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Operations Research

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The discipline of applying mathematical analysis to complex decision problems in operations: allocating scarce resources, scheduling, routing, inventory, and the design of service and production systems. Drawing on mathematical programming, stochastic modeling, queueing, simulation, and game-theoretic reasoning, it seeks policies that perform provably well in systems shaped by constraints, congestion, and uncertainty.

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Numerical AnalysisProbabilityStochastic Systems·Captain: mikedeng1

An Approximation to the Invariant Measure of the Limiting Diffusion of G/Ph/n + GI Queues in the Halfin–Whitt Regime and Related Asymptotics 1: Euler–Maruyama Error C_ς η^{(1−ς)/2} in Wasserstein-1Research Paper

Motivation

Many-server queues are the basic model of call centres and hospital wards, and the Halfin–Whitt regime (the number of servers nnn grows while the traffic intensity approaches one at rate n−1/2n^{-1/2}n−1/2) is where such systems operate efficiently and with short delays. In this regime the centred and scaled queue process of a G/Ph/n+GIG/Ph/n+GIG/Ph/n+GI queue (general arrivals, phase-type service, nnn servers, generally distributed patience) converges to a ddd-dimensional diffusion, ddd being the number of service phases (Dai, He and Tezcan, Ann. Appl. Probab. 2010). For GI/Ph/n+MGI/Ph/n+MGI/Ph/n+M queues the stationary distribution of the queue converges to the invariant measure μ\muμ of that diffusion (Dai, Dieker and Gao, Queueing Systems 2014). So μ\muμ is the object one would like to compute.

With exponential service the diffusion is one-dimensional and μ\muμ is explicit. With phase-type service it is multidimensional with a piecewise-linear drift; Dieker and Gao (Ann. Appl. Probab. 2013) proved that it is exponentially ergodic with a unique μ\muμ, but no closed form is known, and the characterization of multidimensional piecewise-linear diffusions was left open in Browne and Whitt (1995). Jin, Pang, Xu and Xu (arXiv:2209.07361) approximate μ\muμ by the invariant measure of the Euler–Maruyama discretization and give an explicit error rate in the Wasserstein-1 distance.

Setting

Fix d≥1d\ge1d≥1, a patience rate α>0\alpha>0α>0, a slack β∈R\beta\in\mathbb Rβ∈R, a probability vector p∈Rdp\in\mathbb R^dp∈Rd, service rates v1,…,vd>0v_1,\dots,v_d>0v1​,…,vd​>0 and a sub-stochastic phase-transition matrix PPP with Pii=0P_{ii}=0Pii​=0 and I−PI-PI−P invertible. Let R=(I−P′) diag(v)R=(I-P')\,\mathrm{diag}(v)R=(I−P′)diag(v), e=(1,…,1)′e=(1,\dots,1)'e=(1,…,1)′, and assume the phase-type distribution has mean one, e′R−1p=1e'R^{-1}p=1e′R−1p=1. The drift is the piecewise-linear map

g(x)=−βp−Rx+(R−αI)p (e′x)+,y+=max⁡{0,y}.g(x)=-\beta p-Rx+(R-\alpha I)p\,(e'x)^+,\qquad y^+=\max\{0,y\}.g(x)=−βp−Rx+(R−αI)p(e′x)+,y+=max{0,y}.

Let σ\sigmaσ be a d×dd\times dd×d matrix with ξ′σσ′ξ≥c ξ′ξ\xi'\sigma\sigma'\xi\ge c\,\xi'\xiξ′σσ′ξ≥cξ′ξ for some c>0c>0c>0 (in the queueing model σσ′\sigma\sigma'σσ′ has an explicit formula in terms of the arrival variability ca2c_a^2ca2​, ppp, PPP, vvv; only the ellipticity is used). The limiting diffusion is

Xt=x+∫0tg(Xs) ds+σBt,X_t=x+\int_0^t g(X_s)\,ds+\sigma B_t,Xt​=x+∫0t​g(Xs​)ds+σBt​,

with BBB a standard ddd-dimensional Brownian motion; Pt(x,⋅)P_t(x,\cdot)Pt​(x,⋅) is the law of XtX_tXt​ started at xxx, and μ\muμ is a probability measure with ∫Pt(x,⋅) μ(dx)=μ\int P_t(x,\cdot)\,\mu(dx)=\mu∫Pt​(x,⋅)μ(dx)=μ for all t≥0t\ge0t≥0.

The Euler–Maruyama chain with step η>0\eta>0η>0 is

X~k+1η=X~kη+g(X~kη) η+η σξk+1,k∈N0,\tilde X^\eta_{k+1}=\tilde X^\eta_k+g(\tilde X^\eta_k)\,\eta+\sqrt\eta\,\sigma\xi_{k+1},\qquad k\in\mathbb N_0,X~k+1η​=X~kη​+g(X~kη​)η+η​σξk+1​,k∈N0​,

with independent standard Gaussian ξk\xi_kξk​; its one-step kernel is P~η(x,⋅)=N(x+ηg(x),ησσ′)\tilde P_\eta(x,\cdot)=\mathcal N(x+\eta g(x),\eta\sigma\sigma')P~η​(x,⋅)=N(x+ηg(x),ησσ′), and μ~η\tilde\mu_\etaμ~​η​ denotes an invariant probability measure of it. The Wasserstein-1 distance is taken in its dual form

dW(μ1,μ2)=sup⁡h∈Lip(1)∣∫h dμ1−∫h dμ2∣,d_W(\mu_1,\mu_2)=\sup_{h\in\mathrm{Lip}(1)}\Big|\int h\,d\mu_1-\int h\,d\mu_2\Big|,dW​(μ1​,μ2​)=h∈Lip(1)sup​​∫hdμ1​−∫hdμ2​​,

where Lip(1)\mathrm{Lip}(1)Lip(1) is the set of hhh with ∣h(x)−h(y)∣≤∣x−y∣|h(x)-h(y)|\le|x-y|∣h(x)−h(y)∣≤∣x−y∣.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 1.2(i)

There is η0>0\eta_0>0η0​>0 such that for every ς∈(0,1)\varsigma\in(0,1)ς∈(0,1) there is Cς>0C_\varsigma>0Cς​>0, depending on ς\varsigmaς but not on η\etaη, such that for every η∈(0,η0]\eta\in(0,\eta_0]η∈(0,η0​] the chain has a unique invariant probability measure μ~η\tilde\mu_\etaμ~​η​ and

dW(μ,μ~η)≤Cς η1−ς2.d_W(\mu,\tilde\mu_\eta)\le C_\varsigma\,\eta^{\frac{1-\varsigma}{2}}.dW​(μ,μ~​η​)≤Cς​η21−ς​.

The constants are left unspecified, so the goal survives any improvement of them.

Milestones

In the order the proof uses them:

  1. (A.4)–(A.7): a C2C^2C2 Lyapunov function VVV with c^1∣y∣2≤V(y)≤C^∣y∣2+C^′\hat c_1|y|^2\le V(y)\le\hat C|y|^2+\hat C'c^1​∣y∣2≤V(y)≤C^∣y∣2+C^′, ∣∇V(y)∣≤C(1+∣y∣)|\nabla V(y)|\le C(1+|y|)∣∇V(y)∣≤C(1+∣y∣) and AV≤−c1V+c˘1\mathcal AV\le-c_1V+\breve c_1AV≤−c1​V+c˘1​, where A\mathcal AA is the generator.
  2. Lemma A.1: moment bounds EVℓ(Xtx)≤e−c1tVℓ(x)+c˘ℓ(1−e−c1t)/c1\mathbb EV^\ell(X^x_t)\le e^{-c_1t}V^\ell(x)+\breve c_\ell(1-e^{-c_1t})/c_1EVℓ(Xtx​)≤e−c1​tVℓ(x)+c˘ℓ​(1−e−c1​t)/c1​, and exponential ergodicity of the diffusion in dWd_WdW​ and in weighted total variation.
  3. Lemma A.2: P~ηf\tilde P_\eta fP~η​f is Lipschitz for bounded measurable fff (strong Feller), and the chain is irreducible.
  4. Lemma A.3: the one-step error E∣Xηx−X~1η,x∣2ℓ≤C~ℓ(1+Vℓ(x))η3ℓ\mathbb E|X^x_\eta-\tilde X^{\eta,x}_1|^{2\ell}\le\tilde C_\ell(1+V^\ell(x))\eta^{3\ell}E∣Xηx​−X~1η,x​∣2ℓ≤C~ℓ​(1+Vℓ(x))η3ℓ.
  5. Lemma A.4: the drift condition P~ηVℓ≤(e−c1η+C~ℓη3/2)Vℓ+Kˇℓ\tilde P_\eta V^\ell\le(e^{-c_1\eta}+\tilde C_\ell\eta^{3/2})V^\ell+\check K_\ellP~η​Vℓ≤(e−c1​η+C~ℓ​η3/2)Vℓ+Kˇℓ​ for the chain.
  6. Proposition 2.1: existence, uniqueness and exponential ergodicity of μ~η\tilde\mu_\etaμ~​η​, and μ~η(∣⋅∣ℓ)≤C\tilde\mu_\eta(|\cdot|^\ell)\le Cμ~​η​(∣⋅∣ℓ)≤C uniformly in η\etaη.
  7. Lemma 2.2: for the solution fff of the Stein equation Af=h−μ(h)\mathcal Af=h-\mu(h)Af=h−μ(h) with h∈Lip0(1)h\in\mathrm{Lip}_0(1)h∈Lip0​(1), the polynomial bounds on f,∇f,∇2ff,\nabla f,\nabla^2ff,∇f,∇2f and the local (1−ς)(1-\varsigma)(1−ς)-Hölder bound on ∇2f\nabla^2 f∇2f.
  8. (2.7)–(2.8): the second-order Taylor remainder in Stein's argument is O(η(3−ς)/2)O(\eta^{(3-\varsigma)/2})O(η(3−ς)/2).

Significance

The theorem gives a computable approximation of the stationary distribution of the diffusion limit, with an explicit rate. Combined with the convergence of the scaled queue's stationary distribution to μ\muμ at rate n(ς−1)/2n^{(\varsigma-1)/2}n(ς−1)/2 for M/Ph/n+MM/Ph/n+MM/Ph/n+M queues (Braverman and Dai), it yields an approximation of the steady state of the queue itself, by simulating the chain for O(nlog⁡n)O(n\log n)O(nlogn) steps (Remark 2.3 of the paper). Proposition 2.1 also shows that the explicit Euler scheme does not blow up for this non-gradient, non-differentiable drift, which is not automatic: the Euler scheme of an ergodic SDE may blow up.

The result is proved in the paper; nothing here is open mathematically, though Lemma 2.2 is imported from Gurvich's regularity theory rather than proved there. To our knowledge none of it is formalized. A formalization provides the first machine-checked Wasserstein bound between the invariant measures of a multidimensional diffusion and its discretization, and on the way the Lyapunov and Harris-type ergodicity theory of Euler–Maruyama chains.

Difficulty

Standard error analyses of Euler schemes for invariant measures assume a gradient drift, strong dissipativity, or several bounded derivatives; none holds here. The drift is not differentiable on the hyperplane {e′x=0}\{e'x=0\}{e′x=0} and is dissipative only in the Lyapunov sense of Dieker and Gao, so contraction-based couplings do not apply. The Stein argument instead needs second derivatives of the Stein solution fff that are Hölder continuous with polynomially growing constants; this is where the loss η−ς/2\eta^{-\varsigma/2}η−ς/2 comes from, and it rests on elliptic regularity for an operator with only Lipschitz coefficients. The ergodicity of the chain must also hold with constants uniform in η\etaη, which the classical Lyapunov criteria do not give directly.

Formalization scope

  • The state space is EuclideanSpace ℝ (Fin d), so ∣⋅∣|\cdot|∣⋅∣ is the Euclidean norm; matrices act by the usual product, and ∥A∥op=sup⁡∣u∣=1∣Au∣\|A\|_{\mathrm{op}}=\sup_{|u|=1}|Au|∥A∥op​=sup∣u∣=1​∣Au∣.
  • σ\sigmaσ is a general uniformly elliptic matrix, not the paper's explicit covariance; the general case contains the paper's.
  • Brownian motion is the published EthierKurtz.IsStandardBrownian (time ℝ≥0). The diffusion is a pathwise integral equation with continuous paths, so no Itô integral is needed. The transition function PtP_tPt​ is characterized by: on every probability space, every solution from xxx has law Pt(x,⋅)P_t(x,\cdot)Pt​(x,⋅) at time ttt. μ\muμ is a hypothesis (an invariant probability measure of PtP_tPt​), never assumed smooth or with moments.
  • The chain's kernel is the image of stdGaussian under z↦x+ηg(x)+η σzz\mapsto x+\eta g(x)+\sqrt\eta\,\sigma zz↦x+ηg(x)+η​σz; k∈N0k\in\mathbb N_0k∈N0​ starts at 000.
  • dWd_WdW​, ∥⋅∥TV\|\cdot\|_{\mathrm{TV}}∥⋅∥TV​ and ∥⋅∥TV,V\|\cdot\|_{\mathrm{TV},V}∥⋅∥TV,V​ take values in [0,∞][0,\infty][0,∞] and equal +∞+\infty+∞ unless the needed first moment (or ∫(1+V)\int(1+V)∫(1+V)) is finite; so a bound on dWd_WdW​ cannot hold because an integral of a non-integrable test function defaults to 000. All moment bounds are lower Lebesgue integrals.
  • "For any small enough ς\varsigmaς" is read as every ς∈(0,1)\varsigma\in(0,1)ς∈(0,1); the step threshold η0\eta_0η0​ is chosen before ς\varsigmaς, and CςC_\varsigmaCς​ before η\etaη.
  • The Stein solution is f=−∫0∞(Pth−μ(h)) dtf=-\int_0^\infty(P_th-\mu(h))\,dtf=−∫0∞​(Pt​h−μ(h))dt (the paper's (3.2)); Lemma 2.2 concludes that it is C2C^2C2 and solves Af=h−μ(h)\mathcal Af=h-\mu(h)Af=h−μ(h), so its derivatives are never junk.
  • Lemma A.2's gradient bound is stated in Lipschitz form, since P~ηf\tilde P_\eta fP~η​f need not be differentiable where ggg is not.

Trivializing encodings are excluded: the existence and uniqueness of μ~η\tilde\mu_\etaμ~​η​ is a conclusion, not a hypothesis, and the distance is infinite rather than zero when moments fail.

A complete development needs Brownian motion with Gaussian increments, a pathwise SDE solution theory for Lipschitz drift, Itô's formula (or Dynkin's formula) for C2C^2C2 functions of additive-noise diffusions, Harris-type ergodic theorems for Feller chains and diffusions, and elliptic regularity for the Stein equation. The Harris theorems and Wasserstein machinery are reusable well beyond this mission. Contributions to any milestone, and to general infrastructure for Euler–Maruyama chains, are welcome.

Selected references

  • X. H. Jin, G. Pang, L. Xu, X. Xu, An approximation to the invariant measure of the limiting diffusion of G/Ph/n+GI queues in the Halfin–Whitt regime and related asymptotics, arXiv:2209.07361v1, 2022. https://arxiv.org/abs/2209.07361
  • A. B. Dieker, X. Gao, Positive recurrence of piecewise Ornstein–Uhlenbeck processes and common quadratic Lyapunov functions, Annals of Applied Probability 23(4): 1291–1317, 2013.
  • J. G. Dai, S. He, T. Tezcan, Many-server diffusion limits for G/Ph/n+GI queues, Annals of Applied Probability 20(5): 1854–1890, 2010.
  • J. G. Dai, A. B. Dieker, X. Gao, Validity of heavy-traffic steady-state approximations in many-server queues with abandonment, Queueing Systems 78(1): 1–29, 2014.
  • S. Browne, W. Whitt, Piecewise-linear diffusion processes, in J. Dshalalow (ed.), Advances in Queueing: Theory, Methods, and Open Problems, 463–480, 1995.
  • I. Gurvich, Diffusion models and steady-state approximations for exponentially ergodic Markovian queues, Annals of Applied Probability 24(6): 2527–2559, 2014.
  • A. Braverman, J. G. Dai, Stein's method for steady-state diffusion approximations of M/Ph/n+M systems, Annals of Applied Probability 27(1): 550–581, 2017.
  • M. Hairer, J. C. Mattingly, Spectral gaps in Wasserstein distances and the 2D stochastic Navier–Stokes equations, Annals of Probability 36(6): 2050–2091, 2008.

Bibliographic data as in the reference list of arXiv:2209.07361v1, pp. 35–37.

17 thms1 active userReviewed
Markov ChainProbabilityStochastic Systems·Captain: mikedeng1

An Approximation to the Invariant Measure of the Limiting Diffusion of G/Ph/n + GI Queues in the Halfin–Whitt Regime and Related Asymptotics 2: CLT for Occupation Measures With Variance µ(|σ′∇f|²)Research Paper

Motivation

In a many-server queue with nnn servers, the Halfin–Whitt (quality-and-efficiency-driven) regime lets n→∞n\to\inftyn→∞ while the arrival rate approaches capacity at rate n\sqrt nn​. In this regime the centred and scaled number of customers in each service phase of a G/Ph/n+GIG/Ph/n+GIG/Ph/n+GI queue (general arrivals, phase-type service, general patience) converges to a ddd-dimensional diffusion with a piecewise-linear drift (Dai, He and Tezcan, Ann. Appl. Probab. 2010). This diffusion is exponentially ergodic with a unique invariant measure μ\muμ (Dieker and Gao, Ann. Appl. Probab. 2013), but for d≥2d\ge2d≥2 no explicit formula for μ\muμ is known.

Since μ\muμ is not explicit, its averages μ(h)\mu(h)μ(h) are estimated by simulation, for example by the time average of hhh along one long trajectory. The second main result of Jin, Pang, Xu and Xu (arXiv:2209.07361) is a central limit theorem for these time averages. It gives the t\sqrt tt​ rate of convergence, for every starting point, and identifies the limiting variance through the solution of a Stein (Poisson) equation.

Setting

A model consists of d≥1d\ge1d≥1, a patience rate α>0\alpha>0α>0, β∈R\beta\in\mathbb Rβ∈R, a probability vector p∈Rdp\in\mathbb R^dp∈Rd, service rates vk>0v_k>0vk​>0, a sub-stochastic matrix PPP with Pii=0P_{ii}=0Pii​=0 and I−PI-PI−P invertible, and a d×dd\times dd×d matrix σ\sigmaσ. Put R=(I−P′)diag(v)R=(I-P')\mathrm{diag}(v)R=(I−P′)diag(v) and e=(1,…,1)′e=(1,\dots,1)'e=(1,…,1)′. The phase distribution has mean one, e′R−1p=1e'R^{-1}p=1e′R−1p=1, and σσ′\sigma\sigma'σσ′ is uniformly elliptic: ξ′σσ′ξ≥c∣ξ∣2\xi'\sigma\sigma'\xi\ge c|\xi|^2ξ′σσ′ξ≥c∣ξ∣2 for some c>0c>0c>0. The drift is

g(x)=−βp−Rx+(R−αI)p (e′x)+,g(x)=-\beta p-Rx+(R-\alpha I)p\,(e'x)^+ ,g(x)=−βp−Rx+(R−αI)p(e′x)+,

and the limiting diffusion solves, for a standard Brownian motion BBB,

Xtx=x+∫0tg(Xsx) ds+σBt.X^x_t=x+\int_0^tg(X^x_s)\,ds+\sigma B_t .Xtx​=x+∫0t​g(Xsx​)ds+σBt​.

Its semigroup is Pth(x)=Eh(Xtx)P_th(x)=\mathbb Eh(X^x_t)Pt​h(x)=Eh(Xtx​) and μ\muμ is its invariant probability measure. For bounded measurable hhh, the empirical average is Etx(h)=1t∫0th(Xsx) ds\mathcal E^x_t(h)=\frac1t\int_0^th(X^x_s)\,dsEtx​(h)=t1​∫0t​h(Xsx​)ds. The Stein solution is

f(x)=−∫0∞(Pth(x)−μ(h)) dt,f(x)=-\int_0^\infty\big(P_th(x)-\mu(h)\big)\,dt ,f(x)=−∫0∞​(Pt​h(x)−μ(h))dt,

which solves Af=h−μ(h)\mathcal Af=h-\mu(h)Af=h−μ(h) for the generator Af=⟨∇f,g⟩+12⟨σσ′,∇2f⟩HS\mathcal Af=\langle\nabla f,g\rangle+\frac12\langle\sigma\sigma',\nabla^2f\rangle_{HS}Af=⟨∇f,g⟩+21​⟨σσ′,∇2f⟩HS​. Here ∥h∥∞\|h\|_\infty∥h∥∞​ is the essential supremum of ∣h∣|h|∣h∣.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 1.3

There is C>0C>0C>0 such that for every bounded measurable hhh, fff is differentiable, μ(∣σ′∇f∣2)≤C∥h∥∞2\mu(|\sigma'\nabla f|^2)\le C\|h\|_\infty^2μ(∣σ′∇f∣2)≤C∥h∥∞2​, and for every xxx

t [Etx(h)−μ(h)]⇒N(0,μ(∣σ′∇f∣2))(t→∞).\sqrt t\,\big[\mathcal E^x_t(h)-\mu(h)\big]\Rightarrow\mathcal N\big(0,\mu(|\sigma'\nabla f|^2)\big)\qquad(t\to\infty).t​[Etx​(h)−μ(h)]⇒N(0,μ(∣σ′∇f∣2))(t→∞).

Milestones (§3 of the paper)

  • Lemma 3.2: the integral defining fff converges, fff solves (3.1) in integrated form, and f(x)=∫0∞e−λtPt[λf−h+μ(h)](x) dtf(x)=\int_0^\infty e^{-\lambda t}P_t[\lambda f-h+\mu(h)](x)\,dtf(x)=∫0∞​e−λtPt​[λf−h+μ(h)](x)dt for every λ>0\lambda>0λ>0.
  • Lemma 3.4: moment bounds E∣Xtx∣m≤eCt(∣x∣m+1)\mathbb E|X^x_t|^m\le e^{Ct}(|x|^m+1)E∣Xtx​∣m≤eCt(∣x∣m+1), uniform over a family of mollified diffusions XεX^{\varepsilon}Xε, and E∣Xtε,x−Xtx∣m→0\mathbb E|X^{\varepsilon,x}_t-X^x_t|^m\to0E∣Xtε,x​−Xtx​∣m→0.
  • Proposition 3.7: the weighted occupation time of e′Xxe'X^xe′Xx in [−ϵ,ϵ][-\epsilon,\epsilon][−ϵ,ϵ] has mean at most Cϵect(1+∣x∣)(1+t)C\epsilon e^{ct}(1+|x|)(1+t)Cϵect(1+∣x∣)(1+t).
  • Lemma 3.5: the Jacobians of the mollified diffusions converge almost surely, simultaneously for all 0≤s≤t0\le s\le t0≤s≤t, to the Jacobian JxJ^xJx of XxX^xXx.
  • Lemma 3.6: LmL^mLm bounds C∣u∣mt−m/2emCoptC|u|^mt^{-m/2}e^{mC_{op}t}C∣u∣mt−m/2emCop​t on the weights Iux(t)=1t∫0t⟨σ−1Jrxu,dBr⟩\mathcal I^x_u(t)=\frac1t\int_0^t\langle\sigma^{-1}J^x_ru,dB_r\rangleIux​(t)=t1​∫0t​⟨σ−1Jrx​u,dBr​⟩, and their convergence as ε→0\varepsilon\to0ε→0.
  • Lemma 3.3: ∇uEψ(Xtx)=E[ψ(Xtx)Iux(t)]\nabla_u\mathbb E\psi(X^x_t)=\mathbb E[\psi(X^x_t)\mathcal I^x_u(t)]∇u​Eψ(Xtx​)=E[ψ(Xtx​)Iux​(t)] for C1C^1C1 functions ψ\psiψ with bounded gradient.
  • Proposition 3.1: ∣f(x)∣,∣∇f(x)∣≤C∥h∥∞(1+∣x∣2)|f(x)|,|\nabla f(x)|\le C\|h\|_\infty(1+|x|^2)∣f(x)∣,∣∇f(x)∣≤C∥h∥∞​(1+∣x∣2).

Significance

The theorem gives the rate t\sqrt tt​ and the asymptotic variance of the standard ergodic-average estimator of μ(h)\mu(h)μ(h), which yields asymptotic confidence intervals for steady-state performance measures of the queue approximated by the diffusion. The function hhh need only be bounded and measurable, so indicator functions are included, for example the probability that the total queue e′Xe'Xe′X exceeds a level. The same variance governs the moderate deviation principle (Theorem 1.4 of the paper), which is a planned follow-up.

The result is proved in the source paper. None of it is formalized. Formalizing it requires Lean infrastructure that does not exist yet and is reusable beyond queueing: Stein/Poisson equations for non-smooth drifts, a Bismut–Elworthy–Li formula, derivative flows of diffusions, and a continuous-time martingale CLT.

Difficulty

The obvious argument applies Itô's formula to the Stein solution f(Xt)f(X_t)f(Xt​): the time average becomes a martingale plus a boundary term, and a martingale CLT finishes the proof. That argument needs f∈C1f\in C^1f∈C1 with polynomial growth of ∇f\nabla f∇f. For bounded measurable hhh, classical regularity results for Stein equations do not apply, and the drift ggg is not differentiable on the hyperplane e′x=0e'x=0e′x=0, so the diffusion cannot be differentiated in its starting point directly. The central difficulty is Proposition 3.1, a gradient bound for fff when neither hhh nor ggg is differentiable.

Formalization scope

  • The state space is EuclideanSpace ℝ (Fin d) with the Euclidean norm. Matrices act through Matrix.toEuclideanCLM, whose norm is the operator norm.
  • Time is ℝ≥0. Brownian motion is the published predicate EthierKurtz.IsStandardBrownian. The diffusion is the pathwise solution of the integral equation above, for every ω\omegaω.
  • Statements take (Ω,P,B,X)(\Omega,\mathbb P,B,X)(Ω,P,B,X) and an invariant probability measure μ\muμ as hypotheses. Both exist, and the conclusions depend only on the law.
  • σ\sigmaσ is a general uniformly elliptic matrix. The paper's explicit formula for σσ′\sigma\sigma'σσ′ (p. 3) is one instance, and Remark 1.1 says the results use only ellipticity.
  • "fff is the solution to (3.1)" means the function (3.2). Its differentiability is part of the conclusions, because in Lean the gradient of a non-differentiable function is 000 and the variance could otherwise vanish silently.
  • Weak convergence is convergence of Eφ(Yt)\mathbb E\varphi(Y_t)Eφ(Yt​) for every bounded continuous φ\varphiφ (§1.4), along real t→∞t\to\inftyt→∞. Expectations of powers are lower Lebesgue integrals.
  • The constant CCC in the goal and in Proposition 3.1 is uniform in hhh.
  • The Jacobians Js,tJ_{s,t}Js,t​ are propagators of the linearized equation, not the paper's exp⁡∫st∇g dr\exp\int_s^t\nabla g\,drexp∫st​∇gdr, which fails to solve the equation when the matrices do not commute (d≥2d\ge2d≥2).
  • Itô integrals are characterized as L2L^2L2 limits of dyadic left-point Riemann sums.
  • Lemma 3.4 states a model-dependent rate CCC in place of Cm=2m2C~opC_m=2m^2\tilde C_{op}Cm​=2m2C~op​, because the explicit rate fails in large dimension.

Restricting hhh to smooth or Lipschitz functions, starting XXX in μ\muμ, taking d=1d=1d=1 or a diagonal σ\sigmaσ, or dropping the differentiability of fff each makes the statement weaker or trivial, and none of them is the theorem.

Welcome contributions include a general Itô integral and Itô formula for additive-noise diffusions, a martingale CLT in continuous time, exponential ergodicity of this diffusion (Lemma A.1 of the paper, posed in the companion mission on the Euler–Maruyama scheme), and any of the milestones.

Selected references

  • X. Jin, G. Pang, L. Xu, X. Xu, An Approximation to the Invariant Measure of the Limiting Diffusion of G/Ph/n+GI Queues in the Halfin–Whitt Regime and Related Asymptotics, arXiv:2209.07361v1, 2022. https://arxiv.org/abs/2209.07361
  • J. G. Dai, S. He, T. Tezcan, Many-server diffusion limits for G/Ph/n+GI queues, Ann. Appl. Probab. 20(5), 2010. https://doi.org/10.1214/09-AAP674
  • A. B. Dieker, X. Gao, Positive recurrence of piecewise Ornstein–Uhlenbeck processes and common quadratic Lyapunov functions, Ann. Appl. Probab. 23(4), 2013. https://doi.org/10.1214/12-AAP870
  • X. Fang, Q.-M. Shao, L. Xu, Multivariate approximations in Wasserstein distance by Stein's method and Bismut's formula, Probab. Theory Relat. Fields 174, 2019. https://doi.org/10.1007/s00440-018-0874-5
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ProbabilityStochastic Systems·Captain: mikedeng1

Rank-Based Stochastic Differential Inclusions and Diffusion Limits for a Load-Balancing Model: Diffusion-Scaled Queue Lengths and Idle Times Converge to the Reflected Rank-Based DiffusionResearch Paper

Motivation

Randomized load balancing assigns arriving jobs to one of several parallel servers using only partial information about queue lengths. The best-known example is the power-of-choice rule: sample ℓ\ellℓ of the NNN queues and join the shortest. Such rules are used in large server farms because the dispatcher communicates with only a few servers per job. The case of exponential service times and power-of-choice routing in this regime was treated by Banerjee, Budhiraja and Estevez.

Atar and Ichiba (arXiv:2409.15121) study a fixed number NNN of critically loaded queues in the diffusion (heavy-traffic) regime. Each queue has its own dedicated arrival stream. A thinner load-balancing stream is routed by rank: a job joins the queue whose current length has rank rrr with probability prp_rpr​. Because ties in queue length are frequent, the natural limit is not a stochastic differential equation but a stochastic differential inclusion in which the drift is only known to lie in a set. Rank-based diffusions, where the drift of a particle depends on its rank among all particles, are studied independently in stochastic portfolio theory and interacting particle systems (for example Banner, Fernholz and Karatzas and Ichiba, Karatzas and Shkolnikov). This paper connects them to queueing.

Setting

There are NNN servers, indexed by [N]={1,…,N}[N]=\{1,\dots,N\}[N]={1,…,N}. For x∈RNx\in\mathbb R^Nx∈RN the rank of coordinate iii is rank(i;x)=#{j:xj<xi}+#{j≤i:xj=xi}\mathrm{rank}(i;x)=\#\{j:x_j<x_i\}+\#\{j\le i:x_j=x_i\}rank(i;x)=#{j:xj​<xi​}+#{j≤i:xj​=xi​}, so ties go to the smaller index. For a permutation π\piπ of [N][N][N] write bπ=(bπ(1),…,bπ(N))b_\pi=(b_{\pi(1)},\dots,b_{\pi(N)})bπ​=(bπ(1)​,…,bπ(N)​). The order-compatible permutations of xxx are P(x)={π:xi<xj⇒π(i)<π(j)}\mathfrak P(x)=\{\pi: x_i<x_j\Rightarrow\pi(i)<\pi(j)\}P(x)={π:xi​<xj​⇒π(i)<π(j)}.

The queueing model. A sequence of systems is indexed by nnn. In the nnn-th system:

  • queue iii receives a Poisson stream EinE^n_iEin​ of rate λin\lambda^n_iλin​;
  • a Poisson load-balancing stream A0nA^n_0A0n​ of rate λ0n\lambda^n_0λ0n​ is routed by i.i.d. marks θk\theta_kθk​ with P(θk=r)=prP(\theta_k=r)=p_rP(θk​=r)=pr​, where p1≥⋯≥pNp_1\ge\dots\ge p_Np1​≥⋯≥pN​;
  • the kkk-th load-balancing job joins the queue whose rank, just before the arrival, equals θk\theta_kθk​;
  • server iii has i.i.d. service times with mean 1/μin1/\mu^n_i1/μin​ and squared coefficient of variation (σiser)2(\sigma^{ser}_i)^2(σiser​)2.

The queue lengths XnX^nXn and busy times TnT^nTn satisfy the usual balance equations. The scaling is:

  • n−1/2(λin−nλi)→λ^in^{-1/2}(\lambda^n_i-n\lambda_i)\to\hat\lambda_in−1/2(λin​−nλi​)→λ^i​, n−1/2λ0n→λ0>0n^{-1/2}\lambda^n_0\to\lambda_0>0n−1/2λ0n​→λ0​>0 and n−1/2(μin−nμi)→μ^in^{-1/2}(\mu^n_i-n\mu_i)\to\hat\mu_in−1/2(μin​−nμi​)→μ^​i​;
  • critical load λi=μi\lambda_i=\mu_iλi​=μi​;
  • initial residual service times are o(n−1/2)o(n^{-1/2})o(n−1/2);
  • (IC₀): X^n(0−)=n−1/2Xn(0−)\hat X^n(0-)=n^{-1/2}X^n(0-)X^n(0−)=n−1/2Xn(0−) converges in law to a law μ0\mu_0μ0​ on R+N\mathbb R^N_+R+N​.

The diffusion-scaled processes are X^in(t)=n−1/2Xin(t)\hat X^n_i(t)=n^{-1/2}X^n_i(t)X^in​(t)=n−1/2Xin​(t) and L^in(t)=n−1/2μin(t−Tin(t))\hat L^n_i(t)=n^{-1/2}\mu^n_i(t-T^n_i(t))L^in​(t)=n−1/2μin​(t−Tin​(t)), the scaled queue length and scaled cumulative idle time.

The limit equations. Given b,m∈RNb,m\in\mathbb R^Nb,m∈RN and σ∈(0,∞)N\sigma\in(0,\infty)^Nσ∈(0,∞)N, the reflected rank-based SDE (SDER) is

Xi(t)=Xi(0)+σiBi(t)+mit+∫0tbrank(i;X(s)) ds+Li(t)≥0,∫0∞Xi dLi=0.X_i(t)=X_i(0)+\sigma_iB_i(t)+m_it+\int_0^t b_{\mathrm{rank}(i;X(s))}\,ds+L_i(t)\ge0,\qquad \int_0^\infty X_i\,dL_i=0 .Xi​(t)=Xi​(0)+σi​Bi​(t)+mi​t+∫0t​brank(i;X(s))​ds+Li​(t)≥0,∫0∞​Xi​dLi​=0.

Here LiL_iLi​ is continuous, nondecreasing, starts at 000, and increases only when Xi=0X_i=0Xi​=0. The inclusion (SDIR) replaces the drift by a progressively measurable β(t)∈conv{bπ:π∈P(X(t))}\beta(t)\in\mathrm{conv}\{b_\pi:\pi\in\mathfrak P(X(t))\}β(t)∈conv{bπ​:π∈P(X(t))} for a.e. ttt. A weak solution is a filtered probability space satisfying the usual conditions, carrying an NNN-dimensional Brownian motion BBB and adapted processes satisfying the equation almost surely.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 2.3(i)

Define the limit data from the queue:

br=λ0pr,mi=λ^i−μ^i,σi=(λi+μi(σiser)2)1/2.b_r=\lambda_0p_r,\qquad m_i=\hat\lambda_i-\hat\mu_i,\qquad \sigma_i=\big(\lambda_i+\mu_i(\sigma^{ser}_i)^2\big)^{1/2}.br​=λ0​pr​,mi​=λ^i​−μ^​i​,σi​=(λi​+μi​(σiser​)2)1/2.

Under (IC₀), there is a weak solution (X,L,B)(X,L,B)(X,L,B) of (SDER), which is also a weak solution of (SDIR) with β(t)=brank(⋅;X(t))\beta(t)=b_{\mathrm{rank}(\cdot;X(t))}β(t)=brank(⋅;X(t))​, with X(0)∼μ0X(0)\sim\mu_0X(0)∼μ0​ and

(X^n,L^n)⇒(X,L)in D(R+,RN)×C(R+,RN).(\hat X^n,\hat L^n)\Rightarrow(X,L)\quad\text{in } D(\mathbb R_+,\mathbb R^N)\times C(\mathbb R_+,\mathbb R^N).(X^n,L^n)⇒(X,L)in D(R+​,RN)×C(R+​,RN).

The goal is stated in existence form. The paper's phrase "the solution" relies on uniqueness in law, which it obtains from pathwise uniqueness through a cited Yamada–Watanabe-type argument (Remark 2.1).

Milestones

The milestones are the results the paper's proof uses, in order:

  • the monotonicity inequality (3.2) for the drift sets when bbb is nonincreasing;
  • pathwise uniqueness for (SDI) and (SDIR) (Proposition 3.1);
  • solutions of (SDE)/(SDER) solve (SDI)/(SDIR) (Remark 3.2);
  • Skorokhod's lemma (Lemma 4.2);
  • the martingale property of the routing compensator (Lemma 4.3);
  • the reflection representation, the functional central limit theorem for the primitives, and C-tightness (Lemma 4.4(i)–(iii));
  • tightness, identification of subsequential limits, and convergence to (SDIR) (Proposition 4.1(i)–(iii));
  • the Lebesgue-null collision set (5.15), which turns (SDIR) into (SDER).

Significance

The theorem identifies the heavy-traffic limit of rank-based randomized routing for every routing vector ppp with p1≥⋯≥pNp_1\ge\dots\ge p_Np1​≥⋯≥pN​, including both versions of power-of-ℓ\ellℓ-choices. The limit is a reflected rank-based diffusion: routing enters only through the drift b=λ0pb=\lambda_0pb=λ0​p, which depends on the queues' ranks. Along the way, the paper proves pathwise uniqueness for a class of rank-based differential inclusions, a result of independent interest for rank-based diffusions with arbitrary tie behaviour.

The results are proved on paper. No part of them is machine-checked. A formalization would produce:

  • a reusable definition layer: weak solutions of reflected SDEs and SDIs, C-tightness, Poisson processes, and a queueing model with general service times;
  • checked proofs of Skorokhod's lemma in its complementarity form and of the drift-set monotonicity;
  • a precise record of where the argument relies on cited results: Remark 2.1, a renewal FCLT, Tanaka's formula, and a measurable-selection argument from Atar, Budhiraja and Ramanan (Probab. Theory Related Fields 142, 2008), and Yamada and Watanabe with Kurtz for uniqueness in law.

Difficulty

The obvious route is to write the limit as an SDE with drift brank(i;X)b_{\mathrm{rank}(i;X)}brank(i;X)​ and pass to the limit. That route fails because x↦brank(⋅;x)x\mapsto b_{\mathrm{rank}(\cdot;x)}x↦brank(⋅;x)​ is discontinuous exactly on the ties {xi=xj}\{x_i=x_j\}{xi​=xj​}. Limits of the queueing drift there are only constrained to a convex hull of permuted vectors. The paper therefore works with the inclusion (SDIR) and needs three things:

  • Uniqueness for a discontinuous, set-valued drift. This rests on a monotonicity property of conv{bπ:π∈P(x)}\mathrm{conv}\{b_\pi:\pi\in\mathfrak P(x)\}conv{bπ​:π∈P(x)} derived from the rearrangement inequality.
  • A progressively measurable selection of the a.e. derivative of the limiting compensator.
  • A local-time estimate showing that two coordinates of the limit spend zero Lebesgue time together, so the inclusion collapses to the equation.

The queueing side brings its own difficulty. The routing depends on the rank at left limits Xn(s−)X^n(s-)Xn(s−), so the compensator of the routed stream is a random time change, and it must be shown to be a martingale for the system's history.

Formalization scope

Conventions committed to:

  • servers and ranks are Fin N, so the paper's index iii is Lean's i−1i-1i−1;
  • paths are maps R→RN\mathbb R\to\mathbb R^NR→RN evaluated at t≥0t\ge0t≥0, and filtrations are indexed by R≥0\mathbb R_{\ge0}R≥0​;
  • norms are ℓ1\ell^1ℓ1, through the referenced BellWilliams2001.ThresholdPolicy.Paths; this is equivalent to the paper's Euclidean norm;
  • all systems live on one probability space; the model equations hold almost surely, while sample-path properties hold for every ω\omegaω;
  • routing is the finite sum over arrival epochs with the rank at left limits, and the marks may depend on nnn;
  • the potential service process uses the paper's index base 000 (initial residual time included);
  • the constants b,m,σb,m,\sigmab,m,σ are computed from the model, never free;
  • the integrals ∫Xi dLi\int X_i\,dL_i∫Xi​dLi​ and ∫x dz\int x\,dz∫xdz are lintegrals against Stieltjes measures, with z(0−)=0z(0-)=0z(0−)=0;
  • the usual conditions take the Karatzas–Shreve form;
  • C-tightness is the Jacod–Shiryaev VI.3.26 criterion;
  • weak convergence to continuous limits is in Skorokhod-coupling form (CouplingConverges);
  • limit spaces are Ω' : Type.

The goal is not trivialized by a vacuous model. The structure LoadBalancingSequence imposes only the paper's assumptions, and the limit is required to be a genuine weak solution, with an F\mathbb FF-Brownian motion, adaptedness, progressive measurability and the a.e.-ttt inclusion. A statement for a fixed nnn, for N=2N=2N=2 only, for exponential service, for power-of-choice only, or with free b,m,σb,m,\sigmab,m,σ would be a different theorem.

A complete development needs:

  • Poisson and renewal functional central limit theorems;
  • martingale methods for counting processes;
  • the one-dimensional Skorokhod map;
  • the Skorokhod representation theorem;
  • Itô and Tanaka formulas for continuous semimartingales;
  • Yamada–Watanabe-type uniqueness in law.

The rank, drift-set, reflection and C-tightness definitions are reusable beyond this mission. Contributions to any milestone are welcome, including a sharper version of Proposition 4.1(iii) asserting uniqueness in law.

Selected references

  • R. Atar and T. Ichiba, Rank-Based Stochastic Differential Inclusions and Diffusion Limits for a Load Balancing Model, arXiv preprint, 2024. https://arxiv.org/abs/2409.15121
  • S. Banerjee, A. Budhiraja and B. Estevez, Load balancing in parallel queues and rank-based diffusions, arXiv preprint, 2023. https://arxiv.org/abs/2302.10317
  • A. D. Banner, R. Fernholz and I. Karatzas, Atlas models of equity markets, Ann. Appl. Probab. 15, 2005. https://doi.org/10.1214/105051605000000449
  • T. Ichiba, I. Karatzas and M. Shkolnikov, Strong solutions of stochastic equations with rank-based coefficients, Probab. Theory Related Fields 156, 2013. https://doi.org/10.1007/s00440-012-0426-3
  • T. Yamada and S. Watanabe, On the uniqueness of solutions of stochastic differential equations, J. Math. Kyoto Univ. 11, 1971. https://doi.org/10.1215/kjm/1250523691
  • T. G. Kurtz, Weak and strong solutions of general stochastic models, Electron. Commun. Probab. 19, 2014. https://doi.org/10.1214/ECP.v19-2833
  • J. Jacod and A. N. Shiryaev, Limit Theorems for Stochastic Processes, 2nd ed., Springer, 2003. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-05265-5
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ProbabilityStatistics·Captain: mikedeng1

Achieving Efficiency in Black-Box Simulation of Distribution Tails with Self-Structuring Importance Samplers: The Self-Structuring Importance Sampler Is Logarithmically EfficientResearch Paper

Motivation

Many operational risk questions ask for a small probability pu=P(L(X)≥u)p_u=P(L(X)\ge u)pu​=P(L(X)≥u): the chance that the cost LLL of a decision, evaluated at a random scenario X∈RdX\in\mathbb R^dX∈Rd, exceeds a large threshold uuu. Examples are large delays in project networks or vehicle routing, large portfolio credit losses, and failures in engineered systems. Plain Monte Carlo needs on the order of pu−1p_u^{-1}pu−1​ samples to estimate pup_upu​ to fixed relative accuracy, which is prohibitive when pup_upu​ is 10−610^{-6}10−6 or smaller. Importance sampling (IS) draws samples from a different distribution and reweights them by a likelihood ratio, but classical efficient IS schemes are built for one model at a time: they need the distribution of XXX and the structure of LLL (e.g. linearity or convexity) to solve for a good sampling distribution.

