta^+ζ+ was chosen. With an arbitrary admissible lower bound the claim fails.

Formalization scope

EEE, E∗E^*E∗ are EuclideanSpace ℝ (Fin n) identified through the inner product, and the problem data are A:Rn→LRmA : \mathbb R^n \to_L \mathbb R^mA:Rn→L​Rm surjective, bbb, ccc. The cone, the barrier, the local norms ∥⋅∥x\|\cdot\|_x∥⋅∥x​ (lnorm), ∥⋅∥x∗\|\cdot\|^*_x∥⋅∥x∗​ (dnorm), σx\sigma_xσx​ (sigma) and ∣⋅∣x|\cdot|_x∣⋅∣x​ (absn) are the published definitions of the SelfScaledIPM.ShortStep setting; the paper's starred dual norms map to dnorm at a primal point. Nondegeneracy of F′′F''F′′ is part of that barrier definition, and the conjugate barrier is an sSup over int⁡K\operatorname{int}KintK.

Standing assumptions are hypotheses of every statement: surjectivity of AAA (6.1), strict dual feasibility (6.3) (strict primal feasibility follows from the given iterate), the objective not constant on the feasible region, and ν≥1\nu \ge 1ν≥1. The optimal value ζ∗\zeta^*ζ∗ is the infimum of the objective over the feasible set, finite under these assumptions. The projections (7.12) are given as data satisfying their defining equations. The updated lower bound ζ+\zeta^+ζ+ is defined as max⁡(ζ^,sup⁡G)\max(\hat\zeta, \sup G)max(ζ^​,supG), with GGG the set of dual bounds ⟨c,x^⟩−⟨s~(λ),x^⟩\langle c, \hat x\rangle - \langle\tilde s(\lambda), \hat x\rangle⟨c,x^⟩−⟨s~(λ),x^⟩ over λ\lambdaλ with s~(λ)∈K∗\tilde s(\lambda) \in K^*s~(λ)∈K∗, and ζ+=ζ^\zeta^+ = \hat\zetaζ+=ζ^​ when GGG is empty. Because the gap is nondecreasing in λ\lambdaλ, this equals the paper's value at the minimal admissible λ\lambdaλ. "A suitable value of α\alphaα" is an existential over α>0\alpha > 0α>0, and the conclusion also asserts ⟨c,x+⟩>ζ+\langle c, x^+\rangle > \zeta^+⟨c,x+⟩>ζ+ so that the logarithm in Φ(x+;ζ+)\Phi(x^+;\zeta^+)Φ(x+;ζ+) is genuine. Kˉ\bar KKˉ and F‾\underline FF​ of Theorem 7.3 are defined explicitly, with F‾\underline FF​ the infimum of FFF over Kˉ∩int⁡K\bar K \cap \operatorname{int}KKˉ∩intK.

A statement in which ζ+\zeta^+ζ+ is an arbitrary lower bound above ζ^\hat\zetaζ^​, or ppp an arbitrary vector in ker⁡A\ker AkerA, or α\alphaα arbitrary instead of existentially chosen, would be false; the formalization fixes ζ+\zeta^+ζ+ by (7.17) and ppp by (7.14).

A complete development needs the theory of self-scaled barriers along a line (Theorem 4.2 and Proposition 4.1 of the paper, posed in the sibling mission I of this series), the projection identities (Propositions 6.2–6.3, posed in mission IV), weak conic duality, and the inequalities ⟨−F′(x),p⟩≤ν∥p∥x\langle -F'(x), p\rangle \le \sqrt\nu\|p\|_x⟨−F′(x),p⟩≤ν​∥p∥x​ and ⟨−F′(x),p⟩≤νσx(p)\langle -F'(x), p\rangle \le \nu\sigma_x(p)⟨−F′(x),p⟩≤νσx​(p). These are reusable across self-scaled interior-point methods; proofs of any of them are welcome.

Selected references

  • Yu. E. Nesterov and M. J. Todd, Self-scaled barriers and interior-point methods for convex programming, Mathematics of Operations Research 22(1), 1997, 1–42. https://doi.org/10.1287/moor.22.1.1
  • Yu. E. Nesterov and M. J. Todd, Primal-dual interior-point methods for self-scaled cones, SIAM Journal on Optimization 8(2), 1998, 324–364. https://doi.org/10.1137/S1052623495290209
  • Yu. Nesterov and A. Nemirovskii, Interior-Point Polynomial Algorithms in Convex Programming, SIAM, 1994. https://doi.org/10.1137/1.9781611970791
  • C. C. Gonzaga, Polynomial affine algorithms for linear programming, Mathematical Programming 49, 1990, 7–21 (cited as in the paper's reference list).
  • N. Karmarkar, A new polynomial-time algorithm for linear programming, Combinatorica 4, 1984, 373–395. https://doi.org/10.1007/BF02579150
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Convex OptimizationOptimization·Captain: mikedeng1

Self-Scaled Barriers and Interior-Point Methods for Convex Programming IV: The Predictor-Corrector Path-Following Scheme Keeps π(τ, x) ≤ 1/4 and Multiplies τ by at Least 1 + 3/(8√ν + 2)Research Paper

Motivation

Interior-point methods solve linear, second-order cone and semidefinite programs by following a smooth curve through the interior of the feasible region. Nesterov and Nemirovskii (1994) showed that the right object to build such methods on is a self-concordant barrier for the cone, and that the number of Newton steps needed by a path-following method is governed by the barrier parameter ν\nuν. For general cones, however, their analysis of Newton's method only controls a small neighbourhood of the path, so the step in the path parameter must be short.

Nesterov and Todd (1997) singled out the cones that admit a self-scaled barrier: the nonnegative orthant, the second-order cone, the cone of positive semidefinite matrices and their products. For these cones the barrier satisfies global, long-range inequalities that general self-concordant barriers do not. Section 9 of the paper uses them to sharpen the classical primal path-following method: Newton's method converges quadratically on the whole region where the proximity measure is below 111 (extending Roos and Vial, 1992), and a predictor-corrector scheme takes a tangent step whose length adapts to the geometry of the cone at the current point.

Setting

Let E=RnE=\mathbb R^nE=Rn with its Euclidean inner product ⟨⋅,⋅⟩\langle\cdot,\cdot\rangle⟨⋅,⋅⟩; the dual space E∗E^*E∗ is identified with EEE. Let K⊂EK\subset EK⊂E be a proper cone: closed, convex, containing no line, with nonempty interior int⁡K\operatorname{int}KintK. A function F:int⁡K→RF:\operatorname{int}K\to\mathbb RF:intK→R is a ν\nuν-self-scaled barrier for KKK if it is a ν\nuν-self-concordant logarithmically homogeneous barrier (F(tx)=F(x)−νln⁡tF(tx)=F(x)-\nu\ln tF(tx)=F(x)−νlnt) and, for all w,x∈int⁡Kw,x\in\operatorname{int}Kw,x∈intK, F′′(w)x∈int⁡K∗F''(w)x\in\operatorname{int}K^*F′′(w)x∈intK∗ and F∗(F′′(w)x)=F(x)−2F(w)−νF_*(F''(w)x)=F(x)-2F(w)-\nuF∗​(F′′(w)x)=F(x)−2F(w)−ν, where F∗F_*F∗​ is the conjugate barrier (Definition 2.1). Then ν≥1\nu\ge1ν≥1.

At a point x∈int⁡Kx\in\operatorname{int}Kx∈intK the paper uses three measures of a vector p∈Ep\in Ep∈E:

  • the local norm ∥p∥x=⟨F′′(x)p,p⟩1/2\|p\|_x=\langle F''(x)p,p\rangle^{1/2}∥p∥x​=⟨F′′(x)p,p⟩1/2, and for q∈E∗q\in E^*q∈E∗ the dual norm ∥q∥x∗=⟨q,[F′′(x)]−1q⟩1/2\|q\|^*_x=\langle q,[F''(x)]^{-1}q\rangle^{1/2}∥q∥x∗​=⟨q,[F′′(x)]−1q⟩1/2;
  • σx(p)=min⁡{β≥0:βx−p∈K}\sigma_x(p)=\min\{\beta\ge0:\beta x-p\in K\}σx​(p)=min{β≥0:βx−p∈K}, the reciprocal of the largest step from xxx along −p-p−p that stays in KKK;
  • the uniform norm ∣p∣x=max⁡{σx(p),σx(−p)}|p|_x=\max\{\sigma_x(p),\sigma_x(-p)\}∣p∣x​=max{σx​(p),σx​(−p)}, which satisfies ∣p∣x≤∥p∥x|p|_x\le\|p\|_x∣p∣x​≤∥p∥x​.

The problem is min⁡{⟨c,x⟩:Ax=b, x∈K}\min\{\langle c,x\rangle: Ax=b,\ x\in K\}min{⟨c,x⟩:Ax=b, x∈K} with A:E→Y=RmA:E\to Y=\mathbb R^mA:E→Y=Rm surjective; S0(P)={x∈int⁡K:Ax=b}S^0(P)=\{x\in\operatorname{int}K:Ax=b\}S0(P)={x∈intK:Ax=b} is the set of strictly feasible points, and the dual problem is assumed strictly feasible. For w∈int⁡Kw\in\operatorname{int}Kw∈intK and u∈E∗u\in E^*u∈E∗ the system

Ap=0,A∗y+F′′(w)p=u(6.4)Ap=0,\qquad A^*y+F''(w)p=u \tag{6.4}Ap=0,A∗y+F′′(w)p=u(6.4)

defines the projection p=p(u)p=p(u)p=p(u) of uuu into ker⁡A\ker AkerA with respect to F′′(w)F''(w)F′′(w).

For τ>0\tau>0τ>0 the penalty function is ψ(τ,x)=τ⟨c,x⟩+F(x)\psi(\tau,x)=\tau\langle c,x\rangle+F(x)ψ(τ,x)=τ⟨c,x⟩+F(x); its minimizers x(τ)x(\tau)x(τ) over S0(P)S^0(P)S0(P) form the central path. The Newton direction p(τ,x)p(\tau,x)p(τ,x) is the projection of τc+F′(x)\tau c+F'(x)τc+F′(x) with respect to F′′(x)F''(x)F′′(x), and the proximity measure is π(τ,x)=∥p(τ,x)∥x\pi(\tau,x)=\|p(\tau,x)\|_xπ(τ,x)=∥p(τ,x)∥x​. The tangent direction v(x)v(x)v(x) is the projection of ccc with respect to F′′(x)F''(x)F′′(x).

One iteration of the path-following scheme (p. 39) from (τ,x)(\tau,x)(τ,x) with π(τ,x)≤1/4\pi(\tau,x)\le1/4π(τ,x)≤1/4 is:

Δτ=38∣v∣x∥v∥x,z=x−Δτ v,τ+=τ+Δτ,x+=z−p(τ+,z),v=v(x).\Delta\tau=\frac{3}{8\sqrt{|v|_x\|v\|_x}},\quad z=x-\Delta\tau\,v,\quad \tau_+=\tau+\Delta\tau,\quad x_+=z-p(\tau_+,z),\qquad v=v(x).Δτ=8∣v∣x​∥v∥x​​3​,z=x−Δτv,τ+​=τ+Δτ,x+​=z−p(τ+​,z),v=v(x).

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 9.3

For one iteration of the scheme, with v≠0v\ne0v=0:

z∈int⁡K,x+∈S0(P),π(τ+,x+)≤14,z\in\operatorname{int}K,\qquad x_+\in S^0(P),\qquad \pi(\tau_+,x_+)\le\tfrac14,z∈intK,x+​∈S0(P),π(τ+​,x+​)≤41​, τ+ ≥ (1+38ν+2∥v∥x∣v∣x)τ ≥ (1+38ν+2)τ.\tau_+\ \ge\ \Bigl(1+\frac{3}{8\sqrt\nu+2}\sqrt{\frac{\|v\|_x}{|v|_x}}\Bigr)\tau\ \ge\ \Bigl(1+\frac{3}{8\sqrt\nu+2}\Bigr)\tau .τ+​ ≥ (1+8ν​+23​∣v∣x​∥v∥x​​​)τ ≥ (1+8ν​+23​)τ.

By induction from π(τ0,x0)≤1/4\pi(\tau_0,x_0)\le1/4π(τ0​,x0​)≤1/4, the condition (9.3) holds at every iterate and τk\tau_kτk​ grows geometrically.

Milestones

  • Corollary 3.1: for v,z∈int⁡Kv,z\in\operatorname{int}Kv,z∈intK there is w∈int⁡Kw\in\operatorname{int}Kw∈intK with F′(v)=−F′′(w)zF'(v)=-F''(w)zF′(v)=−F′′(w)z, F′(z)=−F′′(w)vF'(z)=-F''(w)vF′(z)=−F′′(w)v, hence F′(v)−F′(z)=F′′(w)(v−z)F'(v)-F'(z)=F''(w)(v-z)F′(v)−F′(z)=F′′(w)(v−z).
  • Corollary 4.1 (iii): for such www (with F′(v)=−F′′(w)xF'(v)=-F''(w)xF′(v)=−F′′(w)x), σx(v)−1F′′(x)≤F′′(w)≤σv(x)F′′(x)\sigma_x(v)^{-1}F''(x)\le F''(w)\le\sigma_v(x)F''(x)σx​(v)−1F′′(x)≤F′′(w)≤σv​(x)F′′(x).
  • Theorem 4.3: ∥F′(v)−F′(x)−F′′(x)(v−x)∥v∗≤∣v−x∣x ∥v−x∥x\|F'(v)-F'(x)-F''(x)(v-x)\|^*_v\le|v-x|_x\,\|v-x\|_x∥F′(v)−F′(x)−F′′(x)(v−x)∥v∗​≤∣v−x∣x​∥v−x∥x​.
  • Proposition 6.2: ∥p(u)∥w2=⟨u,p(u)⟩\|p(u)\|_w^2=\langle u,p(u)\rangle∥p(u)∥w2​=⟨u,p(u)⟩.
  • Proposition 6.3: ∥p(u)∥w≤∥u−A∗y∥w∗\|p(u)\|_w\le\|u-A^*y\|^*_w∥p(u)∥w​≤∥u−A∗y∥w∗​ for all y∈Yy\in Yy∈Y, with equality only at a minimizer.
  • Theorem 9.2: if π(τ,x)<1\pi(\tau,x)<1π(τ,x)<1, the full Newton step x+=x−p(τ,x)x_+=x-p(\tau,x)x+​=x−p(τ,x) satisfies π(τ,x+)≤∣p∣x π(τ,x)≤π2(τ,x)\pi(\tau,x_+)\le|p|_x\,\pi(\tau,x)\le\pi^2(\tau,x)π(τ,x+​)≤∣p∣x​π(τ,x)≤π2(τ,x).

A companion item, Theorem 9.1, states the decrease of ψ(τ,⋅)\psi(\tau,\cdot)ψ(τ,⋅) along the damped Newton step α=1/(1+σx(p))\alpha=1/(1+\sigma_x(p))α=1/(1+σx​(p)).

Significance

Theorem 9.3 shows that the primal path-following method for self-scaled cones increases the penalty parameter by a factor at least 1+3/(8ν+2)1+3/(8\sqrt\nu+2)1+3/(8ν​+2) per iteration, which yields the O(νln⁡(1/ϵ))O(\sqrt\nu\ln(1/\epsilon))O(ν​ln(1/ϵ)) iteration bound, and that the step can be much longer when the ratio ∥v∥x/∣v∣x\|v\|_x/|v|_x∥v∥x​/∣v∣x​ is large. The paper notes that this ratio is the maximal step α∗\alpha^*α∗ along the normalized tangent direction that keeps x±α∗vˉx\pm\alpha^*\bar vx±α∗vˉ in KKK, so the rule is a "large-step" rule in disguise. Theorem 9.2 removes the restriction of the general self-concordant theory, where quadratic convergence of Newton's method is only shown on a smaller neighbourhood, by allowing any point with π(τ,x)<1\pi(\tau,x)<1π(τ,x)<1.

The milestones are general tools for self-scaled barriers. Theorem 4.3 is a global second-order estimate for the gradient, with no restriction on the distance between the two points; Corollary 3.1 is an exact mean-value identity with a single interior intermediate point; Propositions 6.2 and 6.3 are the basic facts about the projections that every algorithm of the paper computes.

None of these results has a machine-checked proof that we know of. The platform has general self-concordant Newton estimates (the contraction λ+≤(λ/(1−λ))2\lambda_+\le(\lambda/(1-\lambda))^2λ+​≤(λ/(1−λ))2 and the damped Newton decrease λ−ln⁡(1+λ)\lambda-\ln(1+\lambda)λ−ln(1+λ)), which use different measures and do not involve σx\sigma_xσx​, ∣⋅∣x|\cdot|_x∣⋅∣x​ or the constraint Ax=bAx=bAx=b.

Difficulty

The obvious route to Theorem 9.2 is the standard self-concordance argument, which compares F′′F''F′′ at the new point with F′′(x)F''(x)F′′(x) through the local norm ∥p∥x\|p\|_x∥p∥x​ alone. It gives π+≤π2/(1−π)2\pi_+\le\pi^2/(1-\pi)^2π+​≤π2/(1−π)2, which is weaker than the claimed bound and gives nothing near π=1\pi=1π=1. The sharper bound needs estimates that hold only for self-scaled barriers: a second-order remainder for the gradient measured at the new point and controlled by the uniform norm ∣⋅∣x|\cdot|_x∣⋅∣x​ (Theorem 4.3), which in turn requires the intermediate point of Corollary 3.1 and the two-sided Hessian comparison of Corollary 4.1 (iii). These fail for general self-concordant barriers, and they depend on the structure theory of §3 (Theorem 3.2 of the paper).

In Theorem 9.3 the predictor step is long in the local norm, so no estimate based on ∥v∥x\|v\|_x∥v∥x​ alone keeps the predictor point close enough to the central path for one corrector step to restore π≤1/4\pi\le1/4π≤1/4; the constant 3/83/83/8 in Δτ\Delta\tauΔτ is fixed by the page and leaves little slack.

Formalization scope

The development reuses the published setting of the 1998 Nesterov–Todd series: IsProperCone, IsSelfScaledBarrier, hess, IsPrimalStrict, IsDualStrict, lnorm (∥⋅∥x\|\cdot\|_x∥⋅∥x​), dnorm (∥⋅∥x∗\|\cdot\|^*_x∥⋅∥x∗​), sigma and absn. Its conventions are:

  1. E∗E^*E∗ is identified with E=RnE=\mathbb R^nE=Rn through the Euclidean inner product.
  2. Positive definiteness of F′′F''F′′ on int⁡K\operatorname{int}KintK is part of the barrier definition.
  3. The conjugate is a real supremum over int⁡K\operatorname{int}KintK.
  4. ν≥1\nu\ge1ν≥1 is a hypothesis.

The paper stars dual norms; the 1998 modules do not, so dnorm F x is the paper's ∥⋅∥x∗\|\cdot\|^*_x∥⋅∥x∗​.

New definitions are the projection system (6.4) (IsProjection), the penalty ψ\psiψ, the Newton and tangent systems as predicates on their solutions, and the step size Δτ\Delta\tauΔτ. Solutions of linear systems are always data satisfying these predicates, never chosen by a function. Operator inequalities are written through quadratic forms.

Every theorem of §9 assumes (6.1)–(6.3) (AAA surjective, a strictly feasible dual point), which the paper states on p. 38. Theorems 9.2 and 9.3 are stated for one iteration and state explicitly that the new points are interior, which the scheme presupposes. Theorem 9.3 assumes v(x)≠0v(x)\ne0v(x)=0: when ccc lies in the range of A∗A^*A∗ the objective is constant on the feasible set and Δτ\Delta\tauΔτ is undefined. In Theorem 9.1 the middle bound of (9.1), which divides by σx(p)\sigma_x(p)σx​(p), is stated under σx(p)>0\sigma_x(p)>0σx​(p)>0, and the outer bound in all cases.

A formalization that leaves Δτ\Delta\tauΔτ as a free positive parameter, drops the corrector step, or treats π\piπ as any number at most 1/41/41/4 that is not tied to the Newton system at the new point would state a different, weaker or vacuous theorem. The goal fixes Δτ\Delta\tauΔτ by the formula of p. 39 and bounds ∥p∥x+\|p\|_{x_+}∥p∥x+​​ for every solution of the Newton system at (τ+,x+)(\tau_+,x_+)(τ+​,x+​).

Contributions welcome: proofs of the milestones, the structure results they rest on (existence of the scaling point, Theorem 3.2; the Hessian bounds of Theorem 4.1), and reusable lemmas on σx\sigma_xσx​ and the uniform norm, which also serve the other missions of this series.

Selected references

  • Yu. E. Nesterov and M. J. Todd, Self-scaled barriers and interior-point methods for convex programming, Mathematics of Operations Research 22(1) (1997) 1–42. https://doi.org/10.1287/moor.22.1.1
  • Yu. E. Nesterov and M. J. Todd, Primal-dual interior-point methods for self-scaled cones, SIAM Journal on Optimization 8(2) (1998) 324–364. https://doi.org/10.1137/S1052623495290209
  • Yu. Nesterov and A. Nemirovskii, Interior-Point Polynomial Algorithms in Convex Programming, SIAM, 1994. https://doi.org/10.1137/1.9781611970791
  • C. Roos and J.-Ph. Vial, A polynomial method of approximate centers for linear programming, Mathematical Programming 54 (1992) 295–305.
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OptimizationProbability·Captain: mikedeng1

Hedging Inventory Risk Through Market Instruments I: Hedging Raises the Risk-Averse Newsvendor's Optimal Order QuantityResearch Paper

Motivation

A retailer who orders a seasonal product before demand is known faces the newsvendor trade-off. Ordering too much leaves unsold stock, and ordering too little forgoes sales. A risk-neutral newsvendor orders a critical fractile of demand. A risk-averse one orders less, since inventory is a risky investment, and this reduction has been shown under constant and decreasing absolute risk aversion (Eeckhoudt, Gollier and Schlesinger, Management Science 41(5), 1995, doi:10.1287/mnsc.41.5.786). Agrawal and Seshadri (2000) and Chen and Federgruen (2000) reached related conclusions.

Demand for many products moves with traded financial quantities: a stock index, a commodity price, an exchange rate. V. Gaur and S. Seshadri (Manufacturing & Service Operations Management 7(2), 2005, pp. 103–120, doi:10.1287/msom.1040.0061) ask what happens when the newsvendor can trade a financial instrument correlated with demand. Their Proposition 7 answers one half of the question: hedging moves the risk-averse newsvendor's order up, towards the risk-neutral quantity. This mission formalizes Proposition 7 and the steps of its appendix proof. The source is the published article, a library scan.

Setting

Let STS_TST​ be the price at time TTT of a traded asset, with law ν\nuν on R\mathbb RR. Demand is D=a+b(ST+ε)D=a+b(S_T+\varepsilon)D=a+b(ST​+ε) with b>0b>0b>0. Here ε\varepsilonε is the scaled forecast error, independent of STS_TST​, with law GGG, E[ε]=0E[\varepsilon]=0E[ε]=0 and E[ε2]<∞E[\varepsilon^2]<\inftyE[ε2]<∞. The unit selling price, cost and salvage value are p>cerT>sp>ce^{rT}>sp>cerT>s. In the paper's scaled units ((11), p. 110) these collapse into one cost parameter c1c_1c1​ with 0<c10<c_10<c1​ and c1b<1c_1b<1c1​b<1, and an initial-wealth term WWW.

A hedge is a portfolio with time-TTT payoff XT=φ(ST)X_T=\varphi(S_T)XT​=φ(ST​) for a nondecreasing function φ\varphiφ, and time-0 price X0X_0X0​. It is a fair gamble, E[XT]=X0erTE[X_T]=X_0e^{rT}E[XT​]=X0​erT (display (12)). A firm that stocks I>max⁡{a,0}I>\max\{a,0\}I>max{a,0} units and shorts α\alphaα units of the hedge ends with the scaled wealth (14)

ΠH(I,α)=W+min⁡{ST+ε, I−ab}−c1I−αXT+αX0erT.\Pi_H(I,\alpha)=W+\min\Big\{S_T+\varepsilon,\ \frac{I-a}{b}\Big\}-c_1I-\alpha X_T+\alpha X_0e^{rT}.ΠH​(I,α)=W+min{ST​+ε, bI−a​}−c1​I−αXT​+αX0​erT.

A decision maker with utility u:R→Ru:\mathbb R\to\mathbb Ru:R→R ranks (I,α)(I,\alpha)(I,α) by E[u(ΠH(I,α))]E[u(\Pi_H(I,\alpha))]E[u(ΠH​(I,α))], and I∗(α)I^*(\alpha)I∗(α) maximizes it over III.

The absolute risk aversion is RA(w)=−u′′(w)/u′(w)R_A(w)=-u''(w)/u'(w)RA​(w)=−u′′(w)/u′(w) and the absolute prudence is −u′′′(w)/u′′(w)-u'''(w)/u''(w)−u′′′(w)/u′′(w). The utility displays DARA or CARA when RAR_ARA​ is decreasing or constant, and DAP when prudence is decreasing or constant.

The hedge ratio is bounded by αˉ\bar\alphaαˉ, chosen so that Eε[ΠH(I,α)∣ST]E_\varepsilon[\Pi_H(I,\alpha)\mid S_T]Eε​[ΠH​(I,α)∣ST​] is nondecreasing in STS_TST​ for 0≤α≤αˉ0\le\alpha\le\bar\alpha0≤α≤αˉ. Beyond αˉ\bar\alphaαˉ the firm over-hedges: its expected profit falls as the asset price rises.

Formalization targets

Goal: Proposition 7 (p. 112)

For an increasing, concave, differentiable utility with constant or decreasing absolute risk aversion and constant or decreasing absolute prudence,

dI∗dα ≥ 0for 0≤α≤αˉ,\frac{dI^*}{d\alpha}\ \ge\ 0\qquad\text{for }0\le\alpha\le\bar\alpha,dαdI∗​ ≥ 0for 0≤α≤αˉ,

stated as: α↦I∗(α)\alpha\mapsto I^*(\alpha)α↦I∗(α) is nondecreasing on [0,αˉ][0,\bar\alpha][0,αˉ].

Milestones

  1. Lemma 2 (p. 118), in its weak form. If fff is decreasing with E[f(X)]=0E[f(X)]=0E[f(X)]=0, then E[w(X)f(X)]≥0E[w(X)f(X)]\ge0E[w(X)f(X)]≥0 for decreasing nonnegative www, and E[w(X)f(X)]≤0E[w(X)f(X)]\le0E[w(X)f(X)]≤0 for increasing nonnegative www.
  2. Utility facts of §3.2 (p. 111). DARA or CARA implies u′′′≥0u'''\ge0u′′′≥0, and DAP implies that u′′′u'''u′′′ is decreasing.
  3. Steps of the proof (pp. 118–119).
    • Eε[u′′(Π)∣ST]E_\varepsilon[u''(\Pi)\mid S_T]Eε​[u′′(Π)∣ST​] is increasing in STS_TST​.
    • The first term of the cross-partial representation (25) is nonnegative.
    • The quantity (1/b)RA(Π0)u′(Π0)Pr⁡{ε>(I−a)/b−ST} ∂Π/∂α(1/b)R_A(\Pi_0)u'(\Pi_0)\Pr\{\varepsilon>(I-a)/b-S_T\}\,\partial\Pi/\partial\alpha(1/b)RA​(Π0​)u′(Π0​)Pr{ε>(I−a)/b−ST​}∂Π/∂α has nonpositive mean.
    • ∂2E[u(Π)]/∂I∂α≥0\partial^2E[u(\Pi)]/\partial I\partial\alpha\ge0∂2E[u(Π)]/∂I∂α≥0, as increasing differences of E[u(ΠH(I,α))]E[u(\Pi_H(I,\alpha))]E[u(ΠH​(I,α))] on (max⁡{a,0},∞)×[0,αˉ](\max\{a,0\},\infty)\times[0,\bar\alpha](max{a,0},∞)×[0,αˉ].

Significance

Proposition 7 reverses the conclusion of Eeckhoudt et al. Those authors find that an additional uncorrelated background risk lowers the risk-averse newsvendor's order. Here a correlated financial position that offsets the inventory risk raises it. Hedging therefore increases expected profit as well as reducing variance, and brings a risk-averse firm's operational decision closer to the risk-neutral one. The result is one of the basic statements linking operational and financial risk management in supply-chain finance.

The formalization adds three things.

  • Corrected lemmas. The proof rests on a one-variable Chebyshev inequality (Lemma 2) whose printed strict form is false, and on a cross-partial computation that differentiates under the expectation without comment. A machine-checked proof fixes the correct hypotheses: the weak inequalities, and the integrability under which (24)–(25) hold.
  • Reusable monotone comparative statics. The steps from increasing differences in (inventory, hedge ratio) to a monotone argmax apply to other stochastic inventory models with expected-utility objectives.
  • Formal status. The result is proved in the paper. To our knowledge no part of it has been formalized.

Difficulty

The obvious argument signs the cross-partial derivative directly: E[u′′(Π) ∂Π/∂I ∂Π/∂α]E[u''(\Pi)\,\partial\Pi/\partial I\,\partial\Pi/\partial\alpha]E[u′′(Π)∂Π/∂I∂Π/∂α], with ∂Π/∂α=X0erT−XT\partial\Pi/\partial\alpha=X_0e^{rT}-X_T∂Π/∂α=X0​erT−XT​ of mean zero. That needs the sign of a covariance between ∂Π/∂α\partial\Pi/\partial\alpha∂Π/∂α and u′′(Π) ∂Π/∂Iu''(\Pi)\,\partial\Pi/\partial Iu′′(Π)∂Π/∂I, a weight that depends on both STS_TST​ and ε\varepsilonε and is not monotone in either.

The paper first conditions on STS_TST​ and splits the weight into two terms. The first is a conditional mean of u′′(Π)u''(\Pi)u′′(Π). The second is concentrated on the sell-out event. Each term then needs its own monotonicity in STS_TST​.

  • For the second term, monotonicity comes from DARA alone.
  • For the first term, Eε[u′′(Π)∣ST]E_\varepsilon[u''(\Pi)\mid S_T]Eε​[u′′(Π)∣ST​], a second application of the Chebyshev inequality, in ε\varepsilonε, is needed. It uses prudence (DAP) and the bound α≤αˉ\alpha\le\bar\alphaα≤αˉ.

Neither ingredient can be dropped. Without α≤αˉ\alpha\le\bar\alphaα≤αˉ the conditional mean payoff decreases in STS_TST​ and the first term changes sign.

Two further obstacles are technical:

  • the expectation is not differentiable in III where ε=(I−a)/b−ST\varepsilon=(I-a)/b-S_Tε=(I−a)/b−ST​ has an atom;
  • the hedge φ\varphiφ is only monotone, hence differentiable only almost everywhere.

Formalization scope

Representation.

  • ST∼νS_T\sim\nuST​∼ν and ε∼G\varepsilon\sim Gε∼G are probability measures on R\mathbb RR, and every expectation is taken over ν⊗G\nu\otimes Gν⊗G. Independence is built in, and Eε[ ⋅∣ST=s]E_\varepsilon[\,\cdot\mid S_T=s]Eε​[⋅∣ST​=s] is the integral over GGG at fixed sss.
  • The parameters are the scaled W,a,b,c1W,a,b,c_1W,a,b,c1​ of (11). The constraint p>cerT>sp>ce^{rT}>sp>cerT>s becomes 0<c10<c_10<c1​ and c1b<1c_1b<1c1​b<1, an exact reparametrization.
  • The hedge is a nondecreasing, measurable, ν\nuν-integrable φ\varphiφ with ∫φ dν=X0erT\int\varphi\,d\nu=X_0e^{rT}∫φdν=X0​erT. The paper's "piecewise continuous, differentiable a.e." is dropped, so the formal statement is more general.
  • RAR_ARA​ is the platform's Arrow–Pratt coefficient MDPFinance.FinancialMarkets.arrowPrattCoefficient, referenced rather than redefined.

Conventions.

  • "Increasing, concave, differentiable" is taken as C3C^3C3 with u′>0u'>0u′>0 and u′′<0u''<0u′′<0 on all of R\mathbb RR. Absolute prudence −u′′′/u′′-u'''/u''−u′′′/u′′ requires u′′≠0u''\ne0u′′=0, and the proof uses u′′<0u''<0u′′<0.
  • DARA/CARA and DAP are stated as RAR_ARA​ and the prudence being nonincreasing.
  • αˉ\bar\alphaαˉ is any value for which the conditional mean payoff is nondecreasing in STS_TST​ for every α∈[0,αˉ]\alpha\in[0,\bar\alpha]α∈[0,αˉ] and every admissible I>max⁡{a,0}I>\max\{a,0\}I>max{a,0}.
  • I∗I^*I∗ is any selection of maximizers over I>max⁡{a,0}I>\max\{a,0\}I>max{a,0}; the maximizer is unique by strict concavity.
  • dI∗/dα≥0dI^*/d\alpha\ge0dI∗/dα≥0 is stated as monotonicity of I∗I^*I∗. The cross-partial claim is stated as increasing differences.
  • Lemma 2 and "the second term is negative" are weakened to the non-strict inequalities, because the printed strict forms fail for constant weights.

Integrability. The goal and the increasing-differences milestone assume integrability of u(Π)u(\Pi)u(Π), u′(Π)u'(\Pi)u′(Π), u′′(Π)u''(\Pi)u′′(Π) and of their products with ∂Π/∂α\partial\Pi/\partial\alpha∂Π/∂α on the whole region, which is the regularity the proof uses. Without it a Bochner integral would silently be 000: the objective would be constant in III and every III a maximizer. A hypothesis set that forces αˉ=0\bar\alpha=0αˉ=0 would also trivialize the goal. A sorry-free check file exhibits the utility class, the standing assumptions and the αˉ\bar\alphaαˉ-condition with αˉ=1/2\bar\alpha=1/2αˉ=1/2 for u(w)=−e−wu(w)=-e^{-w}u(w)=−e−w, ε=±1\varepsilon=\pm1ε=±1 with equal probability and φ(s)=min⁡{s,−1/2}\varphi(s)=\min\{s,-1/2\}φ(s)=min{s,−1/2}.

Infrastructure and contributions. A one-variable Chebyshev association inequality for monotone functions is needed. So are differentiation under the integral, or an integrated mean-value argument, for piecewise-linear payoffs, and the step from increasing differences plus a unique maximizer to a monotone argmax. All three are reusable. Proofs of the milestones in any order are welcome, as are alternative arguments that avoid the cross-partial derivative altogether.

Selected references

  • V. Gaur, S. Seshadri, Hedging Inventory Risk Through Market Instruments, Manufacturing & Service Operations Management 7(2), 103–120, 2005. https://doi.org/10.1287/msom.1040.0061
  • L. Eeckhoudt, C. Gollier, H. Schlesinger, The Risk-Averse (and Prudent) Newsboy, Management Science 41(5), 786–794, 1995. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.41.5.786
  • M. S. Kimball, Precautionary Saving in the Small and in the Large, Econometrica 58(1), 53–73, 1990. https://doi.org/10.2307/2938334
  • K. J. Arrow, Essays in the Theory of Risk-Bearing, North-Holland, 1971.
  • P. Milgrom, C. Shannon, Monotone Comparative Statics, Econometrica 62(1), 157–180, 1994. https://doi.org/10.2307/2951479
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Convex OptimizationOptimization·Captain: mikedeng1

Self-Scaled Barriers and Interior-Point Methods for Convex Programming I: A Joint-Scaling Primal-Dual Long Step Lowers the Potential (ν + ρ) ln⟨s, x⟩ + F(x) + F∗(s) by at Least √3/2 − ln(1 + √3/2)Research Paper

Motivation

Interior-point methods solve linear, second-order cone and semidefinite programs in polynomial time, and they are the engine of most conic optimization software. The general theory of Nesterov and Nemirovskii (1994) covers any convex cone with a self-concordant barrier, but its methods are essentially primal and short-step: their analysis controls the barrier only inside a unit Dikin ellipsoid around the current point. Practical codes for linear programming, in contrast, use symmetric primal-dual methods that take long steps, a large fraction of the way to the boundary.

Nesterov and Todd (1997) isolated the class of cones and barriers for which the primal-dual long-step theory of linear programming carries over: self-scaled cones with self-scaled barriers. The class contains the nonnegative orthant, the second-order cone and the cone of positive semidefinite matrices, and their products. This mission formalizes the paper's §8 result: a primal-dual potential-reduction method with joint scaling decreases a symmetric potential function by an absolute constant at every iteration, which yields an O(νln⁡(1/ϵ))O(\sqrt\nu\ln(1/\epsilon))O(ν​ln(1/ϵ)) iteration bound.

Timeline. Todd and Ye (1990) introduced the symmetric primal-dual potential function for linear programming with a short-step method. Kojima, Mizuno and Yoshise (1991) gave a symmetric long-step primal-dual potential-reduction method for linear complementarity problems; their Lemma 2.5 is the linear-programming case of the key inequality posed here. Nesterov and Nemirovskii (1994, §4.5) extended Ye's non-symmetric method to general cones. Nesterov and Todd (1997) extended the method of Kojima et al. to self-scaled cones; the companion paper (1998) treats short-step and functional-proximity variants.

Setting

Let EEE be a finite-dimensional real vector space with dual E∗E^*E∗ and pairing ⟨s,x⟩\langle s,x\rangle⟨s,x⟩. Let K⊂EK\subset EK⊂E be a proper cone: closed, convex, with nonempty interior, and pointed (it contains no line). Its dual cone is K∗={s:⟨s,x⟩≥0 ∀x∈K}K^*=\{s:\langle s,x\rangle\ge0\ \forall x\in K\}K∗={s:⟨s,x⟩≥0 ∀x∈K}.

A ν\nuν-self-concordant logarithmically homogeneous barrier for KKK is a convex C3C^3C3 function FFF on int⁡K\operatorname{int}KintK that tends to +∞+\infty+∞ at the boundary, satisfies the self-concordance inequality ∣F′′′(x)[h,h,h]∣≤2⟨F′′(x)h,h⟩3/2|F'''(x)[h,h,h]|\le2\langle F''(x)h,h\rangle^{3/2}∣F′′′(x)[h,h,h]∣≤2⟨F′′(x)h,h⟩3/2, the bound ⟨F′(x),h⟩2≤ν⟨F′′(x)h,h⟩\langle F'(x),h\rangle^2\le\nu\langle F''(x)h,h\rangle⟨F′(x),h⟩2≤ν⟨F′′(x)h,h⟩, and F(τx)=F(x)−νln⁡τF(\tau x)=F(x)-\nu\ln\tauF(τx)=F(x)−νlnτ for τ>0\tau>0τ>0. Its conjugate barrier is

F∗(s)=max⁡{−⟨s,x⟩−F(x):x∈int⁡K},s∈int⁡K∗.F_*(s)=\max\{-\langle s,x\rangle-F(x):x\in\operatorname{int}K\},\qquad s\in\operatorname{int}K^*.F∗​(s)=max{−⟨s,x⟩−F(x):x∈intK},s∈intK∗.