Deo and Murthy (arXiv:2102.07060v3, published in Operations Research, 2025) propose a self-structuring sampler that needs neither: it applies a fixed multiplicative stretching to ordinary samples of XXX and uses only black-box evaluations of LLL. Their main result is that this sampler is asymptotically optimal in the standard sense of logarithmic efficiency (Asmussen and Glynn 2007, Ch. 6) over a nonparametric class of light- and Weibull-type-tailed distributions and nonconvex losses.

Setting

Write R+d={x:x≥0}\mathbb R^d_+=\{x:x\ge0\}R+d​={x:x≥0} and R++d={x:x>0}\mathbb R^d_{++}=\{x:x>0\}R++d​={x:x>0} (componentwise), and ∥x∥=max⁡i∣xi∣\|x\|=\max_i|x_i|∥x∥=maxi​∣xi​∣. The random vector X=(X1,…,Xd)X=(X_1,\dots,X_d)X=(X1​,…,Xd​) has density fXf_XfX​. Its marginal cumulative hazards are Λi(x)=−log⁡P(Xi>x)\Lambda_i(x)=-\log P(X_i>x)Λi​(x)=−logP(Xi​>x), Λ(x)=(Λ1(x1),…,Λd(xd))\Lambda(x)=(\Lambda_1(x_1),\dots,\Lambda_d(x_d))Λ(x)=(Λ1​(x1​),…,Λd​(xd​)), and Y=Λ(X)Y=\Lambda(X)Y=Λ(X) is the standardized vector. Let qi=Λi←q_i=\Lambda_i^{\leftarrow}qi​=Λi←​ be the left-continuous inverse, q(y)=(q1(y1),…,qd(yd))q(y)=(q_1(y_1),\dots,q_d(y_d))q(y)=(q1​(y1​),…,qd​(yd​)), q^(t)=q(t1)/∥q(t1)∥\hat q(t)=q(t\mathbf 1)/\|q(t\mathbf 1)\|q^​(t)=q(t1)/∥q(t1)∥ and Λmin⁡(u)=min⁡iΛi(u)\Lambda_{\min}(u)=\min_i\Lambda_i(u)Λmin​(u)=mini​Λi​(u).

The standing assumptions are:

  • Assumption 2.1 on the loss: risk sets {x∈supp⁡X:L(x)≥u}\{x\in\operatorname{supp}X: L(x)\ge u\}{x∈suppX:L(x)≥u} lie in R+d\mathbb R^d_+R+d​ for large uuu, and L(nxn)/nρ→L∗(x)L(nx_n)/n^\rho\to L^*(x)L(nxn​)/nρ→L∗(x) for every xn→xx_n\to xxn​→x in R+d\mathbb R^d_+R+d​, with ρ>0\rho>0ρ>0 and L∗>0L^*>0L∗>0 somewhere on R+d\mathbb R^d_+R+d​.
  • Assumption 3.1 on the marginals: each Λi\Lambda_iΛi​ is continuous, eventually strictly increasing, and regularly varying with index αi>0\alpha_i>0αi​>0 (Λi(sx)/Λi(s)→xαi\Lambda_i(sx)/\Lambda_i(s)\to x^{\alpha_i}Λi​(sx)/Λi​(s)→xαi​).
  • Assumption 3.2 on the dependence: YYY has density p(y)e−φ(y)p(y)e^{-\varphi(y)}p(y)e−φ(y) with n−1φ(nyn)→I(y)n^{-1}\varphi(ny_n)\to I(y)n−1φ(nyn​)→I(y) and n−εlog⁡p(nyn)→0n^{-\varepsilon}\log p(ny_n)\to0n−εlogp(nyn​)→0 along every yn→y≠0y_n\to y\ne0yn​→y=0 in R+d\mathbb R^d_+R+d​.
  • Assumption 5.1: each Λi\Lambda_iΛi​ is eventually convex or concave.
  • The limit q∗=lim⁡t→∞q^(t)q^*=\lim_{t\to\infty}\hat q(t)q∗=limt→∞​q^​(t) exists.

The sampler (Algorithm 1) fixes a hyper-parameter l=l(u)l=l(u)l=l(u) and maps a sample xxx to T(x)=x (u/l)κ(x)T(x)=x\,(u/l)^{\kappa(x)}T(x)=x(u/l)κ(x), with either exponent

κ(1)(x)=1ρlog⁡(1+∣x∣)∥log⁡(1+∣x∣)∥∞orκ(2)(x)=log⁡(1+∣x∣)log⁡l.\kappa^{(1)}(x)=\frac1\rho\frac{\log(1+|x|)}{\|\log(1+|x|)\|_\infty}\qquad\text{or}\qquad \kappa^{(2)}(x)=\frac{\log(1+|x|)}{\log l}.κ(1)(x)=ρ1​∥log(1+∣x∣)∥∞​log(1+∣x∣)​orκ(2)(x)=logllog(1+∣x∣)​.

With JJJ the closed-form Jacobian of Table 1 and Z=T(X)Z=T(X)Z=T(X), the single-sample estimator is

ζ(u)=J(X)fX(Z)fX(X) I(L(Z)≥u),M2,u=E[ζ(u)2].\zeta(u)=\frac{J(X)f_X(Z)}{f_X(X)}\,\mathbb I\big(L(Z)\ge u\big),\qquad M_{2,u}=E[\zeta(u)^2].ζ(u)=fX​(X)J(X)fX​(Z)​I(L(Z)≥u),M2,u​=E[ζ(u)2].

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 5.1 (logarithmic efficiency)

Under Assumptions 2.1, 3.1, 3.2, 5.1, existence of q∗q^*q∗, L∗(q∗x)>0L^*(q^*x)>0L∗(q∗x)>0 for some x∈R+dx\in\mathbb R^d_+x∈R+d​, and any slowly varying l(u)→∞l(u)\to\inftyl(u)→∞, for either exponent,

M2,u<∞ for large u,lim⁡u→∞log⁡M2,ulog⁡pu2=1.M_{2,u}<\infty\ \text{for large }u,\qquad \lim_{u\to\infty}\frac{\log M_{2,u}}{\log p_u^2}=1.M2,u​<∞ for large u,u→∞lim​logpu2​logM2,u​​=1.

The goal fixes neither the exponent, nor the hyper-parameter lll, nor the loss or the distribution beyond the stated assumptions.

Milestones

The milestones follow the paper's proof chain (Appendix A.3 for κ(1)\kappa^{(1)}κ(1), Appendix E for κ(2)\kappa^{(2)}κ(2)):

  1. Proposition 2.1: ζ(u)\zeta(u)ζ(u) is unbiased and TTT is invertible.
  2. Lemma 3.1: the coordinates of YYY are standard exponential.
  3. Theorem 3.1: {Y/t}\{Y/t\}{Y/t} satisfies a large deviations principle with rate III.
  4. Lemma 3.2: III is continuous and homogeneous, and inf⁡yi>cI=c\inf_{y_i>c}I=cinfyi​>c​I=c.
  5. Lemma A.1: the rare event in standardized coordinates.
  6. Theorem 4.1: the tail asymptotic
log⁡pu=−Λmin⁡(u1/ρ)[I∗+o(1)],I∗=inf⁡{I(y):L∗(q∗y1/α)≥1, y≥0}.\log p_u=-\Lambda_{\min}(u^{1/\rho})\big[I^*+o(1)\big],\qquad I^*=\inf\{I(y):L^*(q^*y^{1/\alpha})\ge1,\ y\ge0\}.logpu​=−Λmin​(u1/ρ)[I∗+o(1)],I∗=inf{I(y):L∗(q∗y1/α)≥1, y≥0}.
  1. Lemmas A.4 and A.5: bounds on T−1T^{-1}T−1, and ψu=Λ∘T−1∘q\psi_u=\Lambda\circ T^{-1}\circ qψu​=Λ∘T−1∘q is o(t(u))o(t(u))o(t(u)) on compacts.
  2. Lemma A.6: M2,uM_{2,u}M2,u​ as a Laplace-type functional of Yu=Y/t(u)Y_u=Y/t(u)Yu​=Y/t(u).
  3. Lemma A.7: the density exponent au≥I+o(1)a_u\ge I+o(1)au​≥I+o(1).
  4. Lemma A.9: the rare set stays a fixed distance from the origin.
  5. Display (85): the κ(2)\kappa^{(2)}κ(2) bound on T−1T^{-1}T−1.

Significance

Theorem 4.1 gives the exponential decay rate of pup_upu​ for a broad class of nonconvex losses (piecewise affine and quadratic functions, values of mixed integer programs, neural-network feature maps) under nonparametric, copula-style dependence. Previously such asymptotics were known only for specific losses and distribution families. Theorem 5.1 shows that one simple, model-oblivious transformation attains the best possible exponential rate for the second moment, so the relative error grows more slowly than any power pu−εp_u^{-\varepsilon}pu−ε​. This supports using the sampler for value-at-risk, conditional value-at-risk and chance-constrained optimization.

The results are proved in the paper's appendices (Appendices A, D.1 and E). None of them has a machine-checked proof. Formalizing them would require regular variation and Potter bounds, a tail large deviations principle in Rd\mathbb R^dRd, and a Varadhan-type integral lemma along a real speed. These are general tools that are missing from Mathlib and are reusable well beyond this paper.

Difficulty

The obvious argument is to bound M2,uM_{2,u}M2,u​ by computing the likelihood ratio on the rare set. This fails because the rare set, after standardization, is described only asymptotically: Lu(x)=u−1L(q(t(u)x))L_u(x)=u^{-1}L(q(t(u)x))Lu​(x)=u−1L(q(t(u)x)) converges to fLD(x)=L∗(q∗x1/α)f_{LD}(x)=L^*(q^*x^{1/\alpha})fLD​(x)=L∗(q∗x1/α) only continuously on R++d\mathbb R^d_{++}R++d​, not uniformly. The exponent of the likelihood ratio involves the density of YYY at two different scales (t(u)pt(u)pt(u)p and ψu(t(u)p)\psi_u(t(u)p)ψu​(t(u)p)) and the hazard rates at points pulled back by T−1T^{-1}T−1. A lower bound on it must hold uniformly enough to apply a Varadhan-type lemma with a varying family of functions, while the transformed sample stays inside a region where the asymptotic density assumptions apply. The upper and lower large-deviations bounds also rely on homogeneity of III and fLDf_{LD}fLD​, which hold only for the heaviest-tailed coordinates of q∗q^*q∗.

Formalization scope

Points of Rd\mathbb R^dRd are Fin d → ℝ with the sup norm, and components are 0-based. XXX is modelled by its law μ\muμ together with a density fXf_XfX​. M2,uM_{2,u}M2,u​ is a lower Lebesgue integral and pu=μ{L≥u}p_u=\mu\{L\ge u\}pu​=μ{L≥u}; both are extended nonnegative reals, so neither +∞+\infty+∞ nor 000 is collapsed to a junk value. Logarithms of probabilities in large-deviations statements are taken in EReal, where log⁡0=−∞\log0=-\inftylog0=−∞. I∗I^*I∗ is an EReal infimum, equal to +∞+\infty+∞ over an empty set. Regular variation is the real-variable limit with an eventually positive denominator, and reuses the published definition HeavyTailNV.Tail.IsRegularlyVarying. The Jacobian is Table 1's closed form. Statements that evaluate qqq at t(u)pt(u)pt(u)p take p∈R++dp\in\mathbb R^d_{++}p∈R++d​.

The following hypotheses are added relative to the printed statements, each disclosed on its item:

  • l(u)→∞l(u)\to\inftyl(u)→∞ in Theorem 5.1 and Lemma A.7 (the paper states it in §2.2 and uses it in Lemma A.5 and Appendix D.1).
  • "L∗(q∗x)L^*(q^*x)L∗(q∗x) not identically zero" is read as positivity somewhere.
  • Measurability of LLL.
  • 0<l≤u0<l\le u0<l≤u, and l>1l>1l>1 for κ(2)\kappa^{(2)}κ(2), together with an IS support condition in Proposition 2.1 and Lemma A.6. Proposition 2.1 is false as printed without them.
  • p(nyn)>0p(ny_n)>0p(nyn​)>0 eventually inside (13).
  • d≥1d\ge1d≥1 where junk values at d=0d=0d=0 would otherwise matter.
  • In Theorem 4.1, continuity of the rate III on R+d∖{0}\mathbb R^d_+\setminus\{0\}R+d​∖{0}, which the theorem's hypothesis "the tail LDP in Theorem 3.1" carries through Lemma 3.2(a) and which the proof uses.

The following printed statements are corrected:

  • Lemma A.6 is stated without its spurious factor t(u)2dt(u)^{2d}t(u)2d.
  • Lemma A.9 is restricted to points with q(t(u)p)∈supp⁡Xq(t(u)p)\in\operatorname{supp}Xq(t(u)p)∈suppX. As printed it fails when LLL is large off the support.
  • Lemma 3.2's "I(0)=0I(0)=0I(0)=0" becomes a limit at 000, since (13) does not determine I(0)I(0)I(0).
  • Theorem 3.1 is stated with real speed ttt, which implies the printed sequence form.

Lemmas A.8 and A.10 and Corollary A.1 are not posed. Their uniform claims over all of R+d\mathbb R^d_+R+d​ depend on pointwise versions of the hazard rates and on the values of LLL off the support and off R+d\mathbb R^d_+R+d​, which the hypotheses do not control; Corollary A.1 fails as printed when XXX has negative components.

A trivializing formalization is ruled out explicitly. The goal is the limit (23) for the estimator ζ(u)\zeta(u)ζ(u) of §5.2 with Table 1's Jacobian, for every admissible lll and both exponents. It is not the bound M2,u≥pu2M_{2,u}\ge p_u^2M2,u​≥pu2​, not a statement about an unspecified IS density, and not a statement for one fixed lll. The finiteness conjunct prevents Lean's log⁡0=0\log 0=0log0=0 convention from satisfying it.

Contributions are welcome at every level. The general tools (Potter bounds, the tail LDP, a Varadhan lemma for continuously converging functions) are useful as separate developments.

Selected references

  • A. Deo, K. Murthy, Achieving Efficiency in Black-Box Simulation of Distribution Tails with Self-Structuring Importance Samplers, Operations Research, 2025; preprint arXiv:2102.07060v3, 2023. https://arxiv.org/abs/2102.07060
  • S. Asmussen, P. W. Glynn, Stochastic Simulation: Algorithms and Analysis, Springer, 2007. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-0-387-69033-9
  • L. de Haan, A. Ferreira, Extreme Value Theory: An Introduction, Springer, 2006. https://doi.org/10.1007/0-387-34471-3
  • A. Dembo, O. Zeitouni, Large Deviations Techniques and Applications, 2nd ed., Springer, 1998. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4612-5320-4
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Algorithmic Game TheoryEconomicsOptimization·Captain: mikedeng1

The Value of Information Design in Supply Chain Management II: Under Partial Disclosure the Value of Information Is Unimodal in p₀ and Falling in ξ Against No Disclosure, the Reverse Against FullResearch Paper

Motivation

A retailer often knows more about her own demand than the supplier who produces for her. When the supplier must commit to a production quantity before demand is realized, what the retailer tells him shapes how much he produces, and therefore how much demand she can serve. Information design (Bayesian persuasion, Kamenica and Gentzkow, 2011) asks how a sender should commit in advance to a randomized disclosure rule to steer a receiver's action.

O. Candogan and H. Gurkan, The Value of Information Design in Supply Chain Management (SSRN 4378997; Management Science, 2024, DOI 10.1287/mnsc.2023.03004) solve this problem for a supplier facing a newsvendor problem with uniform demand. Their Theorem 1 identifies the retailer's optimal policy: full disclosure, no disclosure, or an explicit two-message partial disclosure, according to thresholds on the critical ratio. Their Theorem 2, the goal of this mission, quantifies how much the optimal policy is worth compared with the two naive policies a practitioner would use by default, and how this gain moves with the retailer's prior and the supplier's cost structure.

Setting

The state is ω∈{0,1}\omega\in\{0,1\}ω∈{0,1} with prior p0=P(ω=0)p_0=\mathbb P(\omega=0)p0​=P(ω=0). Demand is D0∼U[a0,b0]D_0\sim U[a_0,b_0]D0​∼U[a0​,b0​] in state 000 and D1∼U[a1,b1]D_1\sim U[a_1,b_1]D1​∼U[a1​,b1​] in state 111, with nested supports a0≤a1<b1≤b0a_0\le a_1<b_1\le b_0a0​≤a1​<b1​≤b0​.

Supplier. At belief p=P(ω=0)p=\mathbb P(\omega=0)p=P(ω=0) the supplier chooses Q≥0Q\ge0Q≥0 to minimize the expected newsvendor cost

Sξ(p,Q)=p E[ξ(D0−Q)++(1−ξ)(Q−D0)+]+(1−p) E[ξ(D1−Q)++(1−ξ)(Q−D1)+],S_\xi(p,Q)=p\,\mathbb E\big[\xi(D_0-Q)^++(1-\xi)(Q-D_0)^+\big]+(1-p)\,\mathbb E\big[\xi(D_1-Q)^++(1-\xi)(Q-D_1)^+\big],Sξ​(p,Q)=pE[ξ(D0​−Q)++(1−ξ)(Q−D0​)+]+(1−p)E[ξ(D1​−Q)++(1−ξ)(Q−D1​)+],

where ξ=Cs/(Cs+Ce)∈(0,1)\xi=C_s/(C_s+C_e)\in(0,1)ξ=Cs​/(Cs​+Ce​)∈(0,1) is the critical ratio of the unit shortage cost CsC_sCs​ to the total unit cost Cs+CeC_s+C_eCs​+Ce​.

Retailer. The retailer learns ω\omegaω and sends a message mmm from a finite set M\mathcal MM according to a committed policy π(m∣ω)\pi(m\mid\omega)π(m∣ω). Message mmm has probability P(m)=p0π(m∣0)+(1−p0)π(m∣1)\mathbb P(m)=p_0\pi(m\mid0)+(1-p_0)\pi(m\mid1)P(m)=p0​π(m∣0)+(1−p0​)π(m∣1) and induces the posterior pm=p0π(m∣0)/P(m)p_m=p_0\pi(m\mid0)/\mathbb P(m)pm​=p0​π(m∣0)/P(m). The supplier best-responds with an optimal quantity Q∗(pm)Q^*(p_m)Q∗(pm​), and the retailer pays her expected shortage

R(p,Q)=p E[(D0−Q)+]+(1−p) E[(D1−Q)+].R(p,Q)=p\,\mathbb E[(D_0-Q)^+]+(1-p)\,\mathbb E[(D_1-Q)^+].R(p,Q)=pE[(D0​−Q)+]+(1−p)E[(D1​−Q)+].

Her optimal expected cost Vξ(p0)V_\xi(p_0)Vξ​(p0​) is the infimum of ∑mP(m) R(pm,Q∗(pm))\sum_m\mathbb P(m)\,R(p_m,Q^*(p_m))∑m​P(m)R(pm​,Q∗(pm​)) over all finite message sets, all policies and all best responses of the supplier.

Naive policies. Under no disclosure the supplier keeps the prior, and the retailer pays K(p0)=R(p0,Qp0∗)K(p_0)=R(p_0,Q^*_{p_0})K(p0​)=R(p0​,Qp0​∗​). Under full disclosure he learns ω\omegaω, and she pays KF(p0)=(1−p0)K(0)+p0K(1)K_F(p_0)=(1-p_0)K(0)+p_0K(1)KF​(p0​)=(1−p0​)K(0)+p0​K(1). The values of information are

VIND(ξ,p0)=K(p0)−Vξ(p0),VIFD(ξ,p0)=KF(p0)−Vξ(p0).VI_{ND}(\xi,p_0)=K(p_0)-V_\xi(p_0),\qquad VI_{FD}(\xi,p_0)=K_F(p_0)-V_\xi(p_0).VIND​(ξ,p0​)=K(p0​)−Vξ​(p0​),VIFD​(ξ,p0​)=KF​(p0​)−Vξ​(p0​).

Thresholds. τ‾(p)=p(a1−a0)/(b0−a0)\underline\tau(p)=p(a_1-a_0)/(b_0-a_0)τ​(p)=p(a1​−a0​)/(b0​−a0​), p^=ξ(b0−a0)/(a1−a0)\hat p=\xi(b_0-a_0)/(a_1-a_0)p^​=ξ(b0​−a0​)/(a1​−a0​), p0∗=p^p_0^*=\sqrt{\hat p}p0∗​=p^​​ and ξ∗=1−12(a1−a0)/(b0−b1+a1−a0)\xi^*=1-\tfrac12(a_1-a_0)/(b_0-b_1+a_1-a_0)ξ∗=1−21​(a1​−a0​)/(b0​−b1​+a1​−a0​).

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 2 (p. 13)

In the partial-disclosure regime ξ∈(0,τ‾(p0)]\xi\in(0,\underline\tau(p_0)]ξ∈(0,τ​(p0​)], with a0<a1a_0<a_1a0​<a1​:

VIND is unimodal in p0 with peak p0∗=ξ(b0−a0)/(a1−a0) and decreasing in ξ;VI_{ND}\ \text{is unimodal in } p_0 \text{ with peak } p_0^*=\sqrt{\xi(b_0-a_0)/(a_1-a_0)}\ \text{and decreasing in } \xi;VIND​ is unimodal in p0​ with peak p0∗​=ξ(b0​−a0​)/(a1​−a0​)​ and decreasing in ξ; VIFD is decreasing in p0 and unimodal in ξ with peak ξ∗.VI_{FD}\ \text{is decreasing in } p_0 \text{ and unimodal in } \xi \text{ with peak } \xi^*.VIFD​ is decreasing in p0​ and unimodal in ξ with peak ξ∗.

For fixed ξ\xiξ the regime is p0∈[p^,1]p_0\in[\hat p,1]p0​∈[p^​,1]; for fixed p0p_0p0​ it is ξ∈(0,τ‾(p0)]\xi\in(0,\underline\tau(p_0)]ξ∈(0,τ​(p0​)].

Milestones

  1. Proposition 1 (p. 8): the supplier's optimal quantity is unique and given in closed form.
  2. (B.2) (p. 25): Vξ(p0)=κ(p0)V_\xi(p_0)=\kappa(p_0)Vξ​(p0​)=κ(p0​), the lower convex envelope of KKK on [0,1][0,1][0,1].
  3. (B.5) (p. 28): KKK in closed form for ξ≤(a1−a0)/(b0−a0)\xi\le(a_1-a_0)/(b_0-a_0)ξ≤(a1​−a0​)/(b0​−a0​).
  4. Lemma 1 (p. 25): κ\kappaκ in closed form in the three regimes of ξ\xiξ.
  5. The four derivative displays (p. 30): ∂VIND/∂ξ\partial VI_{ND}/\partial\xi∂VIND​/∂ξ, ∂VIND/∂p0\partial VI_{ND}/\partial p_0∂VIND​/∂p0​, ∂VIFD/∂ξ\partial VI_{FD}/\partial\xi∂VIFD​/∂ξ, ∂VIFD/∂p0\partial VI_{FD}/\partial p_0∂VIFD​/∂p0​ in the regime.

Significance

The result. Theorem 2 tells a retailer when designing information is worth the effort. Against no disclosure, the gain is largest at the intermediate prior p0∗p_0^*p0∗​ and shrinks as shortages become relatively more expensive for the supplier. Against full disclosure, the gain shrinks as the prior probability of the wide-support state ω=0\omega=0ω=0 grows and peaks at the intermediate critical ratio ξ∗\xi^*ξ∗. These comparative statics are what the paper's managerial discussion (pp. 13–14, Figures 4–5) rests on.

Formalizing it. The result is proved in the paper (Online Appendix B, pp. 24–30), by citing Kamenica–Gentzkow for the reduction to the convex envelope and by explicit calculus. No part of it is machine-checked. A complete formalization would contain a self-contained proof of the concavification reduction for a two-state sender–receiver game with finite message sets, the newsvendor quantile of a uniform mixture, and an exact convex-envelope computation, each reusable beyond this paper.

Difficulty

The derivative formulas are routine once KKK and κ\kappaκ are known in closed form. The work lies upstream. The optimal cost is an infimum over all finite policies and all best responses, and turning it into κ(p0)\kappa(p_0)κ(p0​) requires the Kamenica–Gentzkow argument: Jensen's inequality over Bayes-plausible posterior distributions for the lower bound, and a two-point splitting for attainment. κ\kappaκ itself is a supremum over all convex minorants, and identifying it requires showing that KKK is convex below p^\hat pp^​ and concave above, and that the chord from (p^,K(p^))(\hat p,K(\hat p))(p^​,K(p^​)) to (1,K(1))(1,K(1))(1,K(1)) is supporting. Finally, KKK is defined through an argmin, so its closed form needs the uniqueness of the newsvendor quantile. A solver who differentiates the closed forms of p. 28 directly proves only the last step.

Formalization scope

All objects live in the namespace SCInfoDesign.ValueInfo. The supports are bundled in a structure Params. The critical ratio ξ\xiξ is an explicit argument of every object, because Theorem 2 varies it.

Conventions.

  • Uniform expectations are interval integrals divided by the interval length.
  • The supplier's cost is the paper's cost (2) divided by Cs+CeC_s+C_eCs​+Ce​, which has the same minimizers.
  • Message sets are finite (Fin n).
  • A zero-probability message gets the junk posterior 000 and weight 000.
  • KKK uses the largest optimal quantity, which is the unique one here.
  • κ\kappaκ is the published BiconvexProg.BranchBound.convexEnvelope on [0,1][0,1][0,1].
  • The value of information is the difference, not its absolute value; the difference is nonnegative.
  • "Unimodal with peak x∗x^*x∗" means strictly increasing up to x∗x^*x∗ and strictly decreasing from x∗x^*x∗, on the regime.
  • The ξ\xiξ-claims are stated for p0<1p_0<1p0​<1: at p0=1p_0=1p0​=1 both values are identically 000.

Added hypotheses. These are the paper's implicit standing assumptions: a0<b0a_0<b_0a0​<b0​ and a1<b1a_1<b_1a1​<b1​, nonnegative demand (0≤a00\le a_00≤a0​, 0≤a10\le a_10≤a1​), and 0<ξ<10<\xi<10<ξ<1. The goal and the derivative displays also assume a0<a1a_0<a_1a0​<a1​: otherwise the regime is empty and p^\hat pp^​ is 0/00/00/0.

Ruled out. The optimal cost is not the cost of the paper's policy Γ∗\Gamma^*Γ∗, and the supplier's response is an argmin of (2), not the closed form of Proposition 1. Theorem 2 is therefore a statement about the game, not about a formula.

Infrastructure. A complete development needs the concavification theorem for finite policies (milestone 2, reusable for every two-state persuasion model), the uniform-mixture newsvendor quantile (milestone 1), the exact computation of a convex envelope (milestone 4) and one-variable calculus. Contributions of any milestone, of general lemmas on convex envelopes on an interval, or of the Kamenica–Gentzkow reduction in general form are welcome. The proofs of the paper are in its Online Appendix.

Selected references

  • O. Candogan, H. Gurkan, The Value of Information Design in Supply Chain Management, Management Science, 2024 (read as SSRN 4378997). https://ssrn.com/abstract=4378997 , https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2023.03004
  • E. Kamenica, M. Gentzkow, Bayesian Persuasion, American Economic Review 101(6), 2011. https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.101.6.2590
  • R. Levi, G. Perakis, J. Uichanco, The Data-Driven Newsvendor Problem: New Bounds and Insights, Operations Research 63(6), 2015. https://doi.org/10.1287/opre.2015.1422
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Algorithmic Game TheoryEconomicsOptimization·Captain: mikedeng1

The Value of Information Design in Supply Chain Management I: With Nested Uniform Demand Supports, Full, No or Two-Message Partial Disclosure Is Optimal According to Critical-Ratio ThresholdsResearch Paper

Motivation

A retailer who sees her own demand before her supplier does can decide how much of that knowledge to pass upstream. Sharing everything is not obviously best: the supplier uses the information to set his production quantity for his own benefit, and the retailer bears a cost when he under-produces. Candogan and Gurkan (SSRN 4378997; published in Management Science, 2024, doi:10.1287/mnsc.2023.03004) treat this as a Bayesian persuasion (information design) problem in the sense of Kamenica and Gentzkow (AER 2011): the retailer commits in advance to a signalling policy, and the supplier best-responds to the posterior belief that each signal induces. The paper characterizes the retailer's optimal policy in closed form for uniform demand. This mission covers its first main result, the case where one demand support is nested inside the other.

The question links the supply-chain literature on information sharing between firms, where sharing is usually all-or-nothing, with the persuasion literature, where optimal signals are typically partial.

Setting

The state is ω∈{0,1}\omega\in\{0,1\}ω∈{0,1}, with prior p0=P(ω=0)∈[0,1]p_0=\mathbb P(\omega=0)\in[0,1]p0​=P(ω=0)∈[0,1]. Demand is DωD_\omegaDω​, where D0D_0D0​ is uniform on [a0,b0][a_0,b_0][a0​,b0​] and D1D_1D1​ is uniform on [a1,b1][a_1,b_1][a1​,b1​]. The supports are nested: 0≤a0≤a1<b1≤b00\le a_0\le a_1<b_1\le b_00≤a0​≤a1​<b1​≤b0​ and a0<b0a_0<b_0a0​<b0​.

A disclosure policy Γ=(π,M)\Gamma=(\pi,\mathcal M)Γ=(π,M) is a finite message space M\mathcal MM and conditional probabilities π(m∣ω)\pi(m\mid\omega)π(m∣ω). After message mmm the supplier holds the posterior

p=π(m∣ω=0) p0π(m∣ω=0) p0+π(m∣ω=1)(1−p0).p=\frac{\pi(m\mid\omega=0)\,p_0}{\pi(m\mid\omega=0)\,p_0+\pi(m\mid\omega=1)(1-p_0)}.p=π(m∣ω=0)p0​+π(m∣ω=1)(1−p0​)π(m∣ω=0)p0​​.

Full disclosure sends message mim_imi​ exactly in state iii; no disclosure sends the same message in both states.

At belief ppp the supplier solves the newsvendor problem

min⁡Q≥0  p E[ξ(D0−Q)++(1−ξ)(Q−D0)+]+(1−p) E[ξ(D1−Q)++(1−ξ)(Q−D1)+],\min_{Q\ge 0}\; p\,\mathbb E\big[\xi(D_0-Q)^+ + (1-\xi)(Q-D_0)^+\big] + (1-p)\,\mathbb E\big[\xi(D_1-Q)^+ + (1-\xi)(Q-D_1)^+\big],Q≥0min​pE[ξ(D0​−Q)++(1−ξ)(Q−D0​)+]+(1−p)E[ξ(D1​−Q)++(1−ξ)(Q−D1​)+],

where ξ=Cs/(Cs+Ce)∈(0,1)\xi=C_s/(C_s+C_e)\in(0,1)ξ=Cs​/(Cs​+Ce​)∈(0,1) is his critical ratio (shortage cost CsC_sCs​, excess cost CeC_eCe​). A best-response profile Q∗Q^*Q∗ picks an optimal quantity Qp∗Q^*_pQp∗​ for every belief p∈[0,1]p\in[0,1]p∈[0,1]. The retailer pays the expected shortage p E(D0−Qp∗)++(1−p) E(D1−Qp∗)+p\,\mathbb E(D_0-Q^*_p)^+ + (1-p)\,\mathbb E(D_1-Q^*_p)^+pE(D0​−Qp∗​)++(1−p)E(D1​−Qp∗​)+ at the induced posterior. Her design problem (3) minimizes the expectation of this cost over the random posterior, jointly over policies Γ\GammaΓ and best-response profiles Q∗Q^*Q∗. The function K(p)K(p)K(p) of (B.1) is her cost when both parties hold belief ppp.

The thresholds are

ξh=a1−a0b0−a0−b1+a1,τ‾(p)=p(a1−a0)b0−a0,τˉ(p)=1−p(b0−b1)b0−a0.\xi_h=\frac{a_1-a_0}{b_0-a_0-b_1+a_1},\qquad \underline\tau(p)=\frac{p(a_1-a_0)}{b_0-a_0},\qquad \bar\tau(p)=1-\frac{p(b_0-b_1)}{b_0-a_0}.ξh​=b0​−a0​−b1​+a1​a1​−a0​​,τ​(p)=b0​−a0​p(a1​−a0​)​,τˉ(p)=1−b0​−a0​p(b0​−b1​)​.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 1 (p. 9)

For every prior p0∈[0,1]p_0\in[0,1]p0​∈[0,1]:

ξ∈[ξh,1)⇒full disclosure is optimal;ξ∈[τ‾(p0),ξh]⇒no disclosure is optimal;\xi\in[\xi_h,1)\Rightarrow\text{full disclosure is optimal};\qquad \xi\in[\underline\tau(p_0),\xi_h]\Rightarrow\text{no disclosure is optimal};ξ∈[ξh​,1)⇒full disclosure is optimal;ξ∈[τ​(p0​),ξh​]⇒no disclosure is optimal; ξ∈(0,τ‾(p0)]⇒Γ∗ is optimal,π∗(m1∣ω=0)=1−p0p0 ξ(b0−a0)(a1−a0)−ξ(b0−a0),  π∗(m1∣ω=1)=1.\xi\in(0,\underline\tau(p_0)]\Rightarrow\Gamma^*\text{ is optimal},\quad \pi^*(m_1\mid\omega=0)=\frac{1-p_0}{p_0}\,\frac{\xi(b_0-a_0)}{(a_1-a_0)-\xi(b_0-a_0)},\ \ \pi^*(m_1\mid\omega=1)=1.ξ∈(0,τ​(p0​)]⇒Γ∗ is optimal,π∗(m1​∣ω=0)=p0​1−p0​​(a1​−a0​)−ξ(b0​−a0​)ξ(b0​−a0​)​,  π∗(m1​∣ω=1)=1.

Milestones

  1. Proposition 1 (p. 8): the supplier's optimal quantity Qp∗Q^*_pQp∗​ is unique and has an explicit three-piece form in (p,ξ)(p,\xi)(p,ξ).
  2. (B.2) (p. 25): the optimal value of (3) is κ(p0)\kappa(p_0)κ(p0​), where κ\kappaκ is the lower convex envelope of KKK on [0,1][0,1][0,1].
  3. (B.5) (p. 28): KKK in closed form when ξ≤(a1−a0)/(b0−a0)\xi\le(a_1-a_0)/(b_0-a_0)ξ≤(a1​−a0​)/(b0​−a0​).
  4. Lemma 1 (p. 25): κ\kappaκ in the three regimes of ξ\xiξ.
  5. The Γ∗\Gamma^*Γ∗ display (p. 26): under Γ∗\Gamma^*Γ∗, message m0m_0m0​ has probability (p0−p^)/(1−p^)(p_0-\hat p)/(1-\hat p)(p0​−p^​)/(1−p^​) and induces posterior 111, and, when p0<1p_0<1p0​<1 (so that m1m_1m1​ has positive probability), m1m_1m1​ induces p^=ξ(b0−a0)/(a1−a0)\hat p=\xi(b_0-a_0)/(a_1-a_0)p^​=ξ(b0​−a0​)/(a1​−a0​).

Significance

The result shows that the optimal amount of disclosure depends on the critical ratio. When ξ\xiξ is high the retailer reveals everything; in an intermediate band she reveals nothing; when ξ\xiξ is low she uses a two-message policy that always reveals the narrow-support state (ω=1\omega=1ω=1 always sends m1m_1m1​) but pools part of the wide-support state with it. Corollaries 1–4 of the paper read the thresholds off this theorem (independence of the prior for large ξ\xiξ, full disclosure when a0=a1a_0=a_1a0​=a1​, never full disclosure when b0=b1b_0=b_1b0​=b1​), and Theorem 2 of the paper, on the value of information design relative to full and no disclosure, is built on Lemma 1 and (B.5).

The paper proves the result in its Online Appendix, citing Kamenica and Gentzkow for the reduction to a convex envelope. None of it has been machine-checked. A formalization would make the persuasion reduction explicit for finite message spaces and best-response profiles, and would check the case analysis of the envelope, where the paper prints one overlapping-indicator slip (Lemma 1, case 3).

Difficulty

The obvious argument is to compare the three named policies and pick the cheapest. That is not a proof: optimality is over every policy on every finite message space, and it is only the convex-envelope reduction that cuts the comparison down to splittings of the prior into posteriors. The reduction itself requires showing that the attainable expected costs are exactly the convex combinations of values of KKK at Bayes-plausible posteriors. The envelope computation then needs the shape of KKK: the supplier's quantity is piecewise defined, so KKK is a piecewise rational function of ppp whose convexity changes across the boundaries τ‾(p)=ξ\underline\tau(p)=\xiτ​(p)=ξ and τˉ(p)=ξ\bar\tau(p)=\xiτˉ(p)=ξ. In the low-ξ\xiξ regime KKK is neither convex nor concave on [0,1][0,1][0,1], so its greatest convex minorant is a genuine mixture of KKK itself and a line segment, whose junction point p^\hat pp^​ has to be located exactly.

Formalization scope

States are Fin 2; a policy on a finite type MMM is a map π:Fin 2→M→R\pi : \mathrm{Fin}\,2\to M\to\mathbb Rπ:Fin2→M→R with nonnegative entries and rows summing to 111. The paper does not bound M\mathcal MM; finite message spaces are a convention, and binary spaces already attain the optimum. Uniform expectations are interval integrals divided by the length. The supplier's cost is normalized by Cs+CeC_s+C_eCs​+Ce​ and parameterized by ξ\xiξ, which leaves its minimizers unchanged. A message of probability zero is given posterior 000 and weight 000.

The supplier's response is defined as an argmin of (2), never by the closed form of Proposition 1, and optimality quantifies over all finite policies and all best-response profiles, never over the three named policies; a formalization that hard-codes either would make the goal a statement about a formula. KKK is evaluated at the largest optimal quantity, which is the unique one under the mission's hypotheses. The envelope κ\kappaκ is the published definition BiconvexProg.BranchBound.convexEnvelope (greatest convex minorant) on [0,1][0,1][0,1].

Standing hypotheses, stated in every theorem: a0<b0a_0<b_0a0​<b0​, a1<b1a_1<b_1a1​<b1​, 0<ξ<10<\xi<10<ξ<1, p0∈[0,1]p_0\in[0,1]p0​∈[0,1], and nesting a0≤a1a_0\le a_1a0​≤a1​, b1≤b0b_1\le b_0b1​≤b0​. The hypotheses 0≤a00\le a_00≤a0​, 0≤a10\le a_10≤a1​ are added: demand is nonnegative, and without them the constraint Q≥0Q\ge0Q≥0 can bind. Equal supports are allowed; the threshold ξh\xi_hξh​ is then 0/0=00/0=00/0=0 in Lean and the goal remains true. Lemma 1's third case is formalized as the piecewise function its two indicators intend.

A complete development needs: the convex-envelope (concavification) theorem for finite-support distributions on [0,1][0,1][0,1], the newsvendor quantile characterization for a mixture of uniforms, and calculus for piecewise rational functions. The first two are reusable beyond this mission. Contributions to any milestone are welcome.

Selected references

  • O. Candogan, H. Gurkan, The Value of Information Design in Supply Chain Management, Management Science, 2024. SSRN preprint: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4378997; DOI: https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2023.03004
  • E. Kamenica, M. Gentzkow, Bayesian Persuasion, American Economic Review 101(6), 2011. https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.101.6.2590
  • R. Levi, G. Perakis, J. Uichanco, The Data-Driven Newsvendor Problem: New Bounds and Insights, Operations Research 63(6), 2015. https://doi.org/10.1287/opre.2015.1422
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Algorithmic Game TheoryEconomics·Captain: mikedeng1

Self-Preferencing and Search Neutrality in Online Retail Platforms I: Under a Low Commission, Search Neutrality Strictly Reduces Consumer Surplus When the Two Products Are Similarly PopularResearch Paper

Motivation

Large retail platforms both host independent sellers and sell their own products, and they control the order in which products appear in search results. When the platform ranks its own product first regardless of relevance, it engages in self-preferencing. Regulators have treated this as a competition problem: the European Commission opened a second antitrust investigation into Amazon's treatment of its own retail offers in 2020 (CNBC, 2020), and search neutrality, the requirement that results be ranked by relevance alone, is the remedy most often proposed.

Zou and Zhou ask whether such a rule helps consumers once prices respond to it. Their model builds on the economics of prominence in consumer search (Armstrong, Vickers and Zhou, 2009), in which the product shown first is searched first and so enjoys a demand advantage. The answer they obtain is negative in an identifiable region: when the two competing products are similarly popular, search neutrality strictly lowers consumer surplus. This mission formalizes that result and the equilibrium analysis on which it rests.

Setting

A platform sells its own product FFF and hosts a third-party seller of a competing product TTT; marginal costs are zero. A unit mass of consumers has unit demand. A product either matches a consumer (value 111) or not (value 000).

  • A fraction α∈[0,1]\alpha\in[0,1]α∈[0,1] of consumers are of type fff: product FFF matches them with probability ρH\rho_HρH​ and TTT with probability ρL\rho_LρL​. The remaining 1−α1-\alpha1−α are of type ttt, with the probabilities reversed. Throughout, 1>ρH>ρL>01>\rho_H>\rho_L>01>ρH​>ρL​>0. The parameter α\alphaα is the popularity of FFF.
  • Prices satisfy pF,pT∈[0,1]p_F,p_T\in[0,1]pF​,pT​∈[0,1]. The platform keeps a commission rrr of the third party's revenue, so its profit is πF=pFDF+r pTDT\pi_F=p_FD_F+r\,p_TD_TπF​=pF​DF​+rpT​DT​ and the third party's is πT=(1−r)pTDT\pi_T=(1-r)p_TD_TπT​=(1−r)pT​DT​.
  • A ranking assigns each type a prominent product. Consumers see both prices, search the prominent product for free, and search the other one at a cost c∼U[0,1]c\sim U[0,1]c∼U[0,1]. This yields the per-type demands of equations (1)–(2) of the paper: for prominent product 111 and non-prominent product 222 with match probabilities ρ1,ρ2\rho_1,\rho_2ρ1​,ρ2​,
d1={ρ1(1−ρ22p1+ρ22p2),p1>p2,ρ1,p1≤p2,d2={ρ22(1−ρ1+ρ1p1−p2),p1>p2,(1−ρ1)ρ22(1−p2),p1≤p2.d_1=\begin{cases}\rho_1(1-\rho_2^2p_1+\rho_2^2p_2),&p_1>p_2,\\ \rho_1,&p_1\le p_2,\end{cases}\qquad d_2=\begin{cases}\rho_2^2(1-\rho_1+\rho_1p_1-p_2),&p_1>p_2,\\ (1-\rho_1)\rho_2^2(1-p_2),&p_1\le p_2.\end{cases}d1​={ρ1​(1−ρ22​p1​+ρ22​p2​),ρ1​,​p1​>p2​,p1​≤p2​,​d2​={ρ22​(1−ρ1​+ρ1​p1​−p2​),(1−ρ1​)ρ22​(1−p2​),​p1​>p2​,p1​≤p2​.​
  • Without search neutrality (NS), the sellers set prices simultaneously, and then the platform chooses, for each type, the prominent product that maximizes its expected profit from that consumer. An equilibrium is a price pair together with a ranking rule that is optimal at every price pair, such that no seller gains from a price deviation (anticipating the ranking it induces).
  • With search neutrality (S), FFF is prominent for type fff and TTT for type ttt; an equilibrium is a Nash equilibrium in prices.
  • Consumer surplus CSCSCS is the expected surplus of a consumer, averaged over the search cost ccc and the two types.
  • Condition 1 is the low-commission region r≤0.64 ρL/ρHr\le0.64\,\rho_L/\rho_Hr≤0.64ρL​/ρH​ and ρL≤0.975\rho_L\le0.975ρL​≤0.975, assumed throughout §4.1 of the paper.

Formalization targets

Goal: Proposition 3(1)

Under Condition 1 there are thresholds α‾,αˉ\underline\alpha,\bar\alphaα​,αˉ, depending only on (ρH,ρL,r)(\rho_H,\rho_L,r)(ρH​,ρL​,r), with

α‾<α2S=ρL2(1−rρH)ρL2(1−rρH)+ρH<12<α3S=ρHρH+ρL2<αˉ,\underline\alpha<\alpha_2^S=\frac{\rho_L^2(1-r\rho_H)}{\rho_L^2(1-r\rho_H)+\rho_H}<\frac12<\alpha_3^S=\frac{\rho_H}{\rho_H+\rho_L^2}<\bar\alpha,α​<α2S​=ρL2​(1−rρH​)+ρH​ρL2​(1−rρH​)​<21​<α3S​=ρH​+ρL2​ρH​​<αˉ,

such that for every α∈[0,1]∩(α‾,αˉ)\alpha\in[0,1]\cap(\underline\alpha,\bar\alpha)α∈[0,1]∩(α​,αˉ), consumer surplus in every equilibrium with search neutrality is strictly smaller than in every equilibrium without it:

CSS<CSNS.CS^{S}<CS^{NS}.CSS<CSNS.

Milestones

The equilibria without neutrality: the price order pT≤pFp_T\le p_FpT​≤pF​ when FFF is prominent for all (Appendix, p. 42); the closed-form equilibrium of that pricing game (cases (A)–(B), pp. 42–43); the statement of Lemma A1 (p. 42); Proposition 1 (p. 16) and the uniqueness claim before it. The equilibria with neutrality: the price order by α≶12\alpha\lessgtr\frac12α≶21​ (pp. 44–45); cases (A2), (A3)/(B3) and (B2) (pp. 45–46); Proposition 2 (pp. 17–18). The two consumer-surplus displays (pp. 43–44 and 46). Proposition 3(2) and Corollary 1 are included as companion statements.

Significance

The result. Proposition 3(1) shows that a relevance-based ranking rule can backfire. Under self-preferencing the third-party product is never prominent, so its seller prices low to invite search, and this disciplines the platform's own price. Under neutrality each seller is prominent for the consumers who like its product best, and for similarly popular products both sellers charge the maximal price 111; on [α2S,α3S][\alpha_2^S,\alpha_3^S][α2S​,α3S​] consumer surplus with neutrality is exactly zero. The goal makes this precise and shows that the harmful region strictly contains that interval. It is the paper's central short-term finding and the basis of its policy discussion.

Formalizing it. No part of this analysis is machine-checked anywhere, and the platform has no model of consumer search with prominence. The source file contains the equilibrium derivations of §4.1 in its Appendix, but the proofs of Propositions 1–3 and of Lemma A1 are in an online appendix that is not part of the source; a formal proof would supply them. Several of the Appendix's closed forms are misprinted (the interior prices of cases (A1) and (B1), the thresholds α1S\alpha_1^Sα1S​ and α4S\alpha_4^Sα4S​), and the threshold α1NS\alpha_1^{NS}α1NS​ misclassifies the boundary α=1\alpha=1α=1 when ρL>2/(3−r)\rho_L>\sqrt{2/(3-r)}ρL​>2/(3−r)​; the formal statements fix what is actually true.

Difficulty

The profits are piecewise quadratic with a kink at pF=pTp_F=p_TpF​=pT​, so first-order conditions do not characterize equilibria: every candidate must be checked against global deviations across the kink. Without neutrality, a deviation can also change the platform's ranking, so the deviating seller faces a different demand system; this is the content of Lemma A1 and the reason Condition 1 is needed. The obvious argument for the goal, "consumer surplus with neutrality is zero on [α2S,α3S][\alpha_2^S,\alpha_3^S][α2S​,α3S​] and positive without it", proves only the closed interval. The strict extension to (α‾,αˉ)(\underline\alpha,\bar\alpha)(α​,αˉ) requires controlling the neutral equilibrium just outside that interval, in the regions (A2) and (B2), where it is no longer at the corner.

Formalization scope

  • Parameters. ρH,ρL,r,α\rho_H,\rho_L,r,\alphaρH​,ρL​,r,α are real numbers with 0<ρL<ρH<10<\rho_L<\rho_H<10<ρL​<ρH​<1, 0≤r≤10\le r\le10≤r≤1 (the paper never states a range for rrr; Condition 1 forces r<0.64r<0.64r<0.64) and α∈[0,1]\alpha\in[0,1]α∈[0,1]. Condition 1 is the numbered form with "≤\le≤" (p. 15); the Appendix restates it with "<<<".
  • Prices and deviations are restricted to [0,1][0,1][0,1].
  • Demands are the paper's equations (1)–(2), aggregated over types for any ranking.
  • The ranking without neutrality is a rule from price pairs to rankings that maximizes the platform's per-consumer profit for each type at every price pair, ties broken arbitrarily. The equilibrium is subgame perfect: deviations are evaluated at the ranking the rule selects at the deviated prices.
  • Consumer surplus is ∑kNk∫01CSk(c) dc\sum_k N_k\int_0^1 CS_k(c)\,dc∑k​Nk​∫01​CSk​(c)dc with the per-consumer surplus written for an arbitrary ranking; the closed-form displays are theorems, not definitions.
  • "The equilibrium" is read as "every equilibrium"; existence is a separate conjunct (Propositions 1–2), so the goal is not vacuous.
  • Thresholds printed incorrectly in the Appendix (α1S\alpha_1^Sα1S​, α4S\alpha_4^Sα4S​) are existential; α1NS\alpha_1^{NS}α1NS​, α2S\alpha_2^Sα2S​, α3S\alpha_3^Sα3S​ and the closed-form prices without neutrality are defined as printed. In Proposition 1, the corner α=1\alpha=1α=1 with ρL>2/(3−r)\rho_L>\sqrt{2/(3-r)}ρL​>2/(3−r)​ is excluded from the constant region.
  • A formalization in which the ranking rule is free or optimal only at the equilibrium prices, in which consumer surplus is defined by its closed form, or in which the thresholds may depend on α\alphaα or collapse to the interval [α2S,α3S][\alpha_2^S,\alpha_3^S][α2S​,α3S​] would trivialize the goal; the statements rule each of these out.

A complete development needs elementary real analysis only: piecewise quadratic optimization on [0,1][0,1][0,1], the integral ∫01(a−c)+dc=a2/2\int_0^1(a-c)^+dc=a^2/2∫01​(a−c)+dc=a2/2, and continuity of the neutral equilibrium in α\alphaα. The model definitions are shared, with the same names, with the companion mission on equal popularity and the commission rate. Proofs of any milestone are welcome, as are proofs of Lemma A1 and of uniqueness, whose arguments are not in the source.

Selected references

  • T. Zou and B. Zhou, Self-Preferencing and Search Neutrality in Online Retail Platforms, Management Science (authors' manuscript), 2024. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2022.01795
  • M. Armstrong, J. Vickers and J. Zhou, Prominence and Consumer Search, RAND Journal of Economics 40(2), 209–233, 2009. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1756-2171.2009.00062.x
  • S. Amaro, EU says Amazon breached antitrust rules, opens second investigation into its e-commerce business, CNBC, 2020. https://www.cnbc.com/2020/11/10/eu-hits-amazon-with-antitrust-charges-for-distorting-competition.html
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Algorithmic Game TheoryEconomics·Captain: mikedeng1

Self-Preferencing and Search Neutrality in Online Retail Platforms II: At Equal Popularity, a Commission Below ρL/ρH Makes Search Neutrality Lower Consumer Surplus and Raise the Third-Party ProfitResearch Paper

Why self-preferencing is a regulatory question

Large retail platforms such as Amazon both host independent sellers and sell their own products in competition with them. The platform also controls the search ranking, the order in which products are shown to a consumer. The European Commission and the US Federal Trade Commission have examined whether platforms rank their own products ahead of rivals' (self-preferencing), and proposals of search neutrality would oblige a platform to rank products by relevance alone. The intuitive case for such a rule is that it protects consumers and third-party sellers.

T. Zou and B. Zhou, Self-Preferencing and Search Neutrality in Online Retail Platforms (Management Science, DOI 10.1287/mnsc.2022.01795), study this intuition in a duopoly model with consumer search and find that it can fail: when consumers see prices before searching, a platform free to steer consumers forces the third-party seller to cut its price to attract search, and neutrality removes that pressure. This mission formalizes their §4.2, which isolates the role of the commission rate rrr the platform charges the third-party seller, at equal popularity of the two products.

Setting

A platform sells its own product FFF and hosts a third-party seller of product TTT; production costs are zero. A unit mass of consumers has unit demand. A consumer of type k∈{f,t}k\in\{f,t\}k∈{f,t} values a product at 111 if it matches her taste and at 000 otherwise. A type-fff consumer is matched by FFF with probability ρH\rho_HρH​ and by TTT with probability ρL\rho_LρL​; for a type-ttt consumer the roles are swapped. Throughout, 0<ρL<ρH<10<\rho_L<\rho_H<10<ρL​<ρH​<1. In this mission the two types have equal mass, α=1/2\alpha=1/2α=1/2.

Sellers set prices pF,pT∈[0,1]p_F,p_T\in[0,1]pF​,pT​∈[0,1]. The platform keeps a fraction rrr of the third-party seller's revenue, so the profits are

πF=pFDF+r pTDT,πT=(1−r) pTDT,\pi_F=p_FD_F+r\,p_TD_T,\qquad \pi_T=(1-r)\,p_TD_T,πF​=pF​DF​+rpT​DT​,πT​=(1−r)pT​DT​,

where DjD_jDj​ is the demand for product jjj.

For each consumer type the platform shows one product first: the prominent product. A consumer sees both prices before searching, learns whether the prominent product matches for free, and pays a search cost ccc, uniform on [0,1][0,1][0,1], to inspect the other product. Optimal search yields the per-type demands (1)–(2) of the paper and a consumer surplus equal to the expected payoff of optimal search, averaged over types and over ccc.

Under search neutrality the ranking is fixed: FFF is prominent for type fff and TTT for type ttt. An equilibrium with neutrality is a pair of prices from which neither seller gains by a unilateral change. Without neutrality, the sellers set prices first and the platform then chooses, at whatever prices it sees, the ranking that maximizes its own profit from each consumer. An equilibrium is a pair of prices together with an optimal ranking rule σ\sigmaσ, mapping prices to rankings, such that neither seller gains by changing its price, given that the ranking will respond.

Formalization targets

Goal: Proposition 5

At α=1/2\alpha=1/2α=1/2:

  1. If ρL/ρH<r<1\rho_L/\rho_H<r<1ρL​/ρH​<r<1, search neutrality does not affect the outcome: every equilibrium without neutrality has the same prices, ranking, profits and consumer surplus as every equilibrium with neutrality.
  2. If 0≤r<ρL/ρH0\le r<\rho_L/\rho_H0≤r<ρL​/ρH​, every pair of equilibria satisfies
CSS<CSNS,πTNS<πTS.CS^{S}<CS^{NS},\qquad \pi_T^{NS}<\pi_T^{S}.CSS<CSNS,πTNS​<πTS​.
  1. There is ρˉ<1\bar\rho<1ρˉ​<1 such that, for ρˉ<ρL<ρH<1\bar\rho<\rho_L<\rho_H<1ρˉ​<ρL​<ρH​<1 and every r<ρL/ρHr<\rho_L/\rho_Hr<ρL​/ρH​, also πFNS<πFS\pi_F^{NS}<\pi_F^{S}πFNS​<πFS​.

Milestones

  • Lemma 1 (p. 25): with neutrality the unique equilibrium is pF=pT=1p_F=p_T=1pF​=pT​=1, with πF=ρH(1+r)/2\pi_F=\rho_H(1+r)/2πF​=ρH​(1+r)/2 and πT=ρH(1−r)/2\pi_T=\rho_H(1-r)/2πT​=ρH​(1−r)/2.
  • Proposition 4(1) (p. 24): without neutrality and with r>ρL/ρHr>\rho_L/\rho_Hr>ρL​/ρH​, every equilibrium ranks neutrally and has pF=pT=1p_F=p_T=1pF​=pT​=1.
  • The fixed-ranking game (Appendix, pp. 42–43): with FFF prominent for all, the equilibrium is an explicit interior pair when r<3−2/(ρHρL)r<3-2/(\rho_H\rho_L)r<3−2/(ρH​ρL​) and (1,12)(1,\tfrac12)(1,21​) otherwise.
  • Proposition 4(2) (p. 24): without neutrality and with r<ρL/ρHr<\rho_L/\rho_Hr<ρL​/ρH​, every equilibrium makes FFF prominent for all and has pF>pTp_F>p_TpF​>pT​; the prices are monotone in r,ρH,ρLr,\rho_H,\rho_Lr,ρH​,ρL​ on the region r≤3−2/(ρHρL)r\le 3-2/(\rho_H\rho_L)r≤3−2/(ρH​ρL​) and equal (1,12)(1,\tfrac12)(1,21​) beyond it.
  • The surplus display (Appendix, pp. 43–44): consumer surplus without neutrality as an explicit quadratic in the prices.

Significance

The result separates two regimes of a single policy question. With a high commission the platform already earns most of the revenue of product TTT and has no incentive to steer; neutrality is then moot. With a low commission the platform steers every consumer to FFF; the third-party seller responds by pricing below FFF to make search worthwhile, and consumers benefit from this competition. Imposing neutrality removes it, prices rise to 111, and consumer surplus falls to zero, while the third-party seller gains. For high match probabilities the platform gains as well, which makes neutrality a commitment device a platform might accept voluntarily. Proposition 5 is the equal-popularity version of the paper's main short-term finding (Proposition 3, under a low commission), now valid for every commission rate.

The paper proves Proposition 5, Proposition 4 and Lemma 1 in an online appendix that is not part of the manuscript used here; the manuscript's own Appendix contains only the equilibrium derivations for the game with a fixed ranking. None of these results is machine-checked. A formalization would produce the first verified treatment of a pricing game with an endogenous, profit-maximizing ranking stage and of a consumer-surplus integral over search costs; the definitions are reusable for the companion mission on the low-commission regime and for other prominence models.

Difficulty

The demands are piecewise quadratic with a kink where the two prices cross, so profits are not concave on [0,1]2[0,1]^2[0,1]2, and first-order conditions only locate candidates. The central difficulty is the ranking stage. A seller's deviation can change the platform's ranking: the third-party seller may raise its price to make prominence for type ttt worthwhile to the platform, and the platform as a seller may cut its price to undercut. Checking an equilibrium therefore requires comparing profits across ranking regimes at every deviation price, not only inside the regime of the candidate. The uniqueness claims require excluding equilibria in every regime, including those supported by an unusual tie-break of the ranking rule. The comparison of platform profits in part 3 compares the explicit interior prices of Proposition 4(2), a rational function of (ρH,ρL,r)(\rho_H,\rho_L,r)(ρH​,ρL​,r), with ρH(1+r)/2\rho_H(1+r)/2ρH​(1+r)/2; the paper gives no explicit threshold ρˉ\bar\rhoρˉ​.

Formalization scope

  • Parameters: 0<ρL<ρH<10<\rho_L<\rho_H<10<ρL​<ρH​<1 and 0≤r<10\le r<10≤r<1. The paper calls rrr a percentage commission without stating its range; r<1r<1r<1 is needed because at r=1r=1r=1 the third-party seller's profit is identically zero and Lemma 1's uniqueness fails. Prices range over [0,1][0,1][0,1] (p. 8).
  • The equilibrium without neutrality is subgame perfect: the ranking rule must be optimal for the platform, type by type, at every price pair, and deviations are evaluated at the ranking chosen at the deviated prices. A ranking that is arbitrary, or optimal only at the equilibrium prices, would allow spurious equilibria and is ruled out by the definitions. Ties in the ranking may be broken arbitrarily, and statements about "every equilibrium" hold for every tie-break.
  • "The equilibrium" is read as "every equilibrium"; existence is a separate conjunct of the milestones, so the comparisons of Proposition 5 are not vacuous.
  • At the boundary r=ρL/ρHr=\rho_L/\rho_Hr=ρL​/ρH​ the platform is indifferent for type-ttt consumers at prices (1,1)(1,1)(1,1), and two different equilibria exist depending on the tie-break. Statements about every equilibrium are made for r>ρL/ρHr>\rho_L/\rho_Hr>ρL​/ρH​, and at the boundary only existence is claimed.
  • Consumer surplus is defined from the search model as ∫01\int_0^1∫01​ over the search cost of the optimal-search payoff. It is not defined by the paper's closed-form display, which is a milestone.
  • "Reduces" and "improves" in Proposition 5 and "increase/decrease" in Proposition 4(2) are read strictly. "Sufficiently large" is read as one threshold ρˉ<1\bar\rho<1ρˉ​<1 independent of rrr.
  • Definitions needed: two finite types, the demands (1)–(2), profits, ranking rules and their optimality, both equilibrium notions, and the surplus integral, all in SearchNeutrality.Commission.Model; the closed-form prices and surplus in SearchNeutrality.Commission.ClosedForms. These duplicate, with the same names, the definitions of the companion mission SearchNeutrality.ShortTerm.
  • Contributions welcome: proofs of the milestones in any order, reusable lemmas on the per-type ranking comparison, and an explicit admissible ρˉ\bar\rhoρˉ​.

Selected references

  • T. Zou, B. Zhou, Self-Preferencing and Search Neutrality in Online Retail Platforms, Management Science (authors' manuscript), 2024. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2022.01795
  • M. Armstrong, J. Vickers, J. Zhou, Prominence and consumer search, RAND Journal of Economics 40(2), 2009. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1756-2171.2009.00067.x
  • M. Armstrong, J. Zhou, Paying for prominence, Economic Journal 121(556), 2011. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0297.2011.02469.x
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Control TheoryProbabilityStochastic Systems·Captain: mikedeng1

Scheduling in the High-Uncertainty Heavy Traffic Regime: The Value of the Scheduling Game Converges to the HJB Solution at ZeroResearch Paper

Motivation

Heavy-traffic analysis is the standard tool for scheduling queues whose servers are almost always busy: after diffusion scaling, a multiclass queue is approximated by a reflected Brownian motion, and asymptotically optimal policies are read off a limiting control problem. Classical results of this kind, such as the asymptotic optimality of the cµ rule (serve the class with the largest holding cost times service rate first; van Mieghem, 1995), assume that the job-size distributions are known.

In practice the first moments of service times are usually estimated well, while their variability is not. Atar, Castiel and Shadmi study a high-uncertainty regime: the means of the job-size distributions are pinned down to within O(n−1/2)O(n^{-1/2})O(n−1/2), but their variances are uncertain at order one, and an adversary chooses them job by job with full knowledge of the past. The scheduler wants to minimize, and the adversary to maximize, a discounted holding cost. The paper solves this game asymptotically: the nonpreemptive cµ policy is asymptotically optimal against every adversary, and the value of the game converges to the value at 000 of a one-dimensional Hamilton–Jacobi–Bellman (HJB) equation.

Setting

There are LLL job types and one server. In the nnn-th system one job of each type arrives at each time k/nk/nk/n, k=1,2,…k=1,2,\dotsk=1,2,…, and the server works at rate nnn, so that a job of size xxx occupies it for x/nx/nx/n time units. The system starts empty.

Adversary. For each nnn and type ℓ\ellℓ an uncertainty class Πℓn\Pi^{\ell n}Πℓn, a nonempty closed set of probability distributions on [0,∞)[0,\infty)[0,∞), is given. At each epoch k/nk/nk/n the adversary chooses πkℓn∈Πℓn\pi^{\ell n}_k\in\Pi^{\ell n}πkℓn​∈Πℓn for every ℓ\ellℓ, based on the past job sizes, and the job sizes JkℓnJ^{\ell n}_kJkℓn​ are then drawn independently across types from these distributions. The set of such controls is An\mathcal A^nAn.

Scheduler. The scheduler chooses the cumulative effort BtℓnB^{\ell n}_tBtℓn​ devoted to each type, an LLL-dimensional Lipschitz path whose increments over [s,t][s,t][s,t] lie in (t−s)⋅{x∈[0,1]L:∑ℓxℓ≤1}(t-s)\cdot\{x\in[0,1]^L:\sum_\ell x_\ell\le 1\}(t−s)⋅{x∈[0,1]L:∑ℓ​xℓ​≤1}. An admissible strategy βn∈Bn\beta^n\in\mathbb B^nβn∈Bn is a measurable, non-anticipating, work-conserving map from the adversary's control path to such an effort path that never serves more work than has arrived.

Cost and value. With Atℓn=∑k≤ntJkℓnA^{\ell n}_t=\sum_{k\le nt}J^{\ell n}_kAtℓn​=∑k≤nt​Jkℓn​, the workload is Wtℓn=Atℓn−nBtℓnW^{\ell n}_t=A^{\ell n}_t-nB^{\ell n}_tWtℓn​=Atℓn​−nBtℓn​, the queue length QtℓnQ^{\ell n}_tQtℓn​ is the number of arrived type-ℓ\ellℓ jobs not yet completed, and hats denote scaling by n−1/2n^{-1/2}n−1/2. For holding costs hℓ>0h^\ell>0hℓ>0,

Cn(βn(an),an)=E[∫0∞e−t h⋅Q^tn dt],Vn=inf⁡βn∈Bnsup⁡an∈AnCn(βn(an),an).C^n(\beta^n(a^n),a^n)=\mathbb E\Big[\int_0^\infty e^{-t}\,h\cdot\hat Q^n_t\,dt\Big],\qquad V^n=\inf_{\beta^n\in\mathbb B^n}\sup_{a^n\in\mathcal A^n}C^n(\beta^n(a^n),a^n).Cn(βn(an),an)=E[∫0∞​e−th⋅Q^​tn​dt],Vn=βn∈Bninf​an∈Ansup​Cn(βn(an),an).

Assumptions. With ξπ\xi^\piξπ the mean and qπq^\piqπ half the variance of π\piπ, and bπℓn=n1/2(ξπ−1/μℓ)b^{\pi\ell n}=n^{1/2}(\xi^\pi-1/\mu^\ell)bπℓn=n1/2(ξπ−1/μℓ), the sets Kℓn={(bπℓn,qπ):π∈Πℓn}K^{\ell n}=\{(b^{\pi\ell n},q^\pi):\pi\in\Pi^{\ell n}\}Kℓn={(bπℓn,qπ):π∈Πℓn} converge in the Hausdorff distance to compact sets Kℓ⊂R×(0,∞)K^\ell\subset\mathbb R\times(0,\infty)Kℓ⊂R×(0,∞); fourth moments are uniformly bounded; ∑ℓ1/μℓ=1\sum_\ell 1/\mu^\ell=1∑ℓ​1/μℓ=1 (heavy traffic); and types are labelled so that h1μ1≤⋯≤hLμLh^1\mu^1\le\dots\le h^L\mu^Lh1μ1≤⋯≤hLμL, with h1μ1=1h^1\mu^1=1h1μ1=1.

HJB equation. With Hℓ(v1,v2)=max⁡(b,q)∈ch(Kℓ)(bv1+qv2)H^\ell(v_1,v_2)=\max_{(b,q)\in\mathrm{ch}(K^\ell)}(bv_1+qv_2)Hℓ(v1​,v2​)=max(b,q)∈ch(Kℓ)​(bv1​+qv2​),

∑ℓ=1LHℓ(u′(w),u′′(w))−u(w)+w=0,w≥0,u′(0)=0,lim sup⁡w→∞∣u(w)∣/w<∞.\sum_{\ell=1}^L H^\ell(u'(w),u''(w))-u(w)+w=0,\quad w\ge0,\qquad u'(0)=0,\quad \limsup_{w\to\infty}|u(w)|/w<\infty .ℓ=1∑L​Hℓ(u′(w),u′′(w))−u(w)+w=0,w≥0,u′(0)=0,w→∞limsup​∣u(w)∣/w<∞.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 2.1

Vn⟶u(0)(n→∞),V^n\longrightarrow u(0)\qquad(n\to\infty),Vn⟶u(0)(n→∞),

for the classical solution uuu of the HJB equation. The paper states Vn→V(0)=u(0)V^n\to\mathsf V(0)=u(0)Vn→V(0)=u(0) with V\mathsf VV the value of a martingale control problem; the goal uses the u(0)u(0)u(0) form, which leaves the martingale problem out of the statement.

Milestones

  • β*ⁿ ∈ 𝔹ⁿ: the nonpreemptive cµ strategy is admissible.
  • Lemma 2: the total workload does not depend on the strategy.
  • Lemma 3: second moments of the scaled workload and queue length grow at most like (t+1)2(t+1)^2(t+1)2, uniformly in nnn, the control and the strategy.
  • Lemma 4: Q^ℓn−μℓW^ℓn→0\hat Q^{\ell n}-\mu^\ell\hat W^{\ell n}\to0Q^​ℓn−μℓW^ℓn→0 uniformly in probability over strategies (the snapshot principle).
  • Lemma 5: under the cµ policy the workload of types 2,…,L2,\dots,L2,…,L vanishes.
  • Theorem 1: inf⁡βnCn(βn(an),an)−Cn(β∗n(an),an)→0\inf_{\beta^n}C^n(\beta^n(a^n),a^n)-C^n(\beta^{*n}(a^n),a^n)\to0infβn​Cn(βn(an),an)−Cn(β∗n(an),an)→0 for every adversary.
  • Proposition 1.1: the HJB equation has a unique classical solution. Proposition 1.3: it is nonnegative, non-decreasing and convex.
  • (47): lim sup⁡nCn(β∗n(an),an)≤u(0)\limsup_nC^n(\beta^{*n}(a^n),a^n)\le u(0)limsupn​Cn(β∗n(an),an)≤u(0) for every control sequence.
  • Theorem 2.2: measurable selectors ψℓn\psi^{\ell n}ψℓn attaining the prelimit Hamiltonian.
  • (55): for the feedback control πkℓn=ψℓn(Wk−1n)\pi^{\ell n}_k=\psi^{\ell n}(\mathsf W^n_{k-1})πkℓn​=ψℓn(Wk−1n​), u(0)≤lim inf⁡nCn(β∗n(a∗n),a∗n)u(0)\le\liminf_nC^n(\beta^{*n}(a^{*n}),a^{*n})u(0)≤liminfn​Cn(β∗n(a∗n),a∗n).

Significance

The result gives the first-order asymptotics of a scheduling game with model uncertainty: the scheduler loses nothing by ignoring the adversary and using the cµ rule, and the adversary's best response is a state-feedback choice of drift and variance determined by u′u'u′ and u′′u''u′′. Theorem 1 is a robustness statement for one of the most widely used scheduling rules; Theorem 2 reduces a game on path space to a scalar nonlinear ODE.

The paper's proofs are complete, so the remaining work is formalization. No part of this result, and none of its objects (heavy-traffic queues with adversarial service distributions, the nonpreemptive cµ policy as a map on path space, the HJB equation of a reflected controlled diffusion), has a known machine-checked statement or proof.

Difficulty

The statement is a limit of a real sequence, but each term is an infimum over measurable, causal, work-conserving maps on path space of a supremum over feedback choices of distributions. The proofs (§§4–7 and the appendix) use uniform C-tightness of prelimit processes, weak convergence in D[0,∞)D[0,\infty)D[0,∞), the existence theory for fully nonlinear uniformly elliptic equations (Gilbarg–Trudinger, Thm 17.18), martingale characterizations of limits (Jacod–Shiryaev, Cor. VI.6.30; Karatzas–Shreve, Thm 5.5.15), measurable selection (Budhiraja–Dupuis, Lemma 8.10), and Taylor expansion of uuu along the prelimit workload. The obvious route through the uncontrolled diffusion limit fails because the adversary's variance choice is state dependent, so no single limiting Brownian motion describes all adversaries; the limit is a control problem, not a process.

Formalization scope

The Lean development lives in the namespace HighUncertHT.Game. Types are Fin L, 0-based (the paper's type 1 is index 0). Distributions are ProbabilityMeasure ℝ with no mass on (−∞,0)(-\infty,0)(−∞,0), with the weak topology. Systems are indexed by n≥1n\ge1n≥1; the class at n=0n=0n=0 is required to satisfy the same conditions so that control sequences indexed by N\mathbb NN exist. Costs and values are in [0,∞][0,\infty][0,∞] (lower Lebesgue integrals), sup norms are in [0,∞][0,\infty][0,∞], the Hausdorff distance is the extended one, and derivatives of uuu are one-sided on [0,∞)[0,\infty)[0,∞).

An adversary control is encoded by its feedback map from past job sizes to distributions and the measurable Markov kernel it induces; its law is the Ionescu–Tulcea trajectory measure. By (5), the Doob–Dynkin lemma and (7), this has the same laws, hence the same costs, as the paper's An\mathcal A^nAn. Strategies are measurable for the product σ-algebras. The cµ strategy β∗n\beta^{*n}β∗n is defined explicitly by an event recursion over service decisions.

The standing assumptions (Assumptions 1–2, labelling (14), h1μ1=1h^1\mu^1=1h1μ1=1) are fields of the Setting and hold in every statement. Corrected printed slips: the priority rule serves the highest index (p. 9 prints "lowest", contradicting the cµ rule and Lemma 5); the departure count is capped at the number of arrived jobs (p. 6); "→ 0 in probability" for processes is read as convergence of the sup norm on compact intervals (Lemma 5); (55) is stated for the control (61), not (15).

Trivializing formalizations are ruled out: Bn\mathbb B^nBn is nonempty because β∗n∈Bn\beta^{*n}\in\mathbb B^nβ∗n∈Bn is a milestone; the HJB has a classical solution (Proposition 1.1), so the goal is not vacuous; no expectation is a Bochner integral that could vanish for non-integrable integrands; u′u'u′ is not a junk deriv; and (55) asserts that its feedback control exists.

Needed infrastructure: diffusion-scaled processes and their tightness in D[0,∞)D[0,\infty)D[0,∞), the one-dimensional Skorokhod map and its Lipschitz property, martingale estimates for sums of conditionally centred job sizes, and the existence theory for the HJB equation. The Skorokhod map, the queue primitives and the cµ policy are reusable for other heavy-traffic missions. Contributions on any milestone, or on general lemmas they need, are welcome. Not included: Lemmas 1, 6, 7, 8, Proposition 1.2, Proposition 2, Theorem 2.3 and the martingale control problem.

Selected references

  • R. Atar, E. Castiel, Y. Shadmi, Scheduling in the High Uncertainty Heavy Traffic Regime, Mathematics of Operations Research, 2025; preprint arXiv:2204.05733v1, 2022. https://arxiv.org/abs/2204.05733v1
  • J. A. van Mieghem, Dynamic scheduling with convex delay costs: the generalized cμ rule, Annals of Applied Probability 5(3), 1995. https://doi.org/10.1214/aoap/1177004702
  • M. I. Reiman, Some diffusion approximations with state space collapse, in Modelling and Performance Evaluation Methodology, Springer LNCIS 60, 1984. https://doi.org/10.1007/BFb0005161
  • D. Gilbarg, N. S. Trudinger, Elliptic Partial Differential Equations of Second Order, Springer, 2001. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-61798-0
  • A. Budhiraja, P. Dupuis, Analysis and Approximation of Rare Events, Springer, 2019. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4939-9579-0
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ProbabilityStochastic Systems·Captain: mikedeng1

Learning and Balancing Unknown Loads in Large-Scale Systems I: The Refined Learning Scheme Settles the Threshold at mΔ and Balances the Load on (m, Δ)-Bounded IntervalsResearch Paper

Motivation

In adaptive video streaming and online gaming, tasks are dispatched to one of nnn identical server pools; all tasks in a pool are served in parallel, so a task's duration does not depend on the load, but its quality of service does. The total number of tasks then does not depend on how tasks are dispatched (the pools together form an infinite-server system), and the relevant objective is a balanced distribution of tasks over the pools: every Schur-concave utility of the occupancy vector, including the α\alphaα-fair utilities, rewards balance (Goldsztajn, Borst & van Leeuwaarden 2024, §1). Join the Shortest Queue is optimal for this purpose but needs the exact occupancy of every pool.

A threshold dispatching rule needs much less. With an integer Δ≥1\Delta\ge1Δ≥1 and a threshold ℓn\ell_nℓn​, it keeps every pool between ℓn\ell_nℓn​ and hn:=ℓn+Δh_n:=\ell_n+\Deltahn​:=ℓn​+Δ tasks whenever it can. Choosing ℓn\ell_nℓn​ well requires the offered load ρ=λ/μ\rho=\lambda/\muρ=λ/μ, which in practice is unknown and varies in time. The refined learning scheme of Goldsztajn, Borst and van Leeuwaarden adjusts ℓn\ell_nℓn​ online, in steps of Δ\DeltaΔ, using the same coarse state information as the dispatcher. This mission formalizes their main result on that scheme (Theorem 2 of arXiv:2012.10142v3): along time intervals where the load is suitably bounded, the threshold settles at the right value and the load becomes balanced.

Timeline. The threshold rule with Δ=1\Delta=1Δ=1 and the fixed threshold ⌊ρ⌋\lfloor\rho\rfloor⌊ρ⌋ was shown to have the same fluid and diffusion limits as Join the Shortest Queue for constant arrival rates and exponential service (Goldsztajn et al., INFORMS Journal on Computing, 2022). The present paper (arXiv 2020, revised 2024; Mathematics of Operations Research, 2025) removes the knowledge of ρ\rhoρ, allows a time-varying arrival rate, and proves almost-sure statements about the learned threshold.

Setting

Fix a horizon T>0T>0T>0, a measurable arrival-rate function λ:[0,T]→[0,C]\lambda:[0,T]\to[0,C]λ:[0,T]→[0,C], a service rate μ>0\mu>0μ>0 and an integer Δ≥1\Delta\ge1Δ≥1. The system with nnn pools receives tasks at rate nλ(t)n\lambda(t)nλ(t); service times are exponential with rate μ\muμ. The occupancy state qn(t)=(qn(t,i))i≥0q_n(t)=(q_n(t,i))_{i\ge0}qn​(t)=(qn​(t,i))i≥0​ records the fraction qn(t,i)q_n(t,i)qn​(t,i) of pools with at least iii tasks, so it lies in

Q={q∈[0,1]N:q(i+1)≤q(i)≤q(0)=1}.Q=\{q\in[0,1]^{\mathbb N}: q(i+1)\le q(i)\le q(0)=1\}.Q={q∈[0,1]N:q(i+1)≤q(i)≤q(0)=1}.

The threshold ℓn(t)\ell_n(t)ℓn​(t) is a nonnegative multiple of Δ\DeltaΔ. An arriving task goes to a pool, chosen uniformly at random, with fewer than ℓn\ell_nℓn​ tasks if there is one; otherwise to one with fewer than hnh_nhn​ tasks if there is one; otherwise to any pool. The refined learning scheme with parameters αn∈(0,1)\alpha_n\in(0,1)αn​∈(0,1) acts at arrivals: if, right before the arrival, the fraction of pools with at least ℓn\ell_nℓn​ tasks is at most αn\alpha_nαn​, the threshold drops by Δ\DeltaΔ; if all pools have at least ℓn\ell_nℓn​ tasks and at least n−1n-1n−1 have at least hnh_nhn​, it rises by Δ\DeltaΔ.

All systems are built on one probability space from independent unit-rate Poisson processes Ni\mathcal N_iNi​, i.i.d. uniform selection variables UjU_jUj​, and random initial conditions with qn(0)→q(0)q_n(0)\to q(0)qn​(0)→q(0) almost surely, qn(0,B+1)=0q_n(0,B+1)=0qn​(0,B+1)=0 and ℓn(0)≤B\ell_n(0)\le Bℓn​(0)≤B. The paths (qn,ℓn)(q_n,\ell_n)(qn​,ℓn​) are the solutions of the implicit equations (9a)–(9b): arrivals follow Nnλ(t)=N0(n∫0tλ)\mathcal N^\lambda_n(t)=\mathcal N_0(n\int_0^t\lambda)Nnλ​(t)=N0​(n∫0t​λ) and are routed by the UjU_jUj​; departures from pools with iii tasks follow Ni\mathcal N_iNi​ run at the clock n∫0tμi[qn(s,i)−qn(s,i+1)]dsn\int_0^t\mu i[q_n(s,i)-q_n(s,i+1)]dsn∫0t​μi[qn​(s,i)−qn​(s,i+1)]ds.

The fluid total mass is u(t)=u(0)e−μt+∫0tρ(s)μe−μ(t−s)dsu(t)=u(0)e^{-\mu t}+\int_0^t\rho(s)\mu e^{-\mu(t-s)}dsu(t)=u(0)e−μt+∫0t​ρ(s)μe−μ(t−s)ds with u(0)=∑i≥1q(0,i)u(0)=\sum_{i\ge1}q(0,i)u(0)=∑i≥1​q(0,i). On an interval [a,b]⊂[0,T][a,b]\subset[0,T][a,b]⊂[0,T] let ρmin⁡,ρmax⁡\rho_{\min},\rho_{\max}ρmin​,ρmax​ be the infimum and supremum of ρ\rhoρ. The load is (m,Δ)(m,\Delta)(m,Δ)-bounded on [a,b][a,b][a,b] (Definition 1) if mΔ<ρmin⁡≤ρmax⁡<(m+1)Δm\Delta<\rho_{\min}\le\rho_{\max}<(m+1)\DeltamΔ<ρmin​≤ρmax​<(m+1)Δ and b−ab-ab−a exceeds an explicit constant σ(a,b,m,Δ)\sigma(a,b,m,\Delta)σ(a,b,m,Δ) built from log⁡ρmin⁡ρmin⁡−mΔ\log\frac{\rho_{\min}}{\rho_{\min}-m\Delta}logρmin​−mΔρmin​​ and [log⁡u(a)−ρmax⁡(m+1)Δ−ρmax⁡]+\big[\log\frac{u(a)-\rho_{\max}}{(m+1)\Delta-\rho_{\max}}\big]^+[log(m+1)Δ−ρmax​u(a)−ρmax​​]+.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 2

Assume αn→1\alpha_n\to1αn​→1 and lim inf⁡nnγ0(1−αn)>0\liminf_n n^{\gamma_0}(1-\alpha_n)>0liminfn​nγ0​(1−αn​)>0 for some γ0∈(0,1/2)\gamma_0\in(0,1/2)γ0​∈(0,1/2), the load is (m,Δ)(m,\Delta)(m,Δ)-bounded on [a,b][a,b][a,b], and σ(a,b,m,Δ)<σ<b−a\sigma(a,b,m,\Delta)<\sigma<b-aσ(a,b,m,Δ)<σ<b−a. Then almost surely

lim⁡n→∞sup⁡t∈[a+σ,b]∣ℓn(t)−mΔ∣=0,lim⁡n→∞sup⁡t∈[a+σ,b]nγ∣1−qn(t,i)∣=0  (i≤mΔ, γ∈[0,12)),\lim_{n\to\infty}\sup_{t\in[a+\sigma,b]}|\ell_n(t)-m\Delta|=0,\qquad \lim_{n\to\infty}\sup_{t\in[a+\sigma,b]}n^{\gamma}|1-q_n(t,i)|=0\ \ (i\le m\Delta,\ \gamma\in[0,\tfrac12)),n→∞lim​t∈[a+σ,b]sup​∣ℓn​(t)−mΔ∣=0,n→∞lim​t∈[a+σ,b]sup​nγ∣1−qn​(t,i)∣=0  (i≤mΔ, γ∈[0,21​)), lim sup⁡n→∞sup⁡t∈[a+σ,b]∑i>(m+1)Δqn(t,i) eμ[t−(a+σ)]≤u(a+σ).\limsup_{n\to\infty}\sup_{t\in[a+\sigma,b]}\sum_{i>(m+1)\Delta}q_n(t,i)\,e^{\mu[t-(a+\sigma)]}\le u(a+\sigma).n→∞limsup​t∈[a+σ,b]sup​i>(m+1)Δ∑​qn​(t,i)eμ[t−(a+σ)]≤u(a+σ).

Milestones

In the order of the proof: well-posedness of (9a)–(9b) (§5.1.1); Lemmas 21 and 22 and Proposition 4 (relative compactness); Lemmas 5 and 6 and Proposition 7 (the set ΩT\Omega_TΩT​ of nice sample paths); Proposition 8 (un→uu_n\to uun​→u uniformly); Proposition 9 (decay of tail masses below the threshold); Proposition 10 (the threshold eventually stays at most mΔm\DeltamΔ after a+σbda+\sigma_{\mathrm{bd}}a+σbd​); Corollary 11 (the bound (6c)); Lemmas 12 and 13 (the threshold locks at mΔm\DeltamΔ).

Significance

The result. Theorem 2 shows that a scheme using only two bits of state per arrival finds the balancing threshold mΔm\DeltamΔ without knowing ρ\rhoρ, within the explicit time σ(a,b,m,Δ)\sigma(a,b,m,\Delta)σ(a,b,m,Δ), which is tight for an initially empty system with constant load. It quantifies balance: the fraction of pools with fewer than mΔm\DeltamΔ tasks is o(n−γ)o(n^{-\gamma})o(n−γ) for every γ<1/2\gamma<1/2γ<1/2, and the mass beyond column (m+1)Δ(m+1)\Delta(m+1)Δ decays exponentially. Conditions (5) are sharp in kind: αn→1\alpha_n\to1αn​→1 prevents settling too high, and the rate n−γ0n^{-\gamma_0}n−γ0​ stops O(n)O(\sqrt n)O(n​) fluctuations from pushing the threshold down.

Formalizing it. The result is proved in the paper; nothing here is open mathematically. Nothing of it is machine-checked. A formal proof would add an almost-sure coupled construction of a many-server Markov process on Poisson primitives, a rate-n−γn^{-\gamma}n−γ functional strong law for the Poisson process, and a pathwise relative-compactness argument in the uniform topology. None of these is in Mathlib.

Difficulty

The usual fluid-limit route fails here. The learning scheme reacts to excursions of the occupancy process of vanishing size: a threshold increase needs nqn(hn)≥n−1n q_n(h_n)\ge n-1nqn​(hn​)≥n−1, a decrease qn(ℓn)≤αnq_n(\ell_n)\le\alpha_nqn​(ℓn​)≤αn​ with αn→1\alpha_n\to1αn​→1. So the threshold is not a continuous function of the fluid state, and limits of (qn,ℓn)(q_n,\ell_n)(qn​,ℓn​) need not satisfy any closed ODE. The natural first idea, deriving a limiting ODE for (q,ℓ)(q,\ell)(q,ℓ) jointly and studying its equilibria, fails for exactly this reason: whether the threshold moves is decided by fluctuations of order n−1/2n^{-1/2}n−1/2 around the fluid path, which a law of large numbers does not see. The statements must therefore hold almost surely and uniformly in time for the coupled sequence, not in law.