FFF is ν\nuν-self-scaled (Definition 2.1) if for all v,x∈int⁡Kv,x\in\operatorname{int}Kv,x∈intK, F′′(v)x∈int⁡K∗F''(v)x\in\operatorname{int}K^*F′′(v)x∈intK∗ and F∗(F′′(v)x)=F(x)−2F(v)−νF_*(F''(v)x)=F(x)-2F(v)-\nuF∗​(F′′(v)x)=F(x)−2F(v)−ν. For x∈int⁡Kx\in\operatorname{int}Kx∈intK, s∈int⁡K∗s\in\operatorname{int}K^*s∈intK∗ the scaling point is the w∈int⁡Kw\in\operatorname{int}Kw∈intK with F′′(w)x=sF''(w)x=sF′′(w)x=s.

The distance to the boundary is measured by

σx(p)=min⁡{β≥0:βx−p∈K},σs∗(q)=min⁡{β≥0:βs−q∈K∗},\sigma_x(p)=\min\{\beta\ge0:\beta x-p\in K\},\qquad\sigma^*_s(q)=\min\{\beta\ge0:\beta s-q\in K^*\},σx​(p)=min{β≥0:βx−p∈K},σs∗​(q)=min{β≥0:βs−q∈K∗},

so x−αp∈int⁡Kx-\alpha p\in\operatorname{int}Kx−αp∈intK for α∈[0,1/σx(p))\alpha\in[0,1/\sigma_x(p))α∈[0,1/σx​(p)); local norms are ∥p∥x=⟨F′′(x)p,p⟩1/2\|p\|_x=\langle F''(x)p,p\rangle^{1/2}∥p∥x​=⟨F′′(x)p,p⟩1/2.

The problem is the primal-dual pair min⁡{⟨c,x⟩:Ax=b, x∈K}\min\{\langle c,x\rangle:Ax=b,\ x\in K\}min{⟨c,x⟩:Ax=b, x∈K}, max⁡{⟨b,y⟩:A∗y+s=c, s∈K∗}\max\{\langle b,y\rangle:A^*y+s=c,\ s\in K^*\}max{⟨b,y⟩:A∗y+s=c, s∈K∗} with AAA surjective. For ρ≥ν\rho\ge\sqrt\nuρ≥ν​ the primal-dual potential is

ϕ(x,s)=(ν+ρ)ln⁡⟨s,x⟩+F(x)+F∗(s).\phi(x,s)=(\nu+\rho)\ln\langle s,x\rangle+F(x)+F_*(s).ϕ(x,s)=(ν+ρ)ln⟨s,x⟩+F(x)+F∗​(s).

One iteration from a strictly feasible (x,y,s)(x,y,s)(x,y,s): take the scaling point www and σ=σx(w)\sigma=\sigma_x(w)σ=σx​(w); solve

F′′(w)Δx+Δs=ν+ρ⟨s,x⟩s+F′(x),AΔx=0,A∗Δy+Δs=0;(8.1)F''(w)\Delta x+\Delta s=\tfrac{\nu+\rho}{\langle s,x\rangle}s+F'(x),\qquad A\Delta x=0,\qquad A^*\Delta y+\Delta s=0;\qquad(8.1)F′′(w)Δx+Δs=⟨s,x⟩ν+ρ​s+F′(x),AΔx=0,A∗Δy+Δs=0;(8.1)

put σˉ=max⁡{σx(Δx),σs∗(Δs)}\bar\sigma=\max\{\sigma_x(\Delta x),\sigma^*_s(\Delta s)\}σˉ=max{σx​(Δx),σs∗​(Δs)}, αˉ=1/(σ2+σˉ)\bar\alpha=1/(\sigma^2+\bar\sigma)αˉ=1/(σ2+σˉ), and accept any α\alphaα with ϕ(x−αΔx,s−αΔs)≤ϕ(x−αˉΔx,s−αˉΔs)\phi(x-\alpha\Delta x,s-\alpha\Delta s)\le\phi(x-\bar\alpha\Delta x,s-\bar\alpha\Delta s)ϕ(x−αΔx,s−αΔs)≤ϕ(x−αˉΔx,s−αˉΔs).

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 8.2

ϕ(x−αˉΔx, s−αˉΔs)≤ϕ(x,s)−32+ln⁡(1+32),\phi(x-\bar\alpha\Delta x,\,s-\bar\alpha\Delta s)\le\phi(x,s)-\frac{\sqrt3}{2}+\ln\Big(1+\frac{\sqrt3}{2}\Big),ϕ(x−αˉΔx,s−αˉΔs)≤ϕ(x,s)−23​​+ln(1+23​​),

with x−αˉΔx∈int⁡Kx-\bar\alpha\Delta x\in\operatorname{int}Kx−αˉΔx∈intK and s−αˉΔs∈int⁡K∗s-\bar\alpha\Delta s\in\operatorname{int}K^*s−αˉΔs∈intK∗, and the same bound for every accepted step α\alphaα, whose iterate is again strictly feasible. The constant 3/2−ln⁡(1+3/2)≈0.243\sqrt3/2-\ln(1+\sqrt3/2)\approx0.2433​/2−ln(1+3​/2)≈0.243 is the paper's.

Milestones

In attack order: the structure of Hessians (Theorem 3.1), existence and uniqueness of scaling points (Theorem 3.2), convexity of −⟨F′(⋅),v⟩-\langle F'(\cdot),v\rangle−⟨F′(⋅),v⟩ (Lemma 3.1) and the third-derivative bounds (Corollary 3.2 (i)–(ii)); the long-step Hessian comparison (Theorem 4.1), its corollaries (Corollary 4.1 (i)–(ii)), the barrier estimate (4.8) (Theorem 4.2) and the scalar monotonicity facts (Proposition 4.1); separability along orthogonal boundary directions (Lemma 5.1, Theorem 5.1) and the key inequality

⟨F′(x),F∗′(s)⟩≥ν(ν−1)⟨s,x⟩+34σx2(w)(Theorem 5.2);\langle F'(x),F_*'(s)\rangle\ge\frac{\nu(\nu-1)}{\langle s,x\rangle}+\frac34\sigma_x^2(w)\qquad(\text{Theorem 5.2});⟨F′(x),F∗′​(s)⟩≥⟨s,x⟩ν(ν−1)​+43​σx2​(w)(Theorem 5.2);

and unique solvability of the projection system (Proposition 6.1).

Significance

A constant decrease of ϕ\phiϕ per iteration gives, through the bound of Nesterov–Nemirovskii (Theorem 8.1 of the paper), primal and dual solutions within ϵ\epsilonϵ of optimal in O(νln⁡(1/ϵ))O(\sqrt\nu\ln(1/\epsilon))O(ν​ln(1/ϵ)) iterations when ρ=γν\rho=\gamma\sqrt\nuρ=γν​, with step sizes that are long (a fixed fraction of the distance to the boundary) rather than confined to a Dikin ellipsoid. Theorems 4.1–4.2 and 5.2 are reused by the potential-reduction and path-following analyses of the same paper and by later work on symmetric cones.

The results are proved in the paper. They are not formalized anywhere known to us: Mathlib has no self-concordant barriers, and the platform has the definitions of self-scaled barriers (from the companion 1998 paper) but none of these theorems. The mission produces machine-checked versions of the paper's structure theory of self-scaled barriers (§§3–5) and of the per-iteration decrease of its primal-dual method.

Difficulty

The obvious attempt bounds the change of FFF and F∗F_*F∗​ along the step by self-concordance alone. Self-concordance controls F′′(x−αp)F''(x-\alpha p)F′′(x−αp) only for ∥αp∥x<1\|\alpha p\|_x<1∥αp∥x​<1, so it cannot certify a step of length αˉ\bar\alphaαˉ, which may be far outside the Dikin ellipsoid. The long-step analysis needs Theorem 4.1, which compares Hessians all the way to the boundary and holds for self-scaled barriers but fails for general self-concordant ones. The constant decrease then needs a lower bound on μ/σ\mu/\sigmaμ/σ, where μ\muμ is the scaled norm of the right-hand side of (8.1); that bound is Theorem 5.2, whose proof rests on the separability of FFF along orthogonal boundary directions (Theorem 5.1), a structural property with no analogue for general barriers.

Formalization scope

  • Spaces. E=E∗=RnE=E^*=\mathbb R^nE=E∗=Rn and Y=Y∗=RmY=Y^*=\mathbb R^mY=Y∗=Rm (EuclideanSpace), identified through the inner product; A∗A^*A∗ is ContinuousLinearMap.adjoint A. F′′F''F′′ is hess F (derivative of gradient F), F′′′(x)[u]F'''(x)[u]F′′′(x)[u] is fderiv ℝ (hess F) x u, [F′′(v)]−1[F''(v)]^{-1}[F′′(v)]−1 is ContinuousLinearMap.inverse.
  • Published setting reused. IsProperCone, IsSelfScaledBarrier, conj, IsScalingPoint, IsPrimalStrict, IsDualStrict, sigma, lnorm (SelfScaledIPM.ShortStep), and ConvexOptimization.dualCone. The barrier definition includes nondegeneracy of F′′F''F′′ on int⁡K\operatorname{int}KintK, which follows from the other axioms for a pointed cone. conj K F is a supremum over int⁡K\operatorname{int}KintK and is only evaluated at points of int⁡K∗\operatorname{int}K^*intK∗. σ\sigmaσ is an infimum, equal to the page's minimum at interior centres.
  • Standing binders. Every theorem except Proposition 4.1 assumes IsProperCone K, IsSelfScaledBarrier K F ν and ν≥1\nu\ge1ν≥1; the paper derives ν≥1\nu\ge1ν≥1 from pointedness.
  • Conventions. Operator inequalities are quadratic-form inequalities. Step ranges α∈[0,1/σx(p))\alpha\in[0,1/\sigma_x(p))α∈[0,1/σx​(p)) are encoded as 0≤α0\le\alpha0≤α, ασx(p)<1\alpha\sigma_x(p)<1ασx​(p)<1. Scaling points and search directions are data satisfying their equations; their existence is Theorem 3.2 and Proposition 6.1. "Monotonically" in Proposition 4.1 is read strictly.
  • Goal form. Theorem 8.2 is stated for one iteration from any strictly feasible pair. It asserts that the αˉ\bar\alphaαˉ-step is strictly interior and achieves the bound. Without that clause, a goal asserting the bound only for steps accepted by rule (c) would be vacuous whenever no step is accepted, since F∗F_*F∗​ and ln⁡\lnln take junk values off their domains.
  • New definitions (SelfScaledLongStep.PrimalDual.Defs): the projection system (6.4), the potential ϕ\phiϕ, the system (8.1), σˉ\bar\sigmaσˉ and αˉ\bar\alphaαˉ. The projection system is shared, under the same name, with the other missions of this series.
  • Contributions welcome: calculus of self-concordant barriers on cones (C³ smoothness, logarithmic homogeneity identities, Legendre duality between FFF and F∗F_*F∗​), which is reusable for any interior-point formalization; proofs of the milestones in any order.

Selected references

  • Yu. E. Nesterov and M. J. Todd, Self-scaled barriers and interior-point methods for convex programming, Mathematics of Operations Research 22(1), 1997, 1–42. https://doi.org/10.1287/moor.22.1.1
  • Yu. E. Nesterov and M. J. Todd, Primal-dual interior-point methods for self-scaled cones, SIAM Journal on Optimization 8(2), 1998, 324–364. https://doi.org/10.1137/S1052623495290209
  • Yu. Nesterov and A. Nemirovskii, Interior-Point Polynomial Algorithms in Convex Programming, SIAM, 1994. https://doi.org/10.1137/1.9781611970791
  • M. Kojima, S. Mizuno and A. Yoshise, An O(nL)O(\sqrt n L)O(n​L) iteration potential reduction algorithm for linear complementarity problems, Mathematical Programming 50, 1991, 331–342. https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01594942
  • M. J. Todd and Y. Ye, A centered projective algorithm for linear programming, Mathematics of Operations Research 15(3), 1990, 508–529. https://doi.org/10.1287/moor.15.3.508
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Complexity TheoryTheoretical Computer Science·Captain: mikedeng1

Optimal Inapproximability Results for MAX-CUT and Other 2-Variable CSPs? 1: Assuming the Unique Games Conjecture, (1/2 − ρ/2)- versus ((arccos ρ)/π + ε)-Satisfiable MAX-CUT Is NP-Hard to DistinguishResearch Paper

Motivation

MAX-CUT asks for a partition of the vertices of a graph that cuts as many edges, or as much edge weight, as possible. It is one of Karp's original NP-hard problems and the standard test case for approximation algorithms. A uniformly random partition cuts half of the edges in expectation. Goemans and Williamson (JACM 1995) rounded a semidefinite relaxation with a random hyperplane and obtained the ratio

αGW=min⁡0<θ<πθ/π(1−cos⁡θ)/2≈0.878567.\alpha_{GW}=\min_{0<\theta<\pi}\frac{\theta/\pi}{(1-\cos\theta)/2}\approx 0.878567.αGW​=0<θ<πmin​(1−cosθ)/2θ/π​≈0.878567.

Whether a better ratio can be achieved in polynomial time was a central open question.

Timeline.

  • 1995: Goemans and Williamson give the αGW\alpha_{GW}αGW​-approximation.
  • 2001: Håstad (JACM 2001) shows, via PCPs and gadgets, that approximating MAX-CUT within 16/17+ϵ≈0.94116/17+\epsilon\approx 0.94116/17+ϵ≈0.941 is NP-hard. This remains the best unconditional bound.
  • 2002: Khot (STOC 2002) formulates the Unique Games Conjecture (UGC).
  • 2004–2007: Khot, Kindler, Mossel and O'Donnell (SIAM J. Comput. 2007) show that the UGC implies that αGW\alpha_{GW}αGW​ is optimal. Their reduction rests on the Majority Is Stablest conjecture, which they formulate.
  • 2005–2010: Mossel, O'Donnell and Oleszkiewicz (Annals of Math. 2010, arXiv:math/0503503) prove Majority Is Stablest via the invariance principle.

Setting

A Unique Label Cover instance L(V,W,E,[M],{σv,w})\mathcal L(V,W,E,[M],\{\sigma_{v,w}\})L(V,W,E,[M],{σv,w​}) is a bipartite graph with left vertices VVV, right vertices WWW and edges E⊆V×WE\subseteq V\times WE⊆V×W, together with a bijection σv,w:[M]→[M]\sigma_{v,w}:[M]\to[M]σv,w​:[M]→[M] on each edge. A labeling assigns a label in [M][M][M] to every vertex, and it satisfies (v,w)(v,w)(v,w) if σv,w(label(w))=label(v)\sigma_{v,w}(\mathrm{label}(w))=\mathrm{label}(v)σv,w​(label(w))=label(v). OPT\mathrm{OPT}OPT is the largest fraction of edges satisfied by a labeling. The Unique Games Conjecture says that for all η,γ>0\eta,\gamma>0η,γ>0 there is M=M(η,γ)M=M(\eta,\gamma)M=M(η,γ) such that it is NP-hard to distinguish instances with label set [M][M][M] and OPT≥1−η\mathrm{OPT}\ge 1-\etaOPT≥1−η from those with OPT≤γ\mathrm{OPT}\le\gammaOPT≤γ.

A weighted MAX-CUT instance is a graph with nonnegative edge weights. It is at least ccc-satisfiable if some partition cuts at least a ccc fraction of the total weight, and at most sss-satisfiable if no partition cuts more than an sss fraction.

On the cube {−1,1}n\{-1,1\}^n{−1,1}n, with TRUE =−1=-1=−1 and the uniform measure, the noise stability of f:{−1,1}n→Rf:\{-1,1\}^n\to\mathbb Rf:{−1,1}n→R at ρ∈[−1,1]\rho\in[-1,1]ρ∈[−1,1] is Sρ(f)=E[f(x)f(y)]\mathbb S_\rho(f)=\mathbf E[f(x)f(y)]Sρ​(f)=E[f(x)f(y)]. Here xxx is uniform and yyy is ρ\rhoρ-correlated with xxx: each yiy_iyi​ independently equals xix_ixi​ with probability 12+12ρ\tfrac12+\tfrac12\rho21​+21​ρ. The influence Infi(f)\mathrm{Inf}_i(f)Infi​(f) is the expected variance of fff in the coordinate xix_ixi​, and the low-degree influence is Infi≤k(f)=∑S∋i,∣S∣≤kf^(S)2\mathrm{Inf}_i^{\le k}(f)=\sum_{S\ni i,|S|\le k}\hat f(S)^2Infi≤k​(f)=∑S∋i,∣S∣≤k​f^​(S)2. Majority Is Stablest states: for ρ∈[0,1)\rho\in[0,1)ρ∈[0,1) and ϵ>0\epsilon>0ϵ>0 there is δ>0\delta>0δ>0 such that every f:{−1,1}n→[−1,1]f:\{-1,1\}^n\to[-1,1]f:{−1,1}n→[−1,1] with E[f]=0\mathbf E[f]=0E[f]=0 and all Infi(f)≤δ\mathrm{Inf}_i(f)\le\deltaInfi​(f)≤δ has Sρ(f)≤1−2πarccos⁡ρ+ϵ\mathbb S_\rho(f)\le 1-\tfrac2\pi\arccos\rho+\epsilonSρ​(f)≤1−π2​arccosρ+ϵ.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 1 (p. 11)

Assume the UGC and Majority Is Stablest. For every −1<ρ<0-1<\rho<0−1<ρ<0 and ϵ>0\epsilon>0ϵ>0 it is NP-hard to distinguish MAX-CUT instances that are at least ccc-satisfiable from those that are at most sss-satisfiable, where

c=12−12ρ,s=arccos⁡ρπ+ϵ.c=\tfrac12-\tfrac12\rho,\qquad s=\frac{\arccos\rho}{\pi}+\epsilon.c=21​−21​ρ,s=πarccosρ​+ϵ.

Choosing ρ\rhoρ to minimize s/cs/cs/c gives hardness of approximation within any factor above αGW\alpha_{GW}αGW​; that consequence is not part of the goal.

Milestones

  • The Fourier formulas Sρ(f)=⟨f,Tρf⟩=∑Sρ∣S∣f^(S)2\mathbb S_\rho(f)=\langle f,T_\rho f\rangle=\sum_S\rho^{|S|}\hat f(S)^2Sρ​(f)=⟨f,Tρ​f⟩=∑S​ρ∣S∣f^​(S)2 (Proposition 7.1) and Infi(f)=∑S∋if^(S)2\mathrm{Inf}_i(f)=\sum_{S\ni i}\hat f(S)^2Infi​(f)=∑S∋i​f^​(S)2 (Proposition 7.2).
  • Three variants of Majority Is Stablest:
    • with low-degree influences (Proposition 7.3);
    • in reverse for ρ∈(−1,0]\rho\in(-1,0]ρ∈(−1,0], without E[f]=0\mathbf E[f]=0E[f]=0 (Proposition 7.4);
    • both at once (Proposition 7.5).
  • The completeness of the Long-Code verifier, (1−2η)(12−12ρ)(1-2\eta)(\tfrac12-\tfrac12\rho)(1−2η)(21​−21​ρ) (§8.2).
  • The arithmetization Pr⁡[acc]=12−12Ev[Sρ(gv)]\Pr[\mathrm{acc}]=\tfrac12-\tfrac12\mathbf E_v[\mathbb S_\rho(g_v)]Pr[acc]=21​−21​Ev​[Sρ​(gv​)] (6).
  • The influence-transfer inequality (7).
  • The candidate-set bound ∣Cand[w]∣≤2k/δ|\mathrm{Cand}[w]|\le 2k/\delta∣Cand[w]∣≤2k/δ.
  • The soundness: acceptance ≥(arccos⁡ρ)/π+ϵ\ge(\arccos\rho)/\pi+\epsilon≥(arccosρ)/π+ϵ forces OPT≥γ′(ϵ,ρ)\mathrm{OPT}\ge\gamma'(\epsilon,\rho)OPT≥γ′(ϵ,ρ), independently of MMM (§8.3).

Significance

Under the UGC, Theorem 1 shows that the Goemans–Williamson algorithm is optimal for MAX-CUT. It also shows that the semidefinite relaxation's integrality gap and the hardness threshold coincide. This correspondence was later extended to every constraint satisfaction problem (Raghavendra, STOC 2008). The verifier analysis here is the template for many later UGC-hardness results: dictatorship tests via noise stability, and list-decoding via low-degree influences.

The paper's result is proved, conditional on the UGC; the UGC itself is open. To our knowledge, neither the reduction nor the Majority Is Stablest theorem has a machine-checked proof. This mission produces a checked version of the conditional reduction. Its by-products are reusable: Fourier analysis on the cube (noise stability, influences, the Bonami–Beckner operator), the Long-Code verifier analysis, and a gap-hardness interface on top of a Turing-machine definition of NP.

Difficulty

Completeness is a short calculation. The difficulty is soundness. A proof that the verifier accepts with probability above (arccos⁡ρ)/π+ϵ(\arccos\rho)/\pi+\epsilon(arccosρ)/π+ϵ must be decoded into a labeling that satisfies a fraction γ′\gamma'γ′ of the edges, and γ′\gamma'γ′ must not depend on the label set size MMM. Labeling each www by a coordinate of large influence of fwf_wfw​ is the obvious decoding, but on its own it does not work. The test is passed with high probability by the averaged functions gvg_vgv​, not by the fwf_wfw​ themselves. Ruling out functions with only small influences is exactly the content of Majority Is Stablest. The analysis needs both the reverse form of Majority Is Stablest for negative ρ\rhoρ and low-degree influences, whose sum is bounded by kkk independently of MMM. Turning the PCP into polynomial-time gap-hardness adds further work on top of the analysis:

  • the regularity assumption must be removed;
  • an irrational ρ\rhoρ must be replaced by a nearby rational one, so that the weights are integers;
  • the reduction must be shown polynomial-time on Turing machines.

Formalization scope

  • The cube. {−1,1}n\{-1,1\}^n{−1,1}n is Fin n → Bool, with TRUE ↦−1\mapsto-1↦−1. Expectations are finite averages.
  • No Fourier shortcuts. Noise stability and influence are defined as on pp. 5–6 (a correlated-pair average, an expected coordinate variance), not by their Fourier formulas, which are milestones.
  • Unique Label Cover. Instances have finite V,WV,WV,W, E⊆V×WE\subseteq V\times WE⊆V×W, and a permutation of Fin M\mathrm{Fin}\,MFinM for every pair. OPT\mathrm{OPT}OPT is the maximum over the finitely many labelings, and 000 when there is none.
  • MAX-CUT instances are loopless graphs with natural-number edge weights (edge multiplicities), as §7.1 permits.
  • NP-hardness. "NP-hard to distinguish" is GapNPHard: every NP language of the published CookPvsNP_defs maps by a polynomial-time Turing-machine computable function to Yes-instances or No-instances. Instances are encoded in unary.
  • Hypotheses of the goal. The UGC is a hypothesis of Theorem 1. Majority Is Stablest, which the paper cites from [45] and does not prove, is a second, disclosed hypothesis, of Theorem 1 and of every milestone that uses it.
  • Regularity. The verifier milestones assume the VVV-side regularity of §8.1; Theorem 1 and the UGC do not.
  • No trivial instances. Every Yes- and No-predicate requires a nonempty edge set, so the empty instance cannot carry the hardness. Placeholder (True/False) versions of the UGC or of Majority Is Stablest would trivialize the goal and are excluded.
  • Welcome contributions.
    • The Fourier milestones are self-contained and reusable.
    • A proof of Majority Is Stablest would discharge the second hypothesis.
    • A formal regularization of Unique Label Cover ([38]) would make the reduction self-contained.

Selected references

  • S. Khot, G. Kindler, E. Mossel, R. O'Donnell, Optimal Inapproximability Results for MAX-CUT and Other 2-Variable CSPs?, SIAM J. Comput. 37(1), 2007. https://doi.org/10.1137/S0097539705447372
  • M. X. Goemans, D. P. Williamson, Improved approximation algorithms for maximum cut and satisfiability problems using semidefinite programming, J. ACM 42(6), 1995. https://doi.org/10.1145/227683.227684
  • J. Håstad, Some optimal inapproximability results, J. ACM 48(4), 2001. https://doi.org/10.1145/502090.502098
  • S. Khot, On the power of unique 2-prover 1-round games, STOC 2002. https://doi.org/10.1145/509907.510017
  • E. Mossel, R. O'Donnell, K. Oleszkiewicz, Noise stability of functions with low influences: invariance and optimality, Annals of Math. 171(1), 2010. https://doi.org/10.4007/annals.2010.171.295 (arXiv:math/0503503)
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Dynamic ProgrammingMarkov ChainOptimization·Captain: mikedeng1

Optimality of (s, S) Policies in Inventory Models with Markovian Demand II: In the Nonstationary Discounted Infinite-Horizon Problem, a State-Dependent (s, S) Policy Is OptimalResearch Paper

Motivation

Periodic-review inventory models with a fixed ordering cost are the setting in which the (s,S)(s,S)(s,S) policy is optimal: when the stock falls below a reorder point sss, order up to a level SSS, otherwise order nothing. Scarf (1960) proved this for independent demands over a finite horizon by introducing KKK-convexity, and Iglehart (1963) extended it to the discounted infinite horizon. In practice the demand distribution changes with an exogenous environment: the economy, the season, the stage of a product's life cycle. Song and Zipkin (Oper. Res. 41(2), 1993) modelled this environment as a Markov chain of demand states in continuous time with Poisson demand.

Sethi and Cheng (Oper. Res. 45(6), 1997) treat the discrete-time version with general demand densities, nonstationary costs and convex surplus costs of linear growth. The companion mission (I) covers their finite-horizon result, Theorem 4.1. This mission covers the nonstationary discounted infinite-horizon result, Theorem 6.2, together with the existence theory (Theorem 6.1, proved in the paper's Appendix) on which it rests.

Setting

Demand states form the finite set I={1,…,L}I = \{1,\dots,L\}I={1,…,L} and follow a Markov chain with transition matrix P=(pij)P = (p_{ij})P=(pij​). In period k=0,1,2,…k = 0,1,2,\dotsk=0,1,2,… the demand ξk≥0\xi_k \ge 0ξk​≥0 has the conditional density φi,k\varphi_{i,k}φi,k​ given ik=ii_k = iik​=i, with mean at most MMM. Orders are placed at the start of a period and delivered at once, and unmet demand is backlogged, so the surplus evolves by xk+1=xk+uk−ξkx_{k+1} = x_k + u_k - \xi_kxk+1​=xk​+uk​−ξk​ (2.4). Ordering u≥0u \ge 0u≥0 costs ck(i,u)=Kki δ(u)+ckiuc_k(i,u) = K^i_k\,\delta(u) + c^i_k uck​(i,u)=Kki​δ(u)+cki​u with Kki,cki≥0K^i_k, c^i_k \ge 0Kki​,cki​≥0 (2.1), where δ(z)=1\delta(z) = 1δ(z)=1 for z>0z > 0z>0 and 000 otherwise. The surplus cost fk(i,⋅)f_k(i,\cdot)fk​(i,⋅) is convex and nonnegative, vanishes at 000, and satisfies fk(i,x)≤C(1+∣x∣)f_k(i,x) \le C(1+|x|)fk​(i,x)≤C(1+∣x∣) (2.2).

An admissible policy UUU chooses each order uk≥0u_k \ge 0uk​≥0 as a measurable function of the past demand states and demands. With a discount factor α\alphaα, the objective from period nnn, state iii and surplus xxx is

Jn(i,x;U)=∑k=n∞αk−n E[ck(ik,uk)+fk(ik,xk)],(6.1)J_n(i,x;U) = \sum_{k=n}^{\infty} \alpha^{k-n}\,E\big[c_k(i_k,u_k) + f_k(i_k,x_k)\big], \tag{6.1}Jn​(i,x;U)=k=n∑∞​αk−nE[ck​(ik​,uk​)+fk​(ik​,xk​)],(6.1)

and the value function is vn(i,x)=inf⁡UJn(i,x;U)v_n(i,x) = \inf_U J_n(i,x;U)vn​(i,x)=infU​Jn​(i,x;U). With Fn+1(b)(i,y)=∑jpij∫0∞b(j,y−z) φi,n(z) dzF_{n+1}(b)(i,y) = \sum_j p_{ij}\int_0^\infty b(j,y-z)\,\varphi_{i,n}(z)\,dzFn+1​(b)(i,y)=∑j​pij​∫0∞​b(j,y−z)φi,n​(z)dz (3.1), the dynamic programming equations are

vn(i,x)=fn(i,x)+inf⁡u≥0{cn(i,u)+αFn+1(vn+1)(i,x+u)},n=0,1,2,…(6.2)v_n(i,x) = f_n(i,x) + \inf_{u\ge0}\big\{c_n(i,u) + \alpha F_{n+1}(v_{n+1})(i,x+u)\big\}, \qquad n = 0,1,2,\dots \tag{6.2}vn​(i,x)=fn​(i,x)+u≥0inf​{cn​(i,u)+αFn+1​(vn+1​)(i,x+u)},n=0,1,2,…(6.2)

The truncations Jn,kJ_{n,k}Jn,k​ keep the first kkk periods of (6.1) (6.3), their values are vn,kv_{n,k}vn,k​ (6.4), and wn=Jn(⋅;0)w_n = J_n(\cdot;\mathbf 0)wn​=Jn​(⋅;0) is the cost of never ordering (6.6). The function classes are B0B_0B0​ (nonnegative pointwise limits of continuous functions), B1B_1B1​ (those of linear growth) and C1C_1C1​ (those also uniformly continuous in xxx). A function ggg is KKK-convex if K+g(z+y)≥g(y)+z (g(y)−g(y−b))/bK + g(z+y) \ge g(y) + z\,(g(y)-g(y-b))/bK+g(z+y)≥g(y)+z(g(y)−g(y−b))/b for all z≥0z \ge 0z≥0, b>0b > 0b>0 (4.3). Assumption (4.1) asks Kni≥∑jpijKn+1j≥0K^i_n \ge \sum_j p_{ij}K^j_{n+1} \ge 0Kni​≥∑j​pij​Kn+1j​≥0, and (4.2) asks cnix+Fn+1(fn+1)(i,x)→+∞c^i_n x + F_{n+1}(f_{n+1})(i,x) \to +\inftycni​x+Fn+1​(fn+1​)(i,x)→+∞ as x→∞x \to \inftyx→∞.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 6.2

Under (2.1), (2.2), (4.1), (4.2) and 0<α<10 < \alpha < 10<α<1, there are sni≤Snis^i_n \le S^i_nsni​≤Sni​ in [−∞,∞)[-\infty,\infty)[−∞,∞) such that

u^n(i,x)=(Sni−x) δ(sni−x)\hat u_n(i,x) = (S^i_n - x)\,\delta(s^i_n - x)u^n​(i,x)=(Sni​−x)δ(sni​−x)

attains the infimum in (6.2) at every (n,i,x)(n,i,x)(n,i,x), and its feedback policy, started at any period nnn and surplus xxx, has cost Jn(i,x;U^)=vn(i,x)J_n(i,x;\hat U) = v_n(i,x)Jn​(i,x;U^)=vn​(i,x): it is optimal among all history-dependent policies.

Milestones

  1. The order-nothing cost wnw_nwn​ is finite, lies in C1C_1C1​, and is the unique C1C_1C1​ solution of wn=fn+αFn+1(wn+1)w_n = f_n + \alpha F_{n+1}(w_{n+1})wn​=fn​+αFn+1​(wn+1​) (6.7).
  2. The truncated values solve the dynamic programming equations (6.5), vn,0=0v_{n,0} = 0vn,0​=0, vn,k∈C1v_{n,k} \in C_1vn,k​∈C1​, and under (4.2) the infimum in (6.4) is attained.
  3. Theorem 6.1, (6.8): 0=vn,0≤vn,1≤⋯≤vn,k≤wn0 = v_{n,0} \le v_{n,1} \le \cdots \le v_{n,k} \le w_n0=vn,0​≤vn,1​≤⋯≤vn,k​≤wn​.
  4. Appendix: ∣vn,k(i,x′)−vn,k(i,x)∣≤C∣x′−x∣/(1−α)|v_{n,k}(i,x') - v_{n,k}(i,x)| \le C|x'-x|/(1-\alpha)∣vn,k​(i,x′)−vn,k​(i,x)∣≤C∣x′−x∣/(1−α), and the same for vn=lim⁡kvn,kv_n = \lim_k v_{n,k}vn​=limk​vn,k​.
  5. Theorem 6.1, (6.9): vn,k↑vnv_{n,k} \uparrow v_nvn,k​↑vn​, a solution of (6.2) in B1B_1B1​.
  6. Theorem 6.1, (6.10): vn∈C1v_n \in C_1vn​∈C1​, a B0B_0B0​ minimizer U^\hat UU^ of (6.2) exists, and every such U^\hat UU^ is optimal: vn(i,x)=min⁡UJn(i,x;U)=Jn(i,x;U^)v_n(i,x) = \min_U J_n(i,x;U) = J_n(i,x;\hat U)vn​(i,x)=minU​Jn​(i,x;U)=Jn​(i,x;U^).
  7. Proof of Theorem 6.2: vn,k(i,⋅)v_{n,k}(i,\cdot)vn,k​(i,⋅) is KniK^i_nKni​-convex.
  8. Proof of Theorem 6.2: vn(i,⋅)v_n(i,\cdot)vn​(i,⋅) is KniK^i_nKni​-convex.

The structural lemma behind the step from KKK-convexity to the (s,S)(s,S)(s,S) form, Proposition 4.2 of the paper (an extension of Bertsekas' lemma to lower semicontinuous functions coercive only at +∞+\infty+∞, with possibly infinite sss, SSS), is posed in the companion finite-horizon mission and is not repeated here.

Significance

Theorem 6.2 says that the classical (s,S)(s,S)(s,S) structure survives two generalizations at once: demand driven by a Markov environment, and nonstationary data over an infinite horizon. The two levels may depend on the period and on the current demand state, so only 2L2L2L numbers per period describe an optimal policy, and with cyclic demand only LLL pairs are needed (Corollary 7.1 of the paper). Theorem 6.1 is a self-contained existence result for a positive-cost, unbounded-state dynamic program: value iteration from zero converges to the value function, which solves the optimality equation, and any measurable minimizer is optimal among history-dependent policies.

The results are proved in the paper, with the finite-horizon existence theory delegated to Beyer, Sethi and Taksar (1998). No machine-checked proof of any of them is known. The platform has KKK-convexity (BertsekasKConvex) and the (s,S)(s,S)(s,S) structure lemma of Bertsekas for continuous functions coercive at both ends; it has no discounted infinite-horizon (s,S)(s,S)(s,S) theorem with Markov-modulated demand. The related posed items SongZipkinFluct.FixedCost.theorem5e_theorem6 and theorem5ab concern the Song–Zipkin model (continuous time, Poisson demand, integer levels, stationary data), a different model.

Difficulty

The obvious argument is "the finite-horizon value functions are KKK-convex, so their limit is, and a minimizer of a KKK-convex optimality equation is (s,S)(s,S)(s,S)". Three steps of it fail as stated.

First, the limit of value iteration need not be the value function, nor solve (6.2), in a positive-cost problem with unbounded actions: exchanging lim⁡k\lim_klimk​ with inf⁡u\inf_uinfu​ requires the minimizers of the truncated problems to stay in a compact set uniformly in kkk, and that bound is where the coercivity assumption (4.2) enters. Second, optimality against history-dependent policies, not only Markov ones, requires a verification argument along histories of states and demands. Third, the functions zn(i,y)=cniy+αFn+1(vn+1)(i,y)z_n(i,y) = c^i_n y + \alpha F_{n+1}(v_{n+1})(i,y)zn​(i,y)=cni​y+αFn+1​(vn+1​)(i,y) may be unbounded below, in which case the reorder level is s=−∞s = -\inftys=−∞ and the order-up-to level does not exist; the goal allows this case.

Formalization scope

The Lean development (namespace SethiChengSS.Infinite) commits to the following.

  • Demand states are Fin L; periods are natural numbers with the paper's base 000.
  • Expectations are sums over state paths of Lebesgue integrals against the product weight ∏tpitit+1φit,t(ξt)\prod_t p_{i_t i_{t+1}}\varphi_{i_t,t}(\xi_t)∏t​pit​it+1​​φit​,t​(ξt​), valued in [0,∞][0,\infty][0,∞]. This builds in the conditional independence of ξk\xi_kξk​ and ik+1i_{k+1}ik+1​ given iki_kik​ that (3.1) uses.
  • A policy is a function of the state history and the past demands; admissible means nonnegative and measurable in the demands. The comparison class is never restricted to Markov policies.
  • JnJ_nJn​ (6.1) is the supremum over kkk of the truncations Jn,kJ_{n,k}Jn,k​ (6.3), which equals the series because all costs are nonnegative.
  • Fn+1F_{n+1}Fn+1​ uses the Bochner integral, which is 000 on non-integrable integrands; the C1C_1C1​ conclusions are what make it genuine.
  • The levels sss, SSS are extended reals with s≤Ss \le Ss≤S, S≠+∞S \ne +\inftyS=+∞, and SSS real whenever sss is (Remark 4.4).

Pins. The paper prints 0<α≤10 < \alpha \le 10<α≤1; the mission assumes 0<α<10 < \alpha < 10<α<1, since wnw_nwn​ is infinite at α=1\alpha = 1α=1 and the Appendix divides by 1−α1-\alpha1−α. Theorem 6.2 is printed without (4.1), which its proof uses through the induction of Section 4; (4.1) is assumed for every period. Theorem 6.1 is printed under (2.1)–(2.2) only, but attainment in (6.2) can fail without coercivity and the Appendix bound (A.3) divides by cnic^i_ncni​; (4.2) is added to (6.9), (6.10) and to the attainment clause of (6.5). "In class C1C_1C1​" for the sequence wnw_nwn​ is read with one growth constant for all periods. The boundary condition "vn+k,0=0v_{n+k,0} = 0vn+k,0​=0" of (6.5) is read as vn,0=0v_{n,0} = 0vn,0​=0, as the next sentence of the paper states.

The goal cannot be met by a degenerate encoding: the value function is the infimum over all admissible history-dependent policies (not the solution of (6.2) by definition), the demand data must be genuine probability densities with bounded mean, and the levels may not be S=+∞S = +\inftyS=+∞.

A complete development needs: monotone convergence for the path-measure costs, measurable selection of minimizers, the KKK-convexity closure properties (Proposition 4.1 of the paper; several are proved on the platform as BertsekasDP.kconvex_*), and Proposition 4.2. The model file and the infinite-horizon verification argument are reusable for other Markov-modulated inventory models. Contributions toward any milestone, or toward general lemmas on positive-cost dynamic programs, are welcome.