Formalization scope

  • Model. UnknownLoads.Refined.LoadData holds T,λ,C,μ,ΔT,\lambda,C,\mu,\DeltaT,λ,C,μ,Δ (with λ\lambdaλ measurable, an assumption the paper uses tacitly). Primitives holds the Poisson processes (the published BesbesZeevi.Parametric.PoissonProcess, independent as a family), the uniform UjU_jUj​, the initial conditions, and the independence of the three families. Any probability space carrying them is allowed; completion is immaterial for almost-sure statements.
  • Initial conditions are random and satisfy, almost surely, qn(0)∈Qq_n(0)\in Qqn​(0)∈Q, nqn(0,i)∈Nnq_n(0,i)\in\mathbb Nnqn​(0,i)∈N, ℓn(0)∈ΔN\ell_n(0)\in\Delta\mathbb Nℓn​(0)∈ΔN, qn(0,B+1)=0q_n(0,B+1)=0qn​(0,B+1)=0, ℓn(0)≤B\ell_n(0)\le Bℓn​(0)≤B, and qn(0)→q(0)q_n(0)\to q(0)qn​(0)→q(0) coordinatewise (the form of (2) for exponential service).
  • The processes are given in System with the hypothesis that, almost surely, for every n≥1n\ge1n≥1, (qn,ℓn)(q_n,\ell_n)(qn​,ℓn​) is a càdlàg, QQQ-valued solution of (9a)–(9b) on [0,T][0,T][0,T]. Left limits are Function.leftLim, and τn,k=inf⁡{t≥0:Nnλ(t)≥k}\tau_{n,k}=\inf\{t\ge0:\mathcal N^\lambda_n(t)\ge k\}τn,k​=inf{t≥0:Nnλ​(t)≥k}. The well-posedness milestone states that such solutions exist and are unique almost surely, so System is not vacuous.
  • ΩT\Omega_TΩT​ is the predicate IsNicePath B_T ω. It holds the equations at ω\omegaω, simple events (unit jumps, no coincidences) and the initial conditions at ω\omegaω, Proposition 4's property, (11) and (12a)–(12c). Proposition 7 asserts it almost surely; "for each ω∈ΩT\omega\in\Omega_Tω∈ΩT​" becomes "for every BT,ωB_T,\omegaBT​,ω with IsNicePath B_T ω".
  • Conventions. Time is real, with conditions on [0,T][0,T][0,T]. lim⁡nsup⁡t(⋅)=0\lim_n\sup_t(\cdot)=0limn​supt​(⋅)=0 is written in ε\varepsilonε–nnn form. Relative compactness in (DRN[0,T],ϱ)(D_{\mathbb R^{\mathbb N}}[0,T],\varrho)(DRN​[0,T],ϱ) is coordinatewise uniform convergence along sub-subsequences. Subsequences are StrictMono maps. Tail sums in inequalities ((6c), Corollary 11) are in [0,∞][0,\infty][0,∞]; unu_nun​ and vnv_nvn​ in limit statements are real series, finite sums for large nnn on ΩT\Omega_TΩT​. lim inf⁡nnγ0(1−αn)>0\liminf_n n^{\gamma_0}(1-\alpha_n)>0liminfn​nγ0​(1−αn​)>0 is "eventually ≥κ\ge\kappa≥κ for some κ>0\kappa>0κ>0". The constant in (6c) is fixed to u(a+σ)u(a+\sigma)u(a+σ).
  • Ruled out. A real tsum in (6c) would make the bound vacuous for non-summable tails, and a real supremum would make (6a) vacuous for unbounded thresholds. Neither appears. (6a) says that ℓn\ell_nℓn​ equals mΔm\DeltamΔ on [a+σ,b][a+\sigma,b][a+σ,b] for all large nnn, a property of the learned threshold that no fixed threshold could satisfy for all admissible loads.
  • One added hypothesis. Proposition 9 assumes u(t0)>0u(t_0)>0u(t0​)>0: for an empty system at t0t_0t0​ the paper's strict inequality reads 0<00<00<0.
  • Welcome contributions: the Poisson functional strong law with rate (Lemma 6), Bramson's approximation lemma (Lemma 21), and the construction's well-posedness. All three are reusable for other many-server models.

Selected references

  • D. Goldsztajn, S. C. Borst, J. S. H. van Leeuwaarden, Learning and balancing unknown loads in large-scale systems, arXiv:2012.10142v3, 2024 (Mathematics of Operations Research, 2025). https://arxiv.org/abs/2012.10142
  • D. Goldsztajn, S. C. Borst, J. S. H. van Leeuwaarden, D. Mukherjee, P. A. Whiting, Self-learning threshold-based load balancing, INFORMS Journal on Computing 34(1), 39–54, 2022.
  • M. Bramson, State space collapse with application to heavy traffic limits for multiclass queueing networks, Queueing Systems 30, 89–140, 1998. https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1019160803783
  • P. D. Sparaggis, D. Towsley, C. Cassandras, Extremal properties of the shortest/longest non-full queue policies in finite-capacity systems with state-dependent service rates, Journal of Applied Probability 30, 223–236, 1993.
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ProbabilityStochastic Systems·Captain: mikedeng1

Learning and Balancing Unknown Loads in Large-Scale Systems II: Under Coxian Service Times the Basic Learning Scheme Settles the Threshold at ⌊ρ⌋_Δ and Balances the LoadResearch Paper

Motivation

Large data centers and cloud platforms route a stream of incoming tasks to many server pools, each pool able to serve several tasks at once. A dispatcher that sends each task to the least loaded pool (join-the-shortest-queue, JSQ) balances the load best, but it needs the exact number of tasks at every pool, which is costly to maintain at scale. A threshold dispatching rule needs much less information: it only needs to know which pools hold fewer than ℓn\ell_nℓn​ tasks, or fewer than ℓn+Δ\ell_n+\Deltaℓn​+Δ tasks. For constant arrival rates and exponential service it has the same fluid and diffusion limits as JSQ when Δ=1\Delta = 1Δ=1 and the threshold equals ⌊ρ⌋\lfloor\rho\rfloor⌊ρ⌋, where ρ\rhoρ is the offered load per pool (Goldsztajn, Borst, van Leeuwaarden, Mukherjee and Whiting, INFORMS Journal on Computing 34(1), 2022, reference [15] of arXiv:2012.10142v3).

The difficulty is that the right threshold depends on ρ\rhoρ, which the dispatcher does not know. Goldsztajn, Borst and van Leeuwaarden (arXiv:2012.10142v3) let the dispatcher learn it online. This mission concerns their second main result: with Coxian service times, which are dense among all service-time distributions, and the basic learning scheme, the threshold settles at the optimal value and the load becomes nearly balanced, almost surely in the many-server limit. (The first main result, for exponential service with a time-varying arrival rate and a refined learning scheme, is the subject of a companion mission.)

Setting

There are nnn server pools. Tasks arrive as a Poisson process of rate nλn\lambdanλ, λ≥0\lambda \ge 0λ≥0. A task passes through at most r≥1r \ge 1r≥1 phases: it starts in phase 111, phase mmm lasts an exponential time of rate μm>0\mu_m > 0μm​>0, and after phase mmm the task moves to phase m+1m+1m+1 with probability pmp_mpm​ or leaves with probability 1−pm1-p_m1−pm​, with pr=0p_r = 0pr​=0 and pm∈(0,1)p_m\in(0,1)pm​∈(0,1) for m≠rm\ne rm=r. The mean service time 1/μ1/\mu1/μ follows from these data, and ρ:=λ/μ\rho := \lambda/\muρ:=λ/μ.

A pool has profile ν∈Nr\nu\in\mathbb N^rν∈Nr if it holds ν(m)\nu(m)ν(m) tasks in phase mmm. The occupancy state sn(ν)s_n(\nu)sn​(ν) is the fraction of pools with profile ν\nuν, a point of S={s∈[0,1]Nr:∑νs(ν)=1}S = \{s\in[0,1]^{\mathbb N^r} : \sum_\nu s(\nu) = 1\}S={s∈[0,1]Nr:∑ν​s(ν)=1}, and qn(i)=∑ν(1)+⋯+ν(r)≥isn(ν)q_n(i) = \sum_{\nu(1)+\dots+\nu(r)\ge i} s_n(\nu)qn​(i)=∑ν(1)+⋯+ν(r)≥i​sn​(ν) is the fraction of pools with at least iii tasks.

Dispatching. With threshold ℓn\ell_nℓn​ and hn=ℓn+Δh_n = \ell_n+\Deltahn​=ℓn​+Δ for an integer Δ≥1\Delta\ge1Δ≥1, an arriving task goes to a uniformly random pool with fewer than ℓn\ell_nℓn​ tasks if there is one; otherwise to a uniformly random pool with fewer than hnh_nhn​ tasks if there is one; otherwise to a uniformly random pool.

Basic learning. ℓn(t)=⌊un(t)⌋Δ\ell_n(t) = \lfloor u_n(t)\rfloor_\Deltaℓn​(t)=⌊un​(t)⌋Δ​, where un=∑i≥1qn(i)u_n = \sum_{i\ge1}q_n(i)un​=∑i≥1​qn​(i) is the number of tasks divided by nnn and ⌊x⌋Δ=max⁡{kΔ:kΔ≤x, k∈Z}\lfloor x\rfloor_\Delta = \max\{k\Delta : k\Delta\le x,\ k\in\mathbb Z\}⌊x⌋Δ​=max{kΔ:kΔ≤x, k∈Z}.

All systems, for every nnn, are built on one probability space from independent unit-rate Poisson processes N(ν,i,j)\mathcal N_{(\nu,i,j)}N(ν,i,j)​, i.i.d. uniform selection variables UjU_jUj​ and random initial states sn(0)s_n(0)sn​(0), through the equations (21a)–(21b) of §6.1.1. Initial states converge, sn(0)→s(0)s_n(0)\to s(0)sn​(0)→s(0), and qn(0,B+1)=0q_n(0,B+1)=0qn​(0,B+1)=0 for a fixed BBB.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 3

If ρ∉{iΔ:i∈N}\rho\notin\{i\Delta : i\in\mathbb N\}ρ∈/{iΔ:i∈N}, there are constants σ,η,c>0\sigma,\eta,c>0σ,η,c>0, independent of the horizon TTT, such that almost surely

lim⁡n→∞sup⁡t∈[σ,T]∣ℓn(t)−⌊ρ⌋Δ∣=0,lim⁡n→∞sup⁡t∈[σ,T]∣1−qn(t,i)∣=0  (i≤⌊ρ⌋Δ),\lim_{n\to\infty}\sup_{t\in[\sigma,T]}|\ell_n(t)-\lfloor\rho\rfloor_\Delta| = 0,\qquad \lim_{n\to\infty}\sup_{t\in[\sigma,T]}|1-q_n(t,i)| = 0\ \ (i\le\lfloor\rho\rfloor_\Delta),n→∞lim​t∈[σ,T]sup​∣ℓn​(t)−⌊ρ⌋Δ​∣=0,n→∞lim​t∈[σ,T]sup​∣1−qn​(t,i)∣=0  (i≤⌊ρ⌋Δ​), lim sup⁡n→∞sup⁡t∈[σ,T]∑i>⌊ρ⌋Δ+Δqn(t,i) eη(t−σ)≤c.\limsup_{n\to\infty}\sup_{t\in[\sigma,T]}\sum_{i>\lfloor\rho\rfloor_\Delta+\Delta} q_n(t,i)\,e^{\eta(t-\sigma)}\le c .n→∞limsup​t∈[σ,T]sup​i>⌊ρ⌋Δ​+Δ∑​qn​(t,i)eη(t−σ)≤c.

The constants are left unspecified, as in the paper; what is fixed is the shape: the threshold equals ⌊ρ⌋Δ\lfloor\rho\rfloor_\Delta⌊ρ⌋Δ​ after time σ\sigmaσ, the first ⌊ρ⌋Δ\lfloor\rho\rfloor_\Delta⌊ρ⌋Δ​ columns are asymptotically full, and the excess mass decays exponentially.

Milestones

In the order the proof uses them: well-posedness of the coupled construction (§6.1.1); relative compactness of the occupancy and counting processes (Proposition 14); a uniform bound on occupancy and threshold over [0,T][0,T][0,T] (Lemma 15); the set ΩT\Omega_TΩT​ of nice sample paths (Proposition 16); the almost-sure law of large numbers un→uu_n\to uun​→u for the total mass, with uuu the infinite-server fluid function built from the residual-service survival functions GmG_mGm​ (Proposition 17); and differential inequalities for the limits of the mass processes x,y,zx, y, zx,y,z while the threshold is ⌊ρ⌋Δ\lfloor\rho\rfloor_\Delta⌊ρ⌋Δ​ (Proposition 18).

Significance

Theorem 3 says that a dispatcher that knows nothing about the load except the current number of tasks reaches the threshold JSQ-like balancing needs, and then balances the load: with Δ=1\Delta=1Δ=1, the fraction of pools with fewer than ⌊ρ⌋\lfloor\rho\rfloor⌊ρ⌋ tasks vanishes and the fraction with more than ⌈ρ⌉\lceil\rho\rceil⌈ρ⌉ tasks is O(e−η(t−σ))O(e^{-\eta(t-\sigma)})O(e−η(t−σ)), where η=min⁡m(1−pm)μm\eta=\min_m(1-p_m)\mu_mη=minm​(1−pm​)μm​ is a lower bound on the service hazard rate. Because Coxian laws are dense among service-time distributions, the result is evidence that threshold-based learning works beyond exponential service. Proposition 17 is also a statement of independent interest: the fluid law of large numbers for an infinite-server system with Coxian service, known to hold weakly, holds almost surely under this coupling.

The results are proved in the paper (arXiv:2012.10142v3, 2024). No part of them is formalized. The mission produces a machine-checked model of the coupled many-server construction with phase-type service, which no Lean library has, and a complete formal proof of the paper's almost-sure fluid-limit argument.

Difficulty

The statements are almost sure and pathwise, about one coupled sequence of jump processes with a countable state space Nr\mathbb N^rNr, so weak-convergence arguments do not suffice. The natural first idea, to read off Theorem 3 from Proposition 17 alone, settles only (8a): un→uu_n\to uun​→u and u(t)→ρu(t)\to\rhou(t)→ρ force ℓn=⌊ρ⌋Δ\ell_n=\lfloor\rho\rfloor_\Deltaℓn​=⌊ρ⌋Δ​ eventually, but they say nothing about how the mass is distributed across the pools. Statements (8b) and (8c) require tracking the column masses xn,yn,znx_n, y_n, z_nxn​,yn​,zn​ through subsequential fluid limits that are only known to be Lipschitz, with dispatching decisions that depend discontinuously on the state. The phases complicate this: a pool's departure rate depends on the phases of its tasks, which the column picture ignores, and only the lower bound η\etaη on the hazard rate controls the decay. The hypothesis ρ∉ΔN\rho\notin\Delta\mathbb Nρ∈/ΔN cannot be dropped: when ρ\rhoρ is a multiple of Δ\DeltaΔ, the threshold can oscillate between ρ−Δ\rho-\Deltaρ−Δ and ρ\rhoρ.

Formalization scope

  • Phases and profiles. Phases are Fin r; profiles are Fin r → ℕ; a fixed enumeration νi\nu_iνi​ of Nr\mathbb N^rNr is a parameter. q(i)q(i)q(i) is computed as 1−∑Σ(ν)<is(ν)1-\sum_{\Sigma(\nu)<i}s(\nu)1−∑Σ(ν)<i​s(ν), equal to (1) on SSS.
  • Residual service. Gm(t)=(etQ1)mG_m(t) = (e^{tQ}\mathbf 1)_mGm​(t)=(etQ1)m​ with the Coxian sub-generator QQQ (Qmm=−μmQ_{mm}=-\mu_mQmm​=−μm​, Qm,m+1=pmμmQ_{m,m+1}=p_m\mu_mQm,m+1​=pm​μm​).
  • The construction is a structure: primitives (the published BesbesZeevi.Parametric.PoissonProcess for every driving process, their mutual independence, i.i.d. uniforms, independent initial conditions with n sn(0,ν)∈Nn\,s_n(0,\nu)\in\mathbb Nnsn​(0,ν)∈N), plus processes that almost surely solve (21a)–(21b) for every n≥1n\ge1n≥1 and all t≥0t\ge0t≥0, are càdlàg, SSS-valued and have finitely many tasks. Left limits are Function.leftLim; ν−e1\nu-e_1ν−e1​ and ν+em−em+1\nu+e_m-e_{m+1}ν+em​−em+1​ are guarded, never truncated. The dispatching indicators rijr_{ij}rij​ are defined for all i≥0i\ge0i≥0, and the endpoints of Ji(s,j)J_i(s,j)Ji​(s,j) are corrected so that the intervals partition [0,1)[0,1)[0,1) as the text states.
  • ΩT\Omega_TΩT​ is a predicate collecting exactly the properties of Propositions 14 and 16; relative compactness with respect to ϱ\varrhoϱ is rendered as subsequential coordinatewise uniform convergence on [0,T][0,T][0,T].
  • Theorem 3 quantifies ∃ σ,η,c>0\exists\,\sigma,\eta,c>0∃σ,η,c>0 before ∀T\forall T∀T; with TTT fixed first, (8c) would hold trivially with ccc depending on TTT, because the occupancy vanishes beyond a column BTB_TBT​. The tail sum in (8c) is taken in [0,∞][0,\infty][0,∞], so it cannot be satisfied through a non-summable family, and η\etaη must be positive.
  • Needed infrastructure: functional strong laws for Poisson processes, Arzelà–Ascoli-type compactness in the uniform topology on càdlàg paths, a pathwise forward-induction construction of jump processes, and matrix-exponential facts for phase-type laws. The last three are reusable well beyond this mission. Contributions to any milestone, or to these supporting lemmas, are welcome.

Selected references

  • D. Goldsztajn, S. C. Borst, J. S. H. van Leeuwaarden, Learning and balancing unknown loads in large-scale systems, arXiv:2012.10142v3, 2024. https://arxiv.org/abs/2012.10142v3
  • D. Goldsztajn, S. C. Borst, J. S. H. van Leeuwaarden, D. Mukherjee, P. A. Whiting, Self-learning threshold-based load balancing, INFORMS Journal on Computing 34(1), pp. 39–54, 2022 (reference [15] of the paper above).
  • M. Bramson, State space collapse with application to heavy traffic limits for multiclass queueing networks, Queueing Systems 30, 1998 (the compactness technique of Appendix A). https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1019108120366
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ProbabilityStochastic Systems·Captain: mikedeng1

Sample-Path Large Deviations for Unbounded Additive Functionals of the Reflected Random Walk: The Partial Sums of X_i^p Satisfy a Sample-Path LDP in the M1' Topology at Speed n^(1/(1+p))Research Paper

Motivation

The reflected random walk Xn+1=[Xn+Un+1]+X_{n+1}=[X_n+U_{n+1}]^+Xn+1​=[Xn​+Un+1​]+ is the waiting-time sequence of the single-server queue (Lindley's recursion). Additive functionals ∑i≤nXip\sum_{i\le n}X_i^p∑i≤n​Xip​ measure accumulated congestion. For p=1p=1p=1 this is the total waiting time, the area under the workload curve.

Existing general results on sample-path large deviations for additive functionals of Markov chains (in the Donsker–Varadhan line) assume the function to be bounded. They therefore do not cover the cumulative waiting time of a single-server queue. For f(x)=xpf(x)=x^pf(x)=xp the relevant rare events are not produced by a small, uniform tilt of the whole trajectory but by a few busy periods of exceptional size, and the speed is sublinear.

Bazhba, Blanchet, Rhee and Zwart (arXiv:2003.14381, Mathematics of Operations Research, 2025) prove that the scaled partial-sum process satisfies a large deviation principle at the sublinear speed n1/(1+p)n^{1/(1+p)}n1/(1+p). They also identify the rate function through a variational problem over paths of bounded variation.

Related work on large deviations of the area under a busy period either treats queue-length functionals (Blanchet–Glynn–Meyn, 2013) or assumes a moment generating function that is finite everywhere (Duffy–Meyn, 2014). Neither obtains a sample-path result. The present paper assumes only that the moment generating function of the increment is finite near the origin. It relies on the sample-path large deviations for light-tailed random walk trajectories of Borovkov and Mogulskii (II, III) and of Vysotsky (ALEA, 2021), and on the authors' earlier work in the M1′M_1'M1′​ topology (Bazhba et al., 2020).

Setting

Let U1,U2,…U_1,U_2,\dotsU1​,U2​,… be i.i.d. copies of a real random variable UUU with μ=E(U)<0\mu=\mathbf E(U)<0μ=E(U)<0. Let θ+\theta_+θ+​ and θ−\theta_-θ−​ be the supremum and infimum of {θ:E(eθU)<∞}\{\theta:\mathbf E(e^{\theta U})<\infty\}{θ:E(eθU)<∞}. The paper assumes:

  1. −∞≤θ−<0<θ+≤∞-\infty\le\theta_-<0<\theta_+\le\infty−∞≤θ−​<0<θ+​≤∞ (Assumption 2.1);
  2. log⁡P(U≥n)/n→−θ+\log\mathbf P(U\ge n)/n\to-\theta_+logP(U≥n)/n→−θ+​ and log⁡P(−U≥n)/n→θ−\log\mathbf P(-U\ge n)/n\to\theta_-logP(−U≥n)/n→θ−​ (Assumption 2.2);
  3. P(U>0)>0\mathbf P(U>0)>0P(U>0)>0 (Assumption 2.3).

The chain is X0=0X_0=0X0​=0, Xn+1=[Xn+Un+1]+X_{n+1}=[X_n+U_{n+1}]^+Xn+1​=[Xn​+Un+1​]+. Fix p>0p>0p>0 and let α=1/(1+p)\alpha=1/(1+p)α=1/(1+p). The object of study is

Yˉn(t)=1n∑i=1⌊nt⌋Xip,t∈[0,1].\bar Y_n(t)=\frac1n\sum_{i=1}^{\lfloor nt\rfloor}X_i^p,\qquad t\in[0,1].Yˉn​(t)=n1​i=1∑⌊nt⌋​Xip​,t∈[0,1].

The busy periods are delimited by the return times T0=0T_0=0T0​=0, Ti=inf⁡{k>Ti−1:Xk=0}T_i=\inf\{k>T_{i-1}:X_k=0\}Ti​=inf{k>Ti−1​:Xk​=0}. The busy-period areas are Wj=∑i=Tj−1+1TjXipW_j=\sum_{i=T_{j-1}+1}^{T_j}X_i^pWj​=∑i=Tj−1​+1Tj​​Xip​, and the long-run mean of XpX^pXp is λ=E(W1)/E(T1)\lambda=\mathbf E(W_1)/\mathbf E(T_1)λ=E(W1​)/E(T1​).

Yˉn\bar Y_nYˉn​ lives in the Skorokhod space D[0,1]\mathbb D[0,1]D[0,1] of càdlàg paths. This space carries the M1′M_1'M1′​ metric dM1′d_{M_1'}dM1′​​ (Definitions 2.1–2.2). It compares parametrizations of the extended completed graph, which joins each jump by a vertical segment and also joins 000 to ξ(0)\xi(0)ξ(0) at the origin (ξ(0−)=0\xi(0-)=0ξ(0−)=0).

The rate function involves the variational problem

By∗=inf⁡ξ∈ByIy(ξ).\mathcal B^*_y=\inf_{\xi\in B_y}I_y(\xi).By∗​=ξ∈By​inf​Iy​(ξ).

Here ByB_yBy​ is the set of paths ξ\xiξ of bounded variation on compacts with ξ(0)=y\xi(0)=yξ(0)=y whose reflected area ∫0T(ξ)Ψ(ξ)(s)p ds\int_0^{\mathcal T(\xi)}\Psi(\xi)(s)^p\,ds∫0T(ξ)​Ψ(ξ)(s)pds up to the first return time T(ξ)\mathcal T(\xi)T(ξ) of Ψ(ξ)\Psi(\xi)Ψ(ξ) to zero is at least 111. Ψ(ξ)(t)=ξ(t)−inf⁡s≤t(ξ(s)∧0)\Psi(\xi)(t)=\xi(t)-\inf_{s\le t}(\xi(s)\wedge0)Ψ(ξ)(t)=ξ(t)−infs≤t​(ξ(s)∧0) is the reflection map. The cost is

Iy(ξ)=∫0T(ξ)Λ∗(ξ˙(a)(s)) ds+θ+ξ(u)(T(ξ))+θ−ξ(d)(T(ξ)),I_y(\xi)=\int_0^{\mathcal T(\xi)}\Lambda^*(\dot\xi^{(a)}(s))\,ds+\theta_+\xi^{(u)}(\mathcal T(\xi))+\theta_-\xi^{(d)}(\mathcal T(\xi)),Iy​(ξ)=∫0T(ξ)​Λ∗(ξ˙​(a)(s))ds+θ+​ξ(u)(T(ξ))+θ−​ξ(d)(T(ξ)),

where Λ∗\Lambda^*Λ∗ is the Legendre transform of log⁡EeθU\log\mathbf Ee^{\theta U}logEeθU and ξ(a),ξ(u),ξ(d)\xi^{(a)},\xi^{(u)},\xi^{(d)}ξ(a),ξ(u),ξ(d) are the absolutely continuous, upward singular and downward singular parts of ξ\xiξ.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 2.1

Yˉn\bar Y_nYˉn​ satisfies the large deviation principle in (D[0,1],TM1′)(\mathbb D[0,1],\mathcal T_{M_1'})(D[0,1],TM1′​​) with speed nαn^\alphanα and rate function

IY(ζ)={B0∗∑t:ζ(t)≠ζ(t−)(ζ(t)−ζ(t−))αζ∈D(λ)[0,1],∞otherwise,I_Y(\zeta)=\begin{cases}\mathcal B^*_0\sum_{t:\zeta(t)\neq\zeta(t-)}(\zeta(t)-\zeta(t-))^\alpha & \zeta\in\mathbb D^{(\lambda)}[0,1],\\ \infty&\text{otherwise,}\end{cases}IY​(ζ)={B0∗​∑t:ζ(t)=ζ(t−)​(ζ(t)−ζ(t−))α∞​ζ∈D(λ)[0,1],otherwise,​

where D(λ)[0,1]\mathbb D^{(\lambda)}[0,1]D(λ)[0,1] is the set of paths λt+ζ(t)\lambda t+\zeta(t)λt+ζ(t) with ζ\zetaζ a non-decreasing pure jump path, ζ(0)≥0\zeta(0)\ge0ζ(0)≥0.

Busy-period tails

  • Theorem 2.2: lim⁡t→∞t−αlog⁡P(W1≥t)=−B0∗\lim_{t\to\infty}t^{-\alpha}\log\mathbf P(W_1\ge t)=-\mathcal B^*_0limt→∞​t−αlogP(W1​≥t)=−B0∗​.
  • Theorem 2.3: lim⁡n→∞n−αlog⁡P(Vn≥nb)=−B0∗bα\lim_{n\to\infty}n^{-\alpha}\log\mathbf P(V_n\ge nb)=-\mathcal B^*_0b^\alphalimn→∞​n−αlogP(Vn​≥nb)=−B0∗​bα for the last, incomplete busy period.

Milestones

  1. The variational problem. Lemma 4.1 (By∗=0\mathcal B^*_y=0By∗​=0 beyond yˉ=(∣μ∣(p+1))α\bar y=(|\mu|(p+1))^\alphayˉ​=(∣μ∣(p+1))α, and the restriction to absolutely continuous paths). Proposition 4.1 (monotonicity, Lipschitz continuity, By∗∈(0,∞)\mathcal B^*_y\in(0,\infty)By∗​∈(0,∞) on [0,yˉ)[0,\bar y)[0,yˉ​)). Lemma 4.4 (finite horizon). Lemma 4.5 (uniform M1′M_1'M1′​ continuity of the area on level sets).
  2. Busy-period estimates. Lemma 4.6, Proposition 4.2, and Proposition 4.3(ii) (B0∗=Bπ∗\mathcal B^*_0=\mathcal B^*_\piB0∗​=Bπ∗​).
  3. The decomposition. Lemma 3.1 (LDP for the last busy period), Lemmas 3.2–3.3 (finite-dimensional LDP), Lemma 3.7 (LDP for completed busy periods in M1′M_1'M1′​), and Lemma 3.8 (exponential equivalence).

Significance

The result. The theorem gives the full large deviation behaviour of ∑Xip\sum X_i^p∑Xip​, not only its one-dimensional tail. It identifies the mechanism of rare events: one or a few busy periods of area of order nnn, each contributing B0∗\mathcal B^*_0B0∗​ times its area to the power α\alphaα. In the rate function, a busy period in progress at the end of the horizon is indistinguishable from a completed one; the paper's Theorem 2.3 and Proposition 4.3 make this precise. By contraction the theorem yields tail asymptotics for any M1′M_1'M1′​-continuous functional of the cumulative cost process.

The formalization. The result is proved on paper. No part of it has been machine-checked, and the platform has no Skorokhod M1′M_1'M1′​ metric and no large deviation principle at a sublinear speed. A complete development would supply the first formal M1′M_1'M1′​ metric on D[0,T]\mathbb D[0,T]D[0,T] and a sample-path LDP for a heavy-tailed regime. It would also provide a formal treatment of variational problems over paths of bounded variation with singular parts.

Difficulty

The obvious route is the contraction principle applied to the sample-path LDP for the scaled random walk Kˉn\bar K_nKˉn​, followed by the map that sends the walk to the area under its reflection up to its first return to zero. That map is not continuous: the first passage time is discontinuous in every Skorokhod topology. The paper replaces the random horizon by a large fixed horizon TTT, but then must show that the variational problems over [0,T][0,T][0,T] and over [0,T(ξ)][0,\mathcal T(\xi)][0,T(ξ)] have the same value (Lemma 4.4). It must also prove uniform continuity of the area functional on level sets of the rate function (Lemma 4.5).

A second difficulty is the class of admissible paths. Because θ±\theta_\pmθ±​ may be finite, optimal paths could a priori contain jumps or singular parts. Lemma 4.1 rules this out. Finally, the passage from the finite-dimensional LDP to the M1′M_1'M1′​ topology requires the busy period in progress at time nnn to be handled separately. The mere existence of the limit in Theorem 2.3 relies on a time-reversal argument and on the decay rate of the stationary distribution.

Formalization scope

  • Increments. A sequence U : ℕ → Ω → ℝ, measurable, independent and identically distributed, with U i the paper's Ui+1U_{i+1}Ui+1​. Moments are lower Lebesgue integrals in [0,∞][0,\infty][0,∞], never Mathlib's mgf. θ±∈[−∞,∞]\theta_\pm\in[-\infty,\infty]θ±​∈[−∞,∞].
  • Logarithms and limits. All logarithms are ENNReal.log with log⁡0=−∞\log0=-\inftylog0=−∞; liminf and limsup are taken in EReal. Probabilities of possibly non-measurable events are outer measures.
  • Path space. D[0,T]\mathbb D[0,T]D[0,T] consists of functions R→R\mathbb R\to\mathbb RR→R, càdlàg on [0,T][0,T][0,T] and constant outside. ξ(0−)=0\xi(0-)=0ξ(0−)=0. Parametrizations are on [0,T][0,T][0,T], and "nondecreasing" uses the reflexive closure of the printed strict order. dM1′d_{M_1'}dM1′​​ takes values in [0,∞][0,\infty][0,∞].
  • Rate function ingredients. Costs, By∗\mathcal B^*_yBy∗​, Bπ∗\mathcal B^*_\piBπ∗​, VyT∗\mathcal V^{T*}_yVyT∗​, β\betaβ and all rate functions take values in [0,∞][0,\infty][0,∞], with θ+⋅0=0\theta_+\cdot0=0θ+​⋅0=0 when θ+=∞\theta_+=\inftyθ+​=∞. The exit time T(ξ)\mathcal T(\xi)T(ξ) lies in [0,∞][0,\infty][0,∞]; the return times TiT_iTi​ lie in N∪{∞}\mathbb N\cup\{\infty\}N∪{∞}. The cost of a bounded-variation path is the infimum over its representations ξ(0)+∫g+σu−σd\xi(0)+\int g+\sigma_u-\sigma_dξ(0)+∫g+σu​−σd​ with singular non-decreasing σu,σd\sigma_u,\sigma_dσu​,σd​; this infimum is attained at the Hahn–Jordan decomposition. The downward singular cost is nonnegative (the sign on p. 22 is a typo).
  • The goal. It is stated with T=1T=1T=1, as in the paper's proof. The LDP is given by bounds for open and closed sets, which is equivalent to (2.2).
  • Ruling out trivial readings. ByB_yBy​ and VyTV^T_yVyT​ range over all paths, with jumps and singular parts, and B0∗\mathcal B^*_0B0∗​ and λ\lambdaλ are defined from the data, not assumed. Restricting either problem to absolutely continuous paths would make Lemma 4.1(ii) a tautology. Taking θ±\theta_\pmθ±​ infinite, p=1p=1p=1, or the J1J_1J1​ topology would change the theorem.
  • Infrastructure. A complete development needs sample-path LDPs for random walks in M1′M_1'M1′​ (the cited Results B.1–B.3), the Dawson–Gärtner projective limit theorem, Lebesgue decompositions of BV functions, and regenerative structure of the reflected random walk. The M1′M_1'M1′​ metric, the LDP vocabulary at general speed and the bounded-variation cost are reusable beyond this mission.

Contributions to any milestone, and formalizations of the cited Results B.1–B.3, are welcome.

Selected references

  • M. Bazhba, J. Blanchet, C.-H. Rhee, B. Zwart, Sample-path large deviations for unbounded additive functionals of the reflected random walk, Mathematics of Operations Research, 2025; arXiv:2003.14381v3. https://arxiv.org/abs/2003.14381
  • M. Bazhba, J. Blanchet, C.-H. Rhee, B. Zwart, Sample path large deviations for Lévy processes and random walks with Weibull increments, Annals of Applied Probability 30(6), 2020. https://doi.org/10.1214/20-AAP1570
  • J. Blanchet, P. Glynn, S. Meyn, Large deviations for the empirical mean of an M/M/1 queue, Queueing Systems 73(4), 2013. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11134-013-9349-7
  • A. A. Borovkov, A. A. Mogulskii, Large deviation principles for random walk trajectories. II, Theory of Probability and its Applications 57(1), 2013. https://doi.org/10.1137/S0040585X97985765
  • A. A. Borovkov, A. A. Mogulskii, Large deviation principles for random walk trajectories. III, Theory of Probability and its Applications 58(1), 2014. https://doi.org/10.1137/S0040585X97986370
  • K. R. Duffy, S. P. Meyn, Large deviation asymptotics for busy periods, Stochastic Systems 4(1), 2014. https://doi.org/10.1214/13-SSY098
  • V. Vysotsky, Contraction principle for trajectories of random walks and Cramér's theorem for kernel-weighted sums, ALEA. Latin American Journal of Probability and Mathematical Statistics 18(2):1103–1125, 2021.
  • A. Dembo, O. Zeitouni, Large Deviations Techniques and Applications, Springer, 2010 (corrected reprint of the 2nd ed.). https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-03311-7
  • W. Whitt, Stochastic-Process Limits, Springer, 2002. https://doi.org/10.1007/b97479
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EconomicsOptimization·Captain: mikedeng1

Asset Pricing with Costly Short Sales 1: The Lending Agent Charges Half the Pessimist's Frictionless Sharpe Ratio, and Lending Is Active Exactly When Her Net Sharpe Ratio Is NegativeResearch Paper

Why the price of borrowing a stock matters

To sell a stock short, an investor must first borrow it, and the owner who lends it charges a lending fee. Securities lending is a large market, and the fee varies across stocks: D'Avolio (2002) documents that shorting costs are positively related to the dispersion of investors' beliefs. Short-sale constraints have a long history in asset pricing (Miller 1977; Harrison and Kreps 1978; Jones and Lamont 2002), but most models either forbid short sales outright or take the fee as an exogenous parameter. Neither explains where the fee comes from, nor when a lending market is active at all.

Evgeniou, Hugonnier and Prieto build a dynamic general equilibrium model in which the fee is endogenous: two investors with logarithmic utility disagree about the expected return of a risky asset, and a lending agent, acting for the asset owners, sets the fee charged to short sellers to maximize the owners' fee revenue. Their §3 derives the equilibrium shorting cost in closed form at every state of the economy. This mission formalizes that derivation.

Setting

The economy has a riskless asset and two risky assets with strictly positive volatilities σ1,σ2\sigma_1,\sigma_2σ1​,σ2​. Asset 1 can be shorted at a cost; asset 2 cannot be shorted at all. There are two investors, an optimist ooo and a pessimist ppp, with wealths W(o),W(p)>0W^{(o)},W^{(p)}>0W(o),W(p)>0. Each investor aaa perceives market prices of risk (Sharpe ratios) θ1(a),θ2(a)\theta^{(a)}_1,\theta^{(a)}_2θ1(a)​,θ2(a)​, and the optimist is more optimistic about asset 1: θ1(p)≤θ1(o)\theta^{(p)}_1\le\theta^{(o)}_1θ1(p)​≤θ1(o)​, the disagreement Δ≥0\Delta\ge0Δ≥0.

A short position in asset 1 pays a shorting cost Φ\PhiΦ per dollar shorted, and a long position earns a lending yield Γ\GammaΓ. Both are measured per unit of volatility of asset 1: ϕ=Φ/σ1\phi=\Phi/\sigma_1ϕ=Φ/σ1​ and γ=Γ/σ1\gamma=\Gamma/\sigma_1γ=Γ/σ1​. A position mmm in asset 1 earns fees at the rate

Λ(m;Φ,Γ)=m+Γ−m−Φ,\Lambda(m;\Phi,\Gamma)=m^+\Gamma-m^-\Phi ,Λ(m;Φ,Γ)=m+Γ−m−Φ,

with m+=max⁡{m,0}m^+=\max\{m,0\}m+=max{m,0} and m−=max⁡{−m,0}m^-=\max\{-m,0\}m−=max{−m,0}. Investor aaa chooses wealth fractions p=(p1,p2)p=(p_1,p_2)p=(p1​,p2​) with p2≥0p_2\ge0p2​≥0 to solve the mean-variance problem

max⁡p∈R×R+{Λ(p1;Φ,Γ)+p1σ1θ1(a)+p2σ2θ2(a)−12(p1σ1+p2σ2)2},\max_{p\in\mathbb R\times\mathbb R_+}\Big\{\Lambda(p_1;\Phi,\Gamma)+p_1\sigma_1\theta^{(a)}_1+p_2\sigma_2\theta^{(a)}_2-\tfrac12(p_1\sigma_1+p_2\sigma_2)^2\Big\},p∈R×R+​max​{Λ(p1​;Φ,Γ)+p1​σ1​θ1(a)​+p2​σ2​θ2(a)​−21​(p1​σ1​+p2​σ2​)2},

which is what logarithmic utility reduces to at each instant. The lending agent's revenue per unit of volatility at fee yyy is

R(y)=∑ay (θ1(a)+y)− W(a).R(y)=\sum_a y\,\big(\theta^{(a)}_1+y\big)^-\,W^{(a)} .R(y)=a∑​y(θ1(a)​+y)−W(a).

An equilibrium at a state consists of these quantities such that: the no-dominance condition θ2(a)=θ1(a)+γ\theta^{(a)}_2=\theta^{(a)}_1+\gammaθ2(a)​=θ1(a)​+γ holds for both investors (equation (7)); each investor's portfolio is optimal; asset 1, in positive supply S1>0S_1>0S1​>0, clears; the lending market clears (fees paid by short sellers equal fees received by long holders); and ϕ\phiϕ is the least maximizer of RRR over y≥γy\ge\gammay≥γ. The inactive set is L={γ=0}\mathcal L=\{\gamma=0\}L={γ=0} and the active set S\mathcal SS is its complement.

Formalization targets

Goal: equations (15)–(17)

At every equilibrium state,

γ=0  ⟺  θ2(p)≥0,ϕ=−12 θ1(p) 1{θ2(p)<0}.\gamma=0\iff\theta^{(p)}_2\ge0,\qquad \phi=-\tfrac12\,\theta^{(p)}_1\,\mathbb 1_{\{\theta^{(p)}_2<0\}} .γ=0⟺θ2(p)​≥0,ϕ=−21​θ1(p)​1{θ2(p)​<0}​.

Lending is active exactly where the pessimist perceives a strictly negative net Sharpe ratio on long positions, and there the lending agent charges half the Sharpe ratio −θ1(p)-\theta^{(p)}_1−θ1(p)​ the pessimist could earn by shorting absent frictions.

Milestones, in attack order

  1. Proposition 1 (p. 17): the optimal portfolios of the mean-variance problem under (7) and ϕ≥γ\phi\ge\gammaϕ≥γ.
  2. (11) (p. 18): the optimist is long, θ2(o)=θ1(o)+γ>0\theta^{(o)}_2=\theta^{(o)}_1+\gamma>0θ2(o)​=θ1(o)​+γ>0.
  3. (14) (p. 18): γσ1S1=(ϕ−γ)(θ1(p)+ϕ)−W(p)\gamma\sigma_1S_1=(\phi-\gamma)(\theta^{(p)}_1+\phi)^-W^{(p)}γσ1​S1​=(ϕ−γ)(θ1(p)​+ϕ)−W(p).
  4. (12)–(13) (p. 18): the maximizers of the revenue over y≥γy\ge\gammay≥γ, and their least element max⁡{γ,−12θ1(p)}\max\{\gamma,-\tfrac12\theta^{(p)}_1\}max{γ,−21​θ1(p)​}.

Two companion statements are also included: (18) (p. 20), that the pessimist is strictly short on S\mathcal SS, and the fee flow (π1(p))−Φ=14(θ1(p))2W(p)1S(\pi^{(p)}_1)^-\Phi=\tfrac14(\theta^{(p)}_1)^2W^{(p)}\mathbb 1_{\mathcal S}(π1(p)​)−Φ=41​(θ1(p)​)2W(p)1S​ (p. 19).

Significance

The goal is the paper's description of the short market. It identifies the active set by a condition on one observable-in-principle quantity, the pessimist's net Sharpe ratio, and it gives the fee as a fixed fraction of the pessimist's frictionless Sharpe ratio. The rest of the paper rests on it: the one-asset closed forms of §4.1, the trading regions of §3.3, and the pricing results of Proposition 2 all start from (15)–(16). The fee-flow identity shows that the optimist captures a quarter of the pessimist's frictionless excess return, which is the upper bound Remark 1 attributes to any alternative fee-setting mechanism.

The result is proved in the paper, partly in the text and partly in Appendix A. Some steps are argued informally: (11) rests on the sentence "agents cannot be short simultaneously in equilibrium", and (14) on "substituting the optimal portfolios of Proposition 1 into the market clearing conditions". As far as is known, none of it has been machine-checked. A formalization makes each step explicit, including the degenerate states the text passes over. In checking the statements against each other, three printed slips were found and are corrected here (see Formalization scope).

Difficulty

The goal combines optimality, clearing and revenue maximization, and the obvious argument fails at its degenerate edge. On the inactive set the shorting cost equals the lending yield (ϕ=γ=0\phi=\gamma=0ϕ=γ=0). There Proposition 1's characterization of optimal portfolios no longer holds: portfolios that short asset 1 to buy asset 2 are also optimal. So the step "substitute the optimal portfolios" is not available, and (14) must be obtained from the clearing conditions directly in that case. Similarly the revenue maximizer is not unique on the inactive set; the shorting cost is pinned down only by the paper's selection of the least maximizer, and (16) is false for any other selection. Finally, (11) requires an argument that the two investors cannot both be short while asset 1 is in positive supply. This uses optimality of both portfolios, not just of one.

Formalization scope

Everything is stated at one state (ω,t)(\omega,t)(ω,t) of the paper's continuous-time economy, about real numbers. The continuous-time economy of §2 (Brownian filtrations, consumption streams, the dynamics of wealth) is the paper's motivation and is not formalized; the formalized statements are its instantaneous equilibrium conditions. The time index is dropped throughout, and the paper's "arbitrary process xtx_txt​" in Proposition 1 becomes an arbitrary real number.

Conventions:

  • Rates are per unit of volatility; the dollar rates are Φ=ϕσ1\Phi=\phi\sigma_1Φ=ϕσ1​ and Γ=γσ1\Gamma=\gamma\sigma_1Γ=γσ1​, never obtained by division.
  • m+m^+m+ and m−m^-m− are written as max⁡{m,0}\max\{m,0\}max{m,0} and max⁡{−m,0}\max\{-m,0\}max{−m,0}; indicators are if … then … else 0.
  • Dollar positions are π1(a)=W(a)p1(a)\pi^{(a)}_1=W^{(a)}p^{(a)}_1π1(a)​=W(a)p1(a)​.
  • The standing assumptions are hypotheses of every equilibrium statement: σ1,σ2>0\sigma_1,\sigma_2>0σ1​,σ2​>0 (the standing assumption of §3), S1>0S_1>0S1​>0, W(o),W(p)>0W^{(o)},W^{(p)}>0W(o),W(p)>0, and θ1(p)≤θ1(o)\theta^{(p)}_1\le\theta^{(o)}_1θ1(p)​≤θ1(o)​.
  • The shorting-cost condition (4) is stated in its per-volatility form (10), over y≥γy\ge\gammay≥γ, with the least maximizer selected as in (13). A single lending agent is built in.
  • Consumption clearing and asset-2 clearing are not part of the equilibrium predicate; no statement uses them, so leaving them out makes every statement more general.

Corrected slips of the page, each disclosed in the item concerned:

  1. Proposition 1's "the optimal portfolio satisfies (9)" fails when ϕ=γ\phi=\gammaϕ=γ; the converse direction is stated under ϕ>γ\phi>\gammaϕ>γ, and the constraint 0≤x≤θ20\le x\le\theta_20≤x≤θ2​ only where θ2≥0\theta_2\ge0θ2​≥0.
  2. The indicator in (12) should be 1{θ1(p)+γ≥0}\mathbb 1_{\{\theta^{(p)}_1+\gamma\ge0\}}1{θ1(p)​+γ≥0}​, not 1{θ1(p)≥0}\mathbb 1_{\{\theta^{(p)}_1\ge0\}}1{θ1(p)​≥0}​; the least maximizer (13) is unaffected.
  3. (18) prints "≠∅\neq\emptyset=∅"; its proof shows the set is empty, which is what is stated.

The results (11), (13) and (14) are not built into the equilibrium predicate. With them assumed, the goal would reduce to a four-line computation; they are separate items to be proved. The definitions are short and self-contained, needing only real arithmetic from Mathlib. Proofs of the milestones, and proofs of the goal that use the milestones, are welcome.

Selected references

  • T. Evgeniou, J. Hugonnier, R. Prieto, Asset Pricing with Costly Short Sales, Swiss Finance Institute Research Paper N°22-21, version of September 22, 2022 — the source of this mission. Published as J. Hugonnier, R. Prieto, Asset Pricing with Costly Short Sales, Management Science (2024), https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2023.01887, whose numbering is not used here.
  • G. D'Avolio, The market for borrowing stock, Journal of Financial Economics 66 (2002), 271–306.
  • C. Jones, O. Lamont, Short-sale constraints and stock returns, Journal of Financial Economics 66 (2002).
  • R. Radner, Existence of equilibrium of plans, prices and price expectations in a sequence of markets, Econometrica 40 (2) (1972), 289–303.
6 thms1 active userReviewed
Dynamic ProgrammingOptimizationProbability·Captain: mikedeng1

Coordinating Inventory Control and Pricing Strategies for Perishable Products 2: With Zero Lead Time and Minimal Disposal, Two Myopic Solutions Bound the Optimal Order-Up-To LevelResearch Paper

Why bound the order-up-to level of a perishable product

Food, blood products, pharmaceuticals and many retail goods are perishable: a unit is usable for a fixed number of periods and is then discarded. A seller of such a product decides every period how much to order, what price to charge, and how much stock to deplete or dispose of. Because units of different ages coexist, the state of the system is a vector of inventory levels by remaining lifetime, and the exact dynamic program suffers from the curse of dimensionality in that vector. Nahmias's survey (Nahmias 1982) records this obstacle for the pure ordering problem; adding pricing makes it worse.

Chen, Pang and Pan (Operations Research 62(2), 2014) analyse the joint ordering, pricing and disposal problem with the tools of L♮-concavity (Murota's discrete convex analysis, extended to real vectors). Their §4 shows that the optimal profit-to-go is L♮-concave, which yields monotone policies with bounded sensitivity. Their §6.1 then shows that two one-dimensional, myopic problems bracket the optimal order-up-to level, which is the starting point of the heuristics of §6.2. This mission formalizes the backlogging case of that bracketing result, Theorem 3.

Setting

A single product has lifetime l≥2l\ge 2l≥2 periods; the replenishment lead time is zero, and unmet demand is backlogged. The unit costs are ccc (ordering), h+h^+h+ (holding), h−h^-h− (backlogging) and θ\thetaθ (disposal); γ\gammaγ is the discount factor. The seller chooses the expected demand ddd in an interval D=[d‾,dˉ]\mathcal D=[\underline d,\bar d]D=[d​,dˉ], which is equivalent to choosing the price P(d)P(d)P(d), where PPP is strictly decreasing. The expected revenue P(d) dP(d)\,dP(d)d is continuous and concave on D\mathcal DD (Assumption 1). Realized demand is dt=d+εtd_t=d+\varepsilon_tdt​=d+εt​, with independent, identically distributed, zero-mean noise supported in [A,B][A,B][A,B], A≤0≤BA\le 0\le BA≤0≤B, and d‾+A≥0\underline d+A\ge 0d​+A≥0.

The state s=(s1,…,sl−1)s=(s_1,\dots,s_{l-1})s=(s1​,…,sl−1​) lies in S={s1≤⋯≤sl−1}\mathcal S=\{s_1\le\dots\le s_{l-1}\}S={s1​≤⋯≤sl−1​}: sis_isi​ is the inventory with residual lifetime at most iii periods (negative values are backorders), and sl−1s_{l-1}sl−1​ is the inventory position. Each period the seller picks an order-up-to level sl≥sl−1s_l\ge s_{l-1}sl​≥sl−1​, the demand level ddd, and, after demand is realized, a depletion aaa with s1∨dt≤a≤sl∨dts_1\vee d_t\le a\le s_l\vee d_ts1​∨dt​≤a≤sl​∨dt​. The next state is s~=(s2−a,…,sl−a)\tilde s=(s_2-a,\dots,s_l-a)s~=(s2​−a,…,sl​−a). The one-period objective is

φt(s,sl,d,a∣εt)=γc s~l−1−csl−θ(a−dt)−h+(sl−a)+−h−(a−sl)++γft+1(s~),\varphi_t(s,s_l,d,a\mid\varepsilon_t)=\gamma c\,\tilde s_{l-1}-cs_l-\theta(a-d_t)-h^+(s_l-a)^+-h^-(a-s_l)^++\gamma f_{t+1}(\tilde s),φt​(s,sl​,d,a∣εt​)=γcs~l−1​−csl​−θ(a−dt​)−h+(sl​−a)+−h−(a−sl​)++γft+1​(s~),

gtg_tgt​ maximizes it over aaa, Gt(s,sl,d)=P(d)d+E[gt]G_t(s,s_l,d)=P(d)d+\mathbb E[g_t]Gt​(s,sl​,d)=P(d)d+E[gt​], and the profit-to-go is ft(s)=max⁡sl≥sl−1, d∈DGt(s,sl,d)f_t(s)=\max_{s_l\ge s_{l-1},\,d\in\mathcal D}G_t(s,s_l,d)ft​(s)=maxsl​≥sl−1​,d∈D​Gt​(s,sl​,d) with fT+1=0f_{T+1}=0fT+1​=0.

Under θ≥h+/(1−γ)\theta\ge h^+/(1-\gamma)θ≥h+/(1−γ) only expiring stock is disposed of (Proposition 1). With θ~=θ+γc−h+\tilde\theta=\theta+\gamma c-h^+θ~=θ+γc−h+ and vt(sl,dt)=−(1−γ)csl−γcdt−h+(sl−dt)+−h−(dt−sl)+v_t(s_l,d_t)=-(1-\gamma)cs_l-\gamma cd_t-h^+(s_l-d_t)^+-h^-(d_t-s_l)^+vt​(sl​,dt​)=−(1−γ)csl​−γcdt​−h+(sl​−dt​)+−h−(dt​−sl​)+, the two myopic objectives are

Πt(sl,d)=P(d)d+E[vt(sl,dt)],Π~t(sl,d)=Πt(sl,d)−γcsl−K E[(sl−dt)+],\Pi_t(s_l,d)=P(d)d+\mathbb E[v_t(s_l,d_t)],\qquad \tilde\Pi_t(s_l,d)=\Pi_t(s_l,d)-\gamma cs_l-K\,\mathbb E[(s_l-d_t)^+],Πt​(sl​,d)=P(d)d+E[vt​(sl​,dt​)],Π~t​(sl​,d)=Πt​(sl​,d)−γcsl​−KE[(sl​−dt​)+],

with K=γh++⋯+γl−2h++γl−1θ~K=\gamma h^++\dots+\gamma^{l-2}h^++\gamma^{l-1}\tilde\thetaK=γh++⋯+γl−2h++γl−1θ~. Sˉt(d)\bar S_t(d)Sˉt​(d) and S‾t(d)\underline S_t(d)S​t​(d) are their largest maximizers over sl≥0s_l\ge0sl​≥0.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 3 (Bounds), backlogging case

For every period, every state s∈Ss\in\mathcal Ss∈S and every d∈Dd\in\mathcal Dd∈D, the largest optimal order-up-to level slt(s,d)s_{lt}(s,d)slt​(s,d) satisfies

S‾t(d)∨sl−1 ≤ slt(s,d) ≤ Sˉt(d)∨sl−1.\underline S_t(d)\vee s_{l-1}\ \le\ s_{lt}(s,d)\ \le\ \bar S_t(d)\vee s_{l-1}.S​t​(d)∨sl−1​ ≤ slt​(s,d) ≤ Sˉt​(d)∨sl−1​.

Milestones, in attack order

  1. Lemma 6 (p. 290): ftf_tft​ is nonincreasing in each coordinate of the state.
  2. Proposition 1 (p. 292): if θ≥h+/(1−γ)\theta\ge h^+/(1-\gamma)θ≥h+/(1−γ), depleting dt∨s1d_t\vee s_1dt​∨s1​ is optimal.
  3. The p. 294 decomposition: φt\varphi_tφt​ at a=dt∨s1a=d_t\vee s_1a=dt​∨s1​ equals vt(sl,dt)−θ~(s1−dt)++γft+1(s~)v_t(s_l,d_t)-\tilde\theta(s_1-d_t)^++\gamma f_{t+1}(\tilde s)vt​(sl​,dt​)−θ~(s1​−dt​)++γft+1​(s~).
  4. Theorem 1, first sentence (p. 291), at zero lead time: ftf_tft​, gtg_tgt​, φt\varphi_tφt​ are L♮-concave.
  5. Concavity in sls_lsl​ (p. 295): Πt(⋅,d)\Pi_t(\cdot,d)Πt​(⋅,d) and Gt(s,⋅,d)G_t(s,\cdot,d)Gt​(s,⋅,d) are concave.
  6. Upper step (p. 295): Gt(s,sl′,d)−Gt(s,sl,d)≤Πt(sl′,d)−Πt(sl,d)G_t(s,s'_l,d)-G_t(s,s_l,d)\le\Pi_t(s'_l,d)-\Pi_t(s_l,d)Gt​(s,sl′​,d)−Gt​(s,sl​,d)≤Πt​(sl′​,d)−Πt​(sl​,d) for sl′>sl≥sl−1s'_l>s_l\ge s_{l-1}sl′​>sl​≥sl−1​.

The proof's lower-bound display (p. 295) is not a milestone: as printed, for arbitrary sl′>sl≥sl−1s'_l>s_l\ge s_{l-1}sl′​>sl​≥sl−1​, it is false when h+>γch^+>\gamma ch+>γc (see Formalization scope).

Significance

The result. The bounds reduce an (l−1)(l-1)(l−1)-dimensional optimization to two scalar newsvendor-type problems whose solutions do not depend on the period (Remark 6), and they give interpretable brackets: Sˉt(d)\bar S_t(d)Sˉt​(d) ignores the future cost of excess stock, while S‾t(d)\underline S_t(d)S​t​(d) charges every excess unit holding until expiry and then disposal. They justify the one-dimensional heuristics of §6.2 and give a check on any computed policy.

Formalizing it. The paper's proof is short but compresses three steps that need care: the structural results of §4 at zero lead time, the minimal-disposal property, and a coupling argument for the lower bound whose printed display is not correct as stated (see below). A machine-checked development would make the whole chain from the recursion to the bounds explicit, including the existence conventions for optimal decisions. To the knowledge of this mission, none of these results has been formalized in any proof assistant.

Difficulty

The central obstacle is the concavity of Gt(s,⋅,d)G_t(s,\cdot,d)Gt​(s,⋅,d) in the order-up-to level. It is not visible from the one-period terms: it rests on L♮-concavity of the whole recursion (Theorem 1), and the depletion constraint s1∨dt≤a≤sl∨dts_1\vee d_t\le a\le s_l\vee d_ts1​∨dt​≤a≤sl​∨dt​ is not an L♮-convex set, so the standard preservation lemma does not apply to (5) as written.

The lower bound needs a quantitative estimate of how much an extra unit of fresh stock can cost in the future. The printed estimate charges the expiring unit θ~\tilde\thetaθ~ where an unused unit actually costs θ\thetaθ, so it cannot hold for every pair of order-up-to levels; the lower bound must use that the comparison is only needed below S‾t(d)\underline S_t(d)S​t​(d), where excess stock is not pushed past the next period's optimal order-up-to level.

Formalization scope

The Lean development lives in the namespace PerishablePricing.Bounds. Its conventions are:

  • Carrier R\mathbb RR. The paper treats real and integer vectors at once; only the real case is formalized. L♮-convexity is defined on an explicit domain with real values, the paper's convention for "L♮-convex on a set".
  • Indices. States are Fin L → ℝ with L=l−1≥1L=l-1\ge1L=l−1≥1, 0-based.
  • Time. Time counts periods to go: f 0 = 0 is fT+1f_{T+1}fT+1​, and GtG_tGt​, gtg_tgt​, φt\varphi_tφt​ use the continuation f n.
  • Maxima and expectations. The maxima in the recursion are suprema over nonempty sets whose values are bounded above, and expectations are Bochner integrals against the noise law.
  • Optimal decisions. Every optimal decision is a largest maximizer, taken as a hypothesis at the points where it is used. With an arbitrary maximizer the upper bound fails when Πt(⋅,d)\Pi_t(\cdot,d)Πt​(⋅,d) is flat.

The standing assumptions are the hypotheses of every statement:

  • nonnegative unit costs and 0≤γ≤10\le\gamma\le10≤γ≤1;
  • the noise conditions and the strictly decreasing inverse demand;
  • Assumption 1;
  • (1−γ)c≤h−(1-\gamma)c\le h^-(1−γ)c≤h−, the §4 assumption c≤h−/(1−γ)c\le h^-/(1-\gamma)c≤h−/(1−γ);
  • h+≤(1−γ)θh^+\le(1-\gamma)\thetah+≤(1−γ)θ with γ<1\gamma<1γ<1, the §6.1 assumption θ≥h+/(1−γ)\theta\ge h^+/(1-\gamma)θ≥h+/(1−γ), which divides by 1−γ1-\gamma1−γ.

Deviations from the page, all disclosed in the items:

  • Only the backlogging case of Theorem 3 is stated. The lost-sales case rests on Theorem 2, which is not posed.
  • The hypothesis "the starting inventory level of the planning horizon is zero" constrains no object of the statement, and the conclusion is stated for every state.
  • Π~t\tilde\Pi_tΠ~t​'s printed term −γc s~l−1-\gamma c\,\tilde s_{l-1}−γcs~l−1​ depends on the state and the noise. It is read as −γc sl-\gamma c\,s_l−γcsl​, which leaves the maximizers unchanged.
  • The objective missing from the printed definition of Sˉt(d)\bar S_t(d)Sˉt​(d) is Πt\Pi_tΠt​.
  • The upper step's "Gt=Πt+γE[ft+1]G_t=\Pi_t+\gamma\mathbb E[f_{t+1}]Gt​=Πt​+γE[ft+1​]" omits a term constant in sls_lsl​.
  • The lower-bound display of the proof of Theorem 3 is not stated. Its exponents t+l−3t+l-3t+l−3, t+l−2t+l-2t+l−2 should read l−3l-3l−3, l−2l-2l−2, and even then, for arbitrary sl′>sl≥sl−1s'_l>s_l\ge s_{l-1}sl′​>sl​≥sl−1​, it fails when h+>γch^+>\gamma ch+>γc. Example: l=2l=2l=2, deterministic demand, c=1c=1c=1, γ=12\gamma=\tfrac12γ=21​, h+=h−=1h^+=h^-=1h+=h−=1, θ=2\theta=2θ=2, one period after the current one, s1=0s_1=0s1​=0, d=12d=\tfrac12d=21​, sl=100s_l=100sl​=100, sl′=101s'_l=101sl′​=101: the left side is −3-3−3 and the right side is −2.75-2.75−2.75. In that case an unused unit is disposed of at cost θ\thetaθ, not θ~\tilde\thetaθ~. Theorem 3 itself is stated as printed, with S‾t(d)\underline S_t(d)S​t​(d) defined through Π~t\tilde\Pi_tΠ~t​.

The goal must not be trivialized. Its continuation, the concavity of GtG_tGt​ and the monotonicity of ft+1f_{t+1}ft+1​ are properties of the model's own recursion, never hypotheses on abstract functions. Likewise slt(s,d)s_{lt}(s,d)slt​(s,d) is defined through GtG_tGt​, never through Πt\Pi_tΠt​ or Π~t\tilde\Pi_tΠ~t​.

A complete development needs:

  • L♮-concavity preservation under partial maximization over an L♮-convex set and under expectation;
  • concavity of expectations of piecewise-linear functions of the noise;
  • measurability and integrability of the stage value gtg_tgt​ in the noise;
  • the coupling arguments for Proposition 1 and the lower bound.

The L♮ preservation lemmas are reusable for other discrete-convexity models in inventory theory. Contributions toward any milestone, or toward that infrastructure, are welcome.

The source is the published Operations Research article. In the held scan, printed page = PDF page + 282.

Selected references

  • X. Chen, Z. Pang, L. Pan, Coordinating Inventory Control and Pricing Strategies for Perishable Products, Operations Research 62(2):284–300, 2014. https://doi.org/10.1287/opre.2014.1261
  • K. Murota, Discrete Convex Analysis, SIAM, 2003. https://doi.org/10.1137/1.9780898718508
  • P. Zipkin, On the Structure of Lost-Sales Inventory Models, Operations Research 56(4):937–944, 2008. https://doi.org/10.1287/opre.1070.0482
  • S. Nahmias, Perishable Inventory Theory: A Review, Operations Research 30(4):680–708, 1982. https://doi.org/10.1287/opre.30.4.680
10 thms1 active userReviewed
EconomicsMechanism DesignProbability·Captain: mikedeng1

Dynamic Contract Design in the Presence of Double Moral Hazard: One of Three Tenure-and-Termination Contracts γⁱ(wⁱ) Is Optimal Among Contracts Inducing Full Effort and Truth-TellingResearch Paper

Motivation

Many businesses are run by an agent on behalf of an owner who cannot see everything the agent does. Two frictions arise together. The agent may shirk, saving the cost of the effort that brings customers in, and the agent may divert cash, pocketing the fee of a customer the owner never sees: a plumbing franchise whose offline jobs bypass the head office, or a home-services platform whose providers are paid off-platform by returning clients. Each friction alone is a classical object of dynamic contract theory: DeMarzo and Sannikov (2006) study cash diversion, and Sun and Tian (2018) study effort incentives with Poisson arrivals. Tian, Astashkina and Duenyas (SSRN 4249177; Management Science, 2024, doi:10.1287/mnsc.2022.01169) solve the problem with both frictions present, in a model where customers arrive by a Poisson process whose rate the agent controls. This mission formalizes the baseline model of their Section 2 and its main result, Theorem 1.

Setting

Customers arrive at rate μ\muμ while the agent exerts effort (νt=μ\nu_t=\muνt​=μ, at flow cost ccc) and do not arrive while the agent shirks (νt=0\nu_t=0νt​=0). Each arriving customer independently uses the unobservable channel uuu with probability ppp, paying the fee RuR^uRu, or the observable channel ooo with probability 1−p1-p1−p, paying RoR^oRo. The counting processes NtuN^u_tNtu​ and NtoN^o_tNto​ count the arrivals by channel. The principal observes NoN^oNo and the agent's reports N^u\hat N^uN^u of the uuu-arrivals; an unreported uuu-arrival is cash the agent keeps. Both parties discount at rate rrr.

A contract γ=(L,τ)\gamma=(L,\tau)γ=(L,τ) consists of a nondecreasing cumulative payment LLL (limited liability: payments are never negative) and a termination time τ\tauτ, both functions of what the principal observes. The agent's utility (2.1) and the principal's utility (2.2) are

u(γ,ν,N^u)=E[∫0τe−rt[Ru(dNtu−dN^tu)+dLt+c(1−1[νt=μ])dt]],u(\gamma,\nu,\hat N^u)=\mathbb E\Big[\int_0^\tau e^{-rt}\big[R^u(dN^u_t-d\hat N^u_t)+dL_t+c(1-\mathbb 1[\nu_t=\mu])dt\big]\Big],u(γ,ν,N^u)=E[∫0τ​e−rt[Ru(dNtu​−dN^tu​)+dLt​+c(1−1[νt​=μ])dt]], U(γ,νˉ,Nu)=E[∫0τe−rt[RudNtu+RodNto−dLt−c dt]].U(\gamma,\bar\nu,N^u)=\mathbb E\Big[\int_0^\tau e^{-rt}\big[R^u dN^u_t+R^o dN^o_t-dL_t-c\,dt\big]\Big].U(γ,νˉ,Nu)=E[∫0τ​e−rt[RudNtu​+RodNto​−dLt​−cdt]].

A contract is incentive compatible, γ∈ΓIC\gamma\in\Gamma^{IC}γ∈ΓIC, if always working and always reporting truthfully (νˉ\bar\nuνˉ, N^u=Nu\hat N^u=N^uN^u=Nu) is optimal for the agent against every alternative effort process and reporting rule. Write Vˉ=(μ(pRu+(1−p)Ro)−c)/r\bar V=(\mu(pR^u+(1-p)R^o)-c)/rVˉ=(μ(pRu+(1−p)Ro)−c)/r, β=c/μ\beta=c/\muβ=c/μ, βo=(β−pRu)/(1−p)\beta^o=(\beta-pR^u)/(1-p)βo=(β−pRu)/(1−p), and assume the standing condition (2.5), Vˉ≥0\bar V\ge0Vˉ≥0.

The candidate optimal contracts γi(w)\gamma^i(w)γi(w), i=1,2,3i=1,2,3i=1,2,3, track a promised utility WtW_tWt​ that starts at www, drifts by dWt=r(Wt−wˉi)dtdW_t=r(W_t-\bar w^i)dtdWt​=r(Wt​−wˉi)dt, jumps up at rewarded arrivals, triggers termination when it reaches 000, and is capped at a tenure threshold wˉi\bar w^iwˉi, with the excess paid out: wˉ1=μpRu/r\bar w^1=\mu pR^u/rwˉ1=μpRu/r with jumps RuR^uRu at reported uuu-arrivals only (Definition 1); wˉ2=c/r\bar w^2=c/rwˉ2=c/r with jumps RuR^uRu and βo\beta^oβo (Definition 2); wˉ3=c/r\bar w^3=c/rwˉ3=c/r with jump β\betaβ at every arrival (Definition 3). The principal's value function FiF_iFi​ solves a differential equation with advanced arguments, for instance in the first scenario

rF(w)=rVˉ+μp [F(w+Ru)−F(w)]+r(w−wˉ1)F′(w),F(0)=0,(2.9)rF(w)=r\bar V+\mu p\,[F(w+R^u)-F(w)]+r(w-\bar w^1)F'(w),\qquad F(0)=0,\qquad (2.9)rF(w)=rVˉ+μp[F(w+Ru)−F(w)]+r(w−wˉ1)F′(w),F(0)=0,(2.9)

extended by F(w)=F(wˉ1)−(w−wˉ1)F(w)=F(\bar w^1)-(w-\bar w^1)F(w)=F(wˉ1)−(w−wˉ1) beyond the threshold.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 1 (p. 21)

With wi=arg⁡max⁡w≥0Fi(w)w^i=\arg\max_{w\ge0}F_i(w)wi=argmaxw≥0​Fi​(w) (2.14), the optimal contract in ΓIC\Gamma^{IC}ΓIC is

γ1(w1) if c≤μpRu,γ2(w2) if μpRu<c<μRu,γ3(w3) if c≥μRu,\gamma^1(w^1)\ \text{if}\ c\le\mu pR^u,\qquad\gamma^2(w^2)\ \text{if}\ \mu pR^u<c<\mu R^u,\qquad\gamma^3(w^3)\ \text{if}\ c\ge\mu R^u,γ1(w1) if c≤μpRu,γ2(w2) if μpRu<c<μRu,γ3(w3) if c≥μRu,

meaning γi(wi)∈ΓIC\gamma^i(w^i)\in\Gamma^{IC}γi(wi)∈ΓIC and U(γ,νˉ,Nu)≤U(γi(wi),νˉ,Nu)U(\gamma,\bar\nu,N^u)\le U(\gamma^i(w^i),\bar\nu,N^u)U(γ,νˉ,Nu)≤U(γi(wi),νˉ,Nu) for every γ∈ΓIC\gamma\in\Gamma^{IC}γ∈ΓIC.

Milestones

  1. Lemma 4 (three items, one per scenario): the scenario's equation with F(0)=0F(0)=0F(0)=0 has a unique solution FiF_iFi​ on [0,∞)[0,\infty)[0,∞), concave, with Fi′≥−1F_i'\ge-1Fi′​≥−1.
  2. Proposition 1: U(γi(w),νˉ,Nu)=Fi(w)U(\gamma^i(w),\bar\nu,N^u)=F_i(w)U(γi(w),νˉ,Nu)=Fi​(w) and u(γi(w),νˉ,Nu)=wu(\gamma^i(w),\bar\nu,N^u)=wu(γi(w),νˉ,Nu)=w for w∈[0,wˉi]w\in[0,\bar w^i]w∈[0,wˉi].
  3. The bound (B.12)–(B.16): for F=FiF=F_iF=Fi​, the drift Φ\PhiΦ of (B.7) is nonpositive at every jump pair satisfying Hu≥RuH^u\ge R^uHu≥Ru and pHu+(1−p)Ho≥βpH^u+(1-p)H^o\ge\betapHu+(1−p)Ho≥β.
  4. Proposition 2: Fi(u(γ,νˉ,Nu))≥U(γ,νˉ,Nu)F_i(u(\gamma,\bar\nu,N^u))\ge U(\gamma,\bar\nu,N^u)Fi​(u(γ,νˉ,Nu))≥U(γ,νˉ,Nu) for every γ∈ΓIC\gamma\in\Gamma^{IC}γ∈ΓIC.

Significance

The theorem shows that three simple contracts, each a probation period followed by termination or tenure, solve a two-dimensional moral hazard problem, and it tells which incentive constraint binds: truth-telling alone when c≤μpRuc\le\mu pR^uc≤μpRu, both when μpRu<c<μRu\mu pR^u<c<\mu R^uμpRu<c<μRu, effort alone when c≥μRuc\ge\mu R^uc≥μRu. Section 2.4 of the paper extends optimality to contracts that may let the agent shirk, and Sections 3 to 5 build monitoring, dynamic pricing and continuous effort on the same baseline, so the definitions here are the substrate for those results.

The result is proved in the paper, with two of the three scenarios of Lemma 4 and Proposition 1 left to the reader. It has not been formalized. A complete development would give a machine-checked account of a continuous-time contracting model driven by a controlled point process, which no library currently provides.

Difficulty

Three steps resist a direct transcription of the paper's argument. First, the value-function equations are not ordinary differential equations: they evaluate FFF at w+Ruw+R^uw+Ru, w+βow+\beta^ow+βo, w+βw+\betaw+β, so existence, uniqueness and concavity come from a backward induction over intervals of length RuR^uRu starting at the tenure threshold, and concavity holds only under (2.5). Second, the upper bound for an arbitrary incentive compatible contract needs the promise-keeping representation of the agent's continuation utility, a martingale representation for point-process filtrations, and a verification argument through Itô's formula for jump processes; the paper's proof uses the terminal condition F(Wτ)=F(0)F(W_\tau)=F(0)F(Wτ​)=F(0) and a martingale property without addressing τ=∞\tau=\inftyτ=∞ or integrability. Third, the characterization of incentive compatibility by the jump conditions Hu≥RuH^u\ge R^uHu≥Ru and pHu+(1−p)Ho≥βpH^u+(1-p)H^o\ge\betapHu+(1−p)Ho≥β is argued in the paper by a one-deviation heuristic, whereas (IC) quantifies over all joint deviations in effort and reporting.

Formalization scope

The arrival process is built from an i.i.d. sequence of standard exponential clocks and Bernoulli(ppp) channel marks: the next arrival occurs when μ\muμ times the effort time accumulated since the last arrival reaches the next clock. Strategies (effort and reporting) and contracts (cumulative payment and termination rule) are functions of the relevant history: the agent's full arrival history for strategies, the principal's observed history for contracts, which is the general form of predictable and adapted processes for a marked point process. Effort at time ttt depends only on arrivals strictly before ttt; reports can hide uuu-arrivals but never invent them. Utilities are expectations in [0,∞][0,\infty][0,∞] of nonnegative pathwise terms, payments enter as a Lebesgue–Stieltjes integral over [0,τ][0,\tau][0,τ], and UUU is real-valued on contracts with finite expected payments, which ΓIC\Gamma^{IC}ΓIC requires. (IC) quantifies over every measurable strategy.

The value functions are pinned by solution classes: continuity on [0,∞)[0,\infty)[0,∞), the slope −1-1−1 extension beyond wˉi\bar w^iwˉi, differentiability and the equation on [0,wˉi)[0,\bar w^i)[0,wˉi), and F(0)=0F(0)=0F(0)=0. The printed (2.11) has a stray −rF(w)-rF(w)−rF(w) on its right-hand side; the formalization uses the equation obtained from the HJB equation (2.7), which is the one the proofs use. Proposition 2 is stated for every promised utility w≥0w\ge0w≥0 (the page says w∈[0,wˉi]w\in[0,\bar w^i]w∈[0,wˉi]), which is what the optimality argument (2.15) needs. The bound (B.12)–(B.16) adds the condition w+Ho≥0w+H^o\ge0w+Ho≥0, since FFF is defined on [0,∞)[0,\infty)[0,∞).

The formalization does not trivialize: ΓIC\Gamma^{IC}ΓIC is not shrunk by restricting deviations, contracts react to reports so that hiding an arrival changes what the agent is paid, UUU carries no junk value on ΓIC\Gamma^{IC}ΓIC, and the goal quantifies over solutions of the value-function equations rather than over arbitrary concave functions; Lemma 4 is what makes that quantification non-vacuous.

Out of scope: Theorem 2 (optimality in the larger space Γ\GammaΓ, whose shirking payoffs are defined only inside its proof), Lemma 5, Sections 3 to 5, and as separate items Lemmas 1 to 3, Lemma 14 and the equivalence of (IC) with the two jump conditions, which need a promised-utility process with left limits built from conditional expectations. Contributions of that infrastructure (point-process martingale representation, Itô's formula for finite-variation jump processes, a verification theorem for discounted optimal control) are welcome and reusable beyond this mission.

Selected references

  • F. Tian, E. Astashkina, I. Duenyas, Dynamic Contract Design in the Presence of Double Moral Hazard, SSRN 4249177 (preprint); Management Science, 2024. https://ssrn.com/abstract=4249177, https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2022.01169
  • P. M. DeMarzo, Y. Sannikov, Optimal Security Design and Dynamic Capital Structure in a Continuous-Time Agency Model, Journal of Finance 61(6), 2006. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-6261.2006.01033.x
  • P. Sun, F. Tian, Optimal Contract to Induce Continued Effort, Management Science 64(9), 2018. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2017.2795
  • P. Brémaud, Point Processes and Queues: Martingale Dynamics, Springer, 1981. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4684-9477-8
12 thms1 active userReviewed
Dynamic ProgrammingMachine LearningReinforcement Learning·Captain: mikedeng1

The Role of Lookahead and Approximate Policy Evaluation in Reinforcement Learning with Linear Value Function Approximation: Error Bound for Least-Squares Policy Iteration with LookaheadResearch Paper

Motivation

Approximate policy iteration is the template behind most practical reinforcement-learning systems for large state spaces: alternate between choosing a policy that looks good under the current value estimate and estimating the value of that policy, with errors in both steps. Game-playing systems such as AlphaZero add two ingredients to this template: a multi-step lookahead (tree search) when choosing the policy, and a linear or neural value-function approximation fitted from a few evaluated states. Classical error bounds for approximate policy iteration (Bertsekas and Tsitsiklis, 1996) assume that each evaluation error is bounded by a fixed δ\deltaδ; Efroni, Dalal, Scherrer and Mannor (2019) extended them to HHH-step lookahead policies. Neither analysis asks whether a fitted value function actually meets such a bound.

Winnicki, Lubars, Livesay and Srikant (arXiv:2109.13419, Operations Research, 2025) show that it need not: with least-squares fitting on a subset of states, the iterates of approximate policy iteration can diverge (their Section 3.2). They then prove that sufficient lookahead HHH and rollout length mmm restore convergence, with an explicit finite-time error bound. This mission formalizes that bound.

Setting

A Markov decision process (S,A,P,r,α)(\mathcal S,\mathcal A,P,r,\alpha)(S,A,P,r,α) has a finite set of states S\mathcal SS, a finite set of actions A\mathcal AA, transition probabilities Pij(a)P_{ij}(a)Pij​(a) of moving from state iii to state jjj under action aaa, mean rewards r(s,a)∈[0,1]r(s,a)\in[0,1]r(s,a)∈[0,1], and a discount factor α∈(0,1)\alpha\in(0,1)α∈(0,1). A deterministic policy is a map μ:S→A\mu:\mathcal S\to\mathcal Aμ:S→A. Its value is the expected discounted reward

Jμ(s)=E[∑k≥0αkr(sk,μ(sk)) ∣ s0=s],J^\mu(s)=E\Big[\sum_{k\ge0}\alpha^k r(s_k,\mu(s_k))\,\Big|\,s_0=s\Big],Jμ(s)=E[k≥0∑​αkr(sk​,μ(sk​))​s0​=s],

and the optimal reward-to-go is J∗(s)=max⁡μJμ(s)J^*(s)=\max_\mu J^\mu(s)J∗(s)=maxμ​Jμ(s). Vectors J∈R∣S∣J\in\mathbb R^{|\mathcal S|}J∈R∣S∣ are compared in the sup norm ∥⋅∥∞\|\cdot\|_\infty∥⋅∥∞​. The policy operator and the Bellman operator are

(TμJ)(s)=r(s,μ(s))+α∑jPsj(μ(s))J(j),(TJ)(s)=max⁡a{r(s,a)+α∑jPsj(a)J(j)}.(T_\mu J)(s)=r(s,\mu(s))+\alpha\sum_jP_{sj}(\mu(s))J(j),\qquad (TJ)(s)=\max_{a}\Big\{r(s,a)+\alpha\sum_jP_{sj}(a)J(j)\Big\}.(Tμ​J)(s)=r(s,μ(s))+αj∑​Psj​(μ(s))J(j),(TJ)(s)=amax​{r(s,a)+αj∑​Psj​(a)J(j)}.

Each state iii has a feature vector ϕ(i)∈Rd\phi(i)\in\mathbb R^dϕ(i)∈Rd; Φ\PhiΦ is the matrix with rows ϕ(i)\phi(i)ϕ(i). For a set of states D\mathcal DD, ΦD\Phi_{\mathcal D}ΦD​ keeps the rows indexed by D\mathcal DD and PD\mathcal P_{\mathcal D}PD​ selects the entries of a vector indexed by D\mathcal DD.

Algorithm 2 starts from an arbitrary J0J_0J0​ and, at iteration kkk, (i) picks a policy μk+1\mu_{k+1}μk+1​ with ∥THJk−Tμk+1TH−1Jk∥∞≤εLA\|T^HJ_k-T_{\mu_{k+1}}T^{H-1}J_k\|_\infty\le\varepsilon_{LA}∥THJk​−Tμk+1​​TH−1Jk​∥∞​≤εLA​ (an inexact HHH-step lookahead); (ii) forms the noisy return J^μk+1(i)=Tμk+1mTH−1Jk(i)+wk+1(i)\hat J^{\mu_{k+1}}(i)=T^m_{\mu_{k+1}}T^{H-1}J_k(i)+w_{k+1}(i)J^μk+1​(i)=Tμk+1​m​TH−1Jk​(i)+wk+1​(i) on an evaluation set Dk\mathcal D_kDk​; (iii) fits θk+1\theta_{k+1}θk+1​ by least squares on Dk\mathcal D_kDk​ and sets Jk+1=Φθk+1J_{k+1}=\Phi\theta_{k+1}Jk+1​=Φθk+1​. Assumption 1 asks that the features of Dk\mathcal D_kDk​ have rank ddd for every kkk and that ∥wk∥∞≤εPE\|w_k\|_\infty\le\varepsilon_{PE}∥wk​∥∞​≤εPE​. Under it the fit is linear, Jk+1=Mk+1J^μk+1J_{k+1}=\mathcal M_{k+1}\hat J^{\mu_{k+1}}Jk+1​=Mk+1​J^μk+1​ with M=Φ(ΦD⊤ΦD)−1ΦD⊤PD\mathcal M=\Phi(\Phi_{\mathcal D}^\top\Phi_{\mathcal D})^{-1}\Phi_{\mathcal D}^\top\mathcal P_{\mathcal D}M=Φ(ΦD⊤​ΦD​)−1ΦD⊤​PD​, and the paper defines

δFV=sup⁡k∥Mk∥∞,δapp=sup⁡k,μ∥MkJμ−Jμ∥∞,β=αm+H−1δFV,τ=αm+αm+H−11−αδFV+δapp+δFVεPE.\delta_{FV}=\sup_k\|\mathcal M_k\|_\infty,\qquad \delta_{app}=\sup_{k,\mu}\|\mathcal M_kJ^\mu-J^\mu\|_\infty,\qquad \beta=\alpha^{m+H-1}\delta_{FV},\qquad \tau=\frac{\alpha^m+\alpha^{m+H-1}}{1-\alpha}\delta_{FV}+\delta_{app}+\delta_{FV}\varepsilon_{PE}.δFV​=ksup​∥Mk​∥∞​,δapp​=k,μsup​∥Mk​Jμ−Jμ∥∞​,β=αm+H−1δFV​,τ=1−ααm+αm+H−1​δFV​+δapp​+δFV​εPE​.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 1 (p. 14, eq. (10))

If m+H−1>log⁡(δFV)/log⁡(1/α)m+H-1>\log(\delta_{FV})/\log(1/\alpha)m+H−1>log(δFV​)/log(1/α), then under Assumption 1 every run of Algorithm 2 satisfies, for every k≥0k\ge0k≥0,

∥Jμk−J∗∥∞≤αkH1−α+2αH∥Jμ0−J0∥∞1−α kmax⁡(αH,β)k−1+2αHτ1−β+εLA(1−αH)(1−α).\|J^{\mu_k}-J^*\|_\infty\le\frac{\alpha^{kH}}{1-\alpha}+\frac{2\alpha^H\|J^{\mu_0}-J_0\|_\infty}{1-\alpha}\,k\max(\alpha^H,\beta)^{k-1}+\frac{2\alpha^H\frac{\tau}{1-\beta}+\varepsilon_{LA}}{(1-\alpha^H)(1-\alpha)}.∥Jμk​−J∗∥∞​≤1−ααkH​+1−α2αH∥Jμ0​−J0​∥∞​​kmax(αH,β)k−1+(1−αH)(1−α)2αH1−βτ​+εLA​​.

Milestones

In the order the proof uses them:

  1. Section 2: the Bellman equations Jμ=TμJμJ^\mu=T_\mu J^\muJμ=Tμ​Jμ (unique solution) and J∗=TJ∗J^*=TJ^*J∗=TJ∗ (eq. (2)); the contraction ∥TJ−J∗∥∞≤α∥J−J∗∥∞\|TJ-J^*\|_\infty\le\alpha\|J-J^*\|_\infty∥TJ−J∗∥∞​≤α∥J−J∗∥∞​; shift and monotonicity of TTT, TμT_\muTμ​ (eqs. (3)–(4)).
  2. Section 3.1, eq. (6): the closed form Jk+1=Mk+1J^μk+1J_{k+1}=\mathcal M_{k+1}\hat J^{\mu_{k+1}}Jk+1​=Mk+1​J^μk+1​ of the least-squares step.
  3. Appendix A, eq. (15): one lookahead step with evaluation error δk\delta_kδk​,
∥Jμk+1−J∗∥∞≤αH∥Jμk−J∗∥∞+2αHδk+εLA1−α.\|J^{\mu_{k+1}}-J^*\|_\infty\le\alpha^H\|J^{\mu_k}-J^*\|_\infty+\frac{2\alpha^H\delta_k+\varepsilon_{LA}}{1-\alpha}.∥Jμk+1​−J∗∥∞​≤αH∥Jμk​−J∗∥∞​+1−α2αHδk​+εLA​​.
  1. Proposition 1 (p. 13): the bound for Algorithm 3, an abstract scheme whose evaluation error at step kkk is at most δk\delta_kδk​, in three displays: the general bound, the bound under δk≤βkδ0+μ\delta_k\le\beta^k\delta_0+\muδk​≤βkδ0​+μ, and its limsup.
  2. Appendix B, eq. (19): for Algorithm 2, δk=∥Jk−Jμk∥∞\delta_k=\|J_k-J^{\mu_k}\|_\inftyδk​=∥Jk​−Jμk​∥∞​ satisfies δk≤βδk−1+τ\delta_k\le\beta\delta_{k-1}+\tauδk​≤βδk−1​+τ and, if β<1\beta<1β<1, δk≤βkδ0+τ/(1−β)\delta_k\le\beta^k\delta_0+\tau/(1-\beta)δk​≤βkδ0​+τ/(1−β).