Selected references

  • S. P. Sethi and F. Cheng, Optimality of (s, S) policies in inventory models with Markovian demand, Operations Research 45(6), 931–939, 1997. https://doi.org/10.1287/opre.45.6.931
  • J.-S. Song and P. Zipkin, Inventory control in a fluctuating demand environment, Operations Research 41(2), 351–370, 1993. https://doi.org/10.1287/opre.41.2.351
  • H. Scarf, The optimality of (S, s) policies in the dynamic inventory problem, in Mathematical Methods in the Social Sciences, Stanford University Press, 1960.
  • D. L. Iglehart, Optimality of (s, S) policies in the infinite horizon dynamic inventory problem, Management Science 9(2), 259–267, 1963. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.9.2.259
  • D. P. Bertsekas, Dynamic Programming and Stochastic Control, Academic Press, 1976.
  • A. Bensoussan, M. Crouhy and J.-M. Proth, Mathematical Theory of Production Planning, North-Holland, 1983.
  • D. Beyer, S. P. Sethi and M. Taksar, Inventory models with Markovian demands and cost functions of polynomial growth, Journal of Optimization Theory and Applications 98, 1998 (cited by Sethi and Cheng as forthcoming).
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Probability·Captain: mikedeng1

A Note on Probability Distributions with Increasing Generalized Failure Rates I: X Is IGFR iff log X Is IFR iff X ⪯hr λX for All λ ≥ 1 iff Φ̄(ξ/θ) Is TP₂Research Paper

Motivation

In pricing and supply-chain contracting, demand or valuations are random, and the profit functions that arise are unimodal only under a shape condition on the distribution. A firm facing demand D(p)=Φˉ(p)D(p) = \bar\Phi(p)D(p)=Φˉ(p) at price ppp maximizes revenue π(p)=pΦˉ(p)\pi(p) = p\bar\Phi(p)π(p)=pΦˉ(p); the first-order condition is Φˉ(p)(1−g(p))=0\bar\Phi(p)(1 - g(p)) = 0Φˉ(p)(1−g(p))=0, where ggg is the generalized failure rate introduced by Lariviere and Porteus (2001). When ggg is increasing, it crosses 111 at most once and the optimal price is unique. The same condition makes the supplier's problem unimodal in the price-only newsvendor contract (Lariviere and Porteus, 2001) and appears throughout revenue management. The condition is useful but often hard to verify for a given distribution.

Lariviere (2006) gives three equivalent reformulations of the condition (Theorem 1), two sufficient conditions (Corollary 1), and uses them to show that every beta distribution has an increasing generalized failure rate. The parts of the equivalence had appeared separately: Keilson and Sumita (1982) showed the equivalence of parts 2 and 3, and Ma (1999) linked parts 3 and 4.

Setting

Let XXX be a nonnegative random variable with distribution function Φ\PhiΦ and survival function Φˉ(ξ)=1−Φ(ξ)\bar\Phi(\xi) = 1 - \Phi(\xi)Φˉ(ξ)=1−Φ(ξ). Assume Φ\PhiΦ has a density φ\varphiφ, and let the support of XXX be (α,β)(\alpha,\beta)(α,β) with 0≤α<β≤∞0 \le \alpha < \beta \le \infty0≤α<β≤∞. The failure rate of XXX is h(ξ)=φ(ξ)/Φˉ(ξ)h(\xi) = \varphi(\xi)/\bar\Phi(\xi)h(ξ)=φ(ξ)/Φˉ(ξ), and its generalized failure rate is

g(ξ)=ξ h(ξ).g(\xi) = \xi\,h(\xi).g(ξ)=ξh(ξ).

XXX is IFR if hhh is weakly increasing on {ξ:Φ(ξ)<1}\{\xi : \Phi(\xi) < 1\}{ξ:Φ(ξ)<1}, and IGFR if ggg is weakly increasing on that set. Every IFR variable is IGFR; many variables with decreasing failure rate are IGFR as well.

Write XL=log⁡XX_L = \log XXL​=logX, with distribution ΦL\Phi_LΦL​, density φL\varphi_LφL​, survival ΦˉL\bar\Phi_LΦˉL​ and failure rate hLh_LhL​. Two nonnegative variables with failure rates h1,h2h_1, h_2h1​,h2​ are ordered in the hazard rate order, X1⪯hrX2X_1 \preceq_{hr} X_2X1​⪯hr​X2​, if h1(ξ)≥h2(ξ)h_1(\xi) \ge h_2(\xi)h1​(ξ)≥h2​(ξ) for all ξ≥0\xi \ge 0ξ≥0. A function f(x,y)f(x,y)f(x,y) is totally positive of order 2 (TP₂) if

f(x1,y1)f(x2,y2)−f(x1,y2)f(x2,y1)≥0for x1<x2, y1<y2.f(x_1,y_1)f(x_2,y_2) - f(x_1,y_2)f(x_2,y_1) \ge 0 \qquad\text{for } x_1 < x_2,\ y_1 < y_2 .f(x1​,y1​)f(x2​,y2​)−f(x1​,y2​)f(x2​,y1​)≥0for x1​<x2​, y1​<y2​.

A function is log-concave if its logarithm is concave.

In the Lean development these are survival, failureRate, genFailureRate, IsIFR, IsIGFR, HazardRateLE and IsTP2On in the namespace LariviereIGFR.Char, and log-concavity is the platform predicate ConvexOptimization.LogConcaveOn.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 1 (p. 603)

The following are equivalent:

(1) X is IGFR;(2) XL is IFR;(3) X⪯hrλX for all λ≥1;(4) f(ξ,θ)=Φˉ(ξ/θ) is TP2.\text{(1) } X \text{ is IGFR};\quad \text{(2) } X_L \text{ is IFR};\quad \text{(3) } X \preceq_{hr} \lambda X \text{ for all } \lambda \ge 1;\quad \text{(4) } f(\xi,\theta) = \bar\Phi(\xi/\theta) \text{ is TP}_2 .(1) X is IGFR;(2) XL​ is IFR;(3) X⪯hr​λX for all λ≥1;(4) f(ξ,θ)=Φˉ(ξ/θ) is TP2​.

Milestones (the clauses of the proof)

  1. ΦˉL(ξ)=Φˉ(eξ)\bar\Phi_L(\xi) = \bar\Phi(e^\xi)ΦˉL​(ξ)=Φˉ(eξ), and φL(ξ)=eξφ(eξ)\varphi_L(\xi) = e^\xi\varphi(e^\xi)φL​(ξ)=eξφ(eξ) is a density of XLX_LXL​.
  2. hL(ξ)=g(eξ)h_L(\xi) = g(e^\xi)hL​(ξ)=g(eξ) and hL′(ξ)=eξg′(eξ)h_L'(\xi) = e^\xi g'(e^\xi)hL′​(ξ)=eξg′(eξ).
  3. Parts 1 and 2 are equivalent.
  4. The generalized failure rate of λX\lambda XλX is gλ(ξ)=g(ξ/λ)g_\lambda(\xi) = g(\xi/\lambda)gλ​(ξ)=g(ξ/λ).
  5. Parts 1 and 3 are equivalent.
  6. A law on R\mathbb RR is IFR if and only if Φˉ(ξ−θ)\bar\Phi(\xi - \theta)Φˉ(ξ−θ) is TP₂ (Barlow and Proschan 1965).
  7. ΦˉL(ξ−θ)\bar\Phi_L(\xi - \theta)ΦˉL​(ξ−θ) is TP₂ on R2\mathbb R^2R2 if and only if Φˉ(ξ/θ)\bar\Phi(\xi/\theta)Φˉ(ξ/θ) is TP₂ on (0,∞)2(0,\infty)^2(0,∞)2.

Companion statements

  • Corollary 1. If φ(eξ)\varphi(e^\xi)φ(eξ) is log-concave, or ξφ(ξ)\xi\varphi(\xi)ξφ(ξ) is increasing, on the support, then XXX is IGFR.
  • Beta distributions. For all a,b>0a, b > 0a,b>0 the beta distribution is IGFR.
  • Powers (Paul 2005). If XXX is IGFR, so is δXν\delta X^\nuδXν for δ,ν>0\delta, \nu > 0δ,ν>0.

Significance

Theorem 1 converts the IGFR condition into conditions with an established theory. Through part 2, every closure and comparison property of IFR distributions transfers to IGFR distributions under the logarithm: the lognormal distribution is IGFR because its logarithm is normal, and δXν\delta X^\nuδXν inherits IGFR from XXX. Part 3 has a direct operational reading: as a market scales up, a supplier selling to a newsvendor sells more and a service provider charges more. Part 4 places IGFR in the theory of total positivity. Corollary 1 gives density-level tests that need no closed form for Φ\PhiΦ, which is what makes the beta family tractable.

The results are proved in the paper; none of them is formalized. A machine-checked development would supply reusable facts about image laws under log⁡\loglog and scaling with explicit densities, the failure-rate form of the hazard rate order, and the classical Barlow–Proschan characterization of IFR distributions by total positivity, which is used well beyond this paper.

Difficulty

Parts 1 ⇔ 2 and 1 ⇔ 3 are computations once the laws of log⁡X\log XlogX and λX\lambda XλX and their densities are identified, but that identification is a change of variables for measures, together with a check that the transported density is again the derivative of the distribution function on the support. The substance is the Barlow–Proschan step, part 2 ⇔ 4. Monotonicity of hLh_LhL​ is a pointwise statement about a density, while TP₂ of ΦˉL(ξ−θ)\bar\Phi_L(\xi - \theta)ΦˉL​(ξ−θ) is an inequality between products of tail probabilities; the bridge is log-concavity of ΦˉL\bar\Phi_LΦˉL​ on the support, and its extension across the endpoints of the support, where ΦˉL\bar\Phi_LΦˉL​ equals 111 on one side and 000 on the other. A naive reading that differentiates everywhere fails at those endpoints and wherever the density is changed on a null set.

Formalization scope

  • Laws, not random variables. XXX is a probability measure μ\muμ on R\mathbb RR with μ((−∞,0))=0\mu((-\infty,0)) = 0μ((−∞,0))=0. XLX_LXL​ is the image of μ\muμ under Real.log, and λX\lambda XλX is the image under x↦λxx \mapsto \lambda xx↦λx; both maps are measurable, so the images are genuine probability laws. The junk value log⁡0=0\log 0 = 0log0=0 is harmless because μ\muμ has no atom at 000.
  • The density version is pinned. A density is determined only up to a null set, while IFR and IGFR read it pointwise; with an arbitrary version Theorem 1 is false. Every statement assumes IsRegDensity μ φ: φ≥0\varphi \ge 0φ≥0, μ\muμ has density φ\varphiφ, φ=Φ′\varphi = \Phi'φ=Φ′ at every point of {0<Φ<1}=(α,β)\{0 < \Phi < 1\} = (\alpha,\beta){0<Φ<1}=(α,β), and φ=0\varphi = 0φ=0 where Φ=0\Phi = 0Φ=0. The derived densities eξφ(eξ)e^\xi\varphi(e^\xi)eξφ(eξ) and φ(ξ/λ)/λ\varphi(\xi/\lambda)/\lambdaφ(ξ/λ)/λ are proved to be regular as well (milestones 1 and 4).
  • Rates are read on {Φ<1}\{\Phi < 1\}{Φ<1}. Lean's x/0=0x/0 = 0x/0=0 would otherwise make hhh vanish where Φˉ=0\bar\Phi = 0Φˉ=0. The hazard rate order compares h1(ξ)≥h2(ξ)h_1(\xi) \ge h_2(\xi)h1​(ξ)≥h2​(ξ) for ξ≥0\xi \ge 0ξ≥0 with Φ1(ξ)<1\Phi_1(\xi) < 1Φ1​(ξ)<1; at the other points the paper's h1h_1h1​ is +∞+\infty+∞ and the inequality is automatic.
  • Monotonicity is weak, as in the paper's "weakly increasing". Part 3 quantifies over λ≥1\lambda \ge 1λ≥1 exactly; for λ<1\lambda < 1λ<1 the order reverses.
  • Part 4's domain is (0,∞)2(0,\infty)^2(0,∞)2: θ>0\theta > 0θ>0 is forced by ξ/θ\xi/\thetaξ/θ, and for ξ≤0\xi \le 0ξ≤0 the survival is identically 111, so nothing is lost. The Barlow–Proschan milestone is stated for an arbitrary law on R\mathbb RR, because XLX_LXL​ can be negative.
  • No trivialization. Part 2 is about the image law of log⁡X\log XlogX, never a function such as ξ↦g(eξ)\xi \mapsto g(e^\xi)ξ↦g(eξ) written in by hand, and part 3 is about the image law of λX\lambda XλX; otherwise the equivalences would hold by definition.
  • Additions disclosed. Corollary 1's conditions are read on the support, where the density is positive; "increasing" is read as weakly increasing. Corollary 2 (products of IGFR variables) is not included: the page omits the independence it needs, and the existence of a regular density version for the product was not established.

Contributions welcome: the change-of-variables lemmas for Measure.map with explicit densities, the identification of {0<Φ<1}\{0 < \Phi < 1\}{0<Φ<1} as an open interval, and the Barlow–Proschan equivalence, which is reusable for any IFR result.

Selected references

  • M. A. Lariviere, A note on probability distributions with increasing generalized failure rates, Operations Research 54(3):602–604, 2006. https://doi.org/10.1287/opre.1060.0282
  • M. A. Lariviere and E. L. Porteus, Selling to the newsvendor: an analysis of price-only contracts, Manufacturing & Service Operations Management 3(4):293–305, 2001. https://doi.org/10.1287/msom.3.4.293.9971
  • R. E. Barlow and F. Proschan, Mathematical Theory of Reliability, Wiley, 1965 (reprinted SIAM, 1996). https://doi.org/10.1137/1.9781611971194
  • J. Keilson and U. Sumita, Uniform stochastic ordering and related inequalities, Canadian Journal of Statistics 10(3):181–198, 1982.
  • S. M. Ross, Stochastic Processes, Wiley, 1983.
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Convex OptimizationOptimizationProbability·Captain: mikedeng1

Primal and Dual Linear Decision Rules in Stochastic and Robust Optimization 2: With Random Recourse, the SDP (3.14) Conservatively Approximates the Linear Decision Rule Problem, Exactly for l = 1Research Paper

Linear decision rules for stochastic programs with random recourse

In a one-stage stochastic program a decision maker observes a random outcome ξ\xiξ and then picks a decision x(ξ)x(\xi)x(ξ), subject to constraints that depend on ξ\xiξ, so as to minimize expected cost. The optimization variable is a whole function xxx, and computing the optimal value is #P-hard even for a uniform distribution on the unit cube (Dyer and Stougie, 2006, cited in the paper as [16, Theorem 3.2]). A standard tractable approximation, introduced for robust optimization by Ben-Tal, Goryashko, Guslitzer and Nemirovski (2004) and carried to stochastic programming by Shapiro–Nemirovski and Chen–Sim–Sun, restricts decisions to linear decision rules x(ξ)=Xξx(\xi)=X\xix(ξ)=Xξ. This restriction gives an upper bound on the optimal value.

Kuhn, Wiesemann and Georghiou (2009/2011) study these approximations systematically. Their §3 treats the case where the constraint matrix itself depends on ξ\xiξ (random recourse). Linear decisions then produce constraints that are quadratic in ξ\xiξ, and the paper reformulates the resulting semi-infinite problem as a semidefinite program. This mission formalizes that reformulation, the primal half of the paper's Theorem 2.

Setting

Uncertainty is a probability measure P\mathbb PP on Rk\mathbb R^kRk, with outcomes ξ\xiξ. The support Ξ\XiΞ of P\mathbb PP is the smallest closed set of probability one. It is assumed to have the form

Ξ={ξ∈Rk: e1⊤ξ=1,  ξ⊤Wℓξ≥0, ℓ=1,…,l}(3.11)\Xi=\{\xi\in\mathbb R^k:\ e_1^\top\xi=1,\ \ \xi^\top W_\ell\xi\ge0,\ \ell=1,\dots,l\}\qquad(3.11)Ξ={ξ∈Rk: e1⊤​ξ=1,  ξ⊤Wℓ​ξ≥0, ℓ=1,…,l}(3.11)

for symmetric matrices W1,…,WlW_1,\dots,W_lW1​,…,Wl​, where e1e_1e1​ is the first standard basis vector. The first coordinate of every outcome is therefore 111, so linear functions of ξ\xiξ are affine functions of the remaining coordinates. Ξ\XiΞ is assumed nonempty and bounded, and its linear hull is assumed to be Rk\mathbb R^kRk. Let S\mathbb SS denote the symmetric k×kk\times kk×k matrices and M=E(ξξ⊤)M=\mathbb E(\xi\xi^\top)M=E(ξξ⊤) the second-moment matrix.

The data are C∈Rn×kC\in\mathbb R^{n\times k}C∈Rn×k (cost c(ξ)=Cξc(\xi)=C\xic(ξ)=Cξ), B∈Rm×kB\in\mathbb R^{m\times k}B∈Rm×k (right-hand side b(ξ)=Bξb(\xi)=B\xib(ξ)=Bξ, with rows bμ⊤b_\mu^\topbμ⊤​), and A1,…,Am∈Rk×nA_1,\dots,A_m\in\mathbb R^{k\times n}A1​,…,Am​∈Rk×n, where the μ\muμth row of the recourse matrix A(ξ)A(\xi)A(ξ) is ξ⊤Aμ\xi^\top A_\muξ⊤Aμ​. The stochastic program SP\mathcal{SP}SP minimizes E(c(ξ)⊤x(ξ))\mathbb E(c(\xi)^\top x(\xi))E(c(ξ)⊤x(ξ)) over square-integrable xxx subject to A(ξ)x(ξ)≤b(ξ)A(\xi)x(\xi)\le b(\xi)A(ξ)x(ξ)≤b(ξ) almost surely. It is strictly feasible if some square-integrable xˉ,sˉ\bar x,\bar sxˉ,sˉ and some ε>0\varepsilon>0ε>0 satisfy A(ξ)xˉ(ξ)+sˉ(ξ)=b(ξ)A(\xi)\bar x(\xi)+\bar s(\xi)=b(\xi)A(ξ)xˉ(ξ)+sˉ(ξ)=b(ξ) and sˉ(ξ)≥εe\bar s(\xi)\ge\varepsilon esˉ(ξ)≥εe almost surely.

With linear decisions XξX\xiXξ and quadratic slacks ξ⊤Sμξ\xi^\top S_\mu\xiξ⊤Sμ​ξ, Sμ∈SS_\mu\in\mathbb SSμ​∈S, one obtains the primal approximation

SPu:min⁡ Tr⁡(MC⊤X)  s.t.  ξ⊤AμXξ+ξ⊤Sμξ=bμ⊤ξ,  ξ⊤Sμξ≥0  P-a.s., μ=1,…,m,\mathcal{SP}^u:\quad \min\ \operatorname{Tr}(MC^\top X)\ \ \text{s.t.}\ \ \xi^\top A_\mu X\xi+\xi^\top S_\mu\xi=b_\mu^\top\xi,\ \ \xi^\top S_\mu\xi\ge0\ \ \mathbb P\text{-a.s.},\ \mu=1,\dots,m,SPu:min Tr(MC⊤X)  s.t.  ξ⊤Aμ​Xξ+ξ⊤Sμ​ξ=bμ⊤​ξ,  ξ⊤Sμ​ξ≥0  P-a.s., μ=1,…,m,

and the SDP (3.14)

min⁡ Tr⁡(MC⊤X)  s.t.  12(AμX+X⊤Aμ⊤)+Sμ=12(e1bμ⊤+bμe1⊤),  Sμ−∑ℓΛμℓWℓ⪰0,  Λ≥0.\min\ \operatorname{Tr}(MC^\top X)\ \ \text{s.t.}\ \ \tfrac12(A_\mu X+X^\top A_\mu^\top)+S_\mu=\tfrac12(e_1b_\mu^\top+b_\mu e_1^\top),\ \ S_\mu-\textstyle\sum_\ell\Lambda_{\mu\ell}W_\ell\succeq0,\ \ \Lambda\ge0 .min Tr(MC⊤X)  s.t.  21​(Aμ​X+X⊤Aμ⊤​)+Sμ​=21​(e1​bμ⊤​+bμ​e1⊤​),  Sμ​−∑ℓ​Λμℓ​Wℓ​⪰0,  Λ≥0.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 2, primal half (p. 17)

Feas⁡(3.14) projects into Feas⁡SPu,val⁡SPu≤val⁡(3.14),\operatorname{Feas}(3.14)\ \text{projects into}\ \operatorname{Feas}\mathcal{SP}^u,\qquad \operatorname{val}\mathcal{SP}^u\le\operatorname{val}(3.14),Feas(3.14) projects into FeasSPu,valSPu≤val(3.14), l=1 and SP strictly feasible ⟹ val⁡SPu=val⁡(3.14).l=1\ \text{and}\ \mathcal{SP}\ \text{strictly feasible}\ \Longrightarrow\ \operatorname{val}\mathcal{SP}^u=\operatorname{val}(3.14).l=1 and SP strictly feasible ⟹ valSPu=val(3.14).

Milestones

  1. §3.2, (3.13), p. 12. The μ\muμth equality constraint of SPu\mathcal{SP}^uSPu holds almost surely if and only if Hμ:=12(AμX+X⊤Aμ⊤−e1bμ⊤−bμe1⊤)+Sμ=0H_\mu:=\tfrac12(A_\mu X+X^\top A_\mu^\top-e_1b_\mu^\top-b_\mu e_1^\top)+S_\mu=0Hμ​:=21​(Aμ​X+X⊤Aμ⊤​−e1​bμ⊤​−bμ​e1⊤​)+Sμ​=0.
  2. Lemma 1 (S-lemma), p. 12. If ξˉ⊤Wξˉ>0\bar\xi^\top W\bar\xi>0ξˉ​⊤Wξˉ​>0 for some ξˉ\bar\xiξˉ​, then [ξ⊤Wξ≥0⇒ξ⊤Sξ≥0]  ⟺  ∃λ≥0: S⪰λW[\xi^\top W\xi\ge0\Rightarrow\xi^\top S\xi\ge0]\iff\exists\lambda\ge0:\ S\succeq\lambda W[ξ⊤Wξ≥0⇒ξ⊤Sξ≥0]⟺∃λ≥0: S⪰λW. This is linked to the platform's proved S-procedure, of which it is the homogeneous case.
  3. Proposition 6, p. 12. For symmetric SSS: ∃λ≥0\exists\lambda\ge0∃λ≥0 with S−∑ℓλℓWℓ⪰0S-\sum_\ell\lambda_\ell W_\ell\succeq0S−∑ℓ​λℓ​Wℓ​⪰0 implies ξ⊤Sξ≥0\xi^\top S\xi\ge0ξ⊤Sξ≥0 almost surely, and the converse holds when l=1l=1l=1.

Significance

The theorem replaces a problem with infinitely many constraints, one per outcome, by a semidefinite program with O(mk2+ml)O(mk^2+ml)O(mk2+ml) variables. Its value is always an upper bound on SPu\mathcal{SP}^uSPu, and hence on SP\mathcal{SP}SP. When the support is a single ellipsoid in the hyperplane e1⊤ξ=1e_1^\top\xi=1e1⊤​ξ=1 (l=1l=1l=1), the bound loses nothing beyond the restriction to linear decisions. For l>1l>1l>1 the gap is unavoidable in general: an exact tractable reformulation would decide copositivity, which is NP-hard (Remark 7). Random recourse arises whenever technology or yield coefficients are uncertain, for example in production planning and portfolio problems with uncertain returns.

The result is proved in the paper. As far as is known it has no machine-checked proof. A formalization adds a precise statement of the hypotheses. Writing those hypotheses out showed that the unnumbered §3.2 step needs Ξ\XiΞ to have dimension k−1k-1k−1, which spanning alone does not give for nonconvex Ξ\XiΞ (see Formalization scope). The other half of Theorem 2, about the lower-bounding SDP (3.18), is false in this preprint and is not part of the mission.

Difficulty

The semi-infinite constraints hold only P\mathbb PP-almost surely. The first step is to pass from "almost surely" to "for every ξ∈Ξ\xi\in\Xiξ∈Ξ", which uses that Ξ\XiΞ is exactly the support and that the constraint functions are continuous. A bound P(Ξ)=1\mathbb P(\Xi)=1P(Ξ)=1 alone is not enough. For the equality constraints, a quadratic form that vanishes on Ξ\XiΞ must vanish identically. This requires Ξ\XiΞ to be large enough, and the obvious argument from "Ξ\XiΞ spans Rk\mathbb R^kRk" fails when Ξ\XiΞ is a finite set. For the inequality constraints with l=1l=1l=1, the implication ξ⊤W1ξ≥0⇒ξ⊤Sξ≥0\xi^\top W_1\xi\ge0\Rightarrow\xi^\top S\xi\ge0ξ⊤W1​ξ≥0⇒ξ⊤Sξ≥0 must be established on all of Rk\mathbb R^kRk and not only on the slice e1⊤ξ=1e_1^\top\xi=1e1⊤​ξ=1. Doing so needs boundedness of Ξ\XiΞ (no recession directions) and a strictly feasible point for the S-lemma. The S-lemma itself is a nonconvex duality statement. It is available on the platform.

Formalization scope

Outcomes live in Fin k → ℝ, with k≥1k\ge1k≥1 carried in the setting. Indices are 0-based: ξ1\xi_1ξ1​ is coordinate 0, and μ,ℓ\mu,\ellμ,ℓ range over Fin m, Fin l. "Ξ\XiΞ is the support of P\mathbb PP" is stated as: Ξ\XiΞ is closed, P(Ξc)=0\mathbb P(\Xi^{\mathrm c})=0P(Ξc)=0, and every ball centred in Ξ\XiΞ has positive measure. Mathlib has no Measure.support at this revision. The standing assumptions (probability measure, symmetric WℓW_\ellWℓ​, support, nonempty, bounded, spanning) form one predicate assumed by every theorem. Decision rules are Borel measurable square-integrable functions. Optimal values are infima in EReal, +∞+\infty+∞ for an empty feasible set and −∞-\infty−∞ for an unbounded one. "Equivalent" means equal optimal values. Each SμS_\muSμ​ is required symmetric in both problems; ⪰\succeq⪰ is positive semidefiniteness and Λ≥0\Lambda\ge0Λ≥0 is componentwise. Strict feasibility of SP\mathcal{SP}SP in §3 is the paper's condition (2.9) of §2 with AAA replaced by A(ξ)A(\xi)A(ξ). The paper uses the phrase without restating it.

Repairs and narrowings:

  • Only the clauses of Theorem 2 about (3.14) and SPu\mathcal{SP}^uSPu are stated. The clauses about (3.18) and SPl\mathcal{SP}^lSPl are false in this preprint: a strictly feasible instance with l=1l=1l=1 has val⁡(3.18)≈1.170>ln⁡3=val⁡SP\operatorname{val}(3.18)\approx1.170>\ln3=\operatorname{val}\mathcal{SP}val(3.18)≈1.170>ln3=valSP. Propositions 7–9 serve only that half and are not included. "Polynomial size, efficiently solvable" is informal and omitted.
  • The §3.2 milestone carries the extra hypothesis that Ξ\XiΞ contains a relatively open piece of the hyperplane e1⊤ξ=1e_1^\top\xi=1e1⊤​ξ=1 (the paper's "dimension k−1k-1k−1", p. 10). Without it the claim is false for l≥2l\ge2l≥2. For l=1l=1l=1 the hypothesis follows from the standing assumptions, so the goal is unaffected.
  • Strict feasibility is kept in the l=1l=1l=1 clause as printed, although the argument does not use it.

The goal cannot be trivialized through its definitions. Feasibility is quantified P\mathbb PP-almost surely for a measure whose support is Ξ\XiΞ, not over an empty or arbitrary set. Both optimal values are infima of the same real objective over the problems' own feasible sets. The standing assumptions are satisfiable, for instance by k=2k=2k=2, W1=diag⁡(1,−1)W_1=\operatorname{diag}(1,-1)W1​=diag(1,−1), and P\mathbb PP the uniform law on {1}×[−1,1]\{1\}\times[-1,1]{1}×[−1,1].

The definitions (support of a measure, L2\mathcal L^2L2 decision rules, the random-recourse data) are reusable for the other sections of the paper and for related work on decision rules. Proofs of any milestone, Lean lemmas on quadratic forms vanishing on open cones, and an almost-sure-to-support transfer lemma are welcome.

Selected references

  • D. Kuhn, W. Wiesemann, A. Georghiou, Primal and dual linear decision rules in stochastic and robust optimization, Optimization Online 2009/02/2218 (2009); Math. Program. 130 (2011) 177–209. https://optimization-online.org/wp-content/uploads/2009/02/2218.pdf, https://doi.org/10.1007/s10107-009-0331-4
  • A. Ben-Tal, A. Goryashko, E. Guslitzer, A. Nemirovski, Adjustable robust solutions of uncertain linear programs, Math. Program. 99 (2004) 351–376. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10107-003-0454-y
  • S. Boyd, L. El Ghaoui, E. Feron, V. Balakrishnan, Linear Matrix Inequalities in System and Control Theory, SIAM Studies in Applied Mathematics 15, 1994 (the paper's source for Lemma 1). https://doi.org/10.1137/1.9781611970777
  • S. Boyd, L. Vandenberghe, Convex Optimization, Cambridge University Press, 2004, Appendix B (the S-procedure as stated on the platform). https://web.stanford.edu/~boyd/cvxbook/
  • I. Pólik, T. Terlaky, A survey of the S-lemma, SIAM Review 49 (2007) 371–418. https://doi.org/10.1137/S003614450444614X
  • M. Dyer, L. Stougie, Computational complexity of stochastic programming problems, Math. Program. 106 (2006) 423–432. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10107-005-0597-0
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Algorithmic Game TheoryLinear algebra·Captain: mikedeng1

Flows and Decompositions of Games: Harmonic and Potential Games 3: In Every Harmonic Game the Uniformly Mixed Strategy Profile Is a Mixed Nash EquilibriumResearch Paper

Motivation

Finite games in strategic form are the basic model of strategic interaction in economics, engineering and computer science. Potential games (Monderer and Shapley, 1996, DOI 10.1006/game.1996.0044) are the class with the most tractable equilibrium behaviour: every finite potential game has a pure Nash equilibrium, and simple learning dynamics converge to one.

Candogan, Menache, Ozdaglar and Parrilo (arXiv:1005.2405; Mathematics of Operations Research 36(3), 2011, DOI 10.1287/moor.1110.0500) decompose every finite game canonically into a potential, a harmonic and a nonstrategic component, by viewing the payoff differences of a game as a flow on a graph and applying the combinatorial Helmholtz decomposition. Harmonic games are the complement of potential games, and their equilibria behave in the opposite way: they generically have no pure Nash equilibrium. This mission formalizes the paper's positive result on the harmonic side. In every harmonic game, whatever the number of players and strategies, the profile in which every player randomizes uniformly over its strategies is a mixed Nash equilibrium. Rock–paper–scissors and matching pennies are the familiar two-player instances.

Setting

A finite game has a finite set of players M\mathcal MM and, for each player mmm, a nonempty finite strategy set EmE^mEm with hm=∣Em∣h_m = |E^m|hm​=∣Em∣ elements. A strategy profile is p=(pm)m∈E=∏mEmp = (p^m)_m \in E = \prod_m E^mp=(pm)m​∈E=∏m​Em. We write p−mp^{-m}p−m for the strategies of the players other than mmm, E−m=∏k≠mEkE^{-m} = \prod_{k\ne m}E^kE−m=∏k=m​Ek, and (qm,p−m)(q^m, p^{-m})(qm,p−m) for ppp with player mmm's strategy replaced by qmq^mqm. A game is identified with its utilities u=(um)mu = (u^m)_mu=(um)m​, um:E→Ru^m : E \to \mathbb Rum:E→R, which form an element of C0MC_0^MC0M​, where C0={f:E→R}C_0 = \{f : E\to\mathbb R\}C0​={f:E→R} carries ⟨φ1,φ2⟩0=∑pφ1(p)φ2(p)\langle\varphi_1,\varphi_2\rangle_0 = \sum_p\varphi_1(p)\varphi_2(p)⟨φ1​,φ2​⟩0​=∑p​φ1​(p)φ2​(p).

Two profiles are mmm-comparable if they are distinct and differ only in player mmm's strategy. The game graph has the profiles as nodes and joins every comparable pair. An edge flow is a function XXX on ordered pairs of profiles with X(p,q)=−X(q,p)X(p,q) = -X(q,p)X(p,q)=−X(q,p) on edges and X=0X = 0X=0 off edges. The space C1C_1C1​ of edge flows carries ⟨X,Y⟩1=12∑(p,q)∈AX(p,q)Y(p,q)\langle X,Y\rangle_1 = \tfrac12\sum_{(p,q)\in A}X(p,q)Y(p,q)⟨X,Y⟩1​=21​∑(p,q)∈A​X(p,q)Y(p,q). The combinatorial gradient is (δ0φ)(p,q)=W(p,q)(φ(q)−φ(p))(\delta_0\varphi)(p,q) = W(p,q)(\varphi(q)-\varphi(p))(δ0​φ)(p,q)=W(p,q)(φ(q)−φ(p)), with WWW the edge indicator, and δ0∗\delta_0^*δ0∗​ is its adjoint. Restricting to mmm-comparable pairs gives Dm:C0→C1D_m : C_0\to C_1Dm​:C0​→C1​, and Du=∑mDmumDu = \sum_m D_m u^mDu=∑m​Dm​um is the flow of payoff differences of uuu. With Πm=Dm†Dm\Pi_m = D_m^\dagger D_mΠm​=Dm†​Dm​ (Moore–Penrose pseudoinverse) and Π=diag⁡(Π1,…,ΠM)\Pi = \operatorname{diag}(\Pi_1,\dots,\Pi_M)Π=diag(Π1​,…,ΠM​), Definition 4.2 of the paper sets

H={u∣u=Πu, Du∈ker⁡δ0∗},N=ker⁡D.\mathcal H = \{u \mid u = \Pi u,\ Du \in \ker\delta_0^*\},\qquad \mathcal N = \ker D .H={u∣u=Πu, Du∈kerδ0∗​},N=kerD.

A game is a harmonic game if u∈H⊕Nu\in\mathcal H\oplus\mathcal Nu∈H⊕N, and a normalized harmonic game if u∈Hu\in\mathcal Hu∈H.

A mixed strategy of player mmm is a probability vector xm∈ΔEmx^m\in\Delta E^mxm∈ΔEm, and a mixed strategy profile is x={xm}m∈∏mΔEmx = \{x^m\}_m\in\prod_m\Delta E^mx={xm}m​∈∏m​ΔEm. The mixed extension is um(x)=∑p∈Eum(p)∏kxk(pk)u^m(x) = \sum_{p\in E}u^m(p)\prod_k x^k(p^k)um(x)=∑p∈E​um(p)∏k​xk(pk) (34). The payoff of the pure strategy qmq^mqm against x−mx^{-m}x−m is um(qm,x−m)=∑p−mum(qm,p−m)∏k≠mxk(pk)u^m(q^m,x^{-m}) = \sum_{p^{-m}}u^m(q^m,p^{-m})\prod_{k\ne m}x^k(p^k)um(qm,x−m)=∑p−m​um(qm,p−m)∏k=m​xk(pk) (35). A mixed Nash equilibrium (Definition 5.1.1) is a mixed profile with um(xm,x−m)≥um(pm,x−m)u^m(x^m,x^{-m})\ge u^m(p^m,x^{-m})um(xm,x−m)≥um(pm,x−m) for every mmm and pm∈Emp^m\in E^mpm∈Em. A probability distribution x∈ΔEx\in\Delta Ex∈ΔE on profiles is a correlated equilibrium (Definition 5.1.2) if ∑p−m(um(pm,p−m)−um(qm,p−m)) x(pm,p−m)≥0\sum_{p^{-m}}(u^m(p^m,p^{-m})-u^m(q^m,p^{-m}))\,x(p^m,p^{-m})\ge 0∑p−m​(um(pm,p−m)−um(qm,p−m))x(pm,p−m)≥0 for all mmm and pm,qmp^m,q^mpm,qm. The uniformly mixed strategy profile (Definition 5.2) has xm(qm)=1/hmx^m(q^m) = 1/h_mxm(qm)=1/hm​ for every mmm and qmq^mqm.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 5.4

For every harmonic game u∈H⊕Nu\in\mathcal H\oplus\mathcal Nu∈H⊕N, the uniformly mixed strategy profile xxx is a mixed Nash equilibrium:

um(xm,x−m)  ≥  um(pm,x−m)for all m∈M, pm∈Em.u^m(x^m,x^{-m}) \;\ge\; u^m(p^m,x^{-m})\qquad\text{for all } m\in\mathcal M,\ p^m\in E^m .um(xm,x−m)≥um(pm,x−m)for all m∈M, pm∈Em.

Milestones

  1. Lemma A.1: for every edge flow X^\hat XX^ and every set of profiles S^\hat SS^, ∑p∈S^(δ0∗X^)(p)=−∑p∈S^∑q∈S^cX^(p,q)\sum_{p\in\hat S}(\delta_0^*\hat X)(p) = -\sum_{p\in\hat S}\sum_{q\in\hat S^c}\hat X(p,q)∑p∈S^​(δ0∗​X^)(p)=−∑p∈S^​∑q∈S^c​X^(p,q).
  2. Lemma 5.2: in a harmonic game, ∑p−m∈E−m(um(rm,p−m)−um(qm,p−m))=0\sum_{p^{-m}\in E^{-m}}\big(u^m(r^m,p^{-m}) - u^m(q^m,p^{-m})\big) = 0∑p−m∈E−m​(um(rm,p−m)−um(qm,p−m))=0 for all mmm and qm,rmq^m, r^mqm,rm.
  3. Proposition 5.2: in a normalized harmonic game, a distribution x∈ΔEx\in\Delta Ex∈ΔE is a correlated equilibrium iff all the inequalities of Definition 5.1.2 hold with equality (36), iff ∑p−mum(qm,p−m) x(pm,p−m)=0\sum_{p^{-m}}u^m(q^m,p^{-m})\,x(p^m,p^{-m}) = 0∑p−m​um(qm,p−m)x(pm,p−m)=0 for all m,pm,qmm,p^m,q^mm,pm,qm (37).
  4. Remark after Proposition 5.2: the equivalence of correlated equilibrium with (36) holds for all harmonic games.
  5. Corollary 5.2: in a harmonic game, a mixed profile is a mixed Nash equilibrium iff um(xm,x−m)=um(pm,x−m)u^m(x^m,x^{-m}) = u^m(p^m,x^{-m})um(xm,x−m)=um(pm,x−m) for all mmm and pmp^mpm (42).

Significance

Theorem 5.4 is the counterpart, for harmonic games, of the existence of pure equilibria in potential games. It exhibits an explicit equilibrium that does not depend on the payoffs at all, only on the strategy counts hmh_mhm​. Corollary 5.2, a milestone here, adds that at any mixed equilibrium of a harmonic game every player is indifferent among all its pure strategies, including those outside the support. That is much stronger than the usual support condition. Proposition 5.2 shows that the correlated equilibria of a normalized harmonic game are the points of the probability simplex in a linear subspace determined by the utilities. The paper uses that description in its later analysis of two-player harmonic games.

The results are proved in the paper; none of them is machine-checked. The formalization connects the paper's operator layer (flows on the game graph, the gradient and its adjoint with the 12\tfrac1221​-weighted inner product, pseudoinverses) with standard equilibrium notions on finite games. It reuses published definitions of lotteries, the mixed extension and correlated equilibria.