Significance

Theorem 1 states a sufficient condition for convergence that does not depend on the size of the state space: lookahead plus rollout depth must exceed log⁡δFV/log⁡(1/α)\log\delta_{FV}/\log(1/\alpha)logδFV​/log(1/α), where δFV\delta_{FV}δFV​ depends only on the features and the evaluation sets. Paired with the divergence example of Section 3.2, it shows that lookahead is not merely a heuristic improvement but can be what makes approximate policy iteration with linear function approximation stable. Proposition 1 is a reusable interface: any policy-evaluation scheme whose errors satisfy a geometric-plus-floor bound inherits the same convergence guarantee; the paper's gradient-descent variant is obtained this way.

The result is proved on paper; it has not been machine-checked. The Prove2Me platform has the finite-MDP layer used here (transition kernels, policy values as discounted series, the Bellman optimality operator), exact modified policy iteration, and a one-step bound for greedy approximate policy iteration with QQQ-functions (H=1H=1H=1, no lookahead error). It has no lookahead bound, no least-squares value-function fit, and no finite-time bound for approximate policy iteration with function approximation. A complete development would add the Bellman equations for deterministic policies, the lookahead step (15), the least-squares projection identity, and the error recursion, all of which are reusable for other analyses of approximate dynamic programming.

Difficulty

The obvious argument fails at the evaluation step. Classical analyses treat ∥Jk−Jμk∥∞≤δ\|J_k-J^{\mu_k}\|_\infty\le\delta∥Jk​−Jμk​∥∞​≤δ as given; here the error is produced by the algorithm and fed back: the fitted JkJ_kJk​ is the input of the next lookahead, and the least-squares operator can amplify sup-norm errors by a factor δFV\delta_{FV}δFV​, which is at least 111 whenever d≥1d\ge1d≥1. The error recursion therefore contracts only when αm+H−1δFV<1\alpha^{m+H-1}\delta_{FV}<1αm+H−1δFV​<1. A second point is the lookahead step (15), which must hold for an arbitrary previous policy and an inexact lookahead, and rests on the increase of TnJμT^nJ^\muTnJμ in nnn rather than on contraction alone. Finally, combining the geometric decay of the evaluation errors with the αH\alpha^HαH-contraction of (15) requires a convolution estimate that yields the factor kmax⁡(αH,β)k−1k\max(\alpha^H,\beta)^{k-1}kmax(αH,β)k−1.

Formalization scope

States and actions are finite nonempty types; the transition kernel is the published IsTransitionKernel, JμJ^\muJμ is the published PolicyValue (a discounted series of expected rewards, not a fixed point of TμT_\muTμ​) of the point-mass policy at μ\muμ, TTT is the published BellmanOperator, and J∗J^*J∗ is the maximum of JμJ^\muJμ over the finitely many deterministic policies. Rewards enter only through their means r(s,a)∈[0,1]r(s,a)\in[0,1]r(s,a)∈[0,1]. Vectors are functions S→R\mathcal S\to\mathbb RS→R with the sup norm; matrix norms are Mathlib's ℓ∞\ell^\inftyℓ∞ operator norm (maximum absolute row sum). The rank condition of Assumption 1 is det⁡(ΦDk⊤ΦDk)≠0\det(\Phi_{\mathcal D_k}^\top\Phi_{\mathcal D_k})\ne0det(ΦDk​⊤​ΦDk​​)=0 for every kkk; Lean's matrix inverse is zero on singular matrices, so no statement relies on it without this hypothesis.

Conventions fixed where the page is loose: Algorithms 2 and 3 are predicates on whole runs, quantified over every admissible lookahead policy, noise and minimiser. μ0\mu_0μ0​, which Algorithm 2 never produces, is free, so every bound holds for every deterministic μ0\mu_0μ0​. Mk\mathcal M_kMk​ is the operator of Dk\mathcal D_kDk​ (eq. (6) calls it Mk+1\mathcal M_{k+1}Mk+1​; the suprema agree). δapp\delta_{app}δapp​ is the supremum over all kkk and all deterministic policies. Algorithm 3 is stated with ∥Jk−Jμk∥∞≤δk\|J_k-J^{\mu_k}\|_\infty\le\delta_k∥Jk​−Jμk​∥∞​≤δk​, the index of (15) and Appendix B, and without the representation Jk=ΦθkJ_k=\Phi\theta_kJk​=Φθk​, which Proposition 1 does not use. Proposition 1's first display divides by 1−αH−11-\alpha^{H-1}1−αH−1 and is stated for H≥2H\ge2H≥2; the other results take H≥1H\ge1H≥1. The noise bound ∥wk∥∞≤εPE\|w_k\|_\infty\le\varepsilon_{PE}∥wk​∥∞​≤εPE​ is imposed on the whole vector instead of setting wk(i)=0w_k(i)=0wk​(i)=0 off Dk\mathcal D_kDk​; off Dk\mathcal D_kDk​ it constrains only entries the run never reads. The limsup is stated as "for every ε>0\varepsilon>0ε>0, eventually ≤\le≤ bound +ε+\varepsilon+ε". The hypothesis of Theorem 1 is kept with the real logarithm as printed; for δFV>0\delta_{FV}>0δFV​>0 it is equivalent to β<1\beta<1β<1, and when δFV=0\delta_{FV}=0δFV​=0 (possible only if d=0d=0d=0) it reads m+H−1>0m+H-1>0m+H−1>0.

A formalization that fixes the lookahead policy to an exact argmax, the noise to zero, or μ0\mu_0μ0​ to a convenient policy proves a special case and is ruled out; so is defining JμJ^\muJμ or J∗J^*J∗ as a fixed point, which would make eq. (2) definitional.

Contributions welcome: proofs of the Section 2 milestones from the series definition of JμJ^\muJμ, the least-squares identity (6), the lookahead step (15), and the recursions of Proposition 1 and Appendix B. Theorem 2 of the paper (gradient-descent fitting) is not part of this mission: its Assumption 2 places no lower bound on the step size, and the statement fails for negative step sizes.

Selected references

  • A. Winnicki, J. Lubars, M. Livesay, R. Srikant, The Role of Lookahead and Approximate Policy Evaluation in Reinforcement Learning with Linear Value Function Approximation, Operations Research, 2025; arXiv:2109.13419v7. https://arxiv.org/abs/2109.13419
  • Y. Efroni, G. Dalal, B. Scherrer, S. Mannor, How to Combine Tree-Search Methods in Reinforcement Learning, AAAI, 2019. https://arxiv.org/abs/1809.01843
  • D. P. Bertsekas, J. N. Tsitsiklis, Neuro-Dynamic Programming, Athena Scientific, 1996.
  • D. P. Bertsekas, Reinforcement Learning and Optimal Control, Athena Scientific, 2019.
  • M. G. Lagoudakis, R. Parr, Least-Squares Policy Iteration, Journal of Machine Learning Research 4, 2003. https://www.jmlr.org/papers/v4/lagoudakis03a.html
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CombinatoricsOptimization·Captain: mikedeng1

The Continuous-Time Joint Replenishment Problem: ϵ-Optimal Policies via Pairwise Alignment: Ψ-Pairwise Alignment Yields a Replenishment Policy Within Factor 1 + 5ϵ of Any PolicyResearch Paper

Motivation

The joint replenishment problem is a basic model of coordinated inventory control. A firm stocks nnn commodities, each of which follows its own Economic Order Quantity (EOQ) model, but every order also incurs a joint ordering cost K0K_0K0​, regardless of which commodities it contains. Ordering commodities together therefore saves money, and the question is how to synchronize their replenishment cycles.

Since the mid-1980s the best known guarantee for the continuous-time problem came from power-of-2 policies (Roundy 1985, 1986; Jackson, Maxwell and Muckstadt 1985; Muckstadt and Roundy 1987). Their cost is within 9/8≈1.06\sqrt{9/8}\approx1.069/8​≈1.06 of optimal for a fixed base period, and within 1/(2ln⁡2)≈1.021/(\sqrt2\ln2)\approx1.021/(2​ln2)≈1.02 when the base is optimized. On the hardness side, Schulz and Telha (2022) and Tuisov and Yedidsion (2020) showed the problem to be intractable; the latter proved it strongly NP-hard, which rules out a fully polynomial-time approximation scheme.

Segev (arXiv:2302.09941, published in Management Science, 2025) gave the first improvement over power-of-2 policies. For every ϵ∈(0,12)\epsilon\in(0,\tfrac12)ϵ∈(0,21​) the problem can be approximated within 1+ϵ1+\epsilon1+ϵ of optimal in time O(2O~(1/ϵ3)⋅nO(1))O(2^{\tilde O(1/\epsilon^3)}\cdot n^{O(1)})O(2O~(1/ϵ3)⋅nO(1)). This mission formalizes the approximation guarantee behind that theorem. The source is the arXiv v1 preprint, and all theorem numbers refer to it.

Setting

Commodity i∈[n]i\in[n]i∈[n] has ordering cost Ki>0K_i>0Ki​>0 and holding cost Hi>0H_i>0Hi​>0. Ordering it every Ti>0T_i>0Ti​>0 time units costs per unit time

Ci(Ti)=KiTi+HiTi.C_i(T_i)=\frac{K_i}{T_i}+H_iT_i .Ci​(Ti​)=Ti​Ki​​+Hi​Ti​.

A policy is a vector T=(T1,…,Tn)T=(T_1,\dots,T_n)T=(T1​,…,Tn​) of positive intervals. For t>0t>0t>0 and Δ≥0\Delta\ge0Δ≥0, let Mt,Δ={0,t,2t,…,⌊Δ/t⌋t}\mathcal M_{t,\Delta}=\{0,t,2t,\dots,\lfloor\Delta/t\rfloor t\}Mt,Δ​={0,t,2t,…,⌊Δ/t⌋t} be the multiples of ttt in [0,Δ][0,\Delta][0,Δ]. A policy places

N(T,Δ)=∣⋃i∈[n]MTi,Δ∣N(T,\Delta)=\Big|\bigcup_{i\in[n]}\mathcal M_{T_i,\Delta}\Big|N(T,Δ)=​i∈[n]⋃​MTi​,Δ​​

joint orders in [0,Δ][0,\Delta][0,Δ]. Its joint ordering cost and total cost are

J(T)=K0⋅lim⁡Δ→∞N(T,Δ)Δ,F(T)=J(T)+∑i∈[n]Ci(Ti).J(T)=K_0\cdot\lim_{\Delta\to\infty}\frac{N(T,\Delta)}{\Delta},\qquad F(T)=J(T)+\sum_{i\in[n]}C_i(T_i).J(T)=K0​⋅Δ→∞lim​ΔN(T,Δ)​,F(T)=J(T)+i∈[n]∑​Ci​(Ti​).

For N⊆[n]\mathcal N\subseteq[n]N⊆[n], MNM_{\mathcal N}MN​ is the least common multiple of {Ti}i∈N\{T_i\}_{i\in\mathcal N}{Ti​}i∈N​, and MN=∞M_{\mathcal N}=\inftyMN​=∞ when the intervals have no common multiple.

The algorithm works against a reference policy T∗T^*T∗ with Tmin⁡∗=min⁡iTi∗T^*_{\min}=\min_iT^*_iTmin∗​=mini​Ti∗​ and an estimate F(T∗)≤OPT~≤2F(T∗)F(T^*)\le\widetilde{\mathrm{OPT}}\le2F(T^*)F(T∗)≤OPT≤2F(T∗).

  • Easy regime. When Tmin⁡∗≥nϵ⋅K0OPT~T^*_{\min}\ge\frac n\epsilon\cdot\frac{K_0}{\widetilde{\mathrm{OPT}}}Tmin∗​≥ϵn​⋅OPTK0​​, it uses the easy policy T^i=(K0+Ki)/Hi\hat T_i=\sqrt{(K_0+K_i)/H_i}T^i​=(K0​+Ki​)/Hi​​.
  • Difficult regime. Otherwise it guesses T~min⁡\tilde T_{\min}T~min​ with (1−ϵ/2)Tmin⁡∗≤T~min⁡≤Tmin⁡∗(1-\epsilon/2)T^*_{\min}\le\tilde T_{\min}\le T^*_{\min}(1−ϵ/2)Tmin∗​≤T~min​≤Tmin∗​ (2). It cuts [T~min⁡,T~min⁡/ϵ][\tilde T_{\min},\tilde T_{\min}/\epsilon][T~min​,T~min​/ϵ] into segments Sℓ=[(1+ϵ)ℓ−1T~min⁡,(1+ϵ)ℓT~min⁡)S_\ell=[(1+\epsilon)^{\ell-1}\tilde T_{\min},(1+\epsilon)^\ell\tilde T_{\min})Sℓ​=[(1+ϵ)ℓ−1T~min​,(1+ϵ)ℓT~min​), ℓ=1,…,L\ell=1,\dots,Lℓ=1,…,L. It keeps the active segments A∗\mathcal A^*A∗, those containing some Ti∗T^*_iTi∗​, and picks one representative Rℓ∗R^*_\ellRℓ∗​ among the Ti∗T^*_iTi∗​ in each.

Two representatives are Ψ\PsiΨ-aligned when aRℓ1∗=bRℓ2∗aR^*_{\ell_1}=bR^*_{\ell_2}aRℓ1​∗​=bRℓ2​∗​ for positive integers a,b≤Ψ=2L22L/ϵa,b\le\Psi=2L^2 2^L/\epsilona,b≤Ψ=2L22L/ϵ. The alignment graph GΨ∗G^*_\PsiGΨ∗​ joins Ψ\PsiΨ-aligned active segments. The linear system (LP) asks for Rℓ∈SˉℓR_\ell\in\bar S_\ellRℓ​∈Sˉℓ​ satisfying the same alignment relations as R∗R^*R∗. A solution is misaligned across components when representatives in different components of GΨ∗G^*_\PsiGΨ∗​ are not Ψ\PsiΨ-aligned. The final policy gives commodity iii the CiC_iCi​-cheapest of the RℓR_\ellRℓ​ and of the single large interval ⌈max⁡{T~min⁡/ϵ,Ki/Hi}⌉(R1)\lceil\max\{\tilde T_{\min}/\epsilon,\sqrt{K_i/H_i}\}\rceil^{(R_1)}⌈max{T~min​/ϵ,Ki​/Hi​​}⌉(R1​), rounded up to a multiple of R1R_1R1​.

Formalization targets

Goal: the approximation half of Theorem 1.3

Fix n≥1n\ge1n≥1, K0,Ki,Hi>0K_0,K_i,H_i>0K0​,Ki​,Hi​>0, ϵ∈(0,12)\epsilon\in(0,\tfrac12)ϵ∈(0,21​), a policy T∗T^*T∗ with all Ti∗>0T^*_i>0Ti∗​>0, and OPT~\widetilde{\mathrm{OPT}}OPT with F(T∗)≤OPT~≤2F(T∗)F(T^*)\le\widetilde{\mathrm{OPT}}\le2F(T^*)F(T∗)≤OPT≤2F(T∗).

  • (a) In the easy regime,
F(T^)≤(1+2ϵ)F(T∗).F(\hat T)\le(1+2\epsilon)F(T^*).F(T^)≤(1+2ϵ)F(T∗).
  • (b) In the difficult regime, the grid of powers of 1+ϵ/21+\epsilon/21+ϵ/2 contains a guess satisfying (2). For every such guess and every choice of representatives, a feasible, cross-misaligned solution of (LP) exists, and every final policy T^\hat TT^ built from such a solution satisfies
F(T^)≤(1+5ϵ) F(T∗).F(\hat T)\le(1+5\epsilon)\,F(T^*).F(T^)≤(1+5ϵ)F(T∗).

Milestones

The goal's proof uses the following results, in this order:

  • Claim 1.1 (EOQ facts) and Lemma 1.2 (the density exists and equals ∑N(−1)∣N∣+1/MN\sum_{\mathcal N}(-1)^{|\mathcal N|+1}/M_{\mathcal N}∑N​(−1)∣N∣+1/MN​).
  • Lemma 2.1 (the easy regime) and Observations 2.2 and 2.3.
  • Lemma 2.4, Lemma 2.5 and Corollary 2.6 (the structure of (LP)).
  • Lemmas 3.2 and 3.3 and Claims 3.4 and 3.5 (crossing and uncrossing terms).
  • Lemma 3.1 and inequality (3) (density), and Lemma 3.6 (assignability).

Significance

The theorem gives the first approximation scheme for continuous-time joint replenishment. It settles the problem's approximability up to the form of the exponential dependence on ϵ\epsilonϵ, after nearly four decades in which power-of-2 policies were the best available. Its central device, synchronizing pairs of representatives through bounded integer multiples and controlling everything else by inclusion–exclusion over the alignment graph, is proposed in the paper as a template for other multi-item lot-sizing models.

The result is proved on paper, and no machine-checked version is known. A formalization adds three things.

  • Lemma 1.2. A verified proof that the joint ordering cost of every positive policy is well defined. The paper notes that this is not obvious from (1).
  • Bookkeeping. A check of the paper's constants and signs across a long inclusion–exclusion argument.
  • Generality. Making explicit that the guarantee holds against any positive reference policy, not only an optimal one, whose existence the paper never establishes.

Difficulty

The obvious argument runs as follows: round every Ti∗T^*_iTi∗​ to a nearby point of a small grid and charge joint orders to the grid. It fails because the cost of the joint orders depends on the least common multiples of the intervals, not on their sizes. Two nearby reals can have a small lcm, or none at all, and an arbitrarily small perturbation changes N(T,Δ)N(T,\Delta)N(T,Δ) by a constant factor. The proof must therefore keep the arithmetic relations among the representatives exactly where they matter: within components of GΨ∗G^*_\PsiGΨ∗​, through (LP). It must also show that relations across components contribute only lower-order terms. This requires two nested inclusion–exclusion expansions (Lemma 3.3 and Claim 3.5) whose error terms, of order ∣A∗∣22∣A∗∣|\mathcal A^*|^2 2^{|\mathcal A^*|}∣A∗∣22∣A∗∣, are absorbed by the choice of Ψ\PsiΨ.

Lemma 1.2 is a squeeze argument, but it rests on showing that the common multiples of finitely many positive reals form the set M⋅NM\cdot\mathbb NM⋅N.

Formalization scope

All declarations live in the namespace ContJRP.Align.

Representation.

  • The model is defined on Mathlib with no external dependency.
  • Commodities are Fin n with n≥1n\ge1n≥1.
  • N(⋅,Δ)N(\cdot,\Delta)N(⋅,Δ) counts a finite union of Finset ℝ, and 000 is a member of every Mt,Δ\mathcal M_{t,\Delta}Mt,Δ​.
  • The density is a limUnder.
  • 1/MN1/M_{\mathcal N}1/MN​ is 0 when no common multiple exists.
  • Segments are indexed from 000 in Lean, so the paper's SℓS_\ellSℓ​ and R1R_1R1​ are Lean's index ℓ−1\ell-1ℓ−1 and R 0.

Committed conventions.

  • K0,Ki,Hi>0K_0,K_i,H_i>0K0​,Ki​,Hi​>0 and ϵ∈(0,12)\epsilon\in(0,\tfrac12)ϵ∈(0,21​) everywhere.
  • LLL is the least natural number with (1+ϵ)L>1/ϵ(1+\epsilon)^L>1/\epsilon(1+ϵ)L>1/ϵ, which the page leaves as O(1ϵlog⁡1ϵ)O(\frac1\epsilon\log\frac1\epsilon)O(ϵ1​logϵ1​).
  • Every alignment multiple and the β±\beta^\pmβ± of Lemma 2.4 are positive integers.
  • Inclusion–exclusion sums range over nonempty index sets.
  • The reference policy T∗T^*T∗ is any positive policy whose cost the estimate brackets; it need not be optimal.
  • Lemmas in §2–§3 do not assume the difficult-regime inequality, which their proofs do not use.

What is left out. The running-time half of Theorem 1.3, the time bounds of Lemmas 2.4 and 2.5, and the final selection of the cheapest candidate (§3.3) are not formalized. The goal carries the constants the analysis proves, 1+2ϵ1+2\epsilon1+2ϵ and 1+5ϵ1+5\epsilon1+5ϵ, rather than the rescaled 1+ϵ1+\epsilon1+ϵ.

Trivializing formalizations ruled out.

  • (LP) cannot be empty, because the goal asserts that a feasible, cross-misaligned solution exists.
  • limUnder cannot return a junk value, because Lemma 1.2 and (3) are stated as Tendsto limits.
  • The final policy is not a free parameter: each T^i\hat T_iT^i​ must be one of its options and CiC_iCi​-minimal among them.
  • Misalignment quantifies over positive multiples only, so it is satisfiable.

Infrastructure and contributions. A complete development needs three pieces:

  • the lattice of common multiples of positive reals, and the floor-count ∣⋂iMTi,Δ∣=⌊Δ/M⌋+1|\bigcap_{i}\mathcal M_{T_i,\Delta}|=\lfloor\Delta/M\rfloor+1∣⋂i​MTi​,Δ​∣=⌊Δ/M⌋+1;
  • inclusion–exclusion for finite unions (Finset.inclusion_exclusion_card_biUnion in Mathlib);
  • elementary calculus for the EOQ cost.

The density results (Lemma 1.2) are reusable for any periodic-scheduling model. Proofs of any milestone are welcome, as are alternative statements of the selection step.

Selected references

  • D. Segev, The Continuous-Time Joint Replenishment Problem: ϵ-Optimal Policies via Pairwise Alignment, arXiv:2302.09941v1, 2023; Management Science, 2025. https://arxiv.org/abs/2302.09941
  • R. Roundy, 98%-effective integer-ratio lot-sizing for one-warehouse multi-retailer systems, Management Science 31(11), 1985. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.31.11.1416
  • P. Jackson, W. Maxwell, J. Muckstadt, The joint replenishment problem with a powers-of-two restriction, IIE Transactions 17(1), 1985. https://doi.org/10.1080/07408178508975270
  • C.-P. Teo, D. Bertsimas, Multistage lot sizing problems via randomized rounding, Operations Research 49(4), 2001. https://doi.org/10.1287/opre.49.4.599.11225
  • A. S. Schulz, C. Telha, Integer factorization: Why two-item joint replenishment is hard, Operations Research, 2022 (forthcoming at the time of the preprint).
  • A. Tuisov, L. Yedidsion, The continuous joint replenishment problem is strongly NP-hard, arXiv:2006.05310, 2020. https://arxiv.org/abs/2006.05310
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Bandit AlgorithmsMachine LearningProbability+1·Captain: mikedeng1

Corruption-Robust Exploration in Episodic Reinforcement Learning II: Uniformly Action-Eliminating Algorithms Suffer Expected Regret at Least K/8 for K ≤ A^H/4Research Paper

Why action elimination is the question

In stochastic multi-armed bandits, a robust way to explore is action elimination: keep confidence intervals for every arm, discard an arm once its upper confidence bound falls below another arm's lower confidence bound, and sample uniformly among the arms that survive. Uniform sampling is what makes the first corruption-robust bandit algorithm work (Lykouris, Mirrokni & Paes Leme, STOC 2018): an adversary that corrupts a few rounds cannot steer a learner whose choice among surviving arms is random.

Lykouris, Simchowitz, Slivkins and Sun (arXiv:1911.08689v4, Mathematics of Operations Research) extend corruption-robust exploration to episodic reinforcement learning. Their algorithm also maintains active sets of actions, but it does not play uniformly among them; it follows an optimistic (UCB) policy restricted to the active sets. Section 7 of the paper explains why: Theorem 7.1 shows that the bandit recipe, transplanted verbatim to episodic MDPs, suffers linear regret for exponentially many episodes, even when every confidence statement it makes is correct. This mission formalizes that lower bound.

Setting

An episodic environment E=(X,A,H)\mathscr E=(\mathcal X,\mathcal A,H)E=(X,A,H) has a finite state set X\mathcal XX, a finite action set A\mathcal AA with ∣A∣=A|\mathcal A|=A∣A∣=A, and a horizon HHH. A stochastic problem instance M=(p0,p,Drew)\mathcal M=(p_0,p,\mathcal D_{\mathrm{rew}})M=(p0​,p,Drew​) on it fixes an initial state law p0p_0p0​, a transition kernel p(⋅∣x,a)p(\cdot\mid x,a)p(⋅∣x,a) (the same at every stage), and reward laws Drew(x,a)\mathcal D_{\mathrm{rew}}(x,a)Drew​(x,a) on [0,1][0,1][0,1] with means r⋆(x,a)r^\star(x,a)r⋆(x,a). The optimal Q-function and value are defined backwards from VH+1⋆≡0V^\star_{H+1}\equiv0VH+1⋆​≡0 by Qh⋆(x,a)=r⋆(x,a)+∑x′p(x′∣x,a)Vh+1⋆(x′)Q^\star_h(x,a)=r^\star(x,a)+\sum_{x'}p(x'\mid x,a)V^\star_{h+1}(x')Qh⋆​(x,a)=r⋆(x,a)+∑x′​p(x′∣x,a)Vh+1⋆​(x′) and Vh⋆(x)=max⁡aQh⋆(x,a)V^\star_h(x)=\max_aQ^\star_h(x,a)Vh⋆​(x)=maxa​Qh⋆​(x,a); the optimal actions are πh⋆(x)={a:Qh⋆(x,a)=Vh⋆(x)}\pi^\star_h(x)=\{a:Q^\star_h(x,a)=V^\star_h(x)\}πh⋆​(x)={a:Qh⋆​(x,a)=Vh⋆​(x)}, and V⋆=∑xp0(x)V1⋆(x)V^\star=\sum_xp_0(x)V^\star_1(x)V⋆=∑x​p0​(x)V1⋆​(x).

A Q-supervisor T=(Qˉ,Q‾,A,πucb)\mathcal T=(\bar Q,\underline Q,\mathscr A,\pi^{\mathrm{ucb}})T=(Qˉ​,Q​,A,πucb) holds estimates Qˉh(x,a),Q‾h(x,a)∈[0,H]\bar Q_h(x,a),\underline Q_h(x,a)\in[0,H]Qˉ​h​(x,a),Q​h​(x,a)∈[0,H], active sets Ah(x)⊆A\mathscr A_h(x)\subseteq\mathcal AAh​(x)⊆A, and a policy πucb\pi^{\mathrm{ucb}}πucb greedy for Qˉ\bar QQˉ​. It is confidence-admissible for M\mathcal MM (Definition 4.1) if πh⋆(x)⊆Ah(x)\pi^\star_h(x)\subseteq\mathscr A_h(x)πh⋆​(x)⊆Ah​(x) and Q‾h≤Qh⋆≤Qˉh\underline Q_h\le Q^\star_h\le\bar Q_hQ​h​≤Qh⋆​≤Qˉ​h​ everywhere. Its plausible sets are

Ahplaus(x)={a∈Ah(x): Qˉh(x,a)≥Q‾h(x,a′)  ∀a′∈Ah(x)}.\mathscr A^{\mathrm{plaus}}_h(x)=\{a\in\mathscr A_h(x):\ \bar Q_h(x,a)\ge\underline Q_h(x,a')\ \ \forall a'\in\mathscr A_h(x)\}.Ahplaus​(x)={a∈Ah​(x): Qˉ​h​(x,a)≥Q​h​(x,a′)  ∀a′∈Ah​(x)}.

An algorithm is uniformly action-eliminating if before each episode kkk it outputs a Q-supervisor Tk\mathcal T_kTk​, possibly at random and depending on everything observed so far, and at each stage hhh plays ak;ha_{k;h}ak;h​ uniformly at random from Ak;hplaus(xk;h)\mathscr A^{\mathrm{plaus}}_{k;h}(x_{k;h})Ak;hplaus​(xk;h​), independently across stages. It is uniformly admissible for E\mathscr EE if for every instance on E\mathscr EE its Q-supervisors are confidence-admissible with probability at least 12\tfrac1221​. The regret over KKK episodes is RegretKM=∑k=1K(V⋆−VM,πk)\mathrm{Regret}^{\mathcal M}_K=\sum_{k=1}^K\bigl(V^\star-V^{\mathcal M,\pi_k}\bigr)RegretKM​=∑k=1K​(V⋆−VM,πk​), with πk\pi_kπk​ the uniformly-at-random policy of episode kkk.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 7.1

For every H≥1H\ge1H≥1 and A≥2A\ge2A≥2 there is an instance M\mathcal MM on an environment with ∣X∣=H+1|\mathcal X|=H+1∣X∣=H+1 and ∣A∣=A|\mathcal A|=A∣A∣=A such that every uniformly action-eliminating, uniformly admissible algorithm satisfies

K≤AH4⟹EM[RegretKM]≥K8.K\le\frac{A^H}{4}\quad\Longrightarrow\quad\mathbb E^{\mathcal M}\bigl[\mathrm{Regret}^{\mathcal M}_K\bigr]\ge\frac K8 .K≤4AH​⟹EM[RegretKM​]≥8K​.

Milestones (Appendix A)

The witness is the combination lock M\mathcal MM: states x(0),…,x(H)x^{(0)},\dots,x^{(H)}x(0),…,x(H), action 111 advances x(h)→x(h+1)x^{(h)}\to x^{(h+1)}x(h)→x(h+1), any other action falls into the sink x(0)x^{(0)}x(0), and the only reward is 111 for action 111 at x(H)x^{(H)}x(H). Its twin M0\mathcal M_0M0​ has the same transitions and zero rewards. The milestones are the steps of the paper's proof:

  1. (A.1) M\mathcal MM and M0\mathcal M_0M0​ induce the same law on histories in which (1,…,1)(1,\dots,1)(1,…,1) was never played.
  2. (A.2) If no action is eliminated, the combination is played with probability A−HA^{-H}A−H.
  3. Observation 2 If no action is eliminated, V⋆−VM,πk=1−A−HV^\star-V^{\mathcal M,\pi_k}=1-A^{-H}V⋆−VM,πk​=1−A−H.
  4. Observation 3 Admissibility for M0\mathcal M_0M0​ forces no elimination.
  5. Union bound PM0[⋂k(Ekcombi)c∩⋂kEkadm]≥PM0[⋂kEkadm]−∑kPM0[Ekcombi∩Ekadm]\mathbb P^{\mathcal M_0}[\bigcap_k(\mathcal E^{\mathrm{combi}}_k)^c\cap\bigcap_k\mathcal E^{\mathrm{adm}}_k]\ge\mathbb P^{\mathcal M_0}[\bigcap_k\mathcal E^{\mathrm{adm}}_k]-\sum_k\mathbb P^{\mathcal M_0}[\mathcal E^{\mathrm{combi}}_k\cap\mathcal E^{\mathrm{adm}}_k]PM0​[⋂k​(Ekcombi​)c∩⋂k​Ekadm​]≥PM0​[⋂k​Ekadm​]−∑k​PM0​[Ekcombi​∩Ekadm​].
  6. Chain (i)–(iii) EM[RegretKM]≥(1−A−H)K PM0[⋂k(Ekcombi)c∩⋂kEkadm]\mathbb E^{\mathcal M}[\mathrm{Regret}^{\mathcal M}_K]\ge(1-A^{-H})K\,\mathbb P^{\mathcal M_0}[\bigcap_k(\mathcal E^{\mathrm{combi}}_k)^c\cap\bigcap_k\mathcal E^{\mathrm{adm}}_k]EM[RegretKM​]≥(1−A−H)KPM0​[⋂k​(Ekcombi​)c∩⋂k​Ekadm​].

Significance

The theorem separates two exploration principles that coincide in bandits. For KKK episodes of uniform elimination the regret is Ω(K)\Omega(K)Ω(K) until KKK is of order AHA^HAH, while optimistic exploration over the same confidence sets attains regret polynomial in HHH, ∣X∣|\mathcal X|∣X∣, ∣A∣|\mathcal A|∣A∣ and K\sqrt KK​ (Azar, Osband & Munos, ICML 2017). It is the reason the paper's SuperVIsed.C algorithm combines active sets with a UCB policy rather than sampling uniformly, and it applies to any uniformly admissible construction of the confidence bounds, so better estimators do not escape it.

The result is proved in the paper (Appendix A); it is not formalized anywhere. A machine-checked version adds a precise account of what "algorithm" means here (a learner that may use all past observations and internal randomness), of the probability space of a whole run, and of the change-of-instance argument (A.1), which is the template for many reinforcement-learning lower bounds.

Difficulty

The arithmetic of the final step is elementary. The work is in the probability space: the run of an adaptive learner over KKK episodes is a sequential composition of the learner's choice of supervisor, the episode's states, actions and rewards, and the learner's update. Equation (A.1) needs a likelihood argument on this composed law: on histories that never play (1,…,1)(1,\dots,1)(1,…,1), every factor of the two run laws agrees, because the two instances differ only at a state–action pair such histories never visit. Equation (A.2) needs that, conditionally on the supervisor of episode kkk, the episode's actions are independent and uniform. Neither can be read off the per-episode description; both require induction over episodes on the run law.

A tempting shortcut is to apply admissibility one episode at a time. It does not suffice: the proof needs the joint event ⋂k≤KEkadm\bigcap_{k\le K}\mathcal E^{\mathrm{adm}}_k⋂k≤K​Ekadm​ to have probability at least 12\tfrac1221​ (see the scope section).

Formalization scope

  • Representation. States are Fin (H+1), actions Fin A; the paper's action 111 is 0, the sink is state 0. Stages and episodes are 0-based. Transitions, initial laws, rewards, supervisor laws and action laws are PMFs. The value V⋆V^\starV⋆ is the backward recursion on p. 8, written on the number of remaining stages since the kernel is stage-independent.
  • The algorithm. A learner is a map from the observed history (past Q-supervisors and episodes with their states, actions and rewards, oldest first) to a discrete law of the next Q-supervisor. It sees nothing of the instance beyond these observations. If a plausible set is empty, the action is drawn uniformly from A\mathcal AA; this only enlarges the class of algorithms.
  • Uniform admissibility (pinned). §7 says each Q-supervisor is admissible "with probability at least 1/2"; the proof uses P[⋂k=1KEkadm]≥12\mathbb P[\bigcap_{k=1}^K\mathcal E^{\mathrm{adm}}_k]\ge\tfrac12P[⋂k=1K​Ekadm​]≥21​ ("By assumption", p. 39). The formalization uses the joint event, for every instance on the environment, over the same KKK episodes as the regret.
  • Unstated parts of the construction (pinned). Both instances start at x(1)x^{(1)}x(1); actions at x(H)x^{(H)}x(H) lead to the sink. The page states neither. The start is what makes the combination have probability A−HA^{-H}A−H; the second choice is never used because x(H)x^{(H)}x(H) is reached only at the last stage.
  • Reward laws of the instances quantified in the hypothesis are discrete; this weakens the hypothesis and strengthens the theorem.
  • Not trivial. The hypothesis is satisfiable: the learner that always outputs Qˉ≡H\bar Q\equiv HQˉ​≡H, Q‾≡0\underline Q\equiv0Q​≡0, A≡A\mathscr A\equiv\mathcal AA≡A is uniformly admissible for every KKK. A statement in which the instance is fixed in the admissibility hypothesis, or in which admissibility is relative to M\mathcal MM rather than to every instance, would be a different theorem.
  • Not posed. The paper's headline upper bounds (Theorems 2.1, 2.2) are stated with ≲\lesssim≲ and belong to a separate mission of this series.

Welcome contributions: lemmas on the run law of an adaptive learner (marginals of the kkk-th supervisor, conditional independence of episode kkk given its supervisor), which are reusable for other episodic lower bounds.

Selected references

  • T. Lykouris, M. Simchowitz, A. Slivkins, W. Sun, Corruption-robust exploration in episodic reinforcement learning, Mathematics of Operations Research; arXiv:1911.08689v4, 2023. https://arxiv.org/abs/1911.08689
  • T. Lykouris, V. Mirrokni, R. Paes Leme, Stochastic bandits robust to adversarial corruptions, STOC 2018. https://arxiv.org/abs/1803.09353
  • M. G. Azar, I. Osband, R. Munos, Minimax regret bounds for reinforcement learning, ICML 2017. https://arxiv.org/abs/1703.05449
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Bandit AlgorithmsMachine LearningReinforcement Learning·Captain: mikedeng1

Corruption-Robust Exploration in Episodic Reinforcement Learning I: Regret of SuperVIsed.C Is Bounded by the Bonus Sums of Its Critically Tolerant and Robust Base LearnersResearch Paper

Motivation

Reinforcement-learning algorithms with regret guarantees, such as UCBVI (Azar, Osband & Munos 2017), assume that every episode is generated by the same Markov decision process. In practice a fraction of episodes can be generated by something else: fraudulent users of a recommender, sensor faults, a strategic participant. Corruption-robust learning asks for regret that degrades gracefully with the number CCC of corrupted episodes, without knowing CCC in advance.

Timeline. For stochastic multi-armed bandits, Lykouris, Mirrokni & Paes Leme (STOC 2018) introduced the corruption model and a multi-layer active arm elimination algorithm whose regret grows linearly in CCC; Gupta, Koren & Talwar (COLT 2019) improved the dependence to additive. For episodic reinforcement learning, Lykouris, Simchowitz, Slivkins & Sun (abstract at COLT 2021; Mathematics of Operations Research 2025) gave SuperVIsed.C, the first algorithm with sublinear regret under any deviation from i.i.d. episodes in this setting: in tabular MDPs with TTT steps its regret is of order C H3SATC\,H^3\sqrt{SAT}CH3SAT​ up to logarithmic factors and lower-order terms (their Theorem 2.1), with an analogous bound for linear MDPs, without knowing CCC. Their analysis isolates a deterministic regret guarantee, Theorem 4.1, from which the headline bounds follow by concentration.

Setting

An episodic tabular MDP has a finite state set X\mathcal XX, a finite nonempty action set A\mathcal AA and a horizon H≥1H\ge1H≥1. The nominal MDP consists of an initial distribution p0⋆p^\star_0p0⋆​, stage-independent transition probabilities p⋆(x′∣x,a)p^\star(x'\mid x,a)p⋆(x′∣x,a) and mean rewards r⋆(x,a)∈[0,1]r^\star(x,a)\in[0,1]r⋆(x,a)∈[0,1]. With VH+1⋆≡0V^\star_{H+1}\equiv0VH+1⋆​≡0, the optimal values are Qh⋆(x,a)=r⋆(x,a)+p⋆(x,a)⊤Vh+1⋆Q^\star_h(x,a)=r^\star(x,a)+p^\star(x,a)^\top V^\star_{h+1}Qh⋆​(x,a)=r⋆(x,a)+p⋆(x,a)⊤Vh+1⋆​ and Vh⋆(x)=max⁡aQh⋆(x,a)V^\star_h(x)=\max_aQ^\star_h(x,a)Vh⋆​(x)=maxa​Qh⋆​(x,a), and V⋆=Ex1∼p0⋆[V1⋆(x1)]V^\star=E_{x_1\sim p^\star_0}[V^\star_1(x_1)]V⋆=Ex1​∼p0⋆​​[V1⋆​(x1​)]. A randomized Markovian policy π\piπ is a probability distribution over finitely many deterministic Markov policies, and VπV^\piVπ is its expected total reward.

A Q-supervisor T=(Qˉ,Q‾,A,πucb)\mathcal T=(\bar Q,\underline Q,\mathcal A,\pi^{\mathrm{ucb}})T=(Qˉ​,Q​,A,πucb) holds upper and lower estimates of Q⋆Q^\starQ⋆, active sets Ah(x)\mathcal A_h(x)Ah​(x) of actions, and a UCB policy maximizing Qˉ\bar QQˉ​ over the active set. It is confidence-admissible if Q‾≤Q⋆≤Qˉ\underline Q\le Q^\star\le\bar QQ​≤Q⋆≤Qˉ​ and every optimal action is active. A policy is Q-supervised if it plays only plausible actions, those a∈Ah(x)a\in\mathcal A_h(x)a∈Ah​(x) with Qˉh(x,a)≥Q‾h(x,a′)\bar Q_h(x,a)\ge\underline Q_h(x,a')Qˉ​h​(x,a)≥Q​h​(x,a′) for all active a′a'a′. The Bellman errors are Bell‾h=Qˉh−(r⋆+p⋆⊤Vˉh+1)\overline{\mathbf{Bell}}_h=\bar Q_h-(r^\star+p^{\star\top}\bar V_{h+1})Bellh​=Qˉ​h​−(r⋆+p⋆⊤Vˉh+1​) and Bell‾h=Q‾h−(r⋆+p⋆⊤V‾h+1)\underline{\mathbf{Bell}}_h=\underline Q_h-(r^\star+p^{\star\top}\underline V_{h+1})Bell​h​=Q​h​−(r⋆+p⋆⊤V​h+1​). A policy has UCB visitation ratio at most ρ\rhoρ if switching to πucb\pi^{\mathrm{ucb}}πucb at any stage hhh multiplies the probability of any later state-action pair by at most ρ\rhoρ. A model-estimate (r^,p^,b)(\hat r,\hat p,b)(r^,p^​,b) is valid if the bonus bbb bounds ∣r^−r⋆+(p^−p⋆)⊤Vh+1⋆∣|\hat r-r^\star+(\hat p-p^\star)^\top V^\star_{h+1}|∣r^−r⋆+(p^​−p⋆)⊤Vh+1⋆​∣.

SuperVIsed.C runs ℓmax⁡\ell_{\max}ℓmax​ base learners. Learner ℓ\ellℓ runs a two-estimate value iteration, UCBVI-BASE, with a global model-estimate (all data, bonus inflated by 2ℓ2^\ell2ℓ) and a subsampled one, inside the active sets handed down by learner ℓ+1\ell+1ℓ+1; it returns its base policy πℓbase\pi^{\mathrm{base}}_\ellπℓbase​ and the active sets for learner ℓ−1\ell-1ℓ−1. In each episode a nondecreasing random layer schedule (ℓ1,…,ℓH)(\ell_1,\dots,\ell_H)(ℓ1​,…,ℓH​) decides whose base policy is played at each stage; the master policy πmaster\pi^{\mathrm{master}}πmaster is the resulting mixture, and πℓmaster\pi^{\mathrm{master}}_\ellπℓmaster​, π≤ℓmaster\pi^{\mathrm{master}}_{\le\ell}π≤ℓmaster​ are its conditionings on the final layer, with probabilities qℓq_\ellqℓ​, q≤ℓq_{\le\ell}q≤ℓ​.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 4.1

With ℓ⋆=min⁡{ℓ≥1:2ℓ≥C}\ell_\star=\min\{\ell\ge1:2^\ell\ge C\}ℓ⋆​=min{ℓ≥1:2ℓ≥C} and expected bonus sums Δk,ℓ\Delta_{k,\ell}Δk,ℓ​ (subsampled, along πk,ℓmaster\pi^{\mathrm{master}}_{k,\ell}πk,ℓmaster​) and Δk,≤ℓ⋆\Delta_{k,\le\ell_\star}Δk,≤ℓ⋆​​ (global, along πk,≤ℓ⋆master\pi^{\mathrm{master}}_{k,\le\ell_\star}πk,≤ℓ⋆​master​): if the global and subsampled model-estimates of every learner ℓ≥ℓ⋆\ell\ge\ell_\starℓ≥ℓ⋆​ are valid in every episode, then

CH+∑k=1K(V⋆−Vπkmaster)≤CH+8eH2∑ℓ>ℓ⋆ℓ qℓ∑kΔk,ℓ+8eCH2log⁡2(2C) q≤ℓ⋆∑kΔk,≤ℓ⋆.CH+\sum_{k=1}^K\big(V^\star-V^{\pi^{\mathrm{master}}_k}\big)\le CH+8eH^2\sum_{\ell>\ell_\star}\ell\,q_\ell\sum_k\Delta_{k,\ell}+8eCH^2\log_2(2C)\,q_{\le\ell_\star}\sum_k\Delta_{k,\le\ell_\star}.CH+k=1∑K​(V⋆−Vπkmaster​)≤CH+8eH2ℓ>ℓ⋆​∑​ℓqℓ​k∑​Δk,ℓ​+8eCH2log2​(2C)q≤ℓ⋆​​k∑​Δk,≤ℓ⋆​​.