Difficulty

The equilibrium statement follows quickly once Lemma 5.2 is available. The difficulty lies in translating the harmonic condition, a statement about the adjoint of an operator on edge flows, into an identity about payoffs. That needs the explicit form of δ0∗\delta_0^*δ0∗​, which depends on the 12\tfrac1221​ in the inner product of C1C_1C1​. It also needs the fact that DDD kills the nonstrategic component, and a computation of the flow of DuDuDu across the boundary of the set of profiles in which player mmm plays rmr^mrm. Corollary 5.2 needs the passage from mixed profiles to product distributions on profiles and a careful accounting of sums over p−mp^{-m}p−m against sums over full profiles.

The first idea, to use the normalization ∑qmum(qm,p−m)=0\sum_{q^m}u^m(q^m,p^{-m}) = 0∑qm​um(qm,p−m)=0, is not available. The goal concerns all harmonic games, not only normalized ones, and normalization alone does not give indifference against uniform opponents: the harmonic condition is essential.

Formalization scope

Players form a finite type ι with decidable equality, and the strategy sets E m are nonempty finite types, as in the paper (Em={1,…,hm}E^m = \{1,\dots,h_m\}Em={1,…,hm​}). The hypothesis [∀ m, Nonempty (E m)] is stated explicitly on the game theorems, because the uniform profile 1/hm1/h_m1/hm​ is a probability vector only if hm≥1h_m\ge1hm​≥1. A game is an element of PiLp 2 (fun _ => EuclideanSpace ℝ (∀ k, E k)) with the unweighted sum inner product of p. 14. C1C_1C1​ is the subspace of edge flows with the inner product 12∑\tfrac12\sum21​∑ of (7). δ0∗\delta_0^*δ0∗​ is Mathlib's adjoint, and the pseudoinverse is defined directly. H\mathcal HH and N\mathcal NN are defined by (28), and harmonic games are the submodule H ⊔ N. Lotteries, mixed profiles and the mixed extension (34) come from the published agt_games definitions; correlated equilibrium is the published HartSchmeidler.Finite.IsCorrelatedEq. The pure-deviation payoff (35), mixed Nash equilibrium with pure deviations (Definition 5.1.1, as printed), and the uniform profile are defined in the mission. Sums over p−mp^{-m}p−m are written as sums over the profiles with player mmm's strategy fixed, so each p−mp^{-m}p−m is counted once.

The goal concerns mixed Nash equilibria. Stating it for the uniform product distribution as a correlated equilibrium, or for normalized games only, would be a weaker statement and is not the target. No hypothesis is added beyond the nonemptiness of the strategy sets.

Contributions welcome: proofs of the milestones, and general lemmas on adjoints of graph gradients and on product distributions that are reusable beyond this mission.

Selected references

  • O. Candogan, I. Menache, A. Ozdaglar, P. A. Parrilo, Flows and Decompositions of Games: Harmonic and Potential Games, arXiv:1005.2405v2, 2010; Mathematics of Operations Research 36(3), 2011. https://arxiv.org/abs/1005.2405, https://doi.org/10.1287/moor.1110.0500
  • D. Monderer, L. S. Shapley, Potential Games, Games and Economic Behavior 14, 1996. https://doi.org/10.1006/game.1996.0044
  • S. Hart, D. Schmeidler, Existence of Correlated Equilibria, Mathematics of Operations Research 14(1), 1989. https://doi.org/10.1287/moor.14.1.18
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Algorithmic Game TheoryLinear algebra·Captain: mikedeng1

Flows and Decompositions of Games: Harmonic and Potential Games 2: Harmonic Games Generically Have No Pure Nash EquilibriumResearch Paper

Motivation

Finite games in strategic form are the basic model of interaction between self-interested agents in economics, engineering and computer science. Among them, potential games (Monderer and Shapley, 1996) are the class with the most tractable equilibrium behaviour: every finite potential game has a pure Nash equilibrium, and simple learning dynamics such as best response and fictitious play converge to one. A natural question is what lies at the opposite end of the space of games, and how far a general game is from that tractable class.

Candogan, Menache, Ozdaglar and Parrilo (arXiv:1005.2405; Mathematics of Operations Research 36(3), 2011, DOI 10.1287/moor.1110.0500) answer this with a canonical decomposition of every finite game into a potential, a harmonic and a nonstrategic component, obtained by viewing the payoff differences of a game as a flow on a graph and applying the combinatorial Helmholtz decomposition. Harmonic games, those whose potential component vanishes, are the complement of potential games, and the paper shows that their equilibrium behaviour is opposite as well. This mission formalizes the first such result: harmonic games generically have no pure Nash equilibrium, so the guaranteed existence of pure equilibria in potential games has no counterpart on the harmonic side. The decomposition has since been used to study near-potential games and the convergence of learning dynamics in them.

Setting

A finite game has a finite set of players M\mathcal MM with M=∣M∣M = |\mathcal M|M=∣M∣ and, for each player mmm, a nonempty finite strategy set EmE^mEm with hm=∣Em∣h_m = |E^m|hm​=∣Em∣ elements. A strategy profile is p=(pm)m∈E=∏mEmp = (p^m)_m \in E = \prod_m E^mp=(pm)m​∈E=∏m​Em, and (qm,p−m)(q^m, p^{-m})(qm,p−m) denotes ppp with player mmm's strategy replaced by qmq^mqm. The utilities u=(um)mu = (u^m)_mu=(um)m​ assign to each player a function um:E→Ru^m : E \to \mathbb Rum:E→R; for fixed M\mathcal MM and EEE a game is identified with its utilities, an element of C0MC_0^MC0M​, where C0={f:E→R}C_0 = \{f : E \to \mathbb R\}C0​={f:E→R} carries the inner product ⟨φ1,φ2⟩0=∑pφ1(p)φ2(p)\langle \varphi_1,\varphi_2\rangle_0 = \sum_p \varphi_1(p)\varphi_2(p)⟨φ1​,φ2​⟩0​=∑p​φ1​(p)φ2​(p).

A profile ppp is a pure Nash equilibrium if um(pm,p−m)≥um(qm,p−m)u^m(p^m, p^{-m}) \ge u^m(q^m, p^{-m})um(pm,p−m)≥um(qm,p−m) for every player mmm and every qm∈Emq^m \in E^mqm∈Em.

Two profiles are mmm-comparable if they are distinct and differ only in player mmm's strategy. The game graph has the profiles as nodes and joins every comparable pair. An edge flow is a function XXX on ordered pairs of profiles with X(p,q)=−X(q,p)X(p,q) = -X(q,p)X(p,q)=−X(q,p) on edges and X=0X = 0X=0 off edges; the space C1C_1C1​ of edge flows carries ⟨X,Y⟩1=12∑(p,q)∈AX(p,q)Y(p,q)\langle X,Y\rangle_1 = \tfrac12\sum_{(p,q)\in A} X(p,q)Y(p,q)⟨X,Y⟩1​=21​∑(p,q)∈A​X(p,q)Y(p,q). The combinatorial gradient is (δ0φ)(p,q)=W(p,q)(φ(q)−φ(p))(\delta_0\varphi)(p,q) = W(p,q)(\varphi(q)-\varphi(p))(δ0​φ)(p,q)=W(p,q)(φ(q)−φ(p)), with WWW the edge indicator, and δ0∗\delta_0^*δ0∗​ is its adjoint. Restricting to mmm-comparable pairs gives Dm:C0→C1D_m : C_0 \to C_1Dm​:C0​→C1​, and Du=∑mDmumD u = \sum_m D_m u^mDu=∑m​Dm​um is the flow of payoff differences of the game uuu. With Πm=Dm†Dm\Pi_m = D_m^\dagger D_mΠm​=Dm†​Dm​ (Moore–Penrose pseudoinverse) and Π=diag⁡(Π1,…,ΠM)\Pi = \operatorname{diag}(\Pi_1,\dots,\Pi_M)Π=diag(Π1​,…,ΠM​), the paper's Definition 4.2 sets

P={u∣u=Πu, Du∈im⁡δ0},H={u∣u=Πu, Du∈ker⁡δ0∗},N=ker⁡D.\mathcal P = \{u \mid u = \Pi u,\ Du \in \operatorname{im}\delta_0\},\quad \mathcal H = \{u \mid u = \Pi u,\ Du \in \ker\delta_0^*\},\quad \mathcal N = \ker D .P={u∣u=Πu, Du∈imδ0​},H={u∣u=Πu, Du∈kerδ0∗​},N=kerD.

A game is a harmonic game if u∈H⊕Nu \in \mathcal H \oplus \mathcal Nu∈H⊕N: its payoff differences form a flow with no source or sink at any profile.

Formalization targets

Goal: Proposition 5.1

For finite games in which at least two players have at least two strategies each, and for any additive Haar measure μ\muμ on the finite-dimensional space H⊕N\mathcal H \oplus \mathcal NH⊕N,

μ({u∈H⊕N:u has a pure Nash equilibrium})=0.\mu\big(\{u \in \mathcal H\oplus\mathcal N : u \text{ has a pure Nash equilibrium}\}\big) = 0 .μ({u∈H⊕N:u has a pure Nash equilibrium})=0.

This is the paper's "harmonic games generically do not have pure Nash equilibria", with "generically" read as the paper defines it: true except on a set of measure zero within the harmonic games.

Stronger structural form

For each profile ppp, the harmonic games having ppp as a pure Nash equilibrium form a proper linear subspace of H⊕N\mathcal H \oplus \mathcal NH⊕N. The exceptional set of the goal is then a finite union of lower-dimensional subspaces.

Milestones

  1. Lemma 5.1: at a pure Nash equilibrium of a harmonic game, every player is indifferent among all of their strategies.
  2. Proposition 4.1: dim⁡P=∏mhm−1\dim\mathcal P = \prod_m h_m - 1dimP=∏m​hm​−1, dim⁡H=(M−1)∏mhm−∑m∏k≠mhk+1\dim\mathcal H = (M-1)\prod_m h_m - \sum_m\prod_{k\ne m}h_k + 1dimH=(M−1)∏m​hm​−∑m​∏k=m​hk​+1, dim⁡N=∑m∏k≠mhk\dim\mathcal N = \sum_m\prod_{k\ne m}h_kdimN=∑m​∏k=m​hk​.

Significance

The result separates harmonic games sharply from potential games. A finite potential game always has a pure equilibrium; a harmonic game almost never has one. Together with the decomposition theorem, it says that the obstruction to pure equilibria in a general game is carried by its harmonic component, and it motivates the paper's later results on mixed equilibria of harmonic games (the uniformly mixed profile is always a mixed equilibrium). Proposition 4.1, a milestone here, also gives the dimension of the harmonic games, (M−1)∏mhm+1(M-1)\prod_m h_m + 1(M−1)∏m​hm​+1, and so measures how large that class is.

The results are proved in the paper; none of them is machine-checked. Formalizing them requires the paper's operator layer (flows on the game graph, the gradient with its adjoint, pseudoinverses) in Lean for the first time, and pins down two points the paper leaves informal: the measure with respect to which "generically" is meant, and the shape condition on the game under which the statement holds.

Difficulty

Lemma 5.1 is a short counting argument once the divergence-free condition δ0∗Du=0\delta_0^* D u = 0δ0∗​Du=0 is unpacked, but unpacking it requires knowing that DDD kills N\mathcal NN and computing δ0∗\delta_0^*δ0∗​ from the 12\tfrac1221​-weighted inner product. The main obstacle of the goal is showing that the exceptional subspaces are proper. The proof needs a harmonic game with nonzero payoff differences, that is dim⁡H>0\dim\mathcal H > 0dimH>0, and the only route the paper offers is the dimension count of Proposition 4.1. That count rests on the full decomposition C0M=P⊕H⊕NC_0^M = \mathcal P\oplus\mathcal H\oplus\mathcal NC0M​=P⊕H⊕N, on the kernel of each DmD_mDm​ and on the connectivity of the game graph, all of which must be built in Lean. The measure-theoretic last step, that a finite union of proper subspaces is Haar-null, is in Mathlib.

A tempting shortcut fails: placing Lebesgue measure on all of C0MC_0^MC0M​ and observing that H⊕N\mathcal H \oplus \mathcal NH⊕N is a proper subspace would prove the goal without saying anything about equilibria.

Formalization scope

Players form a finite type ι with decidable equality, and the strategy sets E m are nonempty finite types, as in the paper (Em={1,…,hm}E^m = \{1,\dots,h_m\}Em={1,…,hm​}). A game is an element of PiLp 2 (fun _ => EuclideanSpace ℝ (∀ k, E k)), with the unweighted sum inner product of p. 14. C1C_1C1​ is the subspace of edge flows with the inner product 12∑\tfrac12\sum21​∑ of (7). δ0∗\delta_0^*δ0∗​ is Mathlib's adjoint, and the pseudoinverse is defined directly as the inverse of LLL on (ker⁡L)⊥(\ker L)^\perp(kerL)⊥ composed with the orthogonal projection onto im⁡L\operatorname{im} LimL. P,H,N\mathcal P,\mathcal H,\mathcal NP,H,N are defined by (28), not by the alternative description (29). Harmonic games are the submodule H ⊔ N, and pure Nash equilibrium is AGT.IsPureNash from the published agt_games definitions.

Added hypothesis. The paper leaves implicit that at least two distinct players have at least two strategies each. Its proof uses this through "dimension of H\mathcal HH is larger than zero". Without it Proposition 5.1 is false: with two players having 111 and hhh strategies, dim⁡H=(2−1)h−(h+1)+1=0\dim\mathcal H = (2-1)h - (h+1) + 1 = 0dimH=(2−1)h−(h+1)+1=0, every harmonic game is nonstrategic, and every profile is a pure equilibrium of every harmonic game. The goal and the structural theorem therefore carry this hypothesis explicitly.

The measure. The measure is an arbitrary additive Haar measure on the subspace H⊕N\mathcal H\oplus\mathcal NH⊕N itself, with the Borel σ-algebra of its subspace topology. A measure on the ambient C0MC_0^MC0M​ would make the statement trivial, because the whole subspace is null there. Proposition 4.1 is stated as equalities in Z\mathbb ZZ, so that M−1M-1M−1 and the subtraction in part 2 are not truncated.

Needed infrastructure: kernels of the DmD_mDm​ (the paper's Lemma 4.2), the projection property of D†DD^\dagger DD†D, the decomposition theorem, and the connectivity of the game graph. The operator layer is shared with the other missions of this series and is reusable for any work on flows on graphs. Proofs of the milestones, and of the structural form independently of the goal, are welcome.

Selected references

  • O. Candogan, I. Menache, A. Ozdaglar, P. A. Parrilo, Flows and Decompositions of Games: Harmonic and Potential Games, arXiv:1005.2405v2, 2010; Mathematics of Operations Research 36(3):474–503, 2011. https://arxiv.org/abs/1005.2405, https://doi.org/10.1287/moor.1110.0500
  • D. Monderer, L. S. Shapley, Potential Games, Games and Economic Behavior 14(1):124–143, 1996. https://doi.org/10.1006/game.1996.0044
  • X. Jiang, L.-H. Lim, Y. Yao, Y. Ye, Statistical ranking and combinatorial Hodge theory, Mathematical Programming 127(1):203–244, 2011. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10107-010-0419-x
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Convex OptimizationLinear Optimization·Captain: mikedeng1

Retailer-Supplier Flexible Commitments Contracts: A Robust Optimization Approach: With Box Demand Uncertainty the Min-Max RSFC Problem Has the Same Optimal Value on the Extreme DemandsResearch Paper

Motivation

In a flexible commitments contract a retailer announces, before a selling horizon starts, a vector of planned orders (commitments) to its supplier, who uses them to plan capacity. During the horizon the retailer may deviate from the commitments, but pays penalties for each deviation and for changes between successive commitments. Such contracts were studied with stochastic demand by Bassok and Anupindi, Tsay and Lovejoy, and others, typically by dynamic programming over a discretized state space.

Ben-Tal, Golany, Nemirovski and Vial (2005) treat the retailer's problem as a robust multiperiod linear program: demand is only known to lie in an uncertainty set, decisions may adapt to observed demand, and the retailer minimizes its worst-case total cost. Most of the paper approximates this problem by affinely adjustable decision rules. For one important case, however, the paper shows that the problem can be solved exactly: when the uncertainty set is a box, nature may be restricted to the finitely many corner trajectories of the box. That reduction, Proposition 1 of the Appendix, is the subject of this mission, together with the general principle behind it (Lemma 2), which applies to any multistage worst-case problem with polyhedral dynamics and convex polyhedral costs.

Setting

Data. There are TTT periods. Period ttt carries an ordering cost ctc_tct​, a holding cost hth_tht​, a shortage cost ptp_tpt​, penalties αt+,αt−\alpha_t^{+}, \alpha_t^{-}αt+​,αt−​ for ordering above or below the commitment, and penalties βt+,βt−\beta_t^{+}, \beta_t^{-}βt+​,βt−​ for raising or lowering the commitment relative to the previous one. A salvage value sss applies to the final inventory; put hˉt=ht\bar h_t = h_thˉt​=ht​ for t<Tt < Tt<T and hˉT=hT−s\bar h_T = h_T - shˉT​=hT​−s. The initial inventory x1x_1x1​ and a nominal previous commitment w0w_0w0​ are given, as are order bounds Lt≤qt≤UtL_t \le q_t \le U_tLt​≤qt​≤Ut​ and cumulative bounds L^t≤∑τ≤tqτ≤U^t\widehat L_t \le \sum_{\tau \le t} q_\tau \le \widehat U_tLt​≤∑τ≤t​qτ​≤Ut​, possibly infinite.

Decisions. Before any demand is observed the retailer fixes commitments wt≥0w_t \ge 0wt​≥0 and amounts ztz_tzt​. Demand d=(d1,…,dT)d = (d_1, \dots, d_T)d=(d1​,…,dT​) lies in a product set UT=U1×⋯×UT\mathcal U^T = \mathcal U_1 \times \dots \times \mathcal U_TUT=U1​×⋯×UT​. The order qtq_tqt​ and the cost bounds yt,uty_t, u_tyt​,ut​ of period ttt are decision rules, functions of the past demands dt−1=(d1,…,dt−1)d^{t-1} = (d_1, \dots, d_{t-1})dt−1=(d1​,…,dt−1​); the inventory xt+1x_{t+1}xt+1​ is a function of dtd^tdt. This nonanticipativity is required on trajectories of UT\mathcal U^TUT.

The min-max RSFC problem (5)–(6). A policy is feasible if for every d∈UTd \in \mathcal U^Td∈UT and every ttt: xt+1=xt+qt−dtx_{t+1} = x_t + q_t - d_txt+1​=xt​+qt​−dt​; the order and cumulative-order bounds hold; yt≥hˉtxt+1y_t \ge \bar h_t x_{t+1}yt​≥hˉt​xt+1​ and yt≥−ptxt+1y_t \ge -p_t x_{t+1}yt​≥−pt​xt+1​; ut≥αt+(qt−wt)u_t \ge \alpha_t^{+}(q_t - w_t)ut​≥αt+​(qt​−wt​) and ut≥−αt−(qt−wt)u_t \ge -\alpha_t^{-}(q_t - w_t)ut​≥−αt−​(qt​−wt​); and zt≥βt+(wt−wt−1)z_t \ge \beta_t^{+}(w_t - w_{t-1})zt​≥βt+​(wt​−wt−1​), zt≥−βt−(wt−wt−1)z_t \ge -\beta_t^{-}(w_t - w_{t-1})zt​≥−βt−​(wt​−wt−1​). The optimal value is

value⁡(U)=inf⁡feasible policies sup⁡d∈UT ∑t=1T[ctqt(dt−1)+yt(dt−1)+ut(dt−1)+zt]∈[−∞,+∞].\operatorname{value}(\mathcal U) = \inf_{\text{feasible policies}}\ \sup_{d \in \mathcal U^T}\ \sum_{t=1}^T \big[c_t q_t(d^{t-1}) + y_t(d^{t-1}) + u_t(d^{t-1}) + z_t\big] \in [-\infty, +\infty].value(U)=feasible policiesinf​ d∈UTsup​ t=1∑T​[ct​qt​(dt−1)+yt​(dt−1)+ut​(dt−1)+zt​]∈[−∞,+∞].

Box uncertainty (9)–(10). Ut=[dtmin⁡,dtmax⁡]\mathcal U_t = [d_t^{\min}, d_t^{\max}]Ut​=[dtmin​,dtmax​] with dtmin⁡<dtmax⁡d_t^{\min} < d_t^{\max}dtmin​<dtmax​; its extreme points are {dtmin⁡,dtmax⁡}\{d_t^{\min}, d_t^{\max}\}{dtmin​,dtmax​}.

Convex polyhedral functions. A function f:Rm→R∪{+∞}f : \mathbb R^m \to \mathbb R \cup \{+\infty\}f:Rm→R∪{+∞} is a c.p.f. if its domain {f<∞}\{f < \infty\}{f<∞} is the solution set of finitely many linear inequalities and fff is convex and lower semicontinuous on it. Lemma 2 concerns the generic problem (P[F0,…,FT])(P[F_0, \dots, F_T])(P[F0​,…,FT​]): minimize, over decision rules St(dt−1)∈RmtS_t(d^{t-1}) \in \mathbb R^{m_t}St​(dt−1)∈Rmt​, the worst case over d∈F0×⋯×FTd \in F_0 \times \dots \times F_Td∈F0​×⋯×FT​ of ∑t=1T+1ft(St(dt−1))\sum_{t=1}^{T+1} f_t(S_t(d^{t-1}))∑t=1T+1​ft​(St​(dt−1)), subject to A1S1≥b1A_1 S_1 \ge b_1A1​S1​≥b1​, At+1St+1≥Bt+1dt+Ct+1St+bt+1A_{t+1} S_{t+1} \ge B_{t+1} d_t + C_{t+1} S_t + b_{t+1}At+1​St+1​≥Bt+1​dt​+Ct+1​St​+bt+1​ and ∥St∥∞≤R\|S_t\|_\infty \le R∥St​∥∞​≤R.

Formalization targets

Goal: Proposition 1 (p. 269)

value⁡(∏t=1T[dtmin⁡,dtmax⁡])=value⁡(∏t=1T{dtmin⁡,dtmax⁡}).\operatorname{value}\Big(\prod_{t=1}^T [d_t^{\min}, d_t^{\max}]\Big) = \operatorname{value}\Big(\prod_{t=1}^T \{d_t^{\min}, d_t^{\max}\}\Big).value(t=1∏T​[dtmin​,dtmax​])=value(t=1∏T​{dtmin​,dtmax​}).

The data are arbitrary reals (bounds in [−∞,+∞][-\infty, +\infty][−∞,+∞]) and the values are compared in the extended reals, so the statement covers infeasible and unbounded instances.

Milestones

  1. The extreme points of a segment [a,b][a,b][a,b], a<ba<ba<b, are aaa and bbb.
  2. (38): for a c.p.f. val⁡\operatorname{val}val and a polytope DDD, sup⁡d∈Dval⁡(Bd+Cs+b)=sup⁡d∈ext⁡Dval⁡(Bd+Cs+b)\sup_{d \in D} \operatorname{val}(Bd + Cs + b) = \sup_{d \in \operatorname{ext} D} \operatorname{val}(Bd + Cs + b)supd∈D​val(Bd+Cs+b)=supd∈extD​val(Bd+Cs+b).
  3. val⁡(b)=min⁡{f(s):As≥b,∥s∥∞≤R}\operatorname{val}(b) = \min\{f(s) : As \ge b, \|s\|_\infty \le R\}val(b)=min{f(s):As≥b,∥s∥∞​≤R} is a c.p.f. when fff is.
  4. A c.p.f. composed with an affine map is a c.p.f.
  5. Item (a): φ(sT)=max⁡dT∈DTΦT(sT,dT)\varphi(s_T) = \max_{d_T \in D_T} \Phi_T(s_T, d_T)φ(sT​)=maxdT​∈DT​​ΦT​(sT​,dT​) and fT+φf_T + \varphifT​+φ are c.p.f.s.
  6. The Bellman reduction opt⁡(P[F0,…,FT])=opt⁡(P+[F0,…,FT−1])\operatorname{opt}(P[F_0, \dots, F_T]) = \operatorname{opt}(P_+[F_0, \dots, F_{T-1}])opt(P[F0​,…,FT​])=opt(P+​[F0​,…,FT−1​]).
  7. (39): replacing the last polytope by its extreme points leaves the optimal value unchanged.
  8. Lemma 2: opt⁡(P[D0,…,DT])=opt⁡(P[ext⁡D0,…,ext⁡DT])\operatorname{opt}(P[D_0, \dots, D_T]) = \operatorname{opt}(P[\operatorname{ext} D_0, \dots, \operatorname{ext} D_T])opt(P[D0​,…,DT​])=opt(P[extD0​,…,extDT​]) for convex polytopes DτD_\tauDτ​, D0D_0D0​ a singleton, and c.p.f. costs.
  9. For every RRR, the RSFC problem with every decision bounded by RRR has the same value on the box and on its corners.
  10. The RRR-box step, in corrected form: value⁡(box)≤value⁡R(box)\operatorname{value}(\text{box}) \le \operatorname{value}_R(\text{box})value(box)≤valueR​(box) for all RRR, value⁡(corners)≤value⁡(box)\operatorname{value}(\text{corners}) \le \operatorname{value}(\text{box})value(corners)≤value(box), and value⁡(corners)=inf⁡Rvalue⁡R(corners)\operatorname{value}(\text{corners}) = \inf_R \operatorname{value}_R(\text{corners})value(corners)=infR​valueR​(corners).

Significance

Proposition 1 turns a semi-infinite multistage problem into a finite one: with box uncertainty, the min-max RSFC problem is equivalent to a linear program over the scenario tree of the 2T2^T2T corner trajectories, problem PextP_{\text{ext}}Pext​ of §2.3. The paper uses this exact value as a benchmark for its affinely adjustable approximation in the simulation study. Lemma 2 is the transferable statement: in any multistage worst-case problem whose stage costs are convex polyhedral and whose dynamics are linear with a uniform box on the decisions, the adversary may be restricted to the vertices of each period's uncertainty polytope.

The result is proved in the paper; to the best of current knowledge it has no machine-checked proof. Formalizing it produces a reusable notion of convex polyhedral function in the extended reals, closure properties of that class (partial minimization over a polyhedral box, affine substitution, finite maxima, sums), and a formal worst-case Bellman equation for nonanticipative policies. The corrected form of the RRR-box step also records precisely when the paper's informal "for RRR large enough" argument is valid.

Difficulty

The natural argument, "a convex function attains its maximum over a polytope at a vertex", applies to one stage only. In a multistage problem the cost of the last stage depends on the earlier decisions, which depend on earlier demands, so the worst case is not a convex function of the whole trajectory. The proof must therefore pass through a dynamic programming recursion, and the class of stage costs must be closed under the recursion: the optimal last-stage value as a function of the previous decision must again be convex polyhedral. That closure (the value of a parametric problem with a convex polyhedral objective and a box constraint) is where the work is: the domain is a projection of a polyhedron, and attainment and lower semicontinuity have to be shown with infinite values allowed.

A second difficulty is bookkeeping. The RSFC problem must be rewritten as an instance of Lemma 2 with the right stage vectors so that nonanticipativity of yty_tyt​ in dt−1d^{t-1}dt−1 is preserved, and the bounded problem must be related back to the unbounded one, which can have value −∞-\infty−∞.

Formalization scope

Periods of the RSFC model are Fin T, 0-based. Policies are functions of the whole demand trajectory with nonanticipativity imposed on trajectories of the uncertainty set; a policy that sees future demand is not admissible, which rules out the clairvoyant reading under which the statement changes. Optimal values are EReal infima of suprema: +∞+\infty+∞ for infeasible problems and possibly −∞-\infty−∞, never a real sInf that would turn both into 000. The c.p.f. definition requires the domain to be exactly a finite system of linear inequalities, so it cannot be satisfied vacuously.

The standing assumptions of §2.2, s<cTs < c_Ts<cT​ and (1) hT−s≥−pTh_T - s \ge -p_ThT​−s≥−pT​, are not imposed, and no sign is assumed on any cost or penalty: Proposition 1 holds without them, so the formal statement is a generalization. The norm ∥⋅∥∞\|\cdot\|_\infty∥⋅∥∞​ is Mathlib's default norm on Fin m → ℝ. Lemma 2's families are indexed by N\mathbb NN with the paper's indices; B t, C t stand for Bt+1B_{t+1}Bt+1​, Ct+1C_{t+1}Ct+1​. Two printed slips are corrected in the statements: (38) keeps the + bT+1+\,b_{T+1}+bT+1​ that the page drops, and the RRR-box step is stated in the corrected sandwich form because the literal claim fails when the value is −∞-\infty−∞.

Useful infrastructure: convex polyhedral functions in EReal, Fourier–Motzkin projection of polyhedra, maximum principle for convex functions on polytopes, extreme points of convex hulls of finite sets. Contributions to any milestone, and to general lemmas on these topics, are welcome.

Selected references

  • A. Ben-Tal, B. Golany, A. Nemirovski, J.-P. Vial, Retailer-Supplier Flexible Commitments Contracts: A Robust Optimization Approach, Manufacturing & Service Operations Management 7(3):248–271, 2005. https://doi.org/10.1287/msom.1050.0081
  • A. Ben-Tal, A. Goryashko, E. Guslitzer, A. Nemirovski, Adjustable robust solutions of uncertain linear programs, Mathematical Programming 99(2):351–376, 2004. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10107-003-0454-y
  • G. Iyengar, Robust dynamic programming, Mathematics of Operations Research 30:257–280, 2005. https://doi.org/10.1287/moor.1040.0129
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Convex OptimizationOptimizationProbability·Captain: mikedeng1

Distributionally Robust Optimization and Its Tractable Approximations 3: The Infimal Convolution of π¹, π², π³ Bounds the Worst Case over the Intersected Families and Improves on EachResearch Paper

Motivation

Two-stage and multistage stochastic programs ask for decisions that react to uncertainty revealed over time. When the distribution of the uncertainty is known only partially, one optimizes against the worst distribution in a family F\mathbb FF consistent with what is known: a support set, a range for the mean, a covariance matrix, bounds on how fast the tails decay. Goh and Sim (Oper. Res. 58(4), 2010) show that once linear and deflected linear decision rules are imposed, the recourse costs of such models reduce to worst-case expectations of positive parts,

sup⁡P∈FEP((r0+r′ζ~)+),\sup_{\mathbb P\in\mathbb F}E_{\mathbb P}\big((r^0+r'\tilde\zeta)^+\big),P∈Fsup​EP​((r0+r′ζ~​)+),

of affine functions of a random vector ζ~\tilde\zetaζ~​. These quantities are generally intractable, so the paper bounds them by optimization problems that are. Each kind of partial information gives its own bound, and in practice a modeller usually has several kinds at once. Theorem 4 of the paper, the target here, combines the separate bounds into a single one that uses all of the information.

Timeline: Scarf (1958) gave, for a newsvendor problem, the worst-case expected positive part of a scalar with known mean and variance. Chen, Sim and Sun (Oper. Res. 55(6), 2007) introduced the forward and backward deviations used here to describe tails of independent components. Chen and Sim (Oper. Res. 57(2), 2009) introduced the combination of bounds by infimal convolution that Theorem 4 restates in the present setting. Goh and Sim (2010) assemble the three kinds of information into one model and use the combined bound for their bideflected linear decision rules.

Setting

A distribution P\mathbb PP is a probability measure on RNE\mathbb R^{N_E}RNE​, the law of the uncertain vector ζ~\tilde\zetaζ~​; its mean is ζ^=EP(ζ~)\hat\zeta=E_{\mathbb P}(\tilde\zeta)ζ^​=EP​(ζ~​). Fix data: sets V,V^⊆RNE\mathcal V,\hat{\mathcal V}\subseteq\mathbb R^{N_E}V,V^⊆RNE​, matrices F∈RN×NEF\in\mathbb R^{N\times N_E}F∈RN×NE​, Σ∈RN×N\Sigma\in\mathbb R^{N\times N}Σ∈RN×N, Fσ∈RNσ×NEF_\sigma\in\mathbb R^{N_\sigma\times N_E}Fσ​∈RNσ​×NE​, a vector gσ∈RNσg_\sigma\in\mathbb R^{N_\sigma}gσ​∈RNσ​, a set W^σ⊆RNσ\hat{\mathcal W}_\sigma\subseteq\mathbb R^{N_\sigma}W^σ​⊆RNσ​ and vectors σf,σb≥0\sigma_f,\sigma_b\ge0σf​,σb​≥0 in RNσ\mathbb R^{N_\sigma}RNσ​. Three families encode three kinds of information:

  1. Mean and support: F1={P:ζ^∈V^, P(ζ~∈V)=1}\mathbb F_1=\{\mathbb P:\hat\zeta\in\hat{\mathcal V},\ \mathbb P(\tilde\zeta\in\mathcal V)=1\}F1​={P:ζ^​∈V^, P(ζ~​∈V)=1}.
  2. Mean and covariance: F2={P:ζ^∈V^, EP(F(ζ~−ζ^)(ζ~−ζ^)′F′)=Σ}\mathbb F_2=\{\mathbb P:\hat\zeta\in\hat{\mathcal V},\ E_{\mathbb P}(F(\tilde\zeta-\hat\zeta)(\tilde\zeta-\hat\zeta)'F')=\Sigma\}F2​={P:ζ^​∈V^, EP​(F(ζ~​−ζ^​)(ζ~​−ζ^​)′F′)=Σ}.
  3. Mean and directional deviations: F3\mathbb F_3F3​ is the set of P\mathbb PP with ζ^∈V^\hat\zeta\in\hat{\mathcal V}ζ^​∈V^ such that z~σ=Fσζ~+gσ\tilde z_\sigma=F_\sigma\tilde\zeta+g_\sigmaz~σ​=Fσ​ζ~​+gσ​ has independent components whose forward and backward deviations
σfP(z~σ,j)=sup⁡θ>02θ2ln⁡EPeθ(z~σ,j−z^σ,j),σbP(z~σ,j)=sup⁡θ>02θ2ln⁡EPe−θ(z~σ,j−z^σ,j)\sigma_{f\mathbb P}(\tilde z_{\sigma,j})=\sup_{\theta>0}\sqrt{\tfrac{2}{\theta^2}\ln E_{\mathbb P}e^{\theta(\tilde z_{\sigma,j}-\hat z_{\sigma,j})}},\qquad \sigma_{b\mathbb P}(\tilde z_{\sigma,j})=\sup_{\theta>0}\sqrt{\tfrac{2}{\theta^2}\ln E_{\mathbb P}e^{-\theta(\tilde z_{\sigma,j}-\hat z_{\sigma,j})}}σfP​(z~σ,j​)=θ>0sup​θ22​lnEP​eθ(z~σ,j​−z^σ,j​)​,σbP​(z~σ,j​)=θ>0sup​θ22​lnEP​e−θ(z~σ,j​−z^σ,j​)​

are at most σf,j\sigma_{f,j}σf,j​ and σb,j\sigma_{b,j}σb,j​.

The bounds are the optimal values π1,π2,π3\pi^1,\pi^2,\pi^3π1,π2,π3 of (21), (22) and (24) of the paper. For instance

π1(r0,r)=inf⁡s(sup⁡ζ^∈V^s′ζ^+sup⁡ζ∈Vmax⁡{r0+r′ζ−s′ζ,−s′ζ}),\pi^1(r^0,r)=\inf_{s}\Big(\sup_{\hat\zeta\in\hat{\mathcal V}}s'\hat\zeta+\sup_{\zeta\in\mathcal V}\max\{r^0+r'\zeta-s'\zeta,-s'\zeta\}\Big),π1(r0,r)=sinf​(ζ^​∈V^sup​s′ζ^​+ζ∈Vsup​max{r0+r′ζ−s′ζ,−s′ζ}),

π2\pi^2π2 is an infimum over yyy with F′y=rF'y=rF′y=r of a supremum over V^\hat{\mathcal V}V^ of a Scarf-type expression, and π3\pi^3π3 is an infimum over (s0,s,x0,x)(s^0,s,x^0,x)(s0,s,x0,x) with x0+x′gσ=r0x^0+x'g_\sigma=r^0x0+x′gσ​=r0, Fσ′x=rF_\sigma'x=rFσ′​x=r that involves the function

ψ(x0,x)=inf⁡λ>0λeexp⁡(1λsup⁡z^σ∈W^σ{x0+x′z^σ}+∥u∥222λ2),uj=max⁡{xjσf,j,−xjσb,j}.\psi(x^0,x)=\inf_{\lambda>0}\frac{\lambda}{e}\exp\Big(\frac1\lambda\sup_{\hat z_\sigma\in\hat{\mathcal W}_\sigma}\{x^0+x'\hat z_\sigma\}+\frac{\|u\|_2^2}{2\lambda^2}\Big),\qquad u_j=\max\{x_j\sigma_{f,j},-x_j\sigma_{b,j}\}.ψ(x0,x)=λ>0inf​eλ​exp(λ1​z^σ​∈W^σ​sup​{x0+x′z^σ​}+2λ2∥u∥22​​),uj​=max{xj​σf,j​,−xj​σb,j​}.

For S⊆{1,2,3}S\subseteq\{1,2,3\}S⊆{1,2,3} the unified bound is the infimal convolution

π(r0,r)=min⁡{∑s∈Sπs(r0,s,rs): r0=∑s∈Sr0,s, r=∑s∈Srs}.(25)\pi(r^0,r)=\min\Big\{\sum_{s\in S}\pi^s(r^{0,s},r^s):\ r^0=\sum_{s\in S}r^{0,s},\ r=\sum_{s\in S}r^s\Big\}.\qquad(25)π(r0,r)=min{s∈S∑​πs(r0,s,rs): r0=s∈S∑​r0,s, r=s∈S∑​rs}.(25)

All values lie in [−∞,+∞][-\infty,+\infty][−∞,+∞], with the paper's convention that an infeasible minimization has value +∞+\infty+∞ and an infeasible maximization −∞-\infty−∞.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 4 (p. 911)

With F=⋂s∈SFs\mathbb F=\bigcap_{s\in S}\mathbb F_sF=⋂s∈S​Fs​,

sup⁡P∈FEP((r0+r′ζ~)+)≤π(r0,r)≤πs(r0,r)∀s∈S.(26)\sup_{\mathbb P\in\mathbb F}E_{\mathbb P}\big((r^0+r'\tilde\zeta)^+\big)\le\pi(r^0,r)\le\pi^s(r^0,r)\qquad\forall s\in S.\qquad(26)P∈Fsup​EP​((r0+r′ζ~​)+)≤π(r0,r)≤πs(r0,r)∀s∈S.(26)

Milestones

  1. Theorem 1, upper-bound part: sup⁡F1EP((r0+r′ζ~)+)≤π1(r0,r)\sup_{\mathbb F_1}E_{\mathbb P}((r^0+r'\tilde\zeta)^+)\le\pi^1(r^0,r)supF1​​EP​((r0+r′ζ~​)+)≤π1(r0,r).
  2. Theorem 2, upper-bound part: sup⁡F2EP((r0+r′ζ~)+)≤π2(r0,r)\sup_{\mathbb F_2}E_{\mathbb P}((r^0+r'\tilde\zeta)^+)\le\pi^2(r^0,r)supF2​​EP​((r0+r′ζ~​)+)≤π2(r0,r).
  3. Theorem 3: sup⁡F3EP((r0+r′ζ~)+)≤π3(r0,r)\sup_{\mathbb F_3}E_{\mathbb P}((r^0+r'\tilde\zeta)^+)\le\pi^3(r^0,r)supF3​​EP​((r0+r′ζ~​)+)≤π3(r0,r).
  4. The right inequality of (26): π(r0,r)≤πs(r0,r)\pi(r^0,r)\le\pi^s(r^0,r)π(r0,r)≤πs(r0,r) for every s∈Ss\in Ss∈S.

The tightness halves of Theorems 1 and 2 are the subject of the two companion missions of this series; Theorem 4 does not use them.

Significance

The unified bound turns heterogeneous partial information into one tractable upper bound. When a modeller knows a support set, a covariance and tail information for some independent factors, π\piπ is valid for the intersected family and is never worse than the best of the separate bounds; it is the bound the paper's deflected and bideflected linear decision rules (§6, (31) onward) use for every recourse term. Theorem 4 is thus the guarantee behind the paper's main approximation scheme, and the same infimal-convolution device applies to any collection of valid bounds on a common convex objective.

The theorems are proved in the paper's electronic companion. To the knowledge of this mission none of them has a machine-checked proof: the Lean library has neither a Scarf-type bound nor a bound on expected positive parts from deviation measures. Formalizing Theorem 3 in particular produces reusable facts about moment generating functions of independent sums under deviation bounds.

Difficulty

The left inequality of (26) looks like bookkeeping, but it rests on three separate bounds, each with its own argument: a weak-duality argument for π1\pi^1π1, a Scarf-type mean–variance inequality for π2\pi^2π2, and an exponential-moment argument for π3\pi^3π3 that needs independence of the components of z~σ\tilde z_\sigmaz~σ​ to factor a moment generating function and the deviation bounds to control each factor. Each piece must be carried out with all values in the extended reals: suprema can be +∞+\infty+∞, families can be empty, and a term equal to −∞-\infty−∞ in a sum can absorb a +∞+\infty+∞. The right inequality depends on how each πs\pi^sπs behaves at the zero objective, which for π3\pi^3π3 is an infimum over λ>0\lambda>0λ>0 that is not attained. The naive idea of proving (26) by attainment of the minimum in (25) does not work: the minimum need not be attained, and the statement must hold for every feasible split.

Formalization scope

A distribution is a Measure on Fin N_E → ℝ with IsProbabilityMeasure; ζ~\tilde\zetaζ~​ is the identity map. The mean is the published MomentDRO.Conf.meanVec. F1\mathbb F_1F1​ and F3\mathbb F_3F3​ require integrable coordinates and F2\mathbb F_2F2​ finite second moments, so that means and covariances exist. P(ζ~∈V)=1\mathbb P(\tilde\zeta\in\mathcal V)=1P(ζ~​∈V)=1 is an almost-everywhere statement. In F3\mathbb F_3F3​, independence is iIndepFun of the coordinates of z~σ\tilde z_\sigmaz~σ​; every exponential moment Eeθz~σ,jE e^{\theta\tilde z_{\sigma,j}}Eeθz~σ,j​ is required finite; and the deviation bounds are the published predicates FwdDevLe, BwdDevLe applied to the law of each coordinate, which state 2θ2ln⁡Eeθ(z~σ,j−z^σ,j)≤σf,j2\frac{2}{\theta^2}\ln E e^{\theta(\tilde z_{\sigma,j}-\hat z_{\sigma,j})}\le\sigma_{f,j}^2θ22​lnEeθ(z~σ,j​−z^σ,j​)≤σf,j2​ for all θ>0\theta>0θ>0, equivalent to the square-root form above for σf,j≥0\sigma_{f,j}\ge0σf,j​≥0.

Worst cases and bounds take values in EReal; the printed "min" of (25) and "inf" of (21), (22), (24) are read as infima, without attainment. In ψ\psiψ the supremum over W^σ\hat{\mathcal W}_\sigmaW^σ​ is taken outside the increasing exponential, which gives the same value whenever W^σ\hat{\mathcal W}_\sigmaW^σ​ is nonempty. The index set SSS is a nonempty Finset (Fin 3) with index 0,1,20,1,20,1,2 for the paper's 1,2,31,2,31,2,3, and vector indices are 0-based.

Two hypotheses come from the paper's model rather than its theorem statements: σf,σb≥0\sigma_f,\sigma_b\ge0σf​,σb​≥0 (deviations are square roots), and Fσζ^+gσ∈W^σF_\sigma\hat\zeta+g_\sigma\in\hat{\mathcal W}_\sigmaFσ​ζ^​+gσ​∈W^σ​ for every ζ^∈V^\hat\zeta\in\hat{\mathcal V}ζ^​∈V^, which follows from W^σ=HσW^\hat{\mathcal W}_\sigma=H_\sigma\hat{\mathcal W}W^σ​=Hσ​W^, V^={ζ^:Fζ^+g∈W^}\hat{\mathcal V}=\{\hat\zeta:F\hat\zeta+g\in\hat{\mathcal W}\}V^={ζ^​:Fζ^​+g∈W^}, Fσ=HσFF_\sigma=H_\sigma FFσ​=Hσ​F and gσ=Hσgg_\sigma=H_\sigma ggσ​=Hσ​g (pp. 905, 908, 910).

The bounds are defined by (21), (22), (24) and (25) verbatim; a formalization that defines π\piπ through the worst case itself, sets some πs\pi^sπs to +∞+\infty+∞, drops the exponential integrability from F3\mathbb F_3F3​, or uses real-valued suprema (which return 000 on unbounded sets) would trivialize or falsify the statement and is ruled out.

Contributions welcome: proofs of the three upper bounds, a Scarf inequality EX+≤12(EX+(EX)2+Var⁡X)E X^+\le\frac12(EX+\sqrt{(EX)^2+\operatorname{Var}X})EX+≤21​(EX+(EX)2+VarX​) as a reusable lemma, and the EReal lemmas about infimal convolutions of extended-real functions.

Selected references

  • J. Goh, M. Sim, Distributionally Robust Optimization and Its Tractable Approximations, Operations Research 58(4):902–917, 2010. https://doi.org/10.1287/opre.1090.0795
  • X. Chen, M. Sim, P. Sun, A Robust Optimization Perspective on Stochastic Programming, Operations Research 55(6):1058–1071, 2007. https://doi.org/10.1287/opre.1070.0441
  • W. Chen, M. Sim, Goal-Driven Optimization, Operations Research 57(2):342–357, 2009. https://doi.org/10.1287/opre.1080.0570
  • H. Scarf, A Min-Max Solution of an Inventory Problem, in Studies in the Mathematical Theory of Inventory and Production, K. Arrow, ed., Stanford University Press, 1958, 201–209.
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Convex OptimizationOptimization·Captain: mikedeng1

Solving Semidefinite-Quadratic-Linear Programs Using SDPT3: The HKM and NT Search Directions of Second-Order Cone Programming Are Invariant Under Automorphic ScalingResearch Paper

Motivation

Second-order cone programming (SOCP) minimizes a linear function over the intersection of an affine subspace with a product of Lorentz cones. It contains convex quadratically constrained programs, robust linear programs with ellipsoidal uncertainty, and many norm-minimization problems, and it is solved in practice by primal–dual interior-point methods. At each iteration such a method computes a search direction from a linearized, symmetrized form of the complementarity conditions; the symmetrization depends on a scaling matrix GGG, and different choices of GGG give different directions. The two directions used in practice are the HKM direction (Helmberg–Rendl–Vanderbei–Wolkowicz, Kojima–Shindoh–Hara, Monteiro) and the NT direction (Nesterov–Todd).

A desirable property of a search direction is scale invariance: if the problem is transformed by an automorphism of the cone, the direction computed for the transformed problem is the image of the original direction. A scale-invariant method behaves identically on all problems related by such a change of coordinates, so its behaviour does not depend on an arbitrary choice of coordinates within each cone.

Timeline. Tsuchiya (1999, Optim. Methods Softw. 11 & 12, pp. 141–182; reference [27] of the paper) proved that the HKM and NT directions for SOCP are scale invariant, with a two-page argument for each. Tütüncü, Toh and Todd (2003), in the paper that describes the solver SDPT3 version 3.0, derived closed forms for the blocks (Ei)−1Fi(\mathcal E_i)^{-1}\mathcal F_i(Ei​)−1Fi​ of the Schur complement matrix ((23) for HKM, (29) for NT) and used them to give a short proof of Tsuchiya's result (their Proposition 1).

Setting

There are nqn_qnq​ second-order cone blocks. Block iii has dimension qi≥1q_i \ge 1qi​≥1, and a vector xi∈Rqix_i \in \mathbb R^{q_i}xi​∈Rqi​ is split into its first coordinate xi0x_i^0xi0​ and the rest xi1x_i^1xi1​. The cone is Kqqi={x:x0≥∥x1∥2}K_q^{q_i} = \{x : x^0 \ge \|x^1\|_2\}Kqqi​​={x:x0≥∥x1∥2​}, and with Jˉ=diag⁡(1,−I)\bar J = \operatorname{diag}(1, -I)Jˉ=diag(1,−I) and J=−JˉJ = -\bar JJ=−Jˉ, the function γ(x)=(x0)2−⟨x1,x1⟩=x⊤Jˉx\gamma(x) = \sqrt{(x^0)^2 - \langle x^1, x^1 \rangle} = \sqrt{x^\top \bar J x}γ(x)=(x0)2−⟨x1,x1⟩​=x⊤Jˉx​ is defined on the cone.

The data are matrices Ai∈Rqi×mA_i \in \mathbb R^{q_i \times m}Ai​∈Rqi​×m, a vector b∈Rmb \in \mathbb R^mb∈Rm and vectors ci∈Rqic_i \in \mathbb R^{q_i}ci​∈Rqi​. The primal problem minimizes ∑i⟨ci,xi⟩\sum_i \langle c_i, x_i \rangle∑i​⟨ci​,xi​⟩ subject to ∑iAi⊤xi=b\sum_i A_i^\top x_i = b∑i​Ai⊤​xi​=b and xi∈Kqqix_i \in K_q^{q_i}xi​∈Kqqi​​; the dual maximizes b⊤yb^\top yb⊤y subject to Aiy+zi=ciA_i y + z_i = c_iAi​y+zi​=ci​ and zi∈Kqqiz_i \in K_q^{q_i}zi​∈Kqqi​​.

The arrow matrix of vvv is Arw⁡(v)=(v0(v1)⊤v1v0I)\operatorname{Arw}(v) = \begin{pmatrix} v^0 & (v^1)^\top \\ v^1 & v^0 I \end{pmatrix}Arw(v)=(v0v1​(v1)⊤v0I​). Given an interior iterate (x,y,z)(x, y, z)(x,y,z) and a scaling block GiG_iGi​, set

Ei=Arw⁡(Gi−1zi) Gi,Fi=Arw⁡(Gixi) Gi−1,TGi(xi,zi)=Arw⁡(Gixi)(Gi−1zi).\mathcal E_i = \operatorname{Arw}(G_i^{-1} z_i)\, G_i, \qquad \mathcal F_i = \operatorname{Arw}(G_i x_i)\, G_i^{-1}, \qquad T_{G_i}(x_i, z_i) = \operatorname{Arw}(G_i x_i)(G_i^{-1} z_i).Ei​=Arw(Gi−1​zi​)Gi​,Fi​=Arw(Gi​xi​)Gi−1​,TGi​​(xi​,zi​)=Arw(Gi​xi​)(Gi−1​zi​).

With μ=⟨x,z⟩/nq\mu = \langle x, z \rangle / n_qμ=⟨x,z⟩/nq​ and a centering parameter σ\sigmaσ, a search direction (Δx,Δy,Δz)(\Delta x, \Delta y, \Delta z)(Δx,Δy,Δz) solves the Newton system

AiΔy+Δzi=ci−zi−Aiy,∑iAi⊤Δxi=b−∑iAi⊤xi,EiΔxi+FiΔzi=σμ e1−TGi(xi,zi).A_i \Delta y + \Delta z_i = c_i - z_i - A_i y, \qquad \sum_i A_i^\top \Delta x_i = b - \sum_i A_i^\top x_i, \qquad \mathcal E_i \Delta x_i + \mathcal F_i \Delta z_i = \sigma\mu\, e_1 - T_{G_i}(x_i, z_i).Ai​Δy+Δzi​=ci​−zi​−Ai​y,i∑​Ai⊤​Δxi​=b−i∑​Ai⊤​xi​,Ei​Δxi​+Fi​Δzi​=σμe1​−TGi​​(xi​,zi​).

The HKM direction takes GiG_iGi​ from the explicit formula (19) in ziz_izi​; the NT direction takes GiG_iGi​ from (20)–(21) in xix_ixi​ and ziz_izi​.

The automorphism group Gi\mathcal G_iGi​ of KqqiK_q^{q_i}Kqqi​​ consists of the invertible linear maps FFF with FKqqi=KqqiF K_q^{q_i} = K_q^{q_i}FKqqi​​=Kqqi​​; these are exactly the matrices with F⊤JˉF=λ2JˉF^\top \bar J F = \lambda^2 \bar JF⊤JˉF=λ2Jˉ for some λ>0\lambda > 0λ>0 and F00>0F_{00} > 0F00​>0. Scaling by F=diag⁡(F1,…,Fnq)F = \operatorname{diag}(F_1, \dots, F_{n_q})F=diag(F1​,…,Fnq​​) sends the data and iterate to A^i=Fi−1Ai\hat A_i = F_i^{-1} A_iA^i​=Fi−1​Ai​, b^=b\hat b = bb^=b, c^i=Fi−1ci\hat c_i = F_i^{-1} c_ic^i​=Fi−1​ci​, x^i=Fi⊤xi\hat x_i = F_i^\top x_ix^i​=Fi⊤​xi​, y^=y\hat y = yy^​=y, z^i=Fi−1zi\hat z_i = F_i^{-1} z_iz^i​=Fi−1​zi​.

Formalization targets

Goal: Proposition 1 (p. 11)

For either direction (HKM or NT), every interior iterate, every σ\sigmaσ, and every choice of Fi∈GiF_i \in \mathcal G_iFi​∈Gi​,

(Δx,Δy,Δz) solves the Newton system for (A,b,c;x,y,z)  ⟺  (F⊤Δx, Δy, F−1Δz) solves it for (A^,b^,c^;x^,y^,z^).(\Delta x, \Delta y, \Delta z) \text{ solves the Newton system for } (A, b, c; x, y, z) \iff (F^\top \Delta x,\ \Delta y,\ F^{-1} \Delta z) \text{ solves it for } (\hat A, \hat b, \hat c; \hat x, \hat y, \hat z).(Δx,Δy,Δz) solves the Newton system for (A,b,c;x,y,z)⟺(F⊤Δx, Δy, F−1Δz) solves it for (A^,b^,c^;x^,y^​,z^).

Milestones

In attack order: the identities (31) for FFF with F⊤JˉF=JˉF^\top \bar J F = \bar JF⊤JˉF=Jˉ; the Schur complement reduction (10)–(15); Arw⁡(Gi−1zi)=I\operatorname{Arw}(G_i^{-1} z_i) = IArw(Gi−1​zi​)=I for HKM; the HKM closed forms (23) and (24)–(25); the right-hand-side formula (28) for both directions; the HKM invariance step of the proof; the NT identities Gixi=Gi−1ziG_i x_i = G_i^{-1} z_iGi​xi​=Gi−1​zi​ and (29); the NT block formula (30); and the NT invariance step of the proof.

Significance

The proposition shows that SDPT3's two second-order-cone directions do not depend on how each cone is coordinatized. The closed forms (23), (24), (29) and (30) are what SDPT3 uses to assemble the Schur complement matrix: they show that each block is a diagonal matrix plus a low-rank term, which is the basis for its sparse and Sherman–Morrison–Woodbury handling of large cones.

The result is proved twice in the literature (Tsuchiya 1999 and this paper). As far as is known, neither proof has been machine-checked, and no formal library contains the HKM or NT scalings, the arrow matrix of the Jordan algebra of the Lorentz cone, or its automorphism group. This mission produces those definitions and a checked proof. The printed proof assumes Fi⊤JˉFi=JˉF_i^\top \bar J F_i = \bar JFi⊤​JˉFi​=Jˉ, that is λ=1\lambda = 1λ=1; the goal covers the whole group Gi\mathcal G_iGi​, so a complete formalization also closes the case λ≠1\lambda \ne 1λ=1, where (31) and the remark that ωi\omega_iωi​ is unchanged no longer hold as printed.

Difficulty

Every step is linear algebra, but none is a one-line rewrite. The inverse of Ei\mathcal E_iEi​ appears everywhere, so one first needs invertibility of GiG_iGi​ and Ei\mathcal E_iEi​ for interior iterates, and the HKM and NT scalings must be shown to satisfy Gie1=ziG_i e_1 = z_iGi​e1​=zi​ and Gixi=Gi−1ziG_i x_i = G_i^{-1} z_iGi​xi​=Gi−1​zi​ respectively, which are identities involving γ\gammaγ, square roots and the denominators γ(z)+z0\gamma(z) + z^0γ(z)+z0 and 1+t01 + t^01+t0. Transporting the Newton system directly through FFF fails: Ei\mathcal E_iEi​ and Fi\mathcal F_iFi​ are built from GiG_iGi​, which is not equivariant in an obvious way, and the HKM scaling at z^i\hat z_iz^i​ is not Fi−1GiF_i^{-1} G_iFi−1​Gi​. For λ≠1\lambda \ne 1λ=1, the quantities γ\gammaγ, ω\omegaω and ttt scale by powers of λ\lambdaλ, and these factors must be tracked until they cancel.

Formalization scope

A block of dimension qiq_iqi​ is Fin (d i + 1) → ℝ, so qi=di+1≥1q_i = d_i + 1 \ge 1qi​=di​+1≥1; xi0x_i^0xi0​ is index 0 and xi1x_i^1xi1​ the indices Fin.succ j. Mathlib's norm on this type is the sup norm, so every Euclidean quantity is written through Jˉ\bar JJˉ. Interior points are encoded by x0>0x^0 > 0x0>0 and (x0)2−⟨x1,x1⟩>0(x^0)^2 - \langle x^1, x^1 \rangle > 0(x0)2−⟨x1,x1⟩>0. Matrix inverses are Matrix.inv, which is 000 on singular input; the milestones that invert a matrix state its invertibility.

Standing assumptions: the problem is a pure SOCP (ns=nl=0n_s = n_l = 0ns​=nl​=0); the iterate is interior; μ=⟨x,z⟩/nq\mu = \langle x, z \rangle / n_qμ=⟨x,z⟩/nq​. The paper's assumption that AAA has full row rank is dropped, because the goal is stated for solution sets of the Newton system and needs no uniqueness. Gi\mathcal G_iGi​ is encoded algebraically (positive multiples of orthochronous Lorentz transformations) rather than as {F:FK=K}\{F : F K = K\}{F:FK=K}, so that the goal does not require the classification of cone automorphisms. The goal assumes nothing about the scaled iterate; its interiority is a consequence.

The Newton system is defined by its raw rows with Ei\mathcal E_iEi​, Fi\mathcal F_iFi​ from (8) and GiG_iGi​ from (19)/(21). A formalization that defined the direction through the closed forms (23)/(29), or defined GiG_iGi​ implicitly by Gie1=ziG_i e_1 = z_iGi​e1​=zi​ or Gixi=Gi−1ziG_i x_i = G_i^{-1} z_iGi​xi​=Gi−1​zi​, would make the goal nearly definitional and is ruled out.

Reusable infrastructure: the arrow matrix and γ\gammaγ of the Lorentz cone, the HKM and NT scalings, and the algebra of Lorentz transformations. Contributions toward any milestone, and alternative proofs of the goal that bypass the milestones, are welcome.

Selected references

  • R. H. Tütüncü, K. C. Toh, M. J. Todd, Solving semidefinite-quadratic-linear programs using SDPT3, Mathematical Programming 95 (2003) 189–217. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10107-002-0347-5
  • T. Tsuchiya, A convergence analysis of the scaling-invariant primal-dual path-following algorithms for second-order cone programming, Optimization Methods and Software 11 & 12 (1999) 141–182 (reference [27] of the SDPT3 paper; no stable link recorded).
  • F. Alizadeh, D. Goldfarb, Second-order cone programming, Mathematical Programming 95 (2003) 3–51. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10107-002-0339-5
  • Yu. Nesterov, M. J. Todd, Self-scaled barriers and interior-point methods in convex programming, Mathematics of Operations Research 22 (1997) 1–42. https://doi.org/10.1287/moor.22.1.1
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Linear OptimizationOptimizationProbability·Captain: mikedeng1

Overbooking with Substitutable Inventory Classes: With Semigroup Survivals the Expected Net Revenue Is Componentwise Concave and Submodular in the Overbooking LevelsResearch Paper

Motivation

Airlines, hotels and car-rental firms sell reservations ahead of service, and a fraction of those reservations cancel or do not show up. Overbooking — accepting more reservations than there is capacity — recovers revenue that cancellations would otherwise destroy, at the risk of denying service to some customers. In practice inventory is often substitutable: a passenger booked in economy can be upgraded to business, a guest booked in a standard room can be given a suite. With substitution, the right overbooking level for one reservation class depends on the levels of all the others.

Karaesmen and van Ryzin (Operations Research 52(1):83–104, 2004) model this as a two-period problem: overbooking decisions in a reservation period, followed by an optimal assignment of the customers who actually show up to inventory classes in a service period. Their structural result, Theorem 2, establishes the shape of the expected net revenue as a function of the overbooking levels. That shape is what justifies critical-level booking policies and the stochastic-gradient method of their §4, and it is the textbook account of joint overbooking with substitution (Talluri and van Ryzin, The Theory and Practice of Revenue Management, 2004, Proposition 4.4).

Setting

There are nnn reservation classes i=1,…,ni = 1, \dots, ni=1,…,n and m+1m + 1m+1 inventory classes j=0,1,…,mj = 0, 1, \dots, mj=0,1,…,m. Class j=0j = 0j=0 is virtual: assigning a customer to it means the customer is denied service.

Reservation period. The firm holds xix_ixi​ reservations of class iii and chooses overbooking levels ui≥xiu_i \ge x_iui​≥xi​. Accepting a class-iii reservation earns rir_iri​; a cancellation of class iii is refunded qiq_iqi​, with qi≤riq_i \le r_iqi​≤ri​. The number of class-iii customers who survive to the service period is a random variable Zi(ui)Z_i(u_i)Zi​(ui​) with values in {0,1,2,… }\{0, 1, 2, \dots\}{0,1,2,…}. The family {Zi(ui)}\{Z_i(u_i)\}{Zi​(ui​)} has the semigroup property: if Y1Y_1Y1​ and Y2Y_2Y2​ are independent with the laws of Zi(ui)Z_i(u_i)Zi​(ui​) and Zi(si)Z_i(s_i)Zi​(si​), then Y1+Y2Y_1 + Y_2Y1​+Y2​ has the law of Zi(ui+si)Z_i(u_i + s_i)Zi​(ui​+si​). The binomial model (Zi(ui)∼Bin(ui,pi)Z_i(u_i) \sim \mathrm{Bin}(u_i, p_i)Zi​(ui​)∼Bin(ui​,pi​) for integer uiu_iui​) and the Poisson model (Zi(ui)∼Poisson(uipi)Z_i(u_i) \sim \mathrm{Poisson}(u_i p_i)Zi​(ui​)∼Poisson(ui​pi​)) both have it. The survivals of different classes are independent.

Service period. Given the survivals z=(z1,…,zn)≥0z = (z_1, \dots, z_n) \ge 0z=(z1​,…,zn​)≥0, net benefits aija_{ij}aij​ (of either sign) and capacities cjc_jcj​, the firm solves the transportation problem

V0(z,c)=max⁡∑i=1n∑j=0maijyijs.t.∑j=0myij=zi,  ∑i=1nyij≤cj,  yij≥0.V_0(z, c) = \max \sum_{i=1}^n \sum_{j=0}^m a_{ij} y_{ij} \quad \text{s.t.} \quad \sum_{j=0}^m y_{ij} = z_i, \ \ \sum_{i=1}^n y_{ij} \le c_j, \ \ y_{ij} \ge 0.V0​(z,c)=maxi=1∑n​j=0∑m​aij​yij​s.t.j=0∑m​yij​=zi​,  i=1∑n​yij​≤cj​,  yij​≥0.

Expected net revenue. The objective of the reservation period is

G(u)=∑i=1nri(ui−xi)−E[∑i=1nqi(ui−Zi(ui))]+E[V0(Z(u),c)],G(u) = \sum_{i=1}^n r_i (u_i - x_i) - \mathbb E\Big[\sum_{i=1}^n q_i\big(u_i - Z_i(u_i)\big)\Big] + \mathbb E\big[V_0(Z(u), c)\big],G(u)=i=1∑n​ri​(ui​−xi​)−E[i=1∑n​qi​(ui​−Zi​(ui​))]+E[V0​(Z(u),c)],

to be maximized over u≥xu \ge xu≥x.

A function fff on Rn\mathbb R^nRn is submodular on SSS if f(s∨s′)+f(s∧s′)≤f(s)+f(s′)f(s \vee s') + f(s \wedge s') \le f(s) + f(s')f(s∨s′)+f(s∧s′)≤f(s)+f(s′) for s,s′∈Ss, s' \in Ss,s′∈S, with ∨,∧\vee, \wedge∨,∧ the componentwise maximum and minimum.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 2

For every uuu with levels in the parameter set PPP, every class iii and all ε,α∈P\varepsilon, \alpha \in Pε,α∈P,

G(u+(ε+α)ei)−G(u+αei)≤G(u+εei)−G(u),G(u + (\varepsilon + \alpha) e_i) - G(u + \alpha e_i) \le G(u + \varepsilon e_i) - G(u),G(u+(ε+α)ei​)−G(u+αei​)≤G(u+εei​)−G(u),

and GGG is submodular on PnP^nPn:

G(u∨u′)+G(u∧u′)≤G(u)+G(u′).G(u \vee u') + G(u \wedge u') \le G(u) + G(u').G(u∨u′)+G(u∧u′)≤G(u)+G(u′).

The first statement is the paper's componentwise concavity (6); the second is its submodularity, proved in the paper through the pairwise inequality (7) and Theorem 1.

Milestones

  1. LP duality for the transportation problem (§2.2, p. 86): for z≥0z \ge 0z≥0 the primal attains its optimum and equals the dual optimum.
  2. Lemma 1: V0(⋅,c)V_0(\cdot, c)V0​(⋅,c) is submodular on R≥0n\mathbb R^n_{\ge 0}R≥0n​.
  3. Lemma 2: V0V_0V0​ is concave in (z1,…,zn)(z_1, \dots, z_n)(z1​,…,zn​) and concave in (c1,…,cm)(c_1, \dots, c_m)(c1​,…,cm​).
  4. Theorem 1: on a product set, submodularity is equivalent to decreasing differences.
  5. Under the semigroup property, E[Zi(ui)]\mathbb E[Z_i(u_i)]E[Zi​(ui​)] is additive in uiu_iui​.
  6. The semigroup representation E[V0(Z(u+εei))]=E[V0(Z(u)+Yei)]\mathbb E[V_0(Z(u + \varepsilon e_i))] = \mathbb E[V_0(Z(u) + Y e_i)]E[V0​(Z(u+εei​))]=E[V0​(Z(u)+Yei​)] with YYY independent of Z(u)Z(u)Z(u) and distributed as Zi(ε)Z_i(\varepsilon)Zi​(ε).
  7. The sample-path inequalities of the proof: nonincreasing increments of V0V_0V0​ along one coordinate, and the pairwise submodularity inequality for two coordinates.

Significance

Componentwise concavity of GGG implies that for each reservation class there is a critical booking level beyond which expected revenue does not increase, other levels held fixed. Submodularity implies that these critical levels are nonincreasing in the bookings accepted for any other class: heavier overbooking in one class leaves less spare substitute capacity for the others. These two properties underpin the heuristics and the stochastic-gradient optimization of §4–§5 of the paper.

The result is proved in the paper (for n=2n = 2n=2, with the general case described as straightforward). A machine-checked version would cover the general semigroup case, which includes the binomial model the paper calls realistic, real-valued levels and arbitrary step sizes. The platform already holds a proved special case, RevenueManagement.joint_overbooking_concave_submodular (Talluri–van Ryzin, Proposition 4.4): Poisson survivals, integer levels and unit steps only. This mission generalizes it in all three respects and also formalizes the transportation-problem facts (LP duality, submodularity and concavity of V0V_0V0​) as reusable statements.

Difficulty

The obvious route — differentiate GGG and use concavity of V0V_0V0​ — fails twice. First, V0V_0V0​ is piecewise linear and the survivals are discrete, so there is nothing to differentiate; under the binomial model GGG is only defined at integer levels. Second, concavity of V0V_0V0​ alone does not survive the expectation: E[V0(Z(u))]\mathbb E[V_0(Z(u))]E[V0​(Z(u))] is a mixture over laws that change with uuu, and a concave function of a random vector whose law moves with the parameter need not be concave in the parameter. The semigroup property is what replaces a change of law by the addition of an independent block of survivors, and that coupling must be built for every coordinate and every pair of coordinates at once. On the LP side, submodularity of a transportation-problem value in its demands is a lattice-programming fact (Topkis, Theorem 3.4.1; Shapley 1962), not a consequence of concavity.

Formalization scope

All declarations are in the namespace SubstOverbooking.Structure. Reservation classes are Fin n (0-based), inventory classes Fin (m + 1) with 0 the virtual denied-service class. Conventions committed to:

  • Uncapacitated virtual class. The paper gives class 0 "finite but very high capacity" and then needs it to absorb every survivor; with Poisson survivals no finite capacity does. Constraint (4) is imposed only for j≠0j \ne 0j=0, c0c_0c0​ is unused, and the dual fixes λ0=0\lambda_0 = 0λ0​=0. Capacities satisfy cj≥0c_j \ge 0cj​≥0 for j≠0j \ne 0j=0.
  • V0V_0V0​ on real demands. V0V_0V0​ is the supremum of the TP objective over feasible assignments, for real zzz; every statement assumes z≥0z \ge 0z≥0, where the supremum is attained and finite.
  • Survival laws. Each class has a family u↦Li(u)u \mapsto L_i(u)u↦Li​(u) of probability mass functions on N\mathbb NN, with finite means. Levels range over a parameter set P⊆[0,∞)P \subseteq [0, \infty)P⊆[0,∞) that contains 000 and is closed under addition and under nonnegative differences: P=NP = \mathbb NP=N covers the binomial model, P=[0,∞)P = [0, \infty)P=[0,∞) the Poisson model. The semigroup property is the identity of laws Li(u+s)=(Li(u)⊗Li(s))∘(+)−1L_i(u + s) = (L_i(u) \otimes L_i(s)) \circ (+)^{-1}Li​(u+s)=(Li​(u)⊗Li​(s))∘(+)−1 for u,s∈Pu, s \in Pu,s∈P, and independence across classes is the product law.
  • Concavity is stated as the increment inequality (6), which is meaningful on a discrete PPP; submodularity of GGG is lattice submodularity on PnP^nPn via the published SupermodularOn applied to −G-G−G.
  • Theorem 1 is stated for product sets S=T1×⋯×TnS = T_1 \times \dots \times T_nS=T1​×⋯×Tn​; as printed for arbitrary S⊂RnS \subset \mathbb R^nS⊂Rn it is false, and every set the paper applies it to is a product.
  • The refund condition qi≤riq_i \le r_iqi​≤ri​ is kept as a hypothesis of the goal, as on the page.

A formalization that fixes Poisson laws, integer levels or unit steps, or that defines GGG or V0V_0V0​ through the inequalities to be proved, is the already-proved special case or an empty statement, and is not the goal.

A complete development needs finite LP duality for the transportation problem, the lattice-programming argument for Lemma 1, product measures and image measures on Nn\mathbb N^nNn, and the coupling of the semigroup property. The LP and lattice parts are reusable beyond this mission. Proofs of any milestone are welcome, as are alternative arguments for Lemma 1 (for instance via monotonicity of optimal duals, after Erlenkotter 1970).

Selected references

  • I. Karaesmen and G. van Ryzin, Overbooking with Substitutable Inventory Classes, Operations Research 52(1):83–104, 2004. https://doi.org/10.1287/opre.1030.0079
  • K. T. Talluri and G. J. van Ryzin, The Theory and Practice of Revenue Management, Springer, 2004, §4.4. https://doi.org/10.1007/b139000
  • D. M. Topkis, Supermodularity and Complementarity, Princeton University Press, 1998, Theorem 3.4.1. https://doi.org/10.1515/9781400822539
  • R. K. Sundaram, A First Course in Optimization Theory, Cambridge University Press, 1996. https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511804526
  • L. S. Shapley, Complements and substitutes in the optimal assignment problem, Naval Research Logistics Quarterly 9(1):45–48, 1962. https://doi.org/10.1002/nav.3800090106
  • M. Shaked and J. G. Shanthikumar, Stochastic convexity and its applications, Advances in Applied Probability 20(2):427–446, 1988. https://doi.org/10.2307/1427398
11 thms2 active usersReviewed
Convex OptimizationOptimization·Captain: mikedeng1

On Implementing a Primal-Dual Interior-Point Method for Conic Quadratic Optimization IV: The Nesterov–Todd Scaling of a Quadratic or Rotated Quadratic Cone Is W = −Q + (e₁ + w)(e₁ + w)ᵀ/(1 + w₁)Research Paper

Why the Nesterov–Todd scaling of a second-order cone matters

Conic quadratic (second-order cone) programs are solved in practice by primal-dual interior-point methods. Each iteration solves a Newton system for the central-path equations, and for non-polyhedral cones that system is only guaranteed to be well posed after the problem is scaled: the primal point xxx and the dual slack sss are transformed by a matrix ΘW\Theta WΘW chosen from the current iterate. Among the scalings analysed by Monteiro and Tsuchiya (2000), the best complexity bounds are obtained with the Nesterov–Todd (NT) scaling of Nesterov and Todd (1997), which maps xxx and sss to the same point.

Andersen, Roos and Terlaky (2003) describe the conic quadratic interior-point solver of MOSEK. Their Lemma 4.2 gives the NT scaling in closed form for each of the three cone types they use. It is what makes the NT direction cheap: each cone block of WWW is determined by one vector www, and WWW, W2W^2W2 and their inverses can be applied in time linear in the dimension. For the quadratic cone the formula goes back to Tsuchiya (1999); the paper re-derives it and extends it to the rotated quadratic cone.

Setting

Fix one cone block of dimension ddd. Coordinates are x=(x1,…,xd)x = (x_1,\dots,x_d)x=(x1​,…,xd​), xk:dx_{k:d}xk:d​ denotes the subvector of coordinates k,…,dk,\dots,dk,…,d, and ∥⋅∥\|\cdot\|∥⋅∥ is the Euclidean norm. The block is one of

  • the positive half-line R+\mathbb R_+R+​ (d=1d=1d=1), with T=Q=1T = Q = 1T=Q=1;
  • the quadratic cone Kq={x:x1≥∥x2:d∥}K^q = \{x : x_1 \ge \|x_{2:d}\|\}Kq={x:x1​≥∥x2:d​∥} (d≥1d\ge1d≥1), with T=IT = IT=I and Q=diag⁡(1,−1,…,−1)Q = \operatorname{diag}(1,-1,\dots,-1)Q=diag(1,−1,…,−1);
  • the rotated quadratic cone Kr={x:2x1x2≥∥x3:d∥2, x1,x2≥0}K^r = \{x : 2x_1x_2 \ge \|x_{3:d}\|^2,\ x_1,x_2\ge0\}Kr={x:2x1​x2​≥∥x3:d​∥2, x1​,x2​≥0} (d≥2d\ge2d≥2), with TTT the identity except for the leading block 12[111−1]\tfrac1{\sqrt2}\begin{bmatrix}1&1\\1&-1\end{bmatrix}2​1​[11​1−1​], and QQQ the matrix with Q12=Q21=1Q_{12} = Q_{21} = 1Q12​=Q21​=1, Qjj=−1Q_{jj} = -1Qjj​=−1 for j≥3j\ge3j≥3, and zeros elsewhere.

A scaling matrix (Definition 3.3) is a symmetric positive definite WWW with WQW=QWQW = QWQW=Q. For θ>0\theta>0θ>0 the scaled points are xˉ=θWx\bar x = \theta W xxˉ=θWx and sˉ=(θW)−1s\bar s = (\theta W)^{-1}ssˉ=(θW)−1s. The pair (θ,W)(\theta, W)(θ,W) is an NT scaling of (x,s)(x, s)(x,s) when xˉ=sˉ\bar x = \bar sxˉ=sˉ, equation (28); equivalently s=θ2W2xs = \theta^2W^2xs=θ2W2x, equation (29).

Formalization targets

Goal: Lemma 4.2 (p. 15)

For x,sx, sx,s in the interior of the cone:

  1. every NT scaling satisfies
θ2=sTQsxTQx;(30)\theta^2 = \sqrt{\frac{s^TQs}{x^TQx}};\qquad(30)θ2=xTQxsTQs​​;(30)
  1. with this θ\thetaθ and
w=θ−1s+θQx2xTs+xTQx sTQs,(32)w = \frac{\theta^{-1}s + \theta Qx}{\sqrt2\sqrt{x^Ts + \sqrt{x^TQx\,s^TQs}}},\qquad(32)w=2​xTs+xTQxsTQs​​θ−1s+θQx​,(32)

the following matrices WWW make (θ,W)(\theta, W)(θ,W) an NT scaling: W=θ−1(X−1S)1/2W = \theta^{-1}(X^{-1}S)^{1/2}W=θ−1(X−1S)1/2 for R+\mathbb R_+R+​;

W=[w1w2:dTw2:dI+w2:dw2:dT1+w1]=−Q+(e1+w)(e1+w)T1+e1Tw(31)W = \begin{bmatrix} w_1 & w_{2:d}^T\\ w_{2:d} & I + \frac{w_{2:d}w_{2:d}^T}{1+w_1}\end{bmatrix} = -Q + \frac{(e_1+w)(e_1+w)^T}{1+e_1^Tw}\qquad(31)W=[w1​w2:d​​w2:dT​I+1+w1​w2:d​w2:dT​​​]=−Q+1+e1T​w(e1​+w)(e1​+w)T​(31)

for KqK^qKq; and

W=−Q+(Te1+w)(Te1+w)T1+e1TTw(34)W = -Q + \frac{(Te_1+w)(Te_1+w)^T}{1+e_1^TTw}\qquad(34)W=−Q+1+e1T​Tw(Te1​+w)(Te1​+w)T​(34)

for KrK^rKr. In the last two cases W2=−Q+2wwTW^2 = -Q + 2ww^TW2=−Q+2wwT, equations (33) and (35).