The left side is the paper's upper bound (2.2) on the regret. The statement leaves the estimates arbitrary apart from their ranges and validity, so it holds for every data realization.

Milestones

The milestones follow the proof: the value decomposition over final layers (Lemma 4.4), admissibility from validity (Lemma 4.6), supervision of the master policies (Lemma 4.5), the Bellman-error decompositions (Lemma D.1, Propositions 4.1 and 4.2), the bonus bound on Bellman errors (Lemma 4.7), and the schedule estimates (Claims 4.8, 4.9 and Lemma 4.10).

Significance

Theorem 4.1 is the explicit core of the paper's results: Theorems 2.1 and 2.2, stated only up to constant and logarithmic factors, follow from it by bounding the bonus sums. Its proof architecture, which supervises less robust learners with more robust ones and bounds their mismatch through the visitation ratio, is independent of the tabular setting; the paper applies it to linear MDPs as well.

The result is proved in the paper; no machine-checked proof exists. Formalizing it requires a fully explicit account of the master policy as a mixture over schedules, of concatenated policies, and of the step of Proposition 4.2 from fictitious trajectories to real ones. Several printed constants and statements need correction, which the formal statements record (see the scope section).

Difficulty

The obvious argument, optimism plus the Bellman-error decomposition of UCBVI, fails because the master policy does not play the UCB policy of any single learner. The regret of a supervised but non-greedy policy is controlled only along fictitious trajectories that switch to the UCB policy (Proposition 4.1), and turning those back into the policy's own trajectories needs a bound on the visitation ratio that holds for every schedule prefix of a mixture, not only for marginal layer probabilities. A second difficulty is bookkeeping: nested active sets, two estimates per learner, and conditioning the schedule on its final layer.

Formalization scope

  • Representation. Finite types X, A with [Nonempty A]; stages 0-based (the paper's stage hhh is Lean's h - 1, terminal values at index H); policies ℕ → X → A; randomized policies as finite weighted families of deterministic ones; trajectory laws as finite products, values and occupancies as finite sums; schedules Fin H → Fin ℓmax. Rewards enter through their mean r⋆r^\starr⋆; the regret is the bound (2.2). Logarithms are base 2.
  • Pinned departures from the page, each disclosed in the item's note. (1) 8eH28eH^28eH2 in place of the printed 4eH24eH^24eH2, the constant the printed proof produces. (2) Positive parts in Proposition 4.2 and in the summands of Δ\DeltaΔ: Proposition 4.2 is false as printed when Bellman errors are negative. (3) Lemma 4.5 assumes admissibility of the supervising learner, without which it is false. (4) The UCB policy maximizes over the active set (Algorithm 2), for every argmax selector; an empty filtered active set is replaced by the learner's own, which never happens for admissible learners. (5) Estimated transitions are probability vectors, as in the tabular setting.
  • No trivialization. The schedule weights, qℓq_\ellqℓ​ and the master mixtures are computed from the schedule (3.3), never free inputs; validity is satisfiable (exact estimates with zero bonus are valid); the visitation ratio is cross-multiplied with ρ≥1\rho\ge1ρ≥1.
  • Not posed. Theorems 2.1, 2.2 and 5.1 (bounds up to ≲\lesssim≲), the concentration lemmas of §5–6, and the adversarial regret (2.1).
  • Reusable infrastructure. Finite-horizon tabular MDPs with mixtures of deterministic policies, concatenation and occupancy measures; Q-supervisors and Bellman errors. Contributions of proofs of any milestone are welcome, and the schedule lemmas (Claims 4.8, 4.9, Lemma 4.10) are independent of the rest.

Selected references

  • T. Lykouris, M. Simchowitz, A. Slivkins, W. Sun, Corruption-robust exploration in episodic reinforcement learning, Mathematics of Operations Research, 2025; arXiv:1911.08689v4. https://arxiv.org/abs/1911.08689
  • M. G. Azar, I. Osband, R. Munos, Minimax regret bounds for reinforcement learning, ICML 2017. https://arxiv.org/abs/1703.05449
  • T. Lykouris, V. Mirrokni, R. Paes Leme, Stochastic bandits robust to adversarial corruptions, STOC 2018. https://arxiv.org/abs/1803.09353
  • A. Gupta, T. Koren, K. Talwar, Better algorithms for stochastic bandits with adversarial corruptions, COLT 2019. https://arxiv.org/abs/1902.08647
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Dynamic ProgrammingNumerical AnalysisOptimization·Captain: mikedeng1

Markov Decision Processes with Observation Costs: Framework and Computation with a Penalty Scheme: The Quasi-Variational Inequality with Inspection Operator Has a Unique Bounded SolutionResearch Paper

Motivation

In many sequential decision problems the state of a system is not observed for free. A controller monitoring a machine, a patient or an inventory must pay to inspect it, and between inspections it acts on a belief rather than on the state. The observation cost model (OCM) makes this precise for a finite Markov chain: at each time the controller either pays a fixed cost cobs>0c_{\mathrm{obs}}>0cobs​>0 to observe the state and choose a new action, or keeps the previous action without observing. Reisinger and Tam (arXiv:2201.07908v3, published in Mathematics of Operations Research, 2025) show that, after augmenting the state with the time elapsed since the last observation, the dynamic programming equation of the discounted OCM is a discrete quasi-variational inequality (QVI): an obstacle problem whose obstacle depends on the unknown itself.

Earlier work on the OCM (Anderson and Friedman, 1977; Hajek, Mitzel and Yang, 2008) treated fixed dynamics of the underlying chain. Discrete QVIs with interconnected obstacles and their penalty approximation were analysed by Reisinger and Zhang (2019) for switching problems, with the identity matrix in place of the transition operator QnQ_nQn​. The paper recasts the OCM QVI in an abstract form and proves it is well-posed.

Setting

Let XXX be a finite state space and AAA a finite nonempty action set. The unknown is a function u:N×X→RAu:\mathbb N\times X\to\mathbb R^Au:N×X→RA with components ua(n,x)=ua,xnu_a(n,x)=u^n_{a,x}ua​(n,x)=ua,xn​. A driver is a family Fa:N×X×RA×RN×X→RF_a:\mathbb N\times X\times\mathbb R^A\times\mathbb R^{\mathbb N\times X}\to\mathbb RFa​:N×X×RA×RN×X→R, a∈Aa\in Aa∈A; its third argument is the vector u(n,x)u(n,x)u(n,x) and its fourth the whole function uau_aua​. Given a sequence {Qn}\{Q_n\}{Qn​} of substochastic matrices on XXX (nonnegative entries, row sums at most 111) and a vector c∈RX×Ac\in\mathbb R^{X\times A}c∈RX×A, the inspection operator is

Mu(n,x)=(Qn u1−c‾)x,(u1−c‾)y=max⁡a∈A(ua,y1−ca,y).\mathcal Mu(n,x)=\big(Q_n\,\overline{u^1-c}\big)_x,\qquad \big(\overline{u^1-c}\big)_y=\max_{a\in A}\big(u^1_{a,y}-c_{a,y}\big).Mu(n,x)=(Qn​u1−c​)x​,(u1−c​)y​=a∈Amax​(ua,y1​−ca,y​).

It reads uuu only at time 111 and couples all actions. The QVI (3.1) is

min⁡{Fa(n,x,u(n,x),ua),  ua(n,x)−Mu(n,x)}=0,n∈N, x∈X, a∈A.\min\big\{F_a(n,x,u(n,x),u_a),\;u_a(n,x)-\mathcal Mu(n,x)\big\}=0,\qquad n\in\mathbb N,\ x\in X,\ a\in A.min{Fa​(n,x,u(n,x),ua​),ua​(n,x)−Mu(n,x)}=0,n∈N, x∈X, a∈A.

Assumption 3.2 asks for a constant β>0\beta>0β>0 with Fa(n,x,r,ua+θ)−Fa(n,x,s,va)≥βθF_a(n,x,r,u_a+\theta)-F_a(n,x,s,v_a)\ge\beta\thetaFa​(n,x,r,ua​+θ)−Fa​(n,x,s,va​)≥βθ whenever u≤vu\le vu≤v are bounded and θ=ra−sa=max⁡j(rj−sj)≥0\theta=r_a-s_a=\max_j(r_j-s_j)\ge0θ=ra​−sa​=maxj​(rj​−sj​)≥0, together with boundedness in xxx and uniform continuity in rrr. Assumption 3.12 asks that Fa(n,x,r,ϕ)F_a(n,x,r,\phi)Fa​(n,x,r,ϕ) depend on ϕ\phiϕ only through finitely many values. For the OCM, Fa(n,x,r,ϕ)=ra−γϕ(n+1,x)−(Panra)xF_a(n,x,r,\phi)=r_a-\gamma\phi(n+1,x)-(P^n_ar_a)_xFa​(n,x,r,ϕ)=ra​−γϕ(n+1,x)−(Pan​ra​)x​.

For the computation the paper truncates time to {1,…,N}\{1,\dots,N\}{1,…,N}, giving a finite QVI (3.7) for a map F~:RN×L×d→RN×L\tilde F:\mathbb R^{N\times L\times d}\to\mathbb R^{N\times L}F~:RN×L×d→RN×L with the monotonicity property (3.5), and replaces it by the penalised problem (3.8), F~a(u)−ρ π(Mu−ua)=0\tilde F_a(u)-\rho\,\pi(\mathcal Mu-u_a)=0F~a​(u)−ρπ(Mu−ua​)=0, with a continuous non-decreasing penalty π\piπ vanishing exactly on (−∞,0](-\infty,0](−∞,0].

Formalization targets

Goal: well-posedness (Theorem 3.13)

Under Assumptions 3.2 and 3.12, a uniform bound sup⁡a,n,x∣Fa(n,x,0,0)∣<∞\sup_{a,n,x}|F_a(n,x,0,0)|<\inftysupa,n,x​∣Fa​(n,x,0,0)∣<∞, and ca,x>0c_{a,x}>0ca,x​>0:

∃! u:N×X→RA bounded with min⁡{Fa(n,x,u(n,x),ua), ua−Mu}=0 everywhere.\exists!\,u:\mathbb N\times X\to\mathbb R^A\ \text{bounded with}\ \min\{F_a(n,x,u(n,x),u_a),\,u_a-\mathcal Mu\}=0\ \text{everywhere}.∃!u:N×X→RA bounded with min{Fa​(n,x,u(n,x),ua​),ua​−Mu}=0 everywhere.

Milestones

  • Lemma 3.5: the restriction of FFF to {1,…,N}\{1,\dots,N\}{1,…,N} satisfies (3.5) with the same β\betaβ.
  • Proposition 3.10: for every ρ≥0\rho\ge0ρ≥0, a subsolution of (3.8) lies below a supersolution.
  • Lemma 3.11: for c≥0c\ge0c≥0, every solution of (3.8) satisfies ∥uρ∥∞≤∥F~(0)∥∞/β\|u^\rho\|_\infty\le\|\tilde F(0)\|_\infty/\beta∥uρ∥∞​≤∥F~(0)∥∞​/β.
  • Theorem 3.13, truncated part: (3.8) has a unique solution uρ,Nu^{\rho,N}uρ,N, which increases to a limit uNu^NuN as ρ→∞\rho\to\inftyρ→∞; for c>0c>0c>0, uNu^NuN solves (3.7).
  • Proposition 3.8: comparison for the truncated QVI (3.7) when c>0c>0c>0.
  • Proposition 3.3: comparison for bounded sub- and supersolutions of (3.1) when c>0c>0c>0.
  • Corollary 3.4: bounded solutions of the OCM QVI (2.11) are unique.

Significance

The well-posedness theorem identifies the value function of the discounted observation cost model as the unique bounded solution of a QVI, which is what justifies computing it: truncating time and penalising the obstacle gives a sequence of finite nonlinear systems whose solutions converge to it, and these systems are solved in practice by semismooth Newton iterations. The abstract framework covers other models with a non-local, action-coupling obstacle, such as discretised switching problems.

The results are proved in the paper, partly by reference: existence of the penalised solutions and the convergence uρ,N→uNu^{\rho,N}\to u^Nuρ,N→uN are delegated to Reisinger and Zhang (2019, Theorems 2.5 and 2.6), and Lemma 3.11 is stated as "a direct adaptation" of a lemma there. None of the results is formalized. A formal development makes the delegated steps explicit and fixes the hypotheses under which the statements hold (see Formalization scope).

Difficulty

The comparison principle (Proposition 3.3) is a maximum principle on an infinite index set: the supremum of u−vu-vu−v need not be attained, so the argument works along maximising sequences and needs the uniform continuity of the driver in rrr. In the obstacle branch, the inspection operator transports the maximum to time 111, and excluding that case uses c>0c>0c>0 through a chain argument over the finite set A×XA\times XA×X; with c=0c=0c=0 comparison fails.

Existence is harder. A direct fixed-point argument fails because the driver is only monotone, not a contraction, and the obstacle depends on the unknown. The paper's route goes through two limits, ρ→∞\rho\to\inftyρ→∞ and N→∞N\to\inftyN→∞, each requiring bounds uniform in the other parameter and a passage to the limit in a nonlinear, non-local equation; the N→∞N\to\inftyN→∞ limit uses Assumption 3.12 to localise the dependence on ϕ\phiϕ.

Formalization scope

Everything is finite-dimensional or a function on the discrete set N×X\mathbb N\times XN×X; no measure theory is involved. Unknowns are curried as u n x a =ua(n,x)=u_a(n,x)=ua​(n,x), costs as c a x. Time in (3.1) ranges over all of N\mathbb NN, including 000, and u1u^1u1 is u 1. The truncated time set {1,…,N}\{1,\dots,N\}{1,…,N} is Fin N with the index kkk standing for time k+1k+1k+1, so u1u^1u1 is u 0. Substochastic means nonnegative entries with row sums at most 111; c>0c>0c>0 and c≥0c\ge0c≥0 are componentwise; norms are sup norms, written out entrywise. Bounded sets of rrr in Assumption 3.2.2 are cubes.

Two additions to the paper's hypotheses are made, each because the statement is false without it. The goal assumes sup⁡a,n,x∣Fa(n,x,0,0)∣<∞\sup_{a,n,x}|F_a(n,x,0,0)|<\inftysupa,n,x​∣Fa​(n,x,0,0)∣<∞: Assumption 3.2.2 only bounds FFF for each fixed nnn, and the driver ra−γϕ(n+1,x)−nr_a-\gamma\phi(n+1,x)-nra​−γϕ(n+1,x)−n satisfies both assumptions yet has no bounded solution. Corollary 3.4 is stated for bounded solutions of (2.11). The truncated QVI is stated without Problem 3.6's time boundary condition ua(N,⋅)=Mu(N,⋅)u_a(N,\cdot)=\mathcal Mu(N,\cdot)ua​(N,⋅)=Mu(N,⋅), which (3.8) does not encode. The continuity of the restricted driver claimed in Lemma 3.5 is not part of that milestone; the truncated part of Theorem 3.13 takes continuity of an abstract F~\tilde FF~ as a hypothesis.

The N→∞N\to\inftyN→∞ clause of Theorem 3.13 ("u=lim⁡N→∞uNu=\lim_{N\to\infty}u^Nu=limN→∞​uN, monotone from below") is not stated: the paper does not define the truncated operator beyond time NNN, and with the zero extension the monotonicity in NNN fails. The goal keeps the clause's well-defined content, existence and uniqueness of the bounded solution. A goal asserting only uniqueness (Proposition 3.3), or existence with the uniform bound hidden inside a definition, would be a different theorem; the bound is an explicit hypothesis.

A complete development needs solvability of finite-dimensional monotone nonlinear systems (the existence result cited from Reisinger and Zhang), monotone convergence in finite dimensions, and maximum-principle arguments on N×X\mathbb N\times XN×X. The comparison principles and the a-priori bound are reusable for other monotone schemes. Proofs of any milestone, and alternative existence arguments for the goal, are welcome.

Selected references

  • C. Reisinger and J. Tam, Markov decision processes with observation costs: framework and computation with a penalty scheme, arXiv:2201.07908v3, 2023; Mathematics of Operations Research, 2025. https://arxiv.org/abs/2201.07908v3
  • C. Reisinger and Y. Zhang, A penalty scheme for monotone systems with interconnected obstacles: convergence and error estimates, SIAM Journal on Numerical Analysis 57(4):1625–1648, 2019 (reference [28] of the paper).
  • R. F. Anderson and A. Friedman, Optimal inspections in a stochastic control problem with costly observations, Mathematics of Operations Research 2(2):155–190, 1977. https://doi.org/10.1287/moor.2.2.155
  • B. Hajek, K. Mitzel and S. Yang, Paging and registration in cellular networks: jointly optimal policies and an iterative algorithm, IEEE Transactions on Information Theory 54:608–622, 2008.
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Advance Selling and Upgrading in Priority Queues: With Only Online Customers, Upgrading Raises the Optimal Revenue Exactly When Bₛ − Bₐ > α(p(λₕ) − p(λₗ))Research Paper

Motivation

Amusement parks and similar attractions sell two kinds of ticket for the same ride: a regular ticket, which joins a first-come-first-served queue, and a fast-track ticket, which joins a separate queue served with non-preemptive priority. Increasingly these tickets are sold online in advance, before the customer knows whether the park will be crowded on the day, and some parks also let a customer who bought a regular ticket online upgrade to fast track on arrival for a fee. Whether such an upgrading option earns the seller anything beyond what advance selling already earns is a pricing question that combines two literatures: the economics of priority queues, going back to Naor's toll model (Naor 1969) and equilibrium threshold strategies in priority queues (Hassin and Haviv 1997), and advance selling under demand uncertainty (Xie and Shugan 2001), where upgrades had been studied for inventory but not for queues (Cui, Duenyas and Sahin 2018).

Wang, Cao, Xie and Zhan (MSOM 2025) answer it in a stylised M/M/1 model. This mission formalizes their main result for the case in which every customer buys online, Theorem 1, together with the propositions its proof rests on.

Setting

A single server has exponential service times with rate μ\muμ. The day is crowded (arrival rate λh\lambda_hλh​) or uncrowded (rate λl\lambda_lλl​), with 0<λl<λh<μ0<\lambda_l<\lambda_h<\mu0<λl​<λh​<μ; an arriving customer sees a crowded day with probability α∈(0,1)\alpha\in(0,1)α∈(0,1). Each customer has a cost ccc per unit of waiting time, uniform on [0,cˉ][0,\bar c][0,cˉ] with cˉ>0\bar c>0cˉ>0. Regular tickets cost BaB_aBa​ in advance and BsB_sBs​ on the spot; these prices are exogenous and may be any real numbers. The seller chooses the fast-track prices PaP_aPa​ (advance) and PsP_sPs​ (spot), and in the upgrading scheme also the fee KKK.

Customers sort themselves by two delay-sensitivity cutoffs 0<cr≤cf≤cˉ0<c_r\le c_f\le\bar c0<cr​≤cf​≤cˉ. If on a day of rate λ\lambdaλ the customers with cost above a cutoff ccc use the fast track, the expected waits are

WF(c)=λμ(μ−(1−c/cˉ)λ),WR(c)=μWF(c)μ−λ,W_F(c)=\frac{\lambda}{\mu\bigl(\mu-(1-c/\bar c)\lambda\bigr)},\qquad W_R(c)=\frac{\mu W_F(c)}{\mu-\lambda},WF​(c)=μ(μ−(1−c/cˉ)λ)λ​,WR​(c)=μ−λμWF​(c)​,

Cobham's formulas for a two-class priority queue. The crowded-day waits WhW^hWh are evaluated at (λh,cr)(\lambda_h,c_r)(λh​,cr​) and the uncrowded-day waits WlW^lWl at (λl,cf)(\lambda_l,c_f)(λl​,cf​).

The paper reduces the seller's problem to two explicit programs. Under AS (advance and spot selling) the seller maximises

ΠAS=Pa(1−cfcˉ)+(αPs+(1−α)Bs)cf−crcˉ+min⁡{Ba,Bs}crcˉ\Pi^{AS}=P_a\Bigl(1-\frac{c_f}{\bar c}\Bigr)+\bigl(\alpha P_s+(1-\alpha)B_s\bigr)\frac{c_f-c_r}{\bar c}+\min\{B_a,B_s\}\frac{c_r}{\bar c}ΠAS=Pa​(1−cˉcf​​)+(αPs​+(1−α)Bs​)cˉcf​−cr​​+min{Ba​,Bs​}cˉcr​​

over (cr,cf,Pa,Ps)(c_r,c_f,P_a,P_s)(cr​,cf​,Pa​,Ps​) subject to Pa≤PsP_a\le P_sPa​≤Ps​, 0<cr≤cf≤cˉ0<c_r\le c_f\le\bar c0<cr​≤cf​≤cˉ, and three indifference conditions that apply only when cr<cfc_r<c_fcr​<cf​, when cf<cˉc_f<\bar ccf​<cˉ, and when cf=cˉc_f=\bar ccf​=cˉ respectively (program (7)). Under AUS (advance and spot selling with upgrading), the term αPs+(1−α)Bs\alpha P_s+(1-\alpha)B_sαPs​+(1−α)Bs​ becomes min⁡{αPs+(1−α)Bs, Ba+αK}\min\{\alpha P_s+(1-\alpha)B_s,\ B_a+\alpha K\}min{αPs​+(1−α)Bs​, Ba​+αK} and Pa≤Ba+KP_a\le B_a+KPa​≤Ba​+K is added (program (8)). Write ΠAS⋆\Pi^{AS\star}ΠAS⋆ and ΠAUS⋆\Pi^{AUS\star}ΠAUS⋆ for their optimal values, and

p(λ)=(μ−μ(μ−λ))λcˉ(μ−λ)μ2,c(λ)=(μ(μ−λ)−(μ−λ))cˉλ,π(λ)=(μ−μ−λ)2cˉμ(μ−λ).p(\lambda)=\frac{\bigl(\mu-\sqrt{\mu(\mu-\lambda)}\bigr)\lambda\bar c}{(\mu-\lambda)\mu^2},\quad c(\lambda)=\frac{\bigl(\sqrt{\mu(\mu-\lambda)}-(\mu-\lambda)\bigr)\bar c}{\lambda},\quad \pi(\lambda)=\frac{(\sqrt\mu-\sqrt{\mu-\lambda})^2\bar c}{\mu(\mu-\lambda)}.p(λ)=(μ−λ)μ2(μ−μ(μ−λ)​)λcˉ​,c(λ)=λ(μ(μ−λ)​−(μ−λ))cˉ​,π(λ)=μ(μ−λ)(μ​−μ−λ​)2cˉ​.

These are the optimal price premium, cutoff and revenue gain when the rate λ\lambdaλ is known.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 1

ΠAS⋆=ΠAUS⋆  if Bs−Ba≤α(p(λh)−p(λl)),ΠAUS⋆>ΠAS⋆  if Bs−Ba>α(p(λh)−p(λl)).\Pi^{AS\star}=\Pi^{AUS\star}\ \text{ if } B_s-B_a\le\alpha\bigl(p(\lambda_h)-p(\lambda_l)\bigr),\qquad \Pi^{AUS\star}>\Pi^{AS\star}\ \text{ if } B_s-B_a>\alpha\bigl(p(\lambda_h)-p(\lambda_l)\bigr).ΠAS⋆=ΠAUS⋆  if Bs​−Ba​≤α(p(λh​)−p(λl​)),ΠAUS⋆>ΠAS⋆  if Bs​−Ba​>α(p(λh​)−p(λl​)).

The goal compares the two optima and does not mention their common value. It asserts that the AS supremum exists, that the AUS maximum is attained, and the comparison.

Milestones

  1. The ordering 0<c(λh)<c(λl)<cˉ0<c(\lambda_h)<c(\lambda_l)<\bar c0<c(λh​)<c(λl​)<cˉ (§5.1, p. 15).
  2. Lemma 1: with all customers buying on the spot, the equilibrium cutoffs are the closed form (5).
  3. The single-rate cutoff problem from the proof of Proposition 3: ψ(c^)=c^(WR(c^)−WF(c^))\psi(\hat c)=\hat c(W_R(\hat c)-W_F(\hat c))ψ(c^)=c^(WR​(c^)−WF​(c^)) is strictly increasing, and the revenue as a function of the cutoff is maximised at c(λ)c(\lambda)c(λ) with value π(λ)\pi(\lambda)π(λ).
  4. Proposition 3: with a known rate λ\lambdaλ, the optimal spot price is Bs+p(λ)B_s+p(\lambda)Bs​+p(λ) and the optimal revenue π(λ)+Bs\pi(\lambda)+B_sπ(λ)+Bs​.
  5. Proposition 5, parts 1)–2): if Bs−Ba<α(p(λh)−p(λl))B_s-B_a<\alpha(p(\lambda_h)-p(\lambda_l))Bs​−Ba​<α(p(λh​)−p(λl​)), the AS optimum is απ(λh)+(1−α)π(λl)+min⁡{Ba,Bs}\alpha\pi(\lambda_h)+(1-\alpha)\pi(\lambda_l)+\min\{B_a,B_s\}απ(λh​)+(1−α)π(λl​)+min{Ba​,Bs​}, attained only at cutoffs (c(λh),c(λl))(c(\lambda_h),c(\lambda_l))(c(λh​),c(λl​)) and explicit prices.
  6. Proposition 5, last sentence: if Bs−Ba>α(p(λh)−p(λl))B_s-B_a>\alpha(p(\lambda_h)-p(\lambda_l))Bs​−Ba​>α(p(λh​)−p(λl​)), the AS supremum is strictly below απ(λh)+(1−α)π(λl)+Ba\alpha\pi(\lambda_h)+(1-\alpha)\pi(\lambda_l)+B_aαπ(λh​)+(1−α)π(λl​)+Ba​.
  7. Proposition 6: the AUS optimum is always απ(λh)+(1−α)π(λl)+min⁡{Ba,Bs}\alpha\pi(\lambda_h)+(1-\alpha)\pi(\lambda_l)+\min\{B_a,B_s\}απ(λh​)+(1−α)π(λl​)+min{Ba​,Bs​}, with explicit optimal prices and fees in three regimes.

Significance

The value απ(λh)+(1−α)π(λl)+B\alpha\pi(\lambda_h)+(1-\alpha)\pi(\lambda_l)+Bαπ(λh​)+(1−α)π(λl​)+B is what a seller would earn by charging a different fast-track price on crowded and uncrowded days. Theorem 1 says that the upgrading option always recovers this state-dependent benchmark, whereas advance selling alone recovers it only while the spot regular premium Bs−BaB_s-B_aBs​−Ba​ stays below the threshold α(p(λh)−p(λl))\alpha(p(\lambda_h)-p(\lambda_l))α(p(λh​)−p(λl​)). The threshold gives a concrete pricing rule: offer upgrades exactly when the spot regular ticket is much dearer than the advance one. The paper builds its welfare comparison (§5.4) and its extensions with balking and extra on-site waiting (§6) on the same programs.

The result is proved in the paper, with proofs in its Online Appendix. Nothing in this model has a machine-checked proof. A formalization would check the case analysis of the conditional constraints, which the printed statement gets wrong at the boundary (see Formalization scope), and would provide a Lean model of the waits, the single-rate optimum and the two programs that later missions on this paper can reuse.

Difficulty

Each single-rate step is one-variable calculus with square roots. The difficulty lies in the two programs. Their constraints switch on and off with the cutoffs. Treating them as equalities throughout, or as a disjunction of cases, changes the feasible set. The obvious argument shows that every feasible value is at most the benchmark, by maximising the separable revenue in each cutoff. That is enough for Proposition 6 and for the equality case of Theorem 1, but not for the strict inequality. There the benchmark's maximiser violates Pa≤PsP_a\le P_sPa​≤Ps​, the supremum of (7) need not be attained, and the AS value must be shown to stay a positive distance below the benchmark over a feasible set that is not closed.

Formalization scope

All objects are explicit real expressions in a definitions file, AdvSellUpgrade.Online.Setting. The parameters (μ,λh,λl,α,cˉ,Ba,Bs)(\mu,\lambda_h,\lambda_l,\alpha,\bar c,B_a,B_s)(μ,λh​,λl​,α,cˉ,Ba​,Bs​) are bundled in a structure. The standing assumptions are 0<λl<λh<μ0<\lambda_l<\lambda_h<\mu0<λl​<λh​<μ, cˉ>0\bar c>0cˉ>0 and 0<α<10<\alpha<10<α<1; no sign is assumed on any price. The conventions are:

  • The mission is stated on the reduced programs (7) and (8) as printed. The queueing game they come from (Definition 1, Propositions 1–2 and the revenue (3)) is not formalized; the waits are taken in Cobham's closed form.
  • α\alphaα is a free parameter in (0,1)(0,1)(0,1). The paper defines it as βλh/λˉ\beta\lambda_h/\bar\lambdaβλh​/λˉ, and every value in (0,1)(0,1)(0,1) arises from exactly one β\betaβ. Theorem 1 fails at α=1\alpha=1α=1.
  • The "if" constraints of (7) and (8) are implications.
  • The fourth constraint of (8) is printed with WhW^hWh. It is read with WlW^lWl, as in (7). It binds only at cf=cˉc_f=\bar ccf​=cˉ and does not affect any statement of the mission.
  • Optimal values are stated as a least upper bound (for AS) or a greatest element (for AUS) of the set of attainable objective values, never as a bare supremum, which Lean sets to 000 on an empty or unbounded set. This rules out the trivializing reading of Theorem 1 as 0=00=00=0. The goal does not contain the closed-form optimum.
  • Boundary repairs. Theorem 1 prints "<<<" for the equality case and "Otherwise" for the strict one. At Bs−Ba=α(p(λh)−p(λl))B_s-B_a=\alpha(p(\lambda_h)-p(\lambda_l))Bs​−Ba​=α(p(λh​)−p(λl​)) the AS program attains the AUS optimum, so the boundary point belongs to the equality case, as in the paper's own proof (Online Appendix p. 13). The same repair applies to the last sentence of Proposition 5.
  • Proposition 5 is formalized in parts 1)–2) and its last sentence. Parts 3)–4) use a threshold and a root defined only implicitly in the appendix.
  • Proposition 3 and the single-rate milestones are stated for every rate λ∈(0,μ)\lambda\in(0,\mu)λ∈(0,μ), which covers both states.

Useful contributions include the one-variable lemmas on ppp, ccc, π\piπ and the waits, and the reduction of (7) and (8) to the separable revenue in the cutoffs.

Selected references

  • Y. Wang, P. Cao, J. Xie, D. Zhan, Advance Selling and Upgrading in Priority Queues, Manufacturing & Service Operations Management, 2025. https://doi.org/10.1287/msom.2023.0410
  • A. Cobham, Priority assignment in waiting line problems, Journal of the Operations Research Society of America 2(1), 1954. https://doi.org/10.1287/opre.2.1.70
  • P. Naor, The regulation of queue size by levying tolls, Econometrica 37(1), 1969. https://doi.org/10.2307/1909200
  • R. Hassin, M. Haviv, Equilibrium threshold strategies: the case of queues with priorities, Operations Research 45(6), 1997. https://doi.org/10.1287/opre.45.6.966
  • J. Xie, S. M. Shugan, Electronic tickets, smart cards, and online prepayments: when and how to advance sell, Marketing Science 20(3), 2001. https://doi.org/10.1287/mksc.20.3.219.9765
  • Y. Cui, I. Duenyas, Ö. Şahin, Pricing of conditional upgrades in the presence of strategic consumers, Management Science 64(7), 2018. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2017.2783
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A Model of Shoppertainment Live Streaming: Zero Entertainment Bandwidth Is Never Optimal, the Optimal Bandwidth Lies Beyond the Traffic Peak, and Is Full Entertainment When vₑ > v(1+q)/4Research Paper

Motivation

In shoppertainment live streaming a single streamer sells products from many manufacturers during live sessions that mix product presentation with entertainment. Some of the most successful streamers spend much of their air time on content unrelated to the products; the paper cites Dong Yuhui, who devotes his sessions to English lessons. Traditional TV shopping (QVC) does the opposite and spends all air time on product features. This raises a question for operations and marketing: how should a streamer split a session's limited bandwidth between entertainment and product information?

Gu, Zhao and Wu (Management Science, 2024) answer it in a three-stage game between a streamer, a pool of manufacturers and a population of consumers. Entertainment attracts consumers directly, but it also leaves them less certain whether a product fits, and that uncertainty changes how manufacturers price. The paper's headline result, Proposition 3, says that zero entertainment is never optimal. This mission formalizes Proposition 3 together with the chain of lemmas and propositions of Section 4 on which it rests.

Setting

A product has quality q∈[0,1]q \in [0,1]q∈[0,1], the probability that it fits a consumer. A good fit is worth v>0v > 0v>0 and a bad fit 000. The qualities of the contracted manufacturers are uniform on [q‾,1][\underline q, 1][q​,1], where q‾∈[0,1)\underline q \in [0,1)q​∈[0,1) is the streamer's quality threshold; write dF(q)=dq/(1−q‾)dF(q) = dq/(1-\underline q)dF(q)=dq/(1−q​). The streamer keeps a commission rate α∈(0,1)\alpha \in (0,1)α∈(0,1) of sales revenue.

The streamer chooses an entertainment bandwidth te∈[0,1]t_e \in [0,1]te​∈[0,1], the share of a session spent on entertainment. Each attending consumer receives a fit signal whose accuracy is 1−te1 - t_e1−te​. After a good signal the posterior fit probability is 1−te+teq1 - t_e + t_e q1−te​+te​q, after a bad one it is teqt_e qte​q. The two willingness-to-pay levels are therefore

pH=(1−te+teq) v,pL=teqv.p_H = (1 - t_e + t_e q)\,v, \qquad p_L = t_e q v .pH​=(1−te​+te​q)v,pL​=te​qv.

With TTT attending consumers, the demand at price ppp is TTT if p≤pLp \le p_Lp≤pL​ (everyone buys), qTqTqT if pL<p≤pHp_L < p \le p_HpL​<p≤pH​ (only good-signal consumers buy), and 000 above pHp_HpH​. A manufacturer earns (1−α) p D(p)(1-\alpha)\,p\,D(p)(1−α)pD(p).

Write t^e=1/(2−q‾)\hat t_e = 1/(2-\underline q)t^e​=1/(2−q​) and q^=2−1/te\hat q = 2 - 1/t_eq^​=2−1/te​. In equilibrium a manufacturer of quality qqq prices low (pLp_LpL​) exactly when te>1/(2−q)t_e > 1/(2-q)te​>1/(2−q), that is, when q<q^q < \hat qq<q^​. A consumer's expected shopping surplus Eup(te)Eu_p(t_e)Eup​(te​) is the average, over manufacturers, of what the consumer gains at the equilibrium price. Attending costs are uniform on [0,K][0,K][0,K], and the streamer's entertaining capability ve≥0v_e \ge 0ve​≥0 gives the entertainment utility vetev_e t_eve​te​, so the attending traffic is

T(te)=vete+Eup(te)K.T(t_e) = \frac{v_e t_e + Eu_p(t_e)}{K}.T(te​)=Kve​te​+Eup​(te​)​.

The individual profitability π(te)\pi(t_e)π(te​) is the streamer's expected commission from one attending consumer, and the streamer's payoff is Π(te)=T(te) π(te)\Pi(t_e) = T(t_e)\,\pi(t_e)Π(te​)=T(te​)π(te​).

Formalization targets

Goal: Proposition 3 (p. 33)

For 0<α<10 < \alpha < 10<α<1, v>0v > 0v>0, K>0K > 0K>0, 0≤q‾<10 \le \underline q < 10≤q​<1 and ve≥0v_e \ge 0ve​≥0:

  1. te=0t_e = 0te​=0 is not a maximizer of Π\PiΠ on [0,1][0,1][0,1], and Π\PiΠ attains its maximum on [0,1][0,1][0,1];
  2. if ve≤v(1+q‾)/4v_e \le v(1+\underline q)/4ve​≤v(1+q​)/4, every maximizer te∗t^*_ete∗​ of Π\PiΠ satisfies te∗≥teTt^*_e \ge t^T_ete∗​≥teT​ for every maximizer teTt^T_eteT​ of TTT;
  3. if ve>v(1+q‾)/4v_e > v(1+\underline q)/4ve​>v(1+q​)/4, then
Π(te)<Π(1)for all te∈[0,1).\Pi(t_e) < \Pi(1) \qquad \text{for all } t_e \in [0,1).Π(te​)<Π(1)for all te​∈[0,1).

Milestones

  • Lemma 2 (p. 24): a manufacturer of quality q>0q > 0q>0 maximizes profit at pLp_LpL​ (uniquely) when te>1/(2−q)t_e > 1/(2-q)te​>1/(2−q) and at pHp_HpH​ when te≤1/(2−q)t_e \le 1/(2-q)te​≤1/(2−q).
  • Proposition 1 (p. 25): the proportion of low-pricing manufacturers is ψ(te)=(q^−q‾)/(1−q‾)\psi(t_e) = (\hat q - \underline q)/(1-\underline q)ψ(te​)=(q^​−q​)/(1−q​) for te>t^et_e > \hat t_ete​>t^e​ and 000 otherwise; it increases in tet_ete​ and decreases in q‾\underline qq​.
  • Lemma 3 (p. 27): Eup=∫q‾q^(1−te) qv dF(q)Eu_p = \int_{\underline q}^{\hat q}(1-t_e)\,q v\,dF(q)Eup​=∫q​q^​​(1−te​)qvdF(q) for te>t^et_e > \hat t_ete​>t^e​, and 000 otherwise.
  • Display (14) (p. 31): π(te)=α(∫q‾q^pL dF+∫q^1pHq dF)\pi(t_e) = \alpha\big(\int_{\underline q}^{\hat q} p_L\,dF + \int_{\hat q}^1 p_H q\,dF\big)π(te​)=α(∫q​q^​​pL​dF+∫q^​1​pH​qdF) for te>t^et_e > \hat t_ete​>t^e​, and α∫q‾1pHq dF\alpha \int_{\underline q}^1 p_H q\,dFα∫q​1​pH​qdF otherwise.
  • Proposition 2 (p. 27): TTT is strictly increasing on [0,1][0,1][0,1] if ve>v(1+q‾)/2v_e > v(1+\underline q)/2ve​>v(1+q​)/2; otherwise it strictly increases up to a peak teT∈[t^e,1]t^T_e \in [\hat t_e, 1]teT​∈[t^e​,1] and strictly decreases after it.
  • Lemma 4 (p. 32): π\piπ strictly decreases and then strictly increases on [0,1][0,1][0,1], is maximal at both te=0t_e = 0te​=0 and te=1t_e = 1te​=1, and is strictly increasing in q‾\underline qq​.

Significance

Proposition 3 is the paper's managerial conclusion. Spending all bandwidth on product information, as TV shopping does, is never optimal. A streamer should allocate at least the traffic-maximizing share to entertainment, and should go to full entertainment once its entertaining capability exceeds v(1+q‾)/4v(1+\underline q)/4v(1+q​)/4. Corollary 2 and the extensions of Section 5 of the paper (informing capability, in-session adjustment, competing streamers) build on this result and on the Section 4 chain.

The results are proved in the paper and its Online Supplementary, and none is machine-checked. The supplement's argument for the regime ve>v(1+q‾)/4v_e > v(1+\underline q)/4ve​>v(1+q​)/4 shows only that dΠ/dte>0d\Pi/dt_e > 0dΠ/dte​>0 at te=1t_e = 1te​=1, a local statement. The goal here asks for the global claim that te=1t_e = 1te​=1 is the unique maximizer, so a complete formalization closes a gap in the published argument. The milestones make the paper's equilibrium derivation (manufacturer pricing, consumer surplus, traffic, profitability) checkable step by step.

Difficulty

Lemma 2, Proposition 1, Lemma 3 and display (14) are elementary: case analysis of a price and integrals of piecewise polynomials whose switch point q^(te)\hat q(t_e)q^​(te​) depends on tet_ete​. Proposition 2 and Lemma 4 need sign analysis of explicit rational functions of tet_ete​ on [t^e,1][\hat t_e, 1][t^e​,1], uniformly in q‾∈[0,1)\underline q \in [0,1)q​∈[0,1). The traffic is not concave there: its surplus component is convex on part of the interval and concave on the rest.

The goal is the hard part. Π=Tπ\Pi = T\piΠ=Tπ is the product of a function that rises and then falls (Proposition 2) and a function that falls and then rises (Lemma 4), so the shape of either factor does not settle where the product peaks. Comparing maximizers of Π\PiΠ with maximizers of TTT, and ruling out an interior maximum of Π\PiΠ above the threshold v(1+q‾)/4v(1+\underline q)/4v(1+q​)/4 for every q‾\underline qq​ and vev_eve​, requires quantitative control of the product, not just the monotonicity pattern of its factors. Checking the sign of dΠ/dted\Pi/dt_edΠ/dte​ at te=1t_e = 1te​=1 alone is not enough.

Formalization scope

All parameters are real numbers and every function of the model is total; the statements carry the standing ranges as hypotheses. The bandwidth domain is Set.Icc 0 1, and "optimal" means IsMaxOn on that set. The single definitions file Shoppertainment.OptimalBandwidth.Model contains pHp_HpH​, pLp_LpL​, the demand (8) extended by 000 above pHp_HpH​, the manufacturer's profit, t^e\hat t_et^e​, q^\hat qq^​, the equilibrium pricing rule, ψ\psiψ (as a Lebesgue measure), the consumer's ex-ante surplus, EupEu_pEup​, TTT, the revenue per attending consumer, π\piπ and Π\PiΠ. EupEu_pEup​ and π\piπ are integrals over the uniform law of quantities evaluated at each manufacturer's equilibrium price. They are not defined by the closed forms (12) and (14). This keeps Lemma 3 and (14) genuine statements and ties the goal to the manufacturers' equilibrium.

Conventions and pinned hypotheses:

  • q‾<1\underline q < 1q​<1, so that the uniform law on [q‾,1][\underline q,1][q​,1] exists (the paper allows q‾≤1\underline q \le 1q​≤1).
  • α<1\alpha < 1α<1, the standing range of p. 13.
  • Lemma 2 pins q>0q > 0q>0 and T>0T > 0T>0. Without them every positive price earns 000.
  • Lemma 2 uses the manufacturer's own threshold 1/(2−q)1/(2-q)1/(2−q), as in the Online Supplementary A.2 and Figure 4(b). The printed display (10) reads 1/(2−q‾)1/(2-\underline q)1/(2−q​), which would contradict Proposition 1.
  • A tie te=1/(2−q)t_e = 1/(2-q)te​=1/(2−q) is priced high, as in (10). It is a null set for every integral.
  • Proposition 2 assumes ve>0v_e > 0ve​>0 (Table 1), and the goal assumes ve≥0v_e \ge 0ve​≥0 (as printed in Proposition 3).
  • The peaks teTt^T_eteT​ and te∗t^*_ete∗​ are stated as maximizers, never through the first-order conditions of the supplement.
  • Proposition 1's decrease in q‾\underline qq​ is strict for te<1t_e < 1te​<1 and weak at te=1t_e = 1te​=1, where ψ≡1\psi \equiv 1ψ≡1.

Two formalizations would trivialize the mission, and both are excluded. Without the existence clause, a "for every maximizer" statement could hold vacuously, so the goal asserts existence. Defining EupEu_pEup​ and π\piπ by (12) and (14) would make two milestones true by definition.