Milestones

Lemma 3.3 i)–iii) (scaling preserves xTsx^TsxTs and rescales xTQxx^TQxxTQx, sTQss^TQssTQs by θ±2\theta^{\pm2}θ±2); (30) on its own; the normalization w12−∥w2:d∥2=1w_1^2 - \|w_{2:d}\|^2 = 1w12​−∥w2:d​∥2=1 and the square (62) of the arrow form (31); positivity of the radicand of (32); the identity 2θ2(wTx)2=xTs+xTQx sTQs2\theta^2(w^Tx)^2 = x^Ts + \sqrt{x^TQx\,s^TQs}2θ2(wTx)2=xTs+xTQxsTQs​ and the formula (32); for the rotated cone, the transport (63) by TTT, the identities θ^=θ\hat\theta = \thetaθ^=θ and w^=Tw\hat w = Tww^=Tw, and TWT=W^TWT = \hat WTWT=W^. Two companions: Lemma 4.3, (θW)−2=θ−2QW2Q(\theta W)^{-2} = \theta^{-2}QW^2Q(θW)−2=θ−2QW2Q, and Lemma 3.3 iv), that a scaling maps the cone and its interior onto themselves.

Significance

The result. Lemma 4.2 turns the NT scaling, defined implicitly by (28), into explicit data: one scalar θ\thetaθ and one vector www per cone. Combined with Lemma 4.3 it shows that every product with WWW, W2W^2W2 or their inverses in the scaled Newton system (27) is a rank-one correction of a signature matrix, which is what the paper's implementation relies on. The rotated-cone formula (34) is the paper's own addition and is what lets rotated cones be handled natively instead of through a change of variables.

Formalizing it. The result is proved on paper; no machine-checked version is known to exist, and the platform has no formalization of second-order-cone scalings. The work is the matrix algebra of the Lorentz group — the signature matrix QQQ, the matrices with WQW=QWQW = QWQW=Q, and their action on KqK^qKq and KrK^rKr — which is reusable for every second-order-cone algorithm.

Difficulty

Most of the items are finite-dimensional identities, but they are identities between block matrices of arbitrary size with entries that are nested square roots, and they hold only on the interior of the cone, where the radicands are positive. The derivation in the paper runs backwards: it assumes WWW has the shape (31) and solves for www, taking a square root without fixing its sign. The goal asks for the forward direction — that the displayed θ\thetaθ, www, WWW do satisfy (28) and W≻0W\succ0W≻0 — which needs the normalization wTQw=1w^TQw = 1wTQw=1, positive definiteness of −Q+(e1+w)(e1+w)T/(1+w1)-Q + (e_1+w)(e_1+w)^T/(1+w_1)−Q+(e1​+w)(e1​+w)T/(1+w1​), and, for the rotated cone, the reduction to the quadratic cone through TTT with TT=ITT = ITT=I and TQrT=QqTQ^rT = Q^qTQrT=Qq.

Formalization scope

  • Per block. Every statement is made for one cone block. Θ\ThetaΘ and WWW are block diagonal (pp. 11–12), so this is the paper's statement block by block. The cone type is the parameter kind : ConeKind, and vectors are Fin d → ℝ.
  • Index base and norms. The paper's x1x_1x1​ is coordinate 0. ∥x2:d∥2\|x_{2:d}\|^2∥x2:d​∥2 is written as a sum of squares (tailSq x 1); Mathlib's norm on Fin d → ℝ, which is the sup norm, is never used.
  • Interiors. The interiors are given by strict inequalities. The paper never defines int⁡(K)\operatorname{int}(K)int(K) concretely; these coincide with the topological interiors.
  • Added hypotheses. All are disclosed in the items:
    • the dimension conventions (d=1d=1d=1 for R+\mathbb R_+R+​, d≥1d\ge1d≥1 for KqK^qKq, d≥2d\ge2d≥2 for KrK^rKr), which the paper leaves implicit;
    • θ>0\theta>0θ>0 in Definition 3.3, which the paper calls positive definite on p. 24;
    • 1+w1>01+w_1>01+w1​>0 wherever the page divides by 1+w11+w_11+w1​;
    • wTx>0w^Tx>0wTx>0 for the last step of the derivation of (32), where the page silently fixes this sign.
  • Inverses. The matrix inverse is Mathlib's total inverse. The NT predicate always contains W≻0W\succ0W≻0, so (28) never reads the junk value of a singular inverse.
  • Reading of Lemma 4.2. The lemma names θ\thetaθ and WWW without quantifying them. The goal states (30) for every NT scaling and asserts that the displayed formulas are an NT scaling. It does not claim that the NT scaling is unique, which the paper does not prove.
  • Ruling out a trivial formalization. Stating only (30) would allow a version that holds vacuously if no NT scaling existed. Part 2 of the goal is what excludes this, and a sanity check exhibits θ=1\theta = 1θ=1, W=IW = IW=I at x=s=e1x = s = e_1x=s=e1​ in KqK^qKq for d=2d=2d=2.

A complete development needs:

  • the cone definitions and the matrices TTT, QQQ;
  • Mathlib's Matrix.PosDef and Matrix.inv;
  • elementary real square-root algebra.

Lemmas about {W:W≻0, WQW=Q}\{W : W\succ0,\ WQW = Q\}{W:W≻0, WQW=Q} (closure under products and inverses, invariance of KqK^qKq) are reusable beyond this mission. Proofs of any milestone are welcome, as are alternative arguments for positive definiteness of (31).

Selected references

  • E. D. Andersen, C. Roos, T. Terlaky, On implementing a primal-dual interior-point method for conic quadratic optimization, Mathematical Programming 95 (2003) 249–277; authors' preprint of 18 Dec 2000. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10107-002-0349-3
  • Yu. E. Nesterov, M. J. Todd, Self-scaled barriers and interior-point methods for convex programming, Mathematics of Operations Research 22(1) (1997) 1–42. https://doi.org/10.1287/moor.22.1.1
  • R. D. C. Monteiro, T. Tsuchiya, Polynomial convergence of primal-dual algorithms for the second-order cone program based on the MZ-family of directions, Mathematical Programming 88(1) (2000) 61–83. https://doi.org/10.1007/PL00011378
  • T. Tsuchiya, A convergence analysis of the scaling-invariant primal-dual path-following algorithms for second-order cone programming, Optimization Methods and Software 11–12 (1999) 141–182. https://doi.org/10.1080/10556789908805750
  • F. Alizadeh, D. Goldfarb, Second-order cone programming, Mathematical Programming 95 (2003) 3–51. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10107-002-0339-5
15 thms2 active usersReviewed
Bandit AlgorithmsProbability·Captain: mikedeng1

Linearly Parameterized Bandits 2: Under Smooth Best Arm Response, the Phased Exploration and Greedy Exploitation Policy Has Regret at Most a₁(‖z‖ + 1/‖z‖)r√TResearch Paper

Motivation

In a linearly parameterized bandit, a decision maker repeatedly chooses an arm from a possibly infinite set of vectors and receives a noisy reward whose mean is linear in an unknown parameter. Classical bandit policies treat arms as independent and must try each arm, so their regret grows with the number of arms (Lai and Robbins 1985); in applications such as marketing, where similar products are expected to have similar sales, the linear structure lets one observation inform many arms, and the regret can be made independent of the number of arms. Rusmevichientong and Tsitsiklis (arXiv:0812.3465v2, Mathematics of Operations Research 2010) show that when the arms form the unit sphere of Rr\mathbb R^rRr, no policy has Bayes risk below order rTr\sqrt TrT​. This mission concerns their matching upper bound: a simple policy that alternates exploration and greedy exploitation in cycles of growing length attains regret of order rTr\sqrt TrT​ whenever the best arm depends smoothly on the parameter.

The linearly parameterized bandit was studied earlier by Abe and Long (1999), Auer (2002) and, independently of this paper, Dani, Hayes and Kakade (2008), whose policies rely on confidence regions for the parameter. The result here shows that for arm sets with a smooth best arm, such as balls and, by Polovinkin (1996), ellipsoids, a phase-based policy with a single least squares estimate per cycle suffices.

Setting

Let r≥2r \ge 2r≥2 and let Ur⊂Rr\mathcal U_r \subset \mathbb R^rUr​⊂Rr be a compact set of arms. Playing arm uuu in period ttt yields the reward

Xtu=u′Z+Wtu,X^u_t = u'Z + W^u_t,Xtu​=u′Z+Wtu​,

where Z∈RrZ \in \mathbb R^rZ∈Rr is an unknown parameter and the errors WtuW^u_tWtu​ are independent of each other and of ZZZ, identically distributed in ttt for each arm, with mean zero.

Assumption 1 fixes constants σ0,uˉ,λ0>0\sigma_0, \bar u, \lambda_0 > 0σ0​,uˉ,λ0​>0 that do not depend on rrr: (a) every error satisfies E[exWtu]≤ex2σ02/2\mathbb E[e^{xW^u_t}] \le e^{x^2\sigma_0^2/2}E[exWtu​]≤ex2σ02​/2 for all x∈Rx \in \mathbb Rx∈R; (b) every arm has ∥u∥≤uˉ\|u\| \le \bar u∥u∥≤uˉ, and Ur\mathcal U_rUr​ contains linearly independent arms b1,…,brb_1, \dots, b_rb1​,…,br​ with λmin⁡(∑kbkbk′)≥λ0\lambda_{\min}(\sum_k b_kb_k') \ge \lambda_0λmin​(∑k​bk​bk′​)≥λ0​.

The smooth best arm response condition SBAR(JJJ) requires that every z≠0z \ne 0z=0 have a unique best arm u∗(z)u^*(z)u∗(z), the maximizer of v′zv'zv′z over Ur\mathcal U_rUr​, and that ∥u∗(z)−u∗(y)∥≤J∥z−y∥\|u^*(z) - u^*(y)\| \le J\|z - y\|∥u∗(z)−u∗(y)∥≤J∥z−y∥ for unit vectors z,yz, yz,y.

The PEGE policy (Phased Exploration and Greedy Exploitation) runs in cycles c=1,2,…c = 1, 2, \dotsc=1,2,…. In cycle ccc it plays b1,…,brb_1, \dots, b_rb1​,…,br​ once each, computes the ordinary least squares estimate

Z^(c)=1c(∑k=1rbkbk′)−1∑s=1c∑k=1rbkXbk(s)\widehat Z(c) = \frac1c\Big(\sum_{k=1}^r b_kb_k'\Big)^{-1}\sum_{s=1}^c\sum_{k=1}^r b_k X^{b_k}(s)Z(c)=c1​(k=1∑r​bk​bk′​)−1s=1∑c​k=1∑r​bk​Xbk​(s)

from all exploration rewards so far, and then plays a greedy arm G(c)∈arg⁡max⁡v∈Urv′Z^(c)G(c) \in \arg\max_{v \in \mathcal U_r} v'\widehat Z(c)G(c)∈argmaxv∈Ur​​v′Z(c) for ccc periods, ties broken arbitrarily.

The regret given Z=zZ = zZ=z over TTT periods is Regret(z,T,PEGE)=∑t=1TE[max⁡v∈Urv′z−Ut′z∣Z=z]\mathrm{Regret}(z, T, \mathrm{PEGE}) = \sum_{t=1}^T \mathbb E[\max_{v \in \mathcal U_r} v'z - U_t'z \mid Z = z]Regret(z,T,PEGE)=∑t=1T​E[maxv∈Ur​​v′z−Ut′​z∣Z=z], where UtU_tUt​ is the arm played in period ttt, and the risk is Risk(T,PEGE)=E[Regret(Z,T,PEGE)]\mathrm{Risk}(T, \mathrm{PEGE}) = \mathbb E[\mathrm{Regret}(Z, T, \mathrm{PEGE})]Risk(T,PEGE)=E[Regret(Z,T,PEGE)] for a prior on ZZZ.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 3.1 (p. 15)

Under Assumption 1 and SBAR(JJJ), there is a1>0a_1 > 0a1​>0 depending only on σ0,uˉ,λ0,J\sigma_0, \bar u, \lambda_0, Jσ0​,uˉ,λ0​,J such that for every r≥2r \ge 2r≥2, every z≠0z \ne 0z=0 and T≥rT \ge rT≥r,

Regret(z,T,PEGE)≤a1(∥z∥+1∥z∥)rT,\mathrm{Regret}(z, T, \mathrm{PEGE}) \le a_1\Big(\|z\| + \frac1{\|z\|}\Big) r\sqrt T,Regret(z,T,PEGE)≤a1​(∥z∥+∥z∥1​)rT​,

and, if E∥Z∥≤M\mathbb E\|Z\| \le ME∥Z∥≤M and E[1/∥Z∥]≤M\mathbb E[1/\|Z\|] \le ME[1/∥Z∥]≤M for every rrr, there is a2a_2a2​ depending only on σ0,uˉ,λ0,J,M\sigma_0, \bar u, \lambda_0, J, Mσ0​,uˉ,λ0​,J,M with

Risk(T,PEGE)≤a2 rT.\mathrm{Risk}(T, \mathrm{PEGE}) \le a_2\, r\sqrt T.Risk(T,PEGE)≤a2​rT​.

The constants are unspecified; only the order rTr\sqrt TrT​ and its uniformity in rrr are asserted.

Milestones on the way

  • Lemma 3.4 (p. 16): E[∥Z^(c)−z∥2∣Z=z]≤h1r/c\mathbb E[\|\widehat Z(c) - z\|^2 \mid Z = z] \le h_1 r/cE[∥Z(c)−z∥2∣Z=z]≤h1​r/c.
  • Lemma 3.5 (p. 17): ∥w/∥w∥−z/∥z∥∥≤2∥w−z∥/max⁡{∥z∥,∥w∥}\|w/\|w\| - z/\|z\|\| \le 2\|w - z\|/\max\{\|z\|, \|w\|\}∥w/∥w∥−z/∥z∥∥≤2∥w−z∥/max{∥z∥,∥w∥}.
  • Lemma 3.6 (p. 17): E[max⁡uz′(u−G(c))∣Z=z]≤rh2/(c∥z∥)\mathbb E[\max_{u} z'(u - G(c)) \mid Z = z] \le r h_2/(c\|z\|)E[maxu​z′(u−G(c))∣Z=z]≤rh2​/(c∥z∥).
  • Sec. 3.1 (p. 18): Regret(z,rK+∑c=1Kc,PEGE)≤h3r∥z∥K+h4∑c=1Kr/∥z∥\mathrm{Regret}(z, rK + \sum_{c=1}^K c, \mathrm{PEGE}) \le h_3 r\|z\|K + h_4\sum_{c=1}^K r/\|z\|Regret(z,rK+∑c=1K​c,PEGE)≤h3​r∥z∥K+h4​∑c=1K​r/∥z∥.

Further results

  • Lemma 3.2 (p. 16): a density condition near the origin gives E[1/∥Z∥]≤M\mathbb E[1/\|Z\|] \le ME[1/∥Z∥]≤M; for Z∼N(0,Ir/r)Z \sim N(0, I_r/r)Z∼N(0,Ir​/r), E∥Z∥≤1\mathbb E\|Z\| \le 1E∥Z∥≤1 and E[1/∥Z∥]≤π\mathbb E[1/\|Z\|] \le \sqrt\piE[1/∥Z∥]≤π​.
  • The unit ball and the unit sphere satisfy SBAR(1) (pp. 15–16).
  • Corollary 3.3 (p. 16): on the unit sphere with standard normal errors, Regret≤a3(∥z∥+1/∥z∥)rT\mathrm{Regret} \le a_3(\|z\| + 1/\|z\|)r\sqrt TRegret≤a3​(∥z∥+1/∥z∥)rT​ and, under the prior N(0,Ir/r)N(0, I_r/r)N(0,Ir​/r), Risk≤a3rT\mathrm{Risk} \le a_3 r\sqrt TRisk≤a3​rT​.

Significance

Theorem 3.1 with the lower bound of Theorem 2.1 of the same paper identifies rTr\sqrt TrT​ as the optimal order of the regret and the Bayes risk on the unit sphere, and Corollary 3.3 makes this precise. The bound is achieved by a policy with no confidence sets and no per-period optimization beyond one linear maximization per cycle. The factor ∥z∥+1/∥z∥\|z\| + 1/\|z\|∥z∥+1/∥z∥ shows how the difficulty depends on the size of the parameter; combined with the trivial bound 2uˉ∥z∥T2\bar u\|z\|T2uˉ∥z∥T, the regret does not deteriorate as ∥z∥→0\|z\| \to 0∥z∥→0.

The results are proved in the paper; none of them is machine-checked. A formalization yields a verified dimension-explicit regret bound for an explore–exploit policy with a continuum of arms, the least squares error bound under sub-Gaussian noise (Lemma 3.4), and Lipschitz properties of normalization and of the best-arm map on balls, all of which are reusable.

Difficulty

The expected instantaneous regret of a greedy arm computed from a noisy estimate is not obviously small: for a general compact arm set the best arm may jump under a small perturbation of the parameter, and the regret is then of order ∥z∥\|z\|∥z∥ however good the estimate is. The SBAR condition prevents such jumps, but only for unit vectors, so the estimation error must be transferred to the direction of the estimate, which costs a factor 1/∥z∥1/\|z\|1/∥z∥. The estimate may also vanish with positive probability when the errors are discrete, where the greedy arm is arbitrary. Finally, the constants must be uniform in the dimension rrr: a bound with an rrr-dependent constant is immediate from Regret≤2uˉ∥z∥T\mathrm{Regret} \le 2\bar u\|z\|TRegret≤2uˉ∥z∥T, so the content of the theorem lies in keeping every constant independent of rrr and of the arm set.

Formalization scope

Vectors live in EuclideanSpace ℝ (Fin r), so the norm is Euclidean and the inner product is u′zu'zu′z. The model's standing assumptions are encoded as follows: Ur\mathcal U_rUr​ is compact; the errors of each arm have mean zero and a law νu\nu_uνu​; Assumption 1(a) requires the moment generating function to exist and satisfy the sub-Gaussian bound; Assumption 1(b) writes λmin⁡(∑kbkbk′)≥λ0\lambda_{\min}(\sum_k b_kb_k') \ge \lambda_0λmin​(∑k​bk​bk′​)≥λ0​ as λ0∥x∥2≤∑k(bk′x)2\lambda_0\|x\|^2 \le \sum_k (b_k'x)^2λ0​∥x∥2≤∑k​(bk′​x)2. Every constant is quantified before the dimension rrr, the arm set, the error laws, the exploration arms, the tie-breaking rule, the prior, zzz and TTT; a version with constants depending on rrr or on the instance is trivial and is excluded by this quantifier order.

PEGE uses exactly the exploration arms bkb_kbk​ of Assumption 1(b), which are an argument of the policy. The greedy rule is any measurable selection of a maximizer; measurability, implicit on the page, is a hypothesis. Since PEGE uses only exploration rewards, the expectation is over an independent table of exploration errors Wbk(s)W^{b_k}(s)Wbk​(s) with laws νbk\nu_{b_k}νbk​​, with the parameter fixed to zzz ("given Z=zZ = zZ=z"). Regret and risk are lower Lebesgue integrals of nonnegative gaps, valued in [0,∞][0, \infty][0,∞], so an upper bound is never satisfied by a default value of an integral. The moment conditions on the prior are lower Lebesgue integrals, so E[1/∥Z∥]=∞\mathbb E[1/\|Z\|] = \inftyE[1/∥Z∥]=∞ if the prior charges the origin.

Two printed statements are adjusted. Lemma 3.6 is printed "for any z∈Rrz \in \mathbb R^rz∈Rr", but its bound rh2/(c∥z∥)r h_2/(c\|z\|)rh2​/(c∥z∥) is undefined at z=0z = 0z=0; it is stated for z≠0z \ne 0z=0. The p. 18 cycle-sum display is likewise stated for z≠0z \ne 0z=0. In Corollary 3.3, the exploration arms are those of Assumption 1(b) with uˉ=λ0=1\bar u = \lambda_0 = 1uˉ=λ0​=1, as in its proof. Measurability of the density in Lemma 3.2(a) is added.

The source is arXiv:0812.3465v2; its printed page numbers equal the PDF page numbers. Contributions welcome: proofs of the milestones, a sub-Gaussian least squares library, and the Lipschitz analysis of best-arm maps.

Selected references

  • P. Rusmevichientong, J. N. Tsitsiklis, Linearly Parameterized Bandits, arXiv:0812.3465v2, 2010; Mathematics of Operations Research 35(2), 2010. https://arxiv.org/abs/0812.3465v2
  • V. Dani, T. P. Hayes, S. M. Kakade, Stochastic Linear Optimization under Bandit Feedback, COLT 2008. https://www.learningtheory.org/colt2008/papers/80-Dani.pdf
  • P. Auer, Using Confidence Bounds for Exploitation-Exploration Trade-offs, Journal of Machine Learning Research 3, 2002. https://www.jmlr.org/papers/v3/auer02a.html
  • E. S. Polovinkin, Strongly convex analysis, Sbornik: Mathematics 187(2), 1996. https://doi.org/10.1070/SM1996v187n02ABEH000111
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Convex OptimizationOptimizationProbability·Captain: mikedeng1

Distributionally Robust Optimization and Its Tractable Approximations 2: Under a Mean Set and a Known Covariance, the Bound π² Equals the Worst-Case Expected Positive PartResearch Paper

Motivation

Many operations models contain terms of the form EP((r0+r′ζ~)+)E_{\mathbb P}\big((r^0 + r'\tilde\zeta)^+\big)EP​((r0+r′ζ~​)+): expected shortfall or overflow of an affine function of an uncertain vector. Inventory and newsvendor costs, penalties for violated soft constraints, and the Conditional Value-at-Risk of a linear decision rule all reduce to it. In practice the distribution P\mathbb PP of the uncertainty is rarely known; what is known are a few descriptive statistics, such as a range for the mean and an estimate of the covariance. Distributionally robust optimization then replaces the expectation by its supremum over every distribution consistent with that information.

The question goes back to Scarf (1958), who solved a single-product newsvendor problem against the worst distribution with known mean μ\muμ and variance σ2\sigma^2σ2, using the fact that sup⁡E(X+)=12(μ+μ2+σ2)\sup E(X^+) = \tfrac12\big(\mu + \sqrt{\mu^2 + \sigma^2}\big)supE(X+)=21​(μ+μ2+σ2​) over such laws; Gallego and Moon (1993) simplified the argument. El Ghaoui, Oks and Oustry (2003) obtained conic representations of worst-case Value-at-Risk under mean and covariance information, and Delage and Ye (2010) studied stochastic programs with uncertain mean and covariance. Goh and Sim (2010) use bounds of this kind inside a general framework for linear optimization under uncertainty with recourse: after a piecewise-linear decision rule is introduced, every expectation in the reformulated problem is of the form above, and the framework needs a tractable, ideally exact, value for its worst case. Section 5.2 of the paper provides it when the information consists of a set containing the mean and the exact covariance.

Setting

A primitive uncertainty z~∈RN\tilde z \in \mathbb R^{N}z~∈RN is represented through a segregated uncertainty ζ~∈RNE\tilde\zeta \in \mathbb R^{N_E}ζ~​∈RNE​, NE≥NN_E \ge NNE​≥N, and a fixed matrix F∈RN×NEF \in \mathbb R^{N\times N_E}F∈RN×NE​ and vector g∈RNg \in \mathbb R^{N}g∈RN with z~=Fζ~+g\tilde z = F\tilde\zeta + gz~=Fζ~​+g (equation (9) of the paper). The paper notes that FFF has full row rank. Write n=NEn = N_En=NE​.

The distributional information is:

  • a set V^⊆Rn\hat{\mathcal V} \subseteq \mathbb R^{n}V^⊆Rn known to contain the mean ζ^=EP(ζ~)\hat\zeta = E_{\mathbb P}(\tilde\zeta)ζ^​=EP​(ζ~​) (the mean is uncertain, its "support" is V^\hat{\mathcal V}V^);
  • the exact covariance Σ∈RN×N\Sigma \in \mathbb R^{N \times N}Σ∈RN×N of the primitive vector z~\tilde zz~.

The family is

F2={P: ζ^=EP(ζ~)∈V^, EP(F(ζ~−ζ^)(ζ~−ζ^)′F′)=Σ}.\mathbb F_2 = \Big\{\mathbb P :\ \hat\zeta = E_{\mathbb P}(\tilde\zeta) \in \hat{\mathcal V},\ E_{\mathbb P}\big(F(\tilde\zeta - \hat\zeta)(\tilde\zeta - \hat\zeta)'F'\big) = \Sigma\Big\}.F2​={P: ζ^​=EP​(ζ~​)∈V^, EP​(F(ζ~​−ζ^​)(ζ~​−ζ^​)′F′)=Σ}.

For r0∈Rr^0 \in \mathbb Rr0∈R and r∈Rnr \in \mathbb R^{n}r∈Rn the worst-case expected positive part is sup⁡P∈F2EP((r0+r′ζ~)+)\sup_{\mathbb P \in \mathbb F_2} E_{\mathbb P}\big((r^0 + r'\tilde\zeta)^+\big)supP∈F2​​EP​((r0+r′ζ~​)+), and the bound of (22) is

π2(r0,r)=inf⁡y: F′y=r sup⁡ζ^∈V^{12(r0+r′ζ^)+12(r0+r′ζ^)2+y′Σy}.\pi^2(r^0, r) = \inf_{y:\, F'y = r}\ \sup_{\hat\zeta \in \hat{\mathcal V}} \Big\{ \tfrac12 (r^0 + r'\hat\zeta) + \tfrac12 \sqrt{(r^0 + r'\hat\zeta)^2 + y'\Sigma y} \Big\}.π2(r0,r)=y:F′y=rinf​ ζ^​∈V^sup​{21​(r0+r′ζ^​)+21​(r0+r′ζ^​)2+y′Σy​}.

Following the paper (p. 909), an infeasible minimization has value +∞+\infty+∞; all values are in [−∞,+∞][-\infty, +\infty][−∞,+∞].

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 2 (p. 910)

For FFF of full row rank, Σ\SigmaΣ positive semidefinite and V^\hat{\mathcal V}V^ nonempty,

sup⁡P∈F2EP((r0+r′ζ~)+)=π2(r0,r)for all r0,r.\sup_{\mathbb P \in \mathbb F_2} E_{\mathbb P}\big((r^0 + r'\tilde\zeta)^+\big) = \pi^2(r^0, r) \qquad \text{for all } r^0, r.P∈F2​sup​EP​((r0+r′ζ~​)+)=π2(r0,r)for all r0,r.

This is an exact identity; it contains no constants that later work could improve.

Milestones

  1. Upper-bound part of Theorem 2: sup⁡F2EP((r0+r′ζ~)+)≤π2(r0,r)\sup_{\mathbb F_2} E_{\mathbb P}((r^0 + r'\tilde\zeta)^+) \le \pi^2(r^0, r)supF2​​EP​((r0+r′ζ~​)+)≤π2(r0,r), with no hypotheses.
  2. Remark after Theorem 2: for Σ⪰0\Sigma \succeq 0Σ⪰0, f(u)=12u+12u2+y′Σyf(u) = \tfrac12 u + \tfrac12\sqrt{u^2 + y'\Sigma y}f(u)=21​u+21​u2+y′Σy​ is nondecreasing in uuu.
  3. (23): for Σ⪰0\Sigma \succeq 0Σ⪰0 and V^≠∅\hat{\mathcal V} \neq \emptysetV^=∅,
π2(r0,r)=inf⁡u, y{12u+12u2+y′Σy: r0+sup⁡ζ^∈V^r′ζ^≤u, F′y=r}.\pi^2(r^0, r) = \inf_{u,\, y}\Big\{\tfrac12 u + \tfrac12\sqrt{u^2 + y'\Sigma y} :\ r^0 + \sup_{\hat\zeta \in \hat{\mathcal V}} r'\hat\zeta \le u,\ F'y = r\Big\}.π2(r0,r)=u,yinf​{21​u+21​u2+y′Σy​: r0+ζ^​∈V^sup​r′ζ^​≤u, F′y=r}.
  1. Tightness part of Theorem 2: π2(r0,r)≤sup⁡F2EP((r0+r′ζ~)+)\pi^2(r^0, r) \le \sup_{\mathbb F_2} E_{\mathbb P}((r^0 + r'\tilde\zeta)^+)π2(r0,r)≤supF2​​EP​((r0+r′ζ~​)+) under the goal's hypotheses.

Significance

Theorem 2 says that the deterministic problem (22) evaluates the worst case exactly, not merely bounds it. Through (23) it becomes a second-order cone program whenever V^\hat{\mathcal V}V^ is conic representable, so distributionally robust constraints and objectives with mean–covariance information can be handed to an off-the-shelf conic solver without loss. In the paper, π2\pi^2π2 is one of three building blocks (with the mean–support bound π1\pi^1π1 and the directional-deviation bound π3\pi^3π3) that are combined by infimal convolution into the unified bound of Theorem 4, which in turn prices the deflected linear decision rules of §6. Specialized to N=nN = nN=n, F=IF = IF=I and a singleton mean set, it recovers Scarf's mean–variance bound.

The theorem is proved in the paper's online appendix; no machine-checked proof of it, nor of Scarf's bound in this multivariate form, is known to exist. A formalization would certify the exact value, including the cases the printed statement treats only implicitly: rrr outside the range of F′F'F′ (both sides +∞+\infty+∞), a degenerate quadratic form y′Σy=0y'\Sigma y = 0y′Σy=0, and unbounded mean sets.

Difficulty

The upper bound is a moment inequality and is the easier half. The difficulty is tightness. The supremum over F2\mathbb F_2F2​ is in general not attained, so the proof must exhibit, for every point of V^\hat{\mathcal V}V^, distributions on Rn\mathbb R^{n}Rn that meet the full covariance constraint on Fζ~F\tilde\zetaFζ~​ exactly while driving the expected positive part of the single linear functional r′ζ~r'\tilde\zetar′ζ~​ to the bound. The constraint fixes N(N+1)/2N(N+1)/2N(N+1)/2 second moments, not just the variance of r′ζ~r'\tilde\zetar′ζ~​, so the scalar extremal laws behind Scarf's bound do not directly give members of F2\mathbb F_2F2​. The case F′y=rF'y = rF′y=r infeasible requires showing that the worst case is +∞+\infty+∞, i.e. that F2\mathbb F_2F2​ contains distributions with arbitrarily large expectations; this is where the full-rank assumption on FFF enters.

Formalization scope

The random vector is the identity on Fin n → ℝ and a distribution is a measure P on it. The mean, the covariance matrix and the finite-second-moment condition come from the published definition MomentDRO_Conf_Setting (meanVec, covMat, HasSecondMoments). The covariance condition is F CovP(ζ~) F′=ΣF\,\mathrm{Cov}_{\mathbb P}(\tilde\zeta)\,F' = \SigmaFCovP​(ζ~​)F′=Σ, which equals the paper's EP(F(ζ~−ζ^)(ζ~−ζ^)′F′)E_{\mathbb P}(F(\tilde\zeta - \hat\zeta)(\tilde\zeta - \hat\zeta)'F')EP​(F(ζ~​−ζ^​)(ζ~​−ζ^​)′F′) by linearity; it constrains the covariance of the primitive vector, an N×NN \times NN×N matrix, not the covariance of ζ~\tilde\zetaζ~​. The positive part is max · 0. The worst case and π2\pi^2π2 take values in EReal: an infimum over an empty set is +∞+\infty+∞ and a supremum over an empty set is −∞-\infty−∞, matching the paper's convention for infeasible problems. The paper's "inf" and "sup" are not claimed to be attained.

Readings fixed by this mission, each implicit in the paper:

  • Full row rank of FFF (p. 906, "F has to be full rank"), stated as surjectivity of x↦Fxx \mapsto Fxx↦Fx;
  • Σ\SigmaΣ positive semidefinite, as a covariance matrix must be;
  • V^\hat{\mathcal V}V^ nonempty.

Each is needed for the equality: without it F2\mathbb F_2F2​ can be empty (worst case −∞-\infty−∞) while π2\pi^2π2 is finite or +∞+\infty+∞. No convexity or closedness of V^\hat{\mathcal V}V^ is assumed; the theorem does not need it. A formalization that takes the infimum in R\mathbb RR (where an empty infimum is 000) or states only the inequality ≤\le≤ would trivialize or weaken the theorem and is ruled out.

A complete development needs a Scarf-type mean–variance inequality for E(X+)E(X^+)E(X+), constructions of multivariate distributions with a prescribed mean and covariance (Gaussian or finitely supported laws), and the monotonicity and continuity facts behind (23). The scalar inequality and the constructions of distributions with given first two moments are reusable well beyond this mission. Proofs of any milestone, and supporting lemmas on moment-constrained families, are welcome.

Selected references

  • J. Goh and M. Sim, Distributionally Robust Optimization and Its Tractable Approximations, Operations Research 58(4), 902–917, 2010. https://doi.org/10.1287/opre.1090.0795
  • H. Scarf, A min-max solution of an inventory problem, in K. Arrow (ed.), Studies in the Mathematical Theory of Inventory and Production, Stanford University Press, 201–209, 1958.
  • G. Gallego and I. Moon, The distribution free newsboy problem: Review and extensions, Journal of the Operational Research Society 44(8), 825–834, 1993. https://doi.org/10.1057/jors.1993.141
  • L. El Ghaoui, M. Oks and F. Oustry, Worst-case value-at-risk and robust portfolio optimization: A conic programming approach, Operations Research 51(4), 543–556, 2003. https://doi.org/10.1287/opre.51.4.543.16101
  • E. Delage and Y. Ye, Distributionally robust optimization under moment uncertainty with application to data-driven problems, Operations Research 58(3), 595–612, 2010. https://doi.org/10.1287/opre.1090.0741
  • X. Chen, M. Sim, P. Sun and J. Zhang, A linear decision-based approximation approach to stochastic programming, Operations Research 56(2), 344–357, 2008. https://doi.org/10.1287/opre.1070.0441
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OptimizationProbability·Captain: mikedeng1

Convex Quadratic and Semidefinite Programming Relaxations in Scheduling III: Optimal Nonpreemptive Schedules Are Within 3 of Preemptive Ones for R | rᵢⱼ | Σ wⱼCⱼ, Within 2 Without Release DatesResearch Paper

Motivation

In machine scheduling, preemption means that a job may be interrupted and resumed later, possibly on a different machine. Allowing it can only lower the optimal cost, and a basic question for every scheduling model is how much it can lower it: the ratio between the best nonpreemptive and the best preemptive schedule, often called the power of preemption. For identical parallel machines and the total weighted completion time, McNaughton (1959) showed that preemption does not help at all (doi:10.1287/mnsc.6.1.1). For unrelated machines, where every job has its own processing time on every machine, and with release dates, it does help, and no exact relation is known.

Skutella's paper (J. ACM 48 (2001), doi:10.1145/375827.375840) gives approximation algorithms for unrelated-machine scheduling based on convex quadratic programming relaxations. Its §4 adapts the relaxation of §3 to preemptive schedules and rounds it to a nonpreemptive schedule. A by-product is a constant bound on the power of preemption for R∣rij∣∑wjCjR\mid r_{ij}\mid\sum w_jC_jR∣rij​∣∑wj​Cj​: the factor 333, and 222 without release dates. This mission formalizes that bound together with the steps of §4 that produce it.

Setting

There are nnn jobs jjj and mmm unrelated machines iii. Job jjj has a weight wj≥0w_j\ge0wj​≥0, and on machine iii a processing time pij>0p_{ij}>0pij​>0 and a release date rij≥0r_{ij}\ge0rij​≥0 before which it may not be processed there.

A preemptive schedule is a finite list of pieces: job jjj runs on machine iii during [s,e][s,e][s,e]. Running job jjj for ℓ\ellℓ time units on machine iii completes the fraction ℓ/pij\ell/p_{ij}ℓ/pij​ of it. A schedule is feasible if every piece of jjj on iii starts no earlier than rijr_{ij}rij​, two pieces on the same machine never overlap, two pieces of the same job never overlap, and the fractions of every job add up to exactly 111. The completion time CjC_jCj​ is the end of the last piece of jjj, and the objective is ∑jwjCj\sum_j w_jC_j∑j​wj​Cj​. A schedule is nonpreemptive if every job consists of a single piece.

Smith's order ≺i\prec_i≺i​ on machine iii orders the jobs by nonincreasing ratio wj/pijw_j/p_{ij}wj​/pij​, ties broken by index. On each machine the release dates sorted nondecreasingly are ρi1≤⋯≤ρin\rho_{i_1}\le\dots\le\rho_{i_n}ρi1​​≤⋯≤ρin​​, with ρin+1:=∞\rho_{i_{n+1}}:=\inftyρin+1​​:=∞, and the time slot iki_kik​ is [ρik,ρik+1)[\rho_{i_k},\rho_{i_{k+1}})[ρik​​,ρik+1​​). For a preemptive schedule, aikja_{i_kj}aik​j​ is the fraction of job jjj processed on machine iii inside slot iki_kik​. The convex quadratic program (CQPp′)(CQP'_p)(CQPp′​) asks for a≥0a\ge0a≥0 and ZZZ with ∑i,kaikj=1\sum_{i,k}a_{i_kj}=1∑i,k​aik​j​=1, slot capacities ∑jaikjpij≤ρik+1−ρik\sum_j a_{i_kj}p_{ij}\le\rho_{i_{k+1}}-\rho_{i_k}∑j​aik​j​pij​≤ρik+1​​−ρik​​, aikj=0a_{i_kj}=0aik​j​=0 when ρik<rij\rho_{i_k}<r_{ij}ρik​​<rij​, and

Z ≥ ∑jwj∑i,kaikj(ρik+aikj2pij+∑j′≺ijaikj′pij′),Z ≥ ∑jwj∑i,kaikjpij.Z\ \ge\ \sum_j w_j\sum_{i,k}a_{i_kj}\Bigl(\rho_{i_k}+\frac{a_{i_kj}}{2}p_{ij}+\sum_{j'\prec_ij}a_{i_kj'}p_{ij'}\Bigr),\qquad Z\ \ge\ \sum_j w_j\sum_{i,k}a_{i_kj}p_{ij}.Z ≥ j∑​wj​i,k∑​aik​j​(ρik​​+2aik​j​​pij​+j′≺i​j∑​aik​j′​pij′​),Z ≥ j∑​wj​i,k∑​aik​j​pij​.

Randomized rounding puts job jjj into slot iki_kik​ with probability aikja_{i_kj}aik​j​, pairwise independently over jobs, and schedules each slot's jobs back to back in Smith's order from the slot's start.

Formalization targets

Goal: Corollary 4.6, the power of preemption

For every feasible preemptive schedule PPP there is a feasible nonpreemptive schedule SSS with

∑jwjCj(S) ≤ 3∑jwjCj(P),\sum_j w_jC_j(S)\ \le\ 3\sum_j w_jC_j(P),j∑​wj​Cj​(S) ≤ 3j∑​wj​Cj​(P),

and if all rij=0r_{ij}=0rij​=0, one with ∑jwjCj(S)≤2∑jwjCj(P)\sum_j w_jC_j(S)\le 2\sum_j w_jC_j(P)∑j​wj​Cj​(S)≤2∑j​wj​Cj​(P). This is the paper's ratio of optima, stated so that no existence of optimal schedules is needed.