Lemma 1, Corollaries 1–2, Remark 1 and the Section 5 extensions are not posed. A complete development needs only Mathlib's interval integrals, Lebesgue measure on R\mathbb RR and elementary real analysis. Proofs of the closed forms of the Online Supplementary (Γ\GammaΓ in A.4, (A1) in A.6) are welcome as auxiliary lemmas.

Selected references

  • Z. Gu, X. Zhao, D. J. Wu, A Model of Shoppertainment Live Streaming, Management Science, 2024; authors' accepted manuscript, October 2024. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2023.01724
  • R. Lal, M. Sarvary, When and How Is the Internet Likely to Decrease Price Competition?, Marketing Science 18(4), 1999. https://doi.org/10.1287/mksc.18.4.485
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Dynamic ProgrammingMarkov ChainOptimization·Captain: mikedeng1

Robust Markov Decision Processes: Beyond Rectangularity 2: With Polyhedral r-Rectangular Factor Sets, One Deterministic Policy and Factor Matrix Stay Robust-Optimal for All Discount Factors Near 1Research Paper

Motivation

A Markov decision process (MDP) models sequential decisions under uncertainty: in each state a decision maker picks an action, collects a reward, and the system moves to a random next state according to a transition kernel. In applications the kernel is estimated from data, and an optimal policy for the estimated kernel can perform poorly under a slightly different one. Robust MDPs replace the single kernel by an uncertainty set and maximize the worst-case discounted reward over that set (Iyengar 2005; Nilim and El Ghaoui 2005; Wiesemann, Kuhn and Rustem 2013).

Goyal and Grand-Clément (arXiv:1811.00215v8) introduce r-rectangular uncertainty sets, in which transitions are mixtures of a small number of uncertain factors chosen independently by an adversary. Beyond the algorithmic results (the subject of the first mission of this series), they prove two structural properties of optimal robust policies in this model: a robust maximum principle and robust Blackwell optimality.

In a classical MDP, a policy is Blackwell optimal if it is optimal for every discount factor close enough to 111 (Blackwell 1962; Puterman 1994, §10.1.2). Blackwell optimal policies are optimal for the long-run average reward and for every finer nnn-discount criterion, so they connect discounted and average-reward control. For two-player perfect-information zero-sum stochastic games the existence of Blackwell optimal strategies is due to Gaubert and Gunawardena (1998). Goyal and Grand-Clément establish the analogous statement for robust MDPs with r-rectangular uncertainty, under the assumption that the factor sets have finitely many extreme points, as polyhedral factor sets do.

Setting

Let S\mathbb SS and A\mathbb AA be finite sets of states and actions, with rewards rsa≥0r_{sa}\ge0rsa​≥0, an initial distribution p0∈Δ(S)p_0\in\Delta(\mathbb S)p0​∈Δ(S), and a discount factor λ∈(0,1)\lambda\in(0,1)λ∈(0,1). Fix coefficients usai≥0u^i_{sa}\ge0usai​≥0, i∈[r]i\in[r]i∈[r], with ∑iusai=1\sum_i u^i_{sa}=1∑i​usai​=1. A factor matrix W=(w1,…,wr)W=(w_1,\dots,w_r)W=(w1​,…,wr​) has probability vectors wi∈Δ(S)w_i\in\Delta(\mathbb S)wi​∈Δ(S) as columns and induces the kernel

Psas′=∑i=1rusai wi,s′.P_{sas'}=\sum_{i=1}^r u^i_{sa}\,w_{i,s'} .Psas′​=i=1∑r​usai​wi,s′​.

The adversary chooses WWW from a nonempty convex compact set W\mathcal WW. Its projections are the factor sets W1,…,Wr\mathcal W^1,\dots,\mathcal W^rW1,…,Wr, and W\mathcal WW is r-rectangular when W=W1×⋯×Wr\mathcal W=\mathcal W^1\times\dots\times\mathcal W^rW=W1×⋯×Wr.

A stationary policy π∈Π\pi\in\Piπ∈Π picks πs∈Δ(A)\pi_s\in\Delta(\mathbb A)πs​∈Δ(A) in each state; it is deterministic when each πs\pi_sπs​ is a point mass. With rπ=(∑aπsarsa)sr_\pi=(\sum_a\pi_{sa}r_{sa})_srπ​=(∑a​πsa​rsa​)s​ and L(π,W)ss′=∑aπsaPsas′L(\pi,W)_{ss'}=\sum_a\pi_{sa}P_{sas'}L(π,W)ss′​=∑a​πsa​Psas′​, the value function and the expected reward are

vλπ,W=∑t≥0λtL(π,W)trπ,R(π,W,λ)=p0⊤vλπ,W.v^{\pi,W}_\lambda=\sum_{t\ge0}\lambda^tL(\pi,W)^tr_\pi,\qquad R(\pi,W,\lambda)=p_0^\top v^{\pi,W}_\lambda .vλπ,W​=t≥0∑​λtL(π,W)trπ​,R(π,W,λ)=p0⊤​vλπ,W​.

The worst-case value of π\piπ is zλ(π)=min⁡W∈WR(π,W,λ)z_\lambda(\pi)=\min_{W\in\mathcal W}R(\pi,W,\lambda)zλ​(π)=minW∈W​R(π,W,λ). A pair (π∗,W∗)(\pi^*,W^*)(π∗,W∗) is an optimal solution of the robust MDP problem (1.2) at discount λ\lambdaλ when π∗\pi^*π∗ maximizes zλz_\lambdazλ​ over Π\PiΠ and W∗W^*W∗ attains min⁡W∈WR(π∗,W,λ)\min_{W\in\mathcal W}R(\pi^*,W,\lambda)minW∈W​R(π∗,W,λ). The Lean development uses this notation: value, R, z, IsRobustSolution, IsRRect, factorSet, IsDeterministic.

Formalization targets

Goal: robust Blackwell optimality (Proposition 6.2)

If W\mathcal WW is r-rectangular and every factor set Wi\mathcal W^iWi has finitely many extreme points, there exist a deterministic policy π∗\pi^*π∗, a factor matrix W∗∈WW^*\in\mathcal WW∗∈W and λ0∈(0,1)\lambda_0\in(0,1)λ0​∈(0,1) with

∀λ∈(λ0,1):(π∗,W∗) is an optimal solution of (1.2) at discount λ.\forall\lambda\in(\lambda_0,1):\quad(\pi^*,W^*)\ \text{is an optimal solution of (1.2) at discount }\lambda .∀λ∈(λ0​,1):(π∗,W∗) is an optimal solution of (1.2) at discount λ.

The pair is fixed before λ0\lambda_0λ0​ and does not depend on λ\lambdaλ. The statement fixes no constant and no rate.

Milestones

  1. Proposition 6.1.1: a minimizer W1W^1W1 of R(π,⋅,λ)R(\pi,\cdot,\lambda)R(π,⋅,λ) is a worst case from every initial state, vλ,sπ,W1≤vλ,sπ,W0v^{\pi,W^1}_{\lambda,s}\le v^{\pi,W^0}_{\lambda,s}vλ,sπ,W1​≤vλ,sπ,W0​ for all W0∈WW^0\in\mathcal WW0∈W.
  2. Proposition 6.1.2 (robust maximum principle): if (π∗,W∗)(\pi^*,W^*)(π∗,W∗) solves (1.2), then vλ,sπ,W1≤vλ,sπ∗,W∗v^{\pi,W^1}_{\lambda,s}\le v^{\pi^*,W^*}_{\lambda,s}vλ,sπ,W1​≤vλ,sπ∗,W∗​ for every policy π\piπ, every minimizer W1W^1W1 of R(π,⋅,λ)R(\pi,\cdot,\lambda)R(π,⋅,λ) and every state sss.
  3. Appendix G.1, p. 26: for each λ\lambdaλ, (1.2) has an optimal solution (πλ,Wλ)(\pi_\lambda,W_\lambda)(πλ​,Wλ​) with πλ\pi_\lambdaπλ​ deterministic and WλW_\lambdaWλ​ an extreme point of W\mathcal WW.
  4. Appendix G.1, p. 27: vtπ,W=(I−tL(π,W))−1rπv^{\pi,W}_t=(I-tL(\pi,W))^{-1}r_\pivtπ,W​=(I−tL(π,W))−1rπ​ on (0,1)(0,1)(0,1), and each coordinate is a rational function of ttt whose denominator has no zero in (0,1)(0,1)(0,1).

Stronger: finitely many breakpoints (Proposition 6.3, optional)

Under the same hypotheses there are 0=λ0<λ1<⋯<λp=10=\lambda_0<\lambda_1<\dots<\lambda_p=10=λ0​<λ1​<⋯<λp​=1 and, for each jjj, a single deterministic pair (πj,Wj)(\pi_j,W_j)(πj​,Wj​) optimal for every λ∈(λj,λj+1)\lambda\in(\lambda_j,\lambda_{j+1})λ∈(λj​,λj+1​).

Significance

The result. Robust Blackwell optimality says that, for polyhedral r-rectangular uncertainty, a decision maker who is patient enough does not need to know the discount factor exactly: one deterministic policy is robust-optimal for all discounts near 111, and the adversary has one matching worst-case factor matrix. This is the robust counterpart of the classical bridge from discounted to average-reward criteria, and it is the natural entry point for a theory of robust MDPs under the long-run average criterion, for which the paper notes no results were known. The robust maximum principle states that an optimal robust policy has the highest worst-case value from every starting state, a comparison that has been used to derive structural properties of robust policies in a healthcare setting (Grand-Clément et al. 2020, cited on p. 13 of the paper).

Formalizing it. The results are proved in the paper; none has a machine-checked proof. The nominal analogues (Blackwell 1962, Theorem 5, and the rationality of the discounted value) are posed on Prove2Me as open targets on a different, nominal model and are not reused here. The formalization also corrects two printed statements: Proposition 6.1 is false for an initial distribution with a zero entry and is posed with p0>0p_0>0p0​>0, and the claim in Appendix G.1 that the factor matrix of a solution is an extreme point is posed in its existential form, the form the proof uses.

Difficulty

The obvious argument for the goal is a pigeonhole over the finitely many candidate pairs (deterministic policies and extreme factor matrices): some pair is optimal for discounts λn→1\lambda_n\to1λn​→1. The step that fails is passing from this sequence to a whole interval. Optimality of a pair is not a comparison between two fixed rational functions of λ\lambdaλ: the worst-case value zλ(π)z_\lambda(\pi)zλ​(π) is a minimum over W\mathcal WW, and optimality quantifies over all randomized policies. A comparison of worst-case values at one discount does not by itself give a comparison of value functions that can be propagated to other discounts. The paper bridges this gap with the robust maximum principle, which turns a worst-case comparison into a statewise comparison of two value functions, each rational in λ\lambdaλ. The maximum principle itself rests on the saddle-point structure of r-rectangular robust MDPs (Theorem 4.2 and Lemma 4.3 of the paper), which a solver must develop.

Formalization scope

All objects live in the definition FactorRMDP.Blackwell.Model. States and actions are finite types, with A\mathbb AA nonempty. Factors are indexed by Fin r, i.e. 0-based. A factor matrix is a function Fin r → S → ℝ. W\mathcal WW is a nonempty convex compact set of factor matrices with stochastic factors. Its factor sets are its projections, and r-rectangularity is the predicate IsRRect, not built into the structure. Rewards are nonnegative and p0∈Δ(S)p_0\in\Delta(\mathbb S)p0​∈Δ(S). The value function is the discounted series, not a fixed point, so no Bellman identity holds by definition. Minima and maxima are stated with IsLeast/IsGreatest, and statements at a fixed discount assume 0<λ<10<\lambda<10<λ<1. Optimality in (1.2) is over stationary randomized policies, as in the paper's proof, and requires both halves: π∗\pi^*π∗ maximizes zλz_\lambdazλ​ and W∗W^*W∗ attains min⁡WR(π∗,W,λ)\min_W R(\pi^*,W,\lambda)minW​R(π∗,W,λ). "Finitely many extreme points" is Mathlib's Set.extremePoints of each factor set. The second sentence of Assumption 2.4 (an optimization oracle) is not formalized.

Explicit choices relative to the printed text:

  • W\mathcal WW nonempty, A\mathbb AA nonempty and λ∈(0,1)\lambda\in(0,1)λ∈(0,1) are stated explicitly.
  • Proposition 6.1 (both parts) assumes p0(s)>0p_0(s)>0p0​(s)>0 for every state. As printed, it is false when p0p_0p0​ vanishes on a state.
  • The extreme-point claim of Appendix G.1 is posed as the existence of an optimal pair with an extreme factor matrix.
  • The goal (Proposition 6.2) keeps p0p_0p0​ arbitrary.

A goal in which the pair (π∗,W∗)(\pi^*,W^*)(π∗,W∗) may depend on λ\lambdaλ would only restate milestone 3 and is not robust Blackwell optimality; the pair is quantified before λ0\lambda_0λ0​.

A complete development needs the saddle-point theory of r-rectangular robust MDPs (shared with the first mission of this series), Neumann series and Cramer's rule for I−tLI-tLI−tL, extreme points of products of compact convex sets, and the finiteness of zeros of a nonzero polynomial. The rationality of discounted values and the extreme-point lemmas are reusable for nominal Blackwell optimality and for other robust models. Proofs of any milestone, of the optional Proposition 6.3, and auxiliary lemmas are welcome.

Selected references

  • V. Goyal and J. Grand-Clément, Robust Markov Decision Process: Beyond Rectangularity, arXiv:1811.00215v8, 2021; Mathematics of Operations Research, 2023. https://arxiv.org/abs/1811.00215, https://doi.org/10.1287/moor.2022.1259
  • D. Blackwell, Discrete Dynamic Programming, Annals of Mathematical Statistics 33, 1962. https://doi.org/10.1214/aoms/1177704593
  • S. Gaubert and J. Gunawardena, A Non-Linear Hierarchy for Discrete Event Dynamical Systems, 1998 (as cited in Goyal and Grand-Clément, reference list, arXiv:1811.00215v8).
  • G. N. Iyengar, Robust Dynamic Programming, Mathematics of Operations Research 30, 2005. https://doi.org/10.1287/moor.1040.0129
  • A. Nilim and L. El Ghaoui, Robust Control of Markov Decision Processes with Uncertain Transition Matrices, Operations Research 53, 2005. https://doi.org/10.1287/opre.1050.0216
  • W. Wiesemann, D. Kuhn and B. Rustem, Robust Markov Decision Processes, Mathematics of Operations Research 38, 2013. https://doi.org/10.1287/moor.1120.0566
  • M. L. Puterman, Markov Decision Processes: Discrete Stochastic Dynamic Programming, Wiley, 1994. https://doi.org/10.1002/9780470316887
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Dynamic ProgrammingOptimizationProbability·Captain: mikedeng1

Coordinating Inventory Control and Pricing Strategies for Perishable Products 1: With Backlogging, the Profit-to-Go Is L♮-Concave and the Optimal Policy Is Monotone with Bounded SensitivityResearch Paper

Motivation

Food, blood and pharmaceuticals are perishable: a unit not sold within its lifetime is thrown away. A seller decides each period how much to order, which price to charge, and whether to dispose of stock early. A large stock of old units argues for a lower price and a smaller order.

Optimal policies for fixed-lifetime inventory are hard to characterize: the state is a vector of inventory levels by remaining lifetime (Fries 1975; Nahmias 1982), and later work turned largely to heuristics.

Chen, Pang and Pan (Oper. Res. 62(2), 2014) obtained structural results for the joint ordering, pricing and disposal problem with a positive replenishment lead time. They used L♮-concavity, a notion from discrete convex analysis (Murota 2003) that Zipkin (2008) used to analyze lost-sales inventory systems with lead times. This mission formalizes the paper's result for the case where unmet demand is backlogged.

Setting

A product with a lifetime of exactly l≥2l \ge 2l≥2 periods is reviewed periodically over a finite horizon of TTT periods. Orders arrive after a lead time of kkk periods, 0≤k<l0 \le k < l0≤k<l. Write L=l−1L = l - 1L=l−1.

Vectors and L♮-convexity. For vectors u,v∈Rnu, v \in \mathbb{R}^nu,v∈Rn, u∧vu \wedge vu∧v and u∨vu \vee vu∨v are the componentwise minimum and maximum, and eee is the all-ones vector. A set V\mathcal{V}V is L♮-convex if (u+αe)∧v(u + \alpha e) \wedge v(u+αe)∧v and u∨(v−αe)u \vee (v - \alpha e)u∨(v−αe) lie in V\mathcal{V}V for all u,v∈Vu, v \in \mathcal{V}u,v∈V and α≥0\alpha \ge 0α≥0. A function fff is L♮-convex on V\mathcal{V}V if moreover

f(u)+f(v)≥f((u+αe)∧v)+f(u∨(v−αe)),f(u) + f(v) \ge f\big((u + \alpha e) \wedge v\big) + f\big(u \vee (v - \alpha e)\big),f(u)+f(v)≥f((u+αe)∧v)+f(u∨(v−αe)),

and L♮-concave if −f-f−f is L♮-convex. The ordered sets are Vn,k={s∈Rn:s1≤⋯≤sk}\mathcal{V}_{n,k} = \{s \in \mathbb{R}^n : s_1 \le \dots \le s_k\}Vn,k​={s∈Rn:s1​≤⋯≤sk​}.

Data. The unit costs are ccc (ordering), h+h^+h+ (holding), h−h^-h− (backlogging) and θ\thetaθ (disposal), all nonnegative, and γ∈[0,1]\gamma \in [0, 1]γ∈[0,1] is the discount factor. The seller chooses the expected demand d∈D=[d‾,dˉ]d \in \mathcal{D} = [\underline d, \bar d]d∈D=[d​,dˉ] in place of the price. The price is P(d)P(d)P(d), strictly decreasing, and the expected revenue P(d)dP(d)dP(d)d is continuous and concave on D\mathcal{D}D. The realized demand is dt=d+εtd_t = d + \varepsilon_tdt​=d+εt​, where the noise terms are i.i.d. with mean zero and support in [A,B][A, B][A,B], A≤0≤BA \le 0 \le BA≤0≤B, and d‾+A≥0\underline d + A \ge 0d​+A≥0.

State and decisions. The state s=(s1,…,sl−1)s = (s_1, \dots, s_{l-1})s=(s1​,…,sl−1​) satisfies s1≤⋯≤sl−1s_1 \le \dots \le s_{l-1}s1​≤⋯≤sl−1​, so the state space is S=Vl−1,l−1\mathcal{S} = \mathcal{V}_{l-1,l-1}S=Vl−1,l−1​. The coordinate sis_isi​ is the inventory, net of backorders, with residual lifetime at most iii, including orders in transit. Each period the seller chooses:

  • an order-up-to level sl≥sl−1s_l \ge s_{l-1}sl​≥sl−1​;
  • a demand level d∈Dd \in \mathcal{D}d∈D;
  • after demand is realized, a depletion aaa with s1∨dt≤a≤sl−k∨dts_1 \vee d_t \le a \le s_{l-k} \vee d_ts1​∨dt​≤a≤sl−k​∨dt​, so a−dta - d_ta−dt​ units are disposed of.

The next state is s~=(s2−a,…,sl−a)\tilde s = (s_2 - a, \dots, s_l - a)s~=(s2​−a,…,sl​−a).

Recursion. The modified profit-to-go satisfies fT+1=0f_{T+1} = 0fT+1​=0 and

ft(s)=max⁡sl≥sl−1, d∈D{P(d)d+E[gt(s,sl,d∣εt)]},gt=max⁡s1∨dt≤a≤sl−k∨dtϕt,f_t(s) = \max_{s_l \ge s_{l-1},\ d \in \mathcal{D}} \Big\{ P(d)d + \mathbb{E}\big[g_t(s, s_l, d \mid \varepsilon_t)\big] \Big\}, \qquad g_t = \max_{s_1 \vee d_t \le a \le s_{l-k} \vee d_t} \phi_t,ft​(s)=sl​≥sl−1​, d∈Dmax​{P(d)d+E[gt​(s,sl​,d∣εt​)]},gt​=s1​∨dt​≤a≤sl−k​∨dt​max​ϕt​, ϕt(s,sl,d,a∣εt)=γc s~l−1−csl−θ(a−dt)−h+(sl−k−a)+−h−(a−sl−k)++γft+1(s~).\phi_t(s, s_l, d, a \mid \varepsilon_t) = \gamma c\,\tilde s_{l-1} - c s_l - \theta(a - d_t) - h^+(s_{l-k} - a)^+ - h^-(a - s_{l-k})^+ + \gamma f_{t+1}(\tilde s).ϕt​(s,sl​,d,a∣εt​)=γcs~l−1​−csl​−θ(a−dt​)−h+(sl−k​−a)+−h−(a−sl−k​)++γft+1​(s~).

In §4 the paper also assumes c≤h−/(1−γ)c \le h^-/(1 - \gamma)c≤h−/(1−γ).

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 1 (p. 291)

For t=1,…,T+1t = 1, \dots, T+1t=1,…,T+1, ftf_tft​, gtg_tgt​ and ϕt\phi_tϕt​ are L♮-concave in sss, (s,sl,d)(s, s_l, d)(s,sl​,d) and (s,sl,d,a)(s, s_l, d, a)(s,sl​,d,a). The largest optimal order-up-to level slt(s)s_{lt}(s)slt​(s) and demand level dt(s)d_t(s)dt​(s) are nondecreasing in sss, the optimal price is nonincreasing, and

slt(s+ωe)≤slt(s)+ω,dt(s+ωe)≤dt(s)+ω(ω≥0).s_{lt}(s + \omega e) \le s_{lt}(s) + \omega, \qquad d_t(s + \omega e) \le d_t(s) + \omega \qquad (\omega \ge 0).slt​(s+ωe)≤slt​(s)+ω,dt​(s+ωe)≤dt​(s)+ω(ω≥0).

The largest optimal depletion at(s,sl,d∣ε)a_t(s, s_l, d \mid \varepsilon)at​(s,sl​,d∣ε) is nondecreasing, and at(s+ωe,sl+ω,d+ω∣ε)≤at(s,sl,d∣ε)+ωa_t(s + \omega e, s_l + \omega, d + \omega \mid \varepsilon) \le a_t(s, s_l, d \mid \varepsilon) + \omegaat​(s+ωe,sl​+ω,d+ω∣ε)≤at​(s,sl​,d∣ε)+ω.

Milestones

  • The ordered sets Vn,k\mathcal{V}_{n,k}Vn,k​, Vn,k+\mathcal{V}^+_{n,k}Vn,k+​ are L♮-convex (p. 287).
  • Lemma 1: g(x,ξ)=f(x−ξe)g(x, \xi) = f(x - \xi e)g(x,ξ)=f(x−ξe) is L♮-convex when fff is (p. 287).
  • Lemma 2: partial minimization over an L♮-convex set preserves L♮-convexity (p. 287).
  • The set {a≥s1∨dt}\{a \ge s_1 \vee d_t\}{a≥s1​∨dt​} is L♮-convex (p. 291).
  • The bound ft+1(s~′)−ft+1(s~)≤(θ+c)δf_{t+1}(\tilde s') - f_{t+1}(\tilde s) \le (\theta + c)\deltaft+1​(s~′)−ft+1​(s~)≤(θ+c)δ for the next states generated by a′>a≥sl−k∨dta' > a \ge s_{l-k}\vee d_ta′>a≥sl−k​∨dt​ (p. 291).
  • (9): ϕt\phi_tϕt​ is nonincreasing in aaa beyond sl−k∨dts_{l-k} \vee d_tsl−k​∨dt​, so the upper bound on aaa can be dropped (p. 291).
  • Lemma 3: the largest minimizer of an L♮-convex function is monotone, with ξ(x+ωe)≤ξ(x)+ω\xi(x + \omega e) \le \xi(x) + \omegaξ(x+ωe)≤ξ(x)+ω (p. 287).
  • The first sentence of Theorem 1, the L♮-concavity of ftf_tft​, gtg_tgt​, ϕt\phi_tϕt​.
  • Corollary 1: monotone sensitivity of the order quantity and the demand level in each age class (p. 292).
  • Proposition 1: if θ≥h+/(1−γ)\theta \ge h^+/(1-\gamma)θ≥h+/(1−γ), depleting only dt∨s1d_t \vee s_1dt​∨s1​ is optimal (p. 292).

Significance

The result. Theorem 1 gives a qualitative description of the optimal policy in a model where no closed form is available. Fresher inventory leads to ordering less and charging more. One more unit of inventory of any age raises the order-up-to level and the demand level by at most one unit. Corollary 1 refines this by age: the order quantity is most sensitive to young inventory, and the price discount is most sensitive to inventory close to expiry. These properties underlie the bounds and heuristics of §6 of the paper.

The formalization. The result is proved in the paper, but parts of the argument are informal: the (θ+c)δ(\theta + c)\delta(θ+c)δ bound is a coupling argument, existence of optimal solutions is "straightforward to check and thus omitted", and Lemmas 1–3 are stated without proof. A formalization makes the induction checkable and yields a reusable library of L♮-convexity on real vectors with domains, used by the wider family of inventory models built on the same technique. None of these results is known to be machine-checked.

Difficulty

The obvious induction, that each step of the recursion preserves L♮-concavity, fails at the depletion problem (5): its constraint set is not L♮-convex, because of the upper bound a≤sl−k∨dta \le s_{l-k} \vee d_ta≤sl−k​∨dt​, so Lemma 2 does not apply. The bound must first be shown inactive, which needs a quantitative estimate of how the profit-to-go changes when backorders are added, a property of the value function itself.

Lemma 3 handles a scalar decision, while Theorem 1 has a pair (sl,d)(s_l, d)(sl​,d) and needs the componentwise-largest maximizer; every supremum and expectation must also be shown to be finite.

Formalization scope

  • Carrier. The paper treats F∈{R,Z}\mathbb{F} \in \{\mathbb{R}, \mathbb{Z}\}F∈{R,Z} at once. The mission formalizes the real case only.

  • L♮-convexity. Functions are real-valued on an explicit domain set, which is the paper's own convention for "L♮-convex on a set". The submodularity characterization is not used as the definition.

  • Indexing. States are Fin L → ℝ with L=l−1≥1L = l - 1 \ge 1L=l−1≥1, indexed from 0, and the lead time satisfies k≤Lk \le Lk≤L. The paper's sl−ks_{l-k}sl−k​ is coordinate L−kL - kL−k of (s1,…,sl)(s_1, \dots, s_l)(s1​,…,sl​): at k=0k = 0k=0 it is the decision sls_lsl​, and at k=Lk = Lk=L it is s1s_1s1​.

  • Time. Time is counted in periods to go, which is faithful because the data are stationary. f 0 = 0 is fT+1f_{T+1}fT+1​. The parts of Theorem 1 about gtg_tgt​, ϕt\phi_tϕt​ and decisions cover the decision periods t≤Tt \le Tt≤T.

  • Suprema and expectations. Every maximum is sSup of the image of a nonempty feasible set that is bounded above. Expectations are Bochner integrals against the noise law μ\muμ.

  • Optimal decisions. Largest optimal decisions are hypotheses at the points compared; at γ=1\gamma = 1γ=1, k≥1k \ge 1k≥1 no largest order-up-to level exists in the last period.

  • Standing assumptions. All the §3 assumptions (nonnegative costs, γ∈[0,1]\gamma \in [0,1]γ∈[0,1], strictly decreasing PPP, continuous concave revenue, zero-mean noise with support in [A,B][A, B][A,B], d‾+A≥0\underline d + A \ge 0d​+A≥0) are fields of the model structure. The §4 assumption c≤h−/(1−γ)c \le h^-/(1-\gamma)c≤h−/(1−γ) is a hypothesis (1−γ)c≤h−(1-\gamma)c \le h^-(1−γ)c≤h− of every §4 statement.

  • Corrected slips.

    • The paper sets ft=+∞f_t = +\inftyft​=+∞ off S\mathcal{S}S, a slip for −∞-\infty−∞. The Lean evaluates ftf_tft​ on S\mathcal{S}S only.
    • In Lemma 3, "ξ(x)+ω∈dom(f)\xi(x) + \omega \in \mathrm{dom}(f)ξ(x)+ω∈dom(f)" reads x+ωe∈dom(f)x + \omega e \in \mathrm{dom}(f)x+ωe∈dom(f).
    • The final "<0< 0<0" of (9) is stated as "≤0\le 0≤0". It is an equality when h−=0h^- = 0h−=0 and either γ=1\gamma = 1γ=1 or θ=0\theta = 0θ=0.
    • Proposition 1 needs γ<1\gamma < 1γ<1 for its quotient, and it asserts that dt∨s1d_t \vee s_1dt​∨s1​ is optimal, not that it is unique.
  • Ruled-out formalizations. Any of the following would trivialize the mission:

    • defining ftf_tft​ as an arbitrary L♮-concave function, or taking the continuation in ϕt\phi_tϕt​ as a hypothesis-bound function;
    • dropping the upper bound a≤sl−k∨dta \le s_{l-k} \vee d_ta≤sl−k​∨dt​ from the depletion interval;
    • restricting to l=2l = 2l=2.

    The value functions here are the model's own recursion, for every l≥2l \ge 2l≥2.

  • What is needed. L♮-convexity on Rn\mathbb{R}^nRn with domains (shifts, sums, expectations, partial maximization, comparative statics for largest maximizers) and integrability of gtg_tgt​ in the noise; all reusable. Proofs of single milestones are welcome.

  • Source. The source is the published Operations Research article; in the copy held, printed page = PDF page + 282.

Selected references

  • X. Chen, Z. Pang, L. Pan, Coordinating Inventory Control and Pricing Strategies for Perishable Products, Operations Research 62(2):284–300, 2014. https://doi.org/10.1287/opre.2014.1261
  • P. Zipkin, On the Structure of Lost-Sales Inventory Models, Operations Research 56(4):937–944, 2008. https://doi.org/10.1287/opre.1070.0482
  • K. Murota, Discrete Convex Analysis, SIAM Monographs on Discrete Mathematics and Applications, 2003. https://doi.org/10.1137/1.9780898718508
  • B. Fries, Optimal Ordering Policy for a Perishable Commodity with Fixed Lifetime, Operations Research 23(1):46–61, 1975. https://doi.org/10.1287/opre.23.1.46
  • S. Nahmias, Perishable Inventory Theory: A Review, Operations Research 30(4):680–708, 1982. https://doi.org/10.1287/opre.30.4.680
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Dynamic ProgrammingMarkov ChainOptimization·Captain: mikedeng1

Robust Markov Decision Processes: Beyond Rectangularity 1: Under r-Rectangular Factor Uncertainty, Robust Value Iteration Converges to the Optimal Worst-Case Value, Attained by a Deterministic PolicyResearch Paper

Motivation

A Markov decision process (MDP) is optimized for a transition kernel that, in practice, is estimated from data, and the optimal policy for the estimated kernel can perform poorly under small perturbations of it. The robust MDP approach replaces the single kernel by an uncertainty set of kernels and asks for the policy with the best worst-case expected reward. It goes back to Satia and Lave (1973).

Whether a robust MDP is tractable depends on the shape of the uncertainty set.

  • 2005. Iyengar and Nilim and El Ghaoui treat (s,a)-rectangular sets, in which every row PsaP_{sa}Psa​ is chosen independently. An optimal robust policy is stationary and deterministic, and robust value iteration computes it.
  • 2013. Wiesemann, Kuhn and Rustem treat s-rectangular sets. Optimal robust policies are stationary but may need randomization. For general uncertainty sets, computing an optimal robust policy is strongly NP-hard.
  • 2018. Goh et al. introduce factor-based uncertainty for a medical cost-effectiveness application and evaluate the worst case of a fixed policy.
  • 2021–2023. Goyal and Grand-Clément compute optimal robust policies for factor uncertainty with independent factors. This mission formalizes that result.

Rectangular sets let the adversary choose the transitions out of different states independently, which is conservative when all transitions depend on a few common factors, such as a patient's physiology across health states. Factor uncertainty couples the states, and it is the first coupled model in which an optimal robust policy can still be computed.

Setting

There are finite sets of states S\mathbb SS and actions A\mathbb AA, with S=∣S∣S = |\mathbb S|S=∣S∣ and A=∣A∣A=|\mathbb A|A=∣A∣. The rewards satisfy rsa≥0r_{sa}\ge 0rsa​≥0, p0p_0p0​ is an initial distribution on S\mathbb SS, and λ∈(0,1)\lambda\in(0,1)λ∈(0,1) is the discount factor. Fix rrr factors indexed by [r][r][r] and coefficients usai≥0u^i_{sa}\ge0usai​≥0 with ∑iusai=1\sum_i u^i_{sa}=1∑i​usai​=1. A factor matrix W=(w1,…,wr)W=(w_1,\dots,w_r)W=(w1​,…,wr​) has probability vectors wiw_iwi​ on S\mathbb SS as columns, and it induces the kernel

Psas′=∑i=1rusai wi,s′.P_{sas'}=\sum_{i=1}^r u^i_{sa}\,w_{i,s'} .Psas′​=i=1∑r​usai​wi,s′​.

The uncertainty set is a nonempty convex compact set W\mathcal WW of factor matrices. It is r-rectangular if W=W1×⋯×Wr\mathcal W=\mathcal W^1\times\cdots\times\mathcal W^rW=W1×⋯×Wr, so that each factor is chosen independently of the others.

A stationary policy π∈Π\pi\in\Piπ∈Π gives a distribution πs\pi_sπs​ on A\mathbb AA at each state. It is deterministic if each πs\pi_sπs​ is a point mass. Write rπ=(∑aπsarsa)sr_\pi=(\sum_a\pi_{sa}r_{sa})_srπ​=(∑a​πsa​rsa​)s​ and Tπ=(∑aπsausai)s,iT_\pi=(\sum_a \pi_{sa}u^i_{sa})_{s,i}Tπ​=(∑a​πsa​usai​)s,i​. The decision maker's value function and the expected discounted reward are

vπ,W=∑t≥0λt(TπW⊤)trπ,R(π,W)=p0⊤vπ,W.v^{\pi,W}=\sum_{t\ge0}\lambda^t (T_\pi W^\top)^t r_\pi, \qquad R(\pi,W)=p_0^\top v^{\pi,W}.vπ,W=t≥0∑​λt(Tπ​W⊤)trπ​,R(π,W)=p0⊤​vπ,W.

The policy evaluation problem computes z(π)=min⁡W∈WR(π,W)z(\pi)=\min_{W\in\mathcal W}R(\pi,W)z(π)=minW∈W​R(π,W). The policy improvement problem computes z∗=max⁡π∈Πz(π)z^*=\max_{\pi\in\Pi}z(\pi)z∗=maxπ∈Π​z(π). Let

F(v)s=max⁡a∈A{rsa+λ∑i=1rusaimin⁡wi∈Wiwi⊤v}.F(v)_s=\max_{a\in\mathbb A}\Big\{r_{sa}+\lambda\sum_{i=1}^r u^i_{sa}\min_{w_i\in\mathcal W^i}w_i^\top v\Big\}.F(v)s​=a∈Amax​{rsa​+λi=1∑r​usai​wi​∈Wimin​wi⊤​v}.

Algorithm VI-PI is the iteration v0=0v^0=0v0=0, vk+1=F(vk)v^{k+1}=F(v^k)vk+1=F(vk).

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 5.1, by its mathematical content

Assume W\mathcal WW is r-rectangular. Then FFF has a unique fixed point v∗v^*v∗, and

z∗=max⁡π∈Πmin⁡W∈WR(π,W)=p0⊤v∗,vk→v∗.z^*=\max_{\pi\in\Pi}\min_{W\in\mathcal W}R(\pi,W)=p_0^\top v^*,\qquad v^k\to v^* .z∗=π∈Πmax​W∈Wmin​R(π,W)=p0⊤​v∗,vk→v∗.

Write θ(ε)=ε(1−λ)(2λ)−1\theta(\varepsilon)=\varepsilon(1-\lambda)(2\lambda)^{-1}θ(ε)=ε(1−λ)(2λ)−1. If ∥vk+1−vk∥∞<θ(ε)\|v^{k+1}-v^k\|_\infty<\theta(\varepsilon)∥vk+1−vk∥∞​<θ(ε), then ∥vk+1−v∗∥∞≤ε\|v^{k+1}-v^*\|_\infty\le\varepsilon∥vk+1−v∗∥∞​≤ε, and the deterministic policy that VI-PI computes at that iteration is ε\varepsilonε-optimal. The test is passed as soon as λkmax⁡r<θ(ε)\lambda^k\max r<\theta(\varepsilon)λkmaxr<θ(ε).

Milestones

The milestones follow the paper's route to the goal.

  1. The adversary's Bellman recursion (Proposition 3.1).
  2. The identity W⊤vπ,W=βπ,WW^\top v^{\pi,W}=\beta^{\pi,W}W⊤vπ,W=βπ,W (Lemma 4.3).
  3. The resolvent and linear-programming forms of z(π)z(\pi)z(π) (Lemmas A.2, A.3).
  4. The monotone contraction φ(π,⋅)\varphi(\pi,\cdot)φ(π,⋅) (Appendix A).
  5. The reformulation of z(π)z(\pi)z(π) with constraints βi≤min⁡wiwi⊤(rπ+λTπβ)\beta_i\le\min_{w_i}w_i^\top(r_\pi+\lambda T_\pi\beta)βi​≤minwi​​wi⊤​(rπ​+λTπ​β) (Lemma 3.3).
  6. The existence of a deterministic optimal robust policy (Lemma 4.1).
  7. The saddle point and the min-max duality (Theorem 4.2):
max⁡π∈Πmin⁡W∈WR(π,W)=min⁡W∈Wmax⁡π∈ΠR(π,W).\max_{\pi\in\Pi}\min_{W\in\mathcal W}R(\pi,W)=\min_{W\in\mathcal W}\max_{\pi\in\Pi}R(\pi,W).π∈Πmax​W∈Wmin​R(π,W)=W∈Wmin​π∈Πmax​R(π,W).
  1. The monotone contraction FFF (Lemma E.1).
  2. The fixed-point equation (5.1).

Theorem 3.2, the policy-evaluation analogue of the goal (Algorithm VI-PE), is included as a further item.

Significance

The theorem shows that factor uncertainty, in which transitions out of different states are coupled, is as tractable as (s,a)-rectangular uncertainty, provided the factors are independent. An optimal robust policy exists among deterministic stationary policies, the robust and nominal problems share a saddle point, and value iteration on a λ\lambdaλ-contraction computes the robust value. The structure is also what the companion mission builds on: the robust maximum principle and robust Blackwell optimality are derived from (5.1) and Theorem 4.2.

The results are proved in the paper. None of them is formalized: no factor-matrix robust MDP exists in Lean. The platform's robust-MDP items for (s,a)-rectangular sets (Nilim–El Ghaoui, Iyengar) and s-rectangular sets (Wiesemann et al.) are other uncertainty models and do not specialize to this one. A formal proof would also check a printed statement, since one clause of Theorem 4.2 needs correcting (see below).

Difficulty

The obvious argument writes a robust Bellman equation state by state and appeals to the contraction principle. Here that argument fails. Under factor uncertainty the adversary cannot choose the transitions out of each state separately, because one factor wiw_iwi​ enters every row PsaP_{sa}Psa​ with usai>0u^i_{sa}>0usai​>0. Minimizing state by state therefore yields kernels that need not come from a single feasible WWW. The decision maker's equation for vvv does not close on its own.

The step that requires care links two dynamic programs, the decision maker's over S\mathbb SS and the adversary's over [r][r][r], and shows that factor-wise minimization is feasible. That is where r-rectangularity enters. The paper's Appendix A gives an instance in which the factor-wise minimizers are infeasible once a constraint couples the factors.

Formalization scope

  • States and actions are arbitrary finite types. A\mathbb AA is nonempty, and S\mathbb SS is nonempty because p0p_0p0​ is a distribution. Factors are indexed by Fin r (0-based).
  • W\mathcal WW is a set of maps Fin r → S → ℝ whose values are probability vectors. It is nonempty, convex and compact. Nonemptiness is implicit in the paper and explicit here. Wi\mathcal W^iWi is the projection of W\mathcal WW, and r-rectangularity is a hypothesis (IsRRect). Proposition 3.1, Lemmas 4.3, A.2 and A.3, and both contraction statements are stated without it. Lemma 3.3 is stated with it, since it is false without it.
  • Rewards are nonnegative, as on p. 1. The discount satisfies 0<λ<10<\lambda<10<λ<1 in every statement.
  • vπ,Wv^{\pi,W}vπ,W and the adversary's value βπ,W\beta^{\pi,W}βπ,W are discounted sums, never solutions of a Bellman equation by definition. Defining them as fixed points would make Proposition 3.1, Lemma 4.3 and (5.1) true by definition.
  • Every min and max is attained. Statements use IsLeast/IsGreatest, and Lemma A.2 states the invertibility of I−λW⊤TπI-\lambda W^\top T_\piI−λW⊤Tπ​, because Lean's matrix inverse is 000 on singular matrices.
  • FFF is stated with a maximum over actions. The paper (p. 10) says this is equivalent to its maximum over πs∈Δ\pi_s\in\Deltaπs​∈Δ. Lemma E.1 and the contraction of φ\varphiφ are stated on all of RS\mathbb R^SRS and Rr\mathbb R^rRr.
  • Not formalized: the count of arithmetic operations in Theorems 3.2 and 5.1, and the ε\varepsilonε-optimization oracle of Assumption 2.4 that it counts. The iteration count is stated explicitly instead.
  • Corrections. The paper states (4.6) for every robust solution (π∗,W∗)(\pi^*,W^*)(π∗,W∗) with π∗\pi^*π∗ deterministic. That claim is false: a two-state instance has every policy robust-optimal, yet one robust solution is not nominally optimal against its own W∗W^*W∗. Theorem 4.2 and (5.1) are stated in existence form, which is the form the proof of Theorem 5.1 uses.
  • A goal that kept only the convergence vk→v∗v^k\to v^*vk→v∗ would be a different and weaker theorem. The goal also requires z∗=p0⊤v∗z^*=p_0^\top v^*z∗=p0⊤​v∗, the stopping rule, and the ε\varepsilonε-optimality of the computed deterministic policy.

Reusable infrastructure includes the discounted value of a stationary policy for a stochastic matrix, monotone sup-norm contractions with the standard stopping rule, and minimization of linear forms over compact sets. Contributions to any of these are welcome.

Selected references

  • V. Goyal, J. Grand-Clément, Robust Markov Decision Processes: Beyond Rectangularity, Mathematics of Operations Research, 2023; preprint arXiv:1811.00215v8, 2021 (the version formalized). https://arxiv.org/abs/1811.00215 · https://doi.org/10.1287/moor.2022.1259
  • A. Nilim, L. El Ghaoui, Robust control of Markov decision processes with uncertain transition probabilities, Operations Research 53(5), 2005. https://doi.org/10.1287/opre.1050.0216
  • G. Iyengar, Robust dynamic programming, Mathematics of Operations Research 30(2), 2005. https://doi.org/10.1287/moor.1040.0129
  • W. Wiesemann, D. Kuhn, B. Rustem, Robust Markov decision processes, Mathematics of Operations Research 38(1), 2013. https://doi.org/10.1287/moor.1120.0566
  • J. Goh, M. Bayati, S. A. Zenios, S. Singh, D. Moore, Data uncertainty in Markov chains: application to cost-effectiveness analyses of medical innovations, Operations Research 66(3), 2018. https://doi.org/10.1287/opre.2017.1685
  • J. K. Satia, R. L. Lave, Markov decision processes with uncertain transition probabilities, Operations Research 21(3), 1973. https://doi.org/10.1287/opre.21.3.728
  • M. L. Puterman, Markov Decision Processes: Discrete Stochastic Dynamic Programming, Wiley, 1994.
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