Milestones

  1. (24): ∑jwjCj≥∑jwj∑i,kaikjpij\sum_j w_jC_j\ge\sum_j w_j\sum_{i,k}a_{i_kj}p_{ij}∑j​wj​Cj​≥∑j​wj​∑i,k​aik​j​pij​ for every preemptive schedule.
  2. Exchange inequality (proof of Lemma 4.2): inside one slot, Smith's order minimizes ∑jajwj∑j′ before jaj′pij′\sum_j a_jw_j\sum_{j'\text{ before }j}a_{j'}p_{ij'}∑j​aj​wj​∑j′ before j​aj′​pij′​ over all orders.
  3. (25): the bound (23) with ≺i\prec_i≺i​ replaced by the order of completion times in the schedule.
  4. Lemma 4.2: every preemptive schedule satisfies (23) and (24).
  5. (CQPp′)(CQP'_p)(CQPp′​) is a relaxation: the fractions of every preemptive schedule, with Z=∑jwjCjZ=\sum_j w_jC_jZ=∑j​wj​Cj​, are feasible.
  6. Lemma 4.3: rounding any feasible (aˉ,Z)(\bar a,Z)(aˉ,Z) yields feasible nonpreemptive schedules with E[∑jwjCj]≤3Z\mathbb E[\sum_j w_jC_j]\le 3ZE[∑j​wj​Cj​]≤3Z, and ≤2Z\le 2Z≤2Z when all release dates are 000.

Significance

The result gives a constant bound on how much preemption can help on unrelated machines with release dates, a model in which both the preemptive and the nonpreemptive problems are NP-hard (for the preemptive problem even without weights and release dates, by Sitters, J. Algorithms 57 (2005), doi:10.1016/j.jalgor.2004.06.011). The bound comes from an algorithm: a single relaxation that is valid for preemptive schedules, rounded to a nonpreemptive one. The same rounding is a randomized 333-approximation for R∣rij,pmtn∣∑wjCjR\mid r_{ij},pmtn\mid\sum w_jC_jR∣rij​,pmtn∣∑wj​Cj​ and a 222-approximation for R∣pmtn∣∑wjCjR\mid pmtn\mid\sum w_jC_jR∣pmtn∣∑wj​Cj​ (Theorem 4.5), and since it never preempts, these bounds hold under any communication delays between machines.

The paper proves all of this on paper. As far as a search of the platform shows, none of it is formalized: the only formal preemption result found is McNaughton's theorem for identical machines. The mission produces a machine-checked model of preemptive schedules on unrelated machines with release dates, a checked lower bound on such schedules by a convex quadratic function of their slot fractions, and a checked analysis of pairwise-independent rounding into nonpreemptive schedules.

Difficulty

The natural first idea is to reuse the nonpreemptive relaxation (CQP)(CQP)(CQP) of §3, which already allows fractional assignments. It fails. Example 4.1 of the paper gives two jobs on two machines where an optimal preemptive schedule costs 777 but the corresponding (CQP)(CQP)(CQP) value is 7.257.257.25, so (CQP)(CQP)(CQP) is not a relaxation of the preemptive problem. The relaxation must be weakened: the term (1+aikj)/2(1+a_{i_kj})/2(1+aik​j​)/2 of §3 becomes aikj/2a_{i_kj}/2aik​j​/2, and this weakening is what raises the factor from 222 to 333.

Proving that the weaker program is a relaxation (Lemma 4.2) takes real work. The fractions of a job inside a slot of an arbitrary preemptive schedule are scattered, so the bound needs a rearrangement inside each slot by completion times, then an exchange argument that compares this order with Smith's order slot by slot. On the rounding side, Lemma 4.3 reduces to the analysis of §3 (each job's expected completion time is at most twice its value in the relaxation) and, without release dates, to Theorem 2.1 of §2. Both have to be redone here on the slot model.

Formalization scope

Jobs, machines and slots are Fin n, Fin m, Fin n (0-based). The standing assumptions pij>0p_{ij}>0pij​>0, wj≥0w_j\ge0wj​≥0, rij≥0r_{ij}\ge0rij​≥0 of p. 2 are hypotheses of every theorem. Smith's order is cross-multiplied (wjpik>wkpijw_jp_{ik}>w_kp_{ij}wj​pik​>wk​pij​), equivalent to the ratio form because p>0p>0p>0. Sorted release dates come from Tuple.sort. The last slot of each machine has no right end, so ρin+1=∞\rho_{i_{n+1}}=\inftyρin+1​​=∞ is never a real number, and the slot capacity constraint is imposed only for slots with a successor. A preemptive schedule is a List of pieces with migration allowed and any number of pieces; nonpreemptive means one piece per job. Completion time is the latest end time among a job's pieces.

Added constraint. The display of (CQPp′)(CQP'_p)(CQPp′​) on p. 22 omits the condition aikj=0a_{i_kj}=0aik​j​=0 if ρik<rij\rho_{i_k}<r_{ij}ρik​​<rij​ (constraint (18) of §3). Without it the rounding can place a job in a slot that opens before its release date, and "computes a nonpreemptive schedule" in Lemma 4.3 fails. It is included here. The fractions of every feasible preemptive schedule satisfy it, so the program remains a relaxation.

Randomized rounding is a probability weight on the finite set of slot assignments with marginals aˉ\bar aaˉ and pairwise products aˉaˉ′\bar a\bar a'aˉaˉ′. Pairwise independence is required, full independence is not, and the expectation is a finite sum. "Without nontrivial release dates" is read as rij=0r_{ij}=0rij​=0 for all i,ji,ji,j. Communication delays are not modelled: without them the preemptive class is the largest, so the goal implies the bound for every delay model.

Not formalized: polynomial running time, solving (CQPp′)(CQP'_p)(CQPp′​) within an additive error ε\varepsilonε, derandomization by conditional probabilities (Theorem 4.5), and Corollary 4.4.

The goal is not trivial. Feasible preemptive schedules exist and are not vacuous, since each job's fractions must sum to 111 and no machine runs two pieces at once. The nonpreemptive schedule is required to be feasible in the same model, and its value is compared with the given schedule's real objective, not with a relaxation value.

A complete development needs: the slot schedule (15)–(17) and its feasibility, the bound E[Cj]≤2Cˉj\mathbb E[C_j]\le2\bar C_jE[Cj​]≤2Cˉj​ of §3 (Lemma 3.5) and Theorem 2.1 of §2, both restated on this slot model, and a product-measure argument showing that pairwise-independent rounding exists. The preemptive-schedule model and the slot machinery are reusable for other unrelated-machine results. Contributions to any milestone are welcome, and so are alternative proofs of Lemma 4.2.

Selected references

  • M. Skutella, Convex quadratic and semidefinite programming relaxations in scheduling, J. ACM 48(2) (2001) 206–242. https://doi.org/10.1145/375827.375840
  • W. E. Smith, Various optimizers for single-stage production, Naval Research Logistics Quarterly 3 (1956) 59–66. https://doi.org/10.1002/nav.3800030106
  • R. McNaughton, Scheduling with deadlines and loss functions, Management Science 6(1) (1959) 1–12. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.6.1.1
  • A. S. Schulz and M. Skutella, Scheduling unrelated machines by randomized rounding, SIAM J. Discrete Math. 15(4) (2002) 450–469. https://doi.org/10.1137/S0895480199357078
  • R. Sitters, Complexity of preemptive minsum scheduling on unrelated parallel machines, J. Algorithms 57(1) (2005) 37–48. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jalgor.2004.06.011
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Algorithmic Game TheoryOptimization·Captain: mikedeng1

How Bad is Selfish Routing? 3: With Finitely Many Agents Splitting Their Flow and x·ℓₑ(x) Convex, a Nash Flow Costs No More Than Any Flow Feasible for Twice the RatesResearch Paper

Motivation

In a road or communication network, traffic is routed by its users, not by a central planner. Each user picks the route that is cheapest for itself, and the resulting equilibrium can be much more expensive for the network as a whole than the best centrally planned routing. Roughgarden and Tardos, How Bad is Selfish Routing? (J. ACM 2002), quantified this loss. Their basic model is nonatomic: infinitely many users, each controlling a negligible amount of traffic. There, the cost of a Nash flow can exceed the optimum by an unbounded factor, but it never exceeds the cost of an optimal flow that routes twice as much traffic (their Theorem 3.1).

Many networks are not like that. A few large operators (internet service providers, freight companies, a navigation app routing its whole user base) each control a strictly positive share of the traffic and can split it over many paths. Section 5.2 of the paper treats this finite splittable model and proves the analogue of the bicriteria bound, Theorem 5.4. This mission formalizes that theorem and the three steps of its proof.

Setting

A network has a finite set EEE of edges. Each edge eee carries a latency function ℓe\ell_eℓe​, nonnegative, nondecreasing and continuous on [0,∞)[0,\infty)[0,∞): the delay on eee when xxx units of flow use it is ℓe(x)\ell_e(x)ℓe​(x).

There are kkk agents. Agent iii must send ri>0r_i>0ri​>0 units of flow from a source sis_isi​ to a destination tit_iti​, over its set Pi\mathcal P_iPi​ of paths. Distinct agents may have the same source and destination; their path sets are then separate copies. A flow fff assigns a nonnegative amount fPf_PfP​ to each path; agent iii's part is f(i)f^{(i)}f(i), the restriction of fff to Pi\mathcal P_iPi​. The flow is feasible for the rates rrr if ∑P∈PifP=ri\sum_{P\in\mathcal P_i} f_P = r_i∑P∈Pi​​fP​=ri​ for every iii, and feasible for 2r2r2r if each agent instead sends 2ri2r_i2ri​.

The edge flow fe=∑P∋efPf_e=\sum_{P\ni e} f_Pfe​=∑P∋e​fP​ is the flow of all agents through eee. The latency of a path is ℓP(f)=∑e∈Pℓe(fe)\ell_P(f)=\sum_{e\in P}\ell_e(f_e)ℓP​(f)=∑e∈P​ℓe​(fe​), and

C(f)=∑PℓP(f) fP,Ci(f)=∑P∈PiℓP(f) fP(i)C(f)=\sum_P \ell_P(f)\,f_P,\qquad C_i(f)=\sum_{P\in\mathcal P_i}\ell_P(f)\,f^{(i)}_PC(f)=P∑​ℓP​(f)fP​,Ci​(f)=P∈Pi​∑​ℓP​(f)fP(i)​

are the cost of the flow (its total latency) and the cost of agent iii. A feasible flow fff is at Nash equilibrium if no agent can lower its own cost by rerouting its own flow: for each iii, f(i)f^{(i)}f(i) minimizes CiC_iCi​ given f(j)f^{(j)}f(j) for j≠ij\neq ij=i.

In Lean, edges, paths and agents are Fin J, Fin R and Fin Sd; a path is a 0/10/10/1 incidence column A j r, s r is the agent owning path r, and rate i is rir_iri​. The edge flow linkFlow and the feasible set wardropFeasible come from the published definition KellyStochasticNetworks_Wardrop; pathLatency, cost and the modified latencies barLatency come from the series' shared model definitions (SelfishRouting.Bicriteria), and agentCost and IsSplittableNash are defined in this mission.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 5.4 (p. 20)

If x⋅ℓe(x)x\cdot\ell_e(x)x⋅ℓe​(x) is convex on [0,∞)[0,\infty)[0,∞) for every edge, fff is at Nash equilibrium for the finite splittable instance (G,r,ℓ)(G,r,\ell)(G,r,ℓ), and f∗f^*f∗ is feasible for (G,2r,ℓ)(G,2r,\ell)(G,2r,ℓ), then

C(f)≤C(f∗).C(f)\le C(f^*).C(f)≤C(f∗).

The comparison flow f∗f^*f∗ is arbitrary, so the statement implies the bound against an optimal flow for 2r2r2r without naming one.

Milestones (proof of Theorem 5.4, p. 20)

The proof uses the modified latencies ℓˉe(x)=ℓe(fe)\bar\ell_e(x)=\ell_e(f_e)ℓˉe​(x)=ℓe​(fe​) for x≤fex\le f_ex≤fe​ and ℓˉe(x)=ℓe(x)\bar\ell_e(x)=\ell_e(x)ℓˉe​(x)=ℓe​(x) for x≥fex\ge f_ex≥fe​, built from the Nash flow fff (p. 12). Writing Cˉ(g)=∑PℓˉP(g)gP\bar C(g)=\sum_P\bar\ell_P(g)g_PCˉ(g)=∑P​ℓˉP​(g)gP​:

  1. Cˉ(f∗)−C(f∗)≤C(f)\bar C(f^*) - C(f^*)\le C(f)Cˉ(f∗)−C(f∗)≤C(f) for any flows with nonnegative path flows;
  2. fff is optimal for (G,r,ℓˉ)(G,r,\bar\ell)(G,r,ℓˉ): Cˉ(f)≤Cˉ(g)\bar C(f)\le\bar C(g)Cˉ(f)≤Cˉ(g) for every ggg feasible for rrr;
  3. every ggg feasible for 2r2r2r has Cˉ(g)≥2C(f)\bar C(g)\ge 2C(f)Cˉ(g)≥2C(f).

Significance

Theorem 5.4 says that in a network shared by finitely many traffic-splitting operators, the inefficiency of selfish routing can always be offset by doubling the network's capacity to carry traffic, whatever the network topology and whatever the (convexity-qualified) delay functions. Theorem 3.1 is its limit as the number of agents grows and each share shrinks to zero. The finite splittable model is the setting of later work on atomic splittable routing games and their price of anarchy, which this mission's definitions can serve.

On the formalization side, the result is proved on paper but, as far as a search of the platform and of Mathlib shows, no part of selfish-routing equilibrium theory with finitely many agents has been formalized. The mission provides a reusable encoding of the finite splittable model (per-agent costs, per-agent best responses with all other agents fixed) on top of the published Wardrop definitions, and the three proof steps as separately provable milestones. Milestone 2 is the one with independent content: it turns a game-theoretic equilibrium into the optimum of a convex program.

Difficulty

The obvious attempt copies the proof of Theorem 3.1. That proof uses the nonatomic equilibrium condition: every used path of a commodity has the same, minimal latency Li(f)L_i(f)Li​(f), so ℓˉP(g)≥Li(f)\bar\ell_P(g)\ge L_i(f)ℓˉP​(g)≥Li​(f) for every path and the lower bound Cˉ(g)≥2C(f)\bar C(g)\ge 2C(f)Cˉ(g)≥2C(f) follows path by path. In the finite splittable model this fails: an agent at equilibrium balances marginal costs ℓP(f)+fP(i)⋅(slope)\ell_P(f)+f^{(i)}_P\cdot(\text{slope})ℓP​(f)+fP(i)​⋅(slope), not latencies, and its used paths can have different latencies. The proof must go through the optimality of fff for the modified program (G,r,ℓˉ)(G,r,\bar\ell)(G,r,ℓˉ), and that needs both the convexity of x⋅ℓe(x)x\cdot\ell_e(x)x⋅ℓe​(x) and a comparison between the change of agent iii's cost and the change of the ℓˉ\bar\ellℓˉ-cost under the same local move. The paper invokes a first-order optimality lemma (its Lemma 2.4) for ℓˉ\bar\ellℓˉ, which is not differentiable at fef_efe​; a formal proof has to handle one-sided derivatives or argue by convexity directly.

Formalization scope

  • Routes, not graphs. Paths are arbitrary 0/10/10/1 incidence columns with an owner map; the paper's simple-path families are one instance. The proof never uses graph structure. Two agents with the same source and destination have disjoint index sets of routes.
  • Latency hypotheses on [0,∞)[0,\infty)[0,∞) only: 0 ≤ ℓ j t for 0 ≤ t, MonotoneOn and ContinuousOn on Set.Ici 0, and ConvexOn ℝ (Set.Ici 0) (fun t => t * ℓ j t). Continuity replaces the differentiability of §2.1, as footnote 3 (p. 7) and §5.2 allow; this weakens a hypothesis.
  • Rates are positive (0 < rate i). The case of zero agents is allowed and trivial, as in the paper.
  • Nash equilibrium is the precise form printed on p. 19: each agent's part minimizes its cost among feasible flows that agree with fff on every other agent's paths. A deviating agent keeps its total at rir_iri​ and cannot change others' flows; the agent's cost is evaluated at the total edge flow of all agents.
  • No ratios. The theorem is the inequality C(f)≤C(f∗)C(f)\le C(f^*)C(f)≤C(f∗) for every f∗f^*f∗ feasible for 2r2r2r; no division by an optimal cost appears.
  • Feasible for 2r2r2r is wardropFeasible s (fun i => 2 * rate i).
  • The existence of a Nash flow (Rosen) is neither assumed nor claimed. A sorry-free check shows the definition is satisfiable: in the two-link Pigou network with one agent of rate 1 and latencies 111 and xxx, the flow (1/2,1/2)(1/2,1/2)(1/2,1/2) is a Nash flow.
  • A trivializing formalization is excluded: the equilibrium is not the Wardrop condition, deviations are restricted to the deviating agent's own feasible flows, and the theorem quantifies over every feasible comparison flow rather than over an assumed optimum.

Contributions welcome: proofs of the three milestones and the goal; a general lemma that a feasible flow minimizing a convex separable edge cost has no improving two-path move, and its converse; a proof that x↦ℓˉe(x) xx\mapsto\bar\ell_e(x)\,xx↦ℓˉe​(x)x is convex when x ℓe(x)x\,\ell_e(x)xℓe​(x) is.

Selected references

  • T. Roughgarden and É. Tardos, How Bad is Selfish Routing?, Journal of the ACM 49(2):236–259, 2002. https://doi.org/10.1145/506147.506153
  • J. B. Rosen, Existence and Uniqueness of Equilibrium Points for Concave N-Person Games, Econometrica 33(3):520–534, 1965. https://doi.org/10.2307/1911749
  • F. Kelly and E. Yudovina, Stochastic Networks, Cambridge University Press, 2014, Chapter 4. https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781139565363
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Algorithmic Game TheoryConvex OptimizationOptimization·Captain: mikedeng1

How Bad is Selfish Routing? 4: With Polynomial Latencies of Degree p and Nonnegative Coefficients the Cost of a Nash Flow Is at Most p + 1 Times the Optimal CostResearch Paper

Motivation

In a road or communication network carrying a large population of users, each user picks a route that is fastest for itself given the congestion caused by everyone else. The resulting traffic pattern, a Wardrop or Nash equilibrium, need not minimize the total travel time: Braess's paradox shows that adding a road can make every user slower. Transportation science has modelled such equilibria since Wardrop (1952) and Beckmann, McGuire and Winsten (1956), and the question of how much efficiency selfish behaviour costs was posed in computer science by Koutsoupias and Papadimitriou (1999).

Roughgarden and Tardos, How Bad is Selfish Routing? (J. ACM, 2002) gave the first general answers for networks with many infinitesimal users. This mission formalizes the first of them, from §2.5 of the paper: when every edge latency is a polynomial of degree at most ppp with nonnegative coefficients, the total latency at equilibrium is at most p+1p+1p+1 times the optimum. The argument goes through the convex program of Beckmann et al., whose optimal solutions are exactly the equilibria (Dafermos and Sparrow, 1969).

Timeline. 1952: Wardrop states the equilibrium principle. 1956: Beckmann, McGuire and Winsten characterize equilibria as minimizers of a convex potential and prove existence. 1969: Dafermos and Sparrow reprove existence and essential uniqueness for general networks. 1999: Koutsoupias and Papadimitriou introduce the worst-case ratio between equilibrium and optimum. 2000–2002: Roughgarden and Tardos prove the bounds p+1p+1p+1 for polynomials (Corollary 2.8) and 4/34/34/3 for linear latencies. 2002–2003: Roughgarden shows the worst ratio for degree-ppp polynomials is Θ(p/ln⁡p)\Theta(p/\ln p)Θ(p/lnp), attained already on two parallel links.

Setting

An instance consists of finitely many edges eee, finitely many commodities i∈{1,…,k}i\in\{1,\dots,k\}i∈{1,…,k} and finitely many routes PPP. Each route is a set of edges, recorded by a 0/10/10/1 incidence matrix AAA (AeP=1A_{eP}=1AeP​=1 iff e∈Pe\in Pe∈P), and serves exactly one commodity; Pi\mathcal P_iPi​ is the set of routes serving commodity iii. Commodity iii has a rate ri>0r_i>0ri​>0.

A flow assigns a value fPf_PfP​ to each route. It induces the edge flows fe=∑P∋efPf_e=\sum_{P\ni e}f_Pfe​=∑P∋e​fP​ and is feasible if fP≥0f_P\ge0fP​≥0 for all PPP and ∑P∈PifP=ri\sum_{P\in\mathcal P_i}f_P=r_i∑P∈Pi​​fP​=ri​ for all iii. Each edge has a latency function ℓe\ell_eℓe​, nonnegative, nondecreasing and continuous on [0,∞)[0,\infty)[0,∞). The latency of a route is ℓP(f)=∑e∈Pℓe(fe)\ell_P(f)=\sum_{e\in P}\ell_e(f_e)ℓP​(f)=∑e∈P​ℓe​(fe​) and the cost of a flow is

C(f)=∑PℓP(f) fP=∑eℓe(fe) fe.C(f)=\sum_P\ell_P(f)\,f_P=\sum_e\ell_e(f_e)\,f_e .C(f)=P∑​ℓP​(f)fP​=e∑​ℓe​(fe​)fe​.

A feasible flow is at Nash equilibrium (Definition 2.1) if moving any amount δ∈[0,fP1]\delta\in[0,f_{P_1}]δ∈[0,fP1​​] of commodity iii from a used route P1P_1P1​ to another route P2∈PiP_2\in\mathcal P_iP2​∈Pi​ leaves P2P_2P2​ at least as slow, after the move, as P1P_1P1​ was before. Lemma 2.2 shows that this is the Wardrop condition: every route that carries flow has minimum latency among the routes of its commodity.

The Beckmann potential of a flow is Φ(f)=∑e∫0feℓe(t) dt\Phi(f)=\sum_e\int_0^{f_e}\ell_e(t)\,dtΦ(f)=∑e​∫0fe​​ℓe​(t)dt, the objective of the program (NLP2) of the paper.

Formalization targets

Goal: Corollary 2.8

For latencies ℓe(x)=∑i=0pae,ixi\ell_e(x)=\sum_{i=0}^{p}a_{e,i}x^iℓe​(x)=∑i=0p​ae,i​xi with p≥1p\ge1p≥1 an integer and ae,i≥0a_{e,i}\ge0ae,i​≥0, every flow fff at Nash equilibrium and every feasible flow f∗f^*f∗ satisfy

C(f)≤(p+1) C(f∗).C(f)\le(p+1)\,C(f^*).C(f)≤(p+1)C(f∗).

This is the paper's ρ(G,r,ℓ)=C(f)/C(f∗)≤p+1\rho(G,r,\ell)=C(f)/C(f^*)\le p+1ρ(G,r,ℓ)=C(f)/C(f∗)≤p+1 written without division.

Milestones

  1. Lemma 2.2: Nash equilibrium (Definition 2.1)   ⟺  \iff⟺ the Wardrop condition.
  2. Proof of Lemma 2.6: the flows at Nash equilibrium are exactly the feasible minimizers of Φ\PhiΦ.
  3. Lemma 2.6: a Nash flow exists, and all Nash flows have the same cost.
  4. Corollary 2.7: if x ℓe(x)≤α∫0xℓe(t) dtx\,\ell_e(x)\le\alpha\int_0^x\ell_e(t)\,dtxℓe​(x)≤α∫0x​ℓe​(t)dt for every edge and every x>0x>0x>0, with α≥1\alpha\ge1α≥1, then
C(f)≤α C(f∗)for every Nash flow f and feasible f∗.C(f)\le\alpha\,C(f^*)\quad\text{for every Nash flow } f \text{ and feasible } f^* .C(f)≤αC(f∗)for every Nash flow f and feasible f∗.

Significance

The result. Corollary 2.8 was, according to the authors, the first bound of its kind for polynomial latencies (p. 11). It shows that for the latency functions used in practice (the Bureau of Public Roads function ℓ(x)=a+bx4\ell(x)=a+bx^4ℓ(x)=a+bx4 has p=4p=4p=4) uncoordinated routing loses at most a bounded factor, independent of the network size, the number of commodities and the rates. Corollary 2.7 isolates the mechanism: a single scalar property of each latency function, how far the cost xℓ(x)x\ell(x)xℓ(x) can exceed the potential ∫0xℓ\int_0^x\ell∫0x​ℓ, controls the efficiency loss of the whole network.

Formalizing it. The results are proved in the paper (and the bound p+1p+1p+1 has since been sharpened); none of them is machine-checked on the platform. The mission produces a reusable Lean development of nonatomic selfish routing: Definition 2.1 in its deviation form, its equivalence with the Wardrop condition, the Beckmann characterization of equilibria with an honest integral potential, existence and cost-uniqueness of equilibria, and the potential-based efficiency bound. The same layer is used by the companion missions on the bicriteria bound and the 4/34/34/3 bound for linear latencies.

Difficulty

The bound itself is a short chain of inequalities once the equilibrium is known to minimize the potential Φ\PhiΦ. That step is the substance: it requires showing that the Wardrop condition is a first-order optimality condition of a convex program over the polytope of feasible flows, with latencies that are only continuous, so Φ\PhiΦ is differentiable but its derivative may have kinks. Passing from Definition 2.1 (finite deviations) to the Wardrop condition needs a limit δ→0\delta\to0δ→0, which fails without continuity of the latencies. Mathlib has no Karush–Kuhn–Tucker theory for such programs, so the optimality characterization has to be built from first principles.

Formalization scope

  • Encoding. Edges, routes and commodities are Fin J, Fin R, Fin Sd. Edge flows, feasibility, the Wardrop condition and the potential Φ\PhiΦ are the published KellyStochasticNetworks.linkFlow, wardropFeasible, IsWardropEquilibrium and wardropObjective, reused unchanged.
  • Routes, not graphs. Routes are arbitrary 0/10/10/1 incidence columns rather than the simple sis_isi​–tit_iti​ paths of a graph, a generalization the paper's arguments never use. Two copies of one path serving two commodities are two routes.
  • Definition 2.1 is read with P1≠P2P_1\ne P_2P1​=P2​ and fP1>0f_{P_1}>0fP1​​>0. As printed, P1=P2P_1=P_2P1​=P2​ makes the condition fail for strictly increasing latencies, and fP1=0f_{P_1}=0fP1​​=0 forces unused routes to have the same latency as used ones; either reading would make Nash flows nonexistent in simple instances.
  • Latencies are nonnegative, nondecreasing and continuous on [0,∞)[0,\infty)[0,∞) only. Continuity replaces the paper's differentiability, as its footnote 3 allows; it also makes ∫0xℓe\int_0^x\ell_e∫0x​ℓe​ a genuine integral.
  • Rates are positive. In Lemma 2.6's existence part every commodity must be served by a route, the route-encoding meaning of "an instance".
  • No ratios. Every bound ρ≤c\rho\le cρ≤c is stated as C(f)≤c C(f∗)C(f)\le c\,C(f^*)C(f)≤cC(f∗) for every feasible f∗f^*f∗, which is what each proof shows and which avoids division by a zero cost.
  • Polynomials share one degree bound p≥1p\ge1p≥1; leading coefficients may vanish; coefficients are required nonnegative for i≤pi\le pi≤p.

A statement in which Nash flows cannot exist (the literal Definition 2.1), or in which ∫0xℓe\int_0^x\ell_e∫0x​ℓe​ is the junk value of a non-integrable function, would make the goal vacuous; the guards above rule both out, and the sorry-free check that two small instances admit Nash flows confirms it.

Contributions welcome: proofs of the milestones, in particular the first-order characterization of minimizers of Φ\PhiΦ over the feasible polytope, which is reusable for every potential game on flows.

Selected references

  • T. Roughgarden and É. Tardos, How Bad is Selfish Routing?, J. ACM 49(2):236–259, 2002. https://doi.org/10.1145/506147.506153
  • M. Beckmann, C. B. McGuire and C. B. Winsten, Studies in the Economics of Transportation, Yale University Press, 1956 (RAND RM-1488). https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_memoranda/RM1488.html
  • S. C. Dafermos and F. T. Sparrow, The traffic assignment problem for a general network, J. Res. Nat. Bur. Standards 73B(2):91–118, 1969. https://doi.org/10.6028/jres.073B.010
  • J. G. Wardrop, Some theoretical aspects of road traffic research, Proc. Inst. Civil Engineers, Part II, 1:325–378, 1952. https://doi.org/10.1680/ipeds.1952.11259
  • E. Koutsoupias and C. Papadimitriou, Worst-case equilibria, STACS 1999, LNCS 1563, 404–413. https://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-49116-3_38
  • T. Roughgarden, The price of anarchy is independent of the network topology, J. Comput. System Sci. 67(2):341–364, 2003. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0022-0000(03)00044-8
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Convex OptimizationLinear algebraOptimization·Captain: mikedeng1

Semidefinite Programming Relaxations for Semialgebraic Problems 2: A Feasible Solution of the SDPs (7.7) Certifies That M Is Copositive, and the Test Is at Least as Strong as M = P + NResearch Paper

Copositive matrices and why they need certificates

A real symmetric matrix is copositive when its quadratic form is nonnegative on the nonnegative orthant. Copositive matrices appear wherever a quadratic objective meets sign constraints: standard quadratic programs over the simplex, linear complementarity problems, and conic reformulations of combinatorial problems such as the stability number of a graph. Parrilo's §7.5 (Math. Program. 96 (2003) 293–320) gives an example: if CCC is copositive and Q−ATCA⪰γIQ - A^TCA \succeq \gamma IQ−ATCA⪰γI, then γ\gammaγ is a lower bound on min⁡{xTQx:Ax≥0, xTx=1}\min\{x^TQx : Ax \ge 0,\ x^Tx = 1\}min{xTQx:Ax≥0, xTx=1}.

Deciding copositivity is hard. Murty and Kabadi (Math. Program. 39 (1987) 117–129) showed that checking whether a given integer matrix is not copositive is NP-complete, so the exact tests based on principal minors take an exponential number of operations in the worst case. Efficiently checkable sufficient conditions are therefore what applications use.

Timeline:

  • 1962. Diananda (Proc. Cambridge Philos. Soc. 58) studies the decomposition of a matrix as positive semidefinite plus elementwise nonnegative, condition (7.6) below, which is sufficient for copositivity and also necessary for n≤4n \le 4n≤4.
  • 1977. Choi and Lam (Math. Ann. 231) relate this decomposition to sums of squares of quartic forms (their Lemma 3.5).
  • 1987. Murty and Kabadi prove the NP-completeness result above.
  • 2000–2003. Parrilo's thesis and the 2003 paper introduce a hierarchy of semidefinite programming tests, one level per degree rrr, of which (7.6) is level 000; Theorem 7.7 makes level 111 explicit.
  • 2002. De Klerk and Pasechnik (SIAM J. Optim. 12) use this hierarchy to approximate the stability number of a graph.

Setting

Fix n≥0n \ge 0n≥0 and a real symmetric matrix M=(mij)∈Rn×nM = (m_{ij}) \in \mathbb R^{n\times n}M=(mij​)∈Rn×n. The matrix MMM is copositive if

xi≥0 for all i  ⟹  xTMx≥0.x_i \ge 0 \text{ for all } i \;\Longrightarrow\; x^T M x \ge 0 .xi​≥0 for all i⟹xTMx≥0.

For real variables z=(z1,…,zn)z = (z_1,\dots,z_n)z=(z1​,…,zn​) write z=[z12,…,zn2]T\mathbf z = [z_1^2, \dots, z_n^2]^Tz=[z12​,…,zn2​]T. Three polynomials in zzz are associated with MMM:

P(z):=zTMz=∑i,jmijzi2zj2,Pr(z)=(∑i=1nzi2)rP(z),P1(z):=∑i,j,kmijzi2zj2zk2.P(z) := \mathbf z^T M \mathbf z = \sum_{i,j} m_{ij} z_i^2 z_j^2, \qquad P_r(z) = \Bigl(\sum_{i=1}^n z_i^2\Bigr)^r P(z), \qquad P_1(z) := \sum_{i,j,k} m_{ij} z_i^2 z_j^2 z_k^2 .P(z):=zTMz=i,j∑​mij​zi2​zj2​,Pr​(z)=(i=1∑n​zi2​)rP(z),P1​(z):=i,j,k∑​mij​zi2​zj2​zk2​.

A form is positive semidefinite if it is nonnegative at every point of Rn\mathbb R^nRn, and a polynomial is a sum of squares if it is a finite sum of squares of real polynomials. A matrix AAA satisfies A⪰0A \succeq 0A⪰0 if it is symmetric and xTAx≥0x^TAx \ge 0xTAx≥0 for all x∈Rnx \in \mathbb R^nx∈Rn.

The SDPs (7.7) ask for nnn symmetric matrices Λ1,…,Λn∈Sn\Lambda^1, \dots, \Lambda^n \in \mathcal S^nΛ1,…,Λn∈Sn, with entries Λjki=Λkji\Lambda^i_{jk} = \Lambda^i_{kj}Λjki​=Λkji​, such that

M−Λi⪰0,i=1,…,n,Λiii=0,i=1,…,n,Λjji+Λjij+Λijj=0,i≠j,Λjki+Λkij+Λijk≥0,i≠j≠k.\begin{aligned} M - \Lambda^i &\succeq 0, && i = 1,\dots,n,\\ \Lambda^i_{ii} &= 0, && i = 1,\dots,n,\\ \Lambda^i_{jj} + \Lambda^j_{ji} + \Lambda^j_{ij} &= 0, && i \ne j,\\ \Lambda^i_{jk} + \Lambda^j_{ki} + \Lambda^k_{ij} &\ge 0, && i \ne j \ne k . \end{aligned}M−ΛiΛiii​Λjji​+Λjij​+Λijj​Λjki​+Λkij​+Λijk​​⪰0,=0,=0,≥0,​​i=1,…,n,i=1,…,n,i=j,i=j=k.​

Condition (7.6) asks for a decomposition M=P+NM = P + NM=P+N with P⪰0P \succeq 0P⪰0 and nij≥0n_{ij} \ge 0nij​≥0 for all i,ji,ji,j.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 7.7

For every real symmetric n×nn\times nn×n matrix MMM,

(7.7) feasible  ⟹  (P1(z)≥0  ∀z∈Rn) and M copositive,and(7.6)  ⟹  (7.7) feasible.\text{(7.7) feasible} \;\Longrightarrow\; \bigl(P_1(z) \ge 0 \ \ \forall z \in \mathbb R^n\bigr) \ \text{and}\ M \text{ copositive}, \qquad\text{and}\qquad \text{(7.6)} \;\Longrightarrow\; \text{(7.7) feasible}.(7.7) feasible⟹(P1​(z)≥0  ∀z∈Rn) and M copositive,and(7.6)⟹(7.7) feasible.

The second implication is the paper's "this test is at least as powerful as condition (7.6)".

Milestones (all from §7.5, pp. 317–318)

  1. P1=PrP_1 = P_rP1​=Pr​ at r=1r = 1r=1: (∑kzk2)P(z)=∑i,j,kmijzi2zj2zk2\bigl(\sum_k z_k^2\bigr)P(z) = \sum_{i,j,k} m_{ij} z_i^2z_j^2z_k^2(∑k​zk2​)P(z)=∑i,j,k​mij​zi2​zj2​zk2​.
  2. If Pr(z)≥0P_r(z) \ge 0Pr​(z)≥0 for all zzz, then P(z)≥0P(z) \ge 0P(z)≥0 for all zzz.
  3. MMM is copositive if and only if P(z)≥0P(z) \ge 0P(z)≥0 for all z∈Rnz \in \mathbb R^nz∈Rn.
  4. P(z)P(z)P(z) is a sum of squares if and only if condition (7.6) holds.
  5. If PiP_iPi​ is a sum of squares, then so is Pi+1P_{i+1}Pi+1​.

Significance

Theorem 7.7 turns copositivity at level r=1r = 1r=1 into a single semidefinite feasibility problem whose size is polynomial in nnn: nnn symmetric n×nn \times nn×n matrices, nnn semidefinite constraints and O(n3)O(n^3)O(n3) linear ones. Its second half says that nothing is lost against the classical test (7.6): every matrix certified by the decomposition M=P+NM = P + NM=P+N is also certified by (7.7). The milestones place the result inside the hierarchy: certificates at any level rrr certify copositivity (milestones 2 and 3), and the sum-of-squares tests become weakly stronger as rrr grows (milestone 5), with (7.6) equivalent to the test at level 000 (milestone 4). This hierarchy underlies later SDP approximations of the copositive cone and of the stability number of a graph.

The paper prints no proof of Theorem 7.7. These statements are proved results of the literature; none of them is formalized in Mathlib or, as far as a search of the platform shows, elsewhere in Lean. The mission produces machine-checked statements and proofs of the level-111 test and of the structural facts about the hierarchy, built on the platform's published definition of copositivity.

Difficulty

The first half of Theorem 7.7 requires seeing a feasible point of (7.7) as a certificate for the polynomial P1P_1P1​: the semidefinite constraints control quadratic expressions in z\mathbf zz, while the linear constraints on the entries of Λ\LambdaΛ must account for every monomial zi2zj2zk2z_i^2z_j^2z_k^2zi2​zj2​zk2​ of degree six, grouped by which indices coincide. The bookkeeping over the three index patterns (all equal, two equal, all distinct) and over the superscript/subscript roles of Λjki\Lambda^i_{jk}Λjki​ is where a careless argument loses a term. The second half asks, for an arbitrary decomposition M=P+NM = P + NM=P+N, for a point satisfying all nnn semidefinite constraints and all the linear equalities and inequalities of (7.7) at once. The obvious first idea of testing M⪰0M \succeq 0M⪰0 fails: positive semidefiniteness is sufficient for copositivity but far from necessary, since every elementwise nonnegative matrix is copositive.

Formalization scope

  • MMM is Matrix (Fin n) (Fin n) ℝ with a hypothesis M.IsSymm; nnn is arbitrary, including n=0n = 0n=0.
  • Copositivity is the published definition MurtyKabadi.Reduction.Copositive (Murty–Kabadi mission), xTMx≥0x^TMx \ge 0xTMx≥0 for every coordinatewise nonnegative xxx; it is not replaced by M⪰0M \succeq 0M⪰0.
  • PPP, PrP_rPr​ and P1P_1P1​ are elements of MvPolynomial (Fin n) ℝ; P1P_1P1​ is defined by its own display, and its equality with PrP_rPr​ at r=1r = 1r=1 is a milestone.
  • "Positive semidefinite form" and "nonnegative" mean nonnegative evaluation at every point of Rn\mathbb R^nRn; "sum of squares" is Mathlib's IsSumSq in the polynomial ring.
  • ⪰0\succeq 0⪰0 is Mathlib's Matrix.PosSemidef. Λ\LambdaΛ is a family Fin n → Matrix (Fin n) (Fin n) ℝ, with Λjki\Lambda^i_{jk}Λjki​ = Λ i j k; each Λi\Lambda^iΛi is required symmetric as on the page.
  • "i≠j≠ki \ne j \ne ki=j=k" is read as i,j,ki, j, ki,j,k pairwise distinct. Under the symmetry of the Λi\Lambda^iΛi and the third constraint, the extra constraints of the literal reading hold with equality, so both readings give the same feasible set.
  • "At least as powerful as condition (7.6)" is formalized as the implication (7.6) ⇒\Rightarrow⇒ (7.7) feasible.
  • The mission does not trivialize: the hypothesis of the goal is satisfiable (the identity matrix with Λ=0\Lambda = 0Λ=0 is feasible), the conclusion is copositivity on the orthant rather than a weaker or vacuous property, and the SDP is the paper's finite system with every constraint of (7.7) present.

Contributions welcome: proofs of the milestones, general lemmas on sums of squares in MvPolynomial (closure under multiplication, Gram-matrix representations of a quadratic form in monomials) and Gram-matrix arguments for forms that are even in every variable.

Selected references

  • P. A. Parrilo, Semidefinite programming relaxations for semialgebraic problems, Math. Program. Ser. B 96 (2003) 293–320. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10107-003-0387-5
  • K. G. Murty, S. N. Kabadi, Some NP-complete problems in quadratic and nonlinear programming, Math. Program. 39 (1987) 117–129. https://doi.org/10.1007/BF02592948
  • P. H. Diananda, On non-negative forms in real variables some or all of which are non-negative, Proc. Cambridge Philos. Soc. 58 (1962) 17–25. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0305004100036185
  • M. D. Choi, T. Y. Lam, Extremal positive semidefinite forms, Math. Ann. 231 (1977) 1–18. https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01360024
  • E. de Klerk, D. V. Pasechnik, Approximation of the stability number of a graph via copositive programming, SIAM J. Optim. 12 (2002) 875–892. https://doi.org/10.1137/S1052623401383248
9 thms2 active usersReviewed
OptimizationProbability·Captain: mikedeng1

Centralized and Competitive Inventory Models with Demand Substitution 3: Under Multivariate Normal Demand the Centralized Expected Profit Decreases in Every Demand CorrelationResearch Paper

Motivation

A retailer that carries several substitutable products (brands of the same good, sizes of the same item) faces demands that are linked in two ways: a customer who finds the first-choice product out of stock may buy another one, and the first-choice demands themselves are statistically dependent. Inventory planners routinely assume multivariate normal demand and need to know how the dependence between demands affects what the assortment earns. In the single-product newsvendor and in classical risk-pooling arguments, positive correlation is known to hurt; with substitution it is not obvious, because substitution is itself a form of pooling whose value depends on whether two products run out together.

Netessine and Rudi (SSRN 303779, 2002; journal version in Operations Research 51(2), 2003) settle the question for the centralized model with an arbitrary number of products: under multivariate normal demand, the retailer's expected profit decreases in every demand correlation. The authors note that this effect had been observed numerically by Rajaram and Tang (working paper, UCLA, 1999) and Ernst and Kouvelis (1999) but not proved. They prove the analogous statement for each firm in the competitive model with stocking quantities held fixed.

Setting

There are nnn products. Product iii is stocked in quantity Qi≥0Q_i\ge 0Qi​≥0 at unit cost cic_ici​, sold at price rir_iri​, and salvaged at value sis_isi​, with ri>ci>si>0r_i>c_i>s_i>0ri​>ci​>si​>0. Write ui=ri−ciu_i=r_i-c_iui​=ri​−ci​ (underage cost) and oi=ci−sio_i=c_i-s_ioi​=ci​−si​ (overage cost). The substitution fraction aij∈[0,1]a_{ij}\in[0,1]aij​∈[0,1] is the share of the unmet demand for product iii that switches to product jjj; aii=0a_{ii}=0aii​=0 and ∑jaij<1\sum_j a_{ij}<1∑j​aij​<1.

The first-choice demand is a random vector D=(D1,…,Dn)D=(D_1,\dots,D_n)D=(D1​,…,Dn​). The effective demand of product iii, after substitution from the other products, is

Dis=Di+∑j≠iaji (Dj−Qj)+,x+=max⁡(0,x).D^s_i = D_i + \sum_{j\ne i} a_{ji}\,(D_j-Q_j)^+ ,\qquad x^+=\max(0,x).Dis​=Di​+j=i∑​aji​(Dj​−Qj​)+,x+=max(0,x).

For one realization, product kkk earns

πk(D)=ukDks−uk(Dks−Qk)+−ok(Qk−Dks)+,\pi_k(D) = u_kD^s_k - u_k(D^s_k-Q_k)^+ - o_k(Q_k-D^s_k)^+ ,πk​(D)=uk​Dks​−uk​(Dks​−Qk​)+−ok​(Qk​−Dks​)+,

and a single centralized company owning all products earns π(D)=∑kπk(D)\pi(D)=\sum_k\pi_k(D)π(D)=∑k​πk​(D). The expected profits are π(Q)=E π(D)\pi(Q)=\mathbb E\,\pi(D)π(Q)=Eπ(D) (the paper's equation (1)) and πk(Q)=E πk(D)\pi_k(Q)=\mathbb E\,\pi_k(D)πk​(Q)=Eπk​(D) (equation (9), the profit of firm kkk when each product is owned by a separate firm).

In this mission D∼N(m,Σ)D\sim N(m,\Sigma)D∼N(m,Σ) is multivariate normal with mean m∈Rnm\in\mathbb R^nm∈Rn and positive semidefinite covariance matrix Σ=(σij)\Sigma=(\sigma_{ij})Σ=(σij​). The correlation of products i≠ji\ne ji=j is ρij=σij/σiiσjj\rho_{ij}=\sigma_{ij}/\sqrt{\sigma_{ii}\sigma_{jj}}ρij​=σij​/σii​σjj​​. Raising ρij\rho_{ij}ρij​ means passing from Σ1\Sigma^1Σ1 to Σ2\Sigma^2Σ2 where σij2=σji2≥σij1=σji1\sigma^2_{ij}=\sigma^2_{ji}\ge\sigma^1_{ij}=\sigma^1_{ji}σij2​=σji2​≥σij1​=σji1​ and every other entry, in particular every variance, is unchanged.

A function f:Rn→Rf:\mathbb R^n\to\mathbb Rf:Rn→R is supermodular if f(x)+f(y)≤f(x∨y)+f(x∧y)f(x)+f(y)\le f(x\vee y)+f(x\wedge y)f(x)+f(y)≤f(x∨y)+f(x∧y) for the componentwise maximum and minimum, and submodular if −f-f−f is supermodular. A random vector D1D^1D1 is smaller than D2D^2D2 in the supermodular order, D1≤smD2D^1\le_{sm}D^2D1≤sm​D2, if Ef(D1)≤Ef(D2)\mathbb Ef(D^1)\le\mathbb Ef(D^2)Ef(D1)≤Ef(D2) for every supermodular fff whose expectations exist.

Formalization targets

Goal: Proposition 2 (p. 7)

For Σ2\Sigma^2Σ2 obtained from Σ1\Sigma^1Σ1 by raising one covariance σij\sigma_{ij}σij​, i≠ji\ne ji=j,

πΣ2(Q)≤πΣ1(Q)for every Q≥0,\pi^{\Sigma^2}(Q)\le\pi^{\Sigma^1}(Q)\quad\text{for every } Q\ge 0,πΣ2(Q)≤πΣ1(Q)for every Q≥0,

and, for every maximizer Q1Q^1Q1 of πΣ1\pi^{\Sigma^1}πΣ1 and every maximizer Q2Q^2Q2 of πΣ2\pi^{\Sigma^2}πΣ2 over Q≥0Q\ge0Q≥0,

πΣ2(Q2)≤πΣ1(Q1).\pi^{\Sigma^2}(Q^2)\le\pi^{\Sigma^1}(Q^1).πΣ2(Q2)≤πΣ1(Q1).

These are the two readings of "stocking quantities held fixed or adjusted optimally".

Milestones

  1. The effective demand h(D)=Di+∑j≠iaji(Dj−Qj)+h(D)=D_i+\sum_{j\ne i}a_{ji}(D_j-Q_j)^+h(D)=Di​+∑j=i​aji​(Dj​−Qj​)+ is a valuation (both super- and submodular).
  2. D↦min⁡(h(D),Qi)D\mapsto\min(h(D),Q_i)D↦min(h(D),Qi​) is submodular.
  3. The realized profit π(D)=∑i[(ui+oi)min⁡(Dis,Qi)−oiQi]\pi(D)=\sum_i[(u_i+o_i)\min(D^s_i,Q_i)-o_iQ_i]π(D)=∑i​[(ui​+oi​)min(Dis​,Qi​)−oi​Qi​], and each πk(D)\pi_k(D)πk​(D), is submodular in DDD.
  4. (Müller and Scarsini, quoted on p. 7) If σii1=σii2\sigma^1_{ii}=\sigma^2_{ii}σii1​=σii2​ and σij1≤σij2\sigma^1_{ij}\le\sigma^2_{ij}σij1​≤σij2​ for all i,ji,ji,j, then
N(m,Σ1)≤smN(m,Σ2).N(m,\Sigma^1)\le_{sm}N(m,\Sigma^2).N(m,Σ1)≤sm​N(m,Σ2).
  1. (Proposition 5, p. 10) For every firm kkk and every fixed Q≥0Q\ge0Q≥0, πkΣ2(Q)≤πkΣ1(Q)\pi_k^{\Sigma^2}(Q)\le\pi_k^{\Sigma^1}(Q)πkΣ2​(Q)≤πkΣ1​(Q).

Significance

The result. Proposition 2 says that, under normal demand, positive dependence between substitutable products is costly to the retailer whatever the substitution pattern, the number of products, and the cost parameters, and that re-optimizing the stocking levels cannot undo this. It turns an empirical regularity of numerical studies into a structural statement, and it gives a reason to prefer assortments of products whose demands are less correlated. Proposition 5 gives the same conclusion for each competing firm when stocking quantities are fixed; the paper does not claim it when firms re-optimize, since equilibrium quantities move in ways that need not favour every firm.

Formalizing it. The result is proved in the paper, partly by citation: the comparison of normal laws in the supermodular order is a theorem of Müller and Scarsini that is quoted, not proved, there. No machine-checked version of that comparison is known on the platform: the existing Slepian and Sudakov–Fernique comparisons concern expected suprema and tail probabilities, not expectations of arbitrary supermodular functions. A formal proof of milestone 4 would therefore be reusable well beyond inventory theory, wherever supermodular functionals of Gaussian vectors are compared (portfolio risk, dependence orderings, stop-loss premiums).

Difficulty

The deterministic steps (milestones 1–3) are elementary lattice arguments. The difficulty is milestone 4. The natural route is Gaussian interpolation: connect the two laws through N(m,(1−t)Σ1+tΣ2)N(m,(1-t)\Sigma^1+t\Sigma^2)N(m,(1−t)Σ1+tΣ2) and differentiate Ef\mathbb EfEf in ttt. That argument needs fff twice differentiable with controlled growth, while the statement must hold for every supermodular fff that is merely integrable under the two endpoint laws, such as the piecewise-linear profits of this model, and for singular covariance matrices. Passing from smooth to general supermodular functions, without assuming integrability along the interpolation path, is where the work lies. The paper's own route to the "adjusted optimally" clause, a total derivative dπ/dρijd\pi/d\rho_{ij}dπ/dρij​ along a differentiable optimal path, presumes a smoothness of the optimizer that is not available, since the expected profit need not be concave in QQQ; the goal is stated as a comparison of optimal values, which avoids it.

Formalization scope

All declarations live in DemandSubstitution.Correlation. Products are indexed by Fin n, 0-based. The model data and the standing assumptions ri>ci>si>0r_i>c_i>s_i>0ri​>ci​>si​>0, aij∈[0,1]a_{ij}\in[0,1]aij​∈[0,1], aii=0a_{ii}=0aii​=0, ∑jaij<1\sum_ja_{ij}<1∑j​aij​<1 form a structure Model n; uiu_iui​ and oio_ioi​ are definitions. The paper's §2 assumption that demand is continuous with positive support is dropped, as the paper drops it: a normal law charges negative demands. N(m,Σ)N(m,\Sigma)N(m,Σ) is Mathlib's multivariateGaussian on EuclideanSpace ℝ (Fin n), pushed forward to Fin n → ℝ; every statement assumes both covariance matrices positive semidefinite, because Mathlib's construction returns a Dirac mass otherwise. Correlations are encoded through covariances with fixed variances, which is equivalent to raising ρij\rho_{ij}ρij​. "Decreasing" is weak. Expectations are Bochner integrals; the profit integrands are Lipschitz and integrable under every normal law, and this integrability is to be proved, not assumed. Supermodularity and the supermodular order reuse the platform definitions SupermodularOn and SupermodularOrder.

A trivializing formalization is ruled out: the Müller–Scarsini comparison is a milestone theorem, never a hypothesis of the goal or of Proposition 5, and the "adjusted optimally" clause quantifies over every pair of maximizers, not over one chosen optimizer.

Contributions welcome: integrability of Lipschitz functions under multivariateGaussian; Gaussian interpolation for supermodular functions; the supermodular comparison itself, which would be reusable on its own.

Selected references

  • S. Netessine and N. Rudi, Centralized and Competitive Inventory Models with Demand Substitution, Simon School Working Paper OP 02-01, 2002, SSRN 303779. https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.303779 (published in Operations Research 51(2):329–335, 2003, https://doi.org/10.1287/opre.51.2.329.12788)
  • A. Müller and M. Scarsini, Some remarks on the supermodular order, Journal of Multivariate Analysis 73(1):107–119, 2000. https://doi.org/10.1006/jmva.1999.1867
  • D. M. Topkis, Supermodularity and Complementarity, Princeton University Press, 1998. https://doi.org/10.1515/9781400822539
  • K. Rajaram and C. S. Tang, The impact of product substitution on retail merchandising, working paper, University of California, Los Angeles, 1999 (reference [16] of the source; no stable link).
  • D. M. Topkis, Minimizing a submodular function on a lattice, Operations Research 26(2):305–321, 1978. https://doi.org/10.1287/opre.26.2.305
  • R. Ernst and P. Kouvelis, The effects of selling packaged goods on inventory decisions, Management Science 45(8):1142–1155, 1999. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.45.8.1142
9 thms2 active usersReviewed
Convex OptimizationOptimization·Captain: mikedeng1

On Implementing a Primal-Dual Interior-Point Method for Conic Quadratic Optimization I: Solutions of the Homogeneous Model Are Complementary and Give an Optimal Pair or an Infeasibility CertificateResearch Paper

Motivation

Conic optimization minimizes a linear function over the intersection of an affine subspace with a closed convex cone. Linear programming (the nonnegative orthant), second-order cone programming (products of quadratic cones) and semidefinite programming (the positive semidefinite cone) are all instances. Primal–dual interior-point methods are the standard algorithms for these problems, and production solvers for conic quadratic optimization, such as the MOSEK solver described by Andersen, Roos and Terlaky (Math. Program. 95 (2003)), are built on them.

The classical primal–dual method assumes that both the primal and the dual problem have strictly feasible points. A practical solver cannot assume this: it must also recognize infeasible problems and return a certificate. The device that handles this is the homogeneous model, introduced by Goldman and Tucker for linear programming (1956) and used in interior-point form by Ye, Todd and Mizuno (Math. Oper. Res. 19 (1994)). The model embeds the primal–dual pair into a larger homogeneous system that always has solutions; a solution with a positive homogenizing variable yields an optimal pair, and one with a positive slack variable yields an infeasibility certificate. Section 2 of Andersen, Roos and Terlaky states this generalization to an arbitrary pointed closed convex cone, and this mission formalizes it.

Setting

Let A∈Rm×nA \in \mathbb R^{m\times n}A∈Rm×n, b∈Rmb \in \mathbb R^mb∈Rm, c∈Rnc \in \mathbb R^nc∈Rn, and let K⊆RnK \subseteq \mathbb R^nK⊆Rn be a pointed closed convex cone: closed, convex, closed under multiplication by nonnegative scalars, and pointed, K∩(−K)={0}K \cap (-K) = \{0\}K∩(−K)={0} (it contains 000, and x∈Kx \in Kx∈K and −x∈K-x \in K−x∈K imply x=0x = 0x=0). Its dual cone is

K∗:={ s∈Rn:sTx≥0 for all x∈K }.K_* := \{\, s \in \mathbb R^n : s^Tx \ge 0 \text{ for all } x \in K \,\}.K∗​:={s∈Rn:sTx≥0 for all x∈K}.

The primal problem is (P)(P)(P): minimize cTxc^TxcTx subject to Ax=bAx = bAx=b, x∈Kx \in Kx∈K. The dual problem is (D)(D)(D): maximize bTyb^TybTy subject to ATy+s=cA^Ty + s = cATy+s=c, s∈K∗s \in K_*s∈K∗​. A point satisfying the constraints is feasible; a feasible point is optimal if no feasible point has a better objective value; a problem without feasible points is infeasible. (P)(P)(P) is strictly feasible if some xxx with Ax=bAx = bAx=b lies in the interior of KKK, and (D)(D)(D) if some (y,s)(y,s)(y,s) with ATy+s=cA^Ty + s = cATy+s=c has sss in the interior of K∗K_*K∗​.

The homogeneous model (7) of the paper asks for (x,τ,y,s,κ)(x, \tau, y, s, \kappa)(x,τ,y,s,κ) with

Ax−bτ=0,ATy+s−cτ=0,−cTx+bTy−κ=0,Ax - b\tau = 0,\qquad A^Ty + s - c\tau = 0,\qquad -c^Tx + b^Ty - \kappa = 0,Ax−bτ=0,ATy+s−cτ=0,−cTx+bTy−κ=0, x∈K, τ≥0,s∈K∗, κ≥0.x \in K,\ \tau \ge 0,\qquad s \in K_*,\ \kappa \ge 0.x∈K, τ≥0,s∈K∗​, κ≥0.

The quantity xTs+τκx^Ts + \tau\kappaxTs+τκ is its complementarity gap. In the Lean development these objects are dualCone, PrimalFeasible, DualFeasible, PrimalOptimal, DualOptimal, PrimalInfeasible, DualInfeasible and HomFeasible, all in the namespace ConicQuadIPM.Homogeneous.

Formalization targets

Goal: Lemma 2.1 (p. 6)

For every solution (x∗,τ∗,y∗,s∗,κ∗)(x^*, \tau^*, y^*, s^*, \kappa^*)(x∗,τ∗,y∗,s∗,κ∗) of (7):

(i)(x∗)Ts∗+τ∗κ∗=0;\text{(i)}\quad (x^*)^Ts^* + \tau^*\kappa^* = 0;(i)(x∗)Ts∗+τ∗κ∗=0; (ii)τ∗>0  ⟹  x∗/τ∗ is optimal for (P) and (y∗,s∗)/τ∗ is optimal for (D);\text{(ii)}\quad \tau^* > 0 \implies x^*/\tau^* \text{ is optimal for } (P) \text{ and } (y^*, s^*)/\tau^* \text{ is optimal for } (D);(ii)τ∗>0⟹x∗/τ∗ is optimal for (P) and (y∗,s∗)/τ∗ is optimal for (D); (iii)κ∗>0  ⟹  bTy∗>0 or cTx∗<0;  bTy∗>0⇒(P) infeasible;  cTx∗<0⇒(D) infeasible.\text{(iii)}\quad \kappa^* > 0 \implies b^Ty^* > 0 \ \text{or}\ c^Tx^* < 0;\ \ b^Ty^* > 0 \Rightarrow (P) \text{ infeasible};\ \ c^Tx^* < 0 \Rightarrow (D) \text{ infeasible}.(iii)κ∗>0⟹bTy∗>0 or cTx∗<0;  bTy∗>0⇒(P) infeasible;  cTx∗<0⇒(D) infeasible.

Milestones

  1. Theorem 2.1, weak duality (p. 4): for feasible xxx and (y,s)(y,s)(y,s), cTx−bTy=xTs≥0c^Tx - b^Ty = x^Ts \ge 0cTx−bTy=xTs≥0.
  2. Lemma 2.1 i) on its own.
  3. Theorem 2.1, primal infeasibility (5): s∈K∗s \in K_*s∈K∗​, ATy+s=0A^Ty + s = 0ATy+s=0, bTy>0b^Ty > 0bTy>0 imply that (P)(P)(P) is infeasible.
  4. Theorem 2.1, dual infeasibility (6): x∈Kx \in Kx∈K, Ax=0Ax = 0Ax=0, cTx<0c^Tx < 0cTx<0 imply that (D)(D)(D) is infeasible.
  5. From the proof of Lemma 2.1: κ∗>0\kappa^* > 0κ∗>0 forces bTy∗>0b^Ty^* > 0bTy∗>0 or cTx∗<0c^Tx^* < 0cTx∗<0.
  6. (10): if κ∗>0\kappa^* > 0κ∗>0 and bTy∗>0b^Ty^* > 0bTy∗>0, then bTy∗>0b^Ty^* > 0bTy∗>0, ATy∗+s∗=0A^Ty^* + s^* = 0ATy∗+s∗=0, s∗∈K∗s^* \in K_*s∗∈K∗​.
  7. (11): if κ∗>0\kappa^* > 0κ∗>0 and cTx∗<0c^Tx^* < 0cTx∗<0, then cTx∗<0c^Tx^* < 0cTx∗<0, Ax∗=0Ax^* = 0Ax∗=0, x∗∈Kx^* \in Kx∗∈K.
  8. Theorem 2.1, strong duality (p. 4): if one side is strictly feasible with a bounded objective, then (x,y,s)(x, y, s)(x,y,s) is optimal if and only if it is feasible with cTx−bTy=xTs=0c^Tx - b^Ty = x^Ts = 0cTx−bTy=xTs=0.

Significance

Lemma 2.1 is the correctness statement behind every homogeneous-model interior-point solver for conic problems: whatever solution with τ∗+κ∗>0\tau^* + \kappa^* > 0τ∗+κ∗>0 the algorithm approaches, it is either a scaled optimal primal–dual pair or a certificate of primal or dual infeasibility. Parts (iii) and the certificates (5)–(6) are the conic Farkas-type alternatives on which infeasibility reporting rests. The paper also notes the limit of the statement: for conic problems a solution with τ∗+κ∗>0\tau^* + \kappa^* > 0τ∗+κ∗>0 need not exist (a feasible conic quadratic pair with a nonzero duality gap is an example), unlike in linear programming.

The results are classical and proved on paper; the strong-duality part is cited from the literature rather than proved in the source. Linear-programming versions of the homogeneous-model properties exist as formal statements on the platform (from Ye–Todd–Mizuno, Vanderbei and Matoušek), but those concern the nonnegative orthant only. This mission states the general conic version over an arbitrary pointed closed convex cone, and the weak-duality and certificate statements it introduces are reusable by any later conic formalization.

Difficulty

Parts (i) and (ii) and the certificates are short arguments from the definitions; the formal work is in handling the cone axioms and the bilinear algebra cleanly. The step that is easy to overlook is in (iii): the identities ATy∗+s∗=0A^Ty^* + s^* = 0ATy∗+s∗=0 in (10) and Ax∗=0Ax^* = 0Ax∗=0 in (11) do not follow from the equations of (7) alone, because the terms cτ∗c\tau^*cτ∗ and bτ∗b\tau^*bτ∗ are present; the paper passes over this point. The strong-duality milestone is of a different order: it is a genuine conic duality theorem, cited rather than proved in the source, and it fails without the Slater-type hypothesis (feasible conic quadratic pairs with a nonzero duality gap exist).

Formalization scope

Vectors are Fin n → ℝ, uTvu^TvuTv is u ⬝ᵥ v, AxAxAx is A *ᵥ x and ATyA^TyATy is Aᵀ *ᵥ y; the paper's first coordinate is index 0. The standing assumption that KKK is a pointed closed convex cone is the hypothesis IsPointedClosedConvexCone K on every theorem, even where a proof uses less. The paper's further assumption that AAA has full row rank is stated "for convenience and without loss of generality" and is not used in any of these results; it is dropped, which makes every statement a generalization. A nonempty interior of KKK is not assumed, and no milestone except strong duality mentions interiors; there, interiors are topological interiors in Rn\mathbb R^nRn. Optimality is a predicate (feasible, and at least as good as every feasible point), never a value defined through an infimum or supremum, and infeasibility is the non-existence of a feasible point. Division by τ∗\tau^*τ∗ is scalar multiplication by (τ∗)−1(\tau^*)^{-1}(τ∗)−1 under τ∗>0\tau^* > 0τ∗>0.

A trivializing reading is excluded: part (ii) must conclude optimality of both the primal and the dual point against all feasible points, and part (iii) must conclude that the relevant problem has no feasible point, not merely the sign condition; the milestones (10) and (11) assume only κ∗>0\kappa^* > 0κ∗>0 and the respective inequality, never τ∗=0\tau^* = 0τ∗=0.

All definitions live in one module, Definitions.Def_ConicQuadIPM_Homogeneous_Setting. Contributions welcome: proofs of the milestones, a proof of conic strong duality in this standard form (the platform's Lagrangian conic Slater theorem may help), and reuse of weak duality and the certificates in later conic missions.

Selected references

  • E. D. Andersen, C. Roos, T. Terlaky, On implementing a primal-dual interior-point method for conic quadratic optimization, Mathematical Programming 95 (2003) 249–277. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10107-002-0349-3
  • A. J. Goldman, A. W. Tucker, Theory of linear programming, in Linear Inequalities and Related Systems, Annals of Mathematics Studies 38, Princeton University Press, 1956. https://doi.org/10.1515/9781400881987-005
  • Y. Ye, M. J. Todd, S. Mizuno, An O(nL)O(\sqrt n L)O(n​L)-iteration homogeneous and self-dual linear programming algorithm, Mathematics of Operations Research 19 (1994) 53–67. https://doi.org/10.1287/moor.19.1.53
  • Yu. Nesterov, M. J. Todd, Primal-dual interior-point methods for self-scaled cones, SIAM Journal on Optimization 8 (1998) 324–364. https://doi.org/10.1137/S1052623495290209
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Convex OptimizationOptimizationProbability·Captain: mikedeng1

Models for Minimax Stochastic Linear Optimization Problems with Risk Aversion 3: With Random Right-Hand Side and Known Dual Extreme Points, the Problem Equals the Semidefinite Program (14)Research Paper

Motivation

Two-stage stochastic linear programs model a decision xxx taken before uncertainty is revealed, followed by a corrective recourse action once it is. The classical model needs the full probability distribution of the uncertain data, which in practice is rarely known; often only estimates of the mean and the second moments are available, and the computed plan can be sensitive to the distribution assumed. The minimax (distributionally robust) approach replaces the single distribution by the class of all distributions with given first and second moments and optimizes against the worst member of that class. Bertsimas, Doan, Natarajan and Teo (Math. Oper. Res. 35(3), 2010) combine this with risk aversion, through a piecewise-linear disutility of the second-stage cost, and determine which instances can be solved as semidefinite programs.

When the randomness sits in the right-hand side of the second stage, the paper shows that the problem is NP-hard in general (Theorem 3.1). This mission concerns the tractable special case that follows (§3.2): if the extreme points of the dual feasible region of the recourse problem are known, the whole minimax problem is one semidefinite program.

Setting

A first-stage decision x∈Rnx\in\mathbb R^nx∈Rn is feasible if x∈X={x:Ax=b, x≥0}x\in X=\{x : Ax=b,\ x\ge 0\}x∈X={x:Ax=b, x≥0} and costs c′xc'xc′x. Given a recourse matrix W∈Rr×dW\in\mathbb R^{r\times d}W∈Rr×d, a technology matrix T∈Rr×nT\in\mathbb R^{r\times n}T∈Rr×n, a constant cost vector q∈Rdq\in\mathbb R^dq∈Rd and a realized right-hand side h∈Rrh\in\mathbb R^rh∈Rr, the second-stage cost is written as the optimal value of the dual of the recourse linear program,

Q(h,x)=max⁡p (h−Tx)′ps.t.W′p≤q.\mathcal Q(h,x)=\max_{p}\ (h-Tx)'p\quad\text{s.t.}\quad W'p\le q .Q(h,x)=pmax​ (h−Tx)′ps.t.W′p≤q.

Risk aversion enters through the disutility U(t)=max⁡k=1,…,K(αkt+βk)\mathbb U(t)=\max_{k=1,\dots,K}(\alpha_k t+\beta_k)U(t)=maxk=1,…,K​(αk​t+βk​) with αk≥0\alpha_k\ge 0αk​≥0. The right-hand side h~\tilde hh~ is random, and its distribution is only known to lie in the moment class

P={P:EP[h~]=μ, EP[h~h~′]=Q}.\mathcal P=\{P : \mathbb E_P[\tilde h]=\mu,\ \mathbb E_P[\tilde h\tilde h']=Q\}.P={P:EP​[h~]=μ, EP​[h~h~′]=Q}.

The worst-case expected disutility is Z^(x)=sup⁡P∈PEP[U(Q(h~,x))]\hat Z(x)=\sup_{P\in\mathcal P}\mathbb E_P[\mathbb U(\mathcal Q(\tilde h,x))]Z^(x)=supP∈P​EP​[U(Q(h~,x))], and the problem is

Z=min⁡x∈X(c′x+Z^(x)).Z=\min_{x\in X}\big(c'x+\hat Z(x)\big).Z=x∈Xmin​(c′x+Z^(x)).

The moment problem defining Z^(x)\hat Z(x)Z^(x) has the dual (12): minimize Q⋅Y+μ′y+y0Q\cdot Y+\mu'y+y_0Q⋅Y+μ′y+y0​ over symmetric YYY, y∈Rry\in\mathbb R^ry∈Rr, y0∈Ry_0\in\mathbb Ry0​∈R with h′Yh+y′h+y0≥U(Q(h,x))h'Yh+y'h+y_0\ge\mathbb U(\mathcal Q(h,x))h′Yh+y′h+y0​≥U(Q(h,x)) for every hhh, where Q⋅Y=∑i,jQijYijQ\cdot Y=\sum_{i,j}Q_{ij}Y_{ij}Q⋅Y=∑i,j​Qij​Yij​.

The standing assumptions are: XXX nonempty and bounded (Assumption 1); complete recourse, {Ww:w≥0}=Rr\{Ww : w\ge 0\}=\mathbb R^r{Ww:w≥0}=Rr (Assumption 2); a nonempty dual polyhedron {p:W′p≤q}\{p : W'p\le q\}{p:W′p≤q} (Assumption 3); Q≻μμ′Q\succ\mu\mu'Q≻μμ′ (Assumption 4); and the extreme points p1,…,pNp_1,\dots,p_Np1​,…,pN​ of {p:W′p≤q}\{p : W'p\le q\}{p:W′p≤q} are known (Assumption 5).

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 3.2 (p. 589)

The problem is equivalent to the semidefinite program

Z^SDP=min⁡x,Y,y,y0 c′x+Q⋅Y+μ′y+y0  s.t. (Y12(y−αkpi)12(y−αkpi)′y0+αkpi′Tx−βk)⪰0  ∀k,i,Ax=b, x≥0,(14)\hat Z_{\rm SDP}=\min_{x,Y,y,y_0}\ c'x+Q\cdot Y+\mu'y+y_0\ \ \text{s.t.}\ \begin{pmatrix}Y & \tfrac12(y-\alpha_k p_i)\\ \tfrac12(y-\alpha_k p_i)' & y_0+\alpha_k p_i'Tx-\beta_k\end{pmatrix}\succeq 0\ \ \forall k,i,\quad Ax=b,\ x\ge 0, \tag{14}Z^SDP​=x,Y,y,y0​min​ c′x+Q⋅Y+μ′y+y0​  s.t. (Y21​(y−αk​pi​)′​21​(y−αk​pi​)y0​+αk​pi′​Tx−βk​​)⪰0  ∀k,i,Ax=b, x≥0,(14)

in the sense that Z^(x)\hat Z(x)Z^(x) equals the value of the per-xxx program (15) for every x∈Xx\in Xx∈X, and Z=Z^SDPZ=\hat Z_{\rm SDP}Z=Z^SDP​, both being genuine finite infima.

Milestones (§3.1 and the proof of Theorem 3.2, pp. 588–590)

  1. Strong duality for (11)/(12): Z^(x)=Z^D(x)\hat Z(x)=\hat Z_D(x)Z^(x)=Z^D​(x).
  2. The constraints of (12) are equivalent to h′Yh+(y−αkp)′h+y0+αkp′Tx−βk≥0h'Yh+(y-\alpha_kp)'h+y_0+\alpha_kp'Tx-\beta_k\ge 0h′Yh+(y−αk​p)′h+y0​+αk​p′Tx−βk​≥0 for all hhh, all ppp with W′p≤qW'p\le qW′p≤q and all kkk.
  3. Every feasible YYY of (12) is positive semidefinite.
  4. Q(h,x)=max⁡i=1,…,N(h−Tx)′pi\mathcal Q(h,x)=\max_{i=1,\dots,N}(h-Tx)'p_iQ(h,x)=maxi=1,…,N​(h−Tx)′pi​.
  5. A quadratic h′Yh+2v′h+ch'Yh+2v'h+ch′Yh+2v′h+c is nonnegative on Rr\mathbb R^rRr iff the bordered matrix (Yvv′c)\begin{pmatrix}Y&v\\v'&c\end{pmatrix}(Yv′​vc​) is positive semidefinite (already proved on the platform).
  6. The feasible sets of (12) and (15) coincide, so Z^D(x)\hat Z_D(x)Z^D​(x) is the value of (15).

Significance

The result. Theorem 3.2 turns a two-level problem — a minimum over xxx of a supremum over an infinite-dimensional set of distributions — into one convex program of polynomial size in nnn, rrr, KKK and NNN, jointly in the first-stage decision and the dual multipliers. The first-stage decision enters the linear matrix inequalities only through the corner entry y0+αkpi′Tx−βky_0+\alpha_kp_i'Tx-\beta_ky0​+αk​pi′​Tx−βk​, which is affine in xxx; this is what keeps the joint program convex. Together with the NP-hardness of the general case (Theorem 3.1), it locates the source of intractability in the enumeration of dual vertices. The same program (15) is the starting point of the construction of an extremal distribution (Theorem 3.3), which the paper uses to stress-test first-stage solutions.

Formalizing it. The result is proved in the paper, with strong duality for the moment problem cited from the literature. Nothing in this chain is formalized: neither the moment-problem duality under the interior condition Q≻μμ′Q\succ\mu\mu'Q≻μμ′, nor the vertex representation of a bounded linear program over a pointed polyhedron given by its extreme points. The lemma that a nonnegative quadratic corresponds to a positive semidefinite bordered matrix is already proved on the platform and is reused.

Difficulty

The reduction from (12) to (15) is elementary once Q(h,x)=max⁡i(h−Tx)′pi\mathcal Q(h,x)=\max_i(h-Tx)'p_iQ(h,x)=maxi​(h−Tx)′pi​ is available, but that identity is a genuine statement about polyhedra: the dual region {p:W′p≤q}\{p : W'p\le q\}{p:W′p≤q} is unbounded, so compactness arguments such as Krein–Milman do not apply, and one needs both that the polyhedron is pointed (here a consequence of complete recourse, which forces WWW to have full row rank) and that a bounded linear objective attains its maximum at a vertex. The other substantial step is strong duality between the moment problem over measures and the semi-infinite dual (12), which requires the moment vector (μ,Q)(\mu,Q)(μ,Q) to lie in the interior of the moment cone; without Q≻μμ′Q\succ\mu\mu'Q≻μμ′ a duality gap or an empty class P\mathcal PP can occur. Finally, the equality Z=Z^SDPZ=\hat Z_{\rm SDP}Z=Z^SDP​ requires exchanging an infimum over xxx with the infimum over the dual variables, which needs each per-xxx program to be feasible and bounded.

Formalization scope

Vectors are Fin n → ℝ, matrices Matrix (Fin r) (Fin d) ℝ, and pieces and extreme points are indexed by Fin K and Fin N (zero-based). The paper's letter ppp is both the dimension of qqq and the dual variable; in Lean the dimension is ddd and the dual vector is π. The class P\mathcal PP consists of probability measures on Rr\mathbb R^rRr with square-integrable coordinates, mean μ\muμ and uncentred second-moment matrix QQQ, built on the published MomentDRO.Conf.Setting; the paper's densities are replaced by measures. Q(h,x)\mathcal Q(h,x)Q(h,x) is the real supremum over the dual polyhedron. Every printed min/max is a real infimum/supremum of a set of objective values, and the statements assert with IsLUB/IsGLB that these are genuine finite bounds; attainment of the minima is not claimed. YYY is required symmetric throughout. The bordered matrix is the published WorstCaseVaR.KnownMoments.bordered and ⪰0\succeq 0⪰0 is Matrix.PosSemidef.

Readings of the source:

  • As printed, Assumption 2 (complete recourse) and Assumption 3 ("for all qqq") contradict each other when r≥1r\ge 1r≥1. The section-wise reading is used: complete recourse together with dual feasibility at the single constant qqq of §3.
  • "Assumption i" in Theorem 3.2 and in its proof is read as Assumption 5.
  • "The strong duality condition" is read as Assumption 4.
  • Assumption 5 is the hypothesis that the list p1,…,pNp_1,\dots,p_Np1​,…,pN​ is exactly the set of extreme points of the dual region; "explicitly known" has no further mathematical content.
  • (11) integrates over Rp\mathbb R^pRp where Rr\mathbb R^rRr is meant.

A formalization in which Z^SDP\hat Z_{\rm SDP}Z^SDP​ is defined through Z^D(x)\hat Z_D(x)Z^D​(x), or in which positive semidefiniteness is replaced by a hand-written quadratic condition, would make the goal a restatement of strong duality; (14) is stated as a single program in (x,Y,y,y0)(x,Y,y,y_0)(x,Y,y,y0​) with Matrix.PosSemidef constraints. The hypotheses of the goal are satisfiable (r=1r=1r=1, W=[1,−1]W=[1,-1]W=[1,−1], q=(1,1)q=(1,1)q=(1,1), μ=0\mu=0μ=0, Q=1Q=1Q=1, X={1}X=\{1\}X={1}).

Contributions welcome: the vertex representation of bounded linear programs over pointed polyhedra, and duality for moment problems with first and second moments, are both reusable well beyond this mission.

Selected references

  • D. Bertsimas, X. V. Doan, K. Natarajan, C.-P. Teo, Models for Minimax Stochastic Linear Optimization Problems with Risk Aversion, Mathematics of Operations Research 35(3):580–602, 2010. https://doi.org/10.1287/moor.1100.0445
  • K. Isii, On sharpness of Tchebycheff-type inequalities, Annals of the Institute of Statistical Mathematics 14:185–197, 1962. https://doi.org/10.1007/BF02868641
  • A. Shapiro, On duality theory of conic linear problems, in Semi-Infinite Programming, Kluwer, 2001, pp. 135–165. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4757-3403-4_7
  • L. El Ghaoui, M. Oks, F. Oustry, Worst-case value-at-risk and robust portfolio optimization: a conic programming approach, Operations Research 51(4):543–556, 2003. https://doi.org/10.1287/opre.51.4.543.16101
